
A Monograph
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The purpose of this monograph is to show that US counterinsurgency doctrine would benefit from greater emphasis on social, cultural, and political aspects of the operating environment, using the case of the Maoist insurgency in Nepal as an example. In approximately 12 years, from 1996 to 2008, the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) waged an insurgency against the Nepalese government and gained majority rule through free elections.

The Nepalese government failed to form a coherent strategy to address the root social and economic causes of the conflict. Thw primary lesson of the conflict for US military planners is that the counter-insurgent must understand the social and cultural aspects of the environment that drive politics, motivate insurgents, and determine popular support. Without a thorough understanding of the environment, any military, economic, or political effort is likely to have unintended effects and unlikely to solve the core problems. The US Army need improvement in institutionalizing the application of social and cultural knowledge into operational and strategic planning.

## Subject Terms
Nepal; Nepalese Army; Insurgency; Counterinsurgency; Maoist Insurgency; Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)

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Abstract


The purpose of this monograph is to show that US counterinsurgency doctrine would benefit from greater emphasis on social, cultural, and political aspects of the operating environment, using the case of the Maoist insurgency in Nepal as an example. The concept of fourth generation warfare provides context with its focus on the application of political, economic, and social networks in modern conflict. In approximately 12 years, from 1996 to 2008, the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), or CPN(M), waged an insurgency against the Nepalese government and gained majority rule through free elections. The Maoists, following Mao Zedong’s theory of people’s war, achieved a military stalemate against the Nepalese Army and negotiated a political settlement with the parliamentary parties that effectively ended the monarchy and resulted in a major electoral victory. Despite training and material support from the US, UK, and India, the Nepalese Army was unable to prevail in its counterinsurgency campaign. The Nepalese government failed to wage a coherent strategy to address the root social and economic causes of the conflict. The government relied on military and law enforcement to solve a problem that was rooted in social and political tensions. Power struggles between the monarchy and the parliament as well as among the political parties undermined the legitimacy of the Nepalese government and allowed the Maoists to win the support of the populace. The CPN(M) won the most seats in the April 2008 elections and took control of a coalition government, with the former Maoist leader, Pushpa Kamal Dahal, as Prime Minister. The new government faces challenges in integrating former combatants with the Nepalese Army and in satisfying former insurgent allies who still have unfulfilled agendas.

The implications of the Maoist insurgency in Nepal for US counter-insurgency doctrine pertain to emphasis on certain ideas rather than requiring anything new. The primary lesson of the conflict is that the counterinsurgent must understand the social and cultural aspects of the environment that drive politics, motivate insurgents, and determine popular support. Without a thorough understanding of the environment, any military, economic, or political effort is likely to have unintended effects and unlikely to solve the core problems. While FM 3-24 mentions this requirement to understand the environment, the US Army needs improvement in institutionalizing the application of social and cultural knowledge into operational and strategic planning.

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Introduction

The purpose of this monograph is to show that US counterinsurgency doctrine requires greater emphasis on social, cultural, and political aspects of the operating environment, using the case of the Maoist insurgency in Nepal as an example. The Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) (CPN(M)) defeated the government of Nepal in a twelve-year insurgency starting in 1996, with the Maoists gaining control of the government by way of free elections in April 2008. The successful Maoist insurgency has implications for US counterinsurgency doctrine that suggest a need for a better understanding of the socio-cultural and political factors that motivate insurgency. While current US doctrine for counterinsurgency serves as a point of departure, there is too little emphasis on understanding the environment. In Nepal, neither the host government, nor US supporters had a firm enough grasp of the situation. While the government focused on a military solution, the Maoists grew in strength by out-governing the government and building a solid popular base. After achieving a military stalemate, the CPN(M) transitioned from violent guerilla action to political maneuvering by exploiting fissures between the parliamentary parties and the monarchy. A key to Maoist success was its ability to mobilize dissatisfied classes and ethnic groups. The government of Nepal was unable to gain or maintain the support of the people because of political upheaval, repressive tactics, and failure to solve social issues. US and other foreign training and material support to Nepal were helpful militarily, but insufficient because they did little to address the political, social, and economic problems unique to Nepal.

Despite military assistance, education, and training from the US, Nepalese security forces were unable to defeat the insurgency decisively. Neither the government nor the security forces ultimately understood the environment well enough to address the core problems. The US military, like the Nepalese Army, faces challenges in understanding the cultures of host nations and adversaries. US counterinsurgency doctrine, as articulated in US Army Field Manual 3-24/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency, stresses gaining legitimacy
and mentions that understanding the environment is important for gaining intelligence, but still lacks a comprehensive explanation of the role of cultural expertise.¹

In December 2006, the US Army and Marine Corps published Field Manual 3-24/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5, *Counterinsurgency* to establish doctrine for counterinsurgency operations in the contemporary operating environment. The Army and Marine Corps published FM 3-24 in the context of the “Global War on Terrorism” with a specific focus on operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. FM 3-24 is a compilation of tactics, techniques, and procedures, other doctrinal sources, and theorists such as Mao Zedong and David Galula. The Preface states that it is for leaders at the battalion level and above. It further warns that the manual “is not intended to be a standalone reference. Users should assess information from other sources to help them decide how to apply the doctrine…to the specific circumstances facing them.”² The writers acknowledge that given the complexity and changing characteristics of counterinsurgency operations, FM 3-24 is incomplete. Professional journals such as *Military Review* and discussions on the Battle Command Knowledge System (BCKS) serve as forums for updating counterinsurgency methods. A case such as Nepal, where insurgents adapted Maoist strategy to the conditions of their country, illustrates the difficulty of formulating a counterinsurgency strategy in a challenging political environment with limited means.

From 1996 to 2008, Maoists in Nepal achieved a military stalemate, established a peaceful political agreement, and gained majority rule of the government.³ Nepal, situated between India and China, suffers from extreme poverty, economic stagnation, social oppression,

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and a legacy of political turmoil. Ethnic and linguistic divisions separate the country into three distinct cultural areas with approximately 32 languages. The Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) grew from the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist) in 1995 and declared a “people’s war” against the government of Nepal in 1996. The goals of the CPN(M) were to establish a Maoist people’s republic, end Indian imperialism in Nepal, eliminate the caste system, and stop ethnic, religious, and linguistic exploitation. Until 2008, the Nepalese government was a constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary system. The Nepalese government struggled to establish democracy as power alternated between the monarchy and the political parties. The police force and Royal Nepalese Army (RNA) struggled to control a country with insufficient personnel and equipment, inadequate training, poor integration of agencies, and little infrastructure. Following Maoist doctrine, the CPN(M) established support in the remote, impoverished areas where poor infrastructure limited government reach. Starting in 1996 the CPN(M) waged guerilla warfare against the government of Nepal, specifically attacking officials, the police force, and after 2001, the RNA. The insurgents transitioned to


mobile warfare in November 2001, escalating violence after the failure of negotiations. While establishing a counter-state in the base areas where the government had no control, the Maoist developed the strategy of “Prachanda Path,” to overthrow the government form its center in the capital. In 2005, King Gyanendra assumed direct rule, but reinstated the parliament after mass protests in 2006. In 2006, the CPN(M) ended the insurgency through peace talks and subsequently joined the government by way of legal political means. The CPN(M) won the largest share of seats in the April 2008 parliamentary elections. In June 2008, King Gyanendra stepped down, Prime Minister Koirala resigned, and in August 2008, Pushpa Kamal Dahal, leader of the CPN(M), became Prime Minister. Over a decade of violence ended with Maoist victory, not by military means alone, but through a political settlement.

The CPN(M) leveraged military, political, and social means to prevail. The government response focused on police and military tactics without strong enough political, economic, or social efforts. The social, political, and economic aspects of the Nepalese insurgency fit the construct of Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW), a concept that William S. Lind first conceived in the 1980’s to describe what he viewed as the evolution of war. 4GW brought modern warfare from emphasis on fire and maneuver to increased importance of political, social, and economic ideas. Lind posits that modern irregular warfare employs 4GW concepts. Thomas X. Hammes, author of The Sling and the Stone, takes Lind’s concept of fourth generation warfare further,

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devoting a chapter describing Mao as the first true practitioner of 4GW. Mao’s theory of people’s war, says Hammes, emphasizes the primacy of politics and integrates social and economic strategy over military means. He further explains that no force has ever defeated an adversary employing 4GW by using third or second generation strategies.  

Application of the 4GW model to Nepal shows that while the Maoists effectively approached political and social problems, the Nepalese government and security forces were either inept or lacked capability in this respect. The police initially attempted to approach the insurgency using law and order tactics while the army later focused on counter-terrorism without well-constructed lines of effort in the political, economic, or social areas. Although the RNA received some training and doctrinal assistance from US and other advisors, they had neither the means nor the requisite parliamentary support to wage an effective campaign. The Nepalese government, and the Nepal Congress party in particular, failed to recognize the political strength of the Maoists and the importance of social issues among the populace. Thus, the Maoist victory in the April 2008 elections came as a surprise to the political parties. The Maoists themselves did not anticipate the scope of their electoral win.

**History of the Maoist Insurgency in Nepal**

The political environment in Nepal is one of constant struggle for power. This struggle takes place among the political elites in Kathmandu with an impoverished countryside as a backdrop. The broken economy of Nepal is a major source of dissatisfaction among the people.

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But a repressive, traditional social structure has provided the spark to move people to action when compounded with perceived political injustice.

From 1846 until 1951, the Rana court ruled Nepal.20 The Ranas imposed a Hindu caste system, with Khas (Chetri) and Bahuns (Brahmins) as the leaders. Starting in 1936 and through the 1940’s, political parties formed and existed in opposition to the monarchy. The Nepali Congress Party (NCP) and the Communist Party of Nepal (CPN) formed in India and finally overthrew the Rana regime in 1951 with the support of members of the disgruntled Rana elite to include Shah King Tribuvan.21 By 1959, Nepal had its first elections with the NPC winning the majority of the votes. The change to democracy did not last long. King Mahendra dismissed the congress in 1960 citing a breakdown in law and order and failure of the government to overcome political bickering. Mahendra declared multi-party democracy unsuited for Nepal and banned political parties. In 1962, the king established “Panchayat,” a party-less, pseudo-democratic system of government with the King remaining the real center of power. Under the new constitution, Nepal became a Hindu state with Nepali as the national language. The parties went underground in opposition to exclusivity, lack of accountability, and suffering development.22 The country suffered economically and socially under the Panchayat system until April 1990, when the Nepali Congress Party (NC) and the United Left Front (ULF) led a people’s movement for democracy and human rights.23

The movement brought change to a bicameral parliamentary system and by November 1990, Nepal had a new constitution and the King became nominally less powerful. The NC became the dominant party, with the Communist Party of Nepal - Unified Marxist-Leninist,

23 Ibid., 3.
CPN(UML), as the largest party. Throughout the 90s, the parties clamored for control of the parliament with a multitude of coalitions grappling for power until the NC gained a solid hold on power in 1999. Michael Hutt illustrates the political chaos: “Between 1995 and 1999, some half a dozen different coalitions came to power…and the popular perception quickly spread that the political parties were interested only in clinging to power, and that their leaders were taking every opportunity to feather their nests before they were ousted by the next incongruous coalition…”

The popular perception that politicians were acting in their own interests rather in those of the country provided fuel for those who sought a deeper change. Ethnic and disadvantaged groups hoped that the reestablishment of democracy would provide an opportunity to correct the domination by upper castes and elites. Various groups formed parties to seek representation and promote their ethnic and cultural interests with goals to reverse the Panchayat linguistic and religious policies. But the new government saw the demands of these special interest groups as a threat and marginalized them. Just as the Chhetri and Brahmin castes had dominated under Panchayat, the elites took charge of the new democratic government with little concern for the people outside Kathmandu. Missing the opportunity to represent the people in a truly democratic fashion, the parliament rekindled popular resentment of perceived social injustice and lack of economic opportunity.

