Civil-Military Relations: From Vietnam to Operation Iraqi Freedom

A Monograph
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AY 2008-2009

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This monograph traces the thread between civil-military relations during two times of war for the U.S. The military must know what the civilian leadership requires and must, in return, articulate a clear path to achieve it, if feasible. The U.S. military never lost a battle in Vietnam and yet that conflict is looked upon as an American defeat. The war in Iraq began to look like a repeat performance. The military was clearly winning engagements on the battlefield but the talk at home, in the media, was of a “quagmire” and “stagnation” (two terms used to describe Vietnam) and ultimately, of defeat.

Although this monograph uses two snapshots in time of civil-military relations, the significance of its findings apply, in general, to all students interested in civil-military relations, as well as decision making. Whether looking at times of war or peace, civil-military relations play a significant role in all matters pertaining to the running of our military; the decisions made by our civilian leadership can influence even the smallest facets of military life.
Title of Monograph: Civil-Military Relations: From Vietnam to Operation Iraqi Freedom

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Abstract

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS: FROM VIETNAM TO OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM by MAJOR Brandon L. DeWind, U.S. Army, 53 pages.

The end of the Cold War did not bring about the grand peace that was hoped for during four decades. Instead, the world has become more dangerous, with multiple complex problems. Military institutions worldwide must learn to adapt to the ever-changing face of the threat to fight the Global War on Terror. Services can no longer look within their own ranks to accomplish the mission; all operations must be joint in order to succeed in the contemporary operating environment.

This monograph traces the thread between civil-military relations during two times of war for the U.S. The military must know what the civilian leadership requires and must, in return, articulate a clear path to achieve it, if feasible. The U.S. military never lost a battle in Vietnam and yet that conflict is looked upon as an American defeat. The war in Iraq began to look like a repeat performance. The military was clearly winning engagements on the battlefield but the talk at home, in the media, was of a “quagmire” and “stagnation” (two terms used to describe Vietnam) and ultimately, of defeat.

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Introduction

The end of the Cold War did not bring about the grand peace that was hoped for during four decades. Instead, the world has become more dangerous, with multiple complex problems. Military institutions worldwide must learn to adapt to the ever-changing face of the threat to fight the Global War on Terror. Services can no longer look within their own ranks to accomplish the mission; all operations must be joint in order to succeed in the contemporary operating environment.

This monograph traces the thread between civil-military relations in two times of war for the U.S. The most famous theorist and professional soldier, Carl Von Clausewitz, wrote “The political object—the original motive for war—will thus determine both the military objective to be reached and the amount of effort it requires.”¹ What Clausewitz is relating is that the political objective must be clear to both the civilian politicians and the military. The military must know what the civilian leadership requires and must, in return, articulate a clear path to achieve it, if feasible. The U.S. military never lost a battle in Vietnam and yet that conflict is looked upon as an American defeat. The war in Iraq began to look like a repeat performance. The military was clearly winning engagements on the battlefield but the talk at home, in the media, was of a “quagmire” and “stagnation” (two terms used to describe Vietnam) and ultimately of defeat.²

Research Question

What, if anything, has changed in civil-military relations from the Vietnam War, under the leadership of Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson, to the current war

Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), under the leadership of President George W. Bush, which may have accounted for the different outcomes?

This monograph will attempt to explore this question through two case studies. The first will be the U.S. involvement in Vietnam through the presidencies of both John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson. The second case study will examine the ongoing conflict in Iraq under President George W. Bush. Relevant literature on the theory of civil-military relations was reviewed, as well as legislation that directly influenced it. Both studies will trace the evolution of civil-military relations during the respective time periods in order to gain answers to the question.

**Limitations**

This research will have the inherent limitations of forecasting into the future based on the past historical facts and fast-paced events of the contemporary operating environment. Unclassified material forms the basis of this research.
Background

U.S. political involvement in Vietnam began under the Eisenhower administration. It was an inheritance from France's colonial rule, which ended in 1954 with the French Army's defeat at Dien Bien Phu and the acceptance of the Geneva Conference agreement, splitting Vietnam into Cambodia, Laos and North Vietnam with Ho Chi Minh in control, and South Vietnam under President Ngo Dinh Diem. President Eisenhower assured President Diem that the U.S. would provide support and pledged to not allow his theory of “falling dominoes” occur, as long as Diem fully cooperated with U.S. advice. Contrary to U.S. hopes, President Diem took a hard line approach and canceled democratic elections. The elections were set for 1956 in South Vietnam and would have paved the way for reunification. This action alienated U.S. administration and infuriated both the opposition of Ho Chi Minh and the communists, since they expected to win the election. Subsequently, the South Vietnamese government faced progressively serious resistance from the Viet Cong insurgents, aided by North Vietnam.

Significant U.S. military intervention began under the Kennedy administration. This involved the U.S. providing weapons and other military equipment and limited advisors; no U.S. combat troops were yet involved. In 1961, South Vietnam signed a military and economic aid treaty with the United States, leading to the arrival of U.S. support troops and the formation

4 Public Papers of President Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1954, p. 381- 390 "Domino Theory Principle, Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1954" The President's News Conference, April 7, 1954 http://coursesa.matrix.msu.edu/~hst306/documents/domino.html (accessed November 19, 2008) Domino Theory: This statement by President Eisenhower turned into U.S. foreign policy. To not let Vietnam fall into the hands of a communist regime, which in turn would take surrounding countries such as Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, Malaysia, was of the highest priority of the administrations until the end of the Cold War. “Finally, you have broader consideration that might follow what you would call the falling domino principle. You have a row of dominoes set up, you knock over the first one, and what will happen to the last one is the certainty that it will go over very quickly. So you could have the beginning of a disintegration that would have the most profound influences.”
(1962) of the U.S. Military Assistance Command. The South Vietnamese Army gladly received U.S. advice and aid but was unable to defeat the guerrillas. In November 1963, mounting dissatisfaction with the ineffectiveness and corruption of Diem's government culminated in a military coup engineered by Duong Van Minh, resulting in Diem’s execution. Disorder reigned and political control was not established in South Vietnam until June 1965, when Nguyen Cao Ky became premier.

In 1964, under the Johnson administration, intervention increased dramatically after the Senate passed the Tonkin Gulf Resolution. In early 1965, the United States began air raids on North Vietnam, as well as Communist-controlled areas in the South. By 1966, there were 190,000 U.S. troops in South Vietnam. North Vietnam, meanwhile, was receiving armaments and technical assistance from the Soviet Union and other communist countries. Despite massive U.S. military aid, heavy bombing, a growing U.S. troop commitment (reaching nearly 550,000 by 1969) and some political stability in South Vietnam after the election of President Nguyen Van Thieu (1967), the United States and South Vietnam were unable to defeat Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces. Optimistic U.S. military reports were discredited in February 1968 by the costly and devastating Tet offensive of the North Vietnamese Army and Viet Cong, involving attacks on more than one hundred towns and cities and a month-long battle for Hue in South Vietnam.

