MASTER OF OPERATIONAL STUDIES

TITLE:

MITIGATING SURPRISE THROUGH ENHANCED OPERATIONAL DESIGN:
Civilian Conceptual Planning Models

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
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Executive Summary

Title: MITIGATING SURPRISE THROUGH ENHANCED OPERATIONAL DESIGN: Civilian Conceptual Planning Models

Author: Major Adam T Strickland, United States Marine Corps Reserve

Thesis: The conceptual planning (visualization) portion of the United States Marine Corps’ operational design must be revised to incorporate a more detailed Commander’s Battlespace Area Evaluation or estimate that attempts to identify the root cause of conflict in order to ensure that planners have a more systemic understanding of the operating environment; and thus, are better prepared to recommend several well-informed courses of action that mitigate the risks of surprise and unintended consequences.

Discussion: If commanders lack the requisite knowledge of complex environments to correctly identify social or political connectedness, or know which effects will have unintended consequences, will this mean the rest of the process is flawed? In a command driven process such as the MCPP, one would likely conclude that the answer is yes. There are three civilian problem-setting tools that satisfy military planning needs from the battalion to the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) level in complex environments. USAID’s Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM), the World Bank (WB), and CIA Political Instability Task Force (PITF) have developed three distinct problem-setting tools that have demonstrated considerable efficacy in determining the root causes of conflict, as well as the ability to accurately predict the outbreak of civil conflict. All three tools can provide military planners with a depth of knowledge of the environment that is unattainable through standard means of visualization, to include: CBAE, staff estimate, or standard IPB. All three models can be completed using open-source materials.

Conclusion: Failing to understand and address the means, motive, and windows of opportunity associated with instability, as well as the root causes of conflict will have disastrous consequences in the form of unexpected second and third order effects. While the current CBAE and IPB may be useful for conventional operations, they are potentially detrimental to the prosecution of operations in complex environments in their current form, and are contradictory to a true “single-battle” mentality and understanding. Having these products informed by a detailed conflict assessment and/or civilian expertise would further ensure a more systemic understanding of the battlespace by all planners and subordinate commanders as they proceeded in functional and detailed planning. Commanders should incorporate the planning tools referenced in this document to include civilian expertise during “visualization,” and/or return to utilizing a Commanders Estimate of the Situation (See Annexes F-G), a document that would truly be a “living document” during the planning process. Providing instruction on conflict assessments and civilian planning tools could be done with minimal impact on the current curriculum of USMC schools, and with rewards that far exceed any friction created during implementation, to include “bridging” a perceived gap that exists between civilian and military planners.
“We might well ask ourselves, have we fully profited by past experiences?”

- Major Charles J Miller, USMC (1934)\(^1\)

Countering insurgency requires us to develop a comprehensive understanding of the complex character of the conflict, of its social, political, historical, cultural, and economic contexts. If we are going to fight among the people, we must understand them.¹

When evaluating US military operations in Vietnam, Lebanon, and Somalia, individuals are often left asking — why did we understand so little about the true nature of the environment prior to engagement? While historians are busy answering this question, today in Iraq and Afghanistan, we are again confronted with a similar question concerning the limitations of our conceptual planning and problem-framing that reminds us of those earlier failures.² Failure to accurately predict the nature of the threat, root causes of instability, and the character of the environment as a whole in both Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) demonstrate that although the military has revised its planning processes in accordance with the evolving character of warfare, we are no better at conceptual planning or problem-setting today than in those earlier failures. The conceptual planning portion of the United States Marine Corps’ operational design must be revised to incorporate a more detailed Commander’s Battlespace Area Evaluation or estimate that attempts to identify the root cause of conflict in order to ensure that planners have a more systemic understanding of the environment; and thus, are better prepared to mitigate the risks of surprise and unintended consequences.³

First, this paper will identify and evaluate limitations of conceptual planning and operational design as manifest in the Marine Corps Planning Process (MCPP). Next, it will review conceptual and functional planning tools utilized by the United States Agency for International Development’s (USAID) Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM), the World Bank (WB), and Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) Political Instability Task Force

¹ Countering Irregular Threats (Quantico, VA: MCCDC, 2006), 5-6.
² References to Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield are made in accordance with FM 34-130 Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield and MCWP 5-1 Marine Corps Planning Process.
³ References to Commander’s Estimate of the Situation are made in accordance with FMFM 3-1 Command and Staff Action, Appendix A, Form 12, and MCWP 5-1 Marine Corps Planning Process, Appendix F.
(PITF). Finally, the merit of these conceptual and functional planning tools is demonstrated in the context of current conflicts, such as those in Afghanistan, Chad, Iraq, and Nigeria, followed by recommendations for revision to the MCPP, and proposals for warfighting experimentation.  

**MCPP – Operational Design and Conceptual Planning**

*Visualization of the battlespace and the intended actions of both the enemy and friendly force is a continuous process that requires the commander to understand the current situation, broadly define his desired future situation, and determine the necessary actions to bring about the desired end state.*

Before military planners can begin the process of functional and detailed planning for any operation, the commander must provide them with a “mental-picture” of the battlespace, known as the Commander’s Battlespace Area Evaluation (CBAE), and a vision of how to achieve a decision. This process of visualization is better known as conceptual planning, and is the first step in operational design as defined by USMC doctrine.

*Operational design is the commander’s tool for translating the operational requirements of his superiors into the tactical guidance needed by his subordinate commanders and staff. The commander uses his operational design to visualize, describe, and direct those actions necessary to achieve his desired end state and accomplish his assigned mission.*

Implicit to operational design is the notion that the commander will inherently have a more complete understanding of the battlespace than his subordinates; and thus, inherently understand the complexities of the intended area of operation more so than any other. While this assumption may be true in purely conventional conflicts, it has proven less so in complex environments such as Afghanistan or Iraq; where an understanding of political and social sciences is essential. Thus, commanders who fail to correctly frame the problem, hinder the planning process.

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4 The selection of Afghanistan and Iraq is due to the on-going operations in support of OEF and OIF; while the author selected Chad and Nigeria due to their growing strategic significance as primary exporters of oil to the US. Chad was further selected due to it being a primary belligerent in the on-going Darfur Crisis / Genocide.


