The US Army Assignment Policy
For Women: Relevancy in 21st Century Warfare

A Monograph
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The role of women in the armed forces has always been and will probably always be a hotly contested topic. Recent statements by senior civilian and military leaders illustrate the reliance the nation has placed on women in the armed forces. In view of the valuable role women play in the Army and the policies that govern their assignment, this monograph explores the relevancy of the Army assignment policy for women in the context of 21st century warfare.

To remain relevant in the 21st century, the Army must change two aspects of its assignment policy for women. First, the Army must reword or remove the collocation restriction from its policy. Current doctrine advocates collocation and units in Iraq and Afghanistan are clearly following doctrine. If the Army deems the collocation aspect to be critical, it must reword the definition so it is clear and consistent with doctrine. Second, the Army should take the lead in developing a common DOD definition of direct ground combat that matches the realities of 21st century warfare.
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Abstract

The role of women in the armed forces has always been and will probably always be a hotly contested topic. Recent statements by senior civilian and military leaders illustrate the reliance the nation has placed on women in the armed forces. In view of the valuable role women play in the Army and the policies that govern their assignment, this monograph will address the question: Is the Army assignment policy for women relevant in the context of 21st century warfare?

Many Americans are familiar with ‘Rosie the Riveter’, the iconic symbol of women in the wartime workforce during World War II. This further symbolizes the growing role of women in both society and the Army during periods of total war throughout U.S. history. From the early days of serving with the Army, to an institutionalized role with the Armed Forces Integration Act of 1948, and finally full integration with the All-Volunteer Force, the role of women in the Army has greatly increased. Understanding the historical aspect of women in the Army provides useful background information for understanding the ongoing debate.

The Army published Army Regulation 600-13, its assignment policy for women, in 1992. The Department of Defense published its policy in 1994. Both policies originated at the end of the Cold War when major combat operations (MCO) thinking predominated in doctrine. Additionally, they were influenced by the MCO victory during Operation Desert Storm. Both policies intend to minimize exposure of women to direct ground combat instead of preventing them from participating in direct ground combat. While similar in wording, the two policies are different in two critical areas. First, the policies have different definitions for direct ground combat. Second, the policies differ on the issue of collocation. The DOD policy permits restrictions on assignment of women where units and positions are doctrinally required to physically collocate and remain with direct ground combat units that are closed to women. The Army policy permits restrictions on assignment of women where the position or unit routinely physically locates and remains with a military unit assigned a doctrinal mission to routinely engage in direct combat. The critical differences in the use of collocation and definitions of direct combat provide a framework to analyze current practices in 21st century warfare.

The nature of modern warfare is certainly different from centuries past. The Army must operate across the spectrum of conflict, only a portion of which is MCO. Partially in response to this, the Army transformed to a modular force. Women perform duties in Forward Support Companies (FSC) that male soldiers previously performed in the Army of Excellence. Current Army doctrine advocates collocation of the FSC with its supported maneuver battalion, the majority of which have a doctrinal mission to routinely engage in direct combat. Current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan indicate that Army units are following doctrine and FSCs or sub-elements/positions are collocating with their supported units. Female casualty figures and awards for bravery under fire and combat action illustrate the changed nature of warfare and the role women play in support of the Army on the modern battlefield.

To remain relevant in the 21st century, the Army must change two aspects of its assignment policy for women. First, the Army must reword or remove the collocation restriction from its policy. Current doctrine advocates collocation and units in Iraq and Afghanistan are clearly following doctrine. If the Army deems the collocation aspect to be critical, it must reword the definition so it is clear and consistent with doctrine. Second, there are no longer clearly defined forward and rear areas. The modern battlefield has changed. The Army should take the lead in developing a common DOD definition
of direct ground combat that matches the realities of 21st century warfare. If the Army does not act, civilian leaders may force it to take a giant step backwards in terms of opportunities for women.
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Introduction

“The greatest change that has come about in the United States Forces in the time I’ve been in the military service has been the extensive use of women.”

General John W. Vessey, Jr.
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
February 2, 1984

Throughout the history of the United States, women have volunteered to serve with and in the armed forces. However, “the incorporation of women into the US armed forces has been an evolutionary process.” From the Revolutionary War through Vietnam, women performed various duties in support of the Army, as both civilian volunteers and uniformed members of the Army. These duties included medics on the field and in military hospitals, doctors and nurses, cooks, laundresses, ammunition suppliers on the battlefield, camp maintenance workers, telephone operators, quartermaster clerks, and other clerical duties. After the creation of the All-Volunteer Force (AVF) in 1973, opportunities for women in the Army increased significantly and today women comprise approximately 14 percent of the active duty Army. Women have served their country with honor and distinction in Panama, Desert Shield/Storm, Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq, where they make up about 10 percent of the deployed force. During these conflicts, women have been subject to hostilities and ultimately killed in action, wounded in action, and held captive by the nation’s enemies.

Bernard Rotsker, former Under Secretary of the Army (1998-2000) and Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (2000-2001), argues that women, as a group, are most responsible for the success of the AVF, as both soldiers and spouses of soldiers. Others share that sentiment. In 1982, Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger said, “Women in the military are a very important part of our total force capability. Qualified women are essential to obtaining the numbers of quality people required to maintain the readiness of our forces. This Department must aggressively break down those remaining barriers that prevent us from making the fullest use of the capabilities of women in providing for our national defense.” In March 2005, the Secretary of the Army, Chief of Staff of the Army, and

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3 Ibid., 1 and 5.
Sergeant Major of the Army jointly said, “Women are an invaluable and essential part of the Army team. They play a crucial role in the War on Terrorism and their sacrifices in this noble effort underscore their dedication and willingness to share great responsibilities—hallmarks of the American Soldier.”\(^7\) Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates echoed these comments by saying, “Today, there are few areas of our military where women have not established themselves as skilled and dedicated leaders. They are facing the dangers – and have also paid the price – of our campaigns in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other conflict zones with extraordinary courage. America simply can’t go to war without them.”\(^8\) It is clear that senior civilian and military leaders place great value on the service of women in defense of the nation.

The role of women in the armed forces has always been and will probably always be a hotly contested topic. The laws and policies governing assignment of women in the armed forces pay testament to this debate. While the armed forces are undergoing a transformation to a more agile and lethal force in an age of persistent conflict, the debate continues. While commenting on this transformation, former Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld said, “This transformation is not only about weapon systems and force structure, however. It is also about transforming our policies and practices, to include manpower and personnel policies. Changes to personnel policy cannot be made quickly; they take thought, analysis, and discussion. But it is clear that the world has changed, the force has changed, and some of our policies and practices must change as well.”\(^9\)

In view of the valuable role women play in the Army and the policies that govern their assignment, this monograph will address the question: Is the Army assignment policy for women relevant in the context of 21\(^{st}\) century warfare? An overview of women’s role in the Army and society during the Civil War, World War I, World War II, the Cold War, and the AVF illustrates the nation’s increasing dependence on women and provide background for the remainder of the monograph. A detailed analysis of current Department of Defense (DOD) and Army assignment policies and their relationship to doctrine provides a framework to examine current practices. An overview of the changed nature of war, current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, Army modularization, and current doctrine provides insight to answering the monograph’s question. Given the reality of the current operational environment and the Army’s transformation to address it, the Army’s current assignment policies for women are no longer relevant. The Army must reword or remove the collocation rule from


its assignment policy and the Army must take the lead in developing a common DOD definition for direct combat.

**Historical Overview: Women in the Army**

**Civil War**

War, especially total war, often results in social change. The Civil War resulted in the fielding of mass armies for the first time in American history. At the start of the war, the U.S. Army had 16,000 soldiers. By the end of the war, the Union alone fielded an army of over one million men. Whether it is buttons on the uniforms, bayonets on the rifles, or beans in the stomachs of its soldiers, mass armies require economic mobilization in order to sustain them. The federal government became the single largest purchaser in the American economy during the Civil War. Government requirements generated rapid growth in war related industries such as iron, textile, shoe manufacturing, and meatpacking. Military and economic mobilization can be at odds with each other in terms of available manpower competition. As they would in future conflicts, women helped fill the manpower void. The Civil War “gave impetus to the budding women’s movement, as hundreds of thousands of female workers replaced men on factory lines and farms, dispelling myths of female inadequacy and stimulating social activism.” The intervening century between end of the war and Congressional passage of the Equal Rights Amendment in 1972 would prove to be a long and sometimes difficult journey for the women’s movement.

Earlier conflicts involved small field armies and less of a requirement for support functions. However, with the Civil War, field armies became significantly larger, magnifying the requirement for support that women provided. Probably the single most influential contribution made by women during the Civil War was in the field of health care. As was the case in previous conflicts, “death due to disease continued to account for a far greater proportion of mortality in the war than death due to wounds and injury; thus the care of sick and injured (was) a riskier military occupation than that of soldier.” Large field armies and horrendous casualties put a drain on the available male manpower pool. To provide required medical support, the Union Army recruited and trained approximately 6,000 female nurses to serve with the army, primarily through the efforts of Dorothea Dix, appointed Superintendent of Army Nurses by the U.S. Secretary of War. Doctor Mary Walker, a combat surgeon

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12 Ibid, 264.

13 Jeanne Holm, *Women in the Military: An Unfinished Revolution*, Rev. ed. (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1992), 7. Jeanne Holm is a retired U.S. Air Force Major General with 33 years of service. At the time of her retirement, she was the highest ranking woman in the U.S. armed forces.


World War I

Similar to the Civil War, World War I saw the return of the mass army. In a period of only 19 months, the United States drafted 2.8 million men, housed, clothed, fed, and equipped them, and transported two million of them to Europe. This military mobilization required an economic mobilization with the inevitable competition for manpower. As before, women left their household work and other tradition female jobs and helped to fill the void in businesses and factories. “From 1910 to 1920, the number of women employed as laborers or semiskilled operatives in manufacturing increased by over 400,000, and numerous inroads were made into other skilled occupations and professions traditionally dominated by men.” More importantly for women, the suffrage campaign, which started at the end of the Civil War, came to fruition. On August 18, 1920, an amendment, originally introduced to Congress in 1878, was ratified as the 19th amendment to the Constitution guaranteeing the right to vote to women. The country’s first major foreign war brought significant social change for women. Equal rights for all, however, was still decades away.

