Interagency Cooperation for Irregular Warfare at the Combatant Command

A Monograph
by
MAJ David S. Doyle
United States Army

School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

AY 2009

Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited
Interagency coordination organizations at the combatant command level contribute significantly to irregular warfare (IW) planning and execution but need reform. The challenges presented to the United States by IW are substantial and persistent. National level interagency reform is necessary to manage IW threats, but is impeded by numerous considerations. Interagency improvement at the Combatant Command level is more practical and offers immediate benefit to national strategy. Combatant Commanders (CCDRs) are charged with applying IW doctrine in order to accomplish United States policy in their areas of responsibility. As configured, the Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACGs) serving the CCDRs require improvement in organization, resourcing and training. Study of three specific interagency organizations at USPACOM, USSOUTHCOM, and USSOCOM offer examples of JIACGs coping with the issues of IW. Congressional legislation should establish minimum levels of budgetary and personnel support from the whole of government to JIACGs. Congressional legislation should also stipulate training requirements for interagency members who serve in JIACGs. Finally, CCDRs should introduce an IW Directorate to assist JIACGs with the conduct of IW.
Title of Monograph: Interagency Cooperation for Irregular Warfare at the Combatant Command

Approved by:

__________________________________ Monograph Director
Jack D. Kem Ph. D.

__________________________________ Seminar Leader
COL Thomas Hollis

__________________________________ Monograph Reader
LTC Andrew Johnson

__________________________________ Director,
Stefan Banach, COL, IN School of Advanced Military Studies

__________________________________ Director,
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D. Graduate Degree Programs
Abstract

Interagency coordination organizations at the combatant command level contribute significantly to irregular warfare (IW) planning and execution but need reform to become more effective. The challenges presented to the United States by IW are substantial and persistent. National level interagency reform is necessary to manage IW threats, but is impeded by numerous considerations. Interagency improvement at the Combatant Command level is more practical and offers immediate benefit to national strategy. Combatant Commanders are charged with applying IW doctrine in order to accomplish United States policy in their areas of responsibility. As configured, the Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACGs) serving the Combatant Commanders require improvement in organization, resourcing and training. Study of three specific interagency organizations provides potential areas of improved performance and efficiency. The USPACOM Joint Interagency Coordination Group for Counterterrorism (JIACG/CT) from 2001 through 2005, the USSOUTHCOM’s reconfigured Interagency Coordination Group (IACG) within its Partnering Directorate, and the USSOCOM Interagency Task Force (IATF) offer examples of JIACGs coping with the issues of IW. Each organization possesses strengths and weaknesses but all need additional emphasis and support. Congressional legislation should establish minimum levels of budgetary and personnel support from the whole of government to the JIACGs. Congressional legislation should also stipulate specific training requirements for interagency members who serve in JIACGs. Finally, Combatant Commanders should introduce an IW Directorate within their staff to assist JIACGs and all directorates with the conduct of IW.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 1  
Irregular Warfare Concepts ................................................................................................. 3  
Hypothesis ............................................................................................................................ 8  
National Interagency Structure ........................................................................................... 9  
Joint Interagency Coordination Group Structure ............................................................... 11  
Literature Review ................................................................................................................ 14  
Irregular Warfare ................................................................................................................. 14  
Interagency Effort .................................................................................................................. 26  
Joint Interagency Coordination Groups .............................................................................. 29  
Research Methods .............................................................................................................. 33  
JIACG Examples .................................................................................................................. 35  
Combatant Commands ....................................................................................................... 35  
USPACOM ............................................................................................................................. 36  
  Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 36  
  USPACOM JIACG History ................................................................................................. 36  
  Organization ...................................................................................................................... 38  
  Resources .......................................................................................................................... 38  
  Training ............................................................................................................................. 39  
  Assessment ...................................................................................................................... 39  
USSOUTHCOM ..................................................................................................................... 40  
  Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 40  
  USSOUTHCOM JIACG History ......................................................................................... 41  
  Organization ...................................................................................................................... 42  
  Resources .......................................................................................................................... 44  
  Training ............................................................................................................................. 44  
  Assessment ...................................................................................................................... 45  
USSOCOM ............................................................................................................................. 46  
  Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 46  
  USSOCOM IATF History ................................................................................................. 48  
  Organization ...................................................................................................................... 49  
  Resources .......................................................................................................................... 51  
  Training ............................................................................................................................. 52  
  Assessment ...................................................................................................................... 52  
Conclusions .......................................................................................................................... 54  
Findings ................................................................................................................................. 54  
Recommendations ............................................................................................................... 56  
Topics for Additional Research .......................................................................................... 59  
APPENDICES ...................................................................................................................... 61  
  Appendix A: Acronyms .................................................................................................... 61  
  Appendix B: DoD Directive 3000.07 .............................................................................. 64  
GLOSSARY ............................................................................................................................ 73  
BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................................................. 74
Introduction

Because of successive perceived United States national security failures and shortcomings culminating with the Al Qaeda attacks of 11 September 2001, United States governmental interagency cooperation is a popular topic of discussion and critique. Scholars, journalists, military officers, and politicians have offered their views and suggestions to make the United States national security system more effective. The recommendations have discussed the improvement of the national interagency process, in many cases advocating the passage of Congressional legislation similar to the National Security Act of 1947 or the Goldwater Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. The new legislation would reform the entrenched departments of the government and restructure the entire national security apparatus. The changes would presumably make the government more effective in dealing with current and emerging dangerous threats that no longer resemble the mostly predictable challenges that existed in the bipolar 20th century. An overwhelming portion of contemporary literature discussing the subject supports the implementation of governmental reform, and cites reasons related to poor intelligence collection, sharing and synthesis, unsuccessful post-conflict reconstruction measures, and overall foreign policy failures. Commentators and analysts from private organizations and former leaders from the national defense and intelligence communities predict that greater interagency coordination will enable the United States to manage future conflict against 21st century adversaries described as shadowy, ill-defined, non-state actors, and political or religious movements. The adaptive nature of the contemporary enemies of the United States presents an overwhelming set of problems to the current government structures. Technologically perceptive decentralized networks, many with global reach, are forcing the United States government to realize that current inefficiencies could lead to a national security catastrophe. Military leaders and others working in and near the United States government have determined that a stove-piped
hierarchy of multiple agencies cannot defeat an agile and anticipatory series of linked enemy networks.¹

A corresponding trend in contemporary national security literature deals with the future character of warfare. The United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) published the Joint Operating Environment (JOE) for 2008 that described the anticipated global security environment for the next 25 years. It predicted the continuing requirement for the American military to participate in “irregular” fights and stipulated, “[t]he difficulties involved in training to meet regular and nuclear threats must not push training to fight irregular war into the background.”² In autumn 2007, Army Chief of Staff General (GEN) George W. Casey testified to the United States Senate Armed Service Committee that persistent conflict would permeate the next several decades. He reported that the United States will participate in a protracted confrontation with state and non-state actors, adversaries who “avoid our proven advantages by adopting asymmetric techniques.”³ Secretary of Defense Robert Gates echoed GEN Casey’s testimony and wrote in January of 2009 that today’s war on terror is more aptly described as a “prolonged, worldwide irregular campaign.”⁴ The struggle defined by GEN Casey and Secretary Gates matches the descriptions previously provided by other analysts and specialists. Thomas Barnett, a strategic theorist and author, described an “non integrating gap” in his initial book, The Pentagon’s New Map, and stated that American efforts would best be focused on reconciling the


gap between functioning countries and isolated, problematic countries by addressing irregular threats rather than preparing for conventional war against a near peer competitor.\(^5\) In a more recent publication, Stephen Flanagan, Senior Vice President and Director of the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic International Studies (CSIS), stated that the future challenge for the United States policy in dealing with potential adversaries would be irregular warfare (IW).\(^6\) He predicted that future American policy makers will be less willing to use coercive power in an overt manner and will seek to implement non-military options employing other elements of national power to accomplish national interests.\(^7\)

**Irregular Warfare Concepts**

For several years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, scholars and authors noted the complete dominance of the United States military against conventional military foes.\(^8\) Evidence of the United States conventional military ascendancy seemed more pronounced in the aftermath of Operation DESERT STORM in 1991. However, events in Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1992 through 1995, and in Somalia during 1993 demonstrated some of the limits of American military prowess as an exclusive tool of national policy. Increasingly, the adversaries of the United States realized that by conducting “war amongst the people,” as described by General Sir Rupert Smith, they could accomplish their goals with limited risk of interference from an overwhelming

---


6 Stephen J. Flanagan and James A. Schear, eds., *Strategic Challenges: America’s Global Security Agenda* (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2008), 112. Note: Many organizations and authors define Irregular Warfare (IW) in different ways. Many of the definitions are explored in the following literature review. Flanagan defines IW as wide ranging realm of conflict with substate actors. He considers the term ironic as Western militaries now expect “irregular” warfare to be more common than “regular” warfare.

7 Ibid., 130.

American military response. General Smith categorized this new type of warfare as something different from the “industrial wars” that emerged after the Napoleonic period.9

The United States Government 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) introduced IW among four types of contemporary security challenges. Michèle A. Flournoy, who served as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy for the George W. Bush administration and serves as the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy for the Barack Obama Administration, analyzed the 2006 QDR and described the four challenges as displayed in table 1.10

Table 1. Security Environment: Four Challenges

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Higher Likelihood</th>
<th>Lower Likelihood</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Those seeking to <strong>erode</strong> American influence and power by employing <strong>unconventional or irregular methods</strong> (e.g., terrorism, insurgency, civil war, and emerging concepts like “unrestricted warfare”)</td>
<td>States seeking to <strong>challenge</strong> American power by instigating <strong>traditional</strong> military operations with <strong>legacy and advanced</strong> military capabilities (e.g., conventional, air, sea, and land forces, and nuclear forces or established nuclear powers)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Likelihood:</strong> Very high, strategy of the weak</td>
<td><strong>Likelihood:</strong> Decreasing (absent preemption) due to historic capability overmatch and expanding qualitative lead</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Vulnerability:</strong> Moderate, if not effectively checked</td>
<td><strong>Vulnerability:</strong> Low, only if transformation is balanced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher Vulnerability</td>
<td>Lower Likelihood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Those seeking to <strong>paralyze</strong> American leadership and power by employing <strong>WMD or WMD-like effects in unwarmed attacks</strong> on symbolic, critical, or other high-value targets (e.g., 9/11, terrorist use of WMD, rogue missile attack)</td>
<td>States seeking to <strong>usurp</strong> American influence and power by acquiring <strong>breakthrough capabilities</strong> (e.g., sensors, information, biotechnology, miniaturization on the molecular level, cyber-operations, space, directed energy, and other emerging fields)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Likelihood:</strong> Moderate and increasing</td>
<td><strong>Likelihood:</strong> Low, but time works against U.S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Vulnerability:</strong> Unacceptable; single event could alter American way of life</td>
<td><strong>Vulnerability:</strong> Unknown; strategic surprise puts American security at risk</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


After further study and discussion, the United States military defined the irregular challenge as a category of warfare named “irregular warfare” (IW). In 2007, the United States Department of Defense (DoD) defined IW as:

[a] violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. IW favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will. It is inherently a protracted struggle that will test the resolve of our Nation and our strategic partners.11

In February 2007 Deputy Defense Secretary Gordon England explained that from a national perspective IW is “a form of warfare that has as its objective the credibility and or legitimacy of the relevant political authority, with the goal of undermining or supporting that authority.”12 During a press conference in April of 2008, United States Air Force Brigadier General Robert H. Holmes, the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) Deputy Director of Operations, clarified the scope of IW as it related to a Combatant Commander (CCDR). He explained that the scope of IW operations spans “the DIMES model: diplomacy, information, military, economic and societal-cultural development activities,” and that the IW operation ranged from “combat operations to . . . information operations and computer net-ops [operations] and then begin to expand into threat finance, economic development, criminalization and international law enforcement.”13

This explanation of IW and the previous doctrinal definition have significant detractors. Authors in military journals and military staff college papers claim the current scope of IW is either too broad, or misguided. In a 2009 Joint Force Quarterly publication, Colonel Kenneth Coons Jr., the Chairman of the Warfighting Department at the Air War College, and Colonel (retired) Glenn Harned, a Booz Allen Hamilton consultant for USSOCOM, stated that the 2007

---

11Department of Defense, Irregular Warfare (IW) Joint Operating Concept (JOC), 1.
12Pincus, A15.
13Ibid.
IW Joint Operating Concept (JOC) authorized definition of IW must be placed within a context that outlines a path for IW transformation. The authors contend that without clearly articulated force employment requirements for IW the DoD will diminish emphasis on IW preparation and training and the term will be considered only a “temporary inconvenience.”14 Another paper written by Dr. Barak Salamoni, the Deputy Director of the Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning, at the USMC Training and Education Command (USMCTEC), stated that the current IW mental model for thinking about IW is a “fallacy.”15 He stated that “irregular” warfare is far more common in history than “regular” or traditional warfare, consisting of battles between armed military services of nation states oriented on the destruction of the enemy force or the elimination of the enemy’s command capability.16 Salamoni argued that the term “irregular warfare” belies an ethnocentric perspective of conflict that will limit military leaders as they prepare for challenges against future adversaries.17 More than simply an issue with taxonomy, he maintained that the designation of IW as a term similar to previous expressions--asymmetric warfare, low intensity conflict, or military operations other than war--would lead the United States military to apply temporary solutions to deal with what is likely to be common and protracted conflict.18 These brief descriptions of contemporary thought concerning IW demonstrate only a small portion of the material described later in this paper. The nature of IW requires a comprehensive approach from the United States Government, necessitating participation from all elements responsible for national security.

