Building Trust and Capacity: Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration to Transition Pro-Government Non-State Armed Groups

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Governments attempting to counter insurgent threats often lack the authority, influence, and control to counter these threats, creating what some have described as “ungoverned” spaces. A number of governments seek alliances with non-state armed groups that emerge from these conflicts. These groups have proved effective at reducing violence in some cases, most notably demonstrated by the Sunni “Sons of Iraq” movement. As governments consider forging alliances with non-state armed groups, they often focus on how to ally with these groups, what support they might gain from these relationships, and how to employ these groups to defeat a common threat. Typically, leaders give less thought to the eventual transition of these groups from war to peace. How then, can governments transition non-state armed groups from war to peace?

The implementation of a Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) program provides an effective method for building government trust and transitioning war-torn societies towards peace. The United Nations developed a model to assist countries with this process, which it described in the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS). The application of the UN’s IDDRS model to three case studies demonstrates its usefulness. The selected case studies encompass different eras, cultures, and continents including the UN intervention in Sierra Leone in the late 1990s, British support for the indigenous units during the Dhofar Rebellion in Oman in the 1960s and 1970s, and the Colombian government’s demobilization of pro-government forces starting in 2003. The application of the UN’s IDDRS model to the events in each of these case studies suggests the potential effectiveness in transitioning armed groups from war to peace. The challenges involved in implementing a DDR program also offer considerations for leaders as they evaluate and develop alliances with non-state armed groups.
Introduction

Governments responding to insurgents often lack the authority, influence, and control to counter these threats within their borders, creating what some have described as “ungoverned” spaces. Faced with a threat and lacking state capacity, some governments seek alliances with non-state armed groups. Well-known examples of this include the Colombian government’s support for a paramilitary group in their fight against insurgent forces and the United States’ support for Sunni tribes in Iraq. As leaders consider forging this alliance, they often focus on how to ally with these groups, what support they can gain from these relationships, and how these groups can contribute towards defeating the government’s immediate threat. Another important consideration, which often receives far less attention, involves how the government will pacify these groups after the conflict ends.

The implementation of a Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) program provides a proven method to build government trust and transition war-torn societies towards peace. Understanding the relationship between governments and non-state armed groups undertaking DDR programs provides insight into how these alliances may develop through the conflict period. Comprehensive DDR programs can reduce violence by removing weapons from the environment and can create an opening for governments to extend their authority and capacity within a country. Governments that align with non-state armed groups tend to lack the capacity to meet their people’s expectations, especially in creating a secure society. Applying a DDR

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2 For example, Peru’s government authorized the formation and support of “rondas” or Comités de auto defensa (Committees of Self Defense) as the government fought the Shining Path movement in the 1980s and 1990s. Guatemala and El Salvador also formed similar groups over this same period. Additionally, in 1998 the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), a local defense force emerged called the “Mai Mai.” This group formed in response to an insurgency backed by neighboring Rwanda. More recently, the allegiances of the Mai Mai appear more conflicted, with reports indicating they fought both government troops and other insurgent factions.
program can assist a government not only with the transition of a society from peace to war, but can also become a state-building tool to extend feeble governmental authority into previously ungoverned spaces.

Governments that successfully implement the UN’s DDR model are thought to create conditions for the transition of groups from war to peace. Although the DDR abbreviation by itself only describes three activities, the DDR model constitutes an array of complex considerations and implementation methods which must fit within the unique context of a particular conflict environment. Successful DDR programs include political, social, economic, and security efforts to adjust conditions within a state’s society to prevent a return to violence. A DDR process offers a means to extend the government’s trust and confidence to its people, creating the potential for the state to increase its capacity and internal sovereignty. Governments that consider these factors are more likely to transition successfully, while those that do not risk a return to bloodshed.

Applying the United Nation’s DDR model to three case studies will demonstrate how important and relevant these factors are to governments who ally with non-state armed groups. These case studies include DDR programs from several different decades, in disparate countries, and under unique security and political conditions. The case studies include the United Nations (UN) intervention in Sierra Leone beginning in the late 1990s, British support for indigenous units during the Dhofar Rebellion in Oman in the 1960s and 1970s, and the Colombian government’s efforts to demobilize pro-government forces starting in 2003. The UN’s intervention into Sierra Leone in the 1990s included both peacekeeping operations and a DDR program. Prior to this settlement, the government of Sierra Leone partnered with a civilian defense force, the kamajors, to help quell the threat from an insurgent force, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). The UN recorded that expenses totaled $80 million to disarm and
demobilize more than 70,000 ex-combatants, which the UN and the World Bank both described as “successful.”

The second case study involves British support to the Sultan of Oman during the Dhofar Rebellion, spanning from the early 1960s through the mid-1970s. Following years of unrest and evolving threats from various factions during the Dhofar Rebellion, Qaboos bin Said overthrew his father in 1970 and replaced him on the throne. In response, the British increased their support for the Sultan, which included governmental reforms and training for irregular units, called *firqat*, to counter the insurgent forces. The British and Omani government conducted this operation before the development of the UN’s DDR program, but still managed to implement key aspects of it, demonstrating the value of DDR as a useful conceptual tool for the employment of non-state armed groups during war and their transition to peace.

The Colombian government’s efforts to reduce influence of the United Self-Defense Force (*Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia*, or AUC) constitute the third case study. Faced with growing violence and increased popular support for insurgent groups, including the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN), the Colombian government supported the AUC, a non-state armed group operating largely outside state influence. Governmental support for the AUC waivered, partly based on the government’s perceived threat from the insurgent groups, partly in response to allegations of human rights abuses, and partly because of improved capabilities of Colombia’s state security forces. The Colombian government initiated its own DDR program beginning in 2003, yet faced a variety of continued challenges in completely pacifying the AUC through 2008.

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Although these case studies share some commonalities, their differences are more obviously apparent. The selection of these particular cases, spanning several decades and across multiple continents and cultures, demonstrates the suitability and applicability of DDR concepts in disparate settings. They include several different types of DDR programs, including one supported by the UN, one run internally by a state’s government, and one run in conjunction with a government heavily dependent on assistance from a foreign country. Although the countries in these case studies lacked large populations and large geographic areas, their governments were still unable to extend influence across their land and throughout their people. Each government faced an internal threat and struggled to extend authority across the breadth of their countries. In each case the government formed an alliance with local non-state armed groups to counter internal threats, and later implemented efforts to demobilize and integrate these groups into their societies. The governments’ successful transition from peace to war depended in part upon its ability to grasp and implement concepts found within the UN’s DDR program.

An analysis of the UN’s DDR model, as applied to these three cases studies, creates useful considerations for governments and international institutions working with non-state armed groups. The US recently supported non-state armed groups with positive results, most notably the “Sons of Iraq” described by General David H. Petraeus in his April 2008 testimony to Congress. Encouraged by this program, several have suggested that it ought to serve as a model to apply in Afghanistan and other countries. In 2007, the Department of Defense initiated support for the Frontier Corps in Pakistan’s North-West Frontier Province and Baluchistan Province, with mixed results. Although journalist and Al Qaeda expert Peter Bergen supported this approach in Pakistan, he opposed its implementation in Afghanistan for fear of encouraging warlords and a

tribal militia. Yet the Afghan Interior Ministry reported in early 2009 that the United States began just such a program, calling it the “Afghan Public Protection Force.”

In considering these alliances, most analysts focus on the development and employment of local non-state armed groups to fight the insurgent threat, with little mention of how these pro-government armed groups will eventually transition once the conflict ends. This approach overlooks the full lifecycle of non-state armed groups. It may also leave governments unprepared to pacify these groups successfully. The DDR model, as described by the United Nations, includes useful guidelines for governments currently involved in transitioning non-state armed groups and governments considering future alliances with these organizations. The analysis of the DDR model as applied to Sierra Leone, Colombia, and Oman suggest its relevance for the United States and its allies in considering current conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. By recognizing the challenges involved in transitioning armed groups, as identified in these case studies, analysts will be more able to consider the implications of allying with non-state armed groups.

**Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration**

The UN’s DDR concept encompasses a range of programs for a variety of organizations in different conditions. These include efforts to reform and downsize existing military and security forces, programs for insurgent groups who opposed government forces, and pro-government forces that received some support from the state but remained largely outside existing security organizations. In addition to these cases, another variant involves armed groups that receive substantive assistance from one or more foreign nations. The Department of Defense

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term for this is a “surrogate,” which describes an individual or group which acts on behalf of another. The non-state armed groups from these three case studies are limited to pro-government forces, which include those that a) emerged from regions lacking government authority and b) who acted as surrogates of a foreign government.

Before reviewing DDR programs as outlined by the UN and as practiced by various organizations, it is first necessary to consider its historic development. Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) initially emerged within efforts to downsize government military organizations, sometimes also involving UN peacekeeping forces. The United Nations later incorporated some of these efforts into peacekeeping activities, also termed Peace Support Operations (PSOs), during the late 1980s. This developed into DDR as a conceptual approach, which the UN Security Council first sanctioned in Namibia from 1989-1990. These two cases typify the two general categories of DDR programs. One set focuses on downsizing militaries and initiated reforms within the defense and security sector, as occurred in Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Cambodia. The second set occurs in war-to-peace transitions.

9 These two categories overlap, with DDR programs aimed at reforming militaries also involved in reducing the threat to governments from armed groups. For example, after years of violence, various Cambodian armed groups signed an agreement in 1991 with assistance from the UN. The UN formed a team to integrate the four main groups into a single force, supervise a ceasefire, and implement a DDR program to reduce the size and condition of the state’s security forces. See Agencia Catalana de Cooperacio al Desenvolupament, Cambodia, http://www.escolapau.org/img/programas/desarme/mapa/camboyai.pdf (accessed 19 March 2009). In Ethiopia, follow its war with Eritrea through 2000, more than 148,000 combatants disarmed as the nation transition to a less militarized society. See Robert Muggah, “Comparing DDR and durable solutions: some lessons from Ethiopia,” Humanitarian Practice Network 39 (June 2008). Eritrea mobilized a larger percentage of its smaller population during the border conflict, with nearly 50 percent of the population and 80 percent of the working age men involved. The Eritrean government, with help from both the World Bank and United Nations, initiated a DDR program following this conflict to reduce the size and expense of the government’s defense and security forces. See: Sally Healy, Eritrea’s Economic Survival: Summary record of a conference held on 20 April 2007, http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files/9764_200407eritrea.pdf (Accessed March 19, 2009).
DDR programs in Sierra Leone, Dhofar, and Colombia represent the second category of cases, involving primarily pacification efforts rather than demilitarization.

The UN continued to pursue DDR programs across the globe from the early 1990s onward, with a large percentage of these done in Africa. Along with these UN missions, other individual countries and other international organizations initiated DDR programs, including NATO, the European Union, Britain, Germany, and the Organization for African Unity (now the African Union). Some countries commenced DDR without direct involvement from the United Nations, as in the case of Ethiopia, Eritrea, and, more recently, Colombia. Although DDR programs became more common, critics highlighted the lack of a consistent framework or doctrine for its application.  

This lack of an agreed upon framework for DDR presents challenges in considering it as a proposed solution for how governments might effectively transition non-state armed groups beyond conflicts. To further complicate matters, many organizations offer best practices and lessons learned without fully describing which particular DDR model was applied. This method makes learning from these experiences problematic. The lack of a recognized DDR framework presented difficulties and redundancy, most notably within the UN itself. The UN-led DDR activities in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in 2001 with several different UN agencies conducting operations within the country, often with different approaches and

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overlapping objectives. One UN agency concentrated only on foreign armed groups, another focused on child soldiers, while several more implemented DDR and humanitarian efforts only in the eastern part of the DRC. Even though the UN led many of these DDR efforts, the programs themselves operated independently which resulted in duplicate and competing efforts. In addition to the UN efforts, the government of DRC initiated a DDR program. The UN conducted similar operations in Liberia, with at least six UN programs administering DDR support.

In addition to UN efforts, many other organizations are often involved in implementing DDR programs, which can further complicate matters. These groups may include international organizations, individual foreign governments, and non-government organizations working within the DDR mission or with similar objectives but outside the DDR framework. For example, the World Bank leads the largest demobilization and reintegration program in the world, focusing on ex-combatants from across the Great Lakes region of Central Africa. This program, called the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP), spans seven countries and includes efforts from more than forty other governments, NGOs, and regional organizations. Although this program represents a broad regional approach, the World Bank’s policies prohibit it from supporting disarmament activities. As this example demonstrates, coordinating DDR programs across regions, governments, international organizations, and NGOs creates inherent challenges.