Meanwhile, the left coalition in Nepal had split into multiple factions as the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), CPN(M), emerged and in September 1995 adopted a plan for people’s war. The police subsequently conducted “Operation Romeo” in the district of Rolpa in

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25 Ibid., 4.
27 Ibid., 77-79.
November 1995, treating Maoist activity there as a law and order problem rather than a potential insurgency. Dr. Baburam Bhattarai, Chairman of the Central Committee of the United People’s Front, addressed the “40 point Demand Presented by Maoist” to Prime Minister Deuba on February 4, 1996. When the NC-led coalition failed to respond, the CPN(M) announced people’s war.29 The list of 40 demands includes calls to end intrusion and domination of foreign elements in Nepal; for formation of a secular state free of discrimination and oppression; to strip the monarchy of its privileges; and for a wider range of welfare provisions and social and economic reforms.30 The demands outline what the communists perceived as the economic, political, and social problems in Nepal with desired solutions to address each. The preamble points out that Nepal was the second poorest country in the world and on the verge of bankruptcy because of reliance on foreign loans and a trade deficit. It also blames “economic and cultural encroachment” by foreign elements, accusing India in particular. The list of demands also points to a wealth gap and blames political parties for seeking power and engaging in aggrandizement at the expense of the people. The demands fall into three categories. The first nine are labeled “Concerning nationality,” the second 17 under “people’s democracy,” and the final 14 under “livelihood.”31 Dr. Bhattarai included a deadline of February 17, 1996 for the government to show “positive indications towards” progress on answering the demands. But Prime Minister Deuba did not take the Maoists seriously and gave the demands little attention. On February 13, 1996, the CPN(M) officially began “people’s war.”32

The 40-point list outlines the demands of the CPN(M) to the government, but may not give a complete representation of all the Maoists’ goals. Deepak Thapa suggests the demands were a distraction and that the Maoists had decided to start their attacks on February 13 regardless how parliament received them.\(^{33}\) Thapa provides an analysis of economic, political, and social factors that motivated the Maoists to wage people’s war. The government’s failure and the Maoist source of strength were in the neglected rural areas. Economically, Nepal was unsuccessful in development. The corruption and class separation that had characterized the Panchayat system drained the country economically and socially. Politically, antagonism and power struggles between the parties in parliament exacerbated the problem. Thapa explains that the Nepali Congress chose not to look closely at the underlying structural problems that fed the insurgency. The NC instead blamed extremism and “political conspiracies.”\(^{34}\)

The Maoist insurgency began with attacks on police stations in Rolpa, Rukum, and Sindhuli districts. The Army was initially not involved. From 1997 until 2001, the government responded with repressive police actions while the Maoists continued to conduct guerilla attacks against police while expanding their base of support.\(^{35}\) In May 1998, the police conducted operation “Kilo Sierra 2.” Because of indiscriminate police violence against the population, Kilo Sierra 2 backfired and ultimately had the effect of pushing many of the people over to the Maoists. In 1999, the government formed the Committee to Provide Suggestions to Solve the Maoist Problem with little result.\(^{36}\) In February 2001, the Maoists announced a change in

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\(^{34}\) Ibid., 72,73.

\(^{35}\) Ibid., 85-87.

\(^{36}\) Ibid., 90-95.
strategy, adopting “Prachanda Path” at the party national conference adding urban and political efforts to the guerilla campaign in the countryside.  

In June of 2001, Prince Dipendra massacred the royal family and shot himself, killing King Birendra and leaving the throne to Prince Gyanendra. Conspiracy theory and investigation into what actually happened had further destabilizing influence on the government. In July of 2001, the Maoists and the government agreed to a ceasefire and began the first peace talks in August. Talks broke down in November as the two parties failed to agree on key issues. The Maoists subsequently resumed attacks, to include the first attack on an Army barracks. On November 26, 2001, the parliament declared a state of emergency, curtailed fundamental rights, and declared the CPN(M) a terrorist organization. This allowed the RNA to mobilize domestically for the first time in the conflict. In April, the parliament passed the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Control & Punishment) Bill. The September 11 attacks in the US influenced Nepal’s decision to label the Maoists as terrorists and turn international opinion against the insurgency, and perhaps to make it easier to obtain security assistance. 

In October 2002, King Gyanendra fired the prime minister, postponed elections, and assumed executive authority. This caused dissention within the government while providing fuel

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for the Maoists claims against the government. On January 29, 2003, the parties agreed to another ceasefire. From March to August 2003, the parties engaged in peace-talks, but returned to fighting at the end of August. Fighting continued until September 2004 when the Maoists declared a ceasefire. In April 2004, the political parties joined in increased opposition to the king’s executive control. The Maoists, meanwhile, held elections in districts under their control, replacing the state in every aspect of governance. Peace talks and fighting continued with a three-month ceasefire beginning in September 2005 followed by an agreement between the seven major political parties and the Maoists in November 2005. In 2006, peace talks continued with a final agreement in November of 2006.

The agreement included provisions to draft a new constitution and form a constituent assembly, satisfying two of the CPN(M)’s major demands. In March of 2007, the Maoists joined the interim government and formally registered as a political party. In April 2008, the CPN(M) won the most seats in the election of the constituent assembly. In June and July of 2008, Prime Minister Koirala resigned and King Gyanendra relinquished his throne. Finally, in August 2008, Pranchanda became Prime Minister of Nepal.

Nepal in the Context of Fourth Generation Warfare

The initial refusal of the Nepali Congress to examine the underlying problems that fueled the Maoist insurgency reflects an unwillingness to acknowledge the connection between armed

conflict and political, economic, and social grievances. William Lind’s concept of fourth
generation warfare provides a model for analyzing how the Maoists, starting with a small group
of communist political elites, were able to mobilize a large base, challenge the government
militarily, and defeat the government politically.46

Lind et al. explain their model of generations of warfare based on changes in technology
and ideas. The first generation included the tactics of line and column and provided order to the
battlefield after introduction of the smoothbore musket. The second generation was a response to
introduction of the rifled musket, breech-loaders, barbed wire, machine guns, and indirect fire.
Second generation warfare emphasized fire and movement and use of massed fire, though still
fundamentally linear. Lind states that third generation warfare, unlike the first and second, was
idea-driven, employing nonlinear maneuver tactics in response to increasing firepower. Fourth
generation warfare is less dominated by the technology. It shares certain qualities with the third
generation in terms of decentralization and maneuver. But fourth generation warfare, according
to Lind, combines technology and ideas, employing characteristics of terrorism and guerilla war.
Lind adds that fourth generation warfare may also employ a “non-national or transnational base,
such as ideology or religion,” “attack on the enemy’s culture…from within as well as without,”
and “highly sophisticated psychological warfare, especially through manipulation of the
media.”47 In a later article, Lind further explains the importance of culture, legitimacy, and the
problem of using second and third generation forces to fight an enemy without a state.48

46 William Lind, Colonel Keith Nightengale (USA), Captain John F. Schmitt (USMC), Colonel
Joseph W. Sutton (USA), and Lieutenant Colonel Gary I. Wilson (USMCR), “The Changing Face of War;
Into the Fourth Generation,” reprinted from the Marine Corps Gazette in Global Insurgency and the Future
of Armed Conflict: Debating Fourth Generation Warfare, Terry Terriff, Aaron Karp, and Regina Karp, ed.,


Colonel Thomas X. Hammes develops Lind’s concept of fourth generation warfare further, emphasizing the use of political, economic, and social as well as military networks to influence political decision makers. Hammes argues that while the United States tends to focus on high technology, cyber-war, and information dominance, current and likely future enemies are not likely to fight to US strengths. Hammes calls Mao the first to practice fourth generation warfare in the form of insurgency since he viewed the Chinese revolution as a political struggle for the “goodwill” of the people. He states further, “Mao, like Clausewitz, understood that war is fundamentally a political undertaking” and that political mobilization is the most fundamental condition for winning. Hammes discusses Mao’s three phases: strategic defensive, strategic stalemate, and strategic offensive in terms of an effort to shift the balance of power by leveraging internal and external networks, starting with the innovation of people’s war:

His emphasis on building a firm political base among the masses of people and using that political power to slowly wear down an enemy’s superior military power was an innovation of the first order…Mao counted heavily on political maneuvering to change the “correlation of forces” both internal and external to China…Mao strove to develop both internal and external networks to support his revolution.

The external networks consisted of international propaganda and diplomacy while internal networks focused on building and controlling the communist base through party groups. Maoist strategy leverages political and social networks to gain the support of the people.

On a strategic level, Hammes argues that fourth generation warfare practitioners leverage political, economic, social, and military networks to “directly defeat the will of the enemy

50 Ibid., 208.
51 Ibid., 51.
52 Ibid., 52, 53.
leadership.” Operationally, Hammes talks about messages. He says the planner must ask what message to send, what networks are available, what types of messages the networks are best suited to carry, what actions will cause the networks to send the message, and what feedback systems will tell whether the intended message has been received. Tactically, Hammes discusses 4GW in a “complex environment of low-intensity conflict.” In terms of timelines, organizations, and objectives, Hammes warns that planners should focus on long-term political viability rather than short-term tactical effectiveness. 4GW enemies can accept tactical and operational setbacks in pursuit of long-term shifts in the political will of their adversaries.