16Ibid., 19.
17Ibid., 23.
18Ibid., 24.
In early 2006, the DoD recognized the deficiencies in interagency cooperation at the combatant command level where the confluence of interagency coordination and IW operational planning and execution takes place. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) tasked the Commander of USJFCOM to present a plan of action to the Secretary of Defense to improve interagency planning within combatant commands. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) directed the plan of action to recommend improvements in stability operations, building partnership capacity, and planning for IW. USJFCOM produced a plan of action based on a series of experiments conducted by the Joint Concept Development and Experimentation Directorate (J9). Their recommendations proposed that commands establish Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACGs) to “coordinate with U.S. government civilian agencies conducting operational planning in contingency operations” and support “day-to-day planning at the combatant commander headquarters.” The plan also stated that JIACGs should advise military planners regarding civilian agency operations, capabilities, and limitations. OSD received these recommendations and directed military efforts toward better interagency coordination by placing the USJFCOM recommendations into joint doctrine but did not force Combatant Commanders to standardize JIACG structure or functions. As a result, individual Combatant Commanders placed varying amounts of emphasis on JIACG effort and received varying amounts of support from interagency partners in the United States Government.

JIACGs fulfill the CCDR interagency requirements to varying degrees. Because the CCDRs maintain control over the composition and priorities for their JIACGs military officers, national security experts have recommended improvements and changes for these organizations.

---


to the individual commands. Many recommendations, published before 2006 omit the specified role of the JIACG as identified by Joint Publication 3-08 Vols. 1 and 2, *Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations* published in 2006. Many works also neglect the role JIACGs perform in the “protracted struggle” as identified by the DoD 2007 *Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept.* Finally, while many papers and articles have advocated additional support for JIACGs from interagency elements outside of DoD, they have not analyzed the role the interagency partners need to play when they serve as lead agencies within the IW construct.

**Hypothesis**

Because recent studies and recommendations concerning interagency coordination for the United States national security apparatus have focused on national level adjustments, they have generally neglected discussion of the interagency efforts taking place at the theater or combatant command level. To implement the four elements of national power (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic) at the theater level CCDRs need organizations prepared to leverage national capabilities. The requirements imposed by the DoD for CCDRs to conduct IW as a form of warfare as important as conventional warfare require substantial interagency support. CCDRs are inappropriately organized, resourced, and trained to conduct interagency IW planning and operations and the existing interagency organizations at the Combatant Commands are sub-

---


23There are some recent scholarly efforts outlining AFRICOM’s emerging JIACG and its role in IW, (one notable paper is “U.S. Africa Command: An Opportunity for Effective Interagency Cooperation” by LCDR William C. Whitsitt written in October 2007). Another set of articles include two opposing essays written in the 1st Quarter *Joint Force Quarterly* by Ambassador Edward Marks and Ambassador Mary Yates, but because this organization is nascent at best and incomplete at worst, the efforts at projecting its appropriate employment in the prosecution of IW are mostly speculative.

optimally organized to leverage all interagency contributions. Leaders within the current interagency organizations are insufficiently supported with a variety of resources and interagency personnel receive limited training to coordinate and direct IW efforts in accordance with DoD Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept. A short summary of the interagency structure in the United States Government and a description of existing Joint Interagency Coordination Groups will clarify the environment that has caused difficulty for CCDRs dealing with IW.

**National Interagency Structure**

The current national security apparatus operates as an integrated organization only at specific levels of interface. At the highest level of government, the National Security Council (NSC) combines members from most of the interagency community. Various entities of the government attend NSC meetings when chaired by the President of the United States, depending on the importance and topic of the called meeting. Under the George W. Bush Administration, the Principals Committee included the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Defense, and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Additional participants included the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of National Intelligence. Other agencies outside of normal security departments, such as Commerce, Treasury, Agriculture, or Labor participated in the meetings when appropriate and when invited.\(^25\) The primary NSC attendees varied depending on direction from the President. Since 1947 each President dictated participation through the use of Presidential directives. In addition to the Principals Committee, there are other levels of interagency coordination, which take place with the Deputies Committee, Policy Coordination Committees, specified functional

\(^{25}\)The White House, National Security Council, www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/ (accessed 24 August 2008). Note: President Obama has not updated or changed this NSPD at the time of this writing (1 March 2009). He has stated that he would provide the National Security Advisor, GEN Jones, greater authority and power to coordinate national security issues.
committees and working groups. The NSC deals with policy related to IW along with other specific and general threats to national security.

The next formalized level for interagency coordination that focuses partially on IW is the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). Established in August of 2004 by President George W. Bush, the NCTC serves as “the primary organization in the United States Government (USG) for integrating and analyzing intelligence pertaining to terrorism and counterterrorism (CT)” and conducts strategic and operational planning through the integration of all instruments of national power. The NCTC is a comprehensive interagency element which includes personnel from a broad spectrum of government agencies including the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Justice; the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the Departments of State, Defense, and Homeland Security. In addition, other United States Government entities that provide unique expertise such as the Departments of Energy, Treasury, Agriculture, Transportation, and Health and Human Services; Nuclear Regulatory Commission; and the US Capitol Hill Police have full time representation in the NCTC. Agencies of the national government in Washington, D.C. and elements of the government postured worldwide benefit from the NCTC and its output but the NCTC by design has limited influence over policy. The organization can recommend policy and suggest action to other government agencies but has no control over appropriations or assets. It also concentrates exclusively on one portion of IW, counterterrorism, which by definition is the effort to “prevent, deter, preempt and respond to

---


terrorism.” The national level interagency elements (NSC and NCTC) provide policy guidance and some support to CCDRs but the CCDRs report directly to the President and execute national policy based on Presidential guidance. CCDRs are the first commanders required to leverage elements of United States Government placed under their responsibility to implement policy.

**Joint Interagency Coordination Group Structure**

The most significant contributors to interagency synergy at the theater level are the JIACGs. Joint doctrine for DoD formalizes the concept of the JIACGs assigned to the headquarters of each combatant command. Joint Publication (JP) 3-08, defines the JIACG as:

an interagency staff group that establishes regular, timely, and collaborative working relationships between civilian and military operational planners. Composed of USG civilian and military experts accredited to the combatant commander and tailored to meet the requirements of a supported combatant commander, the JIACG provides the combatant commander with the capability to collaborate at the operational level with other USG civilian agencies and departments. JIACGs complement the interagency coordination that takes place at the strategic level through the NSCS [National Security Council Staff].

The United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), European Command (USEUCOM), Pacific Command (USPACOM), Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), and Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) each have functioning interagency elements with unique structures. Because each CCDR exercises control over the detailed structure of the interagency elements, the organizations each have different names and perform different roles. For example, CENTCOM maintains both an Effects Synchronization Center (ESC) and an Interagency Task

---


32Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-08 vol. 1, xii.
Force for Irregular Warfare (IATF IW). EUCOM conducts interagency operations within their Command Interagency Engagement Group (CIEG). The functional commands including the United States Special Operations Command (SOCOM), Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), Strategic Command (STRATCOM), and Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) also possess interagency elements with varying capabilities and names.

The study of PACOM’s JIACG is a historic analysis as the JIACG as a planning organization effectively ceased to exist in the summer of 2005 when the USPACOM Chief of Staff reduced support for the JIACG for Counterterrorism (JIACG/CT) and moved nearly all of its interagency personnel and planning capabilities for the War on Terror (WOT) into the Joint Operations (J3) and Future Operations (J35) sections. However, during its existence the USPACOM JIACG pioneered the integration of interagency partners for IW planning and execution.

USSOUTHCOM developed a JIACG and two subordinate Joint Interagency Task Forces (JIATFs) beginning in 2001 which divided responsibility for elements of IW planning and execution. In 2008, USSOUTHCOM reconfigured its headquarters and staff in order to become more agile and responsive to the changing environment. Their adjusted configuration delegated IW execution to Special Operations Command South (SOCSOUTH) and caused the Combatant Command interagency team to focus more on strategic and campaign planning, including IW efforts. USSOUTHCOM’s choice to establish a new interagency “Partnering Directorate” rather than to maintain the commonly accepted JIACG structure is salient to the later study of baseline interagency cooperation for IW.

---


34CDR Brian D. Koehr, Deputy Director of the USPACOM JIACG, Telephonic interview by author, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 30 September 2008.
USSOCOM is responsible for synchronizing the execution of the Global War on Terror (GWOT). Its mission is to “Provide fully capable Special Operations Forces to defend the United States and its interest. Plan and synchronize operations against terrorist networks.” The USSOCOM headquarters recently established a J10 section within their staff to deal directly with the definitions and responsibilities related to IW. The J10, currently an independent staff section, may soon be subordinated to the USSOCOM Center for Special Operations (CSO), which already directs the Intelligence (J2), Operations (J3), Joint Plans (J5), and Interagency Task Force (IATF). The addition of the J10 section influenced how each of the staff sections approached IW. The J10 section also influenced the actions of the standing IATF.

Despite the appreciation of interagency coordination, and their widespread presence at the theater level, there is currently no baseline functionality defined across CCDRs, for JIACG and JIACG-like organizations. Additionally, there is no national policy, code, or legislation that expresses a standard, minimum functionality for JIACG organization, resourcing, and training. There is no unified set of guidelines designed to make theater level interagency coordination across the whole of government more relevant to the prosecution of IW.

Literature Review

Irregular Warfare

As briefly indicated in the introduction, the definition for Irregular Warfare (IW) evolved from significant study and discussion in recent United States Government literature. However, the United States Government, and specifically the Army, defined IW in doctrine more than 50 years ago. In a Joint Forces Staff College paper, several active duty students traced the development of IW as a term and analyzed its use in United States military doctrine. They reported that the term “irregular warfare” emerged in the 1951 United States Army Field Manual (FM) 31-20, *Operations Against Guerilla [sic] Forces*. The manual, written shortly after World War II and published before the outbreak of the Korean War, stated that guerrilla warfare (GW) and IW are the same thing. The authors cite the 1951 manual to show that IW is not a new concept and that the Army had formulated the doctrine from the Army’s experience with a specific form of conflict in different theaters of World War II:

“guerilla [sic] warfare” is used loosely to describe all kinds of irregular warfare. It is generally associated with broad movements that may be briefly described as: a. A people’s war or revolution against existing authority, b. A war conducted by irregular forces (supported by an external power) to bring about a change in the social-political order of a country without engaging it in a formal, declared war, c. A war conducted by irregular forces in conjunction with regularly organized forces as a phase of a normal war, d. Operations, generally of short duration, conducted by detached regular forces in the enemy's rear areas.

Irregular warfare is not new to the United States Government. The United States Army, Marine Corps, and diplomatic agencies participated in IW throughout the Nation’s history.

Professor John M. Gates from the College of Wooster wrote a book highlighting the United States government’s history with irregular warfare...

---


37 Stevenson et al., 3.
Army’s involvement in IW. His brief collection of essays described the activities of the Army in the 19th century when it engaged Indian groups in the continental United States from Florida to the Pacific Coast, Mexican guerrillas inside Texas and Mexico, raiders from the Confederate States of America, and Filipino revolutionaries.38 During the 20th century, the Army dealt with the significant irregular conflicts embedded in World War II, (Burma, Philippines, Yugoslavia), fought irregular forces during the Vietnam War, and faced irregular threats from terrorist organizations within the United States and abroad.39 The United States Marine Corps recently published a directive documenting its participation in irregular conflicts titled, The Long War, Send in the Marines: A Marine Corps Operational Employment Concept To Meet An Uncertain Security Environment. The document, commissioned by the Marine Corps Commandant, GEN James T. Conway, cited the Marine Corps extensive experience with irregular enemies in Central America, the Philippines, and Viet Nam.40 Not only does the employment concept cite Marine Corps history with IW, it nests the accounts of the history with the National Defense Strategy of 2005, the Navy’s Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower and Naval Operations Concept, and the Marine Corps other governing Operating Concepts.41

According to the Army in 1951, major powers including nation states and their militaries, could apply IW to accomplish their goals without an expensive commitment of conventional forces. More typically, overmatched elements lacking resources, or significant military strength could use IW techniques to achieve a specific purpose. GW and therefore IW in the 1951 manual

39Ibid., 6.
41Ibid., 6.
existed mostly at the tactical level of war.42 This more common use of IW addressed the United States Army’s requirement to be prepared to face resistance movements, insurgencies, and revolutionary movements that served as the leadership element for both an overt military and paramilitary threat along with covert forces and support form a civilian population.43 Of note, this definition of IW is focused on defeating an enemy element within the population rather than oriented on the population.44

Over several decades, the Army adjusted its definition of IW slightly based on its continued study and input from the units and leaders conducting operations (see summary in table 2). In 1955, FM 31-21 separated IW from a new concept of Unconventional Warfare (UW).45 The definition of UW as a broader category of warfare placed two types of IW within its framework.46 The first type of IW involved efforts taken by indigenous forces friendly to USG interests within the greater UW campaign, and the second type involved efforts by adversaries to weaken governments of nations allied with USG interests.47 By 1961 doctrine indicated that friendly and enemy supported IW included efforts not only against governments, but also included military efforts used against populations to influence the governments in question.48 The 1965 doctrine (notably FM 31-21, Special Forces Operations) removed the term “irregular” from discussion and combined irregular activities and guerrilla activities, but did not change the definitions of the

42Department of the Army, Field Manual 31-20, 1951, 2-3.
43Stevenson et al., 4.
45The 1955 FM 31-21, 6, defined UW as “operations conducted in time of war behind enemy lines by predominantly indigenous personnel responsible in varying degrees to friendly control or direction in furtherance of military and political objectives. It consists of the interrelated fields of guerrilla warfare, evasion and escape, and subversion against hostile states (resistance).”
46Stevenson et al., 5.
47Ibid.
types and categories of UW. Later doctrine (FM 31-20, *Special Forces Operational Techniques* and FM 90-8, *Counterguerrilla Operations*) no longer defined IW or UW but instead directed Army units to focus on how to organize to defeat irregular forces by influencing the populations in hostile nations. The Army stated that counterinsurgency operations (COIN) would be the broadest category, encompassing UW and IW/GW. COIN remained the predominant IW related category until the introduction of “Low Intensity Conflict (LIC)” in 1990. FM 100-20, *Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict* described the Army and Air Force efforts within AirLand Battle doctrine to serve as members of the United States elements of national power against threats to national interests short of conventional war. This manual placed low intensity military operations within the context of a national effort to deal with “political- military conflict,” described as something different from war. According to the section of FM 100-20 dealing with “major players,” LIC participants primarily included urban guerrillas, anti-Marxists insurgents, vigilante groups, and professional, full time revolutionaries and terrorists. The Army planned to face these participants, along with “irregular guerrillas” who contributed to instability, through Support for Insurgency and Counterinsurgency, Combating Terrorism, Peacekeeping Operations, and Peacetime Contingency Operations. The Army’s newest capstone field manual, FM 3-0 *Operations*, the first capstone manual published after the attacks of 11 September 2001, described irregular threats as:

> those posed by an opponent employing unconventional, asymmetric methods and means to counter traditional U.S. advantages. A weaker enemy often uses irregular warfare to

---


50Stevenson et al., 7.