13 Knight, “Expanding the DDR Model: Politics and Organisations [sic],” 5.
15 For example, Kees Kingma, “Demobilisation and Reintegration of Ex-combatants in Post-war and Transition Countries,” GTZ (Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Technische Zusammenarbeit), Eschborn, Germany, 2001, 16, which included a range of organizations and countries including: Catholic Relief Services, the International Labour Organisation [sic], the International Organisation of Migration, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the World Food Program, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, in addition to various UN agencies.
16 The seven targeted countries include: Angola, Burundi, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Republic of Congo, Rwanda, and Uganda. For more information see: http://www.mdrp.org/about_us.htm.
17 Hanson, “Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) in Africa.”
In contrast to the World Bank, the US Department of Defense has published materials that specifically address disarmament and the DDR programs. These documents focus primarily on the military’s role in support of DDR programs, rather than describing and explaining it as a concept. For example, Joint Publications 3-07.3, Peace Operations, introduces Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Reintegration, and Resettlement (DDRRR) as a potential mission during Peacekeeping Operations and Peace Enforcement Operations.\textsuperscript{18} It further outlines how successful DDRRR programs integrate “the political, military, humanitarian, informational, developmental, and financial management areas.”\textsuperscript{19} This document concentrates on the importance of security within DDRRR programs and lists a range of potential tasks that military units may conduct in support of such missions.\textsuperscript{20} Another perspective can be found in Army Field Manual 3.05.130, Army Special Operations Forces: Unconventional Warfare, which concentrates primarily on support to insurgent force to resist or overthrow an established government. It also considers scenarios involving support for individuals or groups who act in part on behalf of the United States, which it defines as a “surrogate.”\textsuperscript{21} As the manual notes, unconventional warfare “can also refer to military and paramilitary support to an irregular armed group seeking increased power and influence relative to its political rivals without overthrowing the central government in the absence of a foreign occupying power.”\textsuperscript{22} After introducing seven phases to describe unconventional warfare, it notes transition as the final stage. Transition, the manual notes, “is the final, most difficult, and most sensitive phase of UW operations.”\textsuperscript{23} This phase may or may not include demobilization, but does involve the government bringing “arms and ammunition under

\textsuperscript{19} Ibid., III-8, IV-3.
\textsuperscript{20} Ibid. III-8, IV-4. Potential tasks as listed by 3-07.3 include: providing security, supporting arms embargoes, verifying disarmament, providing various types of intelligence, and assisting with logistical support to dispose of weapons and ordnance.
\textsuperscript{21} Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-05.130 Army Special Operations Forces: Unconventional Warfare, (Washington D.C.: Department of the Army, 2008), 4-10.
\textsuperscript{22} Ibid., 3-19.
its control to ensure public security and to return to… the rule of law.” While these military publications appropriately focus on the role armed forces may play during DDR programs, they do not adequately depict the concept for application to case studies.

Militaries often take responsibility for aspects of DDR programs, but political influences dominate many areas of its implementation. The United Nations, as one forum for state’s political actions, has supported many DDR programs without a formal doctrine. The lack of an established DDR framework led to redundancies and a lack of coordination within the UN and difficulties for other organizations working on DDR efforts and related programs. Groups published “lessons learned,” without a common understanding of DDR concepts or implementation guidelines. In response, the UN formed a team and reviewed 15 years of operational reports to develop a comprehensive approach. This resulted in the 2005 publication of the UN’s Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS). In addition, the UN published an “Operational Guide,” research, analysis, and reports from UN DDR programs, and provided online training materials on the subject. The UN’s IDDRS will be the primary source to understand DDR and analyze its application and effectiveness. This is in part because the UN has supported many peacekeeping operations involving DDR programs, to include a variety of progress reports describing their implementation.

The IDDRS emphasizes the importance of DDR, but it also outlines some limitations and preconditions. The manual acknowledges that “DDR alone cannot resolve conflict or prevent violence; it can, however, help establish a secure environment so that other elements of a peace-building strategy, including weapons management, security sector reform (SSR), elections and rule of law reform can proceed.” The UN’s approach identifies several preconditions for DDR

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23 Ibid., 4-10.
24 Ibid., 4-10.
without specifying priorities, including: “the signing of a negotiated peace agreement that provides a legal framework for DDR; trust in the peace process; willingness of the parties to the conflict to engage in DDR; and a minimum guarantee of security.”

Third parties, in the form of UN peacekeeping forces or other organizations, may be involved during implementation of the peace agreement and peace-building process. Much of the academic work on DDR concentrates on countries who implement some form of representational government during or soon after the end of violence, although the UN has supported efforts within countries ruled by dictators and those with democracies.

As described by the UN’s IDDRS, the implementation of DDR focuses on several objectives, most prominently human security and “to contribute to security and stability in post-conflict situations so that recovery and development can begin.” DDR represents a complex process, with various political, economic, social, military, security, and humanitarian considerations. This process aims to remove weapons from ex-combatants, to remove ex-combatants from their military structures, and to integrate ex-combatants socially and economically into their society.

The IDDRS’ “focus is on individuals in armed forces and groups,” which defines a combatant, whether a member of a national army or irregular military organization. Ex-combatants include former combatants who surrender their arms and participate in a DDR program, broadly covering those directly involved in the conflict as well as deserters, cooks,

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26 Ibid.  
28 UN IDDRS “2.10: The UN Approach to DDR.”  
29 UN IDDRS “1.10 Introduction to Integrated DDR Standards.”
messengers, and even “war wives.” Reflecting its “people-centred [sic]” approach, the UN IDDRS identifies a range of other participants including abductees, dependents, women, youth, child, disabled persons, civilian returnees, and communities as potential participants in DDR-related efforts. Some of these groups reflect “cross-cutting issues” which also includes cross-border population movements, food aid programs, HIV/AIDS, and health issues. Although these issues may be relevant for some environments, these the application of the UN DDR model to the three cases studies does not focus on them in particular detail.

Even before the publication of the UN IDDRS in 2005, several authors and organizations confirmed how DDR programs contributed towards transitioning societies from war to peace. King’s College Professor Mats R. Berdal published a concise paper in 1996 on post-conflict transitions and the implementation of DDR programs. This work concentrated on DDR efforts in the post-Cold War period beginning in 1989 and including references to programs in Africa, Central America, and Asia. Berdal examines the context in which DDR programs began, as well as the common challenges faced during their implementation. Berdal concludes his analysis by noting that the “manner in which disarmament, demobilisation [sic] and reintegration are planned and executed can play a crucial role in securing that commitment [to a peace process].” Stanford University political science professor Stephen J. Stedman published an influential paper suggesting that the presence of a “spoiler” creates the greatest danger towards ending negotiated peace and a return to civil conflict. He defines a “spoiler” as “leaders and factions who view a particular peace as opposed to their interest and who are willing to use violence to undermine

30 See Appendix A for a definition.
31 See Appendix A for a definition.
32 UN IDDRS “2.30 Participants, Beneficiaries and Partners.”
33 UN IDDRS “Section 5: Cross Cutting Issues.”
34 Berdal’s examples primarily include aspects of DDR programs from Somalia, Mozambique, El Salvador, Cambodia, Angola, Uganda, Ethiopia, and Zimbabwe.
it.”

Stedman noted that “[b]eyond overcoming the threat from spoilers, the demobilization of soldiers and the reintegration into civilian life is the single most important sub-goal of peace implementation.”

The Integrated DDR Standards outline several steps involved with disarmament, including a design phase and partnership with national institutions. The “Programme Design” involves three steps, including detailed field assessments, cost estimates, and the creation of an implementation plan. Many DDR programs rely on national institutions to serve as the lead agency, with the UN and other institutions supporting those efforts. Establishing national ownership “is essential for the success and sustainability of DDR programmes [sic]” although external actors sometimes exert pressure and control to undermine this tenet. The formation of an implementation plan also occurs during the design process.

Disarmament typically begins the DDR process. It involves “the collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons of combatants.” Elements of this phase include information collection and planning, weapon collection, stockpile management, and weapon destruction. This step contributes towards an improvement in the security environment, but also represents “a highly symbolic act that signifies the ending of an individual’s active role as a combatant.” The UN’s IDDRS describe various operational considerations, including screening and eligibility criteria, mobile and static collection methods, information campaigns regarding the DDR program, security and storage requirements, and weapons destruction concerns. When encampments are used for disarmaments,

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37 Ibid., 109.
38 UN IDDRS “3.20 DDR Programme Design.”
39 UN IDDRS “3.30 National Institutions for DDR.”
40 UN IDDRS “1.20 Glossary and Definitions.”
41 UN IDDRS “4.10 Disarmament.”
then the sequencing of these operations changes somewhat and both disarmament and
demobilization occur at the same time.

Demobilization, as described by the *IDDRS*, includes both a physical and psychological
cOMPONENT. Physically, combatants separate from the command and control structure of their
armed group, which attempts to reduce the group’s influence and potential threat. This often
occurs as combatants move to processing and encampments for further training. The
psychological, or what the *IDDRS* calls mental, aspect of demobilization involves the preparation
of disarmed individuals for their future in civil society without the “camaraderie and support
systems of the structured armed force.” Defined as “the formal and controlled discharge of
active combatants from armed forces or other armed group,” demobilization involves two stages.

The first stage involves screening and processing individuals, and may include an
introduction to the camp, health assessments, counseling and referrals, preparation and awareness
seminars to assist with the individuals transitioning from military to civilian life. One important
decision during this stage concerns the use of cash for weapons, an issue the *IDDRS* provides
opposing views without suggesting an approved approach. UN field reports suggest that buy-
back programs often result in combatants turning in unserviceable weapons and further encourage
cross-border arms trading. Large cash payments to combatants can also breed resentment in
civilian populations, which often lived through more difficult experiences than the combatants.
The final step in this first stage involves an individual’s discharge from the armed group, which
typically includes documentation and recognition for a person’s service without specifying which
particular affiliation, role, or group was involved.

The second stage within the demobilization phase consists of reinsertion, which the UN
*IDDRS* defines as transitional “assistance offered to ex-combatants… prior to the longer-term

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42 Ibid.
43 UN *IDDRS* “4.20 Demobilization.”
44 Ibid.
process of reintegration.”45 The transitional assistance package may include food and non-food items, intended to help ex-combatants and their dependents with their immediate needs. The UN IDDRS separates the roles and responsibilities of implementing the benefits, charging the implementing partner (typically a host-nation government organization or committee) with distribution of benefits while directing the camp manager with ensuring fair distribution. Some reinsertion programs include some training at the encampment site, as in the case of Sierra Leone, although the UN IDDRS does not mention this specifically. The final portion of reinsertion involves transportation of individuals to the community of their choice.

Although described in three district phases, the IDDRS emphasizes that for DDR programs to succeed they must be based on an understanding that each process is “fundamentally indivisible and interlinked at both the strategic and the operational levels.”46 Disjointed efforts, as documented from several UN peacekeeping missions, result in frustrations and even civil unrest. The publication of the IDDRS represented a common approach within the UN that intended to improve synchronization.

The related activities of disarmament and demobilization involve a range of political, economic, and social considerations. Many, however, concentrate on how these two tasks affect the security environment. Paul Collier’s study of a DDR program from 1992 in Uganda directly examines the relationship between demobilization (which includes disarmament, in this case) and security. Using crime data, Collier suggested that demobilization “does not lead to a significant

45 UN IDDRS “1.20 Glossary and Definitions.”
46 UN IDDRS “4.20 Demobilization.” The United Nation attempts to improve the implementation of DDR programs by using three methods: the creation of a common framework, education, and continued learning and feedback. By establishing a common framework, specifically developed within the IDDRS, the UN provides a mechanisms for other organizations to operate in cooperation with the program. The World Bank, for example, funds demobilization and reintegration but not disarmament. In addition, the UN offers education on DDR directly through various published materials as well as with partner agencies who conduct training sessions on the subject. The UN also publishes documents with feedback from those conducting DDR programs in the form of reports from the field and access to academic articles on the subject. This dialogue attempts to improve how organizations and individuals implement DDR programs and also to adjust the IDDRS as a doctrinal manual.
upsurge in insecurity” and that “[t]he demobilized, if returned to their home areas and given some assistance, are, with identifiable exceptions, able to find income-earning opportunities.”

Barbara Walter, a political scientist teaching at University of California, San Diego, conducted an analysis on how civil wars end using data from several countries. Her research highlighted the importance of demobilization and disarmament as a factor to improve the likelihood of a successful transition to peace. Successful transitions occurred when the societies remained secure from armed threats operating beyond government influence. The presence of UN or other peacekeepers reflects a perception that “neutral” or third-party military or security forces contribute towards an environment to establish trust, confidence, and security, with DDR an element of this transition.

Both Collier and Walter identify a relationship between the process of disarmament and demobilization and their effectiveness at improving the security environment. These studies highlight how governments can implement disarmament and demobilization efforts to prevent a return to violence.

Other researchers suggest that many disarmament and demobilization programs overly emphasize security and neglect social aspects. Knight and Ozerdem emphasize the social context involved in disarmament and demobilization, outlining the dilemma for combatants “who are asked to give up their arms, [and then] face a ‘point of no return’: they, and their leaders, must have faith in a future where the advantages of peace outweigh those of war.”

These authors also suggest that the UN’s approach overly emphasizes “cantonment (sometimes termed ‘assembly’ or ‘quartering’) as an essential element within demobilization.” This approach, however, creates many more difficulties, including increased cost associated with building and maintaining a

cantonment as well as potential unrest if camps are not maintained adequately. Walter’s research also supports the importance of social influences. She wrote that social conditions must exist which “convince[e] the combatants to shed their partisan armies and surrender conquered territory even though such steps will increase their vulnerability…”

The disarmament process also affects societies economically. Many DDR programs implement inducements during disarmament, which degenerate to a weapons-for-cash program. The UN implemented such programs commonly in the 1990s, with later programs adopting a “weapons for development” and “weapons for vouchers” approach. Berdal suggested that buy back programs produced limited impacts in reducing the number of weapons in a country when facing porous borders, the lack of government capacity to enforce weapon regulations, and a security climate that encourages the ownership and use of a weapon. Regardless of the methods used, economist Kees Kingma, at the policy institute Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC), suggests, “ex-combatants should not receive more support than necessary to help them attain a standard of living of the communities in which they try to reintegrate.” Offering disproportionate assistance to combatants may remove them as an immediate threat, but could also produce unintended secondary effects including resentment from neutral parties removed from the DDR process. It could even encourage others to take up arms and participate in violence, seeing the reintegration benefits that are more generous relative to the population as an incentive.