In recognition of the skills and contributions of trained nurses, Congress established the Army Nurse Corps in 1901 as an Army auxiliary. Unlike previous conflicts where the Army hired women nurses at the beginning and dismissed them at the conclusion of the war, service with the Army was now permanent. Service with the Army was an important distinction as opposed to service in the Army. “Nurses had no military rank, equal pay, or other benefits [of] military service such as retirement or veterans’ benefits.” Despite this inequality, the Army Nurse Corps was a functioning organization at the start of World War I.

During the course of the war, the Army Nurse Corps expanded from a pre-war strength of 400 to over 20,000 nurses. Over 10,000 of these nurses served overseas in Europe in all levels of hospitals. Three received the Distinguished Service Cross and 38 died in service, most being victims of the flu.

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18 Ibid., 274.


22 Holm, *Women in the Military*, 10. According to the National Archives, the flu epidemic that swept the world in 1918 killed an estimated 50 million people, while deaths from World War I were only approximately 16 million.
Despite their heroic service, both the War Department and the Surgeon General’s Office opposed giving comparable military rank to female Army nurses since it might place them in positions of authority over males. In 1920, however, the Army finally granted female nurses relative rank entitling them to nomenclature and insignia similar to male officers and granted them authority in and around hospitals after that of male officers of the Medical Department.\(^{23}\) It would take another total war, however, to prompt change to this separate and unequal status.

**World War II**

Many Americans are familiar with ‘Rosie the Riveter’, the iconic symbol of women in the wartime workforce during World War II. As with previous large-scale conflicts, this war required a massive military force and corresponding mobilization of the economy, except the scale was much larger. In addition to supporting armed forces of approximately 16-17 million men, the U.S. also supplied allies with war materiel. In support of this massive economic effort, “16.5 million women were employed—36 percent of the civilian labor force. The large-scale entry of women into occupations from which they had largely been excluded permanently altered the composition of the American labor force.”\(^{24}\)

In the years leading up to World War II, the War Department began to envision a larger role for women. Both the 1926 Phipps Plan and the 1928 Hughes Plan envisioned a women’s corps placed in the Army instead of the traditional auxiliary corps attached to the Army. At the request of the Army Chief of Staff, the Army staff completed a third plan in 1939 that envisioned a women’s corps similar to the all-male Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC), with women in a civilian status.\(^{25}\) The massive mobilization required for World War II and the subsequent shortage of manpower to support both the armed forces and civilian industry brought reality to the plans and studies of the interwar years.

In an effort to help alleviate the manpower shortage, Congress passed Public Law 554 in 1942. Sponsored by Congresswoman Edith Nourse Rogers, this legislation established the Women’s Army Auxiliary Corps (WAAC), a small group of women attached to rather than in the Army.\(^{26}\) The WAAC was

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\(^{23}\) Devilbiss, *Women and Military Service*, 5. The reluctance to grant comparable military rank was based on women’s place in society at the time. In a hierarchical organization like the Army, the thought of women being in charge of men was not acceptable. Social change resulting from World War I, including the ratification of the 19th Amendment in August 1920, likely influenced the Army’s decision to grant relative rank to female nurses.


\(^{25}\) Holm, *Women in the Military*, 19. The Army appointed Anita Phipps as the Director Women’s Programs to appease powerful women’s organizations. On her own initiative, she developed a plan to prove the need for 170,000 women in the event of major war. Major Everett Hughes was a personnel planner on the General Staff. His plan focused on how to incorporate large numbers of women into the male only army in the event of total war, something he saw as an inevitable requirement. General Marshall directed completion of the third plan based on an anticipated manpower shortage during total war. All three plans were ultimately buried in the files of the War Department until after the United States entered World War II.

problematic from the start. The Army administered the WAAC under a parallel set of regulations. Unlike males in the Army, there was no legally binding contract to keep women in the WAAC. If deployed, women would not have the same legal protection as men nor were they entitled to the same benefits if wounded or injured. Additionally, women were not entitled to military rank, equal pay, or entitlements for dependents. To alleviate this disparity, Congress passed another bill in the summer of 1943 establishing the Women’s Army Corps (WAC), which finally gave full military status to women. However, the bill excluded women from flag rank, set the WAC as a temporary organization (duration of war plus six months), and forbade WACs from commanding men without specific orders. Despite these limitations, approximately 100,000 women served in the WACs as medical personnel, clerks, truck drivers, pilots, mechanics, air traffic controllers, and radio/telephone operators. Prior to the war, many of these job specialties were male dominated fields both in the Army and in general society.

Throughout the war, the War Department conscripted men under the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940. Even though the Soviet Union and Great Britain conscripted women during the war, the United States filled the ranks of the WACs with volunteers in order to free up men to fight. Interesting for the times, a public opinion poll in December 1943 indicated that 78 percent of Americans were in favor of drafting 300,000 single women for the WAC rather than drafting an equal number of married men for the same work. Despite this, Congress did not then and has not ever passed legislation requiring women to either participate in or even register for the draft.

The Cold War

The Women’s Armed Services Integration Act of 1948, Public Law 625, established for the first time a permanent role for women in the military. While institutionalizing the role of women in the military, the law also imposed a two percent ceiling on the number of women who could be on active duty at one time in each service, excluded women from flag rank, and set different enlistment standards and dependency entitlements for men and women. Despite these differences, the nation could still use this small permanent base to mobilize military womanpower in the event of another national emergency. This concept is similar to the small regular Army being the base to mobilize manpower for war, a technique used by the United States through World War II.

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27 Holm, Women in the Military, 24.
30 Devilbiss, Women and Military Service, 8.
32 Holm, Women in the Military, 120.
The Korean War once again called for mobilization of manpower via volunteers and conscription to support the war effort. With enlistees and both voluntary and involuntary recalls of WAC reservists, the WAC strength peaked at 12,000. In 1951, the Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services (DACOWITS) was formed to help the services recruit more women and to also serve as a public relations’ vehicle for women’s programs. With a temporary lifting of the two percent ceiling on women, the services embarked on an ambitious recruiting drive in the fall of 1951 with slogans like America’s Finest Women Stand Beside Her Finest Men. By the spring of 1952, WAC plans to increase strength from 12,000 to 32,000 failed miserably, with strength actually slipping to around 11,500.

By the mid-1960s, as American involvement in Vietnam increased, so too did the opposition to the draft and the Services experienced a manpower shortage. In 1967, the President’s Commission on Selective Service recommended that more opportunities be made available to women in the armed forces in order to reduce the magnitude of involuntary male conscription. Public Law 90-130, passed in 1967, removed the two percent ceiling for women and removed promotion barriers allowing women to compete for flag rank. That same year, the Department of Defense (DOD) directed the Services to increase the number of women on active duty. Most of the women who served in Vietnam, like other wars, were in the medical field. Like in all previous wars, “some returned with combat decorations, some returned with wounds (physical and/or psychological), and some did not return at all.” With the end of the Vietnam War also came the end of peacetime conscription and the birth of the All-Volunteer Force. Henceforth, both men and women would be volunteers.

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33 Bettie J. Morden, The Women’s Army Corps: 1945-1978 (Washington, DC: United States Army Center of Military History, 1990), 95 and 98; Holm, Women in the Military, 152. Reservists are subject to involuntary recall. This is not the same as a draft. When the war began, the Army Reserve had only 4,281 WAC reservists. Of these, the Army voluntarily recalled 1,593 and involuntarily recalled 175 in the first year of the war. The involuntary recalls were all officers.

34 Devilbiss, Women and Military Service, 10.

35 Holm, Women in the Military, 152.

36 Morden, The Women’s Army Corps: 1945-1978, 103; Holm, Women in the Military, 153. The recruiting drive failed largely because the Army assumed recruiting large numbers of women would be easy like during World War II. However, the circumstances were different. Unlike World War II, a total war with wide public support, Korea was a “police action” under the auspicious of the United Nations. Public support of the war was declining at the time the recruiting drive began. Poor recruiting results and increased discharges for marriage and pregnancy resulted in a decreased WAC strength. Korea was also a limited war, which did not require massive economic mobilization and wide scale use of women in the civilian workforce.

37 Devilbiss, Women and Military Service, 10; Morden, The Women’s Army Corps: 1945-1978, 223, 226, 227, and 298. The Army authorized a 38 percent increase in WAC strength (3,582 personnel), but it took until 1972 to achieve this. Similar to Korea, public opinion on the war and discharges due marriage, pregnancy and unsuitability impacted the Army’s ability to increase strength.

38 Devilbiss, Women and Military Service, 11.
The All-Volunteer Force

Congressional passage of the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) in 1972 and the creation of the All-Volunteer Force (AVF) in 1973 provided the impetus for a dramatic increase in the percentage of women serving in the Army. In the intervening decades, the percentage of women in the Army grew steadily from 2.5 percent in 1973 to 14 percent in 2007. In 1975, the Army began requiring women to participate in individual weapons proficiency training and inducted the first female cadet to West Point in 1976. “Throughout the 1980s, the military dropped barriers and restrictions, opening more jobs to women including non-combat flying, missile launch positions, and shipboard duty. The military continually refined combat and combat support occupations to allow the services to integrate more women.”

Operation Desert Shield/Storm in 1990-1991, proved to be the first great test of the AVF with an increased percentage of serving women. More than 40,000 women served, alongside their male counterparts, with courage, honor, and distinction during the Persian Gulf War. “Operation Desert Storm showed that women could satisfactorily perform many jobs traditionally held by men and that they could be in danger even if restricted from combat posts. The action also called into question the belief that the American public would be unable to accept female casualties or the idea of female prisoners of war. Casualties among female military personnel, which included 13 deaths and two prisoners of war, appeared to be viewed in the same spirit among the American people as casualties among males.” Desert Storm clearly illustrated the vital contributions of women in the Army on the modern battlefield.

Throughout history, the role of women in the Army has ebbed and flowed based on the needs of the nation and the Army. From the days of civilian volunteers to the creation of the Army Nurse Corps, 

39 Morden, *The Women’s Army Corps: 1945-1978*, 257 and 299. Without a draft, planners anticipated an increased requirement for women in the military services. Based on the popularity of the women’s rights movement, the Army studied the impact of ERA passage and determined that a separate women’s organization (WAC) with different rules would be hard to defend. Even though Congress passed the ERA in 1972, it was not ratified.


the WAAC, the WAC and finally the AVF, women have answered the call and served the Army both off and on the battlefield. The ongoing debate about women in the Army entered a new realm after Desert Storm as women had successfully served on the battlefield in large numbers. The first major war after creation of the AVF, therefore, necessitated a review of laws and policies concerning assignment of women service members during which Congress, DOD and the Army developed or influenced the current assignments policies that the Army went to war with in the 21st century.