6 U.S. Marine Corps, MCDP 1-0: Marine Corps Operations, 6-3.
Combining the initial understanding of the situation within the battlespace with his experiences and military judgment, he (commander) may begin his visualization...

Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1-0 Marine Corps Operations lists nine elements of operational design, three of which form the foundation of visualization / conceptual planning — Factors of METT-T (Mission, Enemy, Terrain, Troops and Equipment, and Time), a CBAE consisting of the commander’s analysis of the battlespace, commander’s intent, center of gravity analysis, and commander’s critical information requirements, and commander’s guidance to include desired effects. However, if commanders lack the requisite knowledge of complex environments to correctly identify social or political connectedness, or know which effects will have unintended consequences, will this mean the rest of the process is flawed? In a command driven process such as the MCPP, one would likely conclude that the answer is yes. All other functional and detailed planning is based off the commander’s CBAE/visualization. Revisiting MCDP 1-0, we find a list of six questions that form the basis for the CBAE. These questions are:

1. Where am I? Where is the enemy?
2. Where are my friends? Where are the enemy’s friends?
3. What are my strengths? What are the enemy’s strengths?
4. What must I protect? What are the enemy’s weaknesses?
5. What must I do and why? What will the enemy do and why?
6. What is the enemy’s most dangerous course of action?

While these questions are important, they fail to address the source of conflict, why violence was chosen over other courses of action, the potential for additional conflict or adversaries, or conditions for conflict resolution or termination? The initial questions focus too heavily on what or quantifiable things, while more needed questions associated with why and how are left either unasked or unanswered. Aside from a lack of education necessary to know which

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7 U.S. Marine Corps, MCDP 1-0: Marine Corps Operations, 6-5.
8 U.S. Marine Corps, MCDP 1-0: Marine Corps Operations, 6-5.
9 Some may argue that question #5 addresses the why; however, in practice it addresses the why of his military action, and is linked to discussions of his military strengths such as armor, artillery, a large reserve, etc.
questions to ask in an environment specific context, the most likely reason for inadequate CBAEs is “group-thinking” or shared mental models between military commanders and staff.

Some assert that the CBAE is simply the commander’s initial guidance that evolves or is overcome as planning continues. If this is true, we are left asking why the creators of the MCPP were insistent that this input replace the more detailed commander’s estimate of the situation and drive mission analysis. Obviously, they intended this guidance to be well-informed and complete, and not simply an “educated guess” to be confirmed or refuted during mission analysis. Those failing to know what to do will inevitably do what they know; thus, military planners unfamiliar with the capabilities resident in other government agencies or failing to integrate them into conceptual and functional planning, will most likely develop a purely military course of action that neglects the root cause of conflict, and has the potential for disastrous unforeseen second and third-order effects. The MCPP emphasizes the criticality of a systemic understanding of the battlespace and integration, thus the solution to poorly informed CBAEs lies in the inclusion of civilian personnel and tools throughout the process.

*Today, real power is not about armaments – it is about collaborative relationships.*

**Alternate Problem Framing Tools and Processes**

*Marines must approach counterinsurgency prepared to combat armed adversaries as well as influencing the environment through the use of information, humanitarian aid, economic advice, and a boost towards good governance.*

Civilian agencies provide few examples of complete problem-solving processes; however, there are three specific problem-setting tools that satisfy military planning needs from the battalion to the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) level in complex environments.

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10 Countering Irregular Threats, 6.
USAID’s Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM), the World Bank (WB), and CIA Political Instability Task Force (PITF) have developed three distinct problem-setting tools that have demonstrated considerable efficacy in determining the root causes of conflict, as well as the ability to accurately predict the outbreak of civil conflict. All three tools can provide military planners with a depth of knowledge of the environment that is unattainable through standard means of visualization, to include: CBAE, staff estimate, or standard IPB. The following will provide a general overview of each tool, followed by specific examples of utility.

CMM’s problem-setting tool is the Conflict Assessment Framework (CAF). “Conflict assessments are diagnostic tools that are designed to help missions: 1) identify and prioritize the causes and consequences of violence and instability in a given country; 2) understand how existing development programs interact with these factors; and 3) determine where development and humanitarian assistance can most effectively support local efforts to manage conflict, counteract extremism, and build peace.”

CMM personnel seek to identify conflict means, motives, and opportunities based off an estimate involving a scalable list of five to 100 questions associated with the larger CAF (See Annex B), and not normally included in a standard mission analysis or intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB). Through this process, CMM personnel identify: access to conflict resources (means), incentives for violence (motive), windows of vulnerability and state/social capacity and response (opportunity), as well as regional and international causes, such as globalization and “bad neighborhoods.” This tool could easily be incorporated into conceptual planning and mission analysis with or without CMM personnel.

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14 United States Agency for International Development, 38-41. Reference also Annex C. It is not necessary for all 100 questions to be asked or answered to inform the CMM process. A basic understanding of the 5 primary questions would create a more systemic understanding of the battlespace than any conventional CBAE or IPB.
15 United States Agency for International Development, 14. “Bad neighborhoods” are defined as countries sharing a border with 3 or 4 countries experiencing internal conflict.
In connection with these efforts, CMM has further developed a Fragility Alert Consultation and Tracking System (FATS) in order to provide indications and warnings of conflict within a specific country (See Annex E). This analysis is based on a review of the effectiveness of political, security, economic, and social institutions (See Annex D). Through the use of this tool, planners can readily identify nations that are susceptible to conflict and instability, and further research applicable conflict assessments.

Similar efforts to correctly frame problems in order to understand their root cause(s) within the World Bank, and specifically by Paul Collier, have resulted in the formulation of the “Civil War Cocktail,” and development of a list of dominant indicators of conflict. Collier asserts that regions or countries that demonstrate — 1) economic decline, 2) dependence on primary commodity exports (legal or illegal), 3) low per-capita income, and 4) unequal distribution of income, are pre-destined to suffer conflict and civil war. Economic decline and low per capita income result in the presence of a pool of disaffected young men with few alternatives. These young men become what Collier refers to as “entrepreneurs of violence.”