50 Ibid., 507.
51 Ibid., 508.
53 Knight and Ozerdem, “Guns, Camps and Cash: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reinsertion of Former Combatants in Transitions from War to Peace,” 505.
54 Ibid. Berdal, Disarmament and Demobilisation after Civil Wars: Arms, soldiers and the termination of armed conflicts 34.
Researcher Robert Muggah notes how the initial framing of the objectives associated with DDR programs can often influence the resulting implementation methods. Government officials and military personnel often focus on the short-term pragmatic functions related to DDR programs and concentrate their efforts to primarily disarm and deter “potential spoilers.” Alternatively, development groups and donors relate DDR to long-term development efforts, viewing ex-combatants as a potential labor source. Each approach suggests a different method of improving the solution, even within the general description of a DDR program. If DDR efforts concentrate on reducing spoilers, then programs often attempt to reduce the likelihood of an ex-combatant to return to violence and destabilization. This approach directs resources towards a narrow group of high-risk individuals as an incentive to stay away from violence. Alternatively, if the DDR focuses on long-term development, the programs identifies broad target groups to encourage participation and economic improvements.

This review of the political, security, social and economic considerations involved with disarmament and demobilization emphasizes the complexity involved in implemented these activities. After reviewing the UN’s IDDRS and research on disarmament and demobilization, two important questions emerge in applying this model to the three case studies selected. How did the government implement disarmament and demobilization? In addition, what were the economic, security, political, and social dimensions involved with the DDR effort? These two questions form the foundation for analysis of the disarmament and demobilization programs as applied to Sierra Leone, Colombia, and Oman.

The final phase involved in DDR includes reintegration, which the UN’s IDDRS describes as the “ultimate objective” and “a long-term, continuous social and economic process of development… that can last up to one year.” The lack of funding for reintegration hampers

57 Ibid., 248.
58 UN IDDRS “4.30 Social and Economic Reintegration.”
many UN programs. Program managers attempt to avoid this problem by engaging donors early, although some organizations operate in countries with DDR programs independently of the UN and with their own, more narrow, interests in mind. This complicates coordination and may involve agencies implementing measure with compete or conflict with one another. Because reintegration is both difficult and complex, the UN IDDRS acknowledges that it represents only a portion of a “wider recovery strategy, which often includes post-conflict rehabilitation, resettlement of displaced populations, reconciliation efforts, respect for human rights, rule of law and improved governance.”

Guidelines for the planning of this phase include consultation with combatants, communities, infrastructure assessments, expectation management, balancing equity with security requirements. This last concept recognizes that DDR often initially pursues combatants first to alter the security environment, which the civilian population may then perceive as an unjustified reward to conflict participants. Reintegration, according to the IDDRS, includes both an economic and a social component.

Combatants attempting to reintegrate into their communities often face enormous difficulties, especially following a prolonged armed conflict. Typically, economic conditions deteriorate during conflicts and, once a settlement occurs, a large number of ex-combatants flood the labor market. Education may includes formal education for children and youths, vocational apprenticeships to assist ex-combatants with employment in the civilian economy, and “life skills” training to assist with dispute resolution, career planning, and civilian social behavior expectations. In addition, the IDDRS encourages employment creation methods including public works programs, transition to existing business, and micro-financing to encourage new enterprises. Infrastructure and government services can become “stopgap” measures that provide only temporary relief rather than the primary reintegration mechanism.

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59 Ibid.
60 Ibid.
The second component of reintegration involves a social dimension. Although not explicitly identified as political considerations, many of the issues identified in the IDDRS clearly involve political factors. These include land distribution, resettlement programs, access to water and mineral resources, and property rights.\textsuperscript{61} Urban reintegration can prove difficult as ex-combatants cannot rely as much on family and friends to help establish a support network. This process may also involve reconciliation efforts, initiated by the government or other international agencies.

In addition to research focused on disarmament and demobilization, many analysts have noted the importance of political, economic, and social dimensions during the reintegration process. Economist Kees Kingma, working for a German policy institute, wrote that “[r]eintegration into civilian life is by nature a slow social, economic, and psychological process.”\textsuperscript{62} Kingma’s research from several different countries found that ex-combatants in rural areas more successful at reintegration than those in urban settings. An ex-combatant who returns to a strong social network consisting of family and established friends, which exists more in rural areas than in urban ones, explains this in part. Subsequent research in other countries tends to confirm this finding.\textsuperscript{63} Urban environments may offer more material choices and social networks, but this setting can also diffuse the affect of these relationships and offer seams for returning ex-combatants to exist apart from others, both of which obstruct greater reintegration.

In addition to social considerations, political and economic considerations are also critical to reintegration. Walter’s analysis of recurring civil wars suggests that improved living conditions and increased access to political participation reduce the likelihood of renewed civil war.\textsuperscript{64}

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\textsuperscript{61} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{62} Kees Kingma, Demobilisation [sic] and Reintegration of Ex-combatants in Post-war and Transition Countries (Eschborn, Germany: Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), 2001), 14.
\textsuperscript{63} Knight, “Expanding the DDR Model: Politics and Organisations [sic],” 5.
Several authors have published research supporting the idea that ex-combatants who lack economic opportunities or self-determination contribute to their likelihood to reengage in some form of violence.\textsuperscript{65} Economic issues begin to blur with social, emotional, and psychological factors, leaving some researchers to suggest that ex-combatants feel frustrated and dissatisfied following internal conflicts in part because they lack the ability to influence their own future.\textsuperscript{66} In considering the apparent importance of inclusion and opportunities, both armed groups and governments may need to adapt in order to transition successful. The UN’s \textit{IDDRS} specifically addresses this by acknowledging that DDR efforts represent just one of many likely reforms possibly relevant to a country.\textsuperscript{67}

The social, to include moral and psychological, relationships between armed groups and governments also affect reintegration. William Zartman, Professor Emeritus in international studies at Johns Hopkins University, analyzed how internal conflicts and civil wars often involve asymmetry, especially in terms of legitimacy.\textsuperscript{68} The established government positions itself as the legitimate authority both to its own people and to other states within the international community. The insurgent force may attempt to delegitimize the government, and the struggle between the two in this arena represents one aspect of the conflict. During the adjustment to peace, individual combatants may transition from a position of relative power and status to a lower perceived standing. Addressing legitimacy and an organization’s prestige during the pacification poses another challenge for DDR programs. A pro-government armed force, while neither a fully legitimate government force nor an insurgent group, represents a different faction in the conflict, yet it faces some similar challenges during reintegration.

\textsuperscript{65} Berdal, Disarmament and Dmobilisation [sic] after Civil Wars: Arms, soldiers and the termination of armed conflicts, 18.
\textsuperscript{67} UN \textit{IDDRS} “2.10: The UN Approach to DDR.”
The economic environment can greatly influence how ex-combatants and their organizations respond to the transition period. Several authors suggest that greed motivates and sustains armed groups during civil wars.\(^6\) Groups that organize receive financial support and rely on this material incentive can attract opportunist members, possibly encouraging a transition from armed opposition to criminal activities. In addition, armed groups with sufficient resources may extend social services, a form of civil order, and basic security with the area they control.\(^7\) This economic capability can then influence aspects of the organization socially and politically, especially in terms of how the group recruits and receives support from their community. Alternatively, groups that lack access to material resources tend to organize themselves around shared social identities, often emphasizing grievances instead of greed.\(^7\)

This categorization of the motivations for sustaining an armed group helps policy makers to understand the challenges faced by governments as they reintegrate these groups and individual ex-combatants into their societies.

In consideration of this research, the following two questions relating to the reintegration phase are relevant for the case studies in Sierra Leone, Colombia, and Oman: how did the government implement reintegration? And, what were contributions of the DDR program to the resulting economic, security, political, and social environment? These questions establish a starting point to evaluate the effectiveness of the reintegration process for each of the case studies involved.

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\(^7\) King, *Ending Civil Wars*, 37.

The application of the DDR model and the examination of these questions to the case studies in Sierra Leone, Colombia, and Oman demonstrate methods and considerations for governments as they ally with armed groups during and after conflicts. The unique and disparate circumstances found in each case study further reinforce the applicability of the DDR model, as presented by the UN. While not a universal solution to problems related to violence and insurgencies, the DDR model provides a useful initial framework for governments pacifying armed groups. As the United States considers opportunities to form, build, employ, and transition armed groups, the UN DDR model presents a sound foundation, including both principles and guidelines for application, which will help guide current and future conflict termination.

### Sierra Leone

Unlike many African countries, Sierra Leone enjoyed relative calm following their independence from Britain in 1961. Governed by the “father of the nation” for almost twenty-five years, stability continued until the mid-1980s when economic conditions and regional turmoil spilled over its borders. The Revolutionary United Front (RUF), with support from Liberian insurgents called the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), attacked the government in 1991 and pushed Sierra Leone into more than ten years of civil war. During this period, citizens experienced armed interventions from at least five different organizations, four negotiated settlements, three coup d’états, and widespread violence. Estimates for the number of civil war dead vary, but hovered around 100,000 with many more mutilated with arms, legs, ears, and noses chopped off.  

72 From this conflict emerged many armed groups supporting various factions and governments. This included the RUF, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), the

West Side Boys, and a pro-government group called both the kamajors and Civil Defense Force (CDF). Following the intervention of the British in 2000 under a United Nations mandate, groups agreed to a peace accord and Sierra Leone, with support from the UN, began to implement a DDR program. Although the DDR program experienced multiple problems, it contributed significantly towards Sierra Leone’s transition to a more secure and peaceful country. The DDR program, like other development and reform efforts, could not transform Sierra Leone completely. However, it did help Sierra Leone rise out of its status as a collapsed state and emerge as a sovereign government facing problems similar to other sub-Saharan countries.

Problems in Sierra Leone became prominent following the 1985 transition of power from the country’s modern founder, Siaka Stevens, to his successor, Joseph Momoh. Stevens ruled the country to maintain and consolidate his own grip on power, resulting in a small ceremonial army and a centralization of government power in the capital, Freetown. The government relied primarily on revenue generated from natural resources, with the rising illegal diamond smuggling diverting money away from its coffers and towards armed groups. As revenue fell, the economy first crumbled and then collapsed upon the arrival of President Momoh. Petroleum imports ceased, pay for civil servants ended, and electricity service became intermittent. These conditions, along with other turmoil in the region, contributed to the eventual rise of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF).

The RUFs origins revolved around its founder, Foday Sankoh, and his experiences in several countries of West Africa. Sankoh served in Sierra Leone’s military and attended college in Freetown, where he demonstrated against the government. After his release from prison, Sankoh fled to Libya and received training as a revolutionary under the leadership of Colonel

73 Larry J. Woods and Timothy R. Reese, Military Interventions in Sierra Leone: Lessons From a Failed State (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2008), 13. According to one study, smugglers removed 97 percent of the diamonds from Sierra Leone in the 1980s, which diverted money away from the government.
74 Ibid., 14.
Muammar al Gaddafi. While in Libya, Sankoh met Charles Taylor, who would later instigate an uprising in neighboring Liberia.\textsuperscript{75} The two men joined forces to overthrow the Sierra Leonean government in 1991. Attacking from Liberia, the two men and their followers achieved initial successes, halting only after facing units from Sierra Leone’s military and the more heavily armed and better-trained Guinean forces.\textsuperscript{76} Some within the villages and towns welcomed the arrival of the insurgents, who appeared to be an improvement over corrupt and ineffective government officials.\textsuperscript{77} Although the RUF could not displace the government, they did generate instability and contributed to a military coup and arrival of the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) in 1992.

The small Sierra Leonean military and new government quickly found itself outmatched. Years of distrust had left the country’s armed forces with only 1500 troops and 1500 reservists, with many soldiers lacking weapons and other vital equipment.\textsuperscript{78} Yet insurgent rivalries between the RUF and NFPL provided some relief, resulting in Taylor and his troops leaving the country. The RUF also attacked government soldiers and captured their equipment and uniforms. Sankoh and his men used this captured material to commit atrocities against the civilian population, then

\textsuperscript{75} Charles Taylor, who escaped from a US jail, led a revolt against the government of Liberia from Cote d’Ivoire in 1989. His group, called the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), quickly overthrew the Liberian government but fractured due to internal rivalries. Civil war broke out, with many labeling Taylor a warlord. After the civil war ended in 1996 Taylor successfully ran for the Presidency with the infamous slogan, “He killed my ma, he killed my pa, but I will vote for him.” Insurgents eventually gained power in Liberia and Taylor left office. The UN issued a warrant for Taylor’s arrest in 2003 and, after his arrest, as of January 2009 he awaits a verdict in his trial at the Hague for war crimes and atrocities.

\textsuperscript{76} A regional coalition of West African countries, called the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), sent a military force to intervene in Sierra Leone after the civil war. The Guinean forces represented a portion of this element. See David Keen, \textit{Conflict and Collusion in Sierra Leone} (New York: Palgrave, 2005), 36.

\textsuperscript{77} The RUFs goals remained unclear because of the differences between their actions and rhetoric. Their leaders expressed revolutionary ideas and aimed to overthrow the established Sierra Leonean government in Freetown, specifically citing government corruption and bad governance as justification. Yet RUF members committed horrendous acts against the very people they claimed to represent, with one leader even announcing “Operation No Living Thing” with the stated goal that his forces would kill everything in the country “to the last chicken”. For more see Keen, \textit{Conflict and Collusion in Sierra Leone} 41-47 and 81; Lansana Ggerie, \textit{A Dirty War in West Africa: The RUF and the Destruction of Sierra Leone} 6-7, 120-121.

\textsuperscript{78} Keen, \textit{Conflict and Collusion in Sierra Leone}, 83.
blaming the army for these acts.\textsuperscript{79} The RUF became well known for committing atrocities, including murder, mutilation, abductions, rape, property destruction, and intimidation. In response, leaders expanded the Sierra Leone Army to 17,000 soldiers in four years, without the organizational capacity so that accusations of government corruption, nepotism, and brutality became common.\textsuperscript{80} Civilians began to call the NPRC troops “sobels,” or “soldiers by day, rebels by night.”\textsuperscript{81} As the NRPC and its army continued their downward spiral, attacking the RUF insurgents proved beyond their means. Ultimately, the military proved unable to adapt to fight the insurgency. Later governments even contracted with a private security firm operating from South Africa to conduct military operations, including seizing diamond mines and defeating the RUF\textsuperscript{82}.