Lind and Hammes provide valuable insights for helping to understand modern insurgency. The fourth generation warfare model fits the situation in Nepal. The government of Nepal attempted to fight the insurgency through military means with insufficient consideration for the political, economic, and social problems that led to the rise of the Maoists. While the police and the army tried to suppress the insurgency with force, the government was unable to address the basic needs and unwilling to address the social grievances of the people. Meanwhile, the Maoists were able to exploit the deep political fissures between the parliamentary parties and the monarchy. The Maoists ultimately leveraged popular anger with the dictatorial monarch into a political agreement with political parties. The violent insurgency motivated the king to take power from the democratic parties. In turn, the parties mobilized against the king while the people protested against both. The Maoists took advantage of popular discontent to undermine the monarchy and make an alliance with the parties in order to solve the very problem they had created. The government, unable to act coherently from a political perspective, was able only to

54 Ibid., 215, 216.
55 Ibid., 219.
56 Ibid., 221, 222.
apply military force. But the Maoists did not need a military victory to win the insurgency. Once the government was in political disarray, the Maoists message seemed to be the best choice to answer the demands of the people.

**The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal**

The CPN(M) approach to insurgency was protracted popular war, following Mao Zedong’s theory. Just as Mao adapted Marxist-Leninist thought to the unique conditions of revolution in China, the Maoists adapted their strategy to the situation in Nepal. The insurgent strategy for mobilization also took advantage of ethnic and caste identity. The Maoist approach was therefore a composite of the protracted popular war and the identity focused approached, although Mao’s theory of protracted war was the primary foundation for the CPN(M) strategy.57

Thomas Marks, in his book, *Maoist People’s War in Post-Vietnam Asia*, provides a concise outline of Mao’s five essential lines of operation for taking power from the state. He also provides analysis with respect to how the Nepalese Maoists employed Mao’s lines. The five lines include mass line, united front, violence, political warfare, and international action.58 The mass line consists of building a base of support by constructing a counter-state to address the grievances and hopes of the population. The united front includes allying with groups that share common interests in order to strengthen the mass base. Groups included in a united front may include other insurgent elements or legal entities that can participate in political processes openly. Violence is the armed action of insurgency. Mao further divides armed action into three phases: strategic defensive, strategic stalemate, and strategic offensive. The insurgency transitions from

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58 Marks, *Maoist People’s War in Post-Vietnam Asia*, 2007, 7,8; Marks explains that Mao never articulated his theory specifically in terms these five lines, but Marks uses these “essential components” to form a framework for analysis; Thomas Marks, 24 August 2008, email message to author.
one phase to the next as it gains strength. The party builds its mass base during the strategic
defensive, relying mostly on guerilla tactics. As it gains strength with respect to the state, the
insurgency moves to strategic stalemate, employing regular forces in mobile warfare as well as
guerilla units. When the insurgent strength exceeds that of the state it can transition to the
offensive using regular forces to seize and hold terrain. Concurrent with armed action is political
warfare. Political action includes negotiations and legal action to undermine the enemy.
International action includes engagement with other state or non-state actors to place pressure on
the state and provide support to the insurgents. The Nepalese Maoists employed these lines of
operation to undermine the Nepalese government.

Mass Line

Mao wrote of his five lines, as with most of his theory, in the context of war against
Japan. He learned and subsequently employed his strategy of protracted war fighting the Chinese
Nationalists. Thomas Marks defines Mao’s mass line: “Organizing an alternative society through
the construction of clandestine infrastructure, that is, a counter-state. Local socio-economic
grievances and aspirations are to be addressed by cadre, who then connect solutions to the party’s
political mechanism…The approach seeks a mass base.” FM 3-24 defines the mass base as
consisting “of the followers of the insurgent movement – the supporting populace.” The mass
line is what connects the grievances of the people to the goals of the party. Mao explains in his
writings that the establishment of base areas is “important and essential because of the protracted
nature and ruthlessness of the war.” Mao explains that the base areas sustain guerilla operations

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59 Marks, Maoist People’s War in Post-Vietnam Asia, 7-14.
60 Ibid., 7.
62 Mao Zedong, “Problems of Strategy in Guerilla War Against Japan,” (May 1938) in Selected
Military Writings of Mao Tse-Tung (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute), 167.
and allow party cadre to expand support. He describes the base areas as analogous to a “rear area” for guerilla forces: “They are the strategic bases on which the guerilla forces rely in performing their strategic tasks and achieving the object of preserving and expanding themselves and destroying and driving out the enemy…guerilla warfare could not last long or grow without base areas.”63 Mao goes on to explain that the base areas are primarily for building an armed force, and are additionally for arousing the people to action. He also describes the importance of economic conditions in the base area, emphasizing the importance of equal distribution of financial burdens and protection of commerce.64 In Nepal, the CPN(M) used Mao’s concept of base areas as a blueprint for building their own mass line.

To support a strategy of protracted war, the Maoists established their initial base areas among the Kham Magars in the remote western provinces of Rolpa and Rukkum where poverty was severe and the reach of the government weak. The CPN(M) needed to recruit, train, and equip an army. According to Thomas Marks, the party took advantage of the disaffected dalits, or untouchable caste, in the hill tribe areas.65 The Maoist message appealed to people who felt the government had done nothing to help them. Deepak Thapa explains that the “Maoists found fertile grounds” in the western hill areas which had seen little development.66 The communist cadre provided promise of relief from structural economic, social, cultural, and political inequalities. Michael Hutt explains that the Maoist operational strategy was to “banish the state” and gradually encircle the towns and cities.67 Tactics included political indoctrination of villagers and armed attacks on government officials and police posts. The Maoist objective with respect to establishing the base areas was replacement of state institutions with people’s governments,

64 Ibid., 174.
65 Marks, Maoist People’s War in Post-Vietnam Asia, 303, 310.
beginning with at the local level and eventually expanding into districts. The government response was repressive, further driving villagers to the Maoists. By mid 2000, the Maoists gained considerable strength in the countryside, filling a vacuum that the government left. The Maoists staged rallies and used propaganda to bolster their efforts. Two states existed, with government maintaining district positions while the Maoist counter-state controlled much of the countryside. The strength of the CPN(M) in the countryside eventually allowed them to a stable base from which to influence Kathmandu through political action and mobilization of people in the urban areas.

**United Front**

A united front of various factions that share common interests gives strength to the overall cause and additional power to the mass base. Marks describes the united front as “making common cause with those individuals and groups who share concerns but not necessarily goals.” Mao’s “Anti-Japanese United Front” was necessary to “persevere in the War of Resistance” and to “arouse the full initiative and enthusiasm of the entire army and the entire people in the fight…and so win final victory.” Mao recognized that the core party faithful did not have the strength to win without help. Likewise, the Maoists in Nepal were initially small enough to receive little attention from the government.

The Maoists allied with other factions of the communist party and leveraged the grievances of different groups, not all of which were communist. Ethnic, regional, and tribal groups as well as those concerned with educational and class issues mobilized under the


Prior to initiating people’s war, the communists disbanded the United People’s Front and replaced it with a “revolutionary united front.” Thapa outlines the importance of the united front to the CPN(M): “…without broad-based mass support, the battle against the state was not believed to be possible…” Prachanda, in a 1998 issue of *The Worker*, pronounced that though the people’s war, “oppressed nationalities,” such as the Magars, Gurungs, Tamangs, Newars, Tharus, Rais, Limbus, and Madhesis were gaining fighting for their own rights. He also championed the rebellion of dalits against the “feudal state of high caste Hindus.” In this respect, the Maoist insurgency took on a populist tone through the united front based on diverse socio-cultural interests. The grievances of these groups fit somewhat naturally with the aims of the communists. The common enemy was a self-serving state apparatus that had perpetuated an unjust caste system and had failed to bring development or freedom to the population.

**Violence**

When the CPN(M) initiated people’s war, it was relatively small and not widely known. At the start, the Maoists were ill-equipped and outnumbered. But Mao had provided a strategy through his three phases of insurgency: “The first stage covers the period of the enemy’s strategic offensive and our strategic defensive. The second stage will be the period of the enemy’s strategic consolidation and our preparation for the counter-offensive. The third stage will be the period of our strategic counter-offensive and the enemy’s strategic retreat.” The first, strategic defensive, describes the initial strategy when the insurgents are weak. The

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strategic defensive includes small-scale guerilla action and recruitment to expand the base of support. When the insurgents gain enough strength, they can transition to strategic stalemate. During strategic stalemate, the insurgents achieve military parity with the government forces in some areas and can conduct larger scale raids. When the insurgents become stronger than the state, they transition to the strategic offensive. During the strategic offensive, the insurgents use conventional operations with regular troops to defeat the government forces.\textsuperscript{76}

The Maoists use of armed action grew over the course of the conflict, following Mao’s theories. From 1996 until 2001, the Maoists fought according to the strategic defensive, expanding their base and conducting small guerilla actions against the police and government institutions.\textsuperscript{77} The CPN(M) transitioned from strategic defensive to strategic stalemate, or “strategic balance,” in 2002 after the announcement of “Prachanda Path.”\textsuperscript{78} They never truly transitioned to the strategic offensive. After the entry of the Royal Nepalese Army into the counterinsurgency after the 2001 declaration of emergency, the Maoists never achieved military dominance. Instead, the CPN(M) achieved military stalemate with the army and concluded the insurgency through peace-talks once political conditions shifted in their favor after King Gyanendra’s 2005 seizure of political power.\textsuperscript{79}

At the start of the strategic defensive, the Maoists were weak and had a small following. Weapons and equipment were in short supply. The guerillas relied on captured weapons from the raids on police stations to arm their new force. Meanwhile, the communist cadre recruited new membership. As Krishna Hachhethu describes, the Maoist plan of action during the strategic

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{76} Field Manual 3-24: Counterinsurgency, 1-6.
\footnote{79} Paul Moorcraft, “Revolution in Nepal: Can the Nepalese Army Prevent a Maoist Victory?” \textit{RUSI Journal} 151, No.5 (October 2006): 45.
\end{footnotes}
defensive was to 1) disarm the local people, 2) kill certain public individuals (thugs, exploiters, and informants), 3) target banks, NGO’s, and IGO’s, 4) attack police stations, and 5) establish their own governments at the local and eventually district levels. The Maoists cycled through six plans in the course of strategic defensive. The first plan for initiation of the insurgency in 1996 called for 80% publicity, 15% destruction, and 5% “other” activities. The second plan, covering the period from March 1996 until June 1997, included eliminating selected enemy, capturing weapons, and developing guerilla-zones. The third plan, covering June 1997 through approximately June 1998, increased guerilla action, developed capability to eventually fight the RNA, and increased political pressure. The fourth plan, starting in October 1998, called for wide scale coordinated attacks against the police and government institutions. The fifth plan, starting in August 1999, included expanding the base areas, destruction of police, and larger scale coordinated attacks. The sixth plan, covering July 2000 until February 2001, called for an increase in guerilla action and an attack on the district headquarters at Dunai.