Serious negotiations towards conflict termination began after U.S. President Lyndon Johnson's decision not to seek reelection in 1968. Secret contacts between North Vietnam and

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8 Ibid, 673.
9 Ibid, 674.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
the United States took place in Paris in 1968 and expanded in 1969 to include South Vietnam and
the Viet Cong. The United States, under the leadership of President Richard M. Nixon, altered its
strategy to combine U.S. troop withdrawals with intensified bombing and invasion of communist
sanctuaries in Cambodia (1970).^14

Even as the war continued, peace talks in Paris progressed, with Henry Kissinger as U.S.
negotiator. A break in negotiations, followed by U.S. saturation bombing of North Vietnam did
not derail the talks. A peace agreement was reached and signed on January 27, 1973, by the
United States, North Vietnam, South Vietnam, and the Viet Cong Provisional Revolutionary
Government. The accord provided for an end to hostilities, withdrawal of U.S. and allied troops,
return of prisoners of war and formation of a four-nation International Control Commission to
ensure peace.^15

Fighting between South Vietnamese and communists continued, despite the peace
agreement, until North Vietnam launched an offensive in early 1975.^16 The U.S. Congress
denied South Vietnam’s requests for aid and, after Thieu abandoned the northern half of the
country to the advancing Communists, a panic ensued. South Vietnamese resistance collapsed
and North Vietnamese troops marched into Saigon on April 30, 1975. Vietnam was formally
reunified in July 1976 and Saigon renamed Ho Chi Minh City.^17

The second major U.S. military involvement in a protracted conflict is with Iraq. In
reality, Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) is an absorption^18 of the Gulf War, which began in 1990.
For the purpose of this study, however, current participation began on January 29, 2002 when

[^14]: Dale R. Herspring, The pentagon and the Presidency: Civil-Military Relations from FDR to
George W. Bush (Lawrence: University Pres of Kansas, 2005), 198.
[^15]: Modern Warfare: Global Technologies and Tactics. Directed by Questar Inc. Performed by
[^17]: Ibid, 676.
[^18]: Absorption is a war that does not end but is absorbed by another war or escalates into a larger
war.
President George W. Bush identified Iraq, Iran and North Korea as an "Axis of Evil" in his State of the Union Address, and vowed that the U.S. "will not permit the world's most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world's most destructive weapons." This was a clear indication to the country, and to the world, that the War on Terror would not only be fought in Afghanistan.

In October 2002, the U.S. Congress authorized President Bush to use force if necessary, in a preemptive strike against Iraq. This allowed the President to start preparing for war with the deployment of troops, beginning in December, with almost 200,000 U.S., British and Australian troops slated to be in theater no later than March 2003. On March 19, after the coalition was set, but without a U.N. mandate, President Bush gave the go ahead for military operations to commence. The war began with airstrikes launched at Baghdad, targeting Saddam Hussein and other Iraqi leaders. Subsequently, coalition troops entered Iraq from the south, through Kuwait, and began to push toward the capital city of Baghdad. Less than one month later, U.S. forces entered Baghdad and, on April 9, the city fell under control of U.S. forces. Three weeks later, on May 1st, President Bush declared an end to major combat operations.

Unfortunately, the war was not over. With an insurgency growing, the coalition launched operation Desert Scorpion on June 15, 2003, to defeat organized Iraqi resistance. At this point, there had been an average of one U.S. service member reported killed in action (KIA) per day, since the end of combat was declared. The U.S. combat death toll reached 147 on July 17,

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2003, which was the same number of soldiers that died from hostile fire in the Gulf War of 1990-1991; thirty two of those occurred after the May 1st declaration.\textsuperscript{24}

What seemed at the time to be a great victory, and a major weight, lifted off U.S. forces shoulders, was the capture of Saddam Hussein on December 13, 2003. The dethroned leader had been either hiding out or on the run since the war began in March; he was found by members of the Fourth Infantry Division, in a hole, in his hometown of Tikrit, and surrendered without incident.\textsuperscript{25}

On January 17, 2004 the U.S. death toll in Iraq reached a milestone of 500. Of those, 346 died from combat related incidents and another fifty four died from noncombat related accidents.\textsuperscript{26} In April, U.S. forces launched an all-out assault on the town of Fallujah, a city west of Baghdad in the Sunni triangle. The operation was in response to an incident that occurred March 31 in Fallujah, involving four U.S. civilian contractors that were mutilated and hung from a bridge by an Iraqi mob.\textsuperscript{27} The Fallujah operation lasted eight days, ending with a U.S. cease-fire, which gave time for political discussions to take place between U.S., Iraqi Governing Council officials and Muqtada Al-Sadr's representatives, one of Iraq's most powerful Shia clerics.\textsuperscript{28} In May 2004, after seven weeks of intense fighting in Najaf between coalition forces and Al-Sadr's militia, a truce was reached and Sadr's forces withdrew.\textsuperscript{29}

\textsuperscript{27} Thomas E. Ricks \textit{Fiasco: The American Military Adventure In Iraq} (New York: Penguin Group, 2007), 330-335,341-343.
Less than four months later, in September of 2004, with the insurgency in full swing, U.S. casualties reached 1,000 KIA and 7,000 WIA. During the previous month of August, attacks on American forces reached the highest level since the beginning of the war, with eighty seven reported incidents, per day, on coalition forces.30

Once again, on November 8, 2004, coalition and Iraqi Army forces initiated an all-out assault on Fallujah, which had been retaken by Sunni Arab insurgents since the April cease-fire. The operation to secure Fallujah, named Phantom Fury or Al-Fajr, took approximately two weeks. The price was high on both sides with an estimated 2,000 enemy dead and 1,200 captured. The coalition suffered 73 KIA and 600 WIA.31

January 26, 2005 marked the deadliest day for coalition soldiers since the war began almost two years earlier. Thirty one Marines were killed when their CH 53E Super Stallion crashed near the town of Rutba, in western Iraq. Six other soldiers were killed while fighting elsewhere in Iraq. These deaths put the total Americans killed in Iraq to over 1,400 since the war began.32 The insurgency continued to grow in strength, with the military clearing and re-clearing areas only to leave and have the enemy retake these areas due to a lack of troops to hold the ground. October 25, 2005 marked 2,000 U.S. combat deaths since the war began.33

A major setback for counter-insurgency efforts during the war occurred on February 22, 2006, when Sunni insurgents destroyed the Askariy shrine in Samarra. The Mosque of the Golden Dome was one of the Shiite’s most holy shrines and its bombing ignited serious sectarian fighting, which resulted in the deaths of more than 1,000 people and put the country on the brink

of civil war.\textsuperscript{34} This kicked off months of violent bombing aimed at Iraq's Shiites, conducted by the Sunni leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq, Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi.\textsuperscript{35} He was finally cornered and killed by a U.S. operation on June 7, 2006.\textsuperscript{36} Zarqawi's stated purpose, other than causing coalition troops to leave Iraq, was as Finer writes, “…to foment bloody sectarian strife between his fellow Sunni Muslims and members of Iraq's Shiite majority.”\textsuperscript{37} The sectarian violence that continued, even after his death, almost pushed the country into civil war.