The government’s inability to provide basic security contributed to the emergence of a rural, local defense force known as the \textit{kamajors}.

Villages formed their own defense forces, based in part on pre-colonial cultural traditions. Long before the civil war in Sierra Leone, tribal chiefs selected one or two men from their communities to become specialized hunters, called \textit{kamajors}\textsuperscript{83}. These select individuals

\begin{itemize}
\item[	extsuperscript{79}] Woods and Reese, \textit{Military Interventions in Sierra Leone: Lessons From a Failed State}, 19.
\item[	extsuperscript{80}] Ibid., 27. Following the 1992 Coup, the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) ruled Sierra Leone, expanding the size of the military forces. The NPRC also changed the name for the armed forces from the Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces (RSLMF) to the Sierra Leone Army (SLA).
\item[	extsuperscript{81}] Ibid., 29.
\item[	extsuperscript{82}] The security firm referenced was Executive Outcomes (EO). They also used \textit{kamajors} as scouts in their operations and provided some training for these local armed groups. See Keen, \textit{Conflict and Collusion in Sierra Leone}, 152, 200-201 and Mariane C. Ferme and Danny Hoffman, “Hunter Militias and the International Human Rights Discourse in Sierra Leone and Beyond,” \textit{Africa Today}, 76.
\item[	extsuperscript{83}] Although the word \textit{kamajor} initially referred to individuals appointed by the tribes as hunters, the world \textit{kamajors} later described the many local armed groups in Sierra Leone, including many different ethnicities and villages. Generally these groups maintained ties and loyalties to the recognized government of the country. Anthropologist Danny Hoffman notes that the “hunter” origins and secret ritual initiation contributed to the strong group identity within the \textit{kamajors}, although individual practices varied by group. Some believed that as \textit{kamajors} they could repel bullets and fight off seemingly impossible attacks, as had earlier legendary hunters. However, Hoffman found that as influential as these traditional views were, an even greater influence came from “the cinematic exploits of Sylvester Stallone and Arnold Schwarzenegger and in the survival story of gansta rapper Tupac Shakur.” Use of \textit{a non de guerre} by combatants repeatedly included names such as “Rambo,” “Terminator,” and “Delta Force,” demonstrating the influence of popular culture within the \textit{kamajors}. Quotations and more from Danny Hoffman, “Violent Events as Narrative Blocs: The Disarmament at Bo, Sierra Leone,” \textit{Anthropological Quarterly} 78, no. 2 (Spring 2005): 328-353.
\end{itemize}
applied traditional skills and occult practices to hunt game and protect villages from outside threats. Although the kamajors identity had common origins rooted in their local culture, anthropologist Danny Hoffman noted that “over the course of its institutional life the kamajor militia was hardly a static ‘traditional’ organization.” Their roles shifted during the nation’s civil war and the term became nearly synonymous with the government’s bureaucratic term, the Civil Defense Force (CDF), for various armed groups. As conflict descended on the country, some military units employed kamajors as trackers and scouts. Many of the kamajors dropped their ties to the military as the Sierra Leonean Army lost effectiveness and as citizens started to perceive it as an illegitimate force.

The kamajors fortunes rose and fell like the wave as the tide of the government continued to change. President Alhaji Ahmad Tejan Kabbah and his Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP) assumed power in 1996. Kabbah appointed a kamajor leader as his Deputy Minister of Defense and increased funding for CDF forces, a clear signal of support and legitimacy. Kabbah, with support from the United Nations, capitalized on military successes, maneuvered Sankoh and the RUF to the negotiations table. Leaders agreed to a peace treaty but after only a few weeks, it fell apart. Alienated by the increased support for the CDF, a group of soldiers, led by Major Johnny Koroma, overthrew the government and formed the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) a year later. The AFRC disbanded the CDF, imposed draconian measures across the country, and extended an invitation to the RUF to end the fighting and establish a coalition.84 Koroma coordinated with a West African peacekeeping force to release the captured RUF leader Sankoh, and he joined Koroma and the AFRC as a Vice-Chairman in the government. Life in Sierra Leone under the AFRC-RUF became even more unbearable, with all state services cut and many businesses intimidated by government troops who confiscated money and merchandise.85

85 Ibid., 41. David Keen attributed the partnership between Korma and Sankoh to elements in the Sierra Leone’s business community. See Keen, *Conflict and Collusion in Sierra Leone*, 209-211.
The *kamajor* militias, for the most part, remained loyal to Kabbah’s government in exile. Their ranks swelled and included recruits from neighboring countries. Their role expanded as the *kamajor* became one of the few organizations within Sierra Leone capable of resisting AFRC-RUF brutality. Many Sierra Leoneans initially supported the *kamajors*, in part due to the legitimacy established through tribal chiefs and based on their effectiveness at establishing security. As the *kamajors* numbers increased, however, they drifted away from their roots in local communities. Disaffected members of the RUF and Sierra Leonean military joined the *kamajors* as individuals looked to join the “winning” side. These developments pushed many *kamajors* to become more opportunistic and violent. Members demanded support from local populations while others took on some government functions, including the collection of taxes. Other factions also charged the *kamajors* with committing atrocities, an accusation difficult to verify given conditions during the civil war.

Various international organizations attempted to intervene, through public statements, sponsored negotiations, and directed interventions with few successes. A coalition called the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) condemned the 1997 coup and, along with an unarmed UN observer team, sent their own military observer team without significant progress towards lasting peace. The UN, the United States, Britain, and other governments helped negotiate another settlement between President Kabbah, the RUF, and the AFRC in July of 1999. This agreement, called the Lome Peace Agreement, contributed towards more lasting stability in Sierra Leone.

The Lome Peace Agreement included several important provisions that directly related to DDR and contributed towards its eventual success. Most importantly, it explicitly addressed the major groups involved in the fighting in Sierra Leone, including the government, RUF, and CDF.

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87 Ibid., 61-63.
something previous negotiations excluded. It also granted amnesty to Sankoh and “any member of the RUF/SL, ex-AFRC, ex-SLA or CDF in respect of anything done by them in pursuit of their objectives as members of those organizations.”

The treaty allowed for the RUF to establish itself as a party (which later became the Revolutionary United Front Party, RUF-P), hold office, and granted them positions within the government. The agreement authorized observation groups from the UN, United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL), and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to “disarm all combatants of the RUF/SL, CDF, SLA and paramilitary groups” and committed the government to support a DDR program with help from the international community. The Sierra Leone Army (SLA) remained restricted to their garrisons until it could be restructured, allowing for ex-combatants to enlist if so desired.

Although in and of themselves these stipulations did not secure a lasting peace, they contributed towards both a successful DDR program, reduced violence, and a method of establishing trust between different groups.

In support of the Lome Peace Agreement, the United Nations passed Resolution 1270 in 1999 which created a peacekeeping force with 6,000 military personnel, called the United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMISL). The Security Council directed UNAMISL to assist with the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) process in accordance with the Lome Agreement. UNAMISL’s first challenge involved interpreting its authorization language to develop a shared understanding of its mission. The UN passed

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88 The United Nations Observe Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL).
91 Ibid., 103.
Resolution 1270 under Chapter VII (Peace Enforcement), which authorized UN forces to use force to implement its directives, yet other portions limited UN involvement.\textsuperscript{94} Secretary General Kofi Annan preferred to avoid peace enforcement missions and hoped instead to find a peaceful environment once UNAMISIL arrived.\textsuperscript{95} Major General Vijay Jetley of India, commander of UNAMISIL, shared this view, choosing “not to grant the authority to use force to compel disarmament or even to defend the UN DDR camps from attack.”\textsuperscript{96} This approach to security and the use of force, however, later hinder DDR efforts.

President Kabbah’s government formed the National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (NCDDR) in 1996, although the program remained undeveloped until the arrival of UNAMISIL and British troops in early 2000. The NCDDR received support from many different organizations, including multiple UN agencies, country donors, the World Bank, and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). Initial DDR objectives included weapon and munitions collection and destruction, demobilization of an estimated 45,000 combatants, and reintegration of ex-combatants.\textsuperscript{97} The NCDDR depended heavily on outside support, including UNAMISIL to provide security within the country and the international community to provide financial and development support. Much of the NCDDR efforts depended on factions committing themselves to the peace settlement and its various provisions. The NCDDR identified several target groups for demobilization including the RUF, Armed Forces of

\textsuperscript{92} Ibid., 104.
\textsuperscript{93} Ibid., 55.
\textsuperscript{94} Ibid., 56.
\textsuperscript{95} Ibid., 56.
\textsuperscript{96} Ibid. 58. Keen described one case of UN paralysis at Kono in which the RUF surrounded a demobilization camp and demanded the return of 10 RUF members inside. The UN leadership refused, but rebels inside the camp grabbed weapons and left the camp, joining the RUF until they outnumbered the UN forces. Before long, the RUF held approximately 500 UN security forces hostage. See Keen, \textit{Conflict and Collusion in Sierra Leone}, 262-263.
Sierra Leone, CDF, and AFRC/SLA. Including many of the most significant groups in the settlement reflects an important precondition as described in the UN’s *IDDRS*. The council also planned to transform the RUF from a military organization to a political party.\(^98\) This reflected a DDR program that addressed both individuals and organizations, which proved beneficial in establishing stability.

Implementing disarmament and demobilization occurred simultaneously in selected districts across Sierra Leone in 2001. The NCDDR focused on specific regions within the country that had high concentrations of combatants from the civil war. The disarmament process consisted of five phases in selected districts. It began with assembling combatants, interviewing them to collect personal information, collecting weapons, confirming their eligibility, and ended with transporting ex-combatants to a demobilization facility. The NCDDR guidelines mandated that at least two-thirds of all armed groups appear for disarmament with a weapon, a lenient standard that allowed participation for those who served in support roles rather than as fighters.\(^99\)

Success in each district depended on two factors: the commitment of the armed factions involved and the capacity of the demobilization camps to meet demand from the DDR program. RUF commitment varied and they boycotted participation in some regions due to concerns regarding their ability to successfully transition to a political party for the upcoming election in 2002. The NCDDR successfully resolved this issue, in part because of recent military successes which prevented the RUF from returning to violence. This demonstrated the inherently political nature of DDR programs and the requirement, specified in the UN’s *IDDRS*, that parties demonstrate a commitment to a peace agreement and that agencies hold groups accountable for their actions.\(^100\)

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\(^98\) Ibid.


\(^100\) UN *IDDRS* “2.10 The UN Approach to DDR.”
The second major challenge for the NCDDR involved a lack of capacity at camps within the demobilization effort. As conducted by the NCDDR, demobilization involved the collection of disarmed ex-combatants at camps where they received various services and a transition allowance. Services included trauma healing, counseling, information seminars on support available to DDR participants, and civic education. Ex-combatants received their ID cards at the camps, which certified them as participants in the DDR program and allowed them to receive future benefits during the reintegration phase. The NCDDR organized and had primary responsibility for these camps, although the UN provided considerable assistance and funding from international donors. Although well conceived in theory, implementing these plans proved complicated in that the NCDDR faced a number of practical problems related to the camps that created further difficulties. Many of the camps lacked basic infrastructure, with ex-combatants living in tents for six-week periods. Barbed wire and fences surrounded the camps so that they resembled prisons or prisoner of war compounds. Tension erupted at some sites as citizens reacted negatively to the presence of Nigerian troops, reflecting nationalistic attitudes.101 Ex-combatants in some camps protested at their living conditions and demanded access to their benefits before leaving. As camps reached capacity, a backlog formed which prevented upstream disarmament and the arrival of new ex-combatants from within the district.102 Riots broke out in other camps, resulting in beatings of NCDDR staff at the demobilization camps.103

Even still, the demobilization camps assisted ex-combatants, particularly with vocational training. Ex-combatants underwent six weeks of training on various skills including car repair, masonry, and carpentry. Expectations were high, with some anticipating assistance from the DDR program to acquire a job. This became difficult, however, as many ex-combatants preferred to avoid hard labor in agriculture, which was the area most likely to offer employment in Sierra

101 Woods and Reese, Interventions in Sierra Leone: Lessons From a Failed State, 58.
102 Malan, et. Al, Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone: UNAMSIL Hits the Home Straight.
Leone. The NCDDR extended apprenticeships, formal education, and programs aimed specifically at helping child soldiers return to civilian lifestyles. Historians Larry Woods and Timothy Reese, writing for the Combat Studies Institute, accurately pointed out that aspects of disarmament and demobilization failed “to meet the inflated expectations of Sierra Leoneans who expected the DDR process to provide instant prosperity and peace.”

Ex-combatants left their camps with an allowance to travel anywhere in the country, at which point they began the reintegration process. The NCDDR allocated each ex-combatant two $150 payments as part of their reintegration program. Although the DDR program did offer job training, once ex-combatants left the camps the program expected them to find their own jobs. The economy in Sierra Leone, however, remained stagnant and created few opportunities for any citizen, whether skilled or unskilled. The Sierra Leonean government therefore initiated some infrastructure development and donor organizations provided community based development efforts. Despite these efforts, the UN estimated unemployment in 2007 at 65%. The country’s per capita gross domestic product (GDP) for 2006 was just $230, almost half pre-civil war levels.