At the Second National Conference of the CPN(M) in February 2001, the Maoists announced “Prachanda Path.” Prachanda Path, borrowing from Sendero Luminoso in Peru, deviated from communist fundamentalism and the Maoist construct in order to adapt to the Nepali context. It was a fusion of the Chinese model of protracted people’s war in villages and towns and the Russian model of general armed insurrection to expand the base and move towards a people’s government in the center. The Maoists adopted a three-in-one strategic framework

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for revolution consisting of the party, the revolutionary united front, and the people’s army.83
The aim of the CPN(M) was to use people’s war to expand the base in the villages and instigate
revolt at the urban government center in Kathmandu. The Maoists encircled the city from the
countryside.84 The Maoists recognized Kathmandu as the political center of gravity for Nepal. A
successful insurgency would have to include action against the heart of the government. With the
government declaration of emergency in 2001, the Maoists increased direct attacks against the
RNA. The insurgency escalated in scale and violence as the government began to treat the
Maoists as a terrorist threat rather than a law enforcement challenge. The Maoists also realized
that in strict adherence to people’s war, the CPN(M) had missed opportunities for shortening the
insurgency through political engagement.85 The new strategy included engaging in peace talks.
Between 2001 and 2005, the Maoists conducted their most violent and large-scale attacks while
engaging in several rounds of negotiation. The strategic stalemate phase ended in 2005 with a
political agreement rather than with a transition to strategic offensive.86 While both the NA and
the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), now officially named as the military arm of the CPN(M),
can subsequently claim victory if they arrange the facts to serve their respective arguments, the
ultimate result of the 2006 political agreement was a big Maoist win in the 2008 elections to the
constituent assembly.

86 John Mackinlay, “Nepal’s Transition to a Post-Insurgency Era,” *RUSI Journal* 152, No.3 (June
Political Warfare

Mao describes political warfare directed against the enemy as aimed at “destruction of the unity of the enemy.”\textsuperscript{87} Thomas Marks describes political warfare as non-violent methods of undermining enemy morale or “engaging in negotiations as an adjunct to violence.”\textsuperscript{88} The CPN(M) was successful in manipulating the government and taking advantage of natural rifts. By concentrating action against the police for the first half of the insurgency from 1996 until 2001, the Maoists exacerbated the perceived separation between the police forces who were connected to the political parties in parliament and the Royal Nepali Army which served the King. The tension between the parliamentary parties and the King was another leverage point for the Maoists, particularly after the 2001 massacre of the royal family and Gyranendra’s subsequent takeover of executive power. The Maoists also targeted the political parties unequally, attacking members of the Nepali Congress while leaving the opposition CPN(UML) relatively untouched.\textsuperscript{89}

On a local level, political mobilization was a major component to solidifying Maoist control of local areas in the countryside. The CPN(M) established People’s Governments where the insurgents had pushed the state out. They created a system of economic self-sustainability, small farm cooperatives, taxation, and land redistribution. They also pushed for socio-cultural changes, replacing the old order with a new communist culture.\textsuperscript{90}

The Maoists repeatedly stated their desire to resolve the conflict with a political solution. But, as Marks describes, such statements could be deceptive since the Maoist aim was to


\textsuperscript{88} Marks, \textit{Maoist People's War in Post Vietnam Asia}, 8.

\textsuperscript{89} Paudel, “The Price of Maoist Insurgency and Political Violence in Nepal,” 1-33, 34; Thapa, \textit{A Kingdom Under Siege; Nepal's Maoist Insurgency, 1996 to 2004}, 31, 32.

\textsuperscript{90} Sharma, “The Maoist Movement; an Evolutionary Perspective,” 45,46.
“negotiate the terms whereby the old order will disassemble itself.” The CPN(M) twice followed negotiations in the name of “peace” with major offensives. The breakdown of talks in 2001 preceded the first attacks against RNA targets while the talks in August 2003 ended with a major Maoist offensive. It was through negotiations with the Seven Party Alliance (SPA) in 2005 that the Maoists eventually achieved much of what they had sought, to include provisions for election of a constituent assembly and redrafting of the constitution. The old order essentially disassembled itself by allowing the CPN(M) to join the government as a legal entity and eventually win majority rule by way of a peaceful democratic process.

**International Action**

The CPN(M) is a member of The Revolutionary Internationalist Movement (RIM) and the Co-ordination Committee of Maoist Parties and Organizations of South Asia (CCOMPOSA). The RIM is an organization of revolutionary parties committed to Marxism-Leninism and Maoist thought. The CCOMPOSA is a similar grouping of Maoist parties inaugurated in June 2001 specific to South Asia. Both serve as forums for political statements and expression of ideology. Neither provided direct material support to the CPN(M), but provided outlets for political expression as well as avenues to influence other nations to not support the Nepalese government.

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92 Ibid., 324, 325.
A significant international relationship for the CPN(M) was with communist supporters inside India. The Maoists used India as a safe haven and conducted training in camps with Indian communists. Prior to 2001, the Indian government also quietly tolerated the Nepalese communist presence within its borders despite the Maoists’ view of India as an enemy. India viewed Nepal as a buffer with China and resisted foreign intervention in the conflict while, for a time, working with both sides. After 2001, however, the Indian government ceased its passive tolerance of the newly labeled Maoist “terrorists” and provided aid to the RNA until Nepal’s declaration of emergency rule raised concerns over the impairment of democracy.

Although it followed Maoist doctrine, the CPN(M) did not develop strong ties to China during the insurgency. The party has sought financial support from the People’s Republic of China only after Pushpa Kamal Dahal’s ascendance to the Prime Minister position in 2008. During the insurgency, although the Maoists tried to improve their relationship with China in order to counter the stated threat from India, the CPN(M) considered China to have departed from Maoist principles while the PRC officially considered the Nepalese Maoists to be a rogue entity and even offered some support to the government.

The Maoists adapted Mao’s theory to Nepal’s unique conditions. The introduction of the “Prachanda Path” strategy accelerated Maoist success and allowed the CPN(M) to exploit the political fissures between the parties and the monarchy. The Maoists also benefited from the government’s inability to govern the people in the interior of the country. Whether the CPN(M)

97 Sharma, “The Maoist Movement; an Evolutionary Perspective,” 42.
can succeed as the new ruling party will depend on its ability to address the social, economic, and political needs of the various disaffected groups.

**Government of Nepal Counterinsurgency Strategy**

While Maoist skill in waging insurgency contributed to their eventual success, internal political, economic, and social challenges to the Nepalese government’s counterinsurgency effort were as much a factor in the outcome. The government of Nepal failed at counterinsurgency because it failed to address effectively the root social and economic causes of the conflict. The most critical mistake was in ignoring the social problems that plagued the country and gave fuel to the insurgency. While the Maoists placed ethnic and cultural dissatisfaction at the center of their strategy, the government lost popular support by ignoring complaints of disadvantaged ethnic groups and castes, conducting overly repressive operations that indiscriminately targeted uncommitted civilians.\(^{101}\) As a result, the population increasingly sided with the Maoists. Chaotic, adversarial internal politics and an overly military counterinsurgency strategy contributed to the government’s inability to gain popular support or retain what little it had.\(^{102}\)

Popular support is the key terrain for which the insurgent and the counterinsurgent grapple. After his own deployment to Iraq, John Nagle writes in the preface to an updated edition of his book, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife*, “…the task of winning and keeping the support of the population is far more complex than I had understood.”\(^{103}\) Nagle draws from British experience, saying, building relationships and cultural awareness helps produce actionable

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\(^{102}\) Mackinlay, “Nepal’s Transition to a Post-Insurgency Era,” 42.

intelligence. But good intelligence is not the only objective. David Galula’s book, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*, discusses popular support as “the objective” for both the counterinsurgent and the insurgent. For the counterinsurgent, popular support is critical to driving the enemy from an area. FM 3-24 calls legitimacy the government’s objective: “The primary objective of any COIN operation is to foster development of effective governance by a legitimate government.” The difficulty is in formulating an effective strategy to win the population in a given environment. The counterinsurgent’s challenges are to first, determine what, given the specific context, drives popular support and second, to balance military force with political, economic, social, and other efforts. The Nepalese government and security forces failed to balance their approach and were therefore unable to restore effective governance.

While the initial political and law enforcement response to the Maoist insurgency may have been inappropriate, the Nepalese Army eventually developed sound counterinsurgency doctrine with help from American and British advisors. The NA counterinsurgency manual takes into account the three dominant cultures of Nepal and geographical regions (plains, hills and urban, and mountains). But despite the manual’s cultural specificity, the Army could not implement it effectively without grounding in a coherent political strategy from the government. The Army’s readiness for counterinsurgency was questionable in 2001 when it first joined the


106 The importance of context refers to Mao’s explanation of the uniqueness of revolution to a particular situation, as in China: Mao Zedong, “Problems of Strategy in China’s Revolutionary War,” in Combat Studies Institute, *Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-Tung* (Fort Leavenworth: Command and General Staff College, 2007) 77-79, 92, 93.

107 The Nepalese COIN manual, published approximately 2005, contains comprehensive tactical and operational doctrine as well as a chapter on theory and strategy. One chapter also includes a section on cultural intelligence, civic action, and public relations. Dr. Felix Moos retains a draft copy of the manual at the University of Kansas.
police in battling with the insurgents.\textsuperscript{108} By 2005, however, the army had fought the Maoists to a military stalemate. Once the CPN(M) achieved stalemate with the army, the transition to a political agreement with the political parties obviated the Army’s efforts.\textsuperscript{109} Since the Army had focused primarily on military force, it contributed very little if anything to winning back popular support. The Army’s traditional allegiance to the maligned king further undermined its ability to influence the political environment, especially after the April 2006 protests.\textsuperscript{110}

The violence of the insurgency precipitated by both sides further strained the socio-economic situation. Narendra Raj Paudel writes that the long-term costs in terms of lost governance, human rights, economic, and socio-cultural impacts outweigh the measurable economic and infrastructure costs. He reports that the insurgency and counterinsurgency directly affected 23 million lives, broke down social and communal bonds, spread insecurity and fear, disrupted education, transformed cultural affairs, and has created a crisis in land distribution.\textsuperscript{111} Blame rests with both sides. But without a workable solution from the government or the Army, the people looked to the Maoists, who had the initiative and were willing to address ethnic and social grievances. In gaining and retaining popular support, the CPN(M) had the advantage.

David Galula and FM 3-24 both emphasize popular support and legitimacy. Analysis of Nepal’s counterinsurgency effort with respect to Galula’s theory and US doctrine highlights the weaknesses in Nepal’s strategy. The case of Nepal likewise reveals the limitations of US doctrine regarding cultural specificity in counterinsurgency.