In countries dependent on primary commodity exports such as oil, diamonds, or narcotics, internal competitors are provided with a valuable resource to potentially control, extend influence, and finance continued conflict. In these countries, unexpected price fluctuations or shocks can further cripple the country, sending it into conflict. Finally, the lack of transparency associated with the expenditures of revenues generated from these exports fuels further

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16 Paul Collier et. al, *Breaking the Conflict Trap*, (Washington, D.C.: World Bank and Oxford University Press, 2003), 4. Civil war is defined here as when an identifiable rebel organization challenges the government militarily, and then the resulting violence results in 1,000 or more combat-related deaths, with at least 5% on each side.
17 Collier, 4-5. Primary commodity exports can be defined in both legal and illegal goods.
18 Collier, 4.
conflict. Collier further developed a list of facts to assist planners predict and understand civil wars, which include:

- If the largest ethnic group of a multi-ethnic society forms an absolute majority; the risk of conflict is increased by 50%.
- A completely polarized society, one divided into two equal halves, has a risk of civil war six-times higher than a homogeneous one.
- Doubling per-capita income approximately halves the risk of conflict.
- People or countries with large diasporas have a 30% higher risk of relapse into conflict.
- 95% of the global production of hard drugs occurs in countries with civil wars.

This tool, like the CAF and FATS previously described, offers planners from the battalion to the MEF the ability to better understand their operating environment systemically, and for MEU planners, the potential to “forecast” instability in their respective areas of operations with or without the inclusion of additional civilian personnel prior to deployment.

The CIA’s Political Instability Task Force (PITF) has similarly developed a problem-framing tool which enables planners to predict and understand conflict. Utilizing this method, planners focus on four factors: regime type, infant mortality rate, presence of four or more bordering states with major civil or ethnic conflict, and presence of state led discrimination. Countries with a partial democracy or in transition between autocracy and democracy, a high infant mortality rate, four of more bordering states with ethnic or civil conflict (“bad neighborhoods”), and state led discrimination will most likely devolve into civil conflict. When applying this framework to countries within sub-Saharan Africa, the tool is expanded to include trade openness, leader’s tenure, colonial heritage, and the percentage of the population in the largest religious group. In sub-Saharan Africa, countries with partial democracies, a low degree

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19 Collier, 60-79. The issue of transparency with oil expenditures remains the largest root source of instability in Nigeria and specifically throughout the Niger Delta region.
20 Collier, 57.
21 Collier, 58.
22 Collier, 58.
23 Collier, 85.
24 Collier, 2.
25 See also the conceptual planning tool utilized by the Fund For Peace for a similar diagnostic framing model.
of trade openness, state led discrimination, a non-French colonial heritage, possessing a leader with less than four or more than fifteen years in office, and a religious group representing more than 65% of the population will most likely devolve into civil conflict.\footnote{Jack Goldstone et. al, “A Global Forecasting Model of Political Instability,” (Washington, D.C.: SAIC, 1 September 2005), Tables 1 and 2.} Using this framework, analysts correctly predicted conflicts that developed from 1955-2003 with 80% accuracy.\footnote{Goldstone, Abstract.} One of the most significant features of this PITF tool and all of problem-framing tools detailed above is that they depend only upon open-source inputs, and thus can be completed by any personnel.

**Evaluation of Planning Tools**

_"Planning is the art and science of envisioning a desired future and laying out effective was at bringing it about. It is a preparation process."_\footnote{U.S. Marine Corps, MCDP 5: Planning, (Quantico, VA: MCCDC, 1997), 3.}

For the purpose of our evaluation, we will utilize Afghanistan, Chad, Iraq, and Nigeria; however, the evaluation tools are applicable to any nation. Utilizing the CAF (See Annexes A-B), planners, whether augmented with civilian personnel or not, can readily evaluate the threat in these nations, and provide courses of actions that address the root causes of conflict.

In all four nations, the relationship between ethnic and religious groups is characterized by dominance, potential dominance, and high levels of fragmentation.\footnote{Afghanistan: Pashtun 42%, Tajik 27%, Hazara 9%, Uzbek 9%, 13% Other; Chad: 200 ethnic groups, 51% Muslim, 35% Christian, 14% Other; Iraq: 80% Arab, 15% Kurdish, 65% Shi’a Muslim, 32% Sunni Muslim; Nigeria: 250 ethnic groups, 50% Muslim, 40% Christian.} In Nigeria and Chad, each with over 200 recognized ethnic groups, political and societal fragmentation created by this extreme diversity and a general parity between Muslims and Christians has created significant governance challenges. In Chad, heavily-armed insurgent elements of the Zaghawa and Bidyate continue to struggle for control over the military and oil industry, as well as threaten the government of President General Idriss Deby Itno, a Zaghawa, over his forced revision of the constitution, failure to step-down after two terms as president, and inability to protect fellow
tribesmen in the Darfur Region of Sudan. In response to this continued pressure, the Chadian government sent troops across the border into both Sudan (Darfur) and the Central African Republic in April 2007, in an attempt to combat various hostile militia groups.

In all four nations, there are significant numbers of elites who face political and/or economic incentive to mobilize violence along ethnic lines. In Afghanistan, individuals and groups as diverse as warlords, former communists, the Taliban, Uzbek separatists, and narcotics traffickers all maintain ample motive to destabilize the country, and exploit “entrepreneurs of violence.” In Chad, ethnic minorities such as the Muslim Zaghawa, Gorane, and Hausa continue to struggle for social, political, and economic supremacy; while group’s as diverse as Wahhabi’s from the Sudan and Saudi Arabia, Janjaweed Militias from Darfur, adherents of the Qoreishi Movement, and no fewer than five armed-insurgent groups with external support create further instability. In Iraq, Arab fighters loyal to al-Qaida, and former members of the Ba’ath Party and security services apparatus that have been excluded from government service and from legitimate economic opportunity have sufficient motive to foment violence amongst the Sunni-Arab minority. In Nigeria, President General Olusegun Obasanjo, who represents both the Christian and Yoruba minorities as well as the military, continues to compete against rival elites representing disparate elements from the military, Nigeria’s oil industry, the global narcotics trade, separatist groups such as the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), and Muslim extremists north of the Niger River.