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104 Ibid.
105 Ibid.
106 Woods and Reese, Interventions in Sierra Leone: Lessons From a Failed State, 58.
108 Malan, et. al., Sierra Leone: Building the Road to Recovery; Monograph 80.
Political scientists Macartan Humphreys and Jeremy M. Weinstein conducted research on the individual-level influences of demobilization in Sierra Leone, finding weak correlations between participation in DDR programs and an individual’s reintegration into society. This appears to dispute the apparent claims of success attributed to Sierra Leone’s DDR efforts. The authors note several potential statistical and methodological problems with their work, but appear to have also concentrated their survey on DDR participants with just 13 percent of the 1,043 survey as non-participants. The authors’ initial research overturned some of these assumptions, suggesting that a combatant’s wartime experiences most influenced their successful reintegration into society. High-ranking combatants and those associated with “abusive” units appeared to face problems with reintegration. Yet, Humphreys and Weinstein acknowledged that their micro-analysis of individuals may not have captured other factors measurable at the country level that resulted from the DDR program. Improved security and trust of the government amongst the nation’s people, as well as social deterrence for continued violence, may represent variables presently influenced by the DDR program at the national level. Although difficult to dispute entirely, Humphreys and Weinstein’s research appears initially to confirm the underlying premise of DDR programs: that the sum of the parts is greater than the individual pieces.

Sierra Leone’s government officially ended disarmament in January 2002, with more than 45,000 weapons collected and 70,000 ex-combatants reached. The UN assisted with elections in 2002 and President Kabbah returned to power with substantial support. Foday Sankoh, leader of the RUF, died in a hospital in 2003. Elections in 2007 resulted in a successful change of government, receiving praise from election observers. Seven candidates ran for the office of president from different parties, with the RUF-P proving unable to field a

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candidate for lack of support. However, the troubles in Sierra Leone continued in 2008. The country, however, no longer resembles a collapsed state; problems instead are more similar to those in other sub-Saharan African countries. Life expectancy remains at less than 45 years of age and tension remains between former combatants. Despite these problems, DDR contributed to the conditions in Sierra Leone and helped to reduce the likelihood that violence would return.

**Dhofar Rebellion in Oman**

The Sultanate of Oman lies on the southeastern edge of the Arabian Peninsula, controlling a disconnected patch of land on the mouth of the Strait of Hormuz. The British established close ties to Oman because of its location in relationship to India and later the Suez Canal. The British maintained this close relationship, helping Oman defeat a Saudi-backed insurgency in 1958. Support continued during the Dhofar rebellion, in which insurgents in an isolated part of Oman attempted to overthrow the Sultan from the mid-1960s to mid-1970s. Oman, with significant assistance from the British, defeated the insurgents in part by forming tribal armed groups, called *firqat*, from the Dhofar region. The Sultan implemented a DDR campaign after the war that incorporated many of tenets described in the UN doctrinal manual, successfully transitioning these tribal groups and extending his government’s control in the region. A review of this rebellion demonstrates the effectiveness of the UN’s IDDRS as a means of building trust and confidence during the transition from war to peace.

The Sultan of Oman began to extend greater influence in Dhofar, especially after the discovery of petroleum in the 1960s, yet the region and its people remained separated from the rest of the population and government in the north. The Dhofar region, lies five hundred miles south of Oman’s population center, with only a single unpaved road connecting the two areas in

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the 1960s. A large plateau called the Dhofar Jebel further divides the two regions, especially given its brown and dry climate. Monsoons pass through the region from June to September, dumping heavy rains, especially in the think fertile crescent that includes the provincial capital of Salalah. The Dhofari people speak a different dialect of Arabic and remained ethnically separated from the Omani in the north. Tribal relationships and customs greatly influenced the Dhofari people, upon which Sultan Said Bin Taimur capitalized. After rising to the Sultanate in 1933, the Sultan lived in Salalah in the early 1950s, due in part to a rebellion in northern Oman. While in exile from his capital in Muscate he married a local woman, who gave birth to his only son. The Sultan’s connection to this remote area and its ethnic minority, therefore, proved an important factor in Oman’s counterinsurgency efforts during the Dhofar rebellion. The weather and geography also influenced the insurgents and the conduct of the war.

The Dhofar revolt began in 1963 when Mussalim bin Nufl led fellow Dhofari tribesman in an attack against an American firm exploring for oil. Oman’s limited petroleum fields lay largely in Dhofar, although large-scale extraction would not begin until the early 1970s.\textsuperscript{115} Mussalim’s organization emerged from a network of Dhofari opposition groups that opposed the Sultan for various political, economic, and tribal grievances.\textsuperscript{116} After shooting a security guard and destroying a vehicle, the group fled to Saudi Arabia, which provided them with supplies and military training. Oman and Saudi Arabia previously clashed over a border dispute regarding the Buraimi Oasis, which a Saudi-American oil company believed possessed oil available for commercial extraction.\textsuperscript{117} Bin Nufl returned in 1964, naming his group the Dhofar Liberation

\textsuperscript{116} Ibid., 186-187.
\textsuperscript{117} Roots of the historic conflict include a range of political, economic and religious influences and include several regional actors. The Buraimi oasis actually lies between Oman and the United Arab Emirates, with each controlling several of the nine villages in the area. Wahhabis from Saudi Arabia claimed historic control of the oasis based on a garrison established there in the late nineteenth century, left vacant since 1869. The joint venture ARAMCO, representing Saudi
Front (DLF), and mining the only road connecting Dhofar to northern Oman, attacking petroleum facilities, destroying RAF vehicles at Salalah, and even planning a failed assassination of the Sultan. The Saudis soon ended their support, but the rebels sought and received Yemini assistance to carry on the struggle.

Following the rapid withdrawal of British forces from Aden in 1967, Marxists dominated the Yemen and formed a Communist state with the support of both the Soviet Union and China. British officials became concerned with increased Yemini influence in the Persian Gulf and that other countries in the region would fall into Communist control. This became more pronounced as bin Nufl’s group received additional support from Yemen, renaming it the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arabian Gulf (PFLOAG). China and the USSR provided the PFLOAG with direct support and through intermediaries in Yemen, including equipment, training, and even special instructions for some in Beijing. With 2,000 fighters and an additional 3,000 militia in Oman’s Jebel region, the PFLOAG outmanned the Sultan’s forces in terms of numbers and equipment quality. The material support provided by various Communist countries also came with ideological ties. Upon joining of the DLF and PFLOAG, Communist

and American interests, believed oil existed near Buraimi in the early 1950s. Saudi Arabia and Oman followed different forms of Islam, with strict interpretations of the Wahhabis in the former and Ibadism, an outgrowth of the Kharijites movement in the later. Ibadhi Muslim reject the primogeniture succession of the tribe of Muhammad and, instead, favor electing an imam to assert leadership. This form of Islam dominates within Oman, but is viewed as heretical by many Sunni Muslims including the Wahhabi branch in Saudi Arabia.


Ibid.
indoctrination, persuasion, and coercion marginalized traditional tribal and Islamic roots. This approach created tensions within the insurgency, until finally the PFLOAG leadership ordered the DLF to be disarmed, provoking a battle and the creation of the pro-government militia, the firqat. The Sultan of Oman attempted to counter the Dhofar rebellion but without success. The Sultan’s Armed Forces (SAF) consisted of just 2,000 soldiers, with leadership excluding local Omanis. Instead, seconded British officers commanded at battalion and company levels. Much of the equipment dated to World War II or earlier. Language also proved an obstacle, preventing British pilots from providing support to ground forces. Many of the soldiers came from northern Oman and Gwadur in Pakistan, some speaking no Arabic and even fewer the local dialect, Jebeli. In the eyes of the Dhofar, the SAF represented an army of occupation. In addition to military deficiencies, the Sultan implemented harsh conditions on his people and attempted to isolate them from the excesses of the oil-rich Arab world. By 1970, unrest spread from the Dhofar region in the south of Oman to an open revolt in the north. Although quickly defeated, this provoked a turning point in the conflict as the Sultan’s son overthrew his father in a largely bloodless coup.

The rise of Qaboos bin Said altered both the Omani and British response to the Dhofar

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120 Animosities continued between the PFLOAG and DLF through 1970, when Communist strong-arm tactics sparked a defensive response. The British received reports of Communists blinding old men who refused to deny God’s existence while other cut off their noses. Communist cadre directed the killings of influential sheikhs and forcibly removed children from homes to attend Marxist schools. See Tony Jeapes, SAS: Operation Oman (Nashville, The Battery Press, 1980), 25.
121 Ibid., 28.
122 Seconding refers to a tradition which allows a British military officer to temporarily serve with forces from another allied nation.
124 Jeapes, SAS: Operation Oman, 29.
125 The coup resulted in one of the old Sultan’s guards killed. In addition, the old Sultan accidentally shot himself in the foot. The British provided medical assistance and the new Sultan placed his father under guard as a prisoner until his death. Peterson, Oman’s Insurgencies: The Sultanate’s Struggle for Supremacy, 241.
rebellion. Educated at Sandhurst, bin Said sought and received additional support from the British government following the coup. Faced with increased unrest of their own in Northern Ireland, the British offered only limited support to Oman with approximately 450 officers and two squadrons of Special Air Service (SAS) operating under a pseudonym. The British then helped the Sultan implement various governmental reforms and waged counterinsurgency military operations. In addition, the Sultan offered full immunity and cash grants to insurgents.

Provided these incentives many insurgents not only surrendered, but also joined the Sultan’s forces as militia, calling themselves firqat. Groups of 30 to 90 firqat formed around squad-sized SAS teams, who provided command and control, medical treatment, and coordination for fire support. As natives to the Dhofar region, the firqat also offered important intelligence capabilities previously unavailable to the Sultan’s forces. Later firqat operations included intelligence activities and scouting, which developed into larger offensive operations as their capabilities grew. The firqat also proved especially effective as defensive “home guards” in regions cleared of insurgents by SAF soldiers. The firqat units eventually grew to more than 2,000 men, and as Ladwig points out, represented “[o]ne of the most significant contributions made by British support elements” during the conflict.

Although the firqat contribution proved significant, they also had limitations which the British began to recognize and adjust to. The firqat operated with caveats and irregularities that frustrated the Sultan’s regular soldiers, and required an adjustment for the SAS leadership. The commander of the 22nd SAS regiment during the Dhofar Rebellion, Colonel Tony Jeapes, admired

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127 Other reforms included expansion of the SAF from 3,000 in 1970 to more than 10,000 two years later, recruitment for its soldiers from Oman’s peoples, development efforts including medical and agricultural assistance, as well as expanding intelligence sources and increasing information operations. Ladwig, “Supporting Allies in Counterinsurgency: Britain and the Dhofar Rebellion,” 72


129 Peterson, Oman’s Insurgencies: The Sultanate’s Struggle for Supremacy, 257-260.

some characteristics of the *firqat* but noted “they could also lead you astray, either by pretending to know ground they did not, or by misunderstanding where you wanted to go.”[131] The *firqat* preferred to operate within their tribal region and sometimes made major decisions based on a vote. Individual fighters could ignore an order or opt out of an operation if they liked. *Firqat* soldiers occasionally refused to work and demanded back pay from their British counterparts. The initial development of this concept disintegrated after just a few months, primarily because the British organized all the defecting men into one large *firqat*. Tribal disputes quickly paralyzed the unit and men quit, but soon established new formations around their family and ethnic ties.[132]

The Sultan, along with his British advisors, continued to adapt and initiate programs to quell the unrest in Dhofar, applying a variety of methods. In addition to support for the *firqat* and SAF, the British provided medical treatment and built a new public hospital in Dhofar. The SAS also implemented a model program to improve cultivation methods and livestock husbandry, which further improved the Sultan’s position. Engineers built fortified positions to interdict the insurgent supply routes and further weaken the insurgents’ capabilities. Furthermore, the British encouraged the Sultan to open diplomatic relations, resulting in Oman joining the United Nations and the Arab League. In addition, Sultan Qaboos established ties with other anti-Communist regimes, including Jordan and Iran, which both provided additional military forces to defeat the Dhofar insurgents. These efforts all contributed towards the defeat of the PFLOAG and Sultan Qaboos declared the Dhofar rebellion over in 1975.[133] These reforms and development programs also complimented the Sultans’ DDR efforts. These efforts fit within the UN’s *IDDRS*, as they

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[132] The SAS Commander, Jeapes, had worked hard to build this initial unit. Called the *Firqat* Salahadin, it consisted of sixty-eight men after just a few months. Upon hearing that men wanted to quit because of tribal dispute, Jeapes demanded a unit formation where men would publicly declare their loyalty to the group. The men appeared for formation but had a different understanding of allegiance and honor. All but twenty-eight quit, with Jeapes calling it “a disaster.” Initially unaware of the tribal politics involved, Jeapes’ spirits improved as one of the departing *Firqat* told him, Ma’fee hof Tawel, don’t worry, they will all go to join other *firqats*. Don’t look so sad.” See Jeapes, *SAS: Operation Oman*, 111.
included “elements of a peace-building strategy, including weapons management, security sector reform (SSR), elections and rule of law reform.”

The Sultan of Oman did not conduct a formal Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration program as described by the 2005 UN IDDRS. Yet he and his government, along with the leadership from the British army, implemented elements of DDR to effectively transition Dhofar and its people from war to peace. During the conflict, the Sultan’s forces relied heavily on tribal and cultural ties to bind the firqat to the government’s objectives, a practice which continued after the conflict. The disarmament phase focused on individuals and weapons, but the Sultan concentrated most of his efforts on the firqat at the tribal level. By directing DDR efforts with a consideration for the tribal aspects of the firqat, the Sultan acknowledged their status socially and created a mutually beneficial incentive for them to enforce security within areas their control. As firqat gradually occupied small garrisons vacated by Oman’s regular military units, they also became hubs around which the Sultan extended his civil government through development programs. Following the security improvements, military control at ‘Arafit, Ghadaw, Jahnin, Shayr, Madinat al-Haq, and one of two facilities at ‘Aram passed to the firqat. The Sultan influenced the firqat at these and others sites through development incentives, threats to end funding unless tribal leaders supported government policies, and a mixture of other political methods. These methods, although not applied with a DDR framework at the time, clearly displayed characteristics found within the UN’s IDDRS.