In his chapter on counterinsurgency in the “hot revolutionary war,” Galula lists four laws. The first deals with the support of the population, the second with the need for an active minority

\textsuperscript{108} Thapa, \textit{A Kingdom Under Siege: Nepal’s Maoist Insurgency, 1996 to 2004}, 136; the army did, however, have extensive peacekeeping experience under the auspices of various UN missions.
\textsuperscript{109} Mackinlay, “Nepal’s Transition to a Post-Insurgency Era,” 42-46.
\textsuperscript{110} Moorcraft, “Revolution in Nepal: Can the Nepalese Army Prevent a Maoist Victory?” 46.
\textsuperscript{111} Paudel, “The Price of Maoist Insurgency and Political Violence in Nepal,” I-48, 49.
in support of the counterinsurgent, the third with the conditional nature of support, and the fourth with the importance of means and effort.112

The first law, “The Support of the Population is as Necessary for the Counter-insurgent as for the Insurgent,” emphasizes that the support of the population is critical for both sides.113 Galula explains that for tactical success to last, the counterinsurgent must defeat the insurgent’s advantage with respect to the population:

The problem is, how to keep an area clean so that the counterinsurgent forces will be free to operate elsewhere. This can be achieved only with the support of the population. If it is relatively easy to disperse and expel the insurgent forces from a given area by purely military action, if it is possible to destroy the insurgent political organizations by intensive police action, it is impossible to prevent the return of the guerilla units and the rebuilding of the political cells unless the population cooperates. The population, therefore, becomes the objective…Its tacit support, its submission to law and order, its consensus…have been undermined by the insurgent’s activity. And the truth is that the insurgent, with his organization at the grass roots, is tactically the strongest of opponents where it counts, at the population level. This is where the fight has to be conducted…114

Galula indicates that the population ultimately decides who will govern. The insurgents have an advantage working at the local level unless the counterinsurgents can supplant them. While the RNA was able to dominate certain areas and start some development projects, political upheaval worked against military progress while development was on too small a scale to make a difference.115 The Army had some success, but never gained enough support from the majority of the population. Although many Nepalis had no particular desire to become communists, in the end the Maoists either provided a better alternative or were more effective at coercion.

At the start of the insurgency, Nepal was an example of failed development and bad governance. State withdrawal from the insurgency area only made it more difficult for the government to gain support from the population. Police repression and a singular focus on

113 Ibid., 74.
114 Ibid., 75.
security operations drove the population further from the state.\textsuperscript{116} The government made several attempts to reassert control. In December 1999, the Nepali Congress introduced the Integrated Security Programme (ISP), adding political campaigns and development packages to the counterinsurgency strategy. Later versions of the strategy included military components targeted on the Maoist-controlled areas of Rolpa, Rukum, Salyan, Kalikot, Jajarkot, Gorkha, and Pyuthan. While the ideas of political and development efforts were a step in the right direction, execution was weak. The Maoists were able to block or co-opt most of the government work.\textsuperscript{117}

The second law, “Support is Gained Through an Active Minority,” addresses the problem of mobilizing a segment of the population against the insurgents.\textsuperscript{118} Galula explains what he views as a basic tenet of political power in terms of winning the neutral population to the supporters: “\textit{In any situation, whatever the cause, there will be an active minority for the cause, a neutral majority, and an active minority against the cause.} The technique of power consists in relying on the favorable minority in order to rally the neutral majority and to neutralize or eliminate the hostile minority.”\textsuperscript{119} The problem for the counterinsurgent is identifying and mobilizing supporters and having an “acceptable counter-cause.” Galula adds a principle regarding victory in counterinsurgency warfare, saying victory is not just “destruction in a given area of the insurgent’s forces and his political organization,” but “\textit{A victory is that plus the permanent isolation of the insurgent from the population, isolation not enforced upon the population but maintained by and with the population.}”\textsuperscript{120}

The government of Nepal was not effective in mobilizing those that supported the state against the Maoists. Moorecraft explains that even though active supporters existed, the Maoists
had tight control of the majority in the countryside: “…the majority of the traditionalist population has voiced active or passive support for the king… Others in the countryside, though, have been coerced by Maoist violence into toeing the party line.”121 Supporters of the king or of parliament were primarily concentrated in Kathmandu. The Maoists effectively silenced any government support in the rural areas.

The third law, “Support from the Population is Conditional,” explains that strength for the counterinsurgent derives from “grass roots” political organization rather than raw military power.122 But, Galula argues, the political, social, and economic efforts of the counterinsurgency can not be effective while the insurgents control the population. Galula explains the difficulty for those who support the government in insurgent controlled areas:

Once the insurgent has established his hold over the population, the minority that was hostile to him becomes invisible…[and] will not and cannot emerge as long as the threat has not been lifted to a reasonable extent…Effective political action on the population must be preceded by military and police operations…The counterinsurgent needs a convincing success as early as possible in order to demonstrate that he has the will, the means, and the ability to win. The counterinsurgent cannot safely enter into negotiations except from a position of strength, or his potential supporters will flock to the insurgent side.123

The Nepalese police and military operations never lifted the threat enough at the local level to allow supporters to emerge. The government was unable to demonstrate the will, means, or ability to win. Although the police and later the army attempted to achieve a convincing success on multiple occasions, they repeatedly fell short. Without a position of strength, potential supporters did “flock to the insurgent side,” as was finally shown in the April 2008 elections.124

121 Moorcraft, “Revolution in Nepal: Can the Nepalese Army Prevent a Maoist Victory?” 44.
122 Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, 78.
123 Ibid., 78,79.
The Maoists infiltrated rural communities, undermined traditional structures, and replaced government institutions with their own. John Mackinlay describes the inappropriate government response:

The Royal Nepalese Army (RNA) failed to understand this strategy and responded in a way that strengthened the Maoists rather than weakening them. Influenced by US doctrine from a previous era of counterinsurgency, the Nepalese military forces waged a narrow military campaign measured in body counts and territory whereas the Maoists sought to control the minds and opinions of the population.125 Mackinlay blames failure on the government’s overemphasis of the military solution and neglect of the people: “The vital ground was the population – but the government and security forces opted for a military campaign that helped to drive the uncommitted communities into the arms of the insurgents.”126 The government offered only a solution by force and lacked the means to solve economic hardship or the impetus to solve perceived social injustice. Unstable politics inhibited progress in other areas. If the support of the population is conditional, the government of Nepal never set or met the conditions to gain that support.

The fourth law, “Intensity of Efforts and Vastness of Means are Essential,” highlights the need for full application of resources.127 The government of Nepal failed in intensity and in means because it initially did not recognize the need to treat the Maoists as a significant threat and subsequently lacked the resources to meet that threat when the insurgency grew in strength.128 To illustrate the dire state of Nepal’s economy, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) provides a variety of statistics that compose the human development index (HDI), a measure of how well the people in a given nation live. In 2002, six years into the

126  Ibid., 46.
insurgency, Nepal had the lowest HDI in South Asia.\textsuperscript{129} Nepal’s HDI currently rates 142d out of 177 countries for which the UNDP maintains data.\textsuperscript{130} Such a state of poverty represented a daunting obstacle for the government even had the political situation been more stable. Given the amount of conflict with the government, addressing the basic needs of the people may well have been an impossibility.

The government’s initial response to the beginning of the insurgency set a poor tone. According to Deepak Thapa, The prime minister at the time, Sher Bahadur Deuba, fixated instead on the pervasive political squabbling at the government center: “Since the ‘people’s war’ was viewed as a mere irritant compared to the very real threat to the longevity of his government, Deuba was more preoccupied with the minutiae of ensuring his survival than holding the Maoist bull by the horns.”\textsuperscript{131} Nor was there much commitment to use of force against the Maoists at the outset. The CPN(UML), as a communist with the second highest number of seats in the parliament, was in an especially difficult position of being at the opposite end of a ‘people’s war’ against CPN(M), another communist party. The political problems prevented Nepal from approaching the conflict with any degree of “intensity.”

The combination of political, economic, and social problems that prevented an adequate government approach. Yubaraj Ghimire argues that Nepal was “an ideal place for radical ideology to shape: “It is…a society in which poverty, illiteracy, and diseases are widespread; and a country largely unable to craft plans and policies of the scale and intensity required to tackle its


\textsuperscript{130} United Nations Development Program, “2007/2008 Human Development Report,” http://hdrstats.undp.org/countries/country_fact_sheets/ctry_fs_NPL.html, (accessed December 24, 2008); “Each year since 1990 the Human Development Report has published the human development index (HDI) which looks beyond GDP to a broader definition of well-being. The HDI provides a composite measure of three dimensions of human development: living a long and healthy life (measured by life expectancy), being educated (measured by adult literacy and enrolment at the primary, secondary and tertiary level) and having a decent standard of living (measured by purchasing power parity, PPP, income).”

many economic and social challenges and defeat radical ideologies.”

The conditions in Nepal were ideal for insurgency and shaped the poor performance of the government counterinsurgency. Ghimire blames the combination of economic challenges and political turbulence for weak strategy: “…it took more than nine years for key pro-democracy parties to come together and work out an understanding on how to deal with the Maoist problem…the political parties and successive governments never developed a clear understanding as to the proper use of military force. Instead, the state adopted a reactive policy, rarely a pro-active one.”

Nepal faced many challenges and the government was unable to answer the insurgent threat adequately.

FM 3-24 suggests a “clear-hold-build” approach to counterinsurgency. As with Galula’s theory, the “clear-hold-build” approach includes gaining popular support, but focuses more on security and administrative measures to control the populace. The manual only briefly mentions social and cultural efforts.

FM 3-24 also contains a mix of historical “principles” for counterinsurgency, emphasizing legitimacy. Acknowledging that societies define legitimacy differently, it lists “possible indicators of legitimacy:”

The ability to provide security for the populace…
Selection of leaders at a frequency and in a manner considered just and fair…
A high level of popular participation in or support for the political process.
A culturally acceptable level of corruption.
A culturally acceptable level and rate of political, economic, and social development.
A high level of regime acceptance by major social institutions.

Nepal’s scores on these measures varied in the years between 1996 and 2008. The government was never able to provide more than temporary security for the populace. The political process has been in turmoil from the end of Panchayat in 1990 until present with varying regime acceptance based on the mood of the day and the state of affairs between the monarchy and the

133 Ibid., II-18.
135 Ibid., 1-21.
elected parliament. Lack of any real economic and social development provided the fuel for insurgency. King Gyanendra’s seizures of executive power and the constant turmoil between the political parties removed what little regime acceptance the government could garner. While many in the RNA understood the concept of winning “hearts and minds,” lack of a clear strategy beyond strictly military operations undermined their chances of success.  

FM 3-24 explains that military action primarily addresses the symptoms of insurgency and that all elements of national power are normally required to achieve legitimacy. It explains the “nature” of counterinsurgency operations, saying they “require synchronized application of military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions.” The manual further discusses the need to address the causes of the insurgency and not just the military aspects: “Military forces can compel obedience and secure areas; however, they cannot by themselves achieve the political settlement needed to resolve the situation. Successful efforts…attack the basis for the insurgency rather than just the fighters and comprehensively address the host nation’s core problems.” FM 3-24 lists principles and imperatives for gaining legitimacy, to include the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Principles</th>
<th>Imperatives</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legitimacy is the main objective</td>
<td>Manage information and expectations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unity of effort is essential</td>
<td>Use the appropriate level of force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political factors are primary</td>
<td>Learn and adapt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counterinsurgents must understand the environment</td>
<td>Empower the lowest levels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence drives operations</td>
<td>Support the host nation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Insurgents must be isolated from their cause and support</td>
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<tr>
<td>Security under the rule of law is essential</td>
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<tr>
<td>Counterinsurgents should prepare for a long-term commitment</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
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138 Ibid., 5-1.