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30 Large numbers of the Zaghawa reside in Darfur, and have been targeted by Janajweed Militias. On 2/14-15/2007, the United Nations High Commission on Refugees and Oxfam warned of potential genocide in eastern Chad. [http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6367545.stm]
32 These insurgent groups are: The Salafist Group for Preaching Combat (GSPC), which is an Al Qaida affiliate, the Mouvement pour la Démocratie et la Justice au Tchad (MDJT), the Union of Forces for Democracy and Development (UFDD), Rally for Democratic Forces (RAFD), and the United Front for Democratic Change (FUCD). Additionally, as of 12/2006, 240,000 Sudanese refugees were interned in 12 camps along Chad’s eastern border.
In these nations, it is clear that economic power is directly tied to political power. With estimated oil reserves in Iraq and Nigeria of 112 billion barrels and 36 billion barrels, the potential for elites to seek control over these resources through conflict and instability is self-evident. In Chad, now the 13th largest exporter of crude oil to the US, the potential for large oil revenues creates congruent instability. At $60 - $70 per barrel, there is ample motive for individuals in Chad, Iraq, and Nigeria, making on average $1400 per year to seek financial gain through destabilizing activities. In Afghanistan, the production of heroine has exploded since the fall of the Taliban in 2001. Accounting for 87% of the world’s opium production in 2006, Afghani warlords have sufficient motive to seek continued conflict.

Utilizing the CAF, the motive for conflict is clear in all four nations; yet, it is truly the presence of the means of instability that should create concern for planners. Historically, the means of conflicts has been the sole focus of military planners determined to eliminate threat forces, and thus presumably – the conflict. Unfortunately, the human, financial, and physical resources necessary for instability are ever-present in Afghanistan, Chad, Iraq, and Nigeria.

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33 See CIA World Factbook for Chad, Iraq, and Nigeria GDP per capita. [https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html]
35 While not a integral part of this paper, this raises the question of the military’s role in DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration). Historically, DDR has not been a mission/task of the US military, but has been embraced during UN and OAS/OAU peacekeeping operations.
36 The United Nations Development Program lists adult literacy in Chad to be at 26% of 2004.
As these figures demonstrate, all four nations are burdened with millions of unemployed, impoverished, and illiterate young males — “entrepreneurs of violence”.37 Only in Nigeria, do these young men have the opportunity for employment, albeit employment that is not likely to provide an escape from poverty. It is these young men, the youth bulge, that provide elites with the motive for violence, the means by which to execute their plans. With few alternatives that have the potential for economic reward congruent to joining paramilitaries or criminal enterprises, these young males are easily targeted for employment by elites. In addition, orphaned or unwanted members of these youth bulges continue to seek the sanctuary of Islamic centers and relief organizations that can provide an education and subsistence that is unavailable to them from the state. These individuals provide radical Muslim groups with needed human resources globally. The efforts of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, Hizb’allah, and Islamic charities provide the most well-known examples of this phenomenon of non-state actors providing essential services to vulnerable segments of a society. Fortunately, as noted by Paul Collier earlier in this paper, doubling per capita income halves the risk of civil conflict/war. While not easily done, one can readily see what such an income adjustment would do to the potential threat and availability of the human means necessary for conflict. Planners equipped with this knowledge could forego kill/capture courses of action in favor of alternatives targeting economic development and government transparency.

The presence of human means is not the only source of instability within these four nations. Burdened by neighbors unwilling or able to secure borders and mitigate the flow of arms across international boundaries, government inability to secure the entirety of its territory and the

legacy of years of civil war and conflict, all four subject nations are adrift in a sea of legal and illegal armaments and extra-legal militias.

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<th>BAD NEIGHBORS</th>
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<th>Cameroon, Libya, Niger, Sudan, Nigeria, Central African Republic</th>
<th>Turkey, Iran, Syria, Jordan</th>
<th>Niger, Chad, Cameroon</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

|----------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------|

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIASPORA</th>
<th>Approx. 13 million</th>
<th>Unknown</th>
<th>Approx. 2 million</th>
<th>Approx. 15 million</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

The product of these internal and external conflicts, “bad” neighbors, and paramilitaries is continued instability, and in some cases, a population more heavily armed and experienced in warfare than the national security forces. All four are vulnerable to rebel incursions from neighboring states; while transnational terror organizations operating from sanctuaries beyond

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39 The conflict dates refer to the Chadian Civil War / Conflict 1963-1990 (current President Deby overthrew the former government in 1990), the MDJT Insurgency begun in 1998, and Darfur Crisis.


42 At the beginning of 2007, the GSPC officially changed its name to Al-Qaida in the Maghreb. It further claimed responsibility for a series of suicide bombings in Algeria in April 2007.
the control of the state within each continue to provide a source of instability. In addition, the presence of very large Afghani, Iraqi, and Nigerian Diasporas create the potential for significant financial means to be sent back to finance efforts to create internal instability. As noted earlier, people or countries with large diasporas have a 30% higher risk of relapse into conflict.

As all four nations struggle with the implementation of democratic institutions that protect minority rights and maintain transparency of government spending, they remain vulnerable to conflict and instability. As they continue to address incentives for violence, attempt to block access to conflict resources, and manage regional pressures, they are susceptible to conflict during certain windows of vulnerability. These windows of vulnerability include: elections, global price shocks, and natural disasters. Perhaps no where are these factors more self-evident than currently in Nigeria and Iraq, as one struggles through a window of vulnerability created by contentious presidential elections, and the other prepares for a referendum over the ultimate disposition of Kirkuk and its adjacent oil fields.

For those familiar with standard conceptual and functional planning products, such as a CBAE or conventional intelligence estimate, none of the information produced through the CAF, and listed above is normally included. However, not doing so, can lead to a failure to understand the environment, as well as unanticipated and undesired secondary effects from normal operations. Many argue that the current troubles in Afghanistan and Iraq are due in part to planners’ failure to understand these environments to include the potential for civil conflict. Any planner with access to the Internet or library could quickly conduct an estimate on any target

Insurgents from Pakistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan affect instability in Afghanistan. Insurgents from Sudan, Libya, and the Central African Republic affect instability in Chad. Insurgents from at least 10 Muslim nations affect instability within Iraq.