52Ibid., iv.

53Ibid., 1-4.

54Ibid., 1-6.
exhaust the U.S. collective will through protracted conflict. Irregular warfare includes such means as terrorism, insurgency, and guerrilla warfare. Economic, political, informational, and cultural initiatives usually accompany and may even be the chief means of irregular attacks on U.S. influence.\footnote{Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-0 \textit{Operations} (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2008), 1-4.}

Table 2. IW in Selected U.S. Army Doctrine

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>US Army Field Manual</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>IW Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FM 31-20 Operations Against Guerilla Forces</td>
<td>1951</td>
<td>IW and GW are the same – people’s war, revolution, war by irregular forces, short duration operations by detached regular forces in enemy’s rear areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM 31-21 Organization and Conduct of Guerilla Warfare</td>
<td>1955</td>
<td>IW is a component form of warfare under Unconventional Warfare (UW)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM 31-15 Operations Against Irregular Forces</td>
<td>1961</td>
<td>IW is not only directed against hostile agents, but elements of population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM 31-21 Special Forces Operations</td>
<td>1965</td>
<td>IW subsumed by “guerilla warfare” – IW no longer a term in most doctrine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM 31-20 Special Forces Operational Techniques</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>Directed SF units in “Counterguerrilla” warfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM 90-8 Counterguerrilla Operations</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>Opened “Counterguerrilla Warfare” missions and roles to other than SF units – introduced COIN as preeminent form of warfare (incorporates UW)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM 100-20 Military Operation in Low-Intensity Conflict</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Introduced “LIC,” and related COIN and UW missions to AirLand Battle doctrine – discusses whole of government approach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Described IW as a category of conflict including COIN and insurgency, IW primarily described as enemy method of conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM 3-0 Operations</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Formalized IW as a major form of combat as a method</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM 3-07 Stability Operations</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Changed from “whole of government approach” to IW to “comprehensive approach that includes appreciation of nongovernmental organizations (NGO) and nongovernmental international organizations (NGIO) efforts</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Marine Corps IW doctrine developed from the comprehensive 1940 \textit{Small Wars Manual}. The Marine Corps recognized before World War II that their service would routinely deploy and
execute active operations that protected “American interests, life and property abroad.” The manual described the threat and nature of operations that Marines would face in the conduct of “small wars” as an irregular threat, cutting across a broad spectrum of conflict. The manual stressed understanding of national policy, military strategy, and adoption of military efforts that accomplished missions to defeat adversaries with the minimum commitment of United States forces. Marine Corps doctrine writers understood that when Marines were sent to accomplish United States government policy the circumstances surrounding the conflict were something less than what would incite a declared, “traditional,” war.

The utility of the *Small Wars Manual* led the Marine Corps to continue to use it as governing IW doctrine until emphasis from President Kennedy’s interagency organization, the Special Group (Counterinsurgency) directed the State Department and DoD to reconsider counterinsurgency doctrine. Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM) 21, *Operations Against Guerrilla Forces*, published in 1962, refined the *Small Wars Manual* definition of the cause of guerrilla or IW. The manual stated that resistance from the population, led by armed forces, usually emerged from a desire for “(1) Political change, (2) Relief from actual or alleged repression, (3) Elimination of foreign occupation or exploitation, (4) Economic and social improvement, and (5) Religious expression.” The 1962 FMFM also recognized the importance of interagency effort to deal with the causes of guerilla or irregular activity and advocated Marine Corps coordination with other agencies of the United States Government.

---


57Ibid., 5.

58Ibid., 2.


61Ibid., 13-16.
Marine Corps experience in Vietnam led to an update of FMFM-21, which was redesignated FMFM 8-2, *Counterinsurgency Operations* in 1967. The new manual provided specific examples of counterinsurgency techniques, dedicated sections to small unit actions, and adopted some new terminology, but remained consistent in the definition of guerilla warfare and its underlying causes. Other than the fact that it was nearly twice as large as the previous manual it failed to advance Marine Corps thought concerning IW. Marine Corps doctrine concerning IW remained consistent until 1980 when the Corps produced an updated FMFM 8-2 that incorporated counterinsurgency operations into the Army’s general context of AirLand Battle. The authors added specific subsections to the causes of guerrilla war, and added an entire category of “Host Country Internal Defense.”

Marine Corps leaders used the 1980 manual and referred to the 1940 *Small Wars Manual* for more than twenty years to govern their participation in IW. After the full spectrum conflict in the 2003 Iraq War, Marine Corps doctrine writers received feedback from the fleet and updated the recommended counterinsurgency and IW tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) in a series of manuals. The manuals included two significant pieces of doctrine; *A Tentative Manual for Countering Irregular Threats* and Marine Corps Interim Publication (MCIP) 3-33.01, *Small Unit Leader’s Guide to Counterinsurgency*. The *Tentative Manual* addressed leaders at the battalion and above level and the MCIP 3-33.01 concentrated on the company level and below.

The Marine Corps and Army released the most current doctrinal manual governing the conduct of IW in December of 2006 titled, *FM / Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP)*

---


63 Long, 15.

64 Ibid., 19.


66 Long, 25.
3-24, *Counterinsurgency*. This manual addressed insurgency and COIN operations and categorized them both under the heading of IW. Written by retired LTC Conrad Crane, assisted by U.S. Army and USMC veterans of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, and supervised by LTG David Petraeus, the field manual emphasized the requirement for military forces to adapt to their environment and stressed the COIN role played by traditionally non-military activities, agencies, and organizations. The manual also amplified two significant doctrinal constructs, “Operational Design” adopted from USMC literature, and “Logical Lines of Operation” adopted from the 2001 U.S. Army FM 3-0, *Operations.*

As supporting forces in most aspects of IW, the United States Navy and Air Force have been the last elements to codify their role in IW in doctrine. The Air Force produced Doctrine Documents (AFDDs) capturing their IW views and responsibilities. The first manual, the August 2007 AFDD 2-3, *Irregular Warfare*, addressed the role of airpower for counterinsurgency and other UW forces. The second significant effort, the September 2007 AFDD 2-3.1, *Foreign Internal Defense*, explained the Air Force role in IW related to the FID principles outlined in JP 3-07.1, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense*. The Air Force published a capstone IW manual in January 2009 entitled, *The 21st Century Air Force Irregular Warfare Strategy*. These doctrinal publications stated that the Air Force would maintain the flexibility to respond to all manner of threats to United States national interests, including those presented by IW while maintaining the capability to maintain decisive advantage in conventional warfare.

The DoD introduced the concept of IW as a form of warfare for all services in conjunction with the National Defense Strategy released in March of 2005. The services of the

---


United States armed forces debated the roles and missions related to IW. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the United States Congress, and the Joint Staff provided their input to the debate during the formulation of the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).⁶⁹ After significant negotiation, the 2006 QDR stated the requirements for the United States military to transform and shift emphasis from “major conventional combat operations – to multiple irregular, asymmetric operations.”⁷⁰ The DoD specifically stated that the nation was involved in a long war, “irregular in its nature,” against enemies without traditional conventional military forces who used “terror, propaganda, and indiscriminate violence” to accomplish their ends.⁷¹ The QDR clarified the definition of IW as “conflicts in which enemy combatants are not regular military forces of nation-states.” This definition explained IW by describing whom the enemy combatants were not (uniformed, traditional military forces) and provided several categories of conflict as irregular. The categories included long duration unconventional warfare (UW), counterterrorism (CT), counterinsurgency (CI), and military support for stabilization and reconstruction efforts.⁷²

In several sections, the QDR referred to IW as asymmetric warfare, but failed to identify an appreciable difference between the terms. Instead of offering a detailed explanation for the definition of IW, the QDR referred to the National Defense Strategy of 2005 for its source of the definition.⁷³ The introduction of the 2006 QDR stated that IW required a holistic approach from the United Stated Government. It indicated that to be successful, military leaders needed to

---


⁷¹Ibid., 1.

⁷²Ibid., 4.

⁷³Ibid., 3.
prepare to work with other agencies of the United States government and coalition partners to conduct IW as proficiently as traditional armed conflict.\footnote{Ibid., 5.}

The DoD released the \textit{QDR} in February of 2006, but Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England did not officially approve a comprehensive definition of IW until April 2006.\footnote{Kenneth C. Coons, and Glenn M. Harned, “Irregular Warfare is Warfare,” \textit{Joint Force Quarterly} (1st Quarter 2009): 97.}

Along with the approval of the definition, England outlined specific IW tasks for the armed forces and enumerated twenty-eight distinct tasks related to IW. Among the tasks indicated that all services of the United States military needed to learn, train, and equip to conduct IW to reduce the stress on Special Operations Forces currently fighting IW.\footnote{Department of Defense, \textit{Quadrennial Defense Review Report}, 42.} To clarify roles, missions, and incorporate IW concepts in the services Title 10 responsibilities the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) directed the conduct of a QDR IW Execution Roadmap.\footnote{Coons and Harned, 98. Note: The Roadmap process involved leaders from each of the armed services, the OSD and the Joint Staff. Several working groups met beginning in 2006 to generate action on the 28 assigned IW tasks. They recommended solutions to the Periodic Review Boards, chaired by one-star general officers. The monthly Review Boards took IW actions ready for review to the three-star Programmers Meeting consisting of the G-3 and G-8 general officers from each service chaired by the J-8 (The Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment Directorate) and OSD Director of Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E). When the OSD PA&E and J8 determined the proposed IW actions were ready for approval, they forwarded the briefs to the Deputy Advisor Working Group (DAWG) of service chiefs at the four-star general officer level. Approved IW actions then returned to the services in the form of directed guidance for manning, budgeting, and program management. The two and one half year IW Roadmap process accelerated the implementation of IW concepts and ensured the armed forces maintained focus on IW related missions and responsibilities rather than sacrificing IW efforts for traditional military systems and concepts--derived from interview with MAJ Zach Miller and MAJ Joe Escandon who served in the Pentagon for the Army Staff during the IW Roadmap proceedings.}
The Joint Staff captured the essence of the IW discussion from the Roadmap proceedings and meetings and presented its definition of IW in the 2007 edition of JP 1-0, \textit{Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States}. The manual defined IW as:

\begin{quote}
[a] violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s). Irregular warfare favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capacities, in order to erode an
\end{quote}
adversary’s power, influence, and will. Also called IW. (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)  

One of the tasks from the IW Roadmap included a directive to USSCOMCOM and the Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) to produce a Joint Operating Concept (JOC) for IW. The IW JOC instructed Joint Force Commanders to conduct “protracted regional and global campaigns using indirect approaches against state and non-state adversaries to subvert, coerce, attrite and exhaust adversaries rather than defeating them through direct military confrontation.” The IW JOC recommended a “whole of government” approach to IW efforts but acknowledged different departments of the United States Government would collaborate at different levels depending on their access to resources and personnel. 

The most current IW governing document is the DoD Directive Number 3000.07, published on 1 December 2008 by the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Eric Edelman. This document outlined “policy and assigns responsibilities for DoD conduct of IW and the development of capabilities to address irregular challenges to national security.” The Directive specifically ordered all CCDRs to conduct four tasks:

- Identify IW requirements for ongoing and “surge” campaigns.
- Incorporate IW related concepts in to training and planning.
- Advise the JCS and DoD leadership on their IW capacity and contingency plans within the IW realm.
- Recommend changes in order to implement IW best practices across the United States Armed Forces.

The Commanders of USSOCOM and USJFCOM received additional responsibilities related to their unique organizations (see Appendix B--DoD Directive 3000.07).

---

80 Ibid., 40.
82 Ibid., 9.
Table 3. IW in Selected USG Documents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>IW Event</th>
<th>Governing Document</th>
<th>Sponsor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>March 2005</td>
<td>Introduced as a concept</td>
<td>National Defense Strategy</td>
<td>Secretary of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2006</td>
<td>Working definition approved</td>
<td>Stabilization, Security, Transition and Reconstruction Operations JOC</td>
<td>Deputy Secretary of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 2006</td>
<td>IW concepts explained</td>
<td>2006 DoD QDR</td>
<td>Secretary of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2006</td>
<td>IW approved definition</td>
<td>IW Roadmap Instructions</td>
<td>Secretary of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2007</td>
<td>IW defined in Joint Doctrine</td>
<td>JP 1 (Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States)</td>
<td>Chairman, JCS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 2007</td>
<td>IW Joint Operating Concept published</td>
<td>IW JOC version 1.0</td>
<td>USSOCOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 2008</td>
<td>IW responsibilities assigned</td>
<td>DoD Directive 3000.07</td>
<td>Under Secretary of Defense for Policy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

United States IW doctrine and literature demonstrated similarities through the decades. The evolution of the Army and Marine Corps doctrine and the recent Joint and DoD material indicate practitioners viewed the concepts of IW as consistent principles, even if the recommendations to effect solutions differed. Despite the trends in written doctrine, the application of the doctrinal principles varied in both precision and effectiveness. Evaluation of the doctrinal concepts of IW without consideration of the culture of the organizations tasked to execute IW ignores the factors leading to success or failure in practice. A tight linkage between written doctrine and actions by organizations are much more likely to be evident in organizations with structures, philosophies, and preferences advocating effective prosecution of IW.

---

83 Consider the relative success of the CORDS program in Vietnam and the struggles the military faced in Iraq in 2006 and early 2007.

84 Long, 2.
**Interagency Effort**

One significant advocate for greater holistic interagency reform is James Locher III, an individual closely involved with the development of the *1986 Goldwater Nichols Defense Reorganization Act*. In 1984 and 1985, he wrote much of the language included in the approved legislation. As of 2008, he serves as the Executive Director for the Project on National Security Reform (PNSR), an influential non-profit organization sponsored by the Center for the Study of the Presidency. The PNSR has as its stated goal the construction of new legislation designed to “create a much more agile, nimbler national security system” through interagency restructuring. Dr. Locher considers comprehensive interagency cooperation essential to effective management of national security affairs.