139 Ibid., 1-21 – 1-26. This table is a list of the principles and imperatives contained in FM 3-24 and is meant to show what the manual covers; FM 3-24 does not present a similar table.
While all of these have relevance, a few stand out with respect to Nepal’s situation. Unity of effort, understanding the environment, and use of force deserve particular attention.

FM 3-24 discusses the necessity for unity of effort at every echelon. The nature of Nepalese politics and government inhibited unity. Tension between the King and parliament manifested itself in lack of coordination between the RNA, serving the monarchy, and the police, serving the political parties. Also, constitutional law prevented employment of the Army within Nepal’s borders without an emergency declaration. Prior to 2001, without such a declaration from the King, the police had to fight the insurgents while the Army remained in its barracks. This was the reason for creation of the Armed Police. Coordination with nonmilitary elements never sufficiently materialized since the security situation remained too volatile. Government attempts at infrastructure development could not proceed while the Maoists controlled the countryside.

FM 3-24 lists some cultural items that counterinsurgents need to understand the environment and be able to obtain intelligence in a foreign culture. Nepali politicians and security forces should have had good understanding of their native environment, but their approach to the counterinsurgency indicates some degree of separation from the realities of the country. As mentioned, the NA counterinsurgency manual considered the various sub-cultures within Nepal and many soldiers had experience in international peacekeeping operations. The critical failure was in how the government attempted to influence the environment. Applying military force alone was ineffective in the long term. The political leaders did not understand how to formulate a comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy using multiple lines of effort.

140 Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency, 1-22.
143 Marks, Maoist People’s War in Post Vietnam Asia, 320.
FM 3-24 gives several relevant paradoxes regarding the use of force. Use of force is sensitive among civilian populations with loyalties that may be ambiguous. Among the paradoxes FM 3-24 gives regarding force, the following applies to Nepal: “sometimes, the more force is used, the less effective it is.”\(^{144}\) In Nepal, the police and the army both committed excesses. The early police operations, in particular, such as Operation Romeo and Operation Kilo Sierra Two, contributed to swaying people to the Maoists because of police heavy-handedness.\(^{145}\)

From the perspective of the government of Nepal, addressing the core problems of the insurgency was beyond its capacity. The government attempted to solve the problem militarily with limited ability to address the problem through other lines of effort. Through US and other supporters, the Nepalese government and security forces had access to counterinsurgency doctrine. The Nepalese understood and studied concepts such as those that FM 3-24 describes, but the government was either incapable or unwilling to directly address the social and political issues that hindered a peaceful solution until its capacity was so degraded that the established political parties could no longer prevent the Maoists from taking power.

Galula’s *Counterinsurgency Warfare* and the US Army’s FM 3-24 are both useful for analyzing Nepal’s counterinsurgency approach. With respect to FM 3-24 as an articulation of US doctrine, Nepal’s situation serves to highlight several limitations of the manual. In emphasizing the importance of gaining legitimacy, FM 3-24 gives insufficient emphasis to social and cultural considerations or to understanding the key factors in the environment that fuel insurgency. At the same time, as the forward to FM 3-24 states, the format of the manual is limited in its applicability to the unique situations of each insurgency.\(^{146}\) Nepal is no exception to the reality that every insurgency presents different conditions and requires a tailored response.

\(^{144}\) Field Manual 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, 1-27.


\(^{146}\) Field Manual 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, Foreword.
Foreign Support to the Government of Nepal

The United States, India, and China have had the most significant influence on Nepal during the Maoist insurgency. Military aid to the Nepalese government was not of sufficient quantity or type to prevent a Maoist political victory though it at least allowed the Army to hold the insurgents to a military stalemate and mitigate the outcome.\(^\text{147}\) Despite substantial military aid from the US after 2001, neither military equipment nor training was able to compensate for the political, social, and economic problems that fueled support for the insurgency. After King Gyanendra seized direct rule in February 2005, much of the lethal military aid to the RNA disappeared as the US and other countries withheld support to prevent legitimizing the king’s anti-democratic action.\(^\text{148}\) Human rights concerns, as well, discouraged the US and other potential supporters in the international community from doing more to help the government.\(^\text{149}\) While the US, India, and even the Chinese had no particular desire to see the CPN(M) take power, neither they, nor the international community were fully committed to prevent a Maoist victory.

United States

After the opening attacks of the insurgency in February 1996, the US, UK, and India joined the government of Nepal in denouncing the Maoists as terrorists.\(^\text{150}\) US security assistance to Nepal, however, was minimal prior to 2001, limited mostly to funding for peacekeeping

\(^\text{147}\) Major Patrick Kelly email (January 8, 2009). A Nepali official at the US Embassy in Kathmandu expressed his opinion that without US training, equipment, and political support, the Maoists may have won a more complete victory and much earlier.

\(^\text{148}\) Vaughn, Nepal: Background and U.S. Relations, 2.

\(^\text{149}\) Ibid., 19, 20.

between 1998 and 2001.\textsuperscript{151} The US provided approximately $15 million in aid annually through a variety of programs focusing on development.\textsuperscript{152} Since assistance from the United Kingdom was similar in scope as aid from the US, this paper will not detail it.

The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the US altered the context of the insurgency in Nepal. The US added the CPN(M) to its list of “other terrorist organizations” and substantially increased aid to the government after Secretary of State Colin Powell’s visit in 2002. A 2002 supplemental appropriations package provided $12 million of foreign military financing (FMF) in addition to $2 million already funded. The total of $14 million in FMF to Nepal in 2002 came after no allocation of FMF in 2001. In 2003, forces from US Pacific Command participated in exercises with Nepalese Army and Police to improve interoperability and train Nepal in anti-terrorism techniques.\textsuperscript{153} The US and Belgium additionally supplied Nepal with modern rifles. Total US assistance to Nepal was over $40 million dollars per year between 2002 and 2006, although FMF decreased significantly after 2005.\textsuperscript{154}

When King Gyanendra seized direct rule in February of 2005, US and international support diminished. After the coup, the US and UK halted transfers of lethal military equipment to the RNA but maintained some military advisors in Kathmandu.\textsuperscript{155} US policy towards Nepal focused on the need to restore democracy and civil society. In May, 2005, US Assistance Secretary of State for South Asia, Christina Rocca, met with King Gyanendra and stated US goals, saying, “We want Nepal to be a peaceful, prosperous and democratic country where civil

\textsuperscript{151} Kelly email; Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities Initiative, \url{http://www.ciponline.org/facts/eipc.htm} (accessed 19 February 2009).


\textsuperscript{154} Ibid., 18.

\textsuperscript{155} Rahul Bedi, “Nepal Coup Presents India with Foreign Policy Dilemma,” \textit{Jane’s Intelligence Review-Posted April 1, 2005}, (March 14, 2005).
liberties and human rights are protected."156 A 2006 report to congress further outlined US policy objectives:

- supporting democratic institutions and economic liberalization
- promoting peace and stability in South Asia
- supporting Nepal’s independence and territorial integrity
- alleviating poverty

The report identifies US foreign policy interests as promoting democracy, providing developmental assistance, and preventing the collapse of Nepal since a failed state could support terrorism and destabilize the region. Congressional budget justification included preventing the spread of terrorism as a reason for the US to continue funding nonlethal equipment and training programs through FMF and International Military Education (IMET).157 US concerns for democracy and human rights tempered support to Nepal after 2005. The US essentially joined Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch in criticizing the human rights record of the government of Nepal as well as that of the insurgent CPN(M).158 While it would be difficult to prove that more support from the US could have prevented a Maoist victory, US policy and actions after 2005 indicate that the US placed more value in promoting democracy and human rights than preventing an organization it had labeled “terrorist” from taking over the country. US officials did not expect such a large Maoist political win, largely because they did not devote the resources to gain a more complete understanding of what was happening.159 Nepal was not a high priority to the US. The CPN(M), now in power, has an opportunity to deliver democracy,

157 Ibid., 17.
158 Ibid., 20.
159 Dr. Felix Moos discussion (January 27, 2009); Dr. Moos discussed the nature of his correspondence with officials at the US embassy in Nepal after the April 2008 elections.
development, and human rights – the very things the US has stated it desires for Nepal. Whether or to what degree the US will support the new government is a subject of ongoing negotiation.  

**India**

India has not had a consistent or coherent strategy towards Nepal.  India initially did not provide much material support. The India-Nepal relationship had soured somewhat over the 1989 Trade and Transit Treaty. The move to a democratic government in 1990 came in part as pressure to end the economic bullying of Nepal by India. Indian businesses were prevalent in Nepal and controlled many resources. Nepal, meanwhile, relied on India for transit routes. During the initial years of the insurgency, the Indian government tolerated CPN(M) political activity and training within India’s borders. While not openly supporting the Nepalese Maoists, India did nothing to interdict them. At the same time, India had concerns that its own Naxalite-Maoist rebels might attempt an uprising with encouragement from the Nepalese example.

After the September 2001 terrorist attacks in the US, India began to provide assistance and equipment and moved troops to the border. India provided the Nepalese Army with $88 million worth of equipment (helicopters, vehicles, and small arms) and training. India stopped supplying arms to the RNA in 2001, though, because of concerns that they might be used against civilians. India, meanwhile, did not want a large international role in Nepal. The concern was that interference from the UN or the US in Nepal could destabilize its northern border and influence the northern states where the Maoists have links. India was also concerned that US

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161 Bedi, “Nepal Coup Presents India with Foreign Policy Dilemma.”