As hostilities dissipated, Omani and British leaders began to assess the firqat and their future. The size of the various firqat varied from between 2,000 and 3,000, with recruits from diverse origins including surrendered enemy personnel, jabbalis residents for Dhofari towns, and

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134 UN IDDRS “2.10 The UN Approach to DDR.”
135 Peterson, Oman’s Insurgencies: The Sultanate’s Struggle for Supremacy, 395-398.
expatriates living elsewhere in the Gulf.”136 The size of the firqat reflected both the earlier enthusiasm for incorporating local support into Oman’s counterinsurgency efforts and caution in not developing a force that might later turn against the Sultan. For example, the British avoided providing “expensive and sophisticated equipment” to the Sultan’s military and refused outright the Sultan’s request for napalm for his Air Force.137 This caution also held true for the firqat. Jeapes, the commander of the SAS in the Dhofar, approached his British superiors to expand support to the firqat following initial successes. The British leadership responded by establishing a firqat threshold of just 700 men, with Jeapes realizing his commander “was still more concerned about the possibility of raising a Frankenstein’s monster.”138 Although the British and Omani leadership later lifted these restrictions, their awareness of the potential opportunities and pitfalls encouraged a controlled growth of firqat forces. These efforts contributed in reducing the overall scale of Oman’s DDR program.

Other characteristics of Oman’s DDR program differed from the UN IDDRS model, without significantly reducing its effectiveness. Although the UN IDDRS requires a negotiated settlement as a necessary precondition for DDR, Oman had no such agreement with either the PFLOAG or DLF. By the time the Sultan declared the insurgency over in 1975, few other major hostilities occurred between Omani and insurgent forces or Yemeni surrogates. A negotiated settlement also proved unnecessary because of the security environment. In addition to Omani and British forces, the Sultan developed close ties with the Shah of Iran and the King of Jordan. Both of these leaders provided military forces to the Sultan to counter Oman’s Communist threat, which operated within bilateral and regional agreements rather than a part of a UN or multinational intervention force. Funding Oman’s DDR and development programs also differed from

the UN model because the Sultan relied on internal revenue from petroleum production rather than international donations. As security improved, Oman’s oil exports also expanded, especially during the petroleum shortage of 1973-1974. The Sultan used the petroleum revenue to support development programs that reinforced his government’s goals without needing the input of international organizations or NGOs.

Despite these differences, the Sultan’s DDR program displayed many characteristics of the UN’s IDDRS. For one, various leaders identified the *firqat* as a potential threat to the government and developed recommendations to minimize this possibility. Although the Sultan chose not to follow the British suggestions, this process demonstrated the importance of planning found within the UN IDDRS. In addition, the disarmament process in Oman included many close parallels, especially in its focus on individuals and cash incentives for the collection of weapons. The commander of the Dhofar Brigade, General Akehurst, described how *firqat* received both regular pay and “handsome rewards for handing in weapons and ammunition.” The Sultan offered these incentives during and after the conflict, to discourage further uprising by reducing or eliminating as many caches as possible. Akehurst estimated for the two-year period, beginning in August 1974, nearly a million pounds paid for various weapons from the Dhofar Rebellion, under conditions which he considered “easy money” for the locals. This represented the direct implementation of cash for weapons program focused at the individual, described, but not necessarily recommended, by the UN IDDRS.

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139 See for example the Bell Report in Peterson, *Oman’s Insurgencies: The Sultanate’s Struggle for Supremacy*, 392-3, and Jeapes, *SAS: Operation Oman*, 209. Tony Jeapes warned of the potential danger from a unified *firqat*, but also recognized his Western perspective to the problem and that it did not necessarily reflect the logic suitable to Oman or Dhofar. He found few other Arabs worried about this possibility, demonstrating perception and personal reflection as he wrote: “It was again a case of the Western mind looking at a situation in terms of Western logic, whereas the Arab mind has a wisdom of its own.” Jeapes, *SAS: Operation Oman*, 223.
Later phases of the Sultan’s DDR program did not match as neatly with the UN’s prescribed model, although it did include many of the same considerations. The UN’s IDDRS focuses primarily on individuals in each phase to reduce the influence of armed groups, while still allowing and encouraging community development efforts. The Sultan instead kept intact the tribal structure of the *firqat*, choosing not to integrate them into a cohesive national militia. Although some members volunteered to join one of the Sultan’s regular military units, many did not because “membership in a *firqat* meant little more than receipt of a regular stipend.”

Oman also concentrated on communities during the demobilization and reintegration phases of its program with the Sultan using the *firqat* as conduits for extending civil services and administration into the previously isolated region, beginning with demobilization.

The Sultan’s demobilization efforts considered the social, economic, and security conditions in Dhofar. The military gradually transferred responsibility for various outposts to tribal leaders within each regional *firqat*. General Akehurst noted that the “*Firqat*’s importance for the security of the jebel increased with the advent of peace.” Once responsible for securing areas, Akehurst found that the *firqat* “made it their business to keep their own tribal areas peaceful, even if this meant ignoring the presence of enemy provided that they did not disturb the peace.” This created mutually beneficial incentives for both the Sultan and the *firqat* leadership as trade improved within a secure environment.

In addition, the Sultan’s demobilization objectives differed from the standard goals found within the UN’s IDDRS. The UN IDDRS attempts to removed individuals from armed organizations and integrate them into society. The Sultan took a different approach, choosing to keep the tribal *firqat* structure intact and extended his government’s influence through these groups. Instead of demobilizing these forces in the manner described by the UN, the Sultan’s

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141 Peterson, *Oman’s Insurgencies: The Sultanate’s Struggle for Supremacy*, 416.
142 Ibid., 431.
demobilization became a gradual transformation in which these groups became extensions of the government. This approach reinforced the strong tribal bonds within the region and, along with the reduction of a common threat, helped to eliminate a potential unifying cause that might inspire tribes to organize into a larger threat to the Sultan. Jeapes described this fragmentation succinctly, noting: “As the war receded, so did the unifying force that had brought them together. The firqat began to break into their sub-tribal groups, then into sub-sub-tribal groups and eventually into family groups of ten or twelve men only.”

As the firqat dissolved into tribal entities, the Sultan capitalized on these organizations to extend government capacity. The British helped Oman establish a Civil Aid Department (CAD) to extend development projects, creating regional centers that included a mosque, school, water well, medical clinic, and a representative of the civil government. Initially limited to just six sites, the number grew to twenty-five locations and included paved roads to connect them together. The CAD selected locations for development because they “had originally been established by the military or at sites chosen by individual firqat for tribal reasons.” These civil administrators reported to the provincial leader of Dhofar, which the Sultan also chose to extend social standing to the Dhofaris as well as ensure his own control. The leaders of Dhofar and the important province of Masandam reported directly to the sultan, whereas the other district leaders report to the Sultan’s Interior Ministry. These policies reflected the local conditions within Oman and allowed the Sultan to adjust his demobilization campaign and turn it into a program to extend government capacity.

These development programs not only contributed towards demobilization, but also to reintegration. The Sultan gradually adjusted his military, first forming individual services and then slowly phasing out the use of British leadership. As this concluded, the Sultan removed

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144 Ibid., 176.
145 Jeapes, SAS: Operation Oman, 211.
146 Peterson, Oman’s Insurgencies: The Sultanate’s Struggle for Supremacy, 394
English phrases and replaced them with Arabic titles. Other government reforms continued and contributed towards continued stability in Oman, yet much of this occurred after the Dhofar rebellion faded from peoples’ memories. Unusually and outside of the prescribed method found in the UN’s IDDRS, Oman’s reintegration program overlapped with its demobilization efforts. Recognizing the importance and continuity within the region’s tribal traditions, the Sultan extended development to shift the *firqat* from a largely military organization to a more complex entity. Initial efforts concentrated on security and social standing, and later included economic development and governmental services. As an example of this, Dhofar’s three schools in operation in 1963 had grown to 365 by 1980.\textsuperscript{147} The Sultan also extended roads, airfields, health services, and other infrastructure from heavily populated northern Oman to the Dhofar region, effectively reintegrating the people into the rest of his country.

**Colombia**

The United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (*Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia*, known by their Spanish acronym, AUC), formed in 1997 as an umbrella organization of non-state armed groups. Often described as a paramilitary group, the AUC merged groups with a variety of motivations which included land protection, political reforms, business interests, organized crime, and drug cultivation. These groups unified to oppose leftist guerrilla groups, which the government had fought for years without decisive results. The largest of these groups, the the *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia- Ejercito Popular* (FARC-EP, hereafter abbreviated as FARC) continued to grow during the 1980s and 1990s, also becoming involved in drug trafficking, kidnapping, and assassinations of those who opposed them. The emergence of

the AUC in the late 1990s resulted from and contributed towards increased violence within the country, with cocaine and heroin production fueling the fighting. By the late 1990s, Colombia provided 80 percent of the global cocaine product, representing 5 percent of Colombia’s gross domestic product (GDP). Colombia’s president conceded 42,000 square kilometers to the FARC in 1999 in a desperate bid for peace, while the economy shrank and kidnapping and murder rates soared. Conditions within Colombia appeared dire with the potential to become even worse.

By 2002, the AUC had infiltrated the government and welcomed the arrival of a sympathetic Colombian president who had previously served as mayor of Medellin and governor of Antioquia, with armed conflict and drug cultivation posing significant problems in each area. Seeing an opportunity, with the arrival of a new, potentially sympathetic Colombian president, the AUC agreed to a ceasefire in 2002. President Alvaro Uribe Velez implemented an incremental series of demobilizations, designed for both individuals and organizations while juggling many problematic issues. Internal political problems included an upcoming election in 2006, a growing “para-political” scandal regarding paramilitary influence within his government, a continued war with various insurgent groups. In addition, Uribe faced international criticism of the DDR program and extradition requests from the United States. Despite these difficulties, the Colombian government followed the tenets of the UN’s IDDRS, successfully turning the country away from violence. Problems plagued the government’s implementation of DDR and by itself it did not resolve all of Colombia’s complex problems. However, it significantly contributed towards building trust and confidence in the Colombian government and transition the country further towards peace.

The demobilization efforts begun by President Uribe in 2002 built on earlier efforts to reduce the influence of Colombian armed groups stretching back to at least 1948. The country’s two main parties, the Conservatives and Liberals, fought from 1948-1953 in what became known as La violencia. A military dictator rose to power in 1953 after political assassinations and
widespread rebellion, leaving an estimated 200,000 people dead. Many rural populations formed self-defense groups, forming a legacy that linked them to later paramilitary groups. A coalition of conservatives and liberal elites finally formed a coalition government, the National Front, and ruled Colombia through the mid-1970s, but excluded large sections of society. This encouraged guerrilla movements, including the Ejercit de Liberacion Nacional (ELN), the M19 (Movimiento 19 de Abril), and the previously mentioned FARC. The government negotiated with M19 to demobilize in the mid-1980s, extending general amnesty to all armed groups. Although successful in demobilizing M19 and other groups, fighting continued with the ELN and FARC. The government found it could not extend security into rural areas, with its small conscript military outmatched by the largely drug-funded insurgents. Politics also encouraged the elite to concentrate on urban issues, especially before Colombia adopted a new constitution in 1991. The FARC and ELN capitalized on the demobilization of other groups and on funding from the growing drug trade to expand their power, which in turn further escalated the violence and influenced the formation of pro-government armed groups such as the AUC.

As an umbrella organization consisting of many groups, the AUC’s membership and motivations remained diverse. Individual groups retained their autonomy, methods, and finances but agreed to coordinate their efforts against the insurgents, including the allocation of men, weapons and other resources from one region to another. Subordinate groups represented agricultural interests, the lumber industry, cattle ranchers, and tourism. Some groups allegedly demanded and received protection money from international companies, such as Coca Cola and Chiquita.148 Other groups emerged as people responded to direct threats to themselves and their families, exhibiting what US Army Strategic Studies Institute historian David Spenser described as “pent-up anger and frustration of important sectors of the rural population at guerrillas who

148 Transnational Institute, “TNI Drug Policy Briefing No. 27” (Amsterdam: Transnational Institute, 2008), 3.
have terrorized the countryside for 30-plus years.\footnote{149}{David, Spencer, Colombia’s Paramilitaries: Criminals or Political Force? (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2001), 2.} The Colombian Army also extended support to the AUC to gather intelligence and target the insurgents. Retired officers and former soldiers joined some armed groups, creating social connections between the state and non-state groups.\footnote{150}{Ibid., 6.}

Illegal narcotics production also grew to become an important influence within the AUC.\footnote{151}{Although the AUC leadership for many years denied any involvement in the drug trade, their lead spokesman later admitted that up to 70% of the groups income came from drug trafficking. Drug production also influenced the conduct of the AUC and other armed groups, encouraging them to push people off their land for narcotic cultivation. This and a lack of security contributed to the displacement of up to 4 million people, which became another challenge for the government, Ibid.}

These various influences blurred the boundaries between the AUC and the government and created both opportunities and challenges for the government’s DDR program.

Shortly after President Alvaro Uribe entered office in 2002, several commanders of the AUC publically declared that their organization controlled 35 percent of the National Parliament and claimed to dominate regions of Colombia. Having gained influence in the government, the AUC leadership unilaterally agreed to a cease-fire in December of 2002.\footnote{152}{One of the lingering questions regarding the AUC is why they decided to lay down their arms, especially given that fighting continued in Colombia with the two main insurgent groups, the FARC and ELN. By 2002, the AUC’s influence appeared to be growing within the government and as income grew from illegal drug trafficking. Several explanations exist. Some suggest that the AUC might have gained from the moderate views and leniency of President Uribe, who had previously extended generous terms to armed groups as mayor of Medellin and governor of Antioquia. Colombian society also shifted away from sympathizing with the paramilitaries, which journalists, human rights workers, and the US State Department accused of committing an overwhelming number of atrocities against the civilian population. The personal interests of paramilitary leaders may offer a third explanation, with the AUC’s elite becoming a growing haven for drug lords. Some drug lords reportedly paid several million dollars to become high-ranking members of paramilitary groups. If the AUC could negotiate for a general amnesty as a part of the demobilization process, these drug lords could avoid extradition to the United States and transfer their economic and social status to civilian society. Markus Koth, To End a War: Demobilization and Reintegration of Paramilitaries in Colombia, (Bonn: Bonn International Center for Conversion, 2005), 24-25.} This agreement formally ended the AUC’s military actions but did not include a demobilization settlement.