Another proponent of improved interagency cooperation in order to deal with IW threats is Secretary of Defense Robert Gates. During an address at Kansas State University on 26 November 2007, Secretary Gates recommended the development of an updated National Security Act that would improve holistic government efforts. He stated that modern challenges required the government “to act with unity, agility, and creativity” and that the protection of national security required new and more comprehensive institutions “for the 21st century, new organizations with a 21st century mind-set.”

---

85President Elect Obama appointed three prominent members of the PNSR to positions in his Administration: (1) Admiral Dennis Blair as Director of National Intelligence (DNI); (2) General James Jones as National Security Advisor (NSA); and (3) Michele Flournoy as the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)).


87*The National Security Act of 1947* mandated wholesale reorganization of the foreign policy and military establishments of the United States Government. It mandated the creation of the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, merged the War Department and the Navy Department into the Defense Department, and created the Department of the Air Force.

2009 edition of *Foreign Affairs* Secretary Gates advocated increased collaboration between United States government agencies to deal with increasing complex challenges. He warned that:

> [w]hen thinking about the range of threats, it is common to divide the “high end” from the “low end,” the conventional from the irregular, armored divisions on one side, guerrillas toting AK-47s on the other. In reality, as the political scientist Colin Gray has noted, the categories of warfare are blurring and no longer fit into neat, tidy boxes. One can expect to see more tools and tactics of destruction--from the sophisticated to the simple--employed simultaneously in hybrid and more complex forms of warfare.89

*Washington Post* global security expert and columnist David Ignatius advanced the argument and suggested the United States government should revise the *National Security Act of 1947*, and designate Secretary Gates as the leader to sponsor a commission to develop the structure of the new national security system.90 He, along with other journalists, believes that change in the national security apparatus is long overdue. Ignatius recently reported that:

> Gates is right about the imbalance between civilian and military power. A new report by Refugees International documents how the current, over-militarized approach is misfiring in Africa. But power has shifted to the Pentagon for a reason: It has the resources. As the report notes, there are more people serving in military bands than in the entire State Department. Changing that balance will require a different kind of NSC architecture.91

His article parallels other reporting about the topic of interagency cooperation and resource allocation within the federal government. A simple query using an Internet search engine scoped to locate only “U.S. Government Interagency Reform” items from the year 2008 reveals more than 500,000 entries.

The *National Security Strategy* released by President George W. Bush in 2006 acknowledged the need to reform the capability of the government to deal with 21st century security threats.92 The strategy outlines the reform of key institutions in order to deal with foreign

---


91Ibid.

and domestic security policies and states that the government must “better integrate interagency activity at home and abroad.”93 The Obama Administration cited the need to improve a holistic government approach to national defense. Prior to its publication of a National Security Strategy, the Administration posted on the Defense Agenda web site a commitment to “build up the capacity of each non-Pentagon agency to deploy personnel and area experts where they are needed, to help move soldiers [sic], sailors [sic], airmen [sic] and Marines out of civilian roles.”94

Despite the apparent need for greater interagency cooperation and legislation to ensure effectiveness against the modern and non-monolithic threats to United States interests, many deterrents to interagency cooperation exist in the government’s current structure. Many political observers accurately recall that the National Security Act of 1947 (as subsequently amended) and the Goldwater Nichols Act of 1986 faced significant institutional obstacles to implementation. President Truman made significant compromises to his original concept of “unification” of the military in 1947 in light of the political realities of his environment. Severe public competition between the War Department (the current day Department of the Army and Department of the Air Force) and the Department of the Navy limited what the President could effectively direct. Truman also had to amend the National Security Act as early as 1949 to make the new legislation more effective in the face of continued parochial rivalries.95 Additional governmental reform attempts in 1953 and 1958 failed to gain traction and the legislation languished.96 In 1985 the United States Congress, led by Senator Sam Nunn, proposed legislation designed to improve inter-service coordination after the difficulties they observed in military operations in Lebanon.

93Ibid., 45.
and Grenada and during the failed Iranian hostage rescue during Operation EAGLE CLAW. Even in the face of these struggles, the Navy, Marine Corps, and the Secretary of Defense opposed and attempted to marginalize the 1986 legislation. These attempts at reform faced substantial difficulty and they dealt only with the military. Contemporary “unification” and “jointness” efforts that deal with the whole of government will likely face even more resistance and entrenchment.

A recent study by the Stanley Foundation, a nonpartisan private organization that focuses on peace and security issues, indicated that the cost of establishing an overarching command structure bureaucracy alone would prevent Congress to avoid reform legislation. During a time of close fiscal examination, a Congress controlled by either political party would hesitate to fund sweeping reform at greater expense to the American taxpayer. A currently serving senior military commander, familiar with many aspects of the interagency community, stated that there is “not a groundswell of interest within Washington for an interagency Goldwater Nichols.”

The inertia resident in the current political system seems to indicate that a broad change in the national security structure at the highest levels is currently implausible.

**Joint Interagency Coordination Groups**

The study of JIACGs and their role and function began significantly in late 2001. Much of the discussion centered in military journals, military monographs and dissertations, and

---

97Herspring, 292-293.


99Non attributional, “Brief to CGSOC and SAMS Students and Faculty,” (Lecture, Eisenhower Auditorium, Fort Leavenworth).

100President George W. Bush issued NSPDs 44 and 46 to formalize some interagency coordination for Reconstruction and Stabilization (NSPD 44) and the Global War on Terror (NSPD 46) but both of these directives concentrated on assigning roles, responsibilities, and defining lead agency requirements rather than stipulating wholesale integration of interagency effort.
memoranda between senior leaders in the DoD. A small amount of JIACG related material appeared within non-DoD United States Government literature, indicating a less significant amount of emphasis from outside of the military. Most military writing assumed the validity of the JIACG concept and advocated methods for better JIACG support and implementation.

An often-quoted journal article submitted by Colonel Matthew F. Bogdanos in a 2005 Joint Force Quarterly advocated the formalization of JIACGs as planning organizations for the military.101 According to Bogdanos, the JIACG should report directly to the combatant command chief of staff or deputy commander to prevent it from being undercut or marginalized by the standing joint staff sections with competing perspectives.102 The JIACG should have robust, active duty military staffing to form the nucleus of the organization, which would receive augmentation from additional assigned reservists and interagency partners. He also stated that DoD must formalize a minimum set of mission essential tasks for the CCDR’s JIACGs.103 He recommended several tasks for the NSC. First, Bogdanos recommended that the NSC mandate participation from the USG Departments and solicit funding from Congress to support the Manning requirements. Second, he recommended a streamlined information sharing process to simplify the current requirements of multiple department security classifications for information. Finally, he recommended that the NSC create a joint interagency designation similar to the military’s joint service designation sustained by interagency training at the National Defense University.104

101Colonel Bogdanos, USMC, served in the National Strategic Gaming Center, Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University. He addressed JIACG structure, training, and resourcing.


103Bogdanos, 18.

104Ibid.
A review of several academic papers from military authors demonstrated some frustration and concern with the current variety of JIACG effectiveness. United States Army Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Galvin, a former Director of the Deputy Commander’s Action Group, U.S. European Command, stated that JIACGs should be formalized to enhance “Phase 0” or Theater Security Cooperation programs rather than strictly dealing with post conflict solutions. He stated in 2007 that JIACGs were unable to accomplish their designed purpose of facilitating the implementation of holistic solutions because many combatant commanders limited their access to decision makers. The JIACGs could not bring their IA perspective to policy efforts and as a result, Commanders missed critical input from interagency partners.  

Commander Christopher Herr, from the United States Navy War College stated that JIACG efforts at the combatant commander level were structured, funded, and focused differently leading to diffused support from other than DoD agencies in the United States Government. Lieutenant Colonel Daniel Charchian, an Air Force officer attending the United States Army War College, stated that JIACGs face inherent difficulty because of cultural differences between USG elements. Major Karen Stoff, from the United States Air Force Air Command and Staff College posited that the JIACGs at the combatant command level may assist with operational implementation of the instruments of national power but that their existence can actually inhibit development of interagency formulated strategy for combatant commander regions of responsibility.

---


106 CDR Christopher Herr, “Joint Interagency at the Combatant Commands: Making it Real, Making it Work” (Monograph, Naval War College, 2006), 11.


108 Major Karen D. Stoff, “Strategic Planning and Joint Interagency Coordination Groups” (Research Report, Air Command and Staff College, Air University, 2006), 24.
The military perspective of JIACGs and their role and effectiveness is also an issue addressed by other departments of the United States Government. Ambassador Edward Marks retired from the State Department in 1995 as a Senior Foreign Service Officer (Minister-Counselor) and returned to government service from 2002 until 2005 with the USPACOM JIACG/CT. He stated that most military leaders fail to understand the main function performed by JIACGs. Instead of helping the military to integrate IA partners in military planning, the JIACGs should determine what balance of effort combatant commanders should employ to deal with their operational and strategic circumstances. He viewed JIACGs as organizations that serve the commander by performing two primary functions: (1) dealing with problems and requirements that do not easily fall under the responsibility of an existing staff section or “J code,” and (2) enabling the combatant command staff to interact with IW partners everyday on an informal basis for coordination, consultation, and collaboration.

Much of the literature written by military professionals concentrated on how the JIACGs could better serve military ends to support the CCDR. Few of the papers or articles addressed how IA integration would enable a holistic approach to problems that were not originally military in nature. Because of the multi-dimensional threats found in IW, the idea that other agencies of the United States Government should provide more support to CCDRs is valid but incomplete. Interagency coordination cannot be successful if in every case IA partners are automatically subordinated to military priorities. An effective JIACG must address IW with the ability to emphasize whichever capability will best support the policy that the CCDR is directed to implement.

---

109 Ambassador Marks is currently a Distinguished Adjunct Professor at the Near East and South Asian Center for Strategic Studies, a Distinguished Senior Fellow at the George Mason University School of Public Policy’s Program on Peacekeeping Policy, a Senior Fellow at the Joint Forces Staff College, and a Senior Mentor in the United States Army Battle Command Training Program.

110 Ambassador Edward Marks, Senior Fellow with the School of Public Policy, Program on Peacekeeping Policy, at George Mason University, Telephonic interview by author, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 16 February 2009.
Research Methods

Three primary research methods were used in preparing this study. The first method included a meta analysis approach to assess existing and historic JIACG organizations by identifying criteria and using qualitative research to evaluate the JIACGs. Meta analysis considered the form and function of the JIACGs and focused on the ability of the JIACGs to contend with problems presented in IW, as defined by the IW JOC of 2007. Research also included a most similar systems design (MSSD) to compare instances of similarity and variation between the interagency organizations. The MSSD study outlined the common features between the JIACG organizations and accounted for some of the differing outcomes the organizations produced when dealing with IW subjects.111 Key characteristics for consideration included structure, resources, and training. The final method consisted of interviews with selected current and former members of the Combatant Command level interagency organizations to determine their evaluation of the role of the JIACG in the conduct and planning of IW. Their immediate familiarity with the organization provided input to balance the observations provided in the other qualitative analysis. Interviews, telephonic conversation, and e-mail traffic collected the data from specified individuals.112

Study of a limited sampling of CCDR interagency organizations led to conclusions that could enhance the performance of interagency organizations in other Combatant Commands. The study demonstrated areas where the JIACGs can enhance their own performance in dealing with IW requirements. The research recommended improvements for three primary elements of the JIACGs; organization (structure, status in the command, and ties to national agencies), resources


(manning, budget, and infrastructure), and training (pre-assignment training, organizational experience, and concurrent training programs). This study does not consider the overall impact of a National Security Act of 1947 type of reform for the interagency community, nor does it attempt to predict a type of Goldwater Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 legislation for the National Security apparatus. As previously noted, the volume of material and fervor related to this topic exceeds the limits of this project. This study also does not consider every combatant command JIACG structure in order to remain relatively concise. The focus deals with the USPACOM, USOUTHCOM, and USSOCOM interagency efforts to support IW in order to limit the range of JIACG involvement. A detailed study of all roles and missions executed by the interagency elements is beyond the scope of this paper. This paper includes doctrinal material, United States Government policy, and Combatant Command procedures current through 1 March 2009. This paper researches national policy, Presidential Security Directives (PSDs), Congressional legislation and testimony, changes in military doctrine, books, articles, and electronic sources written prior to 1 March 2009.
For the future, the global scope of problems, and the growing complexity of deterrence in new domains of conflict, will require an integrated interagency and international approach if we are to make use of all the tools available to us.

— 2008 National Defense Strategy

**Combatant Commands**

Combatant Commands within the United States military organization emerged as permanent unified commands after World War II. President Harry S. Truman approved a Joint Chiefs of Staff “Outline Command Plan” that established seven unified commands to administer United States military forces throughout the globe. Those commands originally included; Far East Command, Pacific Command, Alaskan Command, Northeast Command, Atlantic Command, Caribbean Command, and European Command. An account of their detailed history and progression to the modern command structure exceeds the scope of this paper but can be found in a comprehensive work, *The History Of The Unified Command Plan: 1946-1993*. The following analysis of USPACOM, USSOUTHCOM, and USSOCOM begins generally with the adoption of the Unified Command Plan effective in January of 1972. The interagency organizations currently employed by two Combatant Commands, the United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) and the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and the interagency organization employed until 2005 by the United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) have deficiencies that impede their ability to conduct appropriate planning and execution of IW.

---


114 Ibid., 36.
USPACOM

Introduction

USPACOM, the oldest of the geographic Combatant Commands, assumed responsibility for military operations in the Pacific Ocean in 1947. In 1972, the Joint Chiefs of Staff expanded USPACOM to include responsibilities for the Indian Ocean, Southern Asia, and the Arctic. USPACOM grew again in 1976, when it received requirements to supervise operations in parts of Africa and the Middle East and retained this geographic region until 1984.115 The Joint Chiefs of Staff then added China, Mongolia, North Korea, Madagascar, and the Aleutians to the USPACOM region, thus giving it the largest Combatant Command area of responsibility measured in square miles. Unified Command Plans after 2001 made minor changes to USPACOM’s area of responsibility including deletion of the West Coast of North America, addition of Antarctica, and adjustments to roles and missions dealing with operations in and around Russia.116 The operating environment extant in USPACOM’s area of responsibility since 2001 served as an ideal basis for considering action within the context of IW. Activities ongoing in the USPACOM theater included insurgencies, terrorism, foreign internal defense stability operations, and transnational criminal operations.