163 Bedi, “Nepal Coup Presents India with Foreign Policy Dilemma.”

military assistance, in particular, threatened the Indian relationship with Nepal as established in
the 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship.\footnote{Under the Treaty of Peace and Friendship, ratified in July 1950, each government agreed to acknowledge and respect the other's sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence; to continue diplomatic relations; and, on matters pertaining to industrial and economic development, to grant rights equal to those of its own citizens to the nationals of the other residing in its territory. Agreements on all subjects in this treaty superseded those on similar matters dealt with in the previous treaties between Nepal and Britain. Source: \url{http://countrystudies.us/nepal/65.htm}}

After the 2005 coup, India joined the US in suspending military sales.\footnote{Vaughn, \textit{Nepal: Background and U.S. Relations}, 2.} India also withdrew from a meeting of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) scheduled for February 2005 in order to prevent legitimizing King Gyanendra as Nepal’s executive. India subsequently deployed paramilitary forces to patrol the border with Nepal over concerns that Maoist activity may spread over the border. India, however, did allow members of Nepal’s parliamentary parties to enter India to seek political asylum.\footnote{Bedi, “Nepal Coup Presents India with Foreign Policy Dilemma.”} Although India viewed the Maoists as terrorists, the Indian government encouraged “legal Maoists” to participate in working for a democratic government in Nepal.\footnote{Ghimire, “The Many Dimensions of Nepali Insurgency,” II-11.}

India’s strategy towards Nepal has been incoherent. India did not want a Maoist victory, but was lukewarm in supporting the government of Nepal against the insurgency because of various conflicting interests. India’s relationship with the new CPN(M) government may diminish as the Maoists look to build a closer relationship with China and India seeks to prevent its own Maoists from gaining strength from their successful neighbor. India, however, has an interest in maintaining trade relationships and counterbalancing Chinese influence.
China

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) did not support the Maoists, despite the CPN(M)’s communist agenda and stated allegiance to the Mao’s theory. The Chinese Communist Party did not care for the CPN(M) interpretation of Maoist ideology. Nor did China wish to see a successful Nepalese insurgency inspire separatists in Tibet. The PRC even briefly supported the royal regime with arms, but withdrew support when King Gyanendra began to lose power. China refrained from entering decisively on any side of the conflict. The PRC has been more concerned over US influence and supply of military assistance in particular.

Chinese interest with respect to Nepal included developing economic and trade relations. China has been working to expand transportation links with Nepal, to include bus service between Kathmandu and Lhasa, road links, and a planned extension of the new Beijing – Lhasa railroad to Kathmandu. Another motive China may have for seeking influence in Nepal is to gain support from Nepal regarding the Taiwan issue.

China’s policy and actions during the insurgency were not sufficient to influence the outcome. China will likely have a major role, however, in influencing the success of failure of the new government as the CPN(M) seeks financial and developmental assistance to alleviate the structural problems that inspired the insurgency from the beginning.

Foreign Assistance to the New Regime

Since the transition to power, the world is watching to see how the Maoists will proceed. Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal has visited China, the US, Europe, and India seeking

171 Bedi, “Nepal Coup Presents India with Foreign Policy Dilemma.”
172 Ibid.
support. Prachanda first sought to build a relationship with China and seek financial assistance. Next on the agenda was a plea to the US to remove the CPN(M) from the terrorist list. Nepal will likely take developmental assistance from whoever is willing to help. The international community had little influence on the military and political outcome of the Nepalese insurgency, but outside help will be necessary for the current peace to last.

The Maoist Transition to Power and Army Integration

The insurgency in Nepal reached a turning point in 2005. Although the Maoists had embarked on the strategic offensive with the adoption of “Prachanda Path” in 2001, the Maoists realized by 2005 that they were engaged in a military stalemate against the RNA. But in February 2005, King Gyanendra made a fatal error in seizing direct executive authority and disbanding parliament. The king’s move had political repercussions both internationally and internally. The US, UK, and India ceased providing military assistance over concerns about supporting an anti-democratic regime. The RNA, meanwhile, was uncertain that it could win by force alone. Paul Moorecraft relates that the army chief of the general staff had given up on an outright military victory: “Yet even the devout monarchist, Lieutenant General Rukmangad Katuwal, the chief of the general staff, admitted…that ‘there can be no military solution…we can only hold the ring for an election…and follow the constitution.’” The CPN(M) recognized that the time was right for political action and in November of 2005 formed an agreement with the Seven Party Alliance (SPA). Popular opinion swayed against the dictatorial monarch to the

174 Zergovia, “Fragile Peacemaking Underway as Nepal Ushers in Democracy, Seeks Talks with U.S.”
176 Ibid., 45.
177 Ibid., 45.
benefit of the Maoists. In April 2006, when the king refused to reinstate the political parties, the SPA mobilized three weeks of political protests. The Maoists joined the protests and contributed to their intensity.\textsuperscript{178} By the end of April, King Gyanendra relented and ended direct rule, allowing the parties to reinstate parliament. Peace talks between the Maoists and the SPA continued through 2006 resulting in an agreement to hold elections for a constituent assembly and rewrite the constitution. In 2007, the CPN(M) formally joined the government. In April 2008, the Maoists won the majority of the seats in the Constituent Assembly.

Since taking power, the Maoists have the opportunity to make good on their political promises, but face some challenges from their former enemies. John Mackinlay identifies three entities that complicate Nepal’s transition to post-insurgency life. The first is the former Royal Nepalese Army, now simply the NA, which does not consider itself defeated since it did not lose tactically. The second is the Maoist PLA, which Mackinlay places at a strength of 10 to 15,000 currently on the UN camps in accordance with the cease fire agreements. The third entity is the Madhesis and Thurat people living in the southern terai regions.\textsuperscript{179} With many disagreements still lingering, the Maoist assumption of power may not ultimately end the conflict. Whether Nepal is truly finished with insurgency may depend on how the country moves forward.

**Army Integration**

The question of what to do with the former Maoist combatants has become a contentious political issue in Nepal. The question of whether to integrate Maoists into the Nepalese Army provides an opportunity to examine how to successfully (or not) integrate former enemies into one organization. Many conflicts end with a question of what to do with the defeated combatants. Nepal’s case is unique in that the insurgents won by political means rather than by military

\textsuperscript{178} Moorcraft, “Revolution in Nepal: Can the Nepalese Army Prevent a Maoist Victory?” 46.  
\textsuperscript{179} Mackinlay, “Nepal’s Transition to a Post-Insurgency Era,” 44, 45.
victory. Rather than the defeated side being destroyed and the other taking over, the NA remains the official army of Nepal while the Maoist People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is a large and potentially capable force.\(^{180}\) Thousands of insurgents are living in UN supervised camps with nothing to do. Options include: full or partial integration into a single force, employing the Maoists as a separate security force, disbanding the Maoists, or disbanding the NA and replacing it with the PLA. Naturally, there are concerns regarding potential antagonism between the former enemies. The challenge will be to find a solution that satisfies the political parties, the army, and the Maoists. Each option has advantages, disadvantages, and carries risk of renewed violence.

Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal published a policy paper in September 2008 stating his goal to integrate and rehabilitate the PLA within six months (by March 2009).\(^{181}\) The government subsequently formed a committee to determine how to accomplish the integration.\(^{182}\) Progress has been slow. Nanda Kishore Pun, head of the PLA, and Ram Bahadur Thapa, the Maoist defense minister, want full integration. Recently, however, the PLA requested separate funding for its seven divisions and employment in development works through the Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction. PLA Deputy Commander Chandra Prakash Khanal stated that the PLA should be able to perform the same activities as the NA since “it is also a legitimate army of the state.”\(^ {183}\) The NA and the opposition parties fear the Maoists will use either the PLA or an integrated army to achieve their partisan political objectives. The NA generals are concerned about preserving the apolitical role of the army. They have proposed that former Maoists be


\[^{181}\text{Pokharel, “In Nepal, the Next Step Is to Merge Army, Rebels.”}\]


allowed to apply for military service via the same competitive criteria as any other citizen after
denouncing their party affiliation.\textsuperscript{184} Political proposals for partial integration have included
employing the PLA as a separate security force for border or industrial security. Others would
retain senior Maoist soldiers and release the “rank and file” with economic assistance so they can
return to private life.\textsuperscript{185} Mackinlay suggests that many army officers who are Thapa, Rana, and
Shah elites, fear that direct “amalgamation” will undermine their status.\textsuperscript{186}

The NA, in a recent document, outlined the advantages and disadvantages of each
contingency. While NA officers would prefer not to absorb any Maoists, their analysis suggests
that integration by individual, as opposed to whole units or cohorts, would be the most practical
alternative.\textsuperscript{187} The NA document provides a somewhat biased, though arguably realistic
overview of Maoist objectives and the current situation. It also compares historical examples of
post-conflict integration with the warning that Nepal is unique in several respects, principally that
it is not a failed state and the army was not defeated. In addition to concerns about the need for
the army to remain apolitical, the army warns that military mobilization for party interests could
be “disastrous” for Nepal and for democracy. It also mentions the possibility of future Maoists
revolts and the related risk of giving them technical parity by equipping them with the same
weapons as other government forces.\textsuperscript{188} The drafters of the document recognize the need to
satisfy the Maoists while preventing a capability for Maoist remobilization. The NA document
examines three options for integration of “ex-rebels”: “reintegration into society, employ in other

\textsuperscript{184} Pokharel, “In Nepal, the Next Step Is to Merge Army, Rebels.”
\textsuperscript{185} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{186} Mackinlay, “Nepal’s Transition to a Post-Insurgency Era,” 45.
\textsuperscript{187} Nepalese Army, “Management of Integration of Maoist Combatants,” (Fall, 2008). NA
officers prepared this document to include a text memorandum and a slide presentation.
\textsuperscript{188} Ibid., 1.
security agencies, or integrate into existing security forces.”189 The document takes a realistic approach in drafting a possible solution, saying that a combination of the three options is most likely: “In practice, however, it is likely that the solution would be a combination of all of the above. Hence, a degree of integration may take place into the security forces and the NA must plan to properly manage those potentially coming into it.”190 The document recommends integration by individual under the following “principles governing the integration process:” recognition of service, training focus, dilution, tolerance, and apolitical nature.191 Recognition of service gives former rebels the opportunity to serve in a capacity commensurate with their experience while excluding any Maoists from high-level senior positions since the duration of the insurgency, which the writers measure at 13 years, precludes anyone from appointment higher than the rank of major. Training focus allows time to instill the NA’s professional military culture. Dilution is intended to separate Maoists as much as possible to prevent factionalism. Tolerance applies to both former adversaries to eliminate further hostility. The requirement to keep the army apolitical may prove to be one of the more difficult points since Maoist doctrine accepts the use of military means for political ends.192 Agreeing to a final solution to the problem of army integration remains one of the biggest challenges to the new government. The issue, if handled carelessly, has the potential to un hinge the current peace and return Nepal to violent conflict. If integration of the NA and PLA is successful, however, it could serve as a model for reconciliation in the wake of future insurgencies.

189 Nepalese Army, “Management of Integration of Maoist Combatants,” 2,3.
190 Ibid., 5.
191 Ibid., 7.
192 Ibid., 7-22.
The Terai

The Terai consists of the southern plains of Nepal that extend across the entire width of the country along the border with India. The dominant group in the Terai is the Madhesi people, who are of Indian origin. Although the Madhesis have no real military force, John Mackinlay points out their capacity for “agitation.” Many of the Madhesis supported the Maoists during the insurgency, but now have their own issues to pursue, not all of which are in line with the CPN(M) agenda. Members of the Terai Madhes Loktantrik Party (TMLP) claimed that the CPN(M) had ignored its demands since taking power and threatened street protests. There is also potential for tension between the Maoists, who rely on China for financing and political support, and the Madhesis, who remain connected to India for economic and social purposes. India’s discomfort with Chinese influence south of the Himalayas may further strain the relationship between the Madhesis and the Maoist government.