Collier, 85. The author acknowledges that large diasporas also create the potential for accelerating and facilitating economic stabilization such as in the case of Mexican nationals within the United States.
nation using the CAF, and thus provide the commander with a more systemic understanding of the battlespace, ways to mitigate potential conflicts, and resolve on-going causes of instability.

As the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq continue unabated, many are left asking, *would it have been possible to predict the instability now infecting every aspect of society in each in 2003?* As noted in the previous section on the CAF, it would have certainly been possible if planners asked the right questions. While the CAF provides a scalable list of potentially 100 questions to ask in order to understand, prevent, and resolve conflict, the PITF utilizes as framework that asks only four: regime type, infant mortality rate, presence of bad neighbors, and presence of state-led discrimination. Countries with full autocracy, low infant mortality rates, fewer than four destabilizing neighbors, and no state-led discrimination are at the lowest risk for instability and civil conflict. Upon review of our mission of regime change in both Afghanistan and Iraq, planners could have created the following picture of the battlespace of each prior to the commencement of stability and reconstruction operations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AFGHANISTAN</th>
<th>IRAQ</th>
<th>UNITED STATES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regime Type</td>
<td>Partial Democracy w/ factionalism</td>
<td>Partial Democracy w/ factionalism</td>
<td>Full democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant Mortality</td>
<td>160 / 1000 births</td>
<td>48.64 / 1000 births</td>
<td>6.43 / 1000 births</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bad Neighbors</td>
<td>5 – Pakistan, Iran, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan</td>
<td>4 – Iran, Turkey, Syria, Jordan</td>
<td>1 – Mexico</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State-led Discrimination</td>
<td>No (Prior History)</td>
<td>Yes (Prior History)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Using these four simple questions, planners would have noted that Afghanistan would have ranked high on the “greater risk” of instability scale in 3 of 4 risk factors; while Iraq would have ranked high in all 4 risk factors. According to PITF research (*See Annex C*), countries with a partial democracy with factionalism have a 60.84 times higher risk of the onset of instability than full autocracies or full democracies. Those nations with a high infant mortality rate have a 3.89
times higher risk of instability; while the presence of four or more bad neighbors provides an additional 17 times more likely environment for conflict. State-led discrimination provides a 1.89 time more likely environment for instability than one absent of such abuse. If planners preparing for operations in support of OEF and OIF had used this tool, they would have been able to predict that each environment provided “the perfect storm” of instability factors, thus could have dedicated more of their efforts toward governance programs and border security. They could have reasonably concluded that Iraq was already a failed state prior to invasion.

Utilizing a modified PITF applicable specifically to African nations, we can quickly evaluate the likelihood of conflict in Chad and Nigeria (See Annex D).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CHAD</th>
<th>NIGERIA</th>
<th>UNITED STATES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regime Type</td>
<td>Partial Democracy w/ factionalism</td>
<td>Partial Democracy w/ factionalism</td>
<td>Full democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade-Openness</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State-Led Discrimination</td>
<td>Yes/No</td>
<td>Yes/No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonial Heritage</td>
<td>French</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leader’s Tenure</td>
<td>16 years</td>
<td>8 years</td>
<td>6 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Population in Largest Religious Group</td>
<td>51% Muslim</td>
<td>50% Muslim</td>
<td>52% Protestant</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Not only does this tool demonstrate that both nations are at high risk for conflict and instability, but also provides planners with several lines of operation from which to plan and execute civil military operations. Based on figures provided by the PITF, planners would note that Chad is 6.57 times more likely to devolve into conflict and instability due to the extreme duration of their leader’s tenure, and 8.71 more times likely due to its partial democracy with factionalism.

Upon review, planners could adjust civil military operations to focus on governance concerns in

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45 Goldstone, Table 1.
46 In 2005, Chadian President Deby forced a constitutional change, thus allowing him to stand for a third term as president. This immediately caused large segments of the army to breakaway and join one of the insurgent groups.
order to bring increased stability and conflict resolution. Nigeria demonstrates many of the same problems that afflict Chad, thus once again, planners who were able to create a more holistic understanding of the conflict in the Niger Delta, would immediately focus on issues of governance and economic transparency at the expense of large military operations.

**Warfighting Experiment**

_The USMC must develop the fullest mutual understanding and collaboration with the US Government civilian agencies, and train Marines to be both fighters and peace builders in order to meet the requirements of countering irregular threats._\(^{47}\)

In order to familiarize military planners with the CAF, the USMC should develop the following warfighting experiment in collaboration with USAID, the US Department of State, and appropriate law enforcement officials. Known as “The Most Dangerous Gang in America,” Mara Salvatruca - 13 has drawn the attention of law enforcement officials, and forced the creation of an FBI MS-13 Task Force.\(^{48}\) As the closest thing to an organized insurgency with international connectivity within the United States, MS-13 provides the perfect example for those planners attempting to gain a more complete understanding of a potential threat and battlespace prior to the execution of operations. With 20,000 known or suspected members in the US and Canada, and a further 70,000 throughout Central America, planners would have a target not as elusive as small insurgent or terror cells in the Middle East; yet one similarly organized into functional commands such as logistics, training, recruiting, and operations.\(^{49}\) While those involved would undeniably have to learn a new culture, the physical battlespace would not be alien since MS-13 maintains a large presence in areas that are home to Marine Corps bases such as southern California and northern Virginia. This experiment would further

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\(^{47}\) *Countering Irregular Threats*, 13.


establish and/or reinforce relationships between the USMC and civilian agencies tasked with counter-terrorism, thus creating a permanent two-way flow of information and learning.\textsuperscript{50}

**Conclusion**

*Wars based on “shock and awe” may still apply when the enemy consists of conventional military forces. . . although any form of “shock and awe” whose execution leads to “anger and alienation” must be avoided just as much in struggles as asymmetric wars. Most modern combat; however, will not be directed against such enemies.*\textsuperscript{51}