USPACOM JIACG History

USPACOM was the first Combatant Command to establish a standing Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG), and presents the greatest opportunity to analyze all aspects of

115Ibid., 48.
interagency cooperation. Admiral Dennis Blair, the USPACOM Commander from February, 1999 until May 2002, and as of 2009 the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) for the Obama Administration, built the Joint Interagency Coordination Group for Counterterrorism (JIACG/CT) through personal effort and direction. He established the first officially named JIACG in December 2001, and declared it would be the USPACOM office of primary responsibility for the GWOT. Admiral Blair personally spoke with senior members of United States Government Departments and requested experienced personnel from the State Department, the Justice Department, and other national agencies. The USPACOM Division Chief for Combating Terrorism, BG Andrew Twomey, followed Admiral Blair’s guidance and established the most robust JIACG as measured by personnel, and budget allocation among all of the combatant commands for three years. When BG Twomey served as the Executive Assistant to the USPACOM Commander from April 2003 until February 2005, he continued to emphasize the importance of the JIACG/CT. U.S. Navy Captain Rodger Welch directed the JIACG/CT from 2003 until 2005 and organized the element to conduct planning for a comprehensive government counterterrorism campaign in the Pacific region.

In mid-2005, then USPACOM CCDR Admiral William J. Fallon approved a J3 recommendation to reduce support to the JIACG/CT and rename it simply the JIACG. The J3 section took responsibility for CT operations and many of the personnel previously working in

---

117 Marks, Telephonic interview.

118 Ambassador Marks noted that until CENTCOM established its IATF in 2003, no other joint interagency element at the combatant command level received as much funding, had its own dedicated facilities, and had as many military active duty, military reserve, civil servants, and contracted retired governmental experts assigned to its organization.


120 Marks, Telephonic interview.

121 Koehr, Telephonic interview.
the JIACG/CT moved to the J5 and J35 sections. This effectively ended the role that the JIACG/CT played as an independent element within the USPACOM staff.

Organization

Until 2005, the JIACG/CT reported directly to the USPACOM Commander through the Chief of Staff. For administrative purposes, the JIACG/CT personnel worked in the J3 directorate. During the period between 2001 and 2005, it possessed between thirty-five and forty personnel reassigned from within the command. Although the JIACG/CT was authorized only ten active duty military personnel it retained between twelve and twenty active duty military personnel. It received support from an average fifteen military reservists serving on active duty in accordance with Joint Manning Documents (JMDs) led by a military Colonel or equivalent (O-6) Chief. Members also included one government-service (GS) employee, six contractors, two Liaison Officers (LNOs) from the USPACOM J3 section, and representatives from Department of State (DOS) and the Treasury Department. A Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) agent officer served between 2004 and 2005 and one United States Agency for International Development (USAID) senior staff member served in 2005.122

Resources

Admiral Blair authorized the JIACG/CT two million dollars for its first year of operation from USPACOMs operating budget. He allowed the JIACG/CT to develop a significant budget for equipment, travel, and personnel. His personal emphasis reduced some of the bureaucratic impediments to the new organization’s establishment. Admiral Blair also assigned specific facilities for use by the JIACG/CT and ensured that other staff sections provided capable and proficient planners and liaison officers to the organization. Following Admiral Blair’s example,

122Arnas et al., 12.
Admiral Thomas B. Fargo, USPACOM commander from May 2002 to February 2005, expanded the JIACG/CT mission and corresponding level of support. Admiral Fargo selected Captain Welch to serve as the JIACG/CT director and provided the organization with $2,000,000 for its annual operating budget from USPACOM complimented by an annual $1,500,000 allocation from the Joint Staff.123

Training

Despite the high level of support and access that the JIACG/CT maintained with the key staff and commander of USPACOM, personnel arrived to the organization largely unprepared for interagency effort. According to CDR Koehr and Ambassador Marks, military personnel and interagency personnel conducted “on the job training” rather than formalized interagency training. The personnel also learned about counterterrorism while supporting the JIACG/CT’s effort to plan and execute missions. Captain Welch, the JIACG/CT Director, allowed Ambassador Marks enormous flexibility concerning his duties and responsibilities. Because of this freedom Marks did mentor and train interagency participants and served as a bridge between the military personnel and civilian personnel assigned to the organization. This circumstance occurred because of Ambassador Marks’ seniority and individual personality and did not represent a formal arrangement instituted by policy or guidance.124

Assessment

The USPACOM JIACG/CT initially served the command by synthesizing operational intelligence to direct USPACOM finishing forces to capture or kill terrorists. This focus on short-term missions evolved into campaign planning to set conditions for counterterrorism. During its

123 Marks, Telephonic interview.
short lifespan, from 2001 to 2005 the USPACOM JIACG/CT provided the combatant commander an effective tool for planning and conducting aspects of IW. Although the organization’s title determined that most of its effort focused on counterterrorism, the inclusion of interagency partners forced the organization to consider the causes and conditions leading to terrorist activities. The JIACG/CT developed a tremendously deep appreciation for the USPACOM environment, the nation states in the USPACOM area of responsibility, and the capabilities available to the entire United States Government to combat terrorism. The headquarters in Hawaii generated strategic plans for IW in the Pacific region and supported the entire USPACOM staff with interagency capability when required. The JIACG/CT’s influence with Admiral Blair, and its access to the USPACOM Chief of Staff ensured that its GWOT products carried substantial influence. SOCPAC maintained a very close relationship with personnel in the JIACG/CT from 2001 to 2005 and used the resident interagency expertise to shape their own campaign plans. The USPACOM JIACG/CT, until its dissolution in 2005, conducted effective, well-resourced, and holistic IW planning in support of United States strategic objectives.

**USSOUTHCOM**

**Introduction**

The Joint Chiefs of Staff directed the Caribbean Command to rename itself USSOUTHCOM in August of 1962. USSOUTHCOM assumed responsibility for the region encompassing Latin America, South America and the Caribbean Islands. During the 1970s the Joint Chiefs of Staff, several Secretaries of Defense, and Presidents of the United States considered whether the Combatant Command should continue or become a smaller unified command more directly tied to United States diplomatic efforts in the region. USSOUTHCOM

126 Marks, Telephonic interview.
continued service as a combatant command placing emphasis on its role as defender of the Panama Canal, and its requirement to assist democratic nations in the region with the improvement of their military forces.\textsuperscript{127} It also demonstrated significant capability in supporting disaster relief, coordinating United States reconstruction efforts when required. Despite these significant missions, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reduced the command requirement for USSOUTHCOM from a four star billet to a three star billet and placed the command under the control of Commander and Chief Atlantic Command (CINCLANTCOM) in 1981. USSOUTHCOM faced abolishment after the passage of the \textit{Goldwater Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986} but survived because of the relationships senior military leaders within the command had established with military leaders in Latin and South American militaries.

\textbf{USSOUTHCOM JIACG History}

The USSOUTHCOM JIACG originally formed as a multi-functional advisory staff in 2003 established under the J-9 Transformation Directorate. The USSOUTHCOM Commander, GEN Bantz J. Craddock, tasked the JIACG to facilitate coordination, enhance information sharing, and integrate the planning efforts between USSOUTHCOM and the interagency community. In 2003 the JIACG consisted of one USMC Lieutenant Colonel who called interagency personnel assigned throughout the command and in Washington, DC to answer requirements from the J-9 Director. In 2004, a Northrop Grumman employee contracted to support USSOUTHCOM recommended a more substantial organization. Mr. Bruce Cheadle assumed duties as the JIACG lead planner and coordinated with his contracting office to hire another civilian, Mr. Tobey Morison. These two contractors established the operational JIACG and attempted to gain stature in the USSOUTHCOM staff. In order to maximize efficiency with limited resources, the JIACG initially met only periodically by gathering IA partners from within

\textsuperscript{127}Cole et al., 46-47.
the command to collaborate and coordinate for specific requirements. Their effort served strictly as a supporting function to the military mission in the USSOUTHCOM theater. The JIACG focused on campaign planning that met the Commander’s requirements dealing with counter narcotics, partner nation foreign internal defense, and contingency stability planning.

In 2006 the USSOUTHCOM Commander, Admiral James G. Stavridis, realized that the periodic meetings and temporary nature of the JIACG did not fulfill the Joint Staff’s intent and guidance for interagency coordination and established a more robust and permanent JIACG as part of the J-9. In 2007, Secretary of Defense Gates directed Admiral Stavridis to reorganize the entire USSOUTHCOM staff from traditional Joint Staff Sections to Functional Directorates. The J-9 Section became the Partnering Directorate, and the JIACG changed names to become the Interagency Coordination Group (IACG) under the Integration Sub Directorate within the Partnering Directorate.

Organization

The USSOUTHCOM JIACG in 2005 possessed a small cadre of active duty military personnel assigned to the command. It included four military personnel, between two and three DoD civil servants, and two Northrop Grumman sponsored contractors (Mr. Cheadle and Mr. Morison who remain in the IACG as of 2009). Part time interagency partners working with the JIACG included one representative each from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF); the Customs and Border Protection, Office of Border Patrol (CBP-OBP); the FBI; the State Department and Department of the Treasury. These representatives met only

---

129 Arnas et al., 12.
131 Ibid.
periodically depending on the requirements and needs of the agencies involved. The J3 section also detached interagency liaison officers to the JIACG to maintain staff interoperability.\footnote{Arnas et al., 13.} In 2007 the IACG established contacts with a number of interagency offices located in the Miami and south Florida region.\footnote{According to Mr. Morison the IACG works with Miami based government agencies including: Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF), Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), Department of Treasury, Secret Service, Border Patrol, United States Coast Guard, Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the DHS Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).} These interagency offices coordinated frequently with the IACG and met in the USSOUTHCOM Headquarters monthly to discuss regional concerns.\footnote{Because the USSOUTHCOM Headquarters are located in commercial office buildings in downtown Miami, near the international airport, members of the interagency community, NGOs, and NGIOs could meet with the IACG frequently and with little prior coordination.} The IACG in 2009 continued the relationships with Miami based government representatives and established permanent representation from Washington, DC based elements. In addition to governmental coordination, the IACG established dialogue with several U.S. based Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and Non-Governmental International Organizations (NGIOs) through the State Department and in coordination with DoD Migration Operations. This dialogue enabled the IACG to explore migrant camp operations that contribute to IW conditions. Standing members permanently assigned to the IACG included a senior State Department representative, a FBI field agent and analyst, a DEA planner, and a USAID representative. USSOUTHCOM solicited, but did not receive, permanent IACG participation from DHS Headquarters and DHS Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Investigations in February 2009.\footnote{Morison, Telephonic conversation.} Also in 2009, the IACG received liaison officers from other USSOUTHCOM elements specifically Special Operations Command South (SOCSOUTH), Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF-S), Joint Task Force
Guantanamo, and Joint Task Force Bravo (JTF-B) United States Army South, Marine Forces South, United States Air Force South and the United States Navy South 4th Fleet.  

Resources

In 2003, USSOUTHCOM did not allocate money to its JIACG. The Joint Staff provided all funding for the JIACG, $535,000 annually for all operating costs and salaries. This budgeting level remained constant until 2007 when Admiral Stavridis directed that USSOUTHCOM augment the IACG budget from money allocated to the Partnering Directorate. The IACG received an allocation for $2,300,000 as an operating budget in 2009. The JIACG worked initially in a small space within the J-7 office until 2007 when it received its own facilities.

Training

USSOUTHCOM in conjunction with USJFCOM hired a Joint Interagency Training Specialist (JIATS) in 2004 responsible for preparing, recording, and validating training for interagency members assigned to USSOUTHCOM. The JIATS, Mr. Gary Dekay, developed an Internet-based curriculum that introduced JIACG participants to the capabilities and functions of the elements of USSOUTHCOM and the cooperating elements of the United States Government. The training as originally developed did not reference, or mention the components of IW common to the USSOUTHCOM area of focus. The updated training, posted in 2008 also neglected IW and failed to prepare IACG members to interact with the three task forces (JIATF-S, JTF-B, and JTF Guantanamo) that report to USSOUTHCOM. The training plan received

---

136JIATF-S is the organization responsible for counterdrug missions in the USSOUTHCOM area of focus.

additional emphasis in 2009 and is in compliance with the 2009 USJFCOM Joint Knowledge Online Program\textsuperscript{138}

**Assessment**

The USSOUTHCOM IACG is the model IACG for interagency cooperation. The number of agencies who send representatives exceeds that of other combatant commands, largely because of the IACG location in Miami, the gateway to the Caribbean, Central and South America.\textsuperscript{139} These IA representatives come from local offices rather than Washington, DC offices but can coordinate policy and receive guidance from the parent organizations on behalf of the IACG. In recognition of this functionality and the support the IACG received from Admiral Stavridis, USJFCOM signed a memorandum of understanding between its headquarters and other combatant commands to direct the use of USSOUTHCOM’s IACG as a prototype for designing and structuring interagency coordination efforts.\textsuperscript{140}

Despite the IACG successful integration of interagency participants, the organization maintains limited involvement in the planning and execution of IW. The IACG priorities directed by the Partnering Director include planning for scenarios of mass migration from Caribbean nations, counterdrug and countersmuggling missions, and disaster relief. The IACG relegates IW planning to SOCSOUTH and uses the SOCSOUTH liaison officer to provide information from interagency elements when required.\textsuperscript{141} This approach supports military planning for IW with interagency capability, but ignores the possibility of developing IW plans based on capabilities from non-DoD lead organizations. The IACG maintains tremendous capacity to develop holistic

\textsuperscript{138}Morison, Telephonic conversation.
\textsuperscript{139}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{141}Morison, Telephonic conversation.
approaches to IW because of its broad range of contacts and regular members. However, it does not provide the USSOUTHCOM Commander with IW related campaign recommendations or planning. The USSOUTHCOM IACG has enormous potential to serve as an effective, well-resourced, and imaginative IW planning element if so directed and focused by the Partnering Director.