Further complicating the situation in the Terai is the Tharuhat Liberation Army, formed to oppose the Madhesis, promote the liberation of the Tharu people, and establish a Tharuhat province. The Tharu and Madhesi issues are concerned with both ethnicity and control of resources. During the insurgency, their grievances aligned sufficiently with the Maoist demands to end feudalism and exploitation. Now the governing Maoists have the challenge to balance the many competing demands of their former allies in order to prevent becoming what they fought to remove.

193 Mackinlay, “Nepal’s Transition to a Post-Insurgency Era,” 44, 45.
195 Dr. Felix Moos discussion (March 17, 2009).
Conclusions

The implications of the Maoist insurgency in Nepal for US counter-insurgency doctrine pertain to emphasis on certain ideas rather than requiring anything new. The primary lesson of the conflict for US military operational and strategic planners is that the counterinsurgent must understand the social and cultural aspects of the environment that drive politics, motivate the insurgents, and determine popular support. Without a thorough understanding of the environment, any military, economic, or even political effort is likely to have unintended effects and unlikely to solve the core problems. While FM 3-24 mentions this requirement to understand the environment, the US Army still needs improvement in institutionalizing the application of social and cultural knowledge into training and education as well as operational and strategic planning. Consideration of social and cultural factors should not be limited to an intelligence gathering activity, but should inform all of the political, economic, and military aspects of planning and executing operations in a fourth generation warfare environment.

The government in Kathmandu lost control of much of the country long before the April 2008 elections. The Nepalese government failed in counterinsurgency for a variety of reasons. One was the unwillingness of political leaders to subordinate their individual quests for power to the survival of the country. Other reasons were repressive military and police operations which pushed people further toward the insurgents, an inability to improve the economy, and an unwillingness to address social disparity. The Nepalese government suffered from lack of a coherent strategy and a crippling shortage of the resources required to answer the threat. Despite the Nepalese Army’s military accomplishments, the government of Nepal, to include the parliamentary parties and the king, did not have the capacity to operate in a fourth

197 FM 3-24, pp.1-22 – 1-23; the US Army and Marine Corps both have centers established for cultural learning (TRADOC Culture Center at Fort Huachuca and the USMC Center for Advanced Operational Cultural Learning at Quantico) and have implemented culture into education and training, but their efforts are still relatively new and not universally institutionalized in the operating force.
generation warfare context. The divided government could not solve the country’s core social and economic problems in a constructive way.

Foreign military assistance was helpful but insufficient. The US and others gave the NA a significant boost through military assistance and humanitarian aid, but did not help solve the social and political issues at the heart of the insurgency. While US training and material support gave the Nepalese Army a boost in morale and effectiveness as a fighting force, it did little to address the underlying causes of the conflict unique to Nepal. Nepal was never a high enough priority for the US to grant sufficient attention to the problem. India and China served as disruptive elements engaged in their own regional power struggles. They were more concerned with counterbalancing each other than with supporting the government in Nepal. King Gyanendra’s assertion of executive authority caused potential supporters to balk at arming an anti-democratic dictator. Nepal’s conduct of counterinsurgency and the nature of foreign assistance both provide lessons that illustrate the need for a better understanding of the environment.

The case of Nepal illustrates that counterinsurgency requires more than a strong military campaign. The Maoists in Nepal were successful because they were more effective than the government in gaining support from the people, whether through persuasion or coercion. The Maoists adapted Mao’s theory for guerilla warfare to Nepal and employed a strategy that used not just violence, but gained political power by addressing social grievances. To win, the counterinsurgent must address the relevant problems and leverage the social, economic and political networks to achieve a lasting solution. US Army and Marines Corps counterinsurgency doctrine would improve with greater emphasis on application of social and cultural considerations to political and military lines of effort to defeat an insurgency.
APPENDIX A

Timeline

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>Nepal’s first election</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>King Mahendra removes congress, bans political parties, and establishes direct royal rule with “Panchayat” government</td>
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<tr>
<td>1990 February</td>
<td>Start of “People’s Movement” for the Restoration of Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>King lifts ban on political parties and ends Panchayat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991 January</td>
<td>CPN(Masal) and CPN (Marxist-Leninist) unite to form CPN (United Marxists-Leninist)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>Election: Nepali Congress (NC) wins majority with Girija Prasad Koirala as prime minister</td>
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<tr>
<td>1994 November</td>
<td>CPN (UML) wins plurality in election with Man Mohan Adhikari as prime minister</td>
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<tr>
<td>1995 March</td>
<td>Unity Centre renames itself CPN(Maoist)</td>
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<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>Central Committee of the CPN(Maoist) adopts “Plan for the historic initiation of people’s war”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>Police launch Operation Romeo against Maoist supporters in Rolpa</td>
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<tr>
<td>1996 4 February</td>
<td>Baburam Bhattarai presents 40-point demand to Prime Minister Deuba</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 February</td>
<td>Commencement of “people’s war”</td>
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<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>New trade and transit treaty with India</td>
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<tr>
<td>1997 March</td>
<td>Deuba loses no-confidence vote; Lokendra Bahadur Chand of RPP becomes prime minister</td>
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<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>Chand loses no-confidence vote; Surya Bahadur Thapa becomes prime minister with NC – NSP coalition</td>
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<tr>
<td>1998 April</td>
<td>Thapa resigns; GP Koirala becomes prime minister of minority government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>Police begin Operation Kilo Sierra 2 against Maoist insurgents</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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198 This timeline is a compilation and paraphrasing from several sources, to include for 1959 - 2004: Whelpton, A History of Nepal, xii - xviii; Thapa, A Kingdom Under Siege; Nepal's Maoist Insurgency, 1996 to 2004, 203-208.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>May</td>
<td>Elections; Krishna Prasad Bhattarai of NC becomes prime minister</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>September</td>
<td>Maoists attack against police in Rukum</td>
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<td></td>
<td>December</td>
<td>KP Bhattarai sets up commission under Deuba to make recommendations on Maoist problem</td>
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<td>2000</td>
<td>February</td>
<td>Police burn down houses in Rukum following death of police in a bomb explosion</td>
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<td></td>
<td>May</td>
<td>GP Koirala replaces KP Bhattarai as prime minister</td>
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<td></td>
<td>June</td>
<td>Government declares bonded laborers free</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>September</td>
<td>Maoists attack Dunai, district headquarters of Dolpa</td>
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<td></td>
<td>October</td>
<td>Low level meeting between government and Maoist representatives</td>
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<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>January</td>
<td>King Birendra approves ordinances to establish Armed Police Force and system of regional governors</td>
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<td></td>
<td>February</td>
<td>Maoists adopt “Prachanda Path” and elect Prachanda as party chairman at second national conference</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>April</td>
<td>Maoists attack police at Rukumkot, Rukum and Naumule, Dailekh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>June</td>
<td>Government announces plans for Integrated Security and Development Program involving key role for the army for the first time</td>
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<td></td>
<td>July</td>
<td>Crown Prince Dipendra shoots and kills the king, queen, seven other members of the royal family, and himself; Gyanendra becomes king</td>
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<td></td>
<td>August</td>
<td>GP Koirala resigns over army failure to assist captured police in Rolpa Deuba elected prime minister and declares ceasefire</td>
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<td></td>
<td>November</td>
<td>First talks begin between government and insurgents</td>
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<td></td>
<td>November</td>
<td>Prachanda announces withdrawal from talks over governments refusal to grant demand for a constituent assembly</td>
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<td></td>
<td>November</td>
<td>Insurgents break ceasefire with attacks on police and army barracks</td>
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<td></td>
<td>November</td>
<td>Government declares a state of emergency and mobilizes the army against the insurgents; declares CPN(Maoist) a “terrorist organization;” &amp; curtails fundamental rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>February</td>
<td>Maoists conduct major attacks in Acham district headquarters</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>April</td>
<td>Parliament ratifies state of emergency</td>
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<td></td>
<td>April</td>
<td>Parliament passes Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Control and Punishment) Bill</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>May</td>
<td>Deuba dissolves parliament over debate on extension of the state of emergency; Deuba expelled from NC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
|      | July    | 44% increase in security budget from previous year

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Event</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>State of emergency ends</td>
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<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>Insurgents attack police in Sindhuli and district headquarters in Sandhikharka, Arghakhanchi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>Deuba recommends postponing elections until November 2003; King Gyanendra dismisses Deuba, postpones elections indefinitely, and assumes executive authority; King appoints Lokendra Bahadur Chand prime minister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003 January</td>
<td>Maoists assassinate head of Armed Police Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>Ceasefire between insurgent and government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>Maoists and government agree on “22-point of conduct” during ceasefire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>Talks begin between Maoists and government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>Parties begin agitation for end of royal rule and restoration of parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>Thapa becomes prime minister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004 March</td>
<td>Maoists assassinate head of Armed Police Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>Ceasefire between insurgent and government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>Thapa becomes prime minister; coalition with CPN(UML), RPP, &amp; NSP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>Deuba becomes prime minister; coalition with CPN(UML), RPP, &amp; NSP</td>
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<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>Maoists declare ceasefire 2004</td>
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<tr>
<td>2005 January</td>
<td>Talks fail</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>King Gyanendra dismisses government again and assumes full executive power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>Maoists hold local elections in controlled areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>Maoists conduct major attack against security forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>Maoists declare three-month ceasefire</td>
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<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>Agreement between seven parties alliance (SPA) and Maoists to end royal rule, elect constituent assembly, and change the constitution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>Maoists extend ceasefire; change structure and strategy</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>March</td>
<td>Memorandum between CPN(M) and SPA</td>
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<td></td>
<td>April</td>
<td>Nation-wide street protests for restoration of democracy; parliament reinstated with GP Koirala as prime minister</td>
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<td></td>
<td>May</td>
<td>Peace talks begin</td>
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<td></td>
<td>June</td>
<td>Maoists and parties form agreement</td>
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<td></td>
<td>November</td>
<td>Maoists and government finalize agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>December</td>
<td>Draft constitution</td>
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<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>January</td>
<td>Interim constitution and parliament established</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>March</td>
<td>Maoists join interim government</td>
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<td></td>
<td>July</td>
<td>CPN(M) formally registered as a party</td>
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<td></td>
<td>September</td>
<td>Maoists quit government over</td>
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<td></td>
<td>December</td>
<td>SPA reaches agreement; Maoists rejoin government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>April</td>
<td>Constituent Assembly election; CPN(M) wins</td>
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<td></td>
<td>June</td>
<td>King Gyanendra stepped down, ending the monarchy</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>GP Koirala resigns as prime minister</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>August</td>
<td>CPN(M) leader, Prachanda, becomes prime minister</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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