The Permanence of Temporary Security Barriers?

A Monograph
by
Lt Col Lee H. Marsh, Jr.
United States Air Force

School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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Monograph examines the use of security barriers and delves into circumstances leading to the removal of security barriers. The purpose was to explore whether there existed specific conditions or criteria for removal of security barriers. Specific situations in the use of security barriers in Northern Ireland, Cyprus and Iraq to include Baghdad, Fallujah and Mosul were used as case studies.

Based on analysis of the case studies, it was determined there are not definable, prerequisite conditions for the removal of security barriers. The most significant finding was that the most direct link to removal of barriers is risk tolerance regarding an improved security environment, but the decision to remove barriers seemed to be a subjective one rather than based on an objective assessment of variables.

Additional observations: (1) the historical/cultural context of the conflict between primary actors affects the attitudes toward removal of barriers, (2) the numbers/types of actors in the conflict affect the likelihood of a barrier’s removal (3) time can often establish the permanence of temporary barriers as well as establish a precedence for their use, (4) time can also often allow for perspectives to change allowing more accommodation (5) that sometimes an incentive or reward outweighs security concerns.
Title of Monograph: The Permanence of Temporary Security Barriers?

This monograph was defended by the degree candidate on 16 April 2009 and approved by the monograph director and reader named below.

Approved by:

__________________________________ Monograph Director
Jacob W. Kipp, Ph.D.

__________________________________ Monograph Reader
Dan C. Fullerton, Ph.D.

__________________________________ Director, School of Advanced Military Studies
Stefan J. Banach, COL, IN

__________________________________ Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.
Abstract

THE PERMANENCE OF TEMPORARY SECURITY BARRIERS?

by Lt Col Lee H. Marsh, Jr., USAF, 99 pages.

This monograph examines the use of security barriers across the world and delves into the circumstances leading to the removal of security barriers. The purpose of this monograph was to explore whether there existed specific conditions or criteria for the removal of security barriers, proposing that there are definable, prerequisite conditions or criteria that must be met before physical barriers erected to provide security of a population could be removed.

The method for exploring the research question was to analyze specific situations in the use of security barriers as case studies to determine whether there were definable, prerequisite conditions for their removal. Specifically, the uses of security barriers in three countries were determined to be the most relevant to this study. These three countries were Northern Ireland, Cyprus and Iraq. In Iraq, the specific situations in Baghdad, Fallujah and Mosul were analyzed.

For the framework for the actual analysis of the case studies, two constructs for analysis were used. The first construct came from Wallensteen’s book *Understanding Conflict Resolution*, where the author develops three components of conflict: (1) the actors, (2) the incompatibility and (3) the actions. The second construct for analysis were ten conditions for the removal of interface barriers in Northern Ireland as established by Macaulay, an independent development and management consultant living in Northern Ireland.

Based on the analysis of the case studies, it was determined that there are not definable, prerequisite conditions for the removal of security barriers. In fact, what became apparent was that each case study’s situation was unique, leading to varied conditions or criteria for the removal of security barriers, invalidating the monograph’s hypothesis.

The most significant finding was that the most direct link to the removal of security barriers is risk tolerance in regards to an improving security environment. This fell short of identifying specific conditions or criteria for the removal of security barriers. However, this finding did indicate that an improved or improving security environment must be present, but beyond an improved security environment, the decision to remove a security barrier seemed to be a subjective, qualitative one rather than one based on an objective assessment of any variables.

Additional observations include: (1) the historical or cultural context of the conflict between the primary actors affects the attitudes toward the removal of the barriers, (2) the numbers and types of actors involved in the conflict affect the likelihood of a barrier’s removal and more specifically, a third party actor can both sabotage or stabilize the security environment, (3) the permanence of time can often establish the permanence of temporary barriers as well as establishing a precedence for their use, (4) the impact of time can also allow emotions to calm and can often allow for the perspectives of the primary actors to change to allow for a more accommodating perspective to the removal of the barriers, (5) that sometimes an incentive or reward outweighs security, creating what Macaulay termed a ‘tipping point’, as borrowed from Gladwell’s well known concept.
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Introduction

“Before I built a wall, I’d ask to know
What I was walling in or walling out,
And to whom I was like to give offence.”
Excerpt from “Mending Wall” by Robert Frost

Louis Untermeyer discusses in a selection of Robert Frost poems entitled The Road Not Taken that Robert Frost’s famous poem “Mending Wall” is thought to be about “one of the greatest problems of our time: whether national walls should be made stronger for our protection, or whether they should be let down, since they cramp our progress toward understanding and eventual brotherhood.” On a smaller scale, the same struggle of protection versus progress is occurring in Baghdad today due to the security barriers that exist across the city as part of the Baghdad security plan of 2007. These barriers were erected in an effort to stop the violence and establish security within the city. The use of these barriers was unpopular among Iraqi leaders even to the point of the Iraqi Parliament passing a resolution in 2007 objecting to the construction of the security walls.

However, the barriers exist and were assessed as being instrumental in an 80 percent reduction in attacks since the Baghdad security plan was implemented. The security barriers are one of several population control measures applied during Operation Fardh Al-Qanoon, which is the name for the Iraqi Government led Baghdad security plan. Brigadier General Joseph Anderson and Colonel Gary Volesky, U.S. Army, wrote a brief account of their efforts to use

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2 Ibid.
population control in the July-August 2007 issue of the *Military Review*. At the time, Brigadier General Anderson was the Multi-National Corps-Iraq chief of staff and Colonel Volesky was his deputy. In their article “A Synchronized Approach to Population Control,” Anderson and Volesky describe population control measures as including

“physical activities meant to protect the population; influence operations that engage key leaders and an information operations strategy to build support for our actions; and the promotion, coordination, and facilitation of economic opportunities to reduce the pool of disenfranchised communities that enemy forces can rely on for support.”

Anderson and Volesky classify their efforts at population control into strategic, operational and tactical controls with security barriers included as one of the tactical control methods. They state:

“One of the techniques used at the tactical level to protect the population is to create gated communities. These are built with temporary barriers, berms, and other obstacles and incorporate designated ECPs (author’s note: ECP - entry control point) to prevent access by would-be attackers.”

Anderson and Volesky see the use of security barriers as a tactical control measure.

This monograph shifts from that focus to address the strategic impact of the use of security barriers, such as the ones in Baghdad. A strategic impact or perspective is defined for the purpose of this paper as affecting the instruments of national power (diplomatic, informational, military and economic) at the theater level. As discussed in regards to Robert Frost’s “Mending Wall,” the issue of the use of security barriers can be viewed as protection versus progress. This can be further described as “balancing liberty against security” to quote Ignatieff’s *The Lesser Evil.* What Ignatieff meant by the lesser evil is that “The reality is that

8 Ibid, 103.
we are bound to sacrifice some liberty for some security and some security for some liberty.”¹¹

This perspective of the lesser evil informs this monograph as it seeks to assess the strategic perspective impact of security barriers over time, weighing the primary concerns of the long-term impact upon individual and community liberties versus the need to establish security.

While the decision to place security barriers around Baghdad as part of the 2007 security plan was unpopular, the impact was clear. As security is maintained in Baghdad, the security barriers are being removed in certain locations and circumstances, predominately along roads.¹² However, the barriers around many neighborhoods remain for now.¹³ During the initial uproar over the deployment of the security barriers around Baghdad, a State Department spokesman said “the walls were a temporary security measure aimed at protecting civilian populations and were not aimed at dividing people in Iraq.”¹⁴ The U.S. government did not desire that its legacy to Iraq would be to leave Baghdad as a divided city, much like Belfast, Ireland which remains divided to this day. In Belfast as of 2003, there were 40 separation fences, labeled ‘peace lines’ by the British government.¹⁵ An additional ‘peace line’ was constructed as late as 2008.¹⁶


¹³ E-mail correspondence with LTC James Raymer at MND-B


However, balancing between security and liberty makes the removal of these barriers in some of the more conflicted areas in Baghdad challenging. As Anderson and Volesky write with respect to pressures to reduce any control measures that “the Iraqi Government and the coalition will define the conditions that must be met before the population control measures are reduced.”17 As the situation in Belfast suggests in the context of ongoing inter-community violence, there can be lasting consequences to the use of security barriers and more importantly complex issues regarding their removal. This paper examines the use of security barriers across the world and delves into the circumstances leading to the removal of security barriers. This paper proposes that there are definable, prerequisite conditions or criteria that must be met before physical barriers established to provide security of a population are removed.

This study relies heavily on the historical analysis of security barriers as they have been used across the world to deal with inter-community violence. As for the specific organization of this analysis, this monograph first defines the use of security barriers as a form of population control and addresses their use around the world. On this basis, the monograph analyzes the characteristics recommending both the use and the nature of the barriers employed and in some cases the removal of security barriers in order to determine potential criteria for consideration as conditions for the removal of other security barriers. This study concludes with a summary of the author’s findings regarding barrier application as a security technique and offers recommendations for future employment and removal of such barriers.


Historical Background and Scope of Study

As the point of departure, the author has sought to establish a common foundation of understanding of barriers as a security tool in dealing with urban, inter-community violence. The starting point is a brief discussion of the theory of population control and the evolution of the concept of the use of security barriers in that context. It offers a list of various uses of barriers to develop a descriptive classification. As a counterpoint to the use of barriers in dealing with insurgent violence in urban settings, the monograph will briefly consider the emergence of the Western gated community concept as a manifestation of concern for security in a post-modern world and closes with a discussion of the implications of urban control via material barriers as a means of community division/isolation.

The Department of Defense Joint Publication 1-02 defines an insurgency as “An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict.”18 David Galula writes in his book Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice that

“If the insurgent manages to dissociate the population from the counterinsurgent, to control it physically, to get its active support, he will win the war because, in the final analysis, the exercise of political power depends on the tacit or explicit agreement of the population or, at worst, on its submissiveness.”19

Therefore the battle for the control of the population is critical to the success of the insurgent or the counterinsurgent. Dr. Kalev Sepp states in his article “Best Practices in Counterinsurgency,” in Military Review: “The focus of all civil and military plans and operations must be on the center of gravity in any conflict – the country’s people and their belief in and support of their


government.” Sepp goes on to add that “The security of the people must be assured as a basic need, along with food, water, shelter, health care, and a means of living.”

There are several approaches to providing security to the people. These are discussed in detail in Field Manual 3-24 Counterinsurgency. Among the list of counterinsurgency techniques discussed under the sub-category of “Building Support and Protecting the Population” is the category of “Population Control Measures.” FM 3-24 does not provide a definition for population control measures, providing instead a list of actions that constitute population control measures which does not include the use of security barriers. However, in order to provide a common frame of reference, this study will use the description of population control measures as quoted in the introduction of this study and taken from Anderson and Volesky’s Military Review article “A Synchronized Approach to Population Control.”

Therefore, this study addresses security barriers as a population control measure. The two-fold purpose of the barriers is to ensure the security of the people by segregating them from the insurgent and to create problems for the insurgent because they “rely on members of the population for concealment, sustenance, and recruits, so they must be isolated from the people by all means possible.” So, providing for the security of the people is often complimentary to developing an environment hostile to the insurgent by physically preventing the insurgent from accessing the population and sanctuary within the population centers.

It is beyond the scope of this study to delve too deeply into the origins and evolution of population control as a conflict mitigation tool of governments. However, for a better understanding of the recent evolution of the physical segregation of a population for security

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20 Kalev I. Sepp. “Best Practices in Counterinsurgency.” Military Review, May-June 2005, 9. At the end of Dr. Sepp’s Military Review article is a short paragraph describing Dr. Sepp’s qualifications. Dr. Sepp is a former military officer and is currently an assistant professor at the Naval Postgraduate School.
21 Ibid, 9.
purposes, this study will review how security barriers or walls are currently used and have been used in the past to gain a better understanding of their present day uses and to develop a frame of reference for describing the types of uses of security barriers. Ultimately, the rationale for creating security barriers in an insurgency provides the key to the analysis of the arguments for their removal.

From a review of barriers erected to provide security, there are two initial observations. First, barriers are present all over the world in various forms and for various security uses (See Appendix A). Second, rarely do these barriers come down. Based on a survey of the use of security barriers, this study will first categorize security barriers into two primary descriptive classifications: external or internal. The external classification meaning that the security barriers are used along the country’s border against an external or territorial threat. The internal classification meaning that the security barriers are internal to the country’s borders and deal with a domestic threat within the country’s borders. As sub-categories to the external threat, the four main descriptive classifications are: national conflicts, insurgency/terrorism, immigration/refugees, and smuggling, from weapons to people, drugs and commercial goods.

To better illustrate these external sub-classifications, an example for each is provided. The existing barrier between North and South Korea is an example of a national conflict barrier. The Morocco/Western Sahara or Saudi Arabia/Yemen barriers are examples of an insurgency/terrorism barrier. In the case of Morocco, they built a 1500 mile barrier to keep West Saharan guerilla fighters out. For Saudi Arabia, the goal is to prevent terrorist

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26 Abigail Cutler. “Security Fences.”
27 Ibid
infiltration. The U.S. decision to build a barrier along the country’s southern border with Mexico is a good example of an immigration/refugee barrier. This barrier was built in an effort to stop illegal immigration. However, this is not an isolated situation, the United Arab Emirates is building a barrier along their border with Oman to keep immigrants out as well. The Berlin Wall, built in 1961 and pulled down in 1989 at the end of the Cold War, served the purpose of preventing the flight of East Germans from the German Democratic Republic. As for the fourth sub-classification of smuggling, the Iranian government is building a barrier along their border with Pakistan to stop drug smuggling and terror attacks.

This particular example with Iran illustrates that most barriers usually have more than one purpose, highlighting the fact that no classification system will universally fit the varied purposes of security barriers. Just as complex is how Hong Kong’s border with China has become an internal one instead of an external one as Hong Kong became part of China, but as a Special Administrative Region. But, in essence, due to Hong Kong’s special status, their security barriers along their border with China still serve the same purpose, which is to control unwanted immigration from China. One of the most unique security barrier situations is the 180 kilometer “Green Line” separating Greek Cyprus from Turkish Cyprus. This security barrier

28 Abigail Cutler. “Security Fences.”
29 Ibid.
30 Julian Borger. “Security fences or barriers to peace?”
34 Howard Husock. "Controlling the Border: Lesson from Hong Kong."
has been in place since 1974 and even splits the capital, Nicosia, in two.\textsuperscript{36} Depending on the political perspective, this barrier can also be considered an external national conflict barrier or an internal barrier separating two sides with a history of sectarian violence. It is this internal perspective which provides a good beginning to discuss the sub-classification of internal security barriers.

Internal security barriers on the other hand, serve as a means to deal with a domestic threat within the country’s borders. As sub-categories to the internal threat, the four main descriptive classifications are: sectarian/partisan violence, insurgency/terrorism, class/race/crime security and the containment of criminal activities. Conceptually, the idea of securing an area internal to a country with security barriers has not only been used to protect from some type of outside threat, but they have also been used to keep a population inside of the barriers as a security measure. Probably the most famous modern historical use of a barrier in this way would be Nazi Germany’s use of walls to prevent Polish Jews from escaping the Warsaw Ghetto during the occupation of Poland, 1939-1944.\textsuperscript{37} To better illustrate more current and ongoing uses of security barriers, more examples for each of the sub-classifications are provided.

The ‘Peace Lines’ of Northern Ireland are probably the most famous of the security barriers that are characterized as sectarian/partisan violence. Even though there has been a peace agreement in Northern Ireland since 1998, separation barriers are still used to separate Irish Protestants and Catholics since the outbreak of ‘the troubles’ in the late 1960s.\textsuperscript{38} The security barriers erected as part of the Baghdad security plan discussed in the introduction are also there

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{38} Shawn Pogatchnik. "Despite peace, Belfast walls are growing in size and number."
\end{itemize}
primarily for what is described as sectarian violence. In both Northern Ireland and Baghdad, the barriers could also be considered insurgency/terrorism security barriers. The primary distinction between the two classifications is whether the barriers are there to separate two populations in conflict or to separate a small, but active insurgency from the population. Two examples of internal insurgency/terrorism barriers are the security berms used to surround Fallujah, Iraq in 2007 to 2008 and the current security berm surrounding Mosul, Iraq. While the distinction between a sectarian/partisan divide and an insurgency/terrorism divide may seem slight, the descriptive labels get even more convoluted, because the security barriers in Baghdad have also been termed ‘gated communities’.

For the purposes of this study, the Western concept of the ‘gated community’ is probably the best known and most prevalent form of a class/race/crime security barrier. While it is a gross generalization to say that all the U.S. gated communities were built for this reason, security is an important factor in the creation of gated communities. This is even more apparent in places like Brazil and South Africa, where the use of class/race/crime security barriers are attributed to the high rates of crime. For the last sub-category, it was felt necessary to provide a distinction between walling in and walling out. There are two current examples where governments are using security barriers to contain a problem. These two examples are the Via Anelli estate in Padua, Italy where a wall was built to contain the “crime, drugs and prostitution” inside a largely

39 Aws Qusay. “Attacks in Baghdad Fall 80 Percent.”
immigrant neighborhood and in Rio de Janeiro, where a ‘favela’ (shanty-town) was encircled to isolate the drug gangs.\textsuperscript{44} The walls in both Padua and Rio de Janeiro have generated a significant amount of controversy as an extreme governmental response to what Manwaring describes as an “urban insurgency” in his monograph, “Street Gangs: The New Insurgency.”\textsuperscript{45}

With these descriptive classifications for the use of security barriers established, the issue becomes the modern evolution of the use of interior security barriers as a means of physical population control in a counterinsurgency context. The historical cases examined show that relocation has often been the preferred method of physical population control. The two most cited examples of post World War II use of aggressive relocation of a population in response to an insurgency are the “New Villages” of the British Malayan Emergency and the “Strategic Hamlets” of the U.S. Vietnam Conflict.\textsuperscript{46} The U.S. “Strategic Hamlets” were actually derived from the British successes at relocating the population during the Malayan Emergency, albeit without achieving the success the British experienced.\textsuperscript{47}

The current “gated communities” approach in Baghdad is considered to be “an updated version of the strategic hamlets model used in Vietnam. There, people were moved to villages the military thought it could defend, or were moved to entirely new villages.”\textsuperscript{48} Dr. Conrad

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Crane, the director of the U.S. Army Military History Institute, was quoted in the Los Angeles Times as saying with regards to the Baghdad approach that, “the strategy could work because it would not involve moving people, but rather providing security so they could remain in their neighborhoods.” As controversial as the Baghdad security plan’s use of security barriers has been, the evolution of this form of physical population control - of bringing the barriers to the community instead of moving the people to the secured community - seems the more acceptable course of action to unpopular, but sometimes necessary population control measures.

Before moving on to the last topic of this section, this study will discuss the Western gated communities concept as a point of comparison to the gated communities label that is used for the segregation of neighborhoods in Iraq. This study will use the term “Western gated communities” to represent gated communities in the traditional sense as they have evolved in the United States. This term is used whether the gated community is in Brazil, China or South Africa. A detailed discussion of Western gated communities is beyond the scope of this study; however, a summary of the assessed impacts of Western gated communities does have value because it reinforces for the reader some of the underlying reasons for the negative reactions to the use of security barriers amongst the population and the local leadership in places of conflict where they are used. While Western gated communities are not normally considered conflict areas, many of the impacts of erecting physical barriers within a community are the same whether that community is in a conflict area or not. For a more thorough development of the derivation of these impacts, see Appendix D.

The evolution of Western gated communities also has the same tension of protection versus progress. According to Blakely and Snyder’s well known work, *Fortress America*,

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49 Julian E. Barnes. "Plan calls for zone of safety."
security was assessed to be ‘very important’ to 70 percent of surveyed residents’ decision to live in a gated community. However, there are impacts to Western gated communities. Karina Landman, a researcher at the South African Council for Scientific and Industrial Research, has developed four impact areas as a method of categorization in her research paper “The storm that rocks the boat: the systemic impact of gated communities on urban sustainability.” Three of these impact areas have relevance to this study: (1) spatial, (2) socio-economic, and (3) institutional.

The “spatial consequences” to gated communities are “spatial fragmentation and separation.” This separation is a “spatial segregation” that also leads to social and economic segregation which has socio-economic impacts. The concern from researchers is that this socio-economic impact is exclusionary and can polarize a community along the barrier’s boundaries. The last impact is institutional, because inside these gated communities are private ‘micro-governments’ as represented by their own governance and security organizations.

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51 Edward J. Blakely and Mary Gail Snyder. Fortress America: Gated Communities in the United States, 126. At the time of the writing of Fortress America, Dr. Blakely was associated with both University of Southern California and the University of California, Berkeley. At that time Ms. Snyder was a doctoral student at the University of California, Berkeley. For more specifics see bibliographical source listed under: Starnes, Earl M. “Review of Fortress America: Gated Communities in the United States.” H-Net Reviews: Humanities & Social Sciences Online, March 1998. http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showpdf.php?id=1759


54 Ibid, 6.


among many is that no matter what the root cause for the creation of gated communities, they can become permanent fixtures and therefore can often detrimentally impact a community.

The last topic of discussion for this section is to establish the historical scope of this study and the limitations of the historical examples used in this study. Due to the dramatic changes in the world order and warfare in general since the end of World War II, this study’s search for the use of security barriers was limited to post-World War II examples only. This was decided as the most functional way to keep the examples pertinent in context to today’s dynamic operating environment. According to the *Regional Guide to International Conflict and Management from 1945 to 2003*, there have been 343 conflicts from 1945 to 2003.58 It is primarily from these conflicts as sources for analysis that this study focused its search for examples of the use of security barriers.

Unfortunately, the use of security barriers as a population control measure in conflicts is not very common. However, there are some uses of security barriers that do allow for discussion concerning protection versus progress and do compliment this study’s goal of delving into the circumstances or criteria for the use of security barriers and more importantly their removal. In the next section, this study will begin looking at specific situations in the use of security barriers to try and gain a better understanding of their use. Because there is no universal historical example for study, this study will focus on three countries and their ongoing use of security barriers as case studies in an effort to provide varied, but pertinent examples for further study and analysis.

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Case Studies

Armed with a better understanding of security barriers as a form of population control and how they are used, this study now focuses on specific examples of the use of security barriers in the post-World War II world. Before beginning with specific case studies, this study establishes a series of questions that are applied to each case study in order to frame the discussion in regards to the use and removal of separation barriers. These questions are:

1. What is the root cause(s) driving the need for the separation barriers?

2. What is the classification of the barriers based on the descriptive classifications established in the previous section of this study?

3. When placed, were the barriers considered temporary or permanent?

4. How long have the barriers been in place?

5. Were the barriers placed with the consent of the leaders and population on both sides of the barriers?

6. What is the perception of the leaders and population on both sides of the barriers to the existence of the barriers?

7. Have there been or is there currently any dialogue to bring down the barriers?

8. Have the barriers been brought down, either in part or in whole?

9. What were the specific circumstances that instigated the removal of the barriers?

10. Can a specific change in the circumstances be identified as causal to allowing the removal of the barriers?

11. Has the removal of the barriers been permanent?

12. Have there been any negative consequences to the removal of the barriers?

In Appendix A is a list of 25 examples of the use of security barriers around the world today. This list is not comprehensive, but does provide a good illustration of the prevalence of security barriers and also illustrates the varied reasons for the use of these barriers. The 12 questions developed above were used as criteria in the assessment of which examples of the use of security barriers would best support the analysis of this study’s hypothesis. Additional criteria
in determining case study selection were: (1) the specific status of the security barrier in question; specifically, whether there was any discussion of the barrier's removal and (2) whether there was enough written on the specifics of the situation to effectively understand the causes of the establishment of the security barrier.

From this assessment of the 25 examples provided in Appendix A, it was determined that only one external border situation, Cyprus, fit the criteria established. The other 16 external border barriers researched show no signs of changing in the foreseeable future, including the two security barriers along the Iraq-Kuwait and Iraq-Saudi Arabia borders. As for the remaining eight internal security barriers, the two in China at the borders of the Special Administrative Regions of Hong Kong and Macau were eliminated from consideration because they too show no signs of changing in the foreseeable future. The two criminal containment security barriers in Padua, Italy and Rio de Janeiro, Brazil were also eliminated from consideration. Both these cases have much potential for further study due to the controversy surrounding their construction and the obvious parallels that can be drawn between combating the ‘urban insurgency’ within their walls and the sectarian or insurgent violence in other locations like Belfast and Baghdad. But, both these cases are too new for any quality assessment of their longer term impacts and their future removal to be reasonably analyzed. This left as the four remaining examples for further study being the situation in Belfast, Northern Ireland and three examples from Iraq. These four situations did meet the criteria for further analysis and are included in this study.

Therefore, the author has focused on the circumstances of the security barriers in Cyprus, Northern Ireland and inside Iraq. While the security barriers in Baghdad have achieved notoriety, this study also looks at the use of security barriers in and around Fallujah and Mosul. The intent of this study is to use these case studies as examples of the use of security barriers to provide a discussion of value regarding this study’s hypothesis. In support of a logical flow to analyzing this study’s hypothesis, these case studies are discussed in the following order:

1. Northern Ireland, with an emphasis on Belfast
2. Cyprus

3. Iraq
   a. Fallujah
   b. Mosul
   c. Baghdad

One final point, the author has assumed a certain familiarity on the part of the reader with the current situation in Iraq and therefore has provided very little historical background to the events of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) leading up to the present. However, this same level of familiarity is not assumed for the historical events of the situations in both Northern Ireland and Cyprus. Therefore a short historical summary of events is provided for each of these case studies in the appendices.

Northern Ireland

The situation in Northern Ireland has a long, well documented history. For a more detailed summary of the history of Northern Ireland, see Appendix B. This study focuses only from 1969, the beginning of “the troubles” to the present. This conflict is characterized by the Catholic minority not accepting “the partition of Ireland as permanent…The Protestants for their part, remained convinced that Northern Ireland must remain Protestant and British.” This led to a 30 year conflict and an eventual brokered peace agreement by U.S. Senator George Mitchell in April 1998. In April 2008, Northern Ireland celebrated the 10th anniversary of the Belfast peace agreement.

The evolution to the current “power-sharing” agreement has been full of political crisis, but the peace has held.  

However, the “peace walls” of the Northern Ireland conflict still exist today to separate the Northern Irish Catholics from the Protestants. The ‘peace walls’ are categorized by this study’s descriptive classification as internal sectarian/partisan security barriers. When these walls were first erected, “the senior British army commander, Lt. Gen. Ian Freeland, predicted: “The peace line will be a very, very temporary affair. We will not have a Berlin Wall or anything like that in this city.” The first ‘peace line’ went up in Belfast in 1969 and by 2005 there were collectively 13 miles of ‘peace line’ in Belfast. The original barriers “grew out of barricades that the local communities erected themselves during periods of intense conflict in 1969 (and in later years). When the British Army was deployed in August 1969, it replaced the existing barricades with barbed-wire barriers of its own.” As time went by, the “barbed-wire barriers were replaced with more permanent structures and over the years new peace walls have been erected and older ones extended in length and height.”

So, the walls are now a seemingly “permanent feature of the city’s landscape, with the original corrugated metal and barbed wire fences having been replaced by architect-designed

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63 Ibid  
65 Ibid  
68 Ibid, 140.
brick walls.”

However, there is a growing dissatisfaction with this situation. The U.S.-Ireland Alliance asked Millward Brown Ulster, a market and social research agency, to survey Belfast residents “about their views on the peace walls….” The survey found that “81% want walls to come down,” but 60% felt that the walls should only come down “when it’s safe enough, but not at present.” The survey also found that “There was strong agreement that the walls help to make residents feel safer by keeping the communities separated.”

Other significant results were that “61% agree that local politicians should be doing more to create conditions for the walls to come down…” that 52% feel the two communities are growing in their confidence in each other,” and that 58% lack confidence in the ability of the police to preserve peace and maintain order if the walls came down.

But, it appears the government is listening, while still being acutely aware of the difficulties of the sectarian divide. In April 2008, it was announced that “The most recent initiative is the government-appointed Consultative Group on the Past, an independent 10-member group that will this summer release recommendations now being compiled on how best to deal with the legacy of the 30-year Troubles.” Seventy-one million dollars is being made available over the next three years under the direction of the newly created Consultative Group on the Past.

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72 Ibid

73 Ibid


75 Ibid
Assembly debates in June 2008 that “the continuing presence of peace walls needs to be reviewed, and we are working hard to create the conditions whereby the need for those walls no longer exists.”

But, for now Belfast remains a very segregated city. In 2004, the Northern Ireland Housing Executive reported that “Ninety-eight per cent of working-class Belfast is now strictly segregated by religion…. While still segregated, the Catholics have prospered since the 1998 Belfast Agreement. “A study undertaken by academics from Queen’s University, Belfast found that Catholics:

:: Have made significant inroads into the workforce
:: Are now more likely to have a degree than Protestants
:: Are now less likely to leave school with no qualifications than Protestants
:: Are reducing child poverty faster than Protestants

However, this Catholic success is leaving the Protestant majority feeling further disenfranchised, the term most commonly used being “Protestant alienation” to describe the “common perception that ‘all the gains’ from the last 10 years were going the way of the Catholic side, and that the Protestant community wasn't seeing the ‘peace dividend.’”


To summarize the situation in Northern Ireland, the areas along the ‘peace walls’ are still segregated and still considered conflict areas. The people who live there still feel the ‘peace walls’ are needed, but are in favor of having them removed, if security can be guaranteed. There are ongoing discussions and programs by the government and leadership of Northern Ireland to remove the ‘peace walls’, but they are trying to remove a successful method of ensuring security that has been present in some locations for almost 40 years. There is still a significant amount of sectarian distrust within the two populations of Northern Ireland which is ultimately driving the preference of protection over progress. Until this changes, the ‘peace walls’ remain.

Cyprus

Cyprus has a complex history whose details go beyond the scope of this study. This study provides a short historical summary leading up to the present situation in Cyprus in Appendix C. This study of Cyprus focuses on the period from 1974 to the present. Cyprus has traditionally been inhabited by Greek Cypriots, primarily on the southern half of the island and comprising 77 percent of the population.\textsuperscript{80} The Turkish Cypriots were primarily in the northern half of the island and comprised approximately 18 percent of the population.\textsuperscript{81} Cyprus was historically under the rule of the Ottoman Empire, but came under British control in 1878 in an effort to protect the Ottoman Empire against Russian aggression.\textsuperscript{82} In 1925 Cyprus became a British Crown Colony.\textsuperscript{83} The conflict on Cyprus has traditionally been over Greek Cypriot desire

\textsuperscript{81} Ibid, 2.
for enosis, the union of Cyprus with Greece versus the Turkish Cypriot desire to remain under British rule or as a second choice, partition, called taksim, with their portion of Cyprus as part of Turkey.  

In 1960, the independent Republic of Cyprus was created by Britain, Turkey and Greece following the London and Zurich Accords in 1959 and 1960. “The accords prohibited Enosis and taksim and introduced a bicommmunal/federal solution for the island. Britain, Greece and Turkey had a right to intervene, unilaterally or together, in order to restore the state of affairs in the island.” In 1974, following a Greek military coup, Turkey invaded Cyprus and took control of 37 percent of Cyprus due to Turkish fears of enosis. This created the north-south partition of Cyprus that exists today. What followed was an almost complete ethnic separation of the two populations. According to a Council of Europe report entitled “Colonisation of Turkish settlers of the occupied part of Cyprus,” “Since 1974, a reduction of the Greek Cypriot population in the northern part of the island by over 99%.” At the same time, reverse depopulation affected “the Turkish Cypriot population living in the Greek Cypriot zone,” which was “reduced as a result of transfers carried out by UN or the ICRC.”

In addition to the relocation of populations based on ethnicity, Turkey also physically partitioned Cyprus: “Turkey built a barrier along the Green Line, with concrete walls, barbed-
wire fencing, military outposts, and some minefields… and splits the capital, Nicosia, in two.”

The label of the ‘Green Line’ has its history in the original 1963 British military involvement in trying to maintain the peace on Cyprus. This presence evolved into the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) mission that is still there today.

As mentioned in the initial discussion regarding this study’s development of descriptive classifications, the situation in Cyprus is unique. From the perspective of the Turkish Cypriots and the partitioning of Cyprus, the “Green Line” is an external national conflict separation barrier. But, from the perspective of the Greek Cypriots, who desire a unified Cyprus under Greek rule, the ‘Green Line’ is an internal sectarian/partisan separation barrier. Regardless of perspective, the ‘Green Line’ represents a division along lines of ethnic national interests and therefore has witnessed many elements of sectarian conflict over the years to include one of the most thorough physical segregation of two populations in recent history.

While there is no evidence to indicate whether Turkey considered the ‘Green Line’ temporary or permanent, there are other indicators that show that Turkey’s strategic plan was to establish a more permanent influence on Cyprus. The Council of Europe report “Colonisation by Turkish settlers of the occupied part of Cyprus” published figures indicating that Turkey aggressively pushed Turkish settlers to Turkish Cyprus at the same time that the Turkish Cypriot population was leaving the island. The end result was that the Turkish settlers eventually outnumbered the Turkish Cypriot population. The overriding concern of the report was that “the

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95 Ibid, Section II, Para 25.
considerable increase in the numbers of the Turkish-speaking population might be used for a justification...regarding territorial arrangements and political powers in a final settlement of the Cyprus problem."96

It is also important to understand that since the partition of 1974, the Greek Cypriots have made a significant economic recovery.97 According to George Stavri’s research paper entitled “AN ECONOMIC VISION FOR CYPRUS: THE GREEK CYPRIOT EXPERIENCE,” the Greek Cypriot gross domestic product (GDP) “per capita” went from approximately $4000 in 1974 to over $23,000 in 2005.98 However, the Turkish Cypriots did not have the same success. According to Stavri’s research paper, an international embargo on Turkish Cyprus made Turkey their only trading partner, resulting in an GDP of “4409 dollars in 2002.”99

In April 2003, twenty-nine years after the partitioning of Cyprus, the Turkish Cypriot government in an unexpected move, opened the main checkpoint in the capital of Nicosia in a move to “build confidence between the divided communities.”100 This move came one week after the “Greek Cypriots signed the European Union accession treaty paving the way for EU membership.”101 Greek Cyprus joined the EU one year later on 1 May 2004.102 In the days leading up to Greek Cyprus joining the EU, a referendum was held in both Greek and Turkish

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96 Council of Europe Report. "Doc. 9799 Colonisation by Turkish settlers of the occupied part of Cyprus," Section II, Para 42.
98 Ibid, 3.
99 Ibid, 4.
101 Ibid.
Cyprus to vote on reunification.\textsuperscript{103} 65 percent of Turkish Cypriots voted for reunification while 76 percent of Greek Cypriots voted against it.\textsuperscript{104} 

There was a universal expression of disappointment over these results from both Greek and Turkish Cypriot leadership, the EU and even Secretary General Kofi Annan.\textsuperscript{105} However, both sides still appeared to be cautiously moving forward. In March 2007, the Greek Cypriot government demolished the wall on Ledra Street in the capital of Nicosia going one step further than the Turkish Cypriot opening of this checkpoint in 2003.\textsuperscript{106} While the destruction of the wall was good news, the actual re-opening of the street came with conditions to the Turkish Cypriot government.\textsuperscript{107} It was not until one year later in March 2008, after a change in Greek Cypriot government that the street was actually re-opened.\textsuperscript{108} While the barriers are coming down, there is no permanent solution yet between Greek and Turkish Cyprus. As of September 2008, discussions with the assistance of an UN special envoy continue.\textsuperscript{109} 

Over the years, the Greek Cypriots have thrived economically while the Turkish Cypriots have been isolated. The initial move by the Turkish Cypriots to open the main checkpoint in Nicosia came at a time when Greek Cyprus was joining the EU, highlighting their own isolation from economic opportunity. This acceptance of Greek Cyprus into the EU also highlighted the problems of Turkey, the sole sponsor of Turkish Cyprus’s right to exist. Turkey had been trying, unsuccessfully, to gain entry into the EU for years. The president of the European Union has told

\textsuperscript{103} BBC News. "Country Profile: Cyprus."


\textsuperscript{107} Ibid.


the Turkish government “that a solution to the division of Cyprus would be beneficial to Turkey’s EU accession bid.”\textsuperscript{110} So, there seems to be a clear economic incentive for both Turkey and Turkish Cyprus to work toward a permanent agreement to reintegrate the two halves of Cyprus.

In closing this section on Cyprus, it is of value to compare the circumstances of Northern Ireland with those of Cyprus. Much like Northern Ireland, a divided Cyprus continues toward a permanent resolution of their differences. But, one of the most noticeable differences between the two situations is that Northern Ireland managed to establish and keep alive a peace agreement while keeping their ‘peace walls’ while Cyprus is removing their ‘Green Line’ without a peace agreement in place. Even though the ‘Green Line’ was up for almost 29 years, there was enough incentive on both sides to begin its removal prior to a formal peace agreement.

While the Greek Cypriots do not seem comfortable with reunification based on their rejection of the UN referendum, there was enough public support or more correctly, the absence of protests to allow the Greek Cypriot leadership to bring down the wall in Nicosia. From the Turkish Cypriot perspective, progress over protection seems to be the driving factor for both their well-being as well as Turkey’s. However, the Greek Cypriot perspective seems to be more complex. They have not voiced opposition to the removal of the ‘Green Line’, but have shown concerns over the details of reunification. It has been said that their opposition to reunification could be “attributed largely to the supposed failure of the plan to guarantee adequate restitution for the 170,000 individuals displaced by the 1974 Turkish invasion.”\textsuperscript{111} If this is the case, then the Greek Cypriot perspective is really one of progress over protection as well, explaining the lack of opposition to the removal of the ‘Green Line’.


\textsuperscript{111} Keesing’s World News Archive Staff. "Cyprus reunification efforts."
Iraq

There have been several different types of security barriers used for different purposes in Iraq during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF). This study assumes that the reader has some familiarity with the history of OIF and therefore has provided even less historical details than both the Northern Ireland and Cyprus case studies. The specific Iraq case studies addressed here concern the situations in Fallujah, Mosul and Baghdad that occurred during the 2007 surge deployment of U.S. forces. These situations were selected because each highlights one of two aspects in the use of security barriers, (1) to surround an entire city to control access as a method of population control and (2) within a city’s boundaries to separate warring neighborhoods or factions within neighborhoods.

Fallujah

This discussion on the use of security barriers in Fallujah covers the time period from the beginning of the surge, approximately January 2007 to October 2008. During this period, U.S. forces made a systematic effort to restrict access to the city of Fallujah as well as dividing the city interior “into intimately patrollable precincts.”\textsuperscript{112} In both cases, concrete Jersey and Texas barriers were used to wall off portions of the city, with the primary goal being to establish security within the city.\textsuperscript{113} Jersey and Texas barriers are temporary concrete safety barriers normally used in the U.S. to separate highway traffic.\textsuperscript{114} The specific goal of the barriers surrounding the city was to keep al-Qaeda out.\textsuperscript{115} Inside the city, the barriers “divided the city

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\item \textsuperscript{113} Ibid.
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into nine gated communities, each with its own joint security stations staffed by U.S. troops and Iraqi police. Each gated community has its own checkpoints for entry and exit making it difficult for weapons smugglers to transit the city and for car bombers to strike targets.

Returning to the 12 questions established earlier in this study to structure further discussion of Fallujah, the security barriers in Fallujah have characteristics of two types of internal security barriers. The barriers surrounding the city were used as an insurgency/terrorism security barrier and the barriers internal to the city were there to provide security to each neighborhood much like a class/race/crime security barrier would. In the case of Fallujah, the security provided to each neighborhood also served to disrupt the criminal aspects of the insurgency like smuggling or acts of violence. The internal barriers of Fallujah were intended to be temporary. "Eventually, the plan is to tear down the barriers one at a time to allow the city to gradually return to normal and end the state of martial law."

This, in fact, has occurred with the Marines removing all barriers during the Fall of 2008 and handing over control of Anbar province, to include Fallujah, to Iraqi authorities on September 1, 2008.

The successful reduction in violence and transfer of authority to the Iraqi government was attributed to the tactics of the surge; however, this is an incomplete answer. The surge did provide more U.S. forces and dispersed these forces into the community in order to provide direct security to the population. But in Fallujah, these efforts coincided with the creation of the Anbar Awakening, a Sunni movement to counter the terrorism of al-Qaeda. The leaders of the

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117 Michael J. Totten. "Hope for Iraq's Meanest City."
120 Michael J. Totten. "Hope for Iraq's Meanest City."
121 Ibid.
Anbar Awakening in Fallujah, a predominately Sunni town, allied themselves with the U.S. forces and the Iraqi Police in order to regain control of Fallujah.\(^{122}\) As the U.S. and Iraqi security presence increased, the population became more cooperative and as security was established, the U.S. focus shifted from security to attempts to restore services to the community.\(^{123}\) While the population of Fallujah appeared to accept the presence of the U.S. forces and the security measures; there was a growing desire verbalized to have the U.S. forces leave as security was established.\(^{124}\) With the transfer of control on September 1, 2008, the U.S. presence was consolidated to the western desert base of Al Asad and away from the Anbar province population areas.\(^{125}\)

The three most apparent causes of the success of Fallujah can reasonably be tied to the surge buildup, the tactics of dispersed U.S. forces integrated with Iraqi forces in conjunction with the use of population control measures and the Sunni resurgence as represented by the Anbar Awakening. The end result was that security was established to such a level that the security barriers of Fallujah were removed. However, it is important to understand that the situation in Fallujah was unusual in that there are no significant sectarian issues since Fallujah is predominately a Sunni town where 95 per cent of their police force is also Sunni united against an al-Qaeda in Iraq that is often characterized as “foreign fighters and radicals.”\(^{126}\) In essence,


\(^{124}\) James Janega. "Security payoff in Fallujah The Marines' presence is shrinking as the former insurgent bastion transforms."


\(^{126}\) Compilation of two sources: (1) Sudarsan Raghavan. "In Falljuah, Peace Through Brute Strength," (2) David J. Morris. "Fallujah catches its breath."
Fallujah is a fairly homogeneous city, which is very different from the next Iraq case study, Mosul.

Mosul

Similar to Fallujah, Mosul has also seen security berms used to surround the city.\textsuperscript{127} The time period for this discussion regarding Mosul is from approximately December 2007 to the present. In December 2007, U.S. forces spent eight days repairing an old berm built in 2005 to limit insurgent flow into the city, primarily foreign fighters who used to drive across the desert to enter the city.\textsuperscript{128} This berm is approximately 50 kilometers long and “ties into natural obstacles, checkpoints, or COPs (Combat Outposts).”\textsuperscript{129} This berm is called the “Riyadh Line” named after the Iraqi commander of Ninewa operations, Lieutenant General Riyadh.\textsuperscript{130} Internal to the city, the security plan has primarily focused on adding checkpoints and more COPs, “in addition to the 20 that are already in place.”\textsuperscript{131} Unlike the Fallujah security plan, there has been a reluctance to use security barriers because of the city populations’ expected adverse reaction to them. Brigadier General Khazraji, an Iraqi Army commander in Mosul, was quoted as saying in response to a plan to use security barriers inside Mosul that “This is the best plan to control the terrorists,” he said. “But if we do this plan and divide the city, Mosul is not like Baghdad. People are going to get mad and we might have riots.”\textsuperscript{132}

\textsuperscript{130} Ibid.
The primary threat to Mosul is an al-Qaeda effort to keep Mosul as their “last urban stronghold.”\footnote{Sam Dagher. "U.S. sees long fight to oust Al Qaeda in Mosul." \& Sam Dagher. "U.S. sees long fight to oust Al Qaeda in Mosul.".} This is complicated by the additional problem that al-Qaeda has received a more supportive welcome in the past by the majority Sunni community that comprises 60 per cent of Mosul’s population.\footnote{Bill Murray. "Mosul conflict ebbs after five-year battle between Coalition, insurgents for control." The Long War Journal website. July 24, 2008. http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/07/mosul_conflict_ebbs.php (accessed February 9, 2009).} The Sunni majority lives primarily on the western side of Mosul and the Iraqi police in Mosul are primarily Sunni.\footnote{Compilation of two sources: (1) Sam Dagher. "U.S. sees long fight to oust Al Qaeda in Mosul," and (2) Jane Arraf. "As Iraq calms, Mosul remains a battle front." Christian Science Monitor website. December 17, 2008. http://www.csmonitor.com/2008/1217/p01s01-wome.html?page=1 (accessed February 9, 2009).} The main opposition to the Sunni majority is the Kurdish minority comprising 25 per cent of Mosul’s population which lives predominately on the eastern side of Mosul.\footnote{Jane Arraf. "As Iraq calms, Mosul remains a battle front."} The Iraq Army deployed to Mosul is predominately Kurdish.\footnote{Jane Arraf. "As Iraq calms, Mosul remains a battle front."} So, the conflict dynamics within Mosul are complex, with not only al-Qaeda trying to maintain a presence in Iraq but also a complex power struggle between the Sunnis and Kurds for control of Mosul.

With a clearer understanding of the specific dynamics within Mosul, this study will discuss the impacts of the security berm surrounding Mosul. The primary purpose of the recreation of the berm is to keep out insurgent infiltration into Mosul. This purpose is identical to Fallujah’s external berm and would also be described by this study’s classification as an insurgency/terrorism security barrier. While there was no source found stating the long-term plans for the security berm, it is safe to assume that maintaining a 50 kilometer berm in the desert surrounding a city of 1.5 million people is a temporary security measure.

Regarding the decision-making process of re-establishing the berm, the concept has been credited to Lieutenant General Riyadh, the commander of Ninewa operations, the province that
includes Mosul.\textsuperscript{138} This security berm, being outside the city and not providing any daily negative impact on the population of Mosul, does not seem to have generated any reported controversy. The leadership position from both the Sunni and Kurdish perspectives seems to be focused primarily on establishing security and control within the city in a competition for power prior to the scheduled elections in January 2009.\textsuperscript{139}

Irrespective of the troubles al-Qaeda can cause, most see the battle for control over Mosul becoming a Sunni and Kurdish fight that has the U.S. military concerned.\textsuperscript{140} General Raymond Odierno, commander of U.S. forces in Iraq, has “acknowledged that Mosul is one place where Americans could remain. ‘There are still some issues in Mosul that we have to work through,’ said Odierno.”\textsuperscript{141} Therefore it is likely the security berm will remain for the foreseeable future as the situation between Sunni and Kurdish Iraqis does create opportunities for al-Qaeda to exploit.

For the last case study within this examination of the use of security barriers in Iraq, this study now returns to the situation in Baghdad described in the introduction.

**Baghdad**

The security barriers erected in Baghdad were part of the 2007 Baghdad security plan at the beginning of the surge. These barriers have been unpopular among the Iraqi leadership and people, but they have also been successful, being considered one of the major contributing factors in an 80 percent reduction in attacks in the Baghdad area.\textsuperscript{142} These barriers were one of several population control measures applied during Operation Fardh Al-Qanoon, which was the name for

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\textsuperscript{139} Ibid. \textsuperscript{140} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{141} Jane Arraf. "As Iraq calms, Mosul remains a battle front." \textsuperscript{142} Aws Qusay. "Attacks in Baghdad Fall 80 Percent." Reuters. February 16, 2008.  
the Iraqi Government led Baghdad security plan.143 This study discusses the use of these security barriers and their impacts from the period of January 2007 to the present. This time period covers the beginning of what is generally accepted to be the surge of U.S. combat forces as attributed to both President Bush announcing a change in strategy in Iraq and General Petraeus taking command over U.S. forces in Iraq.144 General Petraeus was quoted as saying that “We must focus on population security, particularly in Baghdad, to give the Iraqi government the breathing space it needs to become more effective.”145

In April 2007 the first of several “gated communities” as defined by then Lieutenant General Odierno, were started as part of the Baghdad security plan.146 The first security barrier erected was a three mile blast wall around the neighborhood of Adhamiyah, a Sunni neighborhood in a Shia area as a way to stop Shia sectarian violence.147 Brigadier General Campbell, the deputy commander of U.S. forces in Baghdad was quoted as saying that “At least 10 Baghdad neighborhoods are slated to become or already are gated communities.”148 As Odierno stated in his editorial to the Los Angeles Times with respect to Baghdad’s walls, “they are being put up to protect the Iraqi population by hindering the ability of terrorists to carry out

the car bombings and suicide attacks that are taking the lives of innocent civilians.”

As the walls were established, they were credited by the U.S. military for “disrupting the movement and supply routes of the Sunni militants of al-Qaeda in Iraq and the Shiite militiamen of the so-called special groups.”

Returning to the framework of the 12 questions developed for this study, the Baghdad walls provide functions that fit three of the descriptive classifications of this study. They do, in certain locations, separate Sunni and Shia thereby hindering sectarian violence. They are an anti-insurgency/terrorism barrier but also hinder criminal activities like smuggling in support of either sectarian groups or insurgent activities. The Baghdad walls, like the examples of Fallujah and Mosul, were also meant to be temporary. U.S. Ambassador Ryan Crocker has said “It is in no-one's intention or thinking that this is going to be a permanent state of affairs.” The barriers have now been in place since April 2007 and, as previously mentioned, have been one of the factors attributed to the 80 percent reduction in attacks.

While the perspective of the U.S. leadership, both civilian and military, regarding the use of the barriers is clear, the Iraqi reaction has been much more mixed. The Iraqi parliament objected to the construction of the security barriers as did Sunni and Shiite clerics with the Sunni clerics reported as calling the barriers a form of sectarian discrimination. One man’s “gated community” can seem like a ghetto to those inside the barrier. The initial reaction from the Iraqi

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population was also reported as negative; press reports over time, however, have shown an appreciation for the increased security the barriers provided.\textsuperscript{153}

There have not been any specific press reports regarding ongoing discussions to remove the security barriers in Baghdad. However, Anderson and Volesky have made clear: “the Iraqi Government and the coalition will define the conditions that must be met before the population control measures are reduced.”\textsuperscript{154} On October 17, 2008, the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) website published a press release stating that the security barriers in the neighborhood of Doura were being removed and replaced by a “more permanent security infrastructure;” in essence the large, concrete blast walls were being removed for a “hybrid construction that is half wall and half railing.”\textsuperscript{155} The MNF-I press release also stated that it will “take eight months to a year to remove all of the barriers from Doura.”\textsuperscript{156}

With all the sectarian violence that has plagued Baghdad for the last few years, what conditions or circumstances changed to allow the security barriers to be taken down in Doura? According to the New York Times article, “As Fears Ease, Baghdad Sees Walls Tumble,” “American commanders concede the risks, but contend that the changes are worthwhile given the potential payoff.”\textsuperscript{157} Lieutenant Colonel Tim Watson, the commander of the battalion responsible


\textsuperscript{156} Multi-National Division Baghdad Public Affairs. "Blast wall removal demonstrates progress in Baghdad."

\textsuperscript{157} Alisa Rubin, Stephen Farrell, Sam Dagher, and Erica Goode. "As Fears Ease, Baghdad Sees Walls Tumble."
for Doura said, “We’ve got to balance that: security with economic concerns.”\textsuperscript{158} While the theme of security versus economy is similar to the study’s continued reference to protection versus progress, there are other contributing factors to the increased security occurring in Baghdad.

There are two prevalent factors, in addition to the surge of U.S. forces that have impacted the security situation in Baghdad.\textsuperscript{159} First, the continuing growth and stabilizing influence of the primarily Sunni Awakening movement that started in Anbar province has had a positive impact in reducing violence.\textsuperscript{160} Second, the increasing size and capability of the National Police force has also had a positive impact on security in Baghdad.\textsuperscript{161} The end result -- that there has been a significant reduction in violence in Baghdad -- has created the opportunity to remove barriers in places like Doura.

Combining the original unpopularity of the security barriers among the Iraqi leadership and population with the increased security in Baghdad, it appears that more of the security barriers are to be removed. Currently, the 1st Cavalry Division serves as Multi-National Division-Baghdad (MND-B), and its Division Engineer, Lieutenant Colonel James Raymer, reports that the Baghdad Operations Command in coordination with MND-B are having barriers that block roads removed to restore traffic flow.\textsuperscript{162} The Baghdad Operations Command, commonly referred

\textsuperscript{158} Alisa Rubin, Stephen Farrell, Sam Dagher, and Erica Goode. "As Fears Ease, Baghdad Sees Walls Tumble."
\textsuperscript{159} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{161} Alisa Rubin, Stephen Farrell, Sam Dagher, and Erica Goode. "As Fears Ease, Baghdad Sees Walls Tumble."
\textsuperscript{162} E-mail correspondence with Lieutenant Colonel James Raymer, Division Engineer, 1st Cavalry Division and Multi-National Division-Baghdad, March-April 2009. LTC Raymer provided current specifics of the ongoing removal of security barriers within the Baghdad area. In sum, there is an ongoing effort by U.S. forces to remove barriers at the behest of the Iraq Government. Security barriers along roads are being removed to restore traffic flow. The security barriers that were placed around neighborhoods are
to as the BOC, is the senior command and control element for Iraq security forces within the city. LTC Raymer also reports that security barriers protecting neighborhoods are being removed in areas where the assessed security situation allows. However, many of the neighborhood security barriers are to remain for the foreseeable future. The determining factor in the situation within Baghdad is that where there is no perceived security benefit to maintaining the barriers, they are being removed. However, where there are still perceived security benefits from the barriers surrounding neighborhoods, the barriers are to remain.

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164 E-mail correspondence with LTC Raymer
165 Ibid.
166 E-mail correspondence with LTC Raymer.
167 Ibid.
Analysis

Highlighting the characteristics of each case study’s situation, one can posit the conditions required as potential prerequisites for the removal of physical security barriers. As evidence from the case studies suggests, each one is unique and the variables of each specific situation are complex. What is also clear is that not all the case studies are success stories, meaning that not every case study showed a positive end state at the time of this study. Finally, it is also clear that not every case study even when successful, achieved this end state in a methodical, reasoned approach. To provide a framework for the assessment of these case studies, this study applies two constructs for analysis in addition to the author’s own observations.

First, this study borrows from Peter Wallensteen’s book, *Understanding Conflict Resolution*, the three components of conflict as the initial framework for analysis. These three components are (1) actors, (2) incompatibility, and (3) actions. This study begins the analysis of each case study by discussing the actors, the incompatibility and the actions in each situation. While this study is borrowing the three components of a conflict from *Understanding Conflict Resolution*, this study does not delve into the details of conflict resolution as it applies to each of these case studies. This is too complex a subject and beyond the scope of this study. This study only focuses on the conditions present or those assessed as missing or in interference with the removal of the security barriers as determined by the author within the framework of Wallensteen’s three components.

The second construct for analysis is ten conditions for the removal of interface barriers in Northern Ireland as established by Mr. Tony Macaulay, an independent development and

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management consultant who is involved in resolving the Northern Ireland interface barriers.\textsuperscript{169}

The term interface barrier is another term that is used in Northern Ireland for the ‘peace walls’.\textsuperscript{170} Macaulay’s ten conditions represent a list of conditions that must be met based on his experiences working in Northern Ireland. Due to the violent nature of the conflict in Northern Ireland during the 30 years of ‘the troubles’, these conditions are thorough and are used as a checklist to further analyze the conditions present in each of the case studies used in this study. For the reader’s reference, these ten conditions and a discussion on Macaulay’s paper, “A Process for Removing Interface Barriers,” is provided in Appendix E. The ten conditions are also reproduced below for the reader.

Macaulay’s Ten Conditions

1. A sustained period of political stability
2. A sustained period of a substantial reduction in violent interface incidents, particularly during the summer period
3. Sustained contact, dialogue and discussion between community leaders on both sides of the interfaces
4. Reaching the ‘tipping point,’ when key stakeholders see the benefits of removing interface barriers as outweighing the benefits of maintaining them\textsuperscript{171}
5. A high level of confidence in the policing of interface areas
6. Ongoing community, social, educational and economic development and the regeneration of interface areas
7. Effective youth work strategies in place in interface communities

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{170} Tony Macaulay. “A discussion paper proposing a five phase process for the removal of ‘peace walls’ in Northern Ireland,” 3.
\item \textsuperscript{171} The term ‘tipping point’ is not Macaulay’s idea, but from Malcolm Gladwell’s book \textit{The Tipping Point}. Macaulay confirmed this via e-mail correspondence. For more information on Gladwell’s concept see: Gladwell, Malcolm. Website: http://www.gladwell.com/tippingpoint/index.html. For the purpose of this monograph, a distinction will be made in reference to the ‘tipping point’ by referring to Macaulay’s ten conditions with the understanding that this is a concept borrowed from Gladwell, but is in relation to the removal of security barriers only.
\end{itemize}
8. Both support for the process and engagement in the process by interface residents (including children and young people), elected representatives, government bodies and civic society

9. A high level of confidence among interface residents that the outcome of the process will be a lasting improvement in safety, security and quality of life

10. Adequate resources to support the implementation of the process

Upon reviewing Macaulay’s ten conditions it appears that his conditions also fit within the framework of Wallensteen’s three conflict components of actors, incompatibilities and actions. Or more precisely, Macaulay has considered the various actors, their incompatibilities and the absence of potentially instigating actions as conditions for the removal of interface barriers in Northern Ireland. While these ten conditions were developed specifically for Northern Ireland, they do comprise the most thorough list of considerations discovered by the author and therefore provide a useful tool for the analysis of all the case studies in this monograph. Since the case studies do not always meet all the conditions on Macaulay’s list, only the conditions that are pertinent are discussed in the analysis. Also, in the interest of brevity, this section does not review the specifics of each case study as provided in the previous section or in the amplifying appendices.

Northern Ireland

In Northern Ireland, the two principal actors in this conflict are the Catholic Nationalist population and their political leaders opposed to the Protestant Unionist population and their political leaders. A third influential actor is the British government and the British Army presence in Northern Ireland as a security force. The Clinton Administration had a small, but critical role in brokering the peace agreement, but the U.S. involvement since that time has no significance to this study. The incompatibility of the conflict is the partisan and sectarian

differences between the nationalist Catholics and the unionist Protestants in a battle for control of Northern Ireland. History shows that there is a long history of dislike, prejudice and segregation between the two populations. As for the actions, there is also a long history between the two populations of violence towards each other. There is also a recent history of cooperation between the leadership of both populations as the two sides adhered to the formal power sharing arrangement as stipulated by the Belfast peace agreement.\textsuperscript{173}

As for the characteristics of this situation, the fact is the ‘peace walls’ remain in Northern Ireland even with a formal peace agreement and a government based on power sharing. As mentioned in the case study discussion, it appears that both populations, when surveyed, want the walls to come down, but not just yet because they do provide a sense of security to both sides.\textsuperscript{174} Even as the Catholic population has thrived when compared to the Protestant population, there was not considered to be a significant difference in the two populations’ perspective of the ‘peace walls’.\textsuperscript{175} It is also apparent from the research that the Northern Ireland political leadership is engaged in ways to “create the conditions” to eliminate the walls.\textsuperscript{176} But, in contrast to both the populations’ feelings and the leaderships’ intent, a new barrier was erected as recently as 2008.\textsuperscript{177}

With this understanding, the author has the following observations.

First, the overall impression of the situation in Northern Ireland is one of caution. The thirty years of ‘the troubles’ still appears to haunt the memories of both the population and the leadership and their approach to the removal of the ‘peace walls’. What this caution highlights is

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{173} Shawn Pogatchnik. “10th Anniversary of Belfast Peace Deal.”
\item \textsuperscript{175} E-mail correspondence with Mr. Tony Macaulay confirmed this fact. To quote: “The poll showed slightly more support for walls coming down in Catholic areas -although the difference is less than 10%... one of the most interesting findings of the Millward Brown poll was that the differences between the two communities was not greater.”
\item \textsuperscript{177} Shawn Pogatchnik. “Despite peace, Belfast walls are growing in size and number.”
\end{itemize}
the broader placement of any conflict within the historical and cultural context of the affected actors. For Northern Ireland’s Catholic and Protestant populations a cautious approach appears to be preferred to a violent relapse.

Second, the variable of time has created an interesting dilemma for the actors in this conflict. While it has been almost forty years since the creation of the first ‘peace wall’, it appears that time has not healed the underlying partisan/sectarian ill will. The passage of time could instead be establishing a sense of normalcy to the ‘peace walls’ creating an unintended permanence to these structures.

Third, the success of the ‘peace walls’ in providing security has become one of the default solutions in conflict areas over the years as the walls were formalized and erected in conflict areas over a period of decades. In Northern Ireland, the formalization of the barriers into permanent walls was accomplished by the British Army and not the local populations. The local populations built temporary barriers segregating themselves, but it was a concerned peacekeeping force that established permanence to the ‘peace walls’. Was this an easier decision because of the third party role of the British army? If so, is there a lack of appreciation to the negative impacts on populations from the perspective of a third party? This analysis now refers to Macaulay’s conditions for further analysis.

While many of Macaulay’s conditions are present in Northern Ireland, there are four of Macaulay’s conditions that are problematic in reference to the situation in Northern Ireland. These are, in abbreviated form, (1) “confidence in the policing of the interface areas,” (2) “engagement in the process by interface residents,” (3) “high level of confidence among interface residents” for “lasting improvement” and (4) “reaching the ‘tipping point’” with regard to the

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benefits to the removal of the barriers versus keeping them.\footnote{Tony Macaulay. "A discussion paper proposing a five phase process for the removal of 'peace walls' in Northern Ireland, 4."} The reality of the current situation is that neither Catholic nor Protestant populations have enough involvement in the removal of the barriers to create enough confidence in their own security if the ‘peace walls’ were removed; thus Macaulay’s ‘tipping point’ has not been reached.\footnote{To reiterate from a previous footnote, the term ‘tipping point’ is not Macaulay’s idea, but from Malcolm Gladwell’s book \textit{The Tipping Point}. Macaulay confirmed this via e-mail correspondence. For more information on Gladwell’s concept see: Gladwell, Malcolm. Website: http://www.gladwell.com/tippingpoint/index.html. For the purpose of this monograph, a distinction will be made in reference to the ‘tipping point’ by referring to Macaulay’s ten conditions with the understanding that this is a concept borrowed from Gladwell, but is in relation to the removal of security barriers only.} The concept of a ‘tipping point’ warrants further discussion and the circumstances in Cyprus also led to a ‘tipping point’ that is discussed further in the next section.

\textbf{Cyprus}

In Cyprus, there are four principal actors, the Greek Cypriots and Greece on one side and Turkish Cypriots and Turkey on the other. The one additional actor with some influence was the British government and army. The incompatibility of the conflict was the partisan and sectarian differences between the Greek Cypriots and their sponsors the Greeks versus the Turkish Cypriots and their sponsors the Turks. Unlike the situation in Northern Ireland, the partisan/sectarian conflict between the populations of Cyprus seems to be a post WWII development as a byproduct of the Greek Cypriot push for independence.\footnote{Eric Solsten, Editor. \textit{Cyprus a country study}. Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 1993, 25-32.} However, once begun, the actions of each population against each other were violent and included an aggressive segregation of the two populations, to include the relocation of individuals and the physical separation of the two sides as represented by the ‘Green Line’.

As for the characteristics of the situation in Cyprus, this situation like the one in Northern Ireland is far from being permanently resolved. However, in Cyprus, the ‘Green Line’ has been
opened for cross border commerce in certain locations and in the capital of Nicosia, the barrier has been removed in at least one location, all without a permanent agreement in place.182 The specific circumstances leading to this situation appear to have been instigated by the Greek Cypriot acceptance into the European Union. This highlighted both the economic disparity between the two sides and Turkey’s own frustrations with their attempts to gain acceptance into the European Union. These two circumstances along with the stabilizing factor of time seem to have instigated from the Turkish Cypriot and Turkish sides a desire to find a more acceptable, permanent solution to the ‘Green Line’.

While the economic disparity between the two populations can be attributed to one population’s desire to normalize their border, this desire is not shared by the other population as evidenced by the referendum vote. While 65 percent of Turkish Cypriots favored reunification, 76 percent of Greek Cypriots did not.183 From a Greek Cypriot perspective, there is not any positive value to reunification. It is hard to imagine a permanent solution to Cyprus that does not address the fact that 78% of the land in Turkish Cyprus belonged to Greek Cypriots prior to the forced portioning of Cyprus by Turkey.184

The current situation in Cyprus regarding a permanent resolution could best be described as tenuous; however, there are some observations and potential conditions for consideration regarding the circumstances in Cyprus. First, it appears that an overriding incentive or perceived need on one side can overcome the fears of compromised security by the removal of a barrier. However, it also appears that the actor instigating the removal of the barrier cannot ignore the

original grievances of the reluctant actor for lasting success to occur. Second, it could also be inferred that in the situation on Cyprus, the passage of time not only served to create the economic disparity between the two sides, but also allowed for the evolution of both sides with how they see themselves, not only within the island of Cyprus, but how the two sponsoring nations of Greece and Turkey see themselves within the context of Europe. It is too simplistic to infer that time heals all wounds, but what time does allow to occur is a redefining of each individual actor and an evolution of each actor’s interests with the passage of time.

In reference to Macaulay’s conditions, none of the conditions that required any engagement by either side with the other occurred prior to the initial opening of the ‘Green Line’ in Nicosia in 2003. The two conditions that were in place were (1) “a sustained period of political stability,” and (2) “a sustained period of a substantial reduction in violent interface incidents.” The one other condition that was assessed to have been met was “reaching the ‘tipping point’, when key stakeholders see the benefits of removing interface barriers as outweighing the benefits of maintaining them.” In the previous section on Northern Ireland, a return to Macaulay’s concept of the ‘tipping point’ was promised and the remainder of this discussion on Cyprus focuses on the concept of the ‘tipping point’.

In actuality, the concept of the ‘tipping point’ was developed by the author, Malcolm Gladwell. However, in the context of interface barriers, this paper will refer to the ‘tipping point’ as Macaulay’s concept. Macaulay’s tipping point is an interesting concept and has validity as a construct for assessing an actor’s, or stakeholder’s, desire to remove a barrier. At what point or under what circumstances does an actor’s scale tip over to barrier removal versus barrier security or as developed at the beginning of this study, from the fundamental perspective of progress over protection? If a mediating party has an understanding of each actor’s tipping point, any attempts

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186 Ibid, 4.
at a permanent solution should begin with that understanding and the possible gap between two actor’s tipping points. What also warrants further consideration with regard to the concept of the tipping point is what happens when only one actor has achieved their tipping point and the other actor is a reluctant participant, as evidenced by the ongoing situation in Cyprus.

The last consideration regarding the concept of the ‘tipping point’ is how to assess an actor’s tipping point with regards to that actor’s risk tolerance. Upon initial assessment, it seems reasonable to assume that an actor’s risk tolerance would affect their ‘tipping point’, with the understanding that the more risk tolerant an actor is, the more likely they are to tip toward barrier removal rather than maintaining the status quo. In the two situations, in Northern Ireland and Cyprus, there are differing degrees of risk tolerance. In the case of Northern Ireland, their history of violence seems to have created a risk tolerance level bordering on risk aversion. However, in the Cyprus case, the Turkish Cypriots’ risk tolerance appears more liberally applied with respect to the initial opening of the ‘Green Line’ in 2003. In the following section, this study will again visit the ‘tipping point’ with regards to risk tolerance over the decision to remove barriers in Iraq.

Iraq

In the initial description of the three case studies for Iraq, each location, Fallujah, Mosul and Baghdad were discussed separately. In the analysis, this format is also used due to the unique circumstances and conditions regarding each location in Iraq.

Fallujah

In Fallujah, there were three principal actors, the Sunni Iraqis that constituted the predominant majority of the population in Fallujah, al-Qaeda and U.S. forces. The incompatibility of the conflict was a combination of insurgency/terrorist activity and criminal activity as created by the al-Qaeda fight for dominance of the Sunni population over the
traditional Sunni leadership as represented by the Anbar Awakening and their allies, the U.S. forces. The actions in this case were violent as al-Qaeda tried to create further instability.

There were two overriding factors to the success of this situation. First, the U.S. forces’ decision to place both an external barrier surrounding the city of Fallujah, as well as internal barriers within the city to impede al-Qaeda movements and activity. The U.S. forces, partnered with their Iraqi security forces counterparts, dispersed within the now compartmentalized city to more aggressively attempt to reestablish security within the city. Second, was the reassertion of control by Sunni leadership within the Anbar Awakening to regain control of Fallujah along with their willingness to cooperate with the U.S. and Iraqi security forces.

Regarding specific observations over the success in Fallujah, it is first important to understand that the competing actor for control was not a separate population, but a terrorist group. In Fallujah, the population and the local leadership is predominately Sunni. Therefore, the battle for control of Fallujah was a battle for providing security or losing security of one population. The other significant observation is that the U.S. forces, like the British army in Northern Ireland was a third party actor. They, like the British resorted to the use of concrete barriers out of a need for security; however, the U.S. forces had the distinct advantage of a dramatic turnaround in the security environment which allowed them to maintain the security barriers only long enough to establish security.

Continuing the analysis with a review of the conditions as established by Macaulay, the situation in Fallujah is different because there were not two disparate populations competing for power. Therefore the, establishment of a secure environment may have been more heavily influenced by only the contributing factors of numbers of violent incidents rather than any criteria having to do with sectarian or partisan relationships between leaders or populations. However,

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187 Michael J. Totten. "Hope for Iraq's Meanest City."
Macaulay’s conditions are broad in nature and still have value as an analysis tool and so will also be applied to this analysis of the success of Fallujah.

There are two of Macaulay’s conditions that are applicable to the situation in Fallujah. They are (1) “adequate resources to support the implementation process,” and (2) “support for the process by interface residents.” The combination of the U.S. surge forces, Iraqi police and neighborhood watchmen, created a force large enough to begin securing Fallujah. As the influence of the tribal leadership’s new alignment with the U.S. began to take hold, the population’s cooperation with the U.S. and Iraqi security forces also followed. The end result was a successful conclusion to U.S. involvement in Fallujah, which has not been the case in Mosul.

Mosul

In Mosul, there are six primary actors. The largest and most powerful actor is the Sunni population which comprises approximately 60 percent of the city’s population. From this population stems the second actor, the Iraqi police, who are predominately Sunni. The third actor and the most dangerous one is al-Qaeda, which has found a cooperative environment within the Sunni population of Mosul. The fourth actor is the Kurdish population which comprises approximately 25 percent of Mosul. The fifth actor is the Iraqi Army which is predominately Kurdish. The last actor is the U.S. forces. So, with six main actors, the situation in Mosul is extremely complex.

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189 Compilation of two sources: (1) Sudarsan Raghavan. "In Fallujah, Peace Through Brute Strength," and (2) David J. Morris. "Fallujah catches its breath."
190 Sam Dagher. "U.S. sees long fight to oust Al Qaeda in Mosul."
191 Bill Murray. "Mosul conflict ebbs after five-year battle between Coalition, insurgents for control."
192 Sam Dagher. "U.S. sees long fight to oust Al Qaeda in Mosul."
193 Jane Arraf. "As Iraq calms, Mosul remains a battle front."
194 Ibid.
There are two main incompatibilities in Mosul that have compounded the lack of security there. The first incompatibility is between Sunnis and Kurds. This sectarian incompatibility is prevalent between the two populations or any interaction between Sunni or Kurd dominated organizations. The second incompatibility is between al-Qaeda and anyone that opposes them. The resultant actions within the city have tended to be violent and tended to be sectarian whether they are al-Qaeda derived or instigated by other actors’ attempts to gain or maintain power.

As for the characteristics of the situation in Mosul, it is a large city with strategic importance to the Sunnis, the Kurds and al-Qaeda. The external security berm that was meant to impede the flow of terrorists into the city from the outside seems to be failing when contrasted to the continued lack of security within the city. There is no published controversy over the security berm, but there seems to have been an intentional choice made by the Iraqi Army leadership not to follow the Baghdad and Fallujah models of walling off neighborhoods within the city.\(^{195}\) As the U.S. forces approach a June 30, 2009 deadline to leave all Iraqi cities, the military leadership operating within Mosul are wondering if the Iraqi government will ask them to stay.\(^{196}\)

The overriding observation in this situation regarding Mosul is how much longer will the security situation be allowed to erode before more drastic security measures are taken. Based on the success of barriers within other Iraqi cities, it will be interesting to see if security barriers are eventually used inside Mosul. The one other observation is in regards to how complex the problems within Mosul are. Mosul is a strategic city and whether al-Qaeda survives the surge or not, the problems between the Sunnis and the Kurds are not resolved. Ultimately, the prognosis for peace in Mosul is not good.

In keeping with the format for analysis, Macaulay’s conditions were again reviewed with respect to the situation in Mosul. None of the conditions were met in regards to the security situation in Mosul, again with the observation being that Mosul’s security situation appears to still be eroding and therefore not a candidate for discussion of any conditions regarding the removal of security measures. This section will now analyze the last case study, where there has been success in re-establishing security, Baghdad, Iraq.

Baghdad

In Baghdad, there are seven primary actors. The two largest and most important actors are the Sunni and Shia populations living within the city. Directly linked to the Sunni population are the Sons of Iraq, a predominately Sunni security force originally under U.S. pay, but now under the pay of the Iraqi government.\footnote{Greg Bruno. "Finding a Place for the 'Sons of Iraq.'" \textit{Council on Foreign Relations website}. January 9, 2009. http://www.cfr.org/publication/16088/ (accessed March 16, 2009).} For the sake of brevity, the fourth actor is labeled Iraqi security forces, originally being predominately Iraqi Army forces, but in Baghdad that has slowly been shifted to the Iraqi police.\footnote{Daniel Blottenberger. "Iraqi police now Baghdad's first line of defense." \textit{U.S. Central Command website}. September 14, 2008. http://www.centcom.mil/en/news/iraqi-police-now-baghdads-first-line-of-defense.html (accessed March 16, 2009).} The fifth actor is U.S. forces. The two remaining actors are al-Qaeda, which are primarily Sunni and the Shiite militiamen of the ‘special groups’.\footnote{Associated Press. "Baghdad's walls keep peace but feel like prison.”}

There were two main incompatibilities behind the conflict in Baghdad. One was the al-Qaeda or ‘special group’ sponsored terrorism and the second was the sectarian violence between Sunnis and Shias. For the sake of brevity, this is a very simple categorization of a complex problem and the reader needs to understand that there were many layers of incompatibility influencing Baghdad during the period addressed in this study. As for the actions, there were significant levels of violence against the population and against any formal security group, whether it was U.S., Iraqi government or Sons of Iraq.
In regards to the characteristics of the situation in Baghdad, the ‘Baghdad Walls’ were collectively criticized by both Sunni and Shia populations and leadership. However, the security barriers worked. They are credited with having a dramatic impact on helping re-establish security in Baghdad. Now, approximately two years after the initiation of the first ‘gated communities’ as defined by Lieutenant General Odierno, the security barriers are coming down along roadways and around some neighborhoods. However, for security reasons, many neighborhood security barriers will remain.

In addressing the situation in Doura, American commanders were credited with conceding the risks because of the “potential payoff,” with the battalion commander responsible for Doura describing the need to balance “security with economic concerns.” The initial observation in regards to the situation in Doura is similar to the observation offered during the analysis of the ‘tipping point’ in discussing the situation in Cyprus. It appears that there was enough confidence in the security situation to accommodate an increased risk tolerance in hopes of the bigger reward of increased progress in the form of economic gains for the community. It appears from the additional discussion with LTC Raymer, that there are other neighborhoods emerging as ready for the removal of their security barriers.

A second observation regarding this specific concept of increasing acceptable risk for a greater return has to do with a counter-intuitive but still valid premise. This premise is that with the reduction of security measures comes an increase in progress, which fosters a greater sense of community commitment to maintain this progress and as a byproduct creates within a community a resistance to forces attempting to diminish or destroy that progress. In sum, a reduction in physical security may create a community more resistant to behavior that will marginalize their

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201 Compilation of two sources: Odierno, Ray. "In defense of Baghdad’s ‘walls’," and e-mail correspondence with LTC Raymer.
202 E-mail correspondence with LTC Raymer.
security. The risk in this situation is the confidence in the population’s resiliency to violence as the impetus for a reduction in security measures.

Continuing with the concept of increased risk tolerance, there is one additional observation. Dr. Kimberly Kagan writes in her report “Enforcing the Law: The Baghdad Security Plan Begins” that “mixed neighborhoods in Iraq have existed for centuries, and have rarely been a source of widespread violence.” She attributed much of the current violence in Iraq to groups who had the dual purpose of attempting to incite retaliatory attacks and affect American public opinion. From the perspective of the removal of the security barriers in Baghdad or in any other situation, an understanding of the historical compatibility of two actors in conflict seems relevant to assessing the likelihood of continued conflict subsequent to the removal of the barriers. In the case of Baghdad, one could assume that if the instigating actors were removed from the situation then a community shared by two different populations would be more likely to succeed than not based on their historical behavior. In Baghdad, perhaps the neighborhood security barriers will provide the separation needed to maintain control of the security environment and to also allow the two populations to normalize their behavior prior to the removal of the security barriers. But, in the neighborhoods where the barriers have been removed, there is a separate smaller case study occurring with the removal of their security barriers. To contrast Baghdad with Belfast, the situation in Northern Ireland does not appear to share the same historical behavior. So in Baghdad, stability may allow a removal of the security barriers while in Belfast stability may not be enough. What may be required in Belfast is a change in each population’s perspectives before the barriers can be removed. As the situation in Baghdad progresses this premise will be more thoroughly tested.

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Once again, this section will return to the conditions for barrier removal as advocated by Macaulay to further analyze the Baghdad case study. Based on Colonel Raymer’s statement that the Baghdad Operations Command requested that some of the neighborhood security barriers remain; the assessment is that four of Macaulay’s conditions apply in the case of Baghdad. They are (1) “a sustained period of a substantial reduction in violent interface incidents,” (2) “a high level of confidence in the policing of the interface areas,” (3) “support for the process by interface residents, elected representatives, government bodies and civic society,” (4) “adequate resources to support the implementation of the process.”

While the qualifier of “a sustained period” regarding violent incidents could be debated, this study contends that in relation to the recent violence in Baghdad, the reduction in violence does qualify both due to the significant reduction and the likelihood of that reduction in violence continuing. So, it appears that the circumstances for the removal of security barriers in Baghdad comes the closest of all the case studies in providing circumstances to match the conditions stipulated by Macaulay. The one additional condition that has been reached in some neighborhoods, but not in others is the 'tipping point'.

However, in an effort to maintain objectivity, Macaulay’s conditions were based on a methodical process over time in order to establish the conditions necessary to bring down the interface barriers in Northern Ireland. There is no evidence either in favor or against to indicate that the government of Iraq or U.S. forces is considering these conditions in their assessment to remove the security barriers. There is just as much evidence to indicate from the Doura example, that a desire to reinvigorate their war torn capital city combined with a certain level of risk tolerance based on a dramatically improving security situation led the government of Iraq to request the removal of the barriers in Doura and in other neighborhoods. This is not a judgment

206 E-mail correspondence with LTC Raymer.
in favor or against the circumstances for the removal of the barriers, but a further assessment of the validity of the specific conditions instigating the removal of the security barriers in Iraq.

In closing this section that analyzed each case study, it is evident that there are many variables to consider when assessing an actor’s desire to remove a security barrier. In the final section of this study, the analysis accomplished in this section is used to determine the validity of the original hypothesis. If it is determined that there are a prerequisite set of conditions for the removal of security barriers, then the original hypothesis is validated. If the analysis cannot derive these conditions, then the hypothesis is invalidated, which brings this study to its final section.
Conclusion

In the introduction to this study, both the goal of the study and the hypothesis for analysis were established. The goal of this study was to research the use of security barriers across the world and to specifically delve into the circumstances for the removal of security barriers. The hypothesis of this study was that there are definable, prerequisite conditions or criteria that must be met before physical barriers established to provide security of a population can be removed.

The underlying premise to this study’s goal and hypothesis was that no matter where conflict occurred and security barriers erected, the fundamental conditions for re-establishing security and creating a hospitable environment for the removal of the barriers would be universal or at least indicate common characteristics from which could be derived common conditions or criteria.

However, from the analysis of the case studies selected for this study, it is apparent that each situation is unique and the characteristics of each situation have led to varied conditions or criteria for the removal of security barriers. In fact, what this study discovered is that there appears to be a more direct link between the removal of security barriers and risk tolerance in regards to an improved security environment, than any specific conditions or criteria as necessary underpinnings for the removal of security barriers. This link is developed in more detail later in this concluding section.

The one common condition derived from the successful case studies of Cyprus, Fallujah and Baghdad, or at least in some Baghdad neighborhoods, is an improved security environment. There were no other common conditions or criteria from the case studies that could be considered as prerequisites for the removal of security barriers. This validation of a correlation between an increased security environment and the removal of security barriers falls far short of this study’s objective of discovering more significant findings as represented by additional considerations or criteria for the removal of security barriers. However, no additional common conditions or criteria were identified. Therefore, the hypothesis that there are definable, prerequisite conditions
that must be met before physical barriers established to provide security of a population can be
removed is invalid, based on the analysis of this study.

What was identified in the analysis of the case studies is that there are definable variables
and considerations that increase the likelihood of the successful removal of a security barrier.
There are varied idealized conditions or criteria that can be derived from the works of others. Mr.
Tony Macaulay’s ten conditions for the removal of interface barriers in Northern Ireland probably
represent one of the most complete set of theoretical conditions. There are also conditions as
derived from an analysis of historical case studies. However in both cases, theory and reality,
these conditions cannot be considered necessary or mandatory.

In the process of invalidating the hypothesis of this study, it became evident that there are
a limited number of pertinent case studies that contribute to supporting or invalidating the
premise of this study. In spite of the lack of quantity, this study was able to accomplish the
overarching goal of studying security barriers and the circumstances of their existence or
removal. From this analysis of the use of security barriers, this study gleaned the relevant
observations regarding the future use of security barriers. In the hopes of generating further
research and discussion on this topic as well as providing a summary of the most pertinent
observations, the remainder of this section focuses on summarizing those observations.

The most significant observation was referred to earlier in this section. That observation
being that there appears to be a strong link between removing security barriers in an improved
security environment and risk tolerance rather than any other consideration. Or to better clarify
this point, the decision for the removal of security barriers seems to be more of a subjective,
qualitative one rather than an objective assessment of any variables. This manifested itself by a
sense of initiative fueled by a desire for progress that incorporated varying degrees of risk
tolerance based on the improved security environment. The more tenuous the assessment of
security, the more tolerant the risk assessment seemed to be. From this observation, this study
offers the following additional observations regarding risk.
With regards to more short-term situations like Fallujah, it appeared that the rapidly improving security situation also led to increased confidence by the actors in continuing that success, which then led to the acceptability of the risk in removing the barriers. For longer-term situations like Cyprus and Northern Ireland, there is not as clear an indication in the value of increased security and risk. In the case of Cyprus, the long-term stability of the situation likely enabled the confidence to begin removing the barriers. However, in Northern Ireland, there appears to be no correlation between the long-term success of having no violence and any confidence in accepting the risk of removing the security barriers. However, in all three countries, there is also a significant amount of historical and cultural context that affects the situation in each location that must be considered. It is this historical and cultural context that will be discussed next.

Most importantly, an understanding of the historical and cultural context of the conflict between the primary actors that led to the need for a security barrier is essential. This understanding assists in providing reasonable expectations regarding the use and the permanence of security barriers. As evidenced by the situation in Northern Ireland, it is not surprising considering the centuries of conflict between the Catholic and Protestant populations that there is a continued need for the barriers. In comparison, the improving situation in Doura, Baghdad could be assessed as being more likely to survive the removal of the security barriers since there is not as prevalent a history of sectarian violence in the city.\footnote{Kimberly Kagan. "Enforcing the Law: The Baghdad Security Plan Begins," 5.}

It was observed that whether the differences are historical or cultural, the numbers and types of actors as participants in the conflict were also important. As long as there are two populations with differing goals, there is likely to be conflict. Mosul for example, with its sectarian and partisan differences between the Sunni and Kurd populations could continue to be problematic even with the removal of the instigating actions of al-Qaeda. Only time will tell
whether the security berm around the city isolates al-Qaeda and whether the need to use barriers within the city to separate Sunni from Kurd becomes necessary. Fallujah, on the other hand showed dramatic changes in its security environment once al-Qaeda was removed as an actor in large part because there was no competing large population vying for power with the Sunni population. Once al-Qaeda was removed, so were the security barriers.

Al-Qaeda in Iraq was only one type of third party actor. Both the U.S. forces in Iraq and the British army in Northern Ireland can be categorized as third party actors. For both the U.S. and British actors, their stated goals and actions were attempts to increase security and stability. Regarding a third party actor’s role in a conflict, it is assumed that this third actor can help two actors with issues that appear to have no resolution. However, what is interesting with the use of the security barriers in the case studies researched is that a third party actor was responsible for formalizing the use of security barriers in four of the five case studies. The British army fortified the ‘peace walls’ of Northern Ireland and U.S. forces instigated the use of security barriers in all three Iraq case studies. So, it could be inferred that a third party actor is more willing to consider more drastic measures for establishing security than the principal actors.

Another observation regarding the use of security barriers from the analysis of Northern Ireland is that once they are used with success, their continued use is more likely. Whether this has any correlation with the previous observation is purely speculative, but originally the British army and eventually the Northern Ireland government did find success in their ‘peace walls’, and continued to use them as a barrier to conflict. Without considering the ramifications of security barriers in each specific situation, there is a danger of selecting the easy solution. The reality is that the establishment of a security barrier is easier and cheaper than the manpower needed to establish security without the barriers in place. As a final observation with regards to the success of security barriers is the insidious reinforcement time provides to the success of the security barriers. It is this impact of time that is discussed next.
The impact of time in a conflict situation provided mixed observations. It is too simplistic to assume that the passage of time served to resolve conflict between two actors. However, it is reasonable to assume that the passage of time changes the perspectives of each actor within the context of the conflict. For example, the passage of time created a different strategic environment for both Turkish Cypriots and Turkey in regards to how they viewed the necessity of the ‘Green Line’. Just as significant can be the stabilizing influence of time, both good and bad. Time and the security barrier separating them may help two actors in conflict normalize their relationship over time. However, just as likely is that two actors separated by a security barrier develop a sense of permanence over time with regard to their perspective of each other’s positions in the conflict exacerbated by the lack of engagement with each other due to the security barrier.

There was one concept developed in this study that could be said to occur when the time was right and that concept was the ‘tipping point’. The ‘tipping point’ defined by Macaulay as the point where “the benefits of removing interface barriers as outweighing the benefits of maintaining them.”\textsuperscript{209} There were two observations from the analysis of the situation in Cyprus derived from the ‘tipping point’ concept. First, was the relationship between incentive or reward and risk in relation to the tipping point. For example, the Turkish Cypriots and Turks were willing to remove a security barrier in an effort to begin normalizing relations based on an incentive or potential reward. The understood incentive was that the economic opportunity of a normalized relationship with the rest of Europe would benefit both the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey. Since this action was initiated by one side with no prior coordination from the other side,\textsuperscript{209}

\textsuperscript{209} Tony Macaulay. "A discussion paper proposing a five phase process for the removal of ‘peace walls’ in Northern Ireland,” 4. As a reminder from a previous footnote, the term ‘tipping point’ is not Macaulay’s idea, but from Malcolm Gladwell’s book \textit{The Tipping Point}. Macaulay confirmed this via e-mail correspondence. For more information on Gladwell’s concept see: Gladwell, Malcolm. Website: http://www.gladwell.com/tippingpoint/index.html. For the purpose of this monograph, a distinction will be made in reference to the ‘tipping point’ by referring to Macaulay’s ten conditions with the understanding that this is a concept borrowed from Gladwell, but is in relation to the removal of security barriers only.
there was an assumed level of risk. The competing interests being the chance of reward versus the risk of the loss of security. The discovery of risk as a primary consideration in the removal of a security barrier was discussed earlier with regards to the risk of losing security for the chance of progress. The additional observation is that the balance between choosing to remove a security barrier for the incentive of reward or progress versus the risk of losing security is what defines Macaulay’s ‘tipping point’ for an actor. The greater the chance for reward, the more liberal the risk tolerance is likely to be. This incentive or reward perspective highlighted the second observation.

The second observation was that every actor has a ‘tipping point’. Related to this assumption was that if an actor’s ‘tipping point’ is understood then it has value for a mediator or another actor attempting to resolve the conflict. Also, if all actors have a ‘tipping point’, then it can also be assumed that these ‘tipping points’ are different and that an understanding of each actor’s ‘tipping point’ can indicate a way ahead or at least highlight the realities of resolving the conflict between the two actors.

The last observation regarding the analysis of this study had to do with the realization that sometimes the risk of removing a security barrier must also consider as a variable the chances of actually increasing the security situation. This last observation came from the current situation in Doura where U.S. commanders and Iraqi government officials are increasing their risk tolerance by removing barriers in the hopes that the reward of increased economic benefits creates a healthier and more secure environment for the population. This is counter to the protection versus progress premise discussed throughout this study. However, as long as the actors are willing to accept risk, the logic of this course of action, of removing a barrier even when the security environment is not as secure as would be preferred may be worth the payoff of increased prosperity.

Ultimately, whether one considers the dynamic as protection versus progress or progress begets protection, the case studies in this study highlighted the fact that conflict situations are too
complex to simplify into a common set of prerequisite conditions. Instead, what seemed evident from the case studies is that the underlying concept to resolving a complex conflict between actors is the ability to assess risk based on an actor’s level of comfort with the level of risk they are willing to take based on the potential rewards. This applies to the conflict in general and more specifically to the removal of security barriers.
Appendix A

This is a listing of current security barriers around the world. This list is derived from a variety of sources and is not comprehensive. However, this list does give the reader a better understanding of the types of security barriers and their locations. This list was used to develop this study’s security barrier classification and was also used as the initial assessment for the selection of case studies for this monograph. This list is alphabetical and does not include gated communities, but does include security barriers erected for the purpose of criminal containment. Since a variety of sources were used, each itemized security barrier is footnoted and the purpose of the barrier is described as quoted by the source, not by the classifications developed for this study.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY(IES)</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>LENGTH</th>
<th>PURPOSE</th>
<th>STATUS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan-Pakistan</td>
<td>Border between countries</td>
<td>Unknown, short sections along various locations</td>
<td>Stop militants into Afghanistan</td>
<td>Afghanistan is against the construction²¹⁰</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana-Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Border between countries</td>
<td>300 miles</td>
<td>Official: prevent diseased cattle from crossing, Unofficial: prevent migration into Botswana</td>
<td>Zimbabwe opposes the barrier²¹¹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Rio de Janeiro</td>
<td>650 meters</td>
<td>Drug trafficking and gang violence</td>
<td>First of many barriers around “favelas” (slums)²¹²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China-Hong Kong</td>
<td>Border between</td>
<td>30 kilometers</td>
<td>Stop illegal</td>
<td>Finished²¹³</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country Pair</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Length</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China-Macau</td>
<td>Border between China and Macau Special Administrative Region</td>
<td>0.34 kilometers</td>
<td>Border control</td>
<td>Finished</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>Border between Greek and Turkish Cyprus</td>
<td>112 miles</td>
<td>Conflict barrier between Greek and Turkish sides</td>
<td>Called the “Green Line” and is slowly being taken down</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India-Bangladesh</td>
<td>Border between countries</td>
<td>3000 miles</td>
<td>Defensive and to stop illegal trade</td>
<td>Finished</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India-Pakistan</td>
<td>Border along disputed Kashmir and Punjab regions</td>
<td>1800 miles total</td>
<td>Stop smuggling and separatist militias</td>
<td>India plans to build barrier along entire border. Pakistan protests barrier as illegal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Baghdad</td>
<td>Several short lengths, all under 5 miles</td>
<td>Sectarian violence</td>
<td>Part of Baghdad Security Plan, considered temporary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Fallujah</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Flow of militants into/out of Fallujah and control insurgent activity inside Fallujah</td>
<td>Temporary earthen berm erected from approximately Jan 07 to Oct 08</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


216 PBS Wide Angle. "The World's Most Complex Borders"

217 Compilation of two sources: (1) NOW on PBS. "Walls of the World" and PBS Wide Angle. "The World’s Most Complex Borders."

218 NOW on PBS. "Walls of the World."

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Distance</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Mosul</td>
<td>50 km</td>
<td>Flow of militants into/out of Mosul</td>
<td>Temporary earthen berm erected Dec 07²²₀</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq-Kuwait</td>
<td>Border between countries</td>
<td>120 miles</td>
<td>Prevent Iraq invasion</td>
<td>Finished²²¹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq-Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>Border between countries</td>
<td>559 miles</td>
<td>Flow of militants into Iraq / Flow of refugees and smugglers into Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>Saudi Arabia Project, Construction just beginning²²²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran-Pakistan</td>
<td>Border between countries</td>
<td>435 miles</td>
<td>Stop smuggling, drugs into Iran, fuel into Pakistan and stop terror attacks</td>
<td>Pakistan supports Iran’s right to build barrier on their land²²₃</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel-Gaza</td>
<td>Border with Palestinian governed Gaza</td>
<td>60 km</td>
<td>To prevent terrorists from entering Israel</td>
<td>Finished²²₄</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel-West Bank</td>
<td>Border with Palestinian governed West Bank</td>
<td>436 miles</td>
<td>To prevent terrorists from entering Israel</td>
<td>Under construction, Opposed by UN and Palestinians²²₅</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Padua, Via Anelli Wall</td>
<td>275 feet</td>
<td>Segregate gang violence and drug dealing</td>
<td>Segregated mostly African immigrant area²²₆</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco-Western Sahara</td>
<td>Border between Morocco and disputed Western Sahara area</td>
<td>1700 miles</td>
<td>Stop Sahwari people from entering disputed territory</td>
<td>Finished²²⁷</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Korea-South Korea</td>
<td>Border between countries</td>
<td>151 miles</td>
<td>Conflict barrier</td>
<td>Finished²²⁸</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Ireland</td>
<td>Belfast</td>
<td>13 miles total comprised of</td>
<td>Sectarian violence</td>
<td>Called Peace Lines, some have</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country Pairs</td>
<td>Border Type</td>
<td>Distance</td>
<td>Issue Description</td>
<td>Notes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain-Morocco</td>
<td>Surrounding city of Melilla</td>
<td>6 miles</td>
<td>Stop illegal immigrants from Morocco</td>
<td>Morocco opposes barrier and does not recognize Spain's sovereignty.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain-Morocco</td>
<td>Surrounding city of Ceuta</td>
<td>8 kilometers</td>
<td>Stop illegal immigrants from Morocco</td>
<td>Morocco opposes barrier and does not recognize Spain's sovereignty.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand-Malaysia</td>
<td>Border between countries</td>
<td>12 miles</td>
<td>Stop illegal trafficking of drugs, weapons, people</td>
<td>Discussions ongoing to lengthen barrier along border.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States- Mexico</td>
<td>Border between countries</td>
<td>670 miles</td>
<td>Stop illegal immigrants</td>
<td>Under construction.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

231 NOW on PBS. "Walls of the World."
Appendix B

This appendix provides a short historical summary leading up to the present day situation in Northern Ireland. The purpose of this short summary is to provide a reference of the history, the principal actors and their interests in Northern Ireland. The history of British claims of dominion over Ireland dates back to the 12th century. However, no real attempt to control Ireland occurred until Henry VIII’s reign and was directly related to the Reformation and an attempt to convert the population to the English Church in the late 16th century. While this attempt failed, this attempt is also credited with the polarization of the population in Ireland for the Roman Catholic Church and against the Church of England, merging the religious choice with the patriotic choice against English rule.

Succeeding his father, Henry VIII as king, Edward VI started a policy of “plantation” which was a program of giving English settlers lands confiscated “from rebellious Irish families.” The early 17th century saw a continued plantation of Scottish Presbyterians in Ulster, Northern Ireland following the failed attempt of an Irish revolt that was defeated by the armies of Elizabeth I. the Irish again revolted in the mid 17th century and were again defeated, this time by the armies of Oliver Cromwell who also passed legislation allowing those that helped defeat the Irish “a share in confiscated lands.” Further fighting in the late 17th century between the Catholic James I and the future William III, a protestant, created an even worse situation for

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236 Ibid, 1.
237 Ibid. 1.
239 Ibid
240 Ibid
the Irish population. "Catholic property ownership, education and right to bear arms" were limited, dropping Catholic land ownership “to negligible levels” over the next several years.

However, during the 18th century, even the Protestant class started to “lobby for representation in parliament, thereby sowing the early seeds of Irish nationalism.” In the late 18th century, the Irish Catholics again rebelled and failed with the Irish Protestants converting the failure into seats for themselves in Parliament. During the 19th century, the Irish Catholics did gain emancipation and did continue to use violence in an attempt to establish “Home Rule” for the Irish. It was during the 19th century that two important things happened. First, the creation of the revolutionary movement, the Fenians, occurred; commonly acknowledged as “the precursors of the IRA.” Second, Ulster in Northern Ireland, was “first characterized as a ‘special case’, separate from the rest of Ireland.” “Opposition to Home Rule was strongest in Ulster, where Protestants had benefited greatly from the industrial revolution and associated their economic success with being part of the British Empire.”

The early 20th century was marked with repeated failures in Parliament to achieve Home Rule for the Irish. The Protestants of Ulster were very much opposed to Irish rule and both sides started to form large private armies. The Protestants, also called the Unionists, formed the Ulster Volunteer Force and the Catholics, also called Nationalists, formed the Irish Volunteers. Both armies were estimated to number over 100,000 members. In 1920, the British “weary and unable to defeat the IRA, offered a compromise…Ireland would be divided in

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241 BBC History. The Road to Northern Ireland, 1167 to 1921.
242 Ibid
243 Ibid
244 Ibid
245 Ibid
247 Ibid
248 Ibid
249 Ibid
250 Ibid
251 Ibid
252 Ibid
Northern Ireland...and the Irish Free State.” Northern Ireland was comprised of the six “most Protestant counties of Ulster.” This partitioning of Ireland became law in May 1921.

What followed for much of the remainder of the 20th century was continued conflict. In Ireland, it took over 20 years to declare the IRA dead as they had represented the strongest opposition to the partitioning of Ireland. In Northern Ireland, the IRA had a marginal impact until the late 1960s, when “the Troubles” are commonly thought to have begun in 1968, followed in 1969 by the creation of the Provisional IRA as a more violent breakaway faction of the official IRA. But, on the Protestant side, they spent the 40 plus years following the partitioning agreement consolidating their power. “The Protestants in Northern Ireland remained united with Great Britain as the only sure means of guaranteeing Protestant control.” The Orange Order became the most influential organization in Northern Ireland. The Orange Order is a Protestant organization with a history back to the late 17th century and William III, also known as William the Orange. During the 20th century, “Most of the Protestant politicians have been members of the Orange Order, and the Unionists, the Protestant political party, has been dominated by Orangemen. The Unionist Party held power in Northern Ireland from 1921 to 1971.
The result of this Protestant domination of Northern Ireland was the establishment of “essentially a Protestant state, which effectively discriminated against Catholics in housing, jobs, and political representation.” From the Protestant perspective, the “discrimination was valid because of their fear that Catholics were not loyal to the state, and that the very existence of Northern Ireland was threatened by what they saw as a subversive minority.” Unfortunately, what these differing perspectives have created in Northern Ireland a “divided society,” “where segregation became the norm and in which different categories of a social, political, cultural, and theological nature rarely cut across one another.” It was this segregation and discrimination that was at the heart of the Catholic push for civil rights which began in 1967 out of impatience for reform.

In 1968 what were intended to be peaceful civil rights marches became violent as marchers clashed with the Royal Ulster Constabulary. Britain quickly responded with a series of reforms, however, even these reforms failed to meet the Catholic protestors demands. The situation rapidly escalated and paramilitary groups on both sides began to operate as Britain again tried reform measures to placate the Catholic protestors. This had the unintended effect of creating a Protestant backlash, leading to more violence. As the violence escalated, the British Army was deployed to Northern Ireland in August 1969, further driving Catholics into the Provisional IRA with “some Catholics, fearful for their safety in the riots that followed the civil rights marches, began to ask the IRA for protection.”

266 Ibid, 4.
268 Ibid
269 Ibid
270 Ibid
271 Ibid
confronting British troops who had arrived on the island to assist with riot control.”\textsuperscript{273} This escalating situation that began with the deployment of British troops in 1969 and culminated with the 1998 Belfast Agreement marks the approximate 30 year period that is commonly referred to as “the troubles” and is where the case study in the main portion of this study begins.\textsuperscript{274}

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{273} Mari Fitzduff. \textit{Beyond Violence, Conflict Resolution Process in Northern Ireland}, 8.
\end{flushleft}
Appendix C

Much like the previous appendix on Northern Ireland, this appendix provides a short historical summary leading up to the present day situation in Cyprus in order to establish who the principle actors are and their interests in Cyprus. Even though Cyprus is 500 miles south-east of the Greek mainland, the largest ethnic population and the overwhelming majority are Greek Cypriots, approximately 77% of the total population of Cyprus.\(^{275}\) The Greek Cypriots are descendants of Greeks who settled on Cyprus “during the second half of the second millennium B.C.”\(^{276}\) The Greek Cypriots control the larger, southern half of Cyprus.\(^{277}\) The second largest ethnic population are the Turkish Cypriots, comprising approximately 18% of the total population.\(^{278}\) The Turkish Cypriots control the smaller northern half of the island, whose coast is only 42 miles south of Turkey.\(^{279}\)

From 1571 to 1878, Cyprus was under Ottoman rule.\(^{280}\) In 1878, Britain was ceded administrative control of Cyprus from the Ottoman Empire.\(^{281}\) In 1914, the British annexed Cyprus at the start of World War I and in 1925, Cyprus became a British Crown Colony.\(^{282}\) Over the next 35 years of British rule, the Greek Cypriot desire for enosis, the union of Cyprus with Greece, came to the forefront.\(^{283}\) The Turkish Cypriots preferred to remain under British rule or as a second choice, partition, called taksim, with their portion of Cyprus as part of Turkey.\(^{284}\)


\(^{278}\) Ibid, 2.

\(^{279}\) Ibid, 2.

\(^{280}\) Eric Solsten, Editor. *Cyprus a country study*, 17, 20.

\(^{281}\) Ibid, 19-20.

\(^{282}\) Ibid, 21.

\(^{283}\) Ibid, 21-26.

\(^{284}\) Ibid, xxiv.
In 1960 a compromise solution was brokered, creating the independent Republic of Cyprus.\textsuperscript{285} This compromise solution was created by Britain, Greece and Turkey during the London and Zurich Accords of 1959 and 1960.\textsuperscript{286} “The accords prohibited Enosis and taksim and introduced a bicomunal/federal solution for the island. Britain, Greece and Turkey had a right to intervene, unilaterally or together, in order to restore the state of affairs in the island.”\textsuperscript{287} The actual creation of Cyprus was based on three separate treaties; the Treaty of Guarantee, the Treaty of Alliance and the Treaty of Establishment.\textsuperscript{288} There are two significant ramifications of these treaties. First, the government of Cyprus was required to have a Greek Cypriot president and a Turkish Cypriot vice president, a council of ministers consisting of 7 Greek Cypriots and 3 Turkish Cypriots and a House of Representatives of 50 members, also with the same seven to three ratio.\textsuperscript{289} Second, Britain was given sovereignty over two military bases on the southern coast of Cyprus.\textsuperscript{290}

The impact of these three treaties in creating Cyprus is at the heart of the current situation in Cyprus. The Greek Cypriots were dissatisfied because of the large share of participation and control the Turkish Cypriots were given in the government; especially when compared to their overall percentage of the population. This led to a period from 1963 to 1974 of “intercommunal violence” and the physical segregation of the two populations.\textsuperscript{291} This culminated in 1974 when a Greek military sponsored coup changed the government of Greece. This coup instigated Turkish fears of enosis, causing Turkey to invade Cyprus and take control of approximately 37% of Cyprus.\textsuperscript{292} This created the north-south partition of Cyprus that exists today.\textsuperscript{293}

\textsuperscript{285} Eric Solsten, Editor. \textit{Cyprus a country study}, xxi.
\textsuperscript{287} Ibid, 3.
\textsuperscript{288} Eric Solsten, Editor. \textit{Cyprus a country study}, xxi.
\textsuperscript{289} Ibid, 165-166.
\textsuperscript{290} Ibid, xxii.
\textsuperscript{292} Ibid, 3.
\textsuperscript{293} Eric Solsten, Editor. \textit{Cyprus a country study}, xxvi.
What also happened was an almost complete ethnic separation of the two populations.

According to a Council of Europe report entitled “Colonisation of Turkish settlers of the occupied part of Cyprus,” “Immediately before the conflict, in 1973, about 162,041 Greek Cypriots lived in the northern part of the island, and approximately 72,000 Turkish Cypriots lived in the southern part.**294** This same report also states that “Since 1974, a reduction of the Greek Cypriot population in the northern part of the island by over 99%” and “Also the Turkish Cypriot population living in the Greek Cypriot zone was considerably reduced as a result of transfers carried out by UN or the ICRC, and following negotiations in Vienna in early August 1975.”**295**

The end result of these relocations according to the Library of Congress country study on Cyprus that “As of late 1989, only 611 Greek Cypriots lived under Turkish occupation…Only about 100 Turkish Cypriots remained in the south.”**296**

In addition to the relocation of populations based on ethnicity, Turkey also physically partitioned Cyprus,

“Turkey built a barrier along the Green Line, with concrete walls, barbed-wire fencing, military outposts, and some minefields. The barrier is now 187 miles long and splits the capital, Nicosia, in two. Turkey maintains approximately 30,000 troops in the north, many of them stationed along the barrier. Additionally, United Nations peacekeeping forces maintain a presence along the Green Line.”**297** (Author’s note: This source’s distance is incorrect, the distance is actually closer to 112 miles or 180 km)**298**

The label of the “Green Line” has its history in the Greek Cypriot leadership request for British military support to maintain the peace in 1963.

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295 Ibid

296 Eric Solsten, Editor. Cyprus a country study. 221.


The British commanding officer, Major General Young, used a green pencil to subdivide the Cyprus capital, Nicosia for the purpose of establishing the separation of Greek and Turkish Cypriots.\(^{299}\) As the situation in Cyprus worsened, the possibility of a United Nations peacekeeping operation was considered and requested in February 1964.\(^{300} \ 301\) By March 1964, the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) was a reality and eventually deployed along the entire ceasefire line across the island.\(^{302} \ 303\) UNFICYP still exists today.\(^{304}\)

While there is no evidence to indicate whether Turkey considered the “Green Line” temporary or permanent, there are other indicators that show that Turkey’s strategic plan was to establish a more permanent influence on Cyprus. The Council of Europe report “Colonisation by Turkish settlers of the occupied part of Cyprus” stated that “Turkish figures show at least 31,000 settlers. The Turkish Cypriot and Turkish press have given far larger estimates for Turkish settlers in the occupied area including figures as high as 50,000, 80,000 or even 100,000.”\(^{305}\) This report also documents the eased process for attaining Turkish Cypriot nationality and identifies that the colonization process was made worse by what the report states as “the continuous outflow of the indigenous Turkish Cypriot population from the northern part. Their number decreased from 118,000 in 1974 to an estimated 87,600 in 2001. In consequence, the settlers outnumber the indigenous Turkish Cypriot population in the northern part of the island.”\(^{306}\) The overriding concern of the report being best summarized by this statement:

\(^{301}\) Ibid
\(^{302}\) Ibid
\(^{303}\) Ibid
\(^{304}\) Ibid
\(^{305}\) Council of Europe Report. "Doc. 9799 Colonisation by Turkish settlers of the occupied part of Cyprus."
\(^{306}\) Ibid
“Change in the demographic structure of Cyprus already underway, creates a real threat that in the long-term the considerable increase in the numbers of the Turkish-speaking population might be used for a justification of the inordinate claims of the Turkish side regarding territorial arrangements and political powers in a final settlement of the Cyprus problem.”

It is also important to understand that since the partition of 1974, the Greek Cypriots have made a significant economic recovery. From business projects in the Gulf States to the export of agricultural products to the movement of Lebanese and Russian business to Cyprus due to their own country’s turmoil, the sum total was a positive economic impact on Cyprus. According to George Stavri’s research paper entitled “AN ECONOMIC VISION FOR CYPRUS: THE GREEK CYPRIOT EXPERIENCE,” “In 1974 the GDP per capita among Greek Cypriots stood at nearly 4,000 dollars. In 2005, it stands above 23,000 dollars.” However, the Turkish Cypriots did not have the same success. Again, to quote Stavri’s research paper:

“The international embargo on the Turkish Cypriot community, at the behest of the Republic of Cyprus, removed any possibility of trade the Turkish Cypriots could have with the rest of the world, except with Turkey. Turkey became Turkish Cypriots’ lifeline during the long and tranquil but economically difficult period of 1974-2003. In GDP per capita terms, the Turkish Cypriots had in 1974 a low of 1,800 dollars and slowly increased that over almost thirty years to 4,409 dollars in 2002.”

The economic result of the partitioning of Cyprus led to a prosperous Greek Cyprus and a struggling Turkish Cyprus.

307 Council of Europe Report. "Doc. 9799 Colonisation by Turkish settlers of the occupied part of Cyprus."
309 Ibid, 3-4.
310 Ibid, 3.
311 Ibid, 4.
Appendix D

This appendix on gated communities may seem a divergent path from this study’s thesis; however, there is value added in providing as background information a discussion on the similarities in certain types of gated communities and their residents’ demands for security. According to Blakely and Snyder’s well known work, *Fortress America*, security was assessed to be ‘very important’ to 70% of surveyed residents’ decision to live in a gated community.312 Because of this common need for security, gated communities and more severe uses of security barriers do have some common characteristics. Therefore, this appendix will briefly delve into the study of gated communities to better understand the dynamics driving this need to create physical barriers within communities.

The overriding tension with the growth of gated communities is very similar to the tension derived from Untermeyer’s analysis of Frost’s poem “Mending Wall.” In both cases it is the tension between protection and progress or Ignatieff’s ‘lesser evil’ and the balance between liberty and security. Or as Blakely and Snyder discuss in *Fortress America*,

> “Gated communities manifest a number of tensions: between exclusionary aspirations rooted in fear and protection of privilege and the values of civic responsibility; between the trend toward privatization of public services and the ideals of the public good and general welfare; and between the need for personal and community control of the environment and the dangers of making outsiders of fellow citizens.”313

With an understanding of these tensions, this appendix will rely on *Fortress America* as the baseline reference document for defining and categorizing gated communities.

Blakely and Snyder say, “Gated communities are residential areas with restricted access in which normal public spaces are privatized. They are security developments with designated perimeters, usually walls or fences, and controlled entrances that are intended to prevent

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313 Ibid, 3.
penetration by nonresidents.” Blakely and Snyder categorize gated communities into three main categories: lifestyle communities, prestige communities and security zone communities. This appendix will only delve further into the details of security zone communities, where the “fear of crime and outsiders is the foremost motivation for defensive fortification.” Blakely and Snyder make another distinction with respect to security zone communities in that they are not built by developers, but by residents in an effort to “fend off or regain control from some outside threat.”

This outside threat is fear of crime, both real and perceived. The barriers used to protect neighborhoods include inner city neighborhoods “trying to regain control of their shared territory.” Based on the descriptive classification established in this study, security zone gated communities are internal class/race/crime security barriers. The issue of the permanence of these barriers is extremely complex. In the United States, both the development of a new gated community or the creation of a security zone community by adding barricades to existing streets, goes through some type of municipal approval process. Blakely and Snyder report that the addition of street barricades and the privatization of public streets does tend to create more debate and can often be controversial. The end result is that there are too many different varieties of gated solutions from temporary to permanent, from controversial to undisputed, to be able to coherently analyze in this appendix.

What is also difficult to analyze is the removal of these barriers in the United States and why. Often, public outcry or even litigation is the cause of the barrier removal rather than a

315 Ibid, 38
316 Ibid, 42
317 Ibid, 42
318 Ibid, 100
319 Ibid, 100
320 Ibid, 156-157
321 Ibid, 104, 156-157
measured level of success based on the problem the barrier was erected to solve.\textsuperscript{322} Therefore, instead of an analysis of the removal of security barriers in gated communities, there is value in studying the impacts that the growing presence these security barriers have on communities as a link to better understanding the detrimental side of security barriers on a community. As Glasze, Webster and Frantz point out in Private Cities, ‘private neighbourhoods’, or gated communities are not an “American phenomenon,” but a “global phenomenon.”\textsuperscript{323} While gated communities are proliferating globally and their types are varied, there are a few universal impacts of their existence.

There are several different ways to categorize the impacts of gated communities. From a review of the literature, the best categorization of impacts based on this study’s perspective is Landman’s research paper “The storm that rocks the boat: the systemic impact of gated communities on urban sustainability.”\textsuperscript{324} Landman uses four impact areas as a method of categorization: (1) spatial, (2) socio-economic, (3) environmental, and (4) institutional.\textsuperscript{325} Of these four categories, three have relevance to this appendix, spatial, socio-economic and institutional. These three categories will be briefly described in order to better understand the concerns that often come with any discussions involving the use of barriers in a community.

Spatial impacts are concerned with the actual physical space within which the gated community resides. Landman lists as her “spatial consequences” the impacts of “spatial fragmentation and separation.”\textsuperscript{326} Fragmentation is the descriptor used for the actual breaking apart of the physical environment, creating a physical separation of the population into those who

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{322} Edward J. Blakely and Mary Gail Snyder. \textit{Fortress America: Gated Communities in the United States}, 106, 117
\item \textsuperscript{323} Georg Glasze, Chris Webster, and Klaus, Frantz, Editors. \textit{Private Cities, Global and local perspectives}. London: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2006, 2, 222.
\item \textsuperscript{325} Ibid, 6.
\item \textsuperscript{326} Ibid, 6
\end{itemize}
reside in gated communities and those that do not. Landman in her essay entitled “Urban Fortresses” links separation with segregation, using Istanbul’s “fortressed spaces” to highlight the segregation of the middle class from “squatter settlements.” Blakely and Snyder in Fortress America also develop the concept of “separation as segregation,” to “separate citizens by race and by class.” Landman goes on to state in “Urban Fortresses” that “By contributing to spatial segregation gated communities also result in social and economic segregation,” providing a causal link to the next impact category, socio-economic.

Landman’s discussion of socio-economic impacts focuses on the benefits within the barriers as being an increased quality of life, ranging from security to property values. Blakely and Snyder also discuss the fact that gated communities create a barrier “to interaction among people of different races, cultures, and classes and may add to the problem of building social networks that form the base for economic and social opportunity.” Blakely and Snyder go on to state that “Gates are a visible sign of exclusion,” a similar theme used by Landman in the “Urban Fortress” where she attributes the barrier created by gated communities as a “social exclusion.” Landman in “Urban Fortresses” further links social exclusion with “polarization,”

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328 Edward J. Blakely and Mary Gail Snyder. Fortress America: Gated Communities in the United States, 148.
331 Edward J. Blakely and Mary Gail Snyder. Fortress America: Gated Communities in the United States, 153.
and goes on to state that “in Brazil fortified enclaves contribute to higher levels of inequality, fear, suspicion and feelings of vulnerability in those ‘outside’ the boundaries.”

In a population’s quest for security, Landman states that “Many retreat from public participation, giving rise to territorial governments through micro-governments (neighbourhood associations) and strict neighbourhood rules and regulations.” These ‘micro-governments’ are part of the greater institutional consequences of gated communities described by Landman as “increased privatization of governance and the rise of micro-governments, resulting in less civil participation in urban affairs and a demand for tax rebates.” Landman further states that an additional by-product of institutional impacts are a need for private security in the “protected spaces” “as well as vigilantism and gangs in ‘open’ areas.” In either case, private security or vigilantism, being less than ideal in a community.

In essence, the proliferation of gated communities within their larger communities has fragmented those communities, separating disparate populations, creating an unintended, but real segregation along social and economic lines excluding the less fortunate population and creating an atmosphere of polarization between the populations of the fortunate to those less fortunate. From this exclusion and polarization have grown territorial or private governments within gated communities. With a clearer understanding of the observed impacts of gated communities, it is understandable why they are often opposed and their use can be controversial.

Since gated communities are a global phenomenon, there is a growing legacy of these impacts at any location where gated communities are proliferating. This could well be considered an evolution to permanence in many parts of the world; especially in parts of the world where

there is a large disparity in economic equality within the population. But, an equal cause for concern is in understanding that whether the root cause of the divide is attributable to economic, social, racial, or even sectarian differences, security barriers create a division within the confines of a greater community that can evolve into the permanence of protection over progress.
Appendix E

In the research process for this study, a short paper whose topic was a way ahead for the eventual removal of the “peace walls” of Northern Ireland was discovered. This paper was entitled “A discussion paper proposing a five phase process for the removal of ‘peace walls’ in Northern Ireland.” The author is Tony Macaulay. Quoting Macaulay’s discussion paper, “Tony Macaulay is an independent development and management consultant who has worked in community development, conflict transformation, youth work, equality, human rights and peacebuilding in interface areas in Northern Ireland for the past 25 years.”

Macaulay’s consulting firm, Macaulay Associates, lists amongst its services community development, community relations and change management and includes amongst their clients the Community Relations Council, a Northern Ireland organization whose “aim is to assist the people of Northern Ireland to recognise and counter the effects of communal division.” This background information is provided to establish Macaulay as an expert in his field with an intimate understanding of the conditions in Northern Ireland.

In Macaulay’s work “A discussion paper proposing a five phase process for the removal of ‘peace walls’ in Northern Ireland,” he discusses the “Conditions for an Effective Process.” These 10 conditions represent a list of criteria for a safe and permanent removal of the “peace walls.” This list of conditions, while focused specifically on Northern Ireland, has almost universal application in the discussion of security barrier removal. For reference, the specific text


and the 10 conditions under the heading of “Conditions for an Effective Process” are provided here:

“The conditions required for an effective process that would result in the removal of interface barriers are as follows:

- a sustained period of political stability
- a sustained period of a substantial reduction in violent interface incidents, particularly during the summer period
- sustained contact, dialogue and discussion between community leaders on both sides of the interfaces
- reaching the ‘tipping point,’ when key stakeholders see the benefits of removing interface barriers as outweighing the benefits of maintaining them
- a high level of confidence in the policing of interface areas
- ongoing community, social, educational and economic development and the regeneration of interface areas
- effective youth work strategies in place in interface communities
- both support for the process and engagement in the process by interface residents (including children and young people), elected representatives, government bodies and civic society
- a high level of confidence among interface residents that the outcome of the process will be a lasting improvement in safety, security and quality of life
- adequate resources to support the implementation of the process”

Macaulay goes on to discuss the specific characteristics of the process in the removal of interface barriers which has also has value to this study’s discussion of the use of security barriers. Again, for reference, the specific text and the 10 characteristics under the heading of “Characteristics of the Process” are provided here:

“The essential characteristics of the process are as follows:

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The safety, wellbeing and quality of life of interface residents must be at the centre of the process.

The process must recognise, build on and learn from the success of ‘grass roots’ interface work in recent years.

The process requires political leadership and government support.

The process requires cross departmental and cross sectoral co-operation.

The process must be both ‘bottom up’ and ‘top down’, with local community and government taking on appropriate roles and responsibilities.

The process requires a strong commitment to co-operation and partnership among all stakeholders.

The process requires effective management, co-ordination, monitoring and evaluation.

The process will require sufficient finances to support effective implementation.

The process must be flexible to accommodate the fact that all interfaces are different and will require different approaches and timescales.

The process should operate within the context of any wider policy of cohesion, sharing and integration and should be underpinned by principles of equality and human rights.  

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Bibliography