Therefore, the government introduced legislation to demobilize the AUC in 2002, but only in
2005 did a version become law.\textsuperscript{153} Even then it remained in dispute, as Colombia’s highest court considered and finally ruled favorably on the law in 2005. The government, however, continued efforts to demobilize various armed groups during this period, even without clear legal guidelines. This highlights the importance of the prerequisites outlined in the UN IDDRS and reinforces the political nature of DDR programs.

Colombia’s DDR program consisted of two largely separate programs, one aimed at individuals and the other organizations, which the government described as “collective demobilization.” According to Andres Peñate, Colombia’s deputy Secretary of Defense, the government initiated individual demobilization as a “war tactic” aimed to collect intelligence to target insurgent groups.\textsuperscript{154} The government actually began this method during the 1990s during an earlier Colombian administration to encourage defectors from both the paramilitaries and guerrillas to stop fighting. “Collective demobilization” focused on the paramilitaries as an organization and offered them an incentive to lay down their arms through a different process. The Ministry of Defense’s individual DDR program focused on military objectives and, while important and successful in its own way, is not reviewed in depth or compared to the UN’s approach to DDR.\textsuperscript{155}

The collective demobilization in Colombia occurred in two phases, divided by the AUC’s formal agreement with the government to demobilize. The government initiated a DDR program

\textsuperscript{153} Critics also accused the government of deliberately introducing lenient terms to minimize their potential exposure to paramilitary groups, which added yet another layer of complexity and potential distrust to Colombia’s DDR program. See Koth, \textit{To End a War: Demobilization and Reintegration of Paramilitaries in Colombia}, 27-29.

\textsuperscript{154} Koth, \textit{To End a War: Demobilization and Reintegration of Paramilitaries in Colombia}, 26.

\textsuperscript{155} Prior to the Uribe government, the individual program demobilized just 1,100 ex-combatants from 1999-2002. Upon its expansion in 2002, the program processed 6,335 people through 2004, of which more than half belonged to the FARC, approximately thirty percent to paramilitary groups, and the remainder to the ELN and other organizations. See Koth, \textit{To End a War: Demobilization and Reintegration of Paramilitaries in Colombia}, 40. Later statistics suggest more than 10,000 ex-combatants participated through 2006, with more than 75% of these individuals coming from leftist insurgent groups like the FARC and ELN. Douglas Porch and Maria Jose Rasmussen, “Demobilization of Paramilitaries in Colombia: Transformation or Transition?” \textit{Studies in Conflict and Terrorism} 31, no. 6, 527-528.
in 2002 during the ceasefire agreement but without a negotiated settlement with the AUC, only successfully negotiating with groups unaffiliated with the AUC or only loosely connected to them. Demobilization continued through late 2005 involving just over 10,000 ex-combatants.\textsuperscript{156} After establishing a legal basis for demobilizing the AUC specifically, implementation began in late 2005 and resulted in an additional 20,000 ex-combatants.

Portions of Colombia’s disarmament and demobilization phases overlapped, which fit the UN’s \textit{IDDRS} model. The “collective demobilization” program occurred in five phases, including “[s]ensitization, preparation, concentration, demobilization, verification and the beginning of the reintegration measures.”\textsuperscript{157} Combatants registered at “concentration zones” for short periods, ranging from 15 to 30 days, to avoid potential long-term security risks to the area.\textsuperscript{158} Concentrated demobilization occurred in some regions with very little police or military presence, creating security problems once government forces left the area.\textsuperscript{159} Combatants turned in weapons at the site, registered in the program, and received initial assistance including accommodations, meals, clothing and medical assistance. The Ministry of Defense coordinated the disarmament and demobilization activities, creating a bureaucratic problem as ex-combatants passed through the program and transitioned to reintegration, which the Ministry of the Interior conducted.

Government officials also attempted to assess whether combatants needed to be charged for criminal activity. The government allowed some senior AUC members to remain confined to a ranch but later transferred them to a maximum-security prison, as legal measures became more established.\textsuperscript{160} Initially without clear legal guidelines, officials debated whether turned in arms should be destroyed or held for possible use in criminal proceedings. The lack of a legal

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{157} Koth, \textit{To End a War: Demobilization and Reintegration of Paramilitaries in Colombia}, 26.
\item \textsuperscript{158} Ibid., 30.
\item \textsuperscript{159} Ibid., 32.
\item \textsuperscript{160} Ibid., 32.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
framework for the AUC’s demobilization created obstacles to their participation in the DDR program, and reduced the incentive for other armed groups, to include insurgents, from pursuing a negotiated settlement with the government. This exemplifies why the UN’s IDDRS suggests that a negotiated settlement precede the implementation of a DDR program.

The Department of the Interior conducted reintegration for ex-combatants and experienced difficulties during initial implementation. Colombia’s reintegration efforts established centers initially in Bogota, and only expanded to other sites in 2004. These centers provided reintegration programs and provide education on combatants’ benefits, clarification of their legal status, access to medical and psychological assistance, and introduction to vocational education. The government extended monthly allotments to participants of approximately $155 per month for a maximum of 18 months.\(^{161}\) Payment depended on individuals participating in programmed reintegration activities such as training on social expectations with family and society, vocational training, or academic education.\(^{162}\) Ex-combatants initially received payments regardless of their participation in various educational and counseling services, creating little incentive to remain active in reintegration program.

In addition, combatants had access to vocational training from the Colombian government. Although well-intended, vocational training in practice did not meet the needs of ex-combatants. As described by Jon Morgenthau from the US Institute of Peace (USIP), some centers offered classes only in fish-farming and bread-baking. Interviews conducted by both the USIP’s Jonathan Morgenthau and BICC’s Markus Koth indicated participants’ unhappiness at the education and inability to imagine themselves actually working in the field taught at reintegration.

\[^{160}\] Some wanted to avoid allowing members of armed groups to receive the same treatment of the infamous drug lord Pablo Escobar, who after his capture in the early 1990s remained confined to a luxurious prison estate.


\[^{162}\] Ibid., 10.
Morgenthau reported that centers taught classes based on who could teach a particular topic rather than considering the interests of the students. The USIP report also documented a series of other shortcomings with the reintegration program, including the ineffective management of reintegration centers, use of computers tracking systems without trained operators, and a disconnect between central planners and those attempting to implement various aspects of the program. The Colombia government estimated that 70 percent of ex-combatants lacked functionally literacy, which further challenged reintegration programs. These difficulties produced lackluster results, with surveys suggesting that only 10 percent of ex-combatants had entered the work force through 2006.

The government significantly reorganized reintegration efforts in 2007, forming a High Commissioner for Reintegration, with a successful executive, Frank Pearl, appointed to the job. Pearl increased the number of reintegration centers and improved quality and access for vocational training, medical assistance and some psychological counseling. The government further modified the program so that ex-combatants and their dependents received monthly benefits tied to their participation in the program, with incentives for those attending schools and job training. Lasting 18 months, participants received $179 per month with a lump sum available at the end for those participating in group work programs. These efforts not only improved the effectiveness of the DDR program, but also extended the government’s authority in the country. Pearl’s reforms have improved conditions the program’s ability to monitor and assess conditions, also increasing effectiveness somewhat with employment for ex-combatants rising to 24 percent

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163 Morgenstein, Consolidating Disarmament: Lessons from Colombia’s Reintegration Program for Demobilized Paramilitaries, 8. Koth, To End a War: Demobilization and Reintegration of Paramilitaries in Colombia, 37.
164 Morgenstein, Consolidating Disarmament: Lessons from Colombia’s Reintegration Program for Demobilized Paramilitaries, 8.
165 Ibid., 6-7, 9, 14-15.
by 2007.\textsuperscript{168} These improvements demonstrated Colombia’s application of the UN IDDRS in that it monitored and adapted to increase the program’s effectiveness.

In addition to the DDR program, the Colombian government introduced other complimentary programs that furthered its goal towards reducing violence. This included an increase in the size of its military and police forces, transitioning the army from conscripts to a volunteer force. Military successes helped to reduce the size and effectiveness of the FARC, with their strength down by 40 percent through 2007.\textsuperscript{169} The military then established alternative local security forces, similar in some ways to the paramilitary groups but more closely tied into military and police units.\textsuperscript{170} These programs fit within the context of the UN’s IDDRS, contributing towards the reduction in violence, extending the government’s presence across the country, and reducing violence in Colombia.

Colombia’s DDR program, along with complimentary efforts by the government, contributed towards improved conditions within the country. The government demobilized more than 30,000 paramilitary fighters, with more than 10,000 ex-combatants participating in Colombia’s separate individual demobilization effort. Colombian officials extradited more than 400 individuals to the United States and imprisoned more than 50 senior paramilitary leaders in

\textsuperscript{167} Porch and Rasmussen, “Demobilization of Paramilitaries in Colombia: Transformation or Transition?” 528.
\textsuperscript{168} Ibid., 539.
\textsuperscript{170} The Colombian government initially called these forces the Soldados Campesinos (Peasant Soldiers) but changed it to Soldados de me Pueblo (Home Guards). This state-supported armed group recruited members from rural communities for 18 month-long periods, forming small peasant formations of about 35 men. The national army trained and equipped them, including special education on human rights and interaction with the local community. These groups operate within their homelands in conjunction with government forces, and have allowed government troops to maintain a presence in areas recaptured from insurgents, see Koth, To End a War: Demobilization and Reintegration of Paramilitaries in Colombia, 18-19; and Thomas A. Marks, “A Model Counterinsurgency: Uribe’s Colombia (2002-2006) vs FARC,” Military Review, March-April 2007, 56.
maximum-security prisons. The government overcame significant obstacles to the implementation of its DDR program, notably the disputed and often fragile legal framework for its implementation.

Critics dispute the effectiveness of Colombia’s DDR program, charging that it mirrors previous efforts and merely transitions violence to a different form. Douglas Porch and Maria Jose Rasmussen, both professors at the Naval Postgraduate School, charge that the lenient sentencing and disregard for justice “made a mockery of the rule of law.” According to them, the scandal of paramilitary influence within the government further undermined trust and confidence in the state. Other observers highlight different concerns. The International Crisis Group noted the emergence of “new armed groups,” estimating from between 3,000 and 9,000 members in 2007. These groups appeared to include criminal ties to drug trafficking and urban gangs, as well as some mid-level leaders of paramilitary groups that did not demobilize.

In order to evaluate the changes in Colombia and the influence of its DDR program, it is necessary to review its earlier context. By nearly all statistical measurements, Colombia in the late 1990s lacked a government able to control its people or territory. In 1995, guerrillas operated in more than half of all municipalities and a quarter contained no police presences at all. Between 1995 and 1999, for example, murder rates soared, the number of displaced people grew to 1.8 million people, and more than half of all municipalities contained a guerrilla presence. Membership in the FARC continued to grow, more than doubling from 1995 through 2000. Colombia’s military proved unable and, in part, unwilling to engage armed groups and President Andres Pastrana Arango negotiated for a large demilitarized zone for the FARC in 1998, which

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172 Porch and Rasmussen, “Demobilization of Paramilitaries in Colombia: Transformation or Transition?” 533.
174 Ibid., 7.
lasted for more than two years. The rates of kidnapping and murder climbed to record levels in Colombia by 1999, while the economy shrank and nearly a million fled the country.\textsuperscript{176}

By comparison, conditions in Colombia nearly a decade later appear remarkably better. The rate of kidnapping declined nearly 80 percent from 2000 to 2006, while homicide rates fell by nearly 40 percent for a similar period.\textsuperscript{177} Rates for kidnapping, extortion, “terrorist actions,” and other criminal activity also fell between 2000 and 2005.\textsuperscript{178} The number of displaced persons remained high through 2007, but fell as the government extended its authority over the country.\textsuperscript{179} Although difficult to attribute directly to Colombia’s DDR program, critics have even noted how demobilization of the AUC has helped to save thousands of lives.\textsuperscript{180} These results encouraged international participation in the DDR program, which previously had provided little support. Improved security and the successful DDR program allowed the government to extend its presence in rural communities, establishing “a legitimate presence in all of Colombia’s 1,099 municipalities” for the first time.\textsuperscript{181} Economic conditions also improved through early 2006, contributing to a decrease in official unemployment rates.\textsuperscript{182} Illegal drug trafficking also accounted for less than one percent of Colombia’s GDP in 2006, a marked improvement.\textsuperscript{183} Although DDR did not directly contribute to these improvements, it contributed towards reducing violence in Colombia and allowed for relative peace to potentially continue.