**USSOCOM**

**Introduction**

In the *Goldwater Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986*, the United States Congress mandated the creation of a Unified Combatant Command to supervise, coordinate, and direct all United States Special Operations Forces (SOF). Additional legislation enacted by Congress in 1986 and 1987 authorized the newly formed USSOCOM the ability to fund, train, and modernize the SOF from all branches of the armed forces. On 13 April 1987, the DoD activated USSOCOM and placed GEN James J. Lindsay in command of the new organization. By statute a joint organization, USSOCOM spent a large portion of the first year of its existence expanding the new headquarters and coordinating responsibilities with other agencies of the United States Government. General Lindsay also dedicated effort to meeting the command’s assigned responsibilities from the JCS Memorandum 71-87, *Mission and Functions of the US Special Operations Command*, and preparing for contingency operations.

---


143 Ibid., 8.

144 Initial USSOCOM missions included: (1) Develop SOF doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures. (2) Conduct specialized courses of instruction for all SOF. (3) Train assigned forces and ensure interoperability of equipment and forces. (4) Monitor the preparedness of SOF assigned to other unified commands. (5) Monitor the promotions, assignments, retention, training, and professional development of all SOF personnel. (6) Consolidate and submit program and budget proposals for Major Force Program 11 (MFP-11). (7) Develop and acquire special operations- peculiar equipment, material, supplies, and services.
The command evolved over the next 14 years to meet SOF-specific requirements directed by DoD and participated in operational missions including; EARNEST WILL/PRIME CHANCE I in the Persian Gulf, Operations JUST CAUSE/PROMOTE LIBERTY in Panama, and Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, in Kuwait and Iraq. The command also provided forces for PROVIDE COMFORT in northern Iraq, PROVIDE RELIEF and RESTORE HOPE UNOSOM II in Somalia, SUPPORT and UPHOLD DEMOCRACY in Haiti, and JOINT ENDEAVOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina. After the events of 11 September, 2001, USSOCOM reevaluated its procedures and role as a command headquarters. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld directed USSOCOM to develop the military’s plan to counter the international threat of terrorist organizations and authorized a $7.1 billion increase to the USSOCOM budget to support the plan. GEN Charles R. Holland, the USSOCOM Commander, increased support to Special Operations Command Central Command (SOCCENT) and Special Operations Command Pacific Command (SOCPAC) to assist their efforts in the GWOT. He also conducted an internal evaluation of USSOCOM’s headquarters and determined that additional interagency collaboration would facilitate his command’s efforts worldwide.

Three years later in March of 2005, President George W. Bush signed the 2004 Unified Command Plan (UCP) assigning USSOCOM as “as the lead combatant commander for planning, synchronizing, and as directed, executing global operations against terrorist networks in coordination with other combatant commanders.” This directive prioritized USSOCOM’s effort with other military combatant commanders but did not address the interagency

146Ibid., 15.
147Most Geographic Combatant Commands (USCENTCOM, USPACOM, USSOUTHCOM, USEUCOM) maintain Special Operations Commands as subordinate unified commands to direct Special Operations Forces missions on behalf of the CCDR.
149Ibid., 16.
relationships that would be required to prosecute the GWOT. USSOCOM as directed by the UCP commands SOF missions in special circumstances when directed. It normally serves as a force provider to the Combatant Commands and their individual Special Operations Commands (SOCs). It therefore has the unique requirement to address IW threats with a global perspective.

**USSOCOM IATF History**

In accordance with the 2004 UCP, USSOCOM established a standing interagency element comprised of military members from within the command and from other departments of the United States Government. The interagency element operated informally until 2006 when the USSOCOM Commander, GEN Bryan Brown, directed the IATF to serve as a coordinating activity within DoD and across the interagency that integrates IA efforts while also “solving discrete problem sets that support the War on Terror.”¹⁵⁰ GEN Brown directed the IATF to develop an interagency framework built on three principles, “1) the accumulation of knowledge on specific strategic problem sets; 2) the development of communities of interest in which collaboration, analysis and information sharing occurred; and 3) the linking of this knowledge, analysis and operational recommendations to decision makers across the interagency.”¹⁵¹ GEN Brown also assigned the IATF with the responsibility to support host nation governments when appropriate and placed the IATF as a component of the USSOCOM Crisis Action Planning Team in support of the command’s Time Sensitive Planning process and mission.¹⁵²


¹⁵¹Maj Lance Schmidt, Electronic correspondence with author, 14 April 2009.

¹⁵²Ibid.
Organization

Admiral Eric T. Olson, who assumed command of USSOCOM in July 2007, testified to Congress that he viewed the indirect approach to IW as the command’s highest priority “decisive effort.” He explained that the indirect approach for SOF involves changing the environment where IW threats appear and grow. He also indicated that the indirect approach requires the dedicated effort of other elements of the United States Government, specifically elements that have a long-term approach to IW including USAID among others.154 In order to fulfill the USSOCOM directed mission to “plan synchronize and as directed conduct global operations against terrorist networks,” the command began a global synchronization effort that included participation from each Geographic Combatant Commander, interagency partners, and allied nations.155 USSOCOM established three organizations that addressed IW and combined interagency efforts with military planning; the Interagency Task Force (IATF), the Center for Special Operations (CSO), the and the J-10 Section (Irregular Warfare Directorate).

Admiral Olson stated that the IATF serves as a “catalyst to rapidly facilitate CT collaboration within the U.S. government against trans-regional, functional and strategic level problem sets and opportunities.” The USSOCOM IATF received immediate support from interagency departments and established formal and informal relationships with nearly every element of the United States Government.156 The IATF consists of nearly 100 interagency personnel who serve concurrently in all staff sections and directorates within the USSOCOM structure. The numbers of permanent assigned IATF members range between twelve and fifteen


154Ibid., 6.

155Ibid., 10.

156Ibid., 11.
active duty military personnel, ten contractors, three representatives from DoS, three
representatives from DoJ, one representative from USAID, and three representatives from the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The IATF Executive director is a general officer, BG Robert
Holmes, a USAF Combat Controller. The IATF maintains a Colonel as its Director, COL Fred
Krawchuk, a Special Forces officer, and is authorized a Deputy Director, Mr. Brian Keeth who is
a GS-15, Government Civil Servant. This senior level of leadership, and consistency of civilian
presence in the leadership, ensures the IATF is able to influence other elements of USSOCOM’s
staff and can gain the USSOCOM Commander’s attention when required. The IATF is a portion
of the CSO, and the Executive Director reports to the Commander of the CSO at the same level as
the J2, J3, and J5.157

The CSO established in 2004, directs DoD synchronization efforts for the GWOT,
including development of military operations, intelligence collection, and long range planning
and strategy. Shortly after approving the CSO, GEN Bryan Brown testified to the United States
Congress that “[t]he CSO is in effect USSOCOM’s Joint Interagency Coordination Group
(JIACG).”158 The CSO also sponsors a semiannual Global Synchronization Conference that
includes participants from combatant commands, joint service headquarters, interagency partners,
and coalition militaries. The Global Synchronization Conferences allow USSOCOM to
coordinate both direct and indirect approaches to IW.159

Command (SOCOM), Telephonic conversation with author, 24 March 2009.

158U.S. Congress, Senate, Statement of General Bryan D. Brown, U.S. Army Commander, United
States Special Operations Command before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee On
Emerging Threats And Capabilities On Special Operations’ Roles And Missions (22 April 2005), 4.
2009).

159United States Special Operations Command, United States Special Operations Command
approach includes efforts to attack terrorists, terrorist resources, and terrorist support infrastructure. The
indirect approach includes enabling partners to combat terrorism, deterrence of terrorism, and erosion of
conditions that support terrorist ideology.
The J-10 Directorate developed from subtasks outlined in the IW Roadmap related to the 2006 QDR. USSOCOM assigned the J-10 Directorate the mission to coordinate “concept implementation, strategy development, plans integration and a collaborative network for the DoD and interagency to facilitate USG application of irregular warfare strategies in support of US national objectives.” USSOCOM also enabled the J-10 Directorate to interface outside the command and across the whole of government by providing wide authorizations for coordination, a significant staff, and a senior director. According to Maj Lance Schmidt, a joint planner within the IATF, “while the IATF and CSO operationalize IW, the J-10 works IW policy, structure, doctrine, and concepts.”

Resources

The USSOCOM IATF is one of the most substantially resourced staff elements within the command. USSOCOM provided the IATF with state of the art facilities when it formed the element and began to build new facilities for the IATF in 2009. The near continuous attention provided to the IATF by Congress and the USSOCOM Commanders ensured ample operating budgets and funding for outreach, recruiting, travel, and conferences. USSOCOM funds nearly all of contractor pay for the IATF from sources external to the IATF, freeing expenditures for other priorities. In addition, interagency elements from Washington, DC fund the travel and extended

---

160 United States Special Operations Command, “Irregular Warfare and Security Force Assistance Reference Sheet (v. 1-11 Jun 2008),” http://www.socom.mil/iw/Briefings/IW%20Reference%20sheet/irregular_warfare_ref_sheet.pdf (accessed 9 February 2009). Note: J-10 responsibilities include: (1) Support development and integration of DoD military concepts and capabilities for waging protracted IW on a global or regional scale. (2) Support development of Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel and Facilities (DOTMLPF) solution sets across DoD required to establish Joint Capabilities to conduct IW. (3) Support the Combating Terrorism Coordination Council, Deputy’s Advisory Working Group, QDR, etc. as required. (4) Serve as the Office of Primary Responsibility for virtual collaboration for the IW Community of Interest. (5) Serve as the chair for the Command’s Fusion Integrated Project Team on all matters involving IW.

161 Schmidt, Telephonic conversation.

162 Ibid.
participation of the non-assigned participants to the IATF. The IATF budget is not a constraining factor in its functionality.\textsuperscript{163}

Training

While USSOCOM developed a well-organized and well-resourced IATF, it failed to produce a dedicated training path to prepare both military and interagency partners to deal with IW. The command formed the IATF with personnel from several of the staff sections and allowed them to build their understanding of the interagency community through experience. The IATF is developing a USSOCOM “Interagency Handbook” to better prepare military and civilian government employees to interact with agencies of the United States government outside of the DoD.\textsuperscript{164} The IATF is also requesting assistance from the Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) at Hurlburt Field, Florida to develop a training path for IW operations and interagency collaboration.\textsuperscript{165} USJFCOM is also assisting USSOCOM through a memorandum of agreement that directs resources for joint and interagency education and training programs.\textsuperscript{166} These training programs will enhance the efforts of the IATF and enable personnel assigned to the IATF to better perform their role in support of IW.

Assessment

The USSOCOM model for integration of interagency partners into IW planning and execution is the most promising for use as a model by other commands. The CSO, IATF and J-10

\textsuperscript{163}Schmidt, Telephonic conversation.

\textsuperscript{164}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{165}Joint Special Operations University, \textit{The Link to Joint SOF Knowledge: Academic Handbook Academic Year 2009-2010} (Hurlburt Field, FL: Joint Special Operations University, 2009), 18. Note: JSOU implemented the Special Operations Forces Interagency Collaboration Course (SOFIACC) for military field grade officers, warrant officers, senior non-commissioned officers and mid-career civil service personnel from relevant government agencies who will participate in or support Special Operations as they are executed across the spectrum of conflict.

Directorate collaborate regularly, enabling the IW planners to employ all of the resources available from their interagency counterparts. The IATF maintains a small number of permanently assigned interagency partners, but forms significant dissipative groups for specific mission requirements and issues. The IATF’s regular battle rhythm ensures consistent participation from interagency partners from Washington, DC and from interagency personnel assigned elsewhere within USSOCOM. Although the J-10 Directorate itself conducts limited direct IW planning, it directly supports the IATF, reports directly to the USSOCOM CSO Commander, and has significant influence among the other staff directorates. The CSO, as a standing subordinate Joint Task Force (JTF), also interacts directly with the IATF, J2, J3, and J5 enabling the CSO Commander to execute well crafted operations, shaped by strategic thought from a broad cross section of the United States Government. The USSOCOM global mission and its worldwide authorities contribute to the interaction between the IATF and IW planners, as the USSOCOM Commander must periodically report progress in the GWOT to the Secretary of Defense. Other CCDRs have fewer global requirements that necessitate a high level of interaction between their JIACGs and staff directorates. However, the USSOCOM model of a CSO, J-10 Directorate, and well supported IATF serve as the best current model for IW planning and execution.

167Ibid.
Conclusions

This conflict is a prolonged irregular campaign, a violent struggle for legitimacy and influence over the population. The use of force plays a role, yet military efforts to capture or kill terrorists are likely to be subordinate to measures to promote local participation in government and economic programs to spur development, as well as efforts to understand and address the grievances that often lie at the heart of insurgencies.

— 2008 National Defense Strategy

Findings

The Combatant Commands and the Department of Defense have established conditions that would enable greater impact on IW planning and execution from interagency organizations. JIACGs working in the specific geographic Combatant Commands present a vehicle for a whole of government approach to IW. The organizations do face limitations and have inherent weaknesses because of their organization, training and resourcing. In light of theses weaknesses several authors have recommended suggested changes, the armed services have established IW offices to study methods of better interagency cooperation, and national leaders have expressed interest in improving theater level IW operations.

Within the DoD, each military service now has at least one IW center or directorate. The Army maintains two significant organizations that dedicate effort to IW either directly or indirectly: the Army and Marine Corps COIN Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and the USSOCOM IW Directorate at MacDill Air Force Base, Tampa, Florida. The Marine Corps established the Center for Irregular Warfare at Quantico, Virginia, in June 2007. The Navy maintains an Irregular Warfare Office at the Pentagon under its Future Operations section serving under Rear Admiral Mark W. Kinney and sponsors the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) Center on Terrorism and Irregular Warfare at Monterey, California. The Air Force established an IW Office at their Future Operations section in the Pentagon. The services IW offices could benefit from standardization of JIACG organization, resourcing, and training dealing with IW. The IW departments develop doctrine for service specific IW but have to pass the doctrine and guidance
to service schools for training, and action elements assigned to combatant commands for execution. A standardized JIACG functionality would enable better transmission of ideas into action. Standardization, enforced at the national level by the NSC or by Congressional legislation would also force all departments of the United States Government to contribute to the efforts of interagency organizations at the combatant command level.