**Current Assignment Policies For Women**

**DOD Assignment Policies**

Throughout the late 1970s and 1980s, the services dropped many of the barriers and restrictions to women serving in certain occupational specialties. All services had their own policies and regulations regarding assignment of women. Additionally, the Navy, Marines, and Air Force were constrained by exclusion laws. Title 10 United States Code (U.S.C.) 6015 restricted assignment of women to vessels or aircraft that engage in combat missions. Likewise, Title 10 U.S.C. 8549 restricted assignment of Air Force women to aircraft engaged in combat missions. In an effort to help standardize service assignments policies for women, the Department of Defense (DOD) established the ‘risk rule’ in 1988. This rule provided the services a framework with which to evaluate non-combat positions to determine if they should be open or closed to women. The rule intended to reduce the probability of exposure to direct combat rather than prohibit women from serving in combat all together. The risk rule states:

> "Risks of direct combat, exposure to hostile fire, or capture are proper criteria for closing non-combat positions or units to women, when the type, degree, and duration of such risk are equal to or greater than the combat units with which they are normally associated within a given theater of operations. If the risk of non-combat units or positions is less than comparable to land, air, or sea combat units with which they are associated, they should be open to women. Non-combat land units should be compared to combat land units, air to air and so forth."  

After the Persian Gulf War, Congressional debate of the 1992 Defense Authorization Act focused on the existing combat exclusion laws. Supporters of the exclusion laws wanted more study while opponents felt they were obsolete. Senator Ted Kennedy said, "That law is bad for women because it denies them an equal opportunity for service and advancement in the military." The debate resulted

45 Presidential Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces, B-7 and B-13.

46 Presidential Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces, 36.


48 William B. Breuer, *War and American Women: Heroism, Deeds, and Controversy* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997), 158. Many proponents of women in combat believed that restricting women from the traditional combat arms positions negatively impacted the ability of women to be promoted to the highest ranks.
in Public Law 102-190, signed on December 5, 1991. This law repealed Title 10 U.S.C. Section 8549 and amended provisions of Section 6015 restricting women from combat aircraft and non-combatant vessels. The law also created the Presidential Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces, which was to assess the laws and policies restricting assignment of female service members and make recommendations to the President by November 15, 1992. 49 This bipartisan group consisting of both active/retired military and civilians conducted extensive research to include hearings, interviews, and surveys prior to defining and providing recommendations for 17 relevant issues. 50 In the context of women in combat, the Commission concluded that American military, religious, and cultural experience did not preclude women from serving in direct combat positions for which they are qualified. The Commission, however, recommended that women be excluded from units and positions with direct land combat missions and that service direct land combat exclusion policies be codified. 51 Based on current law, the Secretary of Defense, in April 1993, directed service chiefs to open more positions to women to include combat aircraft and non-combatant ships. 52 With the passage of Public Law 103-160 on November 30, 1993, Congress repealed the combatant ship exclusions (10 USC Section 6015), the last remaining lawful exclusion, leaving only the DOD ‘risk rule’ and service policies and regulations to govern the assignment of women in the armed forces. Additionally, Congress required DOD to provide a 30-day notification prior to opening any additional combat positions to women. 53

Taking into account the November 1992 report from the Presidential Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin established the current Department of Defense (DOD) assignments policy for women in the military in January 1994. Aspin’s memorandum rescinded the previous DOD ‘risk rule’, which was viewed as “no longer appropriate

49 National Defense Authorization Act For Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993, Public Law 190, 102nd Cong. (December 5, 1991), §531, §541(a), §542(a), and §543(a).

50 Presidential Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces, v. Section, 543 of PL 102-190 mandated most of the issues the Commission confronted. The issues relevant to this monograph include combat roles for women, ground combat, combat aircraft, special operations, and the risk rule.

51 Presidential Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces, 22 and 24. In making this recommendation, the Commission considered physiological differences between the sexes, a 1992 survey of Army women showing little interest in serving in ground combat specialties, unit cohesion, international experience with women in ground combat units, and military/general public opinion polls.


based on experiences during Operation Desert Storm, where everyone in the theater of operation was at risk.”54 The new policy also established rules and definitions for ground combat:

Rule: “Service members are eligible to be assigned to all positions for which they are qualified, except that women shall be excluded from assignment to units below the brigade level whose primary mission is to engage in direct combat on the ground as defined below.”

Definition: “Direct ground combat is engaging an enemy on the ground with individual or crew served weapons, while being exposed to hostile fire and to a high probability of direct physical contact with the hostile force’s personnel. Direct combat takes place well forward on the battlefield while locating and closing with the enemy to defeat them by fire, maneuver, or shock effect.”55

The intent of Aspin’s 1994 memorandum was to provide more defined guidance to the services and to expand opportunities for women in the armed forces by opening more occupations. Aspin’s previous guidance in April 1993 restricted women from direct combat on the ground, but did not provide a definition for direct combat on the ground. Aspin’s memorandum also permitted service policies and regulations to include certain restrictions on the assignment of women:

“where units and positions are doctrinally required to physically collocate and remain with direct ground combat units that are closed to women; where units are engaged in long range reconnaissance operations and Special Operation Forces missions; and where job related physical requirements would necessarily exclude the vast majority of women Service members.”56

**Army Assignment Policy**

Published in 1992, Army Regulation (AR) 600-13 is the Army policy for assigning women. It is interesting to note that the Army did not update its policy in response to Aspin’s 1994 memorandum. It would appear that DOD created its policy in consideration of existing Army policy. Although similar, the policies are not exactly the same. Army Regulation 600-13 establishes the Army’s own rules and definitions:

Rule: “The Army’s assignment policy for female soldiers allows women to serve in any officer or enlisted specialty or position except in those specialties, positions, or units

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56 Ibid.
(battalion size or smaller) which are assigned a routine mission to engage in direct combat, or which collocate routinely with units assigned a direct combat mission.”

Definition of Direct Combat: “Engaging an enemy with individual or crew served weapons while being exposed to direct enemy fire, a high probability of direct physical contact with the enemy’s personnel and a substantial risk of capture. Direct combat takes place while closing with the enemy by fire, maneuver, and shock effect in order to destroy or capture the enemy, or while repelling the enemy’s assault by fire, close combat, or counterattack.”57

To implement this rule, the Army uses the Direct Combat Position Coding (DCPC) system. The DCPC uses three dimensions in order to classify a position either open or closed to women. They system considers duties of the position and area of concentration or military occupational specialty, the unit mission, and routine collocation.58 The Army classifies positions when building or updating unit Tables of Organization and Equipment (TOE) and assigns identity codes to the Modified Tables of Organization and Equipment (MTOE). The Army closes positions to women only if:

-“The specialty or position requires routine engagement in direct combat.

- The position is in a battalion or smaller size unit that has a mission of routine engagement in direct combat.

- The position is in a unit that routinely collocates with battalion or smaller size units assigned a mission to engage in direct combat.

- The position is in a portion of a unit that routinely collocates with a battalion or smaller size unit having a direct combat mission.”59

According to the Army’s definition, collocation “occurs when the position or unit routinely physically locates and remains with a military unit assigned a doctrinal mission to routinely engage in direct combat. Specifically, positions in units or sub-units which routinely collocate with units assigned a direct combat mission are closed to women. An entire unit will not be closed because a subunit routinely collocates with a unit assigned a direct combat mission. The sub-unit will be closed to women.”60

Once female soldiers are properly assigned to DCPC open positions or units, they “are subject to the same utilization policies as their male counterparts. In the event of hostilities, female soldiers will

57 Headquarters, Department of the Army, “Army Policy for the Assignment of Female Soldiers,”Army Regulation 600-13 (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, March 27, 1992), 1 and 5.
58 Ibid., 2.
59 Ibid. This regulation defines routine as a ‘regular course of procedure’.
60 Ibid., 5. Emphasis added by author.
remain with their assigned units and continue to perform their assigned duties.” Historically, there have always been rear area threats. By stating that women will remain with their unit and perform their duties in the event of hostilities, the Army policy clearly does not intend to prevent women from participating in ground combat. The policy intends to minimize the exposure to direct combat by restricting assignment of women to those units whose mission requires routine engagement in direct combat. It is also important to note that this is an assignments policy, not an employment policy. The assignments policy dictates the type of units to which women cannot be assigned. It does not dictate how, once properly assigned, women are employed in a theater of operations. “Thus, local commanders, especially tactical commanders, are free to use the resources they have in the most effective way they determine, as the policy states that female soldiers are subject to the same utilization policies as their male counterparts.”

When the Army implemented its assignment policy in 1992, operations doctrine focused on countering a threat from the Warsaw Pact in Europe. In characterizing the operational environment, Field Manual 100-5 stated, “Opposing forces will rarely fight along orderly, distinct lines. Massive troop concentrations or immensely destructive fires will make some penetrations by both combatants nearly inevitable. This means that linear warfare will most often be a temporary condition at best and that distinctions between rear and forward areas will be blurred.” This doctrine clearly defined the rear area threat expected in major combat operations and went on to define rear area combat by saying, “Support projected forward from rear areas will be subject to attack by subversion; terrorism; large airmobile, amphibious, or airborne forces; and long-range conventional, chemical, or nuclear fires.” This doctrine explicitly acknowledged that female soldiers assigned to units that do not routinely engage in direct combat were, in fact, likely to be engaged in direct combat while ‘repelling the enemy’s assault by fire, close combat, or counterattack’ in the rear area.

New operations doctrine implemented in 1993 sought to provide guidance on the changing nature of conflict by saying, “Conditions or events that would cause forces to be employed will challenge Army forces. Such conditions include drug trafficking, natural or man-made disasters, regional conflicts, civil wars, insurgencies, and intimidation by irrational and often ruthless extremists who have available for their use all manner of weapons and systems, including weapons of mass destruction. Unlike the Cold War era when threats were measurable and to some degree predictable, Army forces today are

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61 Army Regulation 600-13, March 27, 1992, 2.
64 Ibid., 1-3.
likely to encounter conditions of greater ambiguity and uncertainty.” This version, unlike its predecessor, did not clearly define a rear area threat. Army units, however, continued to train this rear area threat at the National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, California. During training rotations at NTC in the mid 1990s, it was common for support units in the Brigade Support Area (BSA) to be attacked by enemy rocket or artillery fire, chemical munitions, special forces or remnants of enemy armored formations. In defending the BSA, males and females alike were utilized the same in accordance with Army policy. Support units, who are expected to provide their own self-defense against level I and II threats, were required to ‘engage the enemy with individual or crew served weapons while being exposed to direct enemy fire’ while ‘repelling the enemy’s assault by fire, close combat, or counterattack.’ On the surface, this appears to meet most of the stipulations in both the DOD definition of direct ground combat and the Army definition of direct combat.