Critics, like Porch and Rasmussen, neglected to consider the disastrous conditions in Colombia before the DDR and other complimentary programs. They also overlooked the possible benefits in implementing a DDR program that creates an incentive for other armed groups to

\textsuperscript{176} Ibid., 7-8.
\textsuperscript{177} Ibid., 18.
\textsuperscript{178} Morgenstein, \textit{Consolidating Disarmament: Lessons from Colombia’s Reintegration Program for Demobilized Paramilitaries}, 3.
\textsuperscript{179} Ibid., 25.
\textsuperscript{180} Porch and Rasmussen, “Demobilization of Paramilitaries in Colombia: Transformation or Transition?” 530.
\textsuperscript{181} DeShazo, et. al, \textit{Back from the Brink: Evaluating Progress in Colombia, 1999-2007}, VIII.
\textsuperscript{182} Ibid., 37.
demobilize. The “para-political” scandal and tenuous legal mechanisms reflected a more transparent government, still adjusting from its new constitution of 1991. Public opinion polls conducted between 2000 and 2007 reflect strong support for the government’s actions.\textsuperscript{184} The presence of new criminal gangs posed a potential threat to the government, especially as drug trafficking continues to provide a source of revenue for armed groups, but through 2007, their numbers and influence appeared limited. Improved state capacity and enhanced security forces have allowed the government to better respond to these growing threats, even as it continued to fight and attempt negotiations with insurgents.

The case of Colombia demonstrated how deeply politics influence the DDR program. Although Colombia implemented its demobilization without critical preconditions outlined by the UN’s IDDRS, notably a negotiated settlement and a clear legal framework, it overcame these significant hurdles and effectively disarmed more than 40,000 combatants. Security requirements, including major changes to military and police organizations, also allowed the government to maintain and extend its influence in disputed areas of the country. Legal disputes, victim reparations, and the para-political scandal remained contentious issues but also represented natural dialogue within a developing democracy. The government successfully adapted during this period, and notably within its DDR program. Improvements within the reintegration phase, which some describe as the most difficult, demonstrated the government’s commitment towards making the DDR program even more effective.

**Conclusion and Recommendations**

Implementation of Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration as developed by the United Nations provides a method for transitioning societies from war to peace. A review of three

\textsuperscript{183} Ibid., 32.
\textsuperscript{184} Ibid., 17.
case studies, across different regions, cultures, and periods demonstrates its wide applicability. While successful, the review of these case studies does not suggest that DDR by itself can offer, in what critic Robert Muggah aptly notes in one essay, a “magic bullet.” Despite the best efforts of the governments and international organizations to apply DDR in Sierra Leone, Oman, and Colombia, conditions did not reach perfection. These governments applied DDR in conjunction with other programs, including Security Sector Reform, development efforts and government reorganization. The benefits from implementing a DDR program, using the methods described by the United Nations, provides a means towards incremental improvement to reduce violence, extend government capacity, and build trust and confidence within a society.

The UN outlines several prerequisites necessary for implementing a DDR program. Suggested preconditions include “the signing of a negotiated peace agreement that provides a legal framework for DDR; trust in the peace process; willingness of the parties to the conflict to engage in DDR; and a minimum guarantee of security.”\(^{185}\) The lack of security in Sierra Leone, however, prevented the implementation of agreements and a DDR program for several years, while Colombia struggled to apply its DDR program as it continued to debate the legal mechanisms related to its application. Security and the potential for military or police operations provided a backstop to encourage parties to live up to negotiated agreements. In many ways, DDR programs became a means of building trust within various armed groups. In Oman, this began as former enemies surrendered and then defected to join the Sultan’s forces. The surrendered forces, the Sultan, and his British allies each had to extend a measure of trust to one another as they fought the Communist guerrillas. The relationships established during the conflict continued during Oman’s application of the DDR process. The negotiation process also involves trust, and becomes the building block for further planning and preparation for the DDR program.

Each side acknowledges the other and establishes a measure of legitimacy, while providing practical information necessary to design specifics related to the DDR program.

These preconditions, as included in the UN’s IDDRS, provide the basis for the implementation of the disarmament and demobilization phases of DDR. The specific policies adopted during these phases depend on the conditions found, but broadly fit within the descriptions in the UN’s IDDRS. Combatants posed a risk of destabilizing an environment, and the disarmament and demobilization phases direct resources towards them directly to turn in weapons and extend benefits. Each DDR program included a package of benefits, often including cash payments and medical assistance. Governments also attempted to extend their own government authority as a part of DDR program or with related agendas. Adaptation to the particular circumstances helped programs become more successful. In Oman, the Sultan realized that tribal leadership offered the best route towards integrating and placating members of the firqat. Organizations in Sierra Leone inadequately planned the logistical components required for the demobilization process, creating tensions and reducing trust between ex-combatants, their government, and their society. The governments’ attempts to adapt and improve their disarmament and demobilization efforts also fit within the guidelines of the UN’s IDDRS.

Each case study also suggests that pro-government armed groups often lack coherency, which can create opportunities and challenges during disarmament and demobilization. Colombia exploited loose affiliations between various pro-government armed groups and negotiated with them independently of the AUC to sustain its DDR program. In Oman, the British broadly described the militia groups as firqat, yet these groups fractured along family and tribal lines. Understanding and exploiting the differences within these groups proved a successful mechanism for implementing disarmament and demobilization in each case.

Reintegration often and to date remains the most difficult and least understood phase of the DDR process. In addition, although the UN IDDRS suggest that it could last for up to one year, this process may take far longer. One challenge facing ex-combatants as they reintegrate
concerns the conditions of the society to which they are returning. The armed groups that
developed in Sierra Leone, Oman, and Colombia formed during periods of violence, disorder, and
uncertainty in regions with little government influence. Even after conditions improve, this
environment poses challenges for all members of society, to include ex-combatants. Oman
benefited from increased petroleum revenue following the Dhofar rebellion, allowing the Sultan
to spend his government’s income as he saw fit to integrate, develop, and unify his country.
Sierra Leone’s diamonds offered this potential, but the government relied primarily on
international donors to address the many problems following more than a decade of regional
conflict. Poverty and limited governmental authority existed before and after Sierra Leone’s DDR
program, creating difficulties and few incentives for ex-combatants to reintegrate and embrace
these conditions. This reinforces the potential in implementing a DDR program, but also that it
offers limited improvements to a complex situation. Other programs and governmental reforms
can work together with a DDR program, as outlined by the UN’s IDDRS, to improve conditions
within a society to assist in its transition from war to peace.

In considering DDR as described by the UN and applied to case studies in Sierra Leone, Oman, and Colombia several recommendations emerge for the United States government and military. These recommendations address influences of political dynamics on the DDR process and how the US military might improve its ability to understand and influence events in other countries. Gaining insights into group dynamics particular to other countries and their people will help with implementation of DDR programs, and will likely have beneficial spillover effects to other aspects of US policy involving the US military.

Implementation of DDR programs remains an inherently political process, although it addresses armed groups often associated with military activities. Recognizing and understanding the political context of a situation will better allow leaders to more fully evaluate the potential benefits and risks associated in allying with non-state armed groups. Once governments and armed groups establish relationships the political conditions will change, but this framework
becomes the basis for possibly later implementing a DDR program if necessary. Some officials within the US government in embassies may already be developing these skills currently. Additional participants could develop the ability to recognize and understand these conditions by participating as observers with international organizations, perhaps within a United Nations or regional force implementing DDR programs. This would provide first-hand experience for those involved and allow them to draw upon it for future operations. This experience would also be practical for those designing and planning for post combat operations, which many have criticized following the US invasion of Iraq in 2003.

A review of the pro-government armed groups from the selected case studies suggests that they lacked coherency. Although they may describe themselves with a single name, these groups are not monolithic. Like most organizations, factions existed within them and offered opportunities and challenges for governments attempting to integrate and placate them as warfare became less violent. No universal factors explain these influences. Diamonds, tribal traditions, and popular culture influenced the kamajors in Sierra Leone, while Islam and opposition to Communism contributed towards the establishment of the firqat. Governments acting directly with armed groups or through surrogates ought to recognize the multi-dimensional components within these groups and develop methods for understanding them. The Army’s manual on counterinsurgency rightly notes that “intelligence staff should track [militias] just like insurgent and other armed groups.” Not all armed groups transition within DDR programs, gaining a better understanding of what relevant factors to follow and record. Further exploring other transition programs, including the broader concept of Security Sector Reform (SSR) and smaller scale efforts like weapons reduction programs could also be considered for different, but still applicable factors.

The research work from Humphreys and Weinstein regarding the lack of a correlation between participation in a DDR program and successful reintegration in Sierra Leone also suggests areas for further study. Because DDR programs often occur in conjunction within a
range of other efforts, it becomes difficult to establish direct causes for successful and unsuccessful methods. Security conditions often prevent or dissuade researchers from participating in these efforts. The US Army recently incorporated Human Terrain Teams into operations. If the Army deems this organization effective in assisting to understand other cultures, they may also struggle to define a long-term role if and when the US becomes less involved in Iraq and Afghanistan. Incorporating Human Terrain Teams into international and host nation teams conducting DDR programs and other related efforts offers a potential method to both learn about how DDR and other programs work together and could sustain Human Terrain Teams during periods without sustained combat operations.

A final common theme from the three case studies involves the lack of government capacity and authority, which contributes towards the formation of armed groups. A government’s inability to extend authority over its people threatens its internal sovereignty, as noticed by a lack of control of its borders in Colombia with narco-trafficking and internal resources in Sierra Leone with diamonds. DDR programs often focus on individuals to demobilize armed groups. In contrast, international organizations often implement development programs for community benefit. Further integrating these two approaches would appear to offer several benefits. It might address a state’s lack of authority and provide a vehicle for coalition building and increased governmental capacity through the organizational structure of the non-state armed groups. Developmental programs might also be extended through non-state armed groups, as the Sultan of Oman did following the Dhufar rebellion. While these approaches broadly fit within DDR programs, one primary objective often includes the reduced influence of an armed group as an organization.

The Sultan of Oman’s integration of the firqat offers a nuanced approach that fits within the UN’s IDDRS framework, but focused on organizations rather than individuals. Rather than disband the firqats entirely and threaten to disrupt established tribal and family structures, the Sultan extended support through these organizations to increase his government’s influence
within the Dhofar region. The Sultan then had to reduce the *firqats*’ influence from its weapons while extending incentives for groups to build relationships with his government. The alternative might have been more difficult and could have involved more activities: implementation of a more standard DDR program and the establishment of new organizations to increase the state’s influence in the Dhofar region. This slightly modified approach appears to offer a potentially effective alternative within the current DDR model, especially for armed groups that emerge with strong family or tribal traditions. The unique conditions within Oman and the potential threat to governments from armed groups may make this approach too subtle or difficult to consider, yet it deserves further consideration.
# APPENDIX A – Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Case Study</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AUC</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>United Self-Defense Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFRC</td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>Armed Forces Revolutionary Council</td>
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<td>BATT</td>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>British Army Training Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDF</td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>Civil Defense Force, also known as <em>kamajors</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>DLF</td>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>Dhofar Liberation Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOMOG</td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States (consisting of 15 countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Cote D’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinee, Guinee-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togolese)</td>
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<td>EO</td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>Executive Outcomes</td>
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<td>ELN</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Ejercita de Liberacion Nacional</td>
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<tr>
<td>FARC-EP</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – Ejercito Popular</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
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<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>HCR</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>High Commissioner on Reintegration</td>
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<td>IDDRS</td>
<td></td>
<td>Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Standards</td>
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<td>M19</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Movimiento 19 de Abril</td>
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<td>NCDDR</td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilization, &amp; Reintegration</td>
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<td>NFPL</td>
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<td>National Patriotic Front of Liberia</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Case Study</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
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<td>Non-governmental Organization</td>
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<td>PFLOAG</td>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arabian Gulf</td>
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<td>RSLMF</td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces</td>
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<td>RUF</td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>Revolutionary United Front</td>
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<td>Oman</td>
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<td>Oman</td>
<td>Special Air Service (British)</td>
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<td>Surrendered Enemy Personnel</td>
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<td>SSR</td>
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<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
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<td>UNOMSIL</td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>United Nations Observe Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) — ended in 1999 and replaced by UNAMSIL</td>
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<td>UNAMSIL</td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone</td>
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APPENDIX B - Definitions

Armed group: “A group that has the potential to employ arms in the use of force to achieve political, ideological or economic objectives; is not within the formal military structures of a State, State-alliance or intergovernmental organization; and is not under the control of the State(s) in which it operates.”186

Disarmament: “Disarmament is the collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons of combatants and often also of the civilian population. Disarmament also includes the development of responsible arms management programmes [sic].”187

Demobilization: “Demobilization is the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces or other armed groups. The first stage of demobilization may extend from the processing of individual combatants in temporary centres [sic] to the massing of troops in camps designated for this purpose (cantonment sites, encampments, assembly areas or barracks). The second stage of demobilization encompasses the support package provided to the demobilized, which is called reinsertion.”188

Ex-combatant: “A person who has assumed any of the responsibilities or carried out any of the activities mentioned in the definition of ‘combatant’, and has laid down or surrendered his/her

186 UN IDDRS “1.20 Glossary and Definitions.”
187 Ibid.
188 Ibid.
arms with a view to entering a DDR process. Former combatant status may be certified through a demobilization [sic] process by a recognised [sic] authority.”

Human Security: Developed recently to describe a broad array of necessary living conditions including several aspects including: economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, political security, community security, personal security, and others.

Reintegration: “Reintegration is the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income. Reintegration is essentially a social and economic process with an open time-frame, primarily taking place in communities at the local level. It is part of the general development of a country and a national responsibility, and often necessitates long-term external assistance.”

Reinsertion: “Reinsertion is the assistance offered to ex-combatants during demobilization but prior to the longer-term process of reintegration. Reinsertion is a form of transitional assistance to help cover the basic needs of ex-combatants and their families and can include transitional safety allowances, food, clothes, shelter, medical services, short-term education, training, employment and tools. While reintegration is a long-term, continuous social and economic process of development, reinsertion is short-term material and/or financial assistance to meet immediate needs, and can last up to one year.”

Surrogate: “One who takes the place of or acts on behalf of another.”

Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.

Department of the Army, FM 3-05.130 Army Special Operations Forces: Unconventional Warfare, Department of the Army, Washington D.C. 2008 paragraph 4-54, page 4-10.
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