In an article written for the Small Wars Journal Magazine in 2005, USMC Lieutenant Colonel Harold Van Opdorp recommended a uniform structure for JIACGs in unified combatant commands. He argued that the standardized structure would ensure Congressional funding for IA personnel and IA training.\textsuperscript{168} He recommended the adoption of the Stabilization and Reconstruction Civilian Management Act of 2004 as a method to formalize and mandated IA involvement JIACGs. The bill never departed committee in the Senate because of its cost to enforce, and no legislation followed that places JIACG support into law.\textsuperscript{169} This effort represents the closest attempt made by the United States Government to mandate interagency coordination from civilian agencies. Despite the national level failure to improve IW effort through legislation, the armed services are exploring new opportunities to integrate interagency partners with IW planning.

Despite evidence in favor of standardizing interagency organizations, Ambassador Marks maintained that formalization for JIACGs could hurt their effectiveness. He stated that the structure, manning, and focus for the JIACG should be determined exclusively by the CCDR,


\textsuperscript{169}Senator Richard Lugar, a Republican from Indiana, introduced this bill on 25 February 2004. It went to committee, and the committee reported the bill to the United States Senate, but the Senate did not vote on the bill. The Congressional Budget Office estimated the bill would cost the United States Government more than 550 million dollars over five years if implemented. Representative Sam Farr a Democrat from California re-introduced the bill in February 2008 and it passed in the House of Representatives in March 2008, but the Senate again refused to vote on the legislation. (http://govtrack.us at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h110-1084 (accessed 11 March 2009).
allowing greater flexibility and responsiveness. During his tenure with the USPACOM JIACG/CT Ambassador Marks and the JIACG Director, U.S. Navy Captain Rodger Welch, resisted all efforts from USJFCOM to standardize the JIACG construct across the combatant commands.\textsuperscript{170}

**Recommendations**

In the introductory chapter to a December 2008 collection of Strategic Studies Institute essays, editor Gabriel Marcella explained that “[i]t is an iron rule of the interagency that no national security or international affairs issue can be resolved by one agency alone” (emphasis in the original).\textsuperscript{171} He applied his statement to national efforts by the United States Government and operational efforts undertaken by combatant commanders. His assertion confirmed the requirement for well structured, competently trained, and fully resourced interagency organizations at the operational level of warfare. Because of the likelihood of continued conflict with non-state actors and asymmetric threats as outlined by the 2008 National Defense Strategy, the interagency organizations should prepare to plan for and conduct IW.

Combatant Commanders should retain the ability to organize their joint interagency organizations to meet the unique requirements found in their area of responsibility. Because Combatant Commanders cannot direct participation from interagency partners, they must have a method for gaining critical support through formal, rather than strictly informal measures. The National Security Council should stipulate a minimum slate of interagency partners that must send representatives to combatant commands. The formation of this slate would allow United States Government departments to plan to support the requirements with personnel and adjust

\textsuperscript{170}Marks, Telephonic interview.
\textsuperscript{171}Marcella, 25.
their assignment process accordingly. Congress should introduce legislation to formalize the requirement within Title 10 of U.S. Code in Chapter 6.

Combatant Commanders should explore the structure adopted by USSOCOM for their IW requirements. The establishment of a J-10 IW Directorate that coordinates with an Interagency Task Force, and supports a standing JTF equivalent, the CSO, enabled the USSOCOM Commander to anticipate, plan for, and adapt to IW requirements throughout the globe. Combatant Commanders with regional focus could adopt the same structure by maintaining their JIACGs and establishing an IW Directorate to coordinate and synchronize the IW missions habitually handled only by the theater SOCs. The addition of a directorate or staff section in proximity to the standing interagency organization will enhance holistic approaches to IW challenges.

Not only do Combatant Commanders require personnel from the appropriate agencies configured in collaborative organizations, they need personnel who are trained to excel in the interagency environment and are equipped to face IW conflicts. USPACOM, USOUTHCOM, and USSOCOM do not maintain effective standing JIACG training programs. The Contingency Planning Policy Coordination Committee of the National Security Council directed the National Defense University (NDU) to serve as the lead agent for interagency training and education. In accordance with the guidance, the NDU is “developing an educational program for US government executives, in the area of multi-Agency and Department planning and coordination for overseas emergencies.” The NDU program, named Interagency Training Education and After Action Review (ITEA) focuses training and education programs for both national interagency participants and theater level members of JIACGs.¹⁷² The ITEA program, initiated in 2002 and

funded through 2010 received limited support from non-DoD interagency partners.\textsuperscript{173} The State Department initiated its own interagency training and education program under \textit{The Department of State and Agency for International Development Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years 2004 to 2009}. The document established a plan to provide, train, and fund State Department and USAID participation in interagency organizations. However, the \textit{Strategic Plan} did not outline the requirement to train personnel to prepare for IW.\textsuperscript{174} Congress should mandate required participation in NDU or State Department sponsored education and training and ensure that the curriculum enhances operational level interagency coordination and IW planning.

The United States Congress can also influence IW proficiency among interagency organizations through funding. Congress should allocate specific funding to support JIACG operating budgets, training, and facilities. By placing regular funding in appropriations legislation, Congress could regulate that all departments of the United States Government contribute to the national security effort without risking significant portions of their individual budgets. These monies could also incentivize participation by increasing funding for critical required participants from smaller United States Government departments. Funding should also be supplemented by an expansion in budget for increase manning for non-DoD governmental departments. One component of the increase in personnel authorizations should be the establishment of a type of Trainees, Transients, Holdees and Students (TTHS) account for each department of government. This TTHS account would allow the departments to send members to training with the interagency community, as well as serve in assignments with interagency partners without compromising their own mission critical manning requirements.


\textsuperscript{174}Marcella, 42.
Topics for Additional Research

Several items emerged during the preparation of this study that bear additional research. One item is the study of possible greater interagency coordination at theater Special Operations Commands (SOCs). SOCs plan and conduct IW as a directed task and could employ interagency participation to focus on theater specific IW challenges. The IA members at each SOC could coordinate with combatant command level IA representatives and coordinate with senior department leaders in Washington, DC. This potential course of action requires additional IA participation from an already depleted pool of participants. SOCs could at a minimum increase their representation at combatant command JIACGs with more senior liaison officers.

Another topic for additional research is the inclusion of NGOs within JIACGs. Combatant command level interagency organizations should explore the possible contributions NGOs, NGIOs, and Nongovernmental Humanitarian Organizations (NGHOs) could provide in their IW efforts. The delicate balance of understanding NGO capabilities and leveraging them for IW activities without compromising their nongovernmental affiliation is challenging. The NGOs themselves are wary of direct affiliation with any type of warfare, regular or irregular. However, the numerous organizations spread in theaters of operation have capabilities and access that in some cases government agencies cannot match. JIACGs could include liaison officers from the main NGOs in their areas of operation. This “comprehensive approach” could exceed the benefits provided by a “whole of government” approach.

A third subject that merits additional study is the controversial nature and definition of IW itself within the interagency community. The interagency organizations at the combatant commander level need to improve their ability to plan and execute IW. The organizations also must define the term more clearly to their non-DoD participants. The difficulties in defining IW reside in the military services as well as at the combatant command level. The DoD, as the proponent of the concept of IW, must more carefully define the concept of IW and outline where
IW sits in the military’s full spectrum operations profile and how a comprehensive government approach to IW can accomplish national strategies. The 2007 IW JOC is a starting point, not a final resolution to the subject. The March 2009 establishment of USJFCOM’s Joint Irregular Warfare Center (JIWC) with the mission to develop the next version of the IW JOC is evidence of this requirement.

The recommendations provided in this paper do require additional resources, personnel, and changes in parochial perspectives concerning national security. All three of these challenges are significant, but funding will likely be the immediate impediment to better interagency coordination at the Combatant Command level in support of IW. Secretary of Defense Gates addressed the United States Congress concerning funding on 27 January 2009, after the inauguration of President Barack Obama. He explained to Congress his desire to support the President by managing the DoD budget carefully. He stated that reform requires that we close the yawning gap between the way the defense establishment supports current operations and the way it prepares for future conventional threats. Our wartime needs must have a home and enthusiastic constituencies in the regular budgeting and procurement process. Our procurement and preparation for conventional scenarios must, in turn, be driven more by the actual capabilities of potential adversaries, [emphasis added] and less by what is technologically feasible given unlimited time and resources.¹⁷⁵

Secretary Gates appropriately solicited Congress for responsible fiscal assistance later in his remarks. He should also request Congressional assistance through the form of legislation to fund, and thus initiate significant progress for interagency efforts at the Combatant Command level in order to prepare U.S. forces to defeat the potential adversaries found in IW. Presidential directives and DoD policy can influence the whole of government, but Congressional legislation will provide lasting change in an area in need of lasting improvement.

# APPENDICES

## Appendix A: Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFDD</td>
<td>Air Force Doctrine Document</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCDR</td>
<td>Combatant Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CI</td>
<td>Counter Insurgency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBP-OBP</td>
<td>Customs and Border Protection, Office of Border Patrol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Center for Special Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CT</td>
<td>Counterterrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DoD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FBI</td>
<td>Federal Bureau of Investigations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM</td>
<td>Field Manual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMFM</td>
<td>Fleet Marine Field Manual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GW</td>
<td>Guerrilla Warfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GWOT</td>
<td>Global War on Terror</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IA</td>
<td>Interagency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IACG</td>
<td>Interagency Coordination Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IATF</td>
<td>Interagency Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICE</td>
<td>Immigrations and Customs Enforcement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITEA</td>
<td>Interagency Training, Education and After Action Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IW</td>
<td>Irregular Warfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J2</td>
<td>Joint Intelligence Section</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J3</td>
<td>Joint Operations Section</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J35</td>
<td>Joint Future Operations Section</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J5</td>
<td>Joint Plans Section</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCS</td>
<td>Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JIACG</td>
<td>Joint Interagency Coordination Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JIATF</td>
<td>Joint Interagency Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JIATS</td>
<td>Joint Interagency Training Specialist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JIWC</td>
<td>Joint Irregular Warfare Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOC</td>
<td>Joint Operating Concept</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOE</td>
<td>Joint Operating Environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JP</td>
<td>Joint Publication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSOU</td>
<td>Joint Special Operations University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIC</td>
<td>Low Intensity Conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCIP</td>
<td>Marine Corps Interim Publication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCWP</td>
<td>Marine Corps Warfighting Publication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDS</td>
<td>National Defense Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDU</td>
<td>National Defense University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCTC</td>
<td>National Counterterrorism Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Nongovernmental Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGHO</td>
<td>Nongovernmental Humanitarian Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGIO</td>
<td>Nongovernmental International Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPS</td>
<td>Naval Postgraduate School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSPD</td>
<td>National Security Presidential Directive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNSR</td>
<td>Project on National Security Reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSD</td>
<td>Presidential Security Directive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QDR</td>
<td>Quadrennial Defense Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOC</td>
<td>Special Operations Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOCCENT</td>
<td>Special Operations Command CENTCOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOCSOUTH</td>
<td>Special Operations Command SOUTHCOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOCPAC</td>
<td>Special Operations Command PACOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOF</td>
<td>Special Operations Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWJ</td>
<td>Small Wars Journal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSC</td>
<td>Theater Security Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSOC</td>
<td>Theater Special Operations Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TTHS</td>
<td>Trainees, Transients, Holdees and Students</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCP</td>
<td>Unified Command Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAFRICOM</td>
<td>United States Africa Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USCENTCOM</td>
<td>United States Central Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USEUCOM</td>
<td>United States European Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USPACOM</td>
<td>United States Pacific Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSOCOM</td>
<td>United States Special Operations Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USMC</td>
<td>United States Marine Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USMCTEC</td>
<td>United States Marine Corps Training and Education Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UW</td>
<td>Unconventional Warfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WOT</td>
<td>War on Terror</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix B: DoD Directive 3000.07

Department of Defense

DIRECTIVE

NUMBER 3000.07

December 1, 2008

USD(P)
SUBJECT: Irregular Warfare (IW)

References:  
(d) DoD Directive 5160.41E, “Defense Language Program (DLP),” October 21, 2005  
(e) DoD Directive 5144.1, “Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration/DoD Chief Information Officer (ASD(NII)/DoD CIO),” May 2, 2005

1. PURPOSE. This Directive:

   a. Establishes policy and assigns responsibilities for DoD conduct of IW and development of capabilities to address irregular challenges to national security in accordance with Reference (a).

   b. Requires that any conflicting issuances be identified to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) and the OSD Director, Administration and Management.

2. APPLICABILITY. This Directive applies to OSD, the Military Departments, the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities within the Department of Defense (hereafter referred to collectively as the “DoD Components”). The term “Military Services,” as used herein, refers to the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps.

3. DEFINITIONS. See Glossary.

4. POLICY. It is DoD policy to:

   a. Recognize that IW is as strategically important as traditional warfare. Many of the capabilities and skills required for IW are applicable to traditional warfare, but their role in IW can be proportionally greater than in traditional warfare.

   b. Improve DoD proficiency for IW, which also enhances its conduct of stability operations. Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense
shall be prepared to conduct across the full range of military operations in accordance with DoD Directive 3000.05 (Reference (b)).

c. Conduct IW independently of, or in combination with, traditional warfare.

   (1) IW can include a variety of steady-state and surge DoD activities and operations: counterterrorism; unconventional warfare; foreign internal defense; counterinsurgency; and stability operations that, in the context of IW, involve establishing or re-establishing order in a fragile state.

   (2) While these activities may occur across the full range of military operations, the balance or primary focus of operations gives a campaign its predominant character.

d. Explicitly integrate concepts and capabilities relevant to IW across all DoD activities including doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF); policy; analysis; exercises; experiments; and applicable strategies and plans.

e. Maintain capabilities and capacity so that the Department of Defense is as effective in IW as it is in traditional warfare in order to ensure that, when directed, the Department can:

   (1) Identify and prevent or defeat irregular threats from state and non-state actors across operational areas and environments.

   (2) Extend U.S. reach into denied areas and uncertain environments by operating with and through indigenous foreign forces.

   (3) Train, advise, and assist foreign security forces and partners at the ministerial, service, and tactical levels to ensure security in their sovereign territory or to contribute forces to operations elsewhere.