Recent Developments

While the current DOD and Army policies have not changed since instituted in 1992 and 1994 respectively, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan triggered new debate. In May 2005, the House Armed Services Committee Chairman Duncan Hunter (R-Calif.) introduced an amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 that would require the Army to prohibit women from serving in any company-size unit that provides support to combat battalions or their subordinate companies. Specifically, this measure aimed to prevent women from serving in Forward Support Companies (FSCs), which provide direct support to maneuver battalions as envisioned by the ongoing Army modularization. If enacted into law, this legislation would have restricted assignment of women to thousands of positions that were currently open to them. A statement released by Rep. Hunter said, “The Forward Support Companies under the new Army modularization will be called upon to move into battle to support combat forces. Rocket-propelled grenades, machine gun fire and all the other deadly aspects of war will make no distinction between women and men on the front lines. The American

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65 Headquarters, Department of the Army, “Operations,” Field Manual 100-5 (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, June 14, 1993), 1-1. This doctrine reflects the nature of military commitments during the 1990s.

66 Franklin L. Wenzel, interview by author, Fort Leavenworth, KS, February 9, 2009. Mr Wenzel participated in two rotations to NTC in 1988 and 1993 and trained on the events described here. He was also the Senior Logistics Trainer at NTC from 2006-2007. The author participated in NTC rotations in 1994 and 1996 and as an observer controller from 1996-1997 with similar experiences. Field Manual 3-19.1 defines Level I threats as terrorism, enemy controlled agents, enemy sympathizers, or civil disturbances and Level II threats as guerilla forces, unconventional forces, or small tactical units.

67 Ann Scott Tyson, “Panel Votes to Ban Women from Combat,” Washington Post, May 12, 2005. The 3rd Infantry Division, the first modular division to employ FSCs, deployed to Iraq in December 2004 and January 2005. News reports on employment of women in FSCs and comments from constituents likely influenced Rep. Hunter’s decision to introduce this amendment. Ironically, Senator Hillary Clinton introduced legislation (s. 1134) in the Senate on May 26, 2005 expressing the sense of Congress that there should be no change to existing statutes, regulations or policies that would decrease women’s role in the military. According to the Library of Congress records and Senator Pat Robert’s office, Senator Clinton’s legislation did not make it out of committee.
people have never wanted to have women in combat and this reaffirms that policy.”68 Not surprisingly, many women in Congress were opposed to this proposed legislation. Rep. Susan Davis (D-Calif.) asked, “Can we really afford to toss out 20 percent or more of the individuals who are serving so capably in these units?”69 Senior Army leaders strongly criticized this proposed legislation. General Richard A. Cody, Army Vice Chief of Staff at the time, stated that the amendment would cause confusion amongst soldiers and send the wrong signal to both men and women currently fighting the war on terror. Cody was adamant that the Army was in compliance with DOD and Army policies regarding assignment of women, but was still looking at the role of women in the context of Army modularization and the changing nature of warfare in the 21st century.70 Ultimately, this amendment, as originally written, did not make it into the 2006 National Defense Authorization Act; women continue to serve in FSCs, and the debate continues.71

There are no statutory restrictions involving the assignment of women in the Army. The Army policy, published in 1992, reflected the operational environment and threat of the time. The DOD policy, published in 1994, supported the existing Army policy. While similar in wording, there are several differences between the DOD and Army assignment policies for women. The Army policy restricts women from serving in units that routinely physically locate and remain with units assigned a doctrinal mission to routinely engage in direct combat. The DOD policy authorizes the services to restrict assignment of women to units or positions that are doctrinally required to physically collocate and remain with direct ground combat units. The different placement of the words doctrinal and doctrinally is significant for collocation. Additionally, the two policies have different definitions for ground combat. The Army policy adds ‘substantial risk of capture’ to the definition along with ‘repelling the enemy’s assault by fire, close combat, or counterattack’. The potential impact of these differences, in the context of 21st Century warfare and the role that women are playing in the Army, is the core of the issue.


69 Tyson, “Panel Votes to Ban Women from Combat.”

70 Tyson, “Panel Votes to Ban Women from Combat.”

71 After consulting with Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, Rep. Hunter agreed to revise his original amendment. Section 541 of NDAA 2006 required the Secretary of Defense to notify Congress 30 days in advance of implementing changes to female assignment policies and required DOD to submit a report to Congress reviewing the current and future implementation of the policy regarding the assignment of women as articulated in the DOD policy memorandum of 1994. The author submitted a request to DOD on February 10, 2009 for status on this report. As of March 26, 2009, DOD has not responded. A review of the Library of Congress records for the 111th Congress indicates that there are no bills or resolutions pending concerning women in combat as of February 10, 2009.
War in the 21st Century

“In the combat environment of today, unlike conflicts of the past, there is little distinction between the forward and rear areas. Battlefields of the Global War on Terrorism, and battles to be fought in the US Army’s future, are and will be asymmetrical, violent, unpredictable, and multidimensional. Today’s conflicts are fought throughout the whole spectrum of the battlespace by all Soldiers, regardless of military occupational specialty (MOS). Every Soldier must think as a Warrior first; a professional Soldier, trained, ready, and able to enter combat; ready to fight—and win—against any enemy, any time, any place.”72

Field Manual 3-21.75

The Influence of Doctrine

Operations doctrine in the 1980s, while recognizing a clear rear area threat, focused primarily on fighting the Warsaw Pact threat, a known enemy, in generally linear major combat operations in Europe. In the 1990s, sensing a shift in the future nature of warfare, the Army’s operations doctrine, recognized that the future operational environment would be uncertain and ambiguous. These thoughts carried forward into the new century and the Global War on Terror (GWOT), which has certainly proven to be complex, uncertain and ambiguous. The Army’s 2006 Game Plan described future leaders as multi-skilled pentathletes, “whose versatility and athleticism — qualities that reflect the essence of our Army — will enable them to learn and adapt in ambiguous situations in a constantly evolving environment.”73 With a look to the uncertain future operational environment and with lessons fresh from Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army published its new operations doctrine, Field Manual 3-0 in February 2008.

This new doctrine departed from the bygone era of linear operations and defined the operational environment consistent with the realities of 21st Century Warfare. “At the tactical and operational levels, subordinate units routinely operate in noncontiguous areas of operations. This contrasts sharply with the contiguous and hierarchical arrangement of land forces in operations prevalent in the past.”74 The manual went on to state that “due to the extremely high lethality and range of advanced weapons systems, and the tendency of adversaries to operate among the population, the risk to combatants and noncombatants will be much greater.”75 This doctrine does not differentiate


73 Headquarters, Department of the Army, “The 2006 Army Game Plan,”F100: Changing the Army; Selected Readings and References (Fort Leavenworth, KS: United States Army Command and General Staff College, August 2006), F102AB-6.

74 Headquarters, Department of the Army, “Operations,” Field Manual 3-0 (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, February 27, 2008), C-1.

75 Field Manual 3-0, February 27, 2008, 1-3.
between forward and rear areas. In fact, the very nature of non-contiguous operations imply that there are not really a true ‘forward’ and ‘rear’ area in today’s operational environment. The Army does acknowledge, however, that the risks to all soldiers, male and female alike, will be greater on the modern battlefield.

Army doctrine “provides an authoritative guide for leaders and Soldiers but requires original applications that adapt it to circumstances. Doctrine should foster initiative and creative thinking.”76 Two components of Army doctrine are fundamental principles and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). “Fundamental principles provide the foundation upon which Army forces guide their actions. They foster the initiative needed for leaders to become adaptive, creative problem solvers. Tactics, techniques, and procedures provide additional detail and more specific guidance, based on evolving knowledge and experience. Tactics, techniques, and procedures support and implement fundamental principles, linking them with associated applications.”77 Leaders in Iraq and Afghanistan, schooled in an Army trained and equipped to fight major combat operations, had to use initiative and creative thinking in order to apply doctrine in a complex environment and succeed. This creative thinking led to some techniques and procedures for the employment of women soldiers that are widely used by the Army’s modular Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) in current operations.

The Modular Army

“What's different today is our sense of urgency -- the need to build this future force while fighting a present war. It's like overhauling an engine while you're going at 80 miles an hour. Yet we have no other choice. Our military has a new and essential mission. For states that support terror, it's not enough that the consequences be costly -- they must be devastating.”78

President George W. Bush

December 11, 2001

Through most of the last century, the division was the centerpiece for Army maneuver. The Army designed the division to deploy and fight as a team. However, considering an operational environment characterized by non-contiguous and distributed operations, the Army applied creative

76 Ibid., D-1.
77 Ibid.
thinking in 2003 and shifted from a division centric to a brigade centric force. A force built around Brigade Combat Teams, modular support brigades, and functional brigades would allow the Army to quickly build expeditionary force packages and be more responsive to the full spectrum operations requirements of the Combatant Commanders.79 Brigade Combat Teams “begin as a cohesive combined arms team that can be further task-organized. Commands often augment them for a specific mission with capabilities not organic to the BCT structure. This organizational flexibility allows BCTs to function across the spectrum of conflict.”80 In addition to receiving augmentation from higher headquarters, BCT commanders internally task organize “all organic, assigned, attached, or OPCON [Operational Control] units as required” to better employ their formation.81 It is this internal task organization or employment, especially as it pertains to females in support units, which fans the flames of the continuing debate on women in combat.

Brigade Combat Team commanders task organize internally to maximize the capabilities of their assigned assets. According Field Manual 5-0, “when possible, commanders maintain cohesive mission teams. They organize task forces based on standing headquarters, their assigned forces, and habitually associated combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) (‘slice’) elements.”82 This task organization creates the issue of collocation, which seems to be what most critics of Army policy grasp. As mentioned before, Army policy states that collocation ‘occurs when the position or unit routinely physically locates and remains with a military unit assigned a doctrinal mission to routinely engage in direct combat’. The DOD policy supports Army policy by allowing restrictions on assignment of women ‘where units and positions are doctrinally required to physically collocate and remain with direct ground combat units that are closed to women’. While commonly understood that infantry and armor battalions in a BCT have an assigned, doctrinal mission to routinely engage in direct combat, it is not as clear if the FSC is doctrinally required to be physically located with the supported maneuver battalion. An examination of current doctrine for modular units illustrates this.