In June 2006, in response to the growing sectarian violence in Baghdad, the U.S. launched Operation “Together Forward”.\textsuperscript{38} This was a joint U.S.-Iraqi plan aimed at re-securing Baghdad by moving additional U.S. and Iraqi forces into the capital city. Twelve weeks later, the operation was deemed unsuccessful, paving the way for President Bush to announce his new "Surge" plan.\textsuperscript{39} The plan met stiff opposition, with threats from Congress to cut off all funding for the war. In January, after months of political infighting in Washington, President Bush announced the deployment of an additional 20,000 combat troops into Baghdad in an attempt to crush the sectarian violence. This shift in strategy, from the status quo, was to allow the Iraqi government some breathing space and time to finally get their forces up to speed in order to take control of the country.\textsuperscript{40}

\textsuperscript{34} Mike Whitney, \textit{The Bombing of the Golden Dome Mosque; one year later}, [newspaper article on-line] ("Information Clearing House" 12, 2, 2007, accessed Feb 28, 2009); \texttt{http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article17044.htm}
\textsuperscript{36} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{37} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{38} Donald W. Wright, Timothy R. Reese, \textit{On Point II} (Leavenworth, Combat Studies Institute Press, 2008)
\textsuperscript{39} JAMIE MCINTYRE, \textit{Democrats Threatening to Withhold Funding for War: Battle Plan}, [newspaper article on-line] ("CNN.COM" Jan 8, 2007, accessed Nov 11, 2008); \texttt{http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0701/08/ldt.01.html}
The "Surge," along with other factors, such as the Sunni Awakening, has shown large-scale progress in Iraq. The plan has, at this point, allowed both the Iraqi government and the U.S. government to start contemplating conflict termination criteria that will eventually lead to withdrawal of the majority of combat troops.

Many similarities can be drawn between the War in Vietnam and ongoing operations in Iraq. Vietnam was a war of choice. The Presidential administrations chose to let the survival of the South Vietnamese government become a national security objective. They did this in the name of containment; containing Communism, and in defense of wars of national liberation. Operation Iraqi Freedom is also a war of choice; a pre-emptive war taken on by the Bush Administration to rid the world of Saddam Hussein, a brutal dictator and, as a containment policy to contain violent extremism. The focus of this study will be on the differences between the two, particularly the difference in the administrations and military’s dealing with civil-military relations, and how it shaped national policy in regards to the wars.

Civil-military Relations

“The problem in the modern state is not armed revolt, but in the relation of the expert to the politician” Samuel Huntington

This section illustrates aspects of civil-military relations from the three most influential authors on the subject. This review is based on the works of Samuel Huntington, Elliott Cohen

43 Ibid.
and Dale Herspring. It is the intent of this author to look at the forms of civilian control and how they influence senior leaders’ decision-making in our American system.

Civil military relations are one aspect of national security policy. The aim of national security policy is to enhance the safety of the nation’s social, economic, and political institutions against threats arising from other independent states. Civil military relations are the principal institutional component of military security policy.\(^{46}\)

Samuel Huntington's work appears to be the foundation for all other works on civil military relations for the past 60 years. His “Normal”\(^{47}\) theory of civil-military relations argues that democratic societies must have civilian control of the military. To accomplish this, Huntington poses two types of control. Subjective civilian control and objective civilian control are the foundation of his theory.

Subjective civilian control achieves its end by civilianizing the military, making them the mirror of the state. Objective civilian control achieves its end by militarizing the military, making them the tool of the state. The essence of objective civilian control is the recognition of autonomous military professionalism; the essence of subjective civilian control is the denial of an independent military sphere.\(^{48}\)

The difference between the two types of control over the military is in the professionalism of its officer corps. Under subjective civilian control the officer corps has very little power over itself. Civilian groups hold a majority of power to make military decisions. The two key features of subjective civilian control lie within the officer corps, which is political, as opposed to professional, and that it is controlled by competing civilian groups.\(^{49}\) This form of control is the least desirable, according to Huntington. Objective military control takes full advantage of a highly professional officer corps and exhibits “…distribution of political power between military and civilian groups which is most conducive to the emergence of professional attitudes and

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\(^{49}\) Ibid.
behavior among the members of the officer corps."\(^{50}\) Huntington believes that objective control is the most desirable and effective manner in which to maintain civilian control of the military

Huntington believes that all industrialized democracies share the characteristic of objective civil-military control and that, in the U.S., it is institutionalized within the systems of government. In this, Huntington writes that there are four principles that must be adhered to in order to maintain the most advantageous benefits of objective civilian control. They are:

1) A high level of military professionalism and recognition by military officers of the limits of their professional competence; 2) The effective subordination of the military to civilian political leaders who make the basic decisions on foreign and military policy; 3) The recognition and acceptance by that leadership of an area of professional competence and autonomy for the military; 4) As a result, the minimization of military intervention in politics and of political intervention in the military.\(^{51}\)

These principles will be key in showing the differences between the two era’s to be studied. In summary, subjective control makes the military more like a political interest group, where as, objective civilian control maximizes a professional officer corps, ensuring a self-directed military run by professionals.

The second author is Elliott Cohen and his work *Supreme Command*. In this study, Cohen analyzes the leadership of four iconic personalities in wartime. He studies decisions made by Abraham Lincoln in the Civil War, Georges Clemenceau in World War I, Winston Churchill in World War II and, finally, David Ben-Gurion in Israel's War of Independence.\(^{52}\) Cohen concluded that these leaders did not prescribe to either subjective or objective types of civilian control of the military. At times they relied on their generals and at other times they overruled or fired them.\(^{53}\) There are some limitations to his study, as Herspring writes, “trying to draw cross national comparisons during the same time period is difficult enough; trying to draw them over


\(^{51}\) Ibid, 3-4.