   (4) Through direct or indirect means, and on a large scale when required, support a foreign government or population threatened by irregular adversaries.

   (5) Create a safe, secure environment in fragile states and, if required, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure restoration, and humanitarian relief.

   (6) To meet Combatant Commander (CCDR) objectives, conduct other related activities abroad, including: strategic communication; information, psychological, civil-military, intelligence, and counterintelligence operations; and support to law enforcement.

f. Establish mechanisms and authorities to increase DoD effectiveness in operating with and through foreign security partners.

g. Establish and sustain manpower authorizations, personnel policies, and organizational structures to provide sufficient capacity and expertise in both the DoD civilian workforce and Military Services to conduct activities in support of IW.
h. Synchronize appropriate DoD IW-related activities with the efforts of other U.S. Government agencies, foreign security partners, and selected international organizations by supporting:

(1) Collaborative policies, plans, and procedures, including collaborative training and exercises that promote interoperability, for steady-state and surge activities.

(2) Integrated civilian-military teams for steady-state and surge activities, and lead them if civilians are unable.

(3) Information strategies and operations to neutralize adversary propaganda and promote U.S. strategic interests.

(4) Exchange programs and rotational assignments that build DoD understanding of the functions and structures of other relevant organizations.

(5) Efforts to enhance information sharing, as appropriate, to increase situational awareness of irregular challenges.

i. Develop investment strategy guidance to address capability and capacity for IW-related activities and operations.

5. RESPONSIBILITIES. See Enclosure.

6. RELEASABILITY. This Directive is approved for public release. Copies may be obtained through the Internet from the DoD Issuances Web Site at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives.

7. EFFECTIVE DATE. This Directive is effective immediately.

Enclosure
   Responsibilities
   Glossary
RESPONSIBILITIES

1. USD(P). The USD(P) shall:

   a. In conjunction with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, incorporate IW-relevant concepts into strategic planning documents. Recommend to the Secretary of Defense DoD priorities for policy, concepts, analysis, capabilities, and investment strategies relevant to IW.

   b. In coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)), Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)), and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, incorporate knowledge from social and behavioral science disciplines into the development of DoD strategies and plans.

   c. Advance the development and implementation of whole-of-government strategies for both steady-state and surge activities, and oversee DoD contributions to those efforts. In coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CCRDs, and interagency partners, develop:

      (1) Organizational concepts to employ civilian-military teams, including their command and control relationships, composition, resourcing, and interoperability for steady-state and surge activities.

      (2) Policies and plans to promote a secure environment overseas and build the interoperable capacity of partners to address irregular security challenges.

   d. In coordination with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CCRDs, and interagency partners, advance the development and implementation of whole-of-government global and regional information strategies to counter adversary propaganda and advance U.S. strategic interests.

   e. In coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and CCRDs, develop policy guidance and priorities for DoD capabilities and programs tailored to train, advise, and assist foreign security forces and partners at the ministerial, service, and tactical levels to ensure security in their sovereign territory or to contribute forces to operations elsewhere.

2. ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS/LOWINTENSITY CONFLICT AND INTERDEPENDENT CAPABILITIES (ASD(SOLIC&IC)). The ASD(SOLIC&IC), under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(P), shall:

   a. Serve as the principal civilian advisor to the Secretary of Defense for IW and, in conjunction with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, provide overall policy oversight to ensure that the Department of Defense maintains capabilities and capacity so that it is as effective in IW as it is in traditional warfare.

   b. In coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E), develop sufficiency standards for IW-related activities for the U.S. Armed Forces and assess Military Department force planning for a range of steady-state and surge IW scenarios.
3. USD(I). The USD(I) shall:

   a. Maintain standards and guide the development of capabilities and capacity for persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance and assessment of operational areas and environments that may serve as safe havens for irregular threats.

   b. Advance intelligence and information partnerships with interagency and international partners, as appropriate, to identify and prevent or defeat irregular threats from state and nonstate actors across operational areas and environments.

   c. In accordance with strategic guidance documents, improve all-source collection to identify irregular threats from state and non-state actors. Ensure timely information dissemination from the strategic to the tactical level, recognizing that IW places particular reliance on releasable products to facilitate working with foreign security partners.

   d. Manage the development of appropriate analytical intelligence models, tools, and data to provide intelligence support to U.S. Armed Forces for IW.

   e. Incorporate into intelligence products information derived from social and behavioral science sources in the public and private sectors.

   f. Project activity patterns on a regional and global scale for analyzing both friendly and adversary human networks through modeling and simulation capabilities.

   g. In conjunction with the CCDRs, prioritize capabilities to identify, locate, track, and target adversary networks, cells, and individuals in order to neutralize their influence and operational capacity.

   h. Promote intelligence and counterintelligence career paths that attract and retain the quantity and quality of personnel with IW-relevant skills, in coordination with the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (USD(P&R)).

4. USD(P&R). The USD(P&R) shall:

   a. Establish policies to enable DoD-wide tracking of military and civilian personnel with skills and experience relevant to IW, including foreign language, regional expertise, and experience or expertise in training, advising, and assisting foreign security forces and institutions.

   b. Establish policies for joint and combined training and exercises that meet CCDR IW related requirements and promote interoperability with relevant U.S. departments and agencies and multinational civilian and military organizations in accordance with DoD Directive 1322.18 (Reference (c)).

   c. In conjunction with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretaries of the Military Departments, annually assess the sufficiency and readiness of civilian and uniformed personnel to meet CCDR IW-related requirements.

   d. In conjunction with the Secretaries of the Military Departments, recommend incentive programs such as focused recruitment, bonuses, specialty pays, promotion incentives, and quality of life programs to attract and retain personnel with IW-related skills.
e. In conjunction with the USD(P), Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Secretaries of the Military Departments, coordinate opportunities for DoD military and civilian personnel to contribute or develop knowledge, skills, and experience relevant to IW by undertaking rotational assignments or exchange tours of duty with U.S. Government agencies, foreign security partners, and selected international organizations, and by participating in non-DoD education and training programs.

f. In coordination with USD(I) and the Secretaries of the Military Departments, create opportunities for DoD personnel to develop foreign language proficiency and cultural knowledge commensurate with the Intelligence Community’s assessment of current and emerging threats to national security in accordance with DoD Directive 5160.41E (Reference (d)).

5. USD(AT&L). The USD(AT&L) shall work with the Secretaries of the Military Departments and other DoD Components to include validated IW-related requirements in the acquisition programs of record and rapid acquisition efforts.

6. ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR NETWORKS AND INFORMATION INTEGRATION/DoD CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER (ASD(NII)/DoD CIO). The ASD(NII)/DoD CIO shall, in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and CCDRs, annually set priorities for enhancing command and control and communication architectures to support steady-state and surge IW-related activities, and facilitate interoperability with interagency and indigenous partners in accordance with DoD Directive 5144.1 (Reference (e)).

7. DIRECTOR, PA&E. The Director, PA&E, shall:

a. Annually assess, track, and make recommendations to the Secretary of Defense regarding the distribution of risk among program elements that support activities and missions related to traditional and irregular warfare, based on priorities established in strategic guidance documents.

b. With the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and in coordination with DoD Components, manage the development and use of appropriate analytical models, tools, and data to support the analysis of the U.S. Armed Forces for IW.

8. SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS. The Secretaries of the Military Departments shall:

a. Maintain military capabilities and track the capacity and proficiency of the Military Services to meet CCDR IW-related requirements in accordance with strategic guidance documents.

b. Maintain scalable organizations to train and advise foreign security forces and security institutions (unilaterally or as part of civilian-military teams) in permissive and uncertain environments.

c. Maintain expeditionary units organized, trained, and equipped that, when directed, are able to provide civil security, restore essential government function, repair key infrastructure necessary to government function and to sustain human life, and reform or rebuild indigenous security institutions until indigenous, international, or U.S. civilian personnel can do so.
d. Ensure curricula in individual and unit training programs and Military Department schools prepare personnel for IW. Ensure all Service schools develop appropriate education and training programs and courses, reflecting joint and Military Department IW-relevant doctrine.

e. Establish through designation at the Military Department and/or Service level, as appropriate, a representative accountable for discharging the responsibilities delineated in this Directive.

9. CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall:

a. Serve as the principal military advisor to the Secretary of Defense for IW and, in conjunction with the ASD(SO/LI&IC), provide oversight to ensure that the U.S. Armed Forces maintain the capabilities and capacity so that they are as effective in IW as they are in traditional warfare.

b. Direct joint education and annual training, exercises, concept development, and experimentation to ensure the U.S. Armed Forces are prepared to plan, conduct, and sustain campaigns involving IW-related activities and operations, including:

   (1) Counterterrorism operations, foreign internal defense, unconventional warfare, counterinsurgency, and stability operations.

   (2) Strategic communication; information, psychological, civil-military, intelligence, and counterintelligence operations; and support to law enforcement.

   (3) Sustained operational and intelligence preparation of the environment.

   (4) The integrated operations of interagency and multinational civilian and military organizations to support a foreign government or population threatened by irregular adversaries.

   (5) Operations with and through foreign security forces to achieve objectives through IW-related activities.

c. Identify and validate DOTMLPF capability gaps with IW applications and coordinate with appropriate capability developers to mitigate shortfalls.

d. In conjunction with CCDRs and the Secretaries of the Military Departments, maintain universal joint tasks for mission-essential tasks that support IW-related activities and operations.

e. Incorporate IW-related concepts into joint doctrine in coordination with the CCDRs and the Secretaries of the Military Departments.

f. Annually assess proficiency and readiness of the U.S. Armed Forces to conduct activities necessary to implement CCDR campaign and contingency plans related to IW. Incorporate the assessment into the annual risk assessment.

10. COMMANDERS OF THE COMBATANT COMMANDS. The Combatant Commanders shall:
a. Identify IW-related requirements for steady-state and surge campaigns.

b. Incorporate IW-related concepts into military training, exercises, and planning.

c. Advise ASD(SO/LIC&IC) and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on capacity and capability requirements to implement theater campaign and contingency plans relevant to IW.

d. Recommend DOTMLPF changes to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command (CDRUSJFCOM), Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command (CDRUSSOCOM), and the Secretaries of the Military Departments to implement best practices across the U.S. Armed Forces.

11. CDRUSSOCOM. In addition to the responsibilities listed in section 10, the CDRUSSOCOM shall:

a. Assist the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff by coordinating the development of those aspects of special operations forces (SOF) doctrine relevant to IW. Contribute to the integration of SOF-general purpose forces (GPF) IW-relevant doctrine with CDRUSJFCOM, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Secretaries of the Military Departments.

b. Lead the development of SOF IW-relevant training and education standards for individuals and units with USD(P&R), the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Secretaries of the Military Departments.

c. Develop SOF capabilities for extending U.S. reach into denied areas and uncertain environments by operating with and through indigenous foreign forces or by conducting low visibility operations.

d. Submit an annual assessment of SOF proficiency and readiness for IW to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

12. CDRUSJFCOM. In addition to the responsibilities listed in section 10, the CDRUSJFCOM shall:

a. In coordination with CDRUSSOCOM and the Secretaries of the Military Departments:

   (1) Assist the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff by leading the collaborative development of joint IW-relevant doctrine.

   (2) As part of the joint concept development and experimentation program, explore new concepts and capabilities so that the U.S. Armed Forces are as effective in IW as they are in traditional warfare.

   (3) Recommend mechanisms and capabilities for increasing interoperability and integration of SOF and GPF in IW-related activities.

b. Lead the collaborative development of joint standards for GPF IW-relevant training and readiness for individuals and units with USD(P&R), the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Secretaries of the Military Departments.
c. Assist USD(P&R) in identifying tracking requirements for critical skills and experiences relevant to IW.

d. With CCDRs and the Secretaries of the Military Departments, lead the identification of joint IW-relevant capabilities and recommend priorities for capability development to ASD(SOLIC&IC) and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

e. In conjunction with the Secretaries of the Military Departments, submit an annual assessment of U.S. Armed Forces’ GPF proficiency and readiness for IW to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
GLOSSARY

DEFINITIONS

Unless otherwise noted, these terms and their definitions are for the purposes of this Directive.

civilian-military teams. Temporary organizations of civilian and military personnel specifically task-organized to provide an optimal mix of capabilities and expertise to accomplish specific operational and planning tasks, or to achieve objectives at the strategic, operational, or tactical levels. Civilian-military teams may conduct both overt and clandestine operations.

counterinsurgency. Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency.

counterterrorism. Operations that include the offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, preempt, and respond to terrorism.

direct means. Meeting security objectives through the U.S.-led application of military power.

foreign internal defense. Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.

indirect means. Meeting security objectives by working with and through foreign partners.

irregular warfare. A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s). Irregular warfare favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capacities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will.

security forces. Duly constituted military, paramilitary, police, and constabulary forces of a state.

stability operations. An overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.

traditional warfare. A form of warfare between the regulated militaries of states, or alliances of states, in which the objective is to defeat an adversary’s armed forces, destroy an adversary’s war-making capacity, or seize or retain territory in order to force a change in an adversary’s government or policies.

unconventional warfare. A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes, but is not limited to, guerrilla warfare, subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and unconventional assisted recovery.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books


Congressional Testimony


Electronic Sources


Government Documents


**Interviews**

Escandon, Joseph, MAJ. Personal Interview by author regarding the IW Road Map. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 17 February 2009.

Kelly, Daniel, COL, Director, USMC Center for Irregular Warfare, Quantico. Telephonic interview by author. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 9 February 2009.

Koehr, Brian D., CDR, Deputy Director of the USPACOM JIACG. Telephonic interview by author. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 30 September 2008.

Marks, Edward, Ambassador, Senior Fellow with the School of Public Policy, Program on Peacekeeping Policy, at George Mason University. Telephonic interview by author. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 16 February 2009.

Miller, Zachary, MAJ “Personal Interview by author regarding the IW Road Map. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 17 February 2009.


———. Telephonic conversation with author, 17 February 2009.


———. Electronic correspondence with author, 14 April 2009.
Journal Articles


Monographs


Stoff, Karen D., Major. “Strategic Planning and Joint Interagency Coordination Groups.” Research Report, Air Command and Staff College, Air University, 2006.


Newspaper Articles


Speeches