Field Manual 3-90.5, The Combined Arms Battalion (CAB), published in April 2008, states that the FSC is generally under the operational control (OPCON) of the CAB (see Appendix A for understanding of command and support relationships).83 This field manual clearly implies that the FSC positions in the maneuver battalion’s area of operations and would ‘physically collocate and remain with’ elements of the maneuver battalion (see Appendix B and E for visual depictions of FSC locations relative to maneuver battalions and Appendix C for specific excerpts from FM 3-90.5). This is most

79 Field Manual 3-0, February 27, 2008,C-1.
80 Ibid., C-6.
82 Headquarters, Department of the Army, “Army Planning and Orders Production,” Field Manual 5-0 (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, January 20, 2005), F-2.
83 Headquarters, Department of the Army, “The Combined Arms Battalion,” Field Manual 3-90.5 (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, April 7, 2008), 12-1.
evident in discussion of the composition of maneuver battalion trains and the positioning of company supply sergeants to assist the FSC in preparing logistical packages (LOGPACs) for the maneuver battalion. The only time the field manual uses the term ‘collocate’ in reference to the FSC is the potential requirement for the CAB personnel officer to collocate with the FSC to share FSC communications equipment.  

Field Manual 3-90.6, *The Brigade Combat Team*, published in August 2006, supports this by stating “battalion combat trains usually consist of the FSC and the battalion medical unit.” Both field manuals, published two and four years respectively after the start of modularization, appear to advocate collocation of the FSC with units assigned a doctrinal mission to routinely engage in direct combat. This is not, however, a new practice. Prior to modularization, maneuver battalions controlled their own logistics assets. The soldiers performing these functions were all male and assigned to the Headquarters Company. The company commander normally positioned these soldiers in the battalion combat trains or field trains as described in the current doctrine for the CAB. The difference now is that the Army assigns these logistics assets/soldiers to the FSC, which is open for assignment to women.

Current logistics doctrine concerning the BSB and FSC is contained in Field Manual Interims and initial draft documents. According to Field Manual Interim 4-90.1, *Heavy Brigade Combat Team Logistics*, published in March 2005, “The FSC, as the logistics provider for the HBCT’s battalions and squadron, will be assigned/organic to the combined arms and fires battalions and reconnaissance squadron.” The doctrinal template for the FSC clearly shows the FSC positioned in the maneuver battalions area of operations and elements of the FSC collocated with elements of the maneuver battalion (see Appendix D). This interim doctrine, published two months before Representative Hunter introduced an amendment to restrict women from assignment to FSCs, came at a time when Army authorization documents clearly listed the FSC as assigned to the BSB. Field Manual 4-90.1, *Brigade Support Battalion*, will ultimately replace this interim manual, which expired in March 2007. The initial draft of the BSB doctrine dated January 22, 2009, states “While normally under the command of the BSB, an FSC may be placed in either a command or support relationship with its supported battalion. Command relationships, such as OPCON or TACON, are generally limited in duration and focused on the

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84 Ibid., 12-4 and 12-7.


86 Colonel Robert D. Haycock, interview with author, Fort Leavenworth, KS, February 5, 2009. Colonel Haycock is a career infantry officer who served in infantry battalions prior to and after modularity. Additionally, the author was an infantry battalion S-4 and is knowledgeable of infantry battalion logistics.

87 Headquarters, Department of the Army, “Heavy Brigade Combat Team Logistics,” *Field Manual Interim 4-90.1* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, March 15, 2005), 1-9. Interim field manuals are only valid for two years after publication. This interim manual expired on March 15, 2007.
completion of a particular task or mission (e.g. the movement phase of an operation).” 88 In terms of location, the draft indicates that the company headquarters section positions in the supported battalion’s area of operations to provide command and control for the company while all or part of the Field Maintenance Teams (FMTs) collocate with their supported company teams. Additionally, this draft advocates collocation of the FSC commander/executive officer with the supported battalion S-1/S-4 at the combat trains command post. 89

Modular Brigade Combat Teams have operated in Iraq and Afghanistan for four years without a complete set of current doctrine. The Combined Arms Support Command (CASCOM) did not publish the new BSB field manual before expiration of FMI 4-90.1 in March 2007 due to manning shortfalls and other doctrinal priorities. 90 Fortunately, the initial draft of the BSB doctrine does track closely with the recently published Combined Arms Battalion doctrine in terms of command relationships and physical positioning of the FSC and its sub-units. While doctrine is important to the collocation issue, the Army must also look at unit missions to determine if positions that are closed to women based on the collocation rule.

Using the Direct Combat Position Coding (DCPC) system, the Army coded all brigade support battalion (BSB) positions in infantry and Stryker BCTs (IBCT and SBCT) as open to women. In the heavy BCT (HBCT) support battalion, 154 of 1,105 positions are coded male only, all of these in the maintenance platoons of the FSCs (see Appendix F). 91 All BSBs have a similar mission to “command and control organic units assigned to the brigade support battalion.” 92 Organic units of the BSB include a headquarters company, distribution company, maintenance company, medical company and four FSCs. The FSCs all have a similar mission, the only difference being the unit they support. The infantry FSC’s mission is “to provide direct and habitual combat service support to itself and the infantry battalion.” 93 Based on the stated mission of the BSB/FSC and guidance in AR 600-13, the Army assigns women to FSCs


89 Ibid., 57, 59, and 62. The draft manual uses the word “collocation” in this instance.

90 Major General James E. Chambers, interview with author, Fort Leavenworth, KS, February 4, 2009. MG Chambers is the CASCOM commander.

91 United States Army Force Management Support Agency, “Brigade Support Battalion Modified Table of Organization and Equipment,” FMS Web, https://www.usafmsar.com/protected/WebTAADS/tools.asp (accessed January 16, 2009). Most of the male only coded positions in the heavy BSB FSCs are in Field Maintenance Teams (FMTs). These teams conduct vehicle repair forward to include battlefield damage assessment and repair (BDAR) and typically collocate forward in the company team trains. The bulk of the positions in these FSCs, 79 percent, are open to women, including positions that are responsible to deliver fuel and ammunition forward.


93 Ibid.
including the FMTs of the HBCT CAB FSCs, which have a doctrinal requirement to collocate in the company trains of the maneuver companies.\textsuperscript{94}

The four FSCs in the BSB provide support to the four maneuver battalions of the BCT. These battalions, regardless of BCT type, have similar missions as indicated below:

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textbf{Infantry Battalions:} \textit{To close with and destroy enemy forces using fire, maneuver, and shock effect, or to repel his assault by fire and counterattack.}
  \item \textbf{Armor Battalions:} \textit{To close with and destroy enemy forces using fire, maneuver, and shock effect, or to repel his assault by fire and counterattack.}
  \item \textbf{Artillery Battalion:} To destroy, neutralize, or suppress the enemy by cannon fires.
  \item \textbf{Reconnaissance Surveillance \& Target Acquisition Squadron (RSTA): }To conduct reconnaissance and surveillance in support of the development of the brigade's situational awareness and knowledge in the area of operations. Squadron operations empower the brigade to anticipate, forestall and dominate threats, ensuring brigade mission accomplishment through decisive action and freedom of maneuver. \textsuperscript{95}
\end{itemize}

The MTOEs for the armor, RSTA, and artillery battalions do not list sub-missions for the subordinate companies, so the assumption is the subordinate unit missions are the same as the parent battalion. The infantry battalion MTOE, however, prescribes a mission for the rifle companies and weapons company that is similar to the battalion mission. The headquarters company, on the other hand, has a pure command and control, administrative, and logistics mission with no mention of closing with and destroying the enemy.\textsuperscript{96} Although, not listed for the other battalions, all headquarters companies have a similar mission. Based on MTOE missions, it is clear that infantry and armor battalions have a direct combat mission, which prevents FSCs from collocating with all companies in those battalions except the headquarters company. From a policy perspective there appears to be no issue with FSCs collocating with the RSTA and artillery battalions as long as BCT commanders employ those units according to their stated mission. Army Regulation 600-13, however, is only an assignments policy. The issue becomes employment of the FSC in an operational area and whether or not the FSC physically locates and remains with units assigned a direct combat mission.

Because of different thoughts on employment, FSC relationships in the modular BCTs varied across the Army. When the 101\textsuperscript{st} Airborne Division began transformation in the fall of 2004, the FSCs

\textsuperscript{94} Refer to Appendix C, section 12-119 for doctrinal positioning of the FMT and Appendix F for MTOE authorized male/female positions in the heavy BSB and the armor/infantry FMTs.


\textsuperscript{96} Field Manual 3-90.5, April 7, 2008, 2-3. This manual shows that the CAB headquarters company contains the battalion staff sections which assist the battalion commander to command and control the battalion. All battalion level headquarters companies contain the battalion staff sections similar to this example.
were assigned to the BSB, but generally conformed to an unwritten command relationship of ‘attached to the supported battalion’. Aside from certain administrative matters such as assignment of new soldiers and specific BSB Unit Identification Code (UIC) reporting requirements like the Unit Status Report (USR), the FSCs had a command and day-to-day working relationship with the supported unit. This allowed the new FSCs to forge a relationship with the supported unit, contributing to a cohesive mission team. This also eased the transition of male soldiers previously assigned to the infantry/artillery battalion support, maintenance, and mess platoons, who now found themselves assigned to the FSC, which was assigned to the BSB.97

In February 2005, prior to introduction of Congressman Hunter’s proposed amendment, the 101st Airborne Division issued a memorandum to clarify the relationship of the FSCs. This memorandum directed that FSCs receive all administrative support from the BSB with the exception of evaluation reports, which the supported maneuver battalions were to prepare. In essence, this required the FSC commander to interact with the BSB commander and staff for all administrative matters, but have a ‘command relationship’, to include the evaluation report, with the supported maneuver commander and staff.98 This was more of a ‘direct support’ relationship as defined by FM 5-0, but without the command relationship with the BSB, the parent unit of the FSC. While this may logically make sense in a garrison environment, the geographically dispersed way in which many BCTs operate in Iraq and Afghanistan creates problems for units in a relationship similar to this.99

Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan

“To win this war, we have to think differently. The enemy who appeared on September 11th seeks to evade our strength and constantly searches for our weaknesses. So America is required once again to change the way our military thinks and fights.” 100

President George W. Bush

December 11, 2001

97 Colonel Dan J. Reilly, interview by author, Fort Leavenworth, KS, February 5, 2009. Both Colonel Reilly and the author commanded Brigade Support Battalions in the 101st Airborne Division from 2004 to 2006 during which the units transformed to a modular organization. Both Colonel Reilly and the author had similar experiences in two different BCTs.