\(^{53}\) Ibid, 7.
different time periods is even more difficult."54 This being true, what this author gained from Cohen's case studies is that personalities, which are derived from upbringing, education, experience and other intangible factors, at times, allowed them to override established systems of civil-military relations and go with their "gut feeling." It is important to point out that in these cases, overriding military leadership did lead to positive outcomes.55

The final author reviewed is Dale Herspring and his study, *The Pentagon and the Presidency*. In this study, Herspring takes an alternative approach as he focuses on the process involved and "why conflict between senior military and political officials is intense on some occasions, while mild on others."56 His main thesis is that the service, or military culture, is the dominant factor in modern civil-military relations.57

**The Goldwater-Nichols Reform Act of 1986**

The reorganization of government functions is an ongoing process which, to some degree, happens each time a new administration takes office. There have been three major reforms since the end of the Second World War that required congressional debate to reach a consensus and pass legislation. The first revision was The National Security Act of 1947. The Act brought the Office of the SecDef (OSD), the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the services civilian secretariats under the umbrella of the Department of Defense.58 This resulted in shifting "responsibility away from the individual service secretaries and gave OSD authority over the

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57 Ibid.
national military establishment.\textsuperscript{59} The Act mandated a chairman to the JCS, but really did not define his power, stipulating that the JCS were the principle military advisors to senior civilian leadership, the President, NSC and the SecDef. At the time, many within DOD feared that if they gave any real power to the CJCS that a Czar like position would be created and the advice given would be degraded. In reality, what this created was a huge bureaucracy where the JCS could not agree on anything without first gaining a consensus, usually through a compromise based on service parochialism. The inner service rivalry for scarce military resources was so great between the JCS, that all advice was jaded towards their services best interest.\textsuperscript{60}

The next revision, The Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, initiated during the Eisenhower administration, attempted to fix inner service rivalry problems among the JCS.\textsuperscript{61} The act sought to, "centralize control over the services, remove redundancies, streamlined, command channels, and provide for tighter civilian control at the Pentagon."\textsuperscript{62} In fact, what the act did was strip the JCS of most of their power, giving it all to SecDef. The CJCS still had no real authority and the JCS, even though they maintained the status of principle military advisers, were taken out of the chain of command to the Combatant Commanders. This allowed the SecDef, if he so chose, unfettered power, with no legal recourse on behalf of the JCS. This would have serious implications on the Vietnam conflict, where SecDef McNamara would completely cut the JCS out of the loop, and would not be remedied until the next reform, 28 years later.\textsuperscript{63}

The Goldwater-Nichols Reform Act of 1986 came about partially due to the failures of the Vietnam era administrations and the military’s failure of productive civil-military relations. Several issues were prevalent in the Department of Defense prior to 1986, leading many within

\textsuperscript{60} H.R. McMaster, Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam (New York: HarperCollins, 1997), 14.
\textsuperscript{61} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{62} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{63} Ibid, 17-23.
the establishment to call for reform. Congress was dissatisfied with the lack of joint integration between the four service Chiefs and their services. The reform finally came after more than five years of bureaucratic infighting, in the form of the Goldwater-Nichols Act.64

The Goldwater-Nichols Act had eight objectives aimed at fixing problems within DOD. The first objective was to tighten up civilian control of the military. This was accomplished through three statutes within the act. The first solidified the power of the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) which, actually, was more personality driven than legally binding in its authority. It clearly spelled out who was in charge of the Department of Defense …"the secretary has the sole and ultimate power within the Department of Defense on any matter on which the Secretary chooses to act."65 The second piece ties in with the second objective, which designates the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) as the principal military adviser to the SecDef and the President. Through this, Congress made a cohesive team out of the SecDef and the CJCS, which strengthened the civil-military relations and eliminated some of the problems which occurred during the Vietnam War. The third resulted in prescribed…"responsibilities of the service secretaries vis-à-vis the Secretary of Defense."66 This relationship had never been defined and, therefore, was vague and confusing.67

The second objective of Goldwater-Nichols was to “improve military advice provided to the President, National Security Council and Secretary of Defense”68 and dealt (as previously mentioned) directly with the CJCS. The CJCS generally had less power than the Joint Chiefs (JCS) themselves. The chairman's power was relatively undefined and he had no clear leverage over the JCS because of this, much of the advice that came out of the council was not worth the

66 Ibid.
67 Ibid.
68 Ibid, 10.
paper it was written on. The advice given had to be agreed upon by all, which often meant a great deal of mutual back scratching in order to reach an agreement. Unfortunately, by that time it normally would be watered down and useless. The Goldwater-Nichols Act solved this by designating the CJCS the principal military advisor to the SecDef and the President, and the JCS the CJCS’s advisers. The act also gave the CJCS a deputy and clearly defined his role as the number two ranking officer, eliminating the confusing practice of passing the chair among the JCS when the CJCS was not present. Additionally, the chairman was given full control over the joint staff. The provisions clearly set out in the act eradicated the confusing and often irrelevant advice that was received by the SecDef. Now the JCS, through the CJCS, would speak with one coherent voice that would be speaking for the good of all the services, not one service.

The third and fourth objectives related directly to the responsibility and power of the unified combatant commands (CoCom). To solidify the responsibility of the CoCom commanders, the act outlined their chain of command responsibility. The line now simply goes from subordinate CoCom commanders to the SecDef and the President, effectively and efficiently cutting out the JCS and the CJCS. The effectiveness of this has been seen recently in the positive relationship and discourse between President Bush and the CoCom in relation with the Surge in Iraq. Unfortunately, the Act was not designed to cope with two wars in different theatres taking place simultaneously over an extended period of time.

The second piece relating to the CoCom power or, as the act states, its commensurate authority, would specify their command authority. The Act specifically states:

…the command functions of getting authoritative direction, prescribing the chain of command, organizing commands and forces, employing forces, assigning

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70 Ibid.
command functions to subordinate commanders, coordinating and approving aspects of administration and support, selecting and suspending subordinates, and convening courts-martial’s.\textsuperscript{72}

The Goldwater-Nichols Act’s objective in delineating these powers was to insure balance was achieved in the commander’s authority and responsibility, which was previously lacking, causing multiple problems throughout the Vietnam conflict.\textsuperscript{73}

The previous four objectives proved to have the greatest impact. Briefly, the final four were: to increase attention to strategy formulation and contingency planning; to provide for more efficient use of defense resources; to improve joint officer management policies; and to otherwise enhance the effectiveness of military operations and improve DOD management and administration. For the most part, the Act has achieved what it was meant to achieve, as evidenced in the outstanding performance of the military in Operations Just Cause, Desert Storm, Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia, and current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, it has taken more time than it should have and the time for updating has probably arrived.\textsuperscript{74}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{72} James R. Locher, "Taking Stock of Goldwater-Nichols" \textit{Joint Force Quarterly} (Autumn 1996), 13.
\item \textsuperscript{73} James R. Locher, "Taking Stock of Goldwater-Nichols" \textit{Joint Force Quarterly} (Autumn 1996), 13.
\item \textsuperscript{74} Ibid, 16.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
Vietnam Case Study

This section will analyze the civil-military relationship during the tenure of President John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson. Several questions were asked to understand what influenced the relationship: What was the nature of public perception at the time? What was the nature of the civil-military relationship at the time? What was the nature of the military's perception? The section will conclude with a summary of what factors influenced the civil-military relationship the most as it pertained to the war. In answering these questions, this author hopes to clearly understand the civil-military relationship of the time and understand the factors that may have changed or needed to change in the future.