As the above quotation notes, focusing on purely kinetic military courses of action during planning is not an option if we are to succeed in the continuing Global War on Terror / Global Insurgency. Failing to understand and address the means, motive, and windows of opportunity associated with instability, as well as the root causes of conflict will have disastrous consequences in the form of unexpected second and third order effects. While the current CBAE and IPB may be useful for conventional operations, they are potentially detrimental to the prosecution of operations in complex environments in their current form, and are contradictory to a true “single-battle” mentality and understanding. Having these products informed by a detailed conflict assessment and/or civilian expertise would further ensure a more systemic understanding of the battlespace by all planners and subordinate commanders as they proceeded in functional and detailed planning. Commanders should incorporate the planning tools referenced in this document to include civilian expertise during “visualization,” and/or return to utilizing a Commanders Estimate of the Situation (*See Annexes F-G*), a document that would truly be a “living document” during the planning process. This would provide a true paper trail providing subordinates an insight into the commanders thinking as well as all other reasonable courses of action that were foregone in favor of the commanders selected course of action. At a minimum,

\textsuperscript{50} So long as USMC personnel acted strictly as observers, as done previously with JTF-6 counter-narcotics missions, there would be no violation of Posse Comitatus Act of 1878.

\textsuperscript{51} Cordesman, 1.
the conceptual planning tools referenced in this document can provide commanders from the battalion to MEF-level with additional tools through which to accurately “visualize” the battlespace, and at a maximum, offer congruent utility to a conventional center of gravity analysis during non-conventional operations. Implementation of these recommendations would cost nothing, for a commander’s staff estimate is already available in the current USMC planning manual, literature on conflict assessments is both free and available as an open-source, and CMM personnel are funded through the embassy. Providing instruction on conflict assessments and civilian planning tools could be done with minimal impact on the current curriculum of USMC schools, and with rewards that far exceed any friction created during implementation, to include “bridging” a perceived gap that exists between civilian and military planners. In order to mitigate the risk of unintended consequences and surprise, we must incorporate better problem-setting and problem-framing tools into the planning process. Those failing to do so can answer honestly, that they failed to learn and profit from our past experiences.

Fighting the last war is almost always a good way to lose the next. Ignoring the true political and ideological nature of modern asymmetric warfare is certain to have a price tag that neither country should ever have to pay.\textsuperscript{52}

\textsuperscript{52} Cordesman, 3.
Annex B – Causes of Conflict and Checklist of Questions (See USAID – Conducting a Conflict Assessment: A Framework for Strategy and Program Development)

Incentives for Violence: GRIEVANCE AND GREED (Motive)

1. Ethnic and Religious Divisions
   - Is the relationship between ethnic/religious groups characterized by dominance, potential dominance, or high levels of fragmentation?
   - Where do these groups live and in what numbers? Are they concentrated in regional pockets or dispersed? If they are concentrated, do they form a majority or minority in the area?
   - What is the history of relations between groups? Is there a pattern of systematic discrimination or have relations been relatively peaceful and inclusive?
   - Do other divides, for example political exclusion or economic inequality, reinforce ethnic divisions?
   - Are there elites who face economic or political incentive to mobilize violence along ethnic lines?
   - Is extremist ethnic or religious rhetoric increasing? Are elites beginning to create or promote ethnic ‘myths’?

2. Economic Causes
   - Is the economy (of the country/region) growing, stagnant, or declining? By what percent?
   - Is the country (or region) low income?
   - Are there socio-economic disparities? Do these reinforce other lines of division, such as ethnicity?
   - IS the economy heavily dependent on primary commodities? Are these commodities easily ‘lootable’?
   - Is economic power tied to political power?
   - How pervasive is corruption or patronage? Does it flow along ethnic or other lines of division?
   - Is there a large informal economy, is it legal or illegal (i.e. based on drugs, trafficking in humans)?

3. Environmental Causes
   - Are there major resource scarcities?
   - What are the primary causes of scarcity?
   - Has scarcity led to resource capture?
   - Has scarcity led to population transfers?
   - Do the effects of scarcity (resource capture, population transfers) reinforce other divides (ethnic, religious, economic) and/or generate competition between groups?
   - Do elites compete over the control of valuable natural resources (both renewable and non-renewable), scarce or not?
   - Are certain resources (such as land) used as a tool in political competition?
4. **Demographic Trends**
   - Do population growth rates differ across distinct, adjacent communities?
   - Are there other factors (e.g., economic migration) that are tipping the demographic balance toward one group?
   - Is the rural population expanding? If so, is there access to land or are there other safety valves for population pressures (e.g., migration to adjacent states/economic opportunity in urban centers)?
   - What are the rates of urbanization? Is the urban population expanding in a period of economic growth or decline?
   - What is the size of the youth cohort relative to the adult population?
   - Are there particular areas (urban centers, distinct regions) where the youth cohort is disproportionately large?
   - Are young people radicalizing? If so, around what issues? If not, what is keeping this from happening?
   - Are there rapid increases in young educated professionals who have no opportunities for political or economic advancement?

5. **Interaction Effects (Non-linear system approach)**
   - Are there many incentives for violence (both greed and grievance) or only a few?
   - Are they longstanding and chronic or of fairly recent origin?
   - Do incentives for violence overlap and reinforce each other or cut across lines of division? For example, does access to economic opportunity overlap with ethnic difference or cut across ethnic difference?
   - Is there an alignment between grievance and greed? Are elites with a political or economic incentive to mobilize violence well-positioned to tap into a strong grievance?

**Mobilization: ACCESS TO CONFLICT RESOURCES (Means)**

1. **Organizational Resources**
   - Do organizational structures bridge or reinforce differences in society? For example, are civil society groups mono-ethnic or multi-ethnic?
   - Are there well-established ethnic or religious associations that could be used to mobilize violence?
   - Have these structures stepped in to provide important services, such as access to employment or education, in the context of a weak state?
   - How closely do organizational resources (e.g., ethnic groups or patronage networks) align with incentives for violence?
   - If incentives and organizations are aligned, are these organizations capable of monitoring group behavior and punishing ‘defectors’ from group goals?

2. **Financial Resources**
   - Are groups with an incentive to mobilize violence affiliated with foreign support groups (e.g., diaspora, foreign governments, trans-national religious or ethnic groups) that could provide funding?
• Can those motivated to engage in violence obtain control of “lootable” primary commodities?
• Are resources available through government corruption or patronage networks?
• Can sufficient resources be gained through smuggling, kidnapping, banditry or other activities on the black or gray market?

3. Human Resources
• Is there a population of ready-recruits (e.g. unemployed young men in urban or semi-urban areas) available to actors motivated to engage in violence?

4. General Questions
• Do groups with incentives for violence have access to all conflict resources – organizational, financial, and human – or only a few?
• What level of resources do groups have and what level do they need to achieve their goals? Is there a match?
• Where do these resources come from (e.g. natural resources, corruption/patronage networks, diasporas, foreign recruits, local/international sources) and what does this imply about ease of access and sustainability?

Institutional Capacity and Response (Opportunity)
1. Regime Type and Legitimacy
• Is the regime democratic, authoritarian, or mixed?
• How long has it existed in its current form?
• Is it in a period of transition or erosion?
• Are there generally accepted rules for political competition?
• What is overall level of respect for national authorities?

2. Inclusion/Exclusion
• Do government policies favor one group over another? For example are government services provided equally across different ethnic or religious groups; are exclusive language policies in place?
• Has the collapse or erosion of state institutions led groups to turn to more immediate forms of identity for survival?
• Do civil society groups reinforce or bridge lines of division?
• How robust are multi-ethnic or multi-religious organizations? Do they have a mass base (e.g. trade unions, business associations) or are they limited to a narrow elite layer?
• How are the issues of ethnicity/religion taught in school?
• Does the press promote ethnic or religious intolerance?

3. Rule of Law/Provision of Security
• How strong is the judicial system?
• Are civil and political freedoms respected?
• Are other basic human rights respected?
• Does unlawful state violence exist?
Does civilian power control the security sector?
Is the government able to exercise effective control over its territory?
Does the security sector (police/justice sector) effectively and impartially settle disputes between groups or is there a perception of bias?
To what extent is the security sector involved in ‘shadow’ economic activity?
Do government institutions effectively regulate arms trade and prevent illegal arms trades or do they participate in it?

4. Economic Governance
Does economic policy encourage economic growth or impose obstacles?
Is policy conducive to macro-economic stability?
How pervasive is corruption in state institutions?
Do government institutions/civil society groups effectively monitor and enforce financial transparency and accountability?
Is the government able to exert economic control over the territory of the state or are there large pockets of autonomous economic activity?
Does government policy encourage a good match between available skills and the demands of the market?
Do state economic policies favor one group at the expense of another?
Are local governments able to encourage local economic growth and investment and respond to local economic problems?
Do grassroots and/or national institutions constructively engage underrepresented and marginalized groups in economic development activity?
Do government programs constructively engage potential recruits, such as unemployed youth?

5. Natural Resource Management
Does government policy seek to improve the sustainable management of natural resources?
Are there institutions in place that effectively mediate competing claims to natural resources such as land or water?
Do local/national elites earn significant off-budget income from the exploitation of natural resources?
Do government institutions effectively regulate trade in “lootable” commodities?
Are natural resources viewed by state elites as a useful tool or prize in a larger political competition?
Are state institutions able to respond to environmental shocks or natural disasters?

6. Demographic Factors
Are government policies causing demographic shifts, for example through government sponsored transmigration or agricultural programs?
Are government institutions able to respond to new demands created by demographic change? For example, are voting rights tied to place of residence of birth (meaning – will uprooted populations be able to voice demands though political channels)?
Regional and International Factors (Connectivity)

• Are ethnic and/or religious divisions reinforced by parallel relations in neighboring countries?
• Does environmental degradation have cross-border causes or effects?
• Is dynamic activity (both legal and illegal) closely tied to regional or global dynamics?
• Is the economy highly vulnerable to global economic shocks?
• Are demographic shifts tied to regional events?
• Is mobilization facilitated by support from other governments or ethnic and religious groups outside the country?

Windows of Vulnerability (Opportunity – Forecasting)

1. Predictable
   • Are major government reforms planned that could result in shifts in political or economic power (e.g. decentralization, anti-corruption, security sector reform)?
   • Are contentious elections approaching?

2. Unpredictable
   • Is the country vulnerable to natural disasters?
   • Does the government effectively respond to mitigate the damage done by natural disasters?
   • Is the economy highly vulnerable to global economic shocks?
   • Do government institutions have a history of effectively responding to political or economic crises?
   • Do local governments effectively and constructively respond to local instability?
   • What is the capacity of the formal/informal economy to absorb new entrants?
   • What is the employment rate, particularly for young men in urban areas?
   • Is there a match between the skills of new entrants and the needs of the economy?
   • Are these economies heavily dependent on access to global markets? How susceptible are they to economic shocks?
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model summary statistics</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Full democracy</th>
<th>Partial democracy w/ reconciliation</th>
<th>Failure to reconcile</th>
<th>Military mobilization required</th>
<th>Poor or more problematic states with higher intransit (polity = –88)</th>
<th>No more or same control of native or ethnic minority</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0'03</td>
<td>1'09</td>
<td>1'04</td>
<td>1'00</td>
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<td>0'89</td>
<td>0'88</td>
<td>0'71</td>
<td>0'48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1'00 – 2'00</td>
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<td>1'04</td>
<td>1'00</td>
<td>0'99</td>
<td>0'89</td>
<td>0'88</td>
<td>0'71</td>
<td>0'48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1'00 &gt; 3'00</td>
<td>1'09</td>
<td>1'04</td>
<td>1'00</td>
<td>0'99</td>
<td>0'89</td>
<td>0'88</td>
<td>0'71</td>
<td>0'48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2'00 &gt; 3'00</td>
<td>1'09</td>
<td>1'04</td>
<td>1'00</td>
<td>0'99</td>
<td>0'89</td>
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<td>0'48</td>
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</tbody>
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Table 1: Global Model of Vulnerability to onset of instability, 1955–2003

Note: Re-printed without permission
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>% of controls classified correctly</th>
<th>% of instability classified correctly</th>
<th>number of controls</th>
<th>number of problems</th>
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<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00</td>
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<td>0-4 Years</td>
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<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0-4 Years</td>
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<td>0.00%</td>
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<td>0-4 Years</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.00</td>
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<td>0-4 Years</td>
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<td>0.00</td>
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Note: Re-printed without permission

### Table 2: Model of Vulnerability to Growth of Insatbility in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1985-2003

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<th>Value</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>p-Value</th>
<th>Odds Ratio</th>
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<th>Greater Risk</th>
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**ANNEX – POLITICAL INSTABILITY TASK FORCE AFRICA**

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ANNEX E - Fragility Alert, Consultation and Tracking System

*Note: Numbered Rankings in parentheses refer to global rankings of fragility and political instability.

### MARFOREUR

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>FRAGILITY</th>
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<td>DPR Congo (1)</td>
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<td>Burundi (5)</td>
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<td>Liberia (8)</td>
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<td>Guinea (9)</td>
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<td>Nigeria (18)</td>
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<td>Mali (11)</td>
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<td>Mauritania (22)</td>
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Commander’s Estimate

Ref: (a)  
(b)  
(c)  

1. MISSION

a. Basic Mission.

(1) Commander’s or Ambassador’s Intent.
(2) Intermediate Objectives.
(3) Conflict Termination Objectives / Criteria.
(4) Conflict Resolution Objectives / Criteria.

b. Previous Decisions.

(1) Military.
(2) Political.
(3) Developmental / HA.
(4) Historical Legacy(s).
(5) Unintended Consequences/effects.

c. Unresolved Issues Requiring Decisions.

d. Purpose of this Estimate.

2. SITUATION AND COURSES OF ACTION

a. Considerations Affecting Possible Course of Action.

(1) Characteristics of the Area of Operations.

(a) Geography.

(1) Infrastructure.
(2) Borders, Border Access, and Presence of Bad Neighbors.
(3) Terrain or Area outside Government Influence or Control.
(4) Environmental Concerns.
(b) Population/Sociology.
   (1) Demographics.
   (2) Social, Ethnic, or Tribal/Clan Networks.
   (3) Religious Networks and Organizations.
   (4) Ethnic or Religious Grievances.
   (5) Influence of Diaspora.
   (6) Presence of Elites.

(c) Governance / Politics.
   (1) Political Grievances.
   (2) Balance of Power/Power Sharing.
   (3) Degree of Political Influence over Populace and Territory.
   (4) Popular Perceptions.
   (5) Regional and International Connectivity.
   (6) Justice / Rule of Law.
   (7) Institutional Capacity and Response.
   (8) Non-traditional Sources of Authority.

(d) Economics.
   (1) Natural Resources.
   (2) Presence of Illegitimate Economy/Income.
   (3) Effects of Poverty.
   (4) Economic Grievances.
   (5) Competition over Natural Resources and Natural Resource Management.
   (6) Under-employment and Unemployment.
   (7) Distribution of Wealth.

(e) Other Pertinent Factors.
   (1) C/FACTS Rating.
   (2) Presence of Windows of Vulnerability.
   (3) Means, Motives, and Opportunity for Civil Conflict.
   (4) General / Dormant Grievances.
   (5) NGO/PVO Presence or Past Relationships.
   (6) Sensitivities / No-Go(s).
   (7) Potential Decisive Events.

(2) Relative Combat Power Assessment.

(a) Composition.
   (1) State Security Forces.
   (2) Private Military Organizations / Militias.
   (3) State, Regional, or Private Growth Potential (Capacity).
   (4) Foreign Terrorist Organizations.
   (5) Presence of External or Internal Spoilers.
(b) Disposition.

(1) Incentives for Violence.

(c) Arms and Armament.

(1) Access to Conflict Resources.

(d) Recent and Present Activities.

b. Adversary/Competitor Capabilities and Potential Course of Action.

(1) Risk to Mission / Risk to Force.
(2) Risk to Non-combatants.
(3) Potential Unintended Consequences.
(4) Vulnerabilities.

c. Potential Friendly Courses of Action.

(1) Alternative Courses of Action.
(2) Risk to Mission / Risk to Force.
(3) Risk to Non-combatants.
(4) Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration.
(5) Potential Unintended Consequences and Perceptions.
(6) Vulnerabilities.
(7) Non-DoD/USMC Recommendations.
(8) Limitations.
(9) Shortfalls.
(10) Assumptions.

3. ANALYSIS OF OPPOSING COURSES OF ACTION

4. COMPARISON OF OWN COURSES OF ACTION AGAINST MISSION AND INTERMEDIATE OBJECTIVES.

5. DECISION
Commander’s Estimate

Ref: (a)  
(b)  
(c)  

1. MISSION
   a. Basic Mission.  
   b. Previous Decisions.  
   c. Purpose of this Estimate.  

2. SITUATION AND COURSES OF ACTION
   a. Considerations Affecting Possible Courses of Action.
      (1) Characteristics of the Area of Operations.  
         (a) Weather.  
         (b) Terrain.  
         (c) Hydrography.  
         (d) Politics.  
         (e) Economics.  
         (f) Sociology.  
         (g) Other Pertinent Factors.  
      (2) Relative Combat Power.  
         (a) Composition.  
         (b) Strength and Combat Efficiency.  
         (c) Dispositions.  
         (d) Arms and Armaments.  
         (e) Recent and Present Activities.  
         (f) Time and Space.  
         (g) Combat Service Support.  
         (h) Personnel Situation.  
         (i) Reinforcements.  
         (j) Assistance From Neighboring Forces.  
         (k) Peculiarities and Weaknesses.  
   b. Enemy Capabilities.  
   c. Own Courses of Action.  

3. ANALYSIS OF OPPOSING COURSES OF ACTION
4. COMPARISON OF OWN COURSES OF ACTION
5. DECISION
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*Note: This document was provided to the author by Dr. Elizabeth Kvitashvili, USAID CMM. This is an internal document to the Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation.


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