98 Major General Thomas R. Turner, Commanding General, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), memorandum for record dated February 15, 2005, Subject: Forward Support Companies. The division headquarters issued this guidance 6 months after transformation began.

99 An example of this is punishment under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). If the BSB has UCMJ authority over the FSC soldiers, then FSC soldiers being punished under field grade UCMJ actions would have to convoy to the BSB location with members of the chain of command for the proceedings. This unnecessarily puts soldiers at risk, especially if the FSC is collocated on a geographically dispersed FOB/camp with their supported maneuver battalion.

During combat operations in Iraq in 2005-2006, one BCT of the 101st Airborne Division had two relationships for FSCs based on geography. Two FSCs were task organized under the BSB since their supported maneuver battalions were collocated on the same camp as the BSB. These FSCs maintained a classic ‘direct support’ relationship in accordance with FM 5-0, with the exception of evaluation reports, which the supported maneuver battalion completed. The other FSC was task organized and collocated with its supported maneuver battalion on a geographically separated camp. This FSC maintained an ‘attached’ relationship with the supported unit. Whether collocated with a direct combat mission unit or not, all FSCs received indirect fire on camps. During logistics resupply convoys, all FSCs were subject to improvised explosive devices (IEDs), indirect fire, and direct fire weapons. 101 On today’s non-contiguous battlefield, all units, regardless of stated mission, are subject to attack and even direct combat.

A 2006 RAND Corporation assessment of the DOD and Army assignments policy in the context of operations in Iraq confirmed this. RAND determined that the Army was in compliance by not assigning women to units with a routine mission of direct combat. 102 However, the fact that the Army does not assign women to combat units does not preclude them from accompanying combat units on combat operations. A common tactic, technique and procedure (TTP) widely utilized in Iraq involves using women during combat operations in deference to cultural sensitivities. Although not involved in direct ground combat, female support troops routinely accompany combat troops to guard and search female detainees and provide medical care to female detainees and local nationals. 103 Current doctrine clearly supports the technique of using female soldiers to search local national females. Field Manual 3-90.5, *The Combined Arms Battalion* (CAB), published in April 2008, considers the “use of female Soldiers in the FSC [Forward Support Company] to assist with searching HN [Host Nation] female suspects” to be a special logistics consideration of stability operations. 104 The RAND assessment confirmed that female soldiers were routinely accompanying combat arms units on combat operations, but did not participate in direct ground combat:

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101 Lieutenant Colonel Stanley J. Sliwinski, e-mail message to author, February 9, 2009. LTC Sliwinski was the Support Operations Officer of 526th BSB in Iraq from September 2005 to September 2006. This BSB supported the BCT discussed here.

102 Harrell et al., *Assessing the Assignment Policy for Army Women*, 32.

103 Haycock, interview. The author provided female soldiers to Colonel Haycock’s battalion to support numerous combat operations. These female soldiers did not participate in direct ground combat operations. However, they were located close by to assist in handling local national females based on cultural sensitivities.

“On searches, we’d bring females [but] they’d stay in the Bradley until the building was cleared. No way would people find them in [an offensive combat situation]. Won’t put them in an ambush [situation]. It is not their MOS. We wouldn’t put mechanics in one either.” ¹⁰⁵

Current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan show that maneuver units are following published doctrine by collocating with their supporting FSC. In Afghanistan, FSCs routinely collocate on FOBs, and female soldiers are sometimes collocated on company combat outposts. Some units attach female medics to maneuver battalions to assist with medical care of local national females in remote areas (refer to Appendix G for interview comments with female FSC soldiers).¹⁰⁶ Similarly, the RAND assessment confirmed that support and maneuver units were collocated on Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) and patrol bases in Iraq. “FSCs, in particular, were reported to be in very close proximity to and to have a closer de facto command relationship to the maneuver unit to which they were attached than with their assigned chain of command (BSB)”.¹⁰⁷ Comments from RAND focus groups of FSC commanders and first sergeants illustrate this.

“Because of females, we’re assigned to the BSB on paper, but when deployed, all FSCs are with the infantry battalion. You don’t see the BSB until UCMJ. If you have issues, you have to wait to get a convoy to the main FOB. I was two hours away from the BSB.”¹⁰⁸

The major combat operations phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) identified some potential flaws in the training and equipping of support soldiers. Prior to OIF, support soldiers were required to qualify on individual and crew served weapons once per year. Support soldiers trained to avoid contact with the enemy as much as possible by pushing through convoy ambushes and displacing support sites

¹⁰⁵ Harrell et al., Assessing the Assignment Policy for Army Women, 33-34. Experienced RAND researchers interviewed 80 recently returned soldiers (from Iraq) in 16 focus groups and 8 individual interviews. Brigade and battalion command personnel were generally interviewed while more junior personnel participated in the focus groups. All interviews and focus groups were confidential and RAND did not provide names for the comments contained in their report.


¹⁰⁷ Harrell et al., Assessing the Assignment Policy for Army Women, 42; Major Mark Whiteman, e-mail message to author, February 7, 2009. MAJ Whiteman commanded an FSC in Iraq. He was collocated on a FOB with his supported infantry battalion and a weapons company from that battalion.

¹⁰⁸ Harrell et al., Assessing the Assignment Policy for Army Women, 43; Major Alexander Garcia, e-mail message to author, February 7, 2009. MAJ Garcia commanded a FSC in Iraq. He had small maintenance elements collocated on company patrol bases. On at least one occasion, he had a female mechanic who physically located and remained with an infantry company for up to a week. This employment practice allowed commanders to maximize the capability of assigned assets.
to avoid an indirect fire threat or when threatened by anything larger than a level I threat. On March 23, 2003, the 507th Maintenance Company found itself right in the middle of the Army’s definition of ground combat in An Nasiriyah, Iraq. This support unit found itself ‘engaging an enemy with individual or crew served weapons while being exposed to direct enemy fire, a high probability of direct physical contact with the enemy’s personnel and a substantial risk of capture while repelling the enemy’s assault by fire, close combat, or counterattack’. Iraqi para-militaries killed and captured both female and male soldiers during this combat action. There are several views why this occurred. Many believe that “some CSS and most CS units are generally not equipped, manned, or trained to defend themselves while stationary, let alone when on the march.” Based on this, the Army required support units to qualify on personal and crew served weapons twice per year and train on convoy live fire exercises. The Army also required all personnel to train on 40 ‘warrior tasks’, including small arms and crew served weapons proficiency and entering and clearing rooms, in addition to combatives training for hand to hand combat situations, tasks now embodied in Field Manual 3-21.75. The prior practice of support units avoiding contact with the enemy also changed as combat operations continued.

“For convoys in general. If you’re on the road [and come under fire], they want you to stop and engage the enemy and then proceed…They are starting to train this in Kuwait because they decided that the prior practice of rolling through an attack was encouraging the enemy activity. They decided the convoy either needed to stop and discourage this or have a [combat arms] unit attached to do it.”

An examination of females in combat in Iraq and Afghanistan further illustrates the changed nature of warfare. Sergeant Leigh Ann Hester, 617th Military Police Company, and her squad were shadowing a supply convoy March 20, 2005 when insurgents ambushed the convoy. Sergeant Hester

109 Wenzel, interview. Mr Wenzel and the author both commanded support companies in the mid-1990s and recall soldiers qualifying once per year and the training emphasis on avoiding contact with the enemy.

110 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Attack on the 507th Maintenance Company, Special Report (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, July 17, 2003), http://www.army.mil/features/507thMaintCmpy/ (accessed February 9, 2009), 3. Most recall this incident from the story of Jessica Lynch, one of the soldiers in the 507th who was captured and eventually rescued. The story of Lynch received great publicity and was even made into a TV movie.

111 Gregory Fontenot, EJ Degen, and David Tohn, On Point (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), 414.


113 Harrell et al., Assessing the Assignment Policy for Army Women, 35. This subject was discussed in command channels during the author’s tour in Iraq from October 2005 to September 2006 supporting the comments RAND found from its focus groups.
led her team through the enemy kill zone and flanked their positions assaulting a trench line with hand grenades and M-203 grenade launcher rounds. In the ensuing engagement, she killed three insurgents with her rifle.114 Likewise, Specialist (SPC) Monica Brown, a medic from the 782nd Support Battalion, was on patrol with elements of the 4th Squadron, 73rd Cavalry Regiment on April 25, 2007 when the patrol entered a complex ambush involving IEDs, direct fire and indirect fire. Specialist Brown assisted moving the injured soldiers to a safer location and provided medical treatment while exposed to heavy fire.115 Both female soldiers received the Silver Star for valor under fire. In addition to these exploits of gallantry, the Army awarded 1,521 female enlisted soldiers, 242 female officers, and 25 female warrant officers the Combat Action Badge (CAB) as of August 2006.116 “In keeping with the spirit of the Warrior Ethos, the Combat Action Badge provides special recognition to Soldiers who personally engage the enemy, or are engaged by the enemy during combat operations” and is not intended for those soldiers eligible for the Combat Infantry Badge (CIB) or the Combat Medic Badge (CMB).117 As of August 2, 2008, 87 female Army soldiers have died in Iraq and Afghanistan, approximately 2.4 percent of total Army fatalities. Another 533 female soldiers were wounded.118 A cumulative total of 25 active duty females were killed during the Korean War, Vietnam War and Persian Gulf War, 15 of those during the latter conflict.119 The higher casualty rates in the War on Terror are indicative of the Army’s reliance on women and their increased role on the modern battlefield.

The DOD and Army assignments policies, like all policies, are open for interpretation. If strictly interpreted, the Army would be in violation of its own policy since FSCs/female soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan ‘routinely physically locate and remain with a military unit assigned a doctrinal mission to routinely engage in direct combat’, in other words, they collocate with their supported maneuver unit (down to company level). On the other hand, a 2006 survey of 236 senior officers at the Army War College showed that 75 percent of those surveyed interpreted ‘collocation’ to mean the location of actual combat operations.120 With this interpretation, the Army could technically comply with its policy

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116 Harrell et al., Assessing the Assignment Policy for Army Women, 143-146.


119 Ibid.

by merely moving female soldiers out of the immediate area before combat operations begin. This, of course, would place a tremendous burden on tactical commanders and prevent them from maximizing the capabilities of their assets. Regardless of interpretation, the RAND assessment determined that “personnel who were already familiar with the policy, as well as those who were not, asserted that the policy did not reflect the environment in Iraq.”¹²¹ Many returning veterans felt the Army policy was, at a minimum, out of date.

“If women are on a convoy they are subject to direct combat with the enemy. You were primarily subject to attack every time you went out there. The paradigm of direct fire and engagement is just no longer there. It’s a different environment than when the policy was written in 1992. Any soldier in the theater—if they leave one FOB to go to another—they are subject to direct engagement.”¹²²

As evidenced by operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the operational environment changed from the one Army senior leaders grew up in. In order to counter the threats of the current and future operational environments, the Army transformed to a modular organizational structure and is continually developing new doctrine to support modular concepts. At 14 percent of the force, female soldiers will contribute significantly to the success of the modular force on the modern battlefield. One look at female casualty figures and awards for gallantry/combat action make it abundantly clear that the nature of the modern battlefield has changed. The Army’s approach to warfare in the 21st century and its employment of women soldiers has been and will be far different from centuries past.

**Conclusion**

“As we consider the issue of womanpower in the service today it’s not just a matter of women being entitled to serve this country. It is a simple fact that we could not operate our military services without women. And as skill levels essential to our missions continue to increase, it will be even more essential that we draw from all our citizens, that we draw from the largest pool of talent available.”¹²³

-Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz

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¹²¹ Harrell et al., *Assessing the Assignment Policy for Army Women*, 49. The RAND interviews and focus groups were only focused on operations in Iraq.

¹²² Harrell et al., *Assessing the Assignment Policy for Army Women*, 49-50; Chambers, interview. MG Chambers echoed this comment during his interview with the author. He agrees the nature of warfare has changed and all soldiers, whether they are on a combat patrol or combat logistics patrol, are subject to the same danger. He firmly believes the Army must revise its “Cold War era” policy.

Since the Revolutionary War, women have provided valuable service to the Army both off and on the battlefield. Since creation of the All Volunteer Force in 1973, women have increasingly answered the call to serve their country and today make up 14 percent of the Army. The cumulative effect of decades of debate and a recurring need to fill the ranks of the Army has been increased career opportunities for women in the Army. As of 2007, only 32 enlisted, one warrant officer, and five commissioned officer military occupational specialties (MOS) were closed to women. Taken in the context of the entire Army, 87 percent of enlisted, 99 percent of warrant officer, and 96 percent of commissioned officer MOSs are currently open to women. The few career fields closed to women are combat arms or combat engineer specialties or specialties assigned to those type units. Today, women fly attack helicopters on combat missions and pilot lift helicopters inserting combat infantrymen into enemy controlled territory on air assault missions. From post-World War II when the Armed Forces Integration Act of 1948 established a permanent, albeit limited, role for women in the Army to today, when women make up 14 percent of the force and five percent of Army general officers, it has been a long and arduously debated journey. However, the journey is not over.

In this time of persistent conflict, the Army embarked on an ambitious plan to increase active duty end strength 547,000 by the end 2010. To ensure the quality of the Army, the nation, as Wolfowitz said, must ‘draw from the largest pool of talent available’. Considering only 27 percent of the target youth population is eligible to serve in the military and the propensity to serve is at a record low of nine percent, the Army faces a tremendous challenge while at war. Further exacerbating the situation is the competition between the services for the limited pool of citizens who are qualified and willing to serve. In his July 1994 approval of service proposals to open more positions to women, former Secretary of Defense Perry stated, “In our review of the assignment of women, our overarching goal has been to maintain a high quality, ready, and effective force.” Unless public opinion changes

124 Harrell et al., Assessing the Assignment Policy for Army Women, 79-101. The source presented data in a series of tables. The author of this monograph calculated the percentages listed here from the source data.
dramatically, it is safe to assume that the nation will continue to depend on large numbers of women volunteers to ensure the quality of the Army in the future.

Public opinion regarding women in combat remained consistent during the last two decades. After the Gulf War, the first major combat operation involving large numbers of female ground troops, Gallup conducted a poll concerning women and combat roles. When asked if women serving in combat roles would be an advantage or burden, 72 percent of respondents considered combat support personnel and 69 percent considered military police to both be an advantage to the military effort while only 41 percent considered women in the infantry to be an advantage.\textsuperscript{129} In June 2005, one month after the debate on Congressman Hunter’s proposed legislation, a poll sponsored by CNN, USA Today, and Gallup showed that 72 percent of Americans favored women serving anywhere in Iraq. Additionally, 67 percent of respondents favored women serving in combat zones providing support to ground troops, but only 44 percent favored women serving as ground troops doing most of the fighting.\textsuperscript{130} The polls indicate that American public opinion has not changed much in 14 years. After more than seven years of war in Afghanistan and six years of war in Iraq with the ensuing casualties, including women, public opinion still seems to support the current role of women in the Army in contradiction to Hunter’s statement that Americans never wanted women in combat. Congresswoman Heather Wilson seemed to sum up public opinion in 2005 when she stated, “There have been casualties, men and women, and we grieve for them. But I think we have gotten beyond the point where losing a daughter is somehow worse than losing a son.”\textsuperscript{131}

In a strategic environment often characterized as volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous (VUCA), it is clear that the nature of warfare in the 21\textsuperscript{st} century is different. Major combat operations (MCO) have become the exception rather than the rule. Gone from the lexicon are the terms ‘forward’ and ‘rear’ areas. Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan illustrate this. Written in a time when MCO dominated doctrine, the Army’s 1992 assignments policy for women made sense. After 16 years and a changed operational environment, many consider this policy outdated and not supportive of current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Senator Pat Roberts (R-KS) believes the nature of 21\textsuperscript{st} century warfare is different from the past in the sense that leaders have less control over who is exposed to harm. Based on that, he feels the nation’s senior military leadership is best suited to determine the future of women in combat roles.\textsuperscript{132}

\textsuperscript{132} Libby Quint, e-mail message to author, February 6, 2009. Ms Quint is the Military Legislative Assistant to Senator Pat Roberts.
In 2004 as the Army prepared to modularize the force, it was still wrestling with the problem of whether FSCs should be male only and assigned to the maneuver units, gender-mixed and assigned to the BSB, gender-mixed and assigned to the maneuver battalion, or removed from the BCT along with the BSB and placed in a support headquarters.133 Army officials were concerned about all male FSCs believing that there were not enough male soldiers in the inventory to fill the FSCs and the redistribution of women to non-combat coded units would create an imbalanced force.134 In the end, the Army chose to implement gender-mixed FSCs assigned to the BSB. This option supported Army modularization concepts and was the path of least resistance in that it did not require DOD approval or congressional notification; although a legal opinion suggested notification as this option “could be perceived as [a] subterfuge to avoid reporting requirement[s].”135 This subterfuge involves the Army’s own policy against collocation and the implication that females in FSCs would be providing logistics support on the front lines in combat.

Army officials have always maintained that their assignment practices comply with DOD and Army policies. On the surface, the Army is correct. The Army does not assign female soldiers to units that have a primary or routine mission to engage in direct combat. Collocation, however, is the grey area of the policy. Current maneuver doctrine indicates that FSCs are generally positioned in maneuver battalion trains in order to conduct their direct support mission, while Field Maintenance Teams of the CAB FSCs position in company trains. Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have clearly shown that maneuver units are following doctrine and FSCs routinely collocate with their supported battalions. The infantry and armor battalions and their subordinate companies, except the headquarters company, clearly have a direct combat role. Collocation with any element other than the headquarters company would be in violation of the Army’s 1992 assignment policy, which is restrictive in nature and can prevent proper employment of the FSC. Additionally, both the DOD and Army definition of ground combat are not reflective of operations today. Direct combat does not just occur when you are closing with the enemy and certainly does not just occur ‘well forward on the battlefield’. The Army’s addition of ‘repelling an enemy assault’ could technically apply to all units, which have self-defense missions.

According to the Boston Globe, Colonel Robert H. Woods Jr., a senior personnel official, suggested in a December 2004 briefing that it may be time to rewrite or eliminate portions of AR 600-13 that prohibit collocation with units assigned a direct ground combat mission.136 Less than clear policies are open to multiple interpretations. This is evident in the stance of Army senior leaders in 2005. A January 2005 Secretary of the Army White Paper stated that FSCs “are not routinely collocated with

134 Ibid.
135 Ibid.
those units *conducting an assigned direct ground combat mission.*” In *Soldiers Magazine* in March 2005, Army leadership stated, “We reviewed the existing policy and how it applies to current operations and to some of our key transformation initiatives. The policy does not need to change. Army policy prohibits the assignment of women to positions or units that routinely collocate with those units *conducting an assigned direct combat mission.* Women are assigned to Forward Support Companies of the Brigade Support Battalion and serve in dangerous combat support positions. This is consistent with both DOD and Army policy and is unchanged from past practice.” This interpretation implies that collocation with a unit that has a direct combat mission is authorized as long as that unit is not actively conducting an assigned combat operation. This interpretation is also consistent with the belief of 75% of respondents during an Army War College 2006 survey. However, this interpretation contrasts with the relatively clear wording of Army Regulation 600-13, which says collocation ‘occurs when the position or unit routinely physically locates and remains with a military unit *assigned a doctrinal mission to routinely engage in direct combat.*’ There is a definite difference between a unit *assigned* a doctrinal mission to routinely engage in direct combat and a unit *conducting* an assigned direct combat mission.

**Recommendations**

In responding to criticism of rescinding the risk rule in 1994, Secretary of the Army Togo West said, “The Department of Defense rescinded the ‘risk rule’...because it was no longer realistic given the nature of the modern battlefield.” Well, the nature of the modern battlefield has changed yet again. The Army has been at war for over seven years and gender-mixed FSCs have been collocating with and supporting units with direct combat missions for four years. For the assignment policies to be relevant in the 21st century, the Army must do the following:

-Policy aspect #1--Assignment: *The Army’s assignment policy for female soldiers allows women to serve in any officer or enlisted specialty or position except in those specialties, positions, or units (battalion size or smaller) which are assigned a routine mission to engage in direct combat, or which collocate routinely with units assigned a direct combat mission.*

The Army should retain this aspect of the policy except for collocation, addressed below. The first part of this policy is clear and easy to follow guidance that the Army is correctly following. The Army clearly does not assign women to units that have direct combat missions. This is in line with public opinion and meets the intent of Congress.

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140 Section 541 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 requires DOD to notify Congress 30 days in advance of opening or closing positions to women. This implies that Congress agrees with those positions currently closed to women, those in direct combat units.
Policy aspect #2—Collocation: Collocation occurs when the position or unit routinely physically locates and remains with a military unit assigned a doctrinal mission to routinely engage in direct combat. Specifically, positions in units or sub-units which routinely collocate with units assigned a direct combat mission are closed to women. An entire unit will not be closed because a subunit routinely collocates with a unit assigned a direct combat mission. The sub-unit will be closed to women.

The Army must reword or remove the collocation restriction from its policy. Current and draft doctrine indicates that the FSC positions in the maneuver battalion’s area of operations and does collocate with elements of the maneuver battalion. Units deployed in current operations are following this doctrine. If the Army deems that collocation is a critical part of the policy, then it must reword the definition so it is clear. Changing the wording to say ‘units or positions that are doctrinally required to physically locate and remain with units assigned a direct combat mission’ would suffice and bring the Army definition in line with DOD policy. Changing the wording of the policy to reflect the 2005 Secretary of the Army talking points will not work. Those talking points state that FSCs do not routinely collocate with those units conducting an assigned direct combat mission. Use of this wording would make the Army policy an employment policy not an assignment policy, putting the burden of compliance on tactical commanders.

-Policy aspect #3—Utilization: Once properly assigned, female soldiers are subject to the same utilization policies as their male counterparts. In the event of hostilities, female soldiers will remain with their assigned units and continue to perform their assigned duties.

The Army should retain this. This allows commanders to maximize the capabilities of their assigned personnel to accomplish their mission, such as using female soldiers to accompany combat units to search female detainees or using female medics to provide medical care to local national females. This is a widely used TTP in Iraq and Afghanistan based on cultural sensitivities.

-Policy aspect #4—Army Direct Combat Definition: Engaging an enemy with individual or crew served weapons while being exposed to direct enemy fire, a high probability of direct physical contact with the enemy’s personnel and a substantial risk of capture. Direct combat takes place while closing with the enemy by fire, maneuver, and shock effect in order to destroy or capture the enemy, or while repelling the enemy’s assault by fire, close combat, or counterattack.

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141 Rewording the policy like this would also necessitate a review of Army doctrine to ensure doctrine complies with policy. The Army would also have to code all positions in the CAB FSC FMTs to be male (currently predominantly male). The FMTs are sub-units of the FSC and are required by doctrine to collocate with company team trains. The use of female searchers or medics for medical care is permissible with this wording, even though doctrine offers this as a TTP. Doctrine does not require a specific position or sub-unit to collocate. It offers an employment consideration for the tactical commander.
As the premier land combat power, the Army must take the lead in developing a common DOD definition for direct ground combat. Clearly defined forward and rear areas will be the exception, not the rule, in future warfare. Direct ground combat will no longer take place ‘well forward on the battlefield’. Current operations have shown that all soldiers, regardless of unit mission, are subject to participation in direct ground combat. All Army units have a self-defense mission, which may require them to repel the enemy’s assault by fire, close combat, or counterattack. If the Army determines that this is a vital part of the direct combat definition, it must clarify that this does not apply to self-defense missions.

Women have come as far as they are going to go in the Army, at least for the time being. The nation does not appear willing to explore the final frontier of women serving in units that are assigned a routine mission to engage in direct combat. Congress appears to support the positions currently open/closed to women in the Army and, based on public opinion polls, the majority of Americans do not support women serving in ground units doing most of the fighting. Before civilian leaders force the Army to take a giant step backwards in opportunities for women, the Army must revise its current policy.
## Appendix A

### Command and Support Relationships

<table>
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<td><strong>General Support (GS)</strong></td>
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### INHERENT RESPONSIBILITIES ARE:

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<th>Provides Liaison to:</th>
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</table>

**NOTE 1.** In NATO, the gaining unit may not task organize a multinational unit (see TACON).

**NOTE 2.** Commanders of units in DS may further assign support relationships between their subordinate units and elements of the supported unit after coordination with the supported commander.

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Appendix B

Forward Support Company (FSC) Locations in the Combined Arms Battalion (CAB) Area of Operations

CAB trains during Stability Operations (above) and Offense/Defense (below)\textsuperscript{143}

\textsuperscript{143} Field Manual 3-90.5, The Combined Arms Battalion, April 7, 2008, page 12-5.
Appendix C

Field Manual Excerpts

12-14. Trains are a unit grouping of personnel, vehicles, and equipment to provide sustainment. It is the basic sustainment tactical organization. The CAB uses trains to array its subordinate sustainment elements, including their FSC. BN trains usually are under the control of the BN S-4, and assisted by the BN S-1. (Page 12-4)

12-20. The CAB commander may decide that positioning the FSC within his AO is not tactically sound. Then the FSC will be located in the BSA[Brigade Support Area], positioned by the BSB commander. (Page 12-7)

12-21. The CAB company supply sergeants generally position themselves with the FSC. They assist the FSC in preparing company LOGPACs [Logistic Packages] and then move their vehicles forward to the LRP[Logistics Release Point]. The company 1SG or his representative meets the LOGPAC and guides it to the company resupply point. (Page 12-7)

12-28. The FSC utilizes CSS VSAT [Combat Service Support Very Small Aperture Terminal] for sustainment communications external to the CAB (e.g., BSB or sustainment brigade). The CAB S-1 also relies on the CSS VSAT for eMILPO [electronic military personnel office]. When the FSC is not positioned near the CTCP [Combat Trains Command Post], the S-1 will need to travel to, or collocate with the FSC. (Page 12-7)

12-37. The most efficient resupply of forward companies is accomplished by LOGPACs. LOGPACs are organized by the FSC commander and assisted by company supply sergeants. (12-9)

12-119. Company commanders ensure that vehicle crews and equipment operators perform PMCS. To provide quick turnaround of maintenance problems, each maneuver company has a FMT from the supporting FSC dedicated to support them. These FMTs have forward repair systems and mechanics trained in the company’s equipment. The company 1SG usually positions the FMT in the company trains. (12-23)

144 Field Manual 3-90.5, The Combined Arms Battalion, April 7, 2008.
This Field Manual Interim expired on March 15, 2007.
Appendix E

Notional Support Operations in a Developed Theater of Operations

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Appendix F

Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) Personnel Excerpts

Excerpts below are from FMS Web and reflect a Brigade Support Battalion in a Heavy Brigade Combat Team.

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<td>123</td>
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Table 1: BSB personnel authorization recap showing the number of male only positions in the FSCs.¹⁴⁷

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IDENT “E” = Male only position
IDENT “I” = Interchangeable (Male or Female)

Table 2: Reflects the two armor and two infantry Field Maintenance Teams (FMT) and shows the identification category (male/female). The MTOE shows a mixed gender FMT, which is doctrinally required to collocate in the company trains of the maneuver company they support.

¹⁴⁷ United States Army Force Management Support Agency, Brigade Support Battalion Modified Table of Organization and Equipment.
Appendix G

Interview with Female FSC Soldiers Serving in Afghanistan

XX FSC has eight female Soldiers assigned. Four of these Soldiers have either been attached to the Maneuver Platoon or participated in some form of Combat Operations. The Company Executive Officer interviewed these four Soldiers to learn about their involvements and their perceptions as a female on the battlefield. The following will introduce the Soldiers and their contributions on the battlefield.148

CPL Amanda and PFC Leslie were hand selected by TF XX to support a Special Forces operation which included an Air Assault to search a village. Amanda and Leslie’s role in this operation was specifically to search the women and children of the village. In total, eight women and 15 children were searched throughout the village. Amanda explained that they participated with the SF unit through rehearsals prior to the mission and that they were sufficiently educated on search procedures. At the time of the mission, the Soldiers boarded two Chinooks and two Blackhawks. Once the insertion was complete, the Soldiers stood by while the village was secured by the SF forces and were then guided by the FBI to an area in which they began their searches. Once complete, the Soldiers moved away from the village with the rest of the team to the LZ where they were extracted. Amanda explained that this mission was conducted throughout the night and they utilized their NVGs to navigate throughout the operation. When asked about their interaction with the team, she explained that it was limited however they were very tentative to their knowledge in their role in the operation. They did not feel as though they were looked down upon in any way and that they truly felt as a part of the team.

SPC Silverina was assigned to a Maneuver Platoon which fell under X Co, XX INF located at the XX. SPC Silverina served as the Platoon Leader’s driver and served two different PLs, CPT XX and LT XX. SPC Silverina conducted numerous patrols, both Mounted and Dis-Mounted, several Search and Cordons and acted as the RTO for the PL on several patrols. Silverina was involved in one battle in which their patrol was attacked by over 50 AAF with SAF and RPGs. Silverina’s involvement consisted of maneuvering her Humvee as a fighting platform to provide fire superiority to the platoon with the mounted M240B. During the fight, Silverina single handedly secured CLP from the rear of her vehicle for the M240B, cross leveled ammunition throughout the platoon, fired one AT-4 killing two AAF from 600 meters away and returned fire with her M4 throughout the engagement. When asked about her feelings during the fight Silverina replied that she was not concerned about herself but more about the safety of her fellow Soldiers. She expressed that she always felt as a part of the team and that she was never treated as a female from anyone in the platoon.

PFC Cassandra served as a driver and force protection guard for a Maneuver Platoon assigned to X Co, XX INF. She participated in several patrols with the platoon but was never involved in any

148 Anonymous, e-mail message to author, February 10, 2009. The author sanitized the comments by only referring to the female soldiers by rank and first name and replacing unit designations with the letter “X”.

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engagements. Even though she joined the team after the main deployment she always felt as a part of the team and also was never treated as a female from anyone in the platoon. When asked if she would assume the role as a Combat Soldier again, she replied with a resounding, “Absolutely”.

The female Soldiers of XX FSC involved in combat operations were very excited to speak about their experiences. The consensus from all of them was that they never look at themselves as females on the battlefield but yet as Soldiers. Given the opportunity to fight again, each one of them would fight honorably.
Bibliography