What was the nature of the publics perception of the time

The public’s wartime perceptions are shaped by many factors that can, over the course of a conflict, ultimately play a part in shaping national policy. In the case of the Vietnam Conflict, there was public support after the “Gulf of Tonkin Incident,” which occurred on August 2, 1964. Two U.S. warships were reported to have been attacked by North Vietnamese naval vessels. This angered the U.S. population and gave President Johnson a rally around the flag event. He took advantage of this and, instead of getting a declaration of war from Congress, he asked for, and received, the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. This gave him very broad powers in dealing with Vietnam. However, as the war dragged on and casualties mounted, the public turned against the war, and Congress finally repealed the act in 1971.

A formal declaration of war is important in the eyes of the American people as they have proven to be protective when it comes to committing the Armed Forces, and do not tolerate it

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without first giving consent. It helps give them an active voice, particularly in long term ventures. Additionally, a declaration of war formalizes the rules of conduct for the war, as well as its objectives; this directly relates to how the conflict will eventually end. As Summers writes, it "...legitimizes the relationship in the eyes of society and announces it to the world. It focuses attention, provides certain responsibilities, and creates impediments to dissolution." The declaration of war gives credibility to the start of the war. It shows that the majority (through elected leadership) support the war. This pays dividends, both in good times (we were for it) and bad times (we were for it, now what do we do to win it), utilizing all the elements of national power to achieve victory. It can be done, as it was in Vietnam, without the people's consent or congressional declaration of war but ultimately, this will lead to widespread public dissent, as it did in Vietnam.

In the case of Vietnam, the U.S. military went to war because the President directed it, Congress provided funding to fight it and the Supreme Court never weighed in with opposition; there was, however, no formal declaration of war. This would have inferred that the people were behind the war effort and they were vested partners in the war. Without this, there is no chance to succeed in the prosecution of a protracted war. Short wars may be a different story. If we can get in and out under the guise of humanitarian support or protecting American lives or interest, then the government can probably get away without a formal declaration of war. However, with the Vietnam conflict there were over 50,000 KIA and it lasted over a decade, so that was not possible.

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77 Harry G. Summers, Jr., *On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War* (Novato: Presidio Press, 1982), 14 “The constitutional requirement for a congressional declaration of war served a dual purpose. It insured public support at the outset, and through the legal sanctions against dealing with the enemy, it created impediments to public dissent.”
78 Ibid, 17.
79 Ibid, 14-19.
80 Ibid, 14.
81 Ibid, 22.
82 The Vietnam War Memorial Washington D.C.
One of the reasons behind the government’s failure to obtain a declaration of war was that the Vietnam conflict was looked at in an 18th-century context where, as Clausewitz writes:

In 18th-century… War was still an affair for governments alone, and the people's role was simply that of an instrument... the executive... represented the state in its foreign relations... the people's part had been extinguished... War thus became solely the concern of the government to the extent that governments parted company with their peoples and behaved as if they were themselves the state. 83

This disconnect between the American people and the administration explains why many Americans felt that the Vietnam war was not their war; they had not bought in on the war and the only tangible results were the rising number of killed, captured and wounded American service members. 84

By allowing the public to become alienated with the conflict, over time, the government violated Clausewitz Trinity principal. 85 In order to wage war, the balance of the Trinity must be maintained at all times. 86 There must be a cohesive tie between the people, the government and the military; if one is out of balance, the others will not be able to maintain and, therefore, prosecute war. General Fred C. Weyand, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army July 1976, illustrates this;

Vietnam was a reaffirmation of the peculiar relationship between the American Army and the American people. The American Army really is a People's Army in the sense that it belongs to the American people who take a jealous and proprietary interest in its involvement. When the Army is committed, the American people are committed, when the American people lose their commitment it is futile to try to keep the Army committed. In the final analysis, the American Army is not so much an arm of the executive branch as it is an arm of the American people. The Army, therefore, cannot be committed lightly. 87

85 Ibid, 22-23, 24-28, 34, 36.
86 Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War* Indexed Edition, Edited by Michael Howard and Peter Paret Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), Clausewitz explains the trinity as the three pillars of the population, the military, and the government; if these are not in sync with the war effort it will be hard if not impossible to achieve victory.
Unfortunately, that is exactly what the administration did. A light commitment of the military in the form of slow escalation, coupled with an unclear objective, led to a protracted conflict.\textsuperscript{88} This resulted in high casualties and, ultimately, an unwinnable situation in the eyes of the public.\textsuperscript{89}

The length of the war, the high number of U.S. casualties and the exposure of U.S. involvement in war crimes such as the massacre at My Lai, helped to turn many in the United States against the war.\textsuperscript{90} Immense public outcry and huge public demonstrations in Washington D.C., and many other cities in the United States, as well as on college campuses followed. This, ultimately, began to shape U.S. policy on the conduct of the war.\textsuperscript{91}

**What was the nature of the Civil-Military relationship at the time?**

Conflict termination should be the end state that political leadership envisions and the military achieves. With that in mind, civil-military relationships are directly coupled to the end state. Throughout U.S. involvement in Vietnam, there were three Presidential administrations. All three administrations violated Huntington’s principles of objective civilian control of the military\textsuperscript{92}. This violation of control can be detrimental to civil-military relations and, in the case of Vietnam, proved to be disastrous, leading, in part, to the loss of the conflict.

For the purposes of this study, the Kennedy administration will be the first examined, because with the new administration also came a new national strategy. With Kennedy, the nation would shift from a strategy of massive retaliation to that of “flexible response.”\textsuperscript{93} The

\begin{footnotes}
\item[89] Ibid, 331-334.
\end{footnotes}
previous administrations bluster of a strategy of massive retaliation, “…which threatened the use of U.S. nuclear forces in response to any act of communist aggression,” was seen as largely ineffective by the incoming administration’s defense experts, and was replaced. The administration, with the Commander in Chief leading, took up the slogan of Flexible Response which called for meeting the communists at any level of warfare; low-intensity all the way to high end nuclear war. This, they believed, would tailor our forces in such a way as to be able to fight wherever necessary to contain communism. This new strategy would soon come into contention with the military establishment that was gearing itself solely for a conventional war in Europe, not fighting insignificant small wars.

Before the Vietnam conflict can be viewed through the Kennedy administration's eyes, one must understand the events that shaped civil-military relations. Three incidents stand out in the shaping effort. Kennedy's first crisis with the military was the Bay of Pigs fiasco. The operation which had been approved for planning and preparation by the Eisenhower administration was solely under the direction of the CIA. Here, Kennedy expected the military to offer opinions, assist with problem solving and take charge of the mission. Unfortunately, he never articulated this to the JCS. Possibly due to inexperience, he failed to understand that the military would do this only when directed, otherwise the JCS would not intercede in a mission where they felt uninvolved. This lack of involvement would negatively shape the way President Kennedy dealt with the military from that point forward.

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96 Ibid, 121, 140.
97 Ibid, 123.
99 Ibid, 11.
The second event, also inherited from the previous administration, involved the tiny Southeast Asian country of Laos. The U.S. had been, and was still, in support of the current royal family of Laos, in the form of Prince Boun Oum Aws government; however, the Soviets were supporting the Pathet Lao’s communist insurgency to overthrow Oum’s regime. Early in 1961, the guerrillas had been making impressive headway, forcing President Kennedy to look at options for action. The JCS, not wanting to repeat their perceived inaction of the previous event, gave the President a course of action that called for massive troop deployment and the President’s preparation to use nuclear weapons if necessary. The President thought the JCS were stuck in a World War II mindset of total war and was not impressed with their advice. He, in turn, disregarded their course of action and alerted a much smaller Marine contingent to prepare for action. This deed prompted the Soviets to seek a negotiation that was finally reached a year later. Laos was left divided and the Pathet Lao was in control of key areas used by guerrillas to later supply the Viet Cong in Vietnam. In Kennedy's mind, the poor advice given by the JCS, coupled with a negative outcome of negotiations, started to close his mind to military advisers and forced him to seek ways in which to control the JCS.

President Kennedy, realizing he needed sound and timely military advice from the JCS, did two things. First, in May 1961, he personally went to the JCS at the Pentagon to clarify the fact that he needed them to speak freely on all military matters. This was a good decision; unfortunately, President Kennedy completely undermined any trust he gained from the JCS by recalling General Maxwell Taylor to active duty in July 1961, in the created position of Special

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101 Ibid, 8.
102 Ibid.
103 Dale R. Herspring, The pentagon and the Presidency: Civil-Military Relations from FDR to George W. Bush (Lawrence: University Pres of Kansas, 2005), 133.
Assistant for National Security Affairs in the White House. Here, Taylor would unofficially, oversee all military matters before the President became involved. This new position would effectively make Taylor senior to the JCS; as Herspring writes, "Taylor essentially became another JCS chairman, and a far more influential one at that, especially given the close relationship he developed with Kennedy's inner circle." Taylor who had held numerous high level positions before his retirement, and was the originator of the term “flexible response” in his book “The Uncertain Trumpet,” was highly respected by Kennedy.

Unfortunately, as Krepinevich illustrates, their definitions of flexible response were not the same:

Taylor could accept no more than most other generals the proposal that in order to deal effectively with the VC, the Army, which had fought to modernize and improve in terms of mobility and firepower, must become not more sophisticated but more primitive. Ironically, the effect of placing Taylor at so many of the junction points between the political leadership and the Army was not so much the application of pressure from above on the military as it was the insulation of the service from the very pressure that the president was trying to generate.

The military has a clear-cut chain of command; historically, whenever the chain of command is confused in its hierarchy, subsequent missions will also tend to be confused. This would turn out to be the result of the recall of Taylor by the President.

The final shaping incident was the Cuban missile crisis, and was the closest the country has ever come to Thermo Nuclear War. During this action the JCS, with no cohesion or unity of effort, loudly gave irrelevant (in the President's eyes) advice, "...the various Chiefs held differing

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106 Ibid, 134.
107 Ibid.
110 Ibid, 149.
opinions, and they never made a recommendation as a group to invade Cuba.”111 When the President failed to heed what little advice they did give, they became outspoken, and even disrespectful. As Herspring writes, "Robert Kennedy informed Lemay (Air Force chief) that he would not be permitted to brief the White House, the latter observed, "what a dumb shit."”112 None of which served to improve the relationship between the President and the military. These three events, coupled with the ultra empowerment of the SecDef due to the stipulations in the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, set the stage for disaster in the following major conflict in Vietnam.113

From the very beginning, both President Kennedy and Secretary of Defense McNamara’s ideas contradicted those of the JCS concerning how to solve the complicated Vietnam conflict.114 Kennedy wanted a counter-insurgency focused course of action that would involve a small contingent of Americans training the South Vietnamese Army, and other indigenous forces, so they could conduct their own fighting. The SecDef wanted to carry out the President’s orders but, unfortunately, lacked any operational knowledge concerning the nature of counter-insurgency warfare. The military, with the Army being the lead, disagreed vehemently.115 They insisted that the way to win against North Vietnam was no different than fighting a conventional military war.116 However, they never devised a coherent, unified strategy and Taylor, who could have helped unify them, did not believe they could be unified. In a book Taylor had written shortly before being recalled, he wrote, “He would dissolve the organization and replace it with a single defense chief of staff, who, as the senior military officer of the U.S. government, would report

113 Ibid, 149.
114 Ibid.
115 Ibid, 119.
116 Ibid.
directly to the SecDef and the President.” 117 This passage highlights, unmistakably, what his ambitions concerning the JCS.

In an attempt to gain information concerning the conflict, the President sent Vice President Johnson to Vietnam and, later, General Taylor. 118 Taylor recommended a primarily logistics package that would bolster the South Vietnamese Army's ability to wage war against the North. The JCS disagreed, “…they believed that the fall of Vietnam was inevitable unless substantial numbers of U.S. troops were introduced.” 119 The JCS pushed hard for an all in effort, meaning either the U.S. accept the fact that this was a war where a large contingent of U.S. forces would be needed to win or stop now and get out. 120 Additionally, they violently opposed a slow build up of U.S. troops. 121 This was completely contrary to what the President wanted. The President, not getting information he required from the military, continued to send special emissaries to Vietnam, attempting to discover the real story. 122 The information he received from the military was inflated and contradictory, resulting in mistrust of the military's assessment. By not clearly articulating the situation on the ground, the military did a serious injustice to itself. The lack of trust between the President and the military resulted in the President violating a principle of objective control in which the civilian leadership accepts that the military is both professional and competent. The result was over confidence in, and micromanagement of, the military by Secretary of Defense McNamara.

119 Ibid.
120 Ibid, 156.
121 Ibid, 156. Most of the JCS had fought in Korea and did not want a repeat performance where the troops on the ground were getting killed and the politicians did nothing. As Herspring writes, they believed the options for war were: “The United States could plunge in with both feet and fight for victory or get out. The idea of graduated response was nonsense as far as the chiefs were concerned.”
With the assassination of President Kennedy came the second administration that would have to deal with direct U.S. involvement in Vietnam, under President Lyndon B. Johnson. Unfortunately, President Johnson did not like or trust the military.\textsuperscript{123} His one concern was building his "great society;"\textsuperscript{124} it was his number one priority and winning the war took a very distant back seat.\textsuperscript{125} Instead of appointing his own cabinet, President Johnson kept most of the former administrations cabinet in place.\textsuperscript{126} Especially troubling was his immediate trust and confidence in SecDef McNamara’s handling of military affairs in Vietnam.\textsuperscript{127} With this approach in mind, it is clear that the President expected SecDef McNamara to handle the war. This, combined with the limiting actions of the Defense Reform Act of 1958, created a negative civil-military environment.

McNamara constructed a two-tier strategy without input from the JCS who, at the time, were, by law, his principle military advisors, or General William C. Westmorland, who was the commander responsible for Vietnam. The first tier involved initiating a graduated response. This theory, which would prove completely ineffective, was really about opening a dialogue with the enemy, not killing him.\textsuperscript{128} McNamara felt,"...if the United States showed its resolve and gradually increased pressure on the Viet Cong and, especially the North Vietnamese, in time the

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\textsuperscript{123} H.R. McMaster, Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam (New York: HarperCollins, 1997), 63. \\
\textsuperscript{124} President Johnson’s great society was a program of social reforms and incentives that he desperately wanted passed through congress as his legacy. \\
\textsuperscript{125} Harry G. Summers, Jr., On Strategy: A critical Analysis of the Vietnam War (Novato: Presidio Press, 1982), 12. \\
\textsuperscript{126} H.R. McMaster, Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam (New York: HarperCollins, 1997), 48. \\
\textsuperscript{127} Dale R. Herspring, The pentagon and the Presidency: Civil-Military Relations from FDR to George W. Bush (Lawrence: University Pres of Kansas, 2005), 152-153. \\
\end{flushright}
latter would come to recognize that battle against the mighty U.S. was a futile undertaking.¹²⁹

The plan would use air power to gradually make the enemy see the error of their judgment.¹³⁰

The President approved this plan for two reasons. First, looked at from outside the White House, this plan appeared to take into consideration the expertise of the military; in reality it was just the opposite. In reality, it was all McNamara and his “whiz kids” concept, which had been shaped by previous experience. McNamara’s experience was influenced largely by his service with the Air Force in WWII as a statistician, teaching them the benefits of statistical analysis. Also, more recently, the Bay of Pigs had shaped his strategic outlook.¹³¹ Secondly, this plan would allow President Johnson to maintain a moderate political stance in the eyes of the public, which he believed would help in his bid for re-election.¹³²

The second tier of McNamara's plan was quantification; he wanted to hold the military accountable for everything that could be counted. The best example was "body counts." McNamara believed he was fighting a war of attrition where, at some point, the NVA would run out of bodies to fight the war.¹³³ This was a catastrophic mistake in an insurgency where there are always more soldiers to die for the cause. History has proven a war of insurgency cannot be fought in an attritional format because the insurgents control the population and, through them, can absorb massive amounts of casualties.¹³⁴ As Krepinevich writes, “The ability of the insurgent to draw on the population for replacements and the expansion of insurgent control over the people through subversion, persuasion, or terror not only will serve to replace losses but will...”

¹³² Ibid, 63.
¹³⁴ Ibid, 154-160.
likely result in an increase in strength." This proved true for the NVA; they never had significant issues in filling their ranks.

The JCS repeatedly sent military options to the President, most of which requested more troops and fewer restrictions on combat operations. The President rarely listened to these recommendations. For example, in November 1964 the Viet Cong attacked the Bien Hoa American air base. The JCS requested retaliatory airstrikes, specifically against the North Vietnamese MIG fighter base at Phuc Yen. To appease the military the President and SecDef set up a special council to review military options. The outcome of this, status quo, graduated response, so that the Russians or the Chinese would not be incited. This again illustrates how easily President Johnson would disregard the expertise of the JCS on military matters.

The JCS tried several times, through several venues, to have their opinion heard by the President; unfortunately, three things trumped their views. First, President Johnson never wanted to rock the political boat; he always had his eyes on the next election. His personality made him think that because he came to power through the assassination of his predecessor, that until he was elected outright, he was not legitimate. Given this, his number one goal was to get elected; often he would overtly keep elements of the conflict in Vietnam from public view to maintain the image of status quo in the war. He felt this was necessary to win the election.

The second brick wall was the SecDef. By this time, McNamara did not even attempt to hide his disdain for the JCS. In a blatant move to suppress the JCS, the SecDef rerouted all lines

138 Ibid, 159.
of communication from the JCS to the President directly through his office. More often than not, the communiqués would not be forwarded at all. The JCS continuously asked the President for a clear mission statement and what the end state should look like in Vietnam. They would get nothing back in response. The JCS continued to call for increased bombing efforts; unfortunately, the SecDef was not informing the President of what the JCS had been calling for and had been lying to both the President and the JCS.

The final obstacle encountered by the JCS was from within. They were continuously divided on a way ahead and their parochialism would not allow them to come together on a strategy. As McMaster writes, “It seemed that each of the services, rather than attempt to determine the true nature of the war and source of the insurgency in South Vietnam, assumed that it alone had the capacity to win the war.” The Chiefs could not agree on how to fight the war in Vietnam and, therefore, could not speak with a unified voice with a reasonable plan which, in turn, weakened their stand in the eyes of President.

For the JCS, every major decision between them and the civilian leadership regarding the Vietnam War was a combat exercise and, due, in part, to their lack of cohesiveness, the President rarely sided with them. An example of this was the Gulf of Tonkin incident, which was a turning point in U.S. intervention. Here the President took the side of McNamara and went with the strategy of gradual escalation. This was contrary to the advice given to the SecDef and President by the military; specifically, the Army Chief of Staff Harold Johnson briefed that the minimum

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142 Ibid, 160.
143 Ibid, 159.
144 Ibid, 164.
requirement to win in Vietnam would be approximately 500,000 ground troops, would require roughly five years, and would require national mobilization.\textsuperscript{147}

The administrations poor handling of civil-military relations,\textsuperscript{148} through the violation of principles of objective control, are also evident in its use of McNamara and his team of “whiz kid” analysts.\textsuperscript{149} To the whiz kids and McNamara, the war was becoming less cost-effective. They convinced President Johnson to conduct a Christmas bombing pause in order to save money; this was completely contrary to the JCS recommendations and was viewed as a victory for the whiz kids,\textsuperscript{150} “The President clearly did not trust in the professional competence of the JCS, who had repeatedly argued that a pause "would undo all we've done."\textsuperscript{151} This policy of practiced incrementalism, without a clear goal, continuously allowed the enemy to regroup and continue their struggle.

In 1967, General Westmorland and the JCS finally devised a comprehensive strategy to ensure victory; they required more troops and the freedom to maneuver within Vietnam and the neighboring countries of Laos and Cambodia harboring the Vietcong.\textsuperscript{152} Not trusting their judgment, McNamara and the whiz kids proposed a different plan. Here again, the SecDef disregards the JCS plan, causing the JCS to threaten to resign.\textsuperscript{153} At the last minute they decided more good could be done by staying and continuing to try and work with the administration. This caused, what Herspring and others have called one of the most significant all-time lows in civil-

\textsuperscript{147} Dale R. Herspring, The pentagon and the Presidency: Civil-Military Relations from FDR to George W. Bush (Lawrence: University Pres of Kansas, 2005), 161.
\textsuperscript{148} Ibid, 168. “Johnson simply had no interest in the militaries advice”
\textsuperscript{149} The Whiz Kids were a group of young analysts that McNamara brought with him from Ford motor company that relied on statistical analysis for their decision making. They had little to no government or military experience.
\textsuperscript{150} Ibid, 173.
\textsuperscript{152} Ibid, 171.
\textsuperscript{153} Ibid, 170-171.
The result, basically status quo, the President gave the commander in Vietnam more troops but not what he was asking for, maintaining the policy of gradualism. The final event that sealed the fate of the conflict came with the Tet offensive. Here, U.S. forces won the fight but lost the American populations will to continue the war. This was really the end of the Vietnam War. After this, the President lost faith in McNamara and finally, he resigned. In McNamara’s place, the President appoints Clark Clifford who, compared to McNamara, was extremely moderate. Clifford respected the JCS position and listened to their advice. Unfortunately, the JCS did not know how to work together and there were no systems in place forcing them to work together; therefore, they could not collaborate to answer the SecDef's questions about the war in a unified voice. Without a cohesive strategy for an acceptable endstate and with complete loss of the will of the people, a negative outcome was inevitable.

The outcome in Vietnam was not inevitable from the beginning. Had the two administrations not blatantly violated the principles of objective control and had there been better organization in place, in both the Department of Defense and the government itself, the outcome would most definitely have been different. Unfortunately, it would be a decade later, when the Goldwater-Nichols Act would take the first step in correcting many of these institutional shortcomings. In analyzing the way President Johnson made decisions, this author believes that even with those fixes, President Johnson personality still would have played a large role, which would have been hard if not impossible to overcome.

155 Ibid, 170.
158 Ibid, 178.
159 Ibid, 182.
What was the nature of the military’s perception

Under the Kennedy administration, the military was initially reluctant to fight a land war in Southeast Asia. Senior leaders had paid close attention to French exploits and were not eager to repeat them.  

The Johnson administration inherited the escalating situation in Vietnam and chose to continue. The JCS thought they could win but could not agree on one reasoned and comprehensive strategy. They disagreed with McNamara’s strategy of gradual escalation; however, they allowed their service parochialism to interfere with reaching a reasonable strategy to be articulated with one voice.

Instead of coming together to figure out a strategy that made sense, each of the JCS thought they could win the war with their own service. The SecDef, wanting to continue with his policy, used this as a wedge between the JCS, even going as far as purposefully releasing statements from one service to incite another service. He accomplished this quite effectively, keeping the JCS fighting each other and, essentially, dividing and conquering them through their own lack of cohesion. An amazing example of the lack of cooperation is the fact that each of the services ran their own air war throughout the entire conflict. Another example occurred at the final withdrawal, "When responsibility was split between two separate commands, one on land and one at sea. Each of these set a different “H Hour” which caused confusion and delays." The inexcusable lack of unity and inability to recognize the effectiveness of a joint effort is unimaginable today.

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163 Ibid, 143.
164 Ibid, 82.
165 Ibid, 83.
The answer to the question is yes; the military thought they could win, if given the time resources and flexibility. Unfortunately, they were like poker players holding their cards close so that they could win as individual services. Had there been a forcing agent to require sound, timely, non-parochial advice from the JCS, and had the president not violated the principles of objective civil-military control which trusted in the professionalism of the senior military leaders the outcome could have been different.

Summary

To comment on what would have happened during the Kennedy administration, had he not been assassinated, would be complete speculation; however, in his limited time the military did not impress Kennedy and he generally sought the council of civilian advisors over the JCS. The one exception was his unusual trust and confidence in General Taylor, whom he called back to active duty from retirement.\textsuperscript{167}

During the Johnson administration, domestic political objectives drove all of the decisions. With each section of the government vying for the power and ear of the president, political infighting was inevitable. Had there been a whole government reform, forcing each agency to cooperate, the outcome may have been different. President Johnson's goal for the war was to keep it limited; he did not want it to escalate. He did not want to risk bringing in the Russians or the Chinese, fearing Nuclear War, and he did not want it to interfere with the domestic policy he desperately wanted passed through Congress.\textsuperscript{168}

Unfortunately, the military establishment also would not see past service parochialism in order to develop a coherent operational design. If President Johnson could not focus the JCS, they certainly could not do it themselves. As McMaster's writes, "...the result was that the JCS

\textsuperscript{167} Dale R. Herspring, The pentagon and the Presidency: Civil-Military Relations from FDR to George W. Bush (Lawrence: University Pres of Kansas, 2005), 120-123, 134.
and McNamara became fixated on the means rather than on the ends, and on the manner in
which the war was conducted instead of a military strategy that could connect military actions to
achievable goals.169 The military could keep piling on forces but without any goal other than to
"kill more VC" then the war could not be won.170

Without a clear policy objective to begin with there will always be an unclear military
end state and, therefore, no clear termination criteria other than the war of attrition which is not
winnable in an insurgency. Because the president did not trust the JCS, and initially had absolute
trust in the SecDef, he listened only to civilian advisers to run the war.171

169 H.R. McMaster, Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of
170 Dale R. Herspring, The pentagon and the Presidency: Civil-Military Relations from FDR to
George W. Bush (Lawrence: University Pres of Kansas, 2005), 155.
171 Ibid, 180-183.
OIF Case Study

This section is a study of the contemporary operating environment, focusing on Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). The same sets of questions asked in the first case study are explored here: What was the nature of public perception at the time? What was the nature of the civil-military relationship at the time? What was the nature of the military's perception. The section will conclude with a summary analysis of what influenced the President’s decision the most. This should illuminate possible reasons the President disregarded public opinion as well as advice of senior civilians, and agreed with advice from military leaders to successfully conduct the "surge." This set the conditions necessary for military withdrawal under favorable and winning conditions.

What was the nature of the publics perception at the time

The publics’ perceptions on the war in Iraq have at times been like riding a roller coaster. The publics view on Iraq started out very high, regardless of party affiliation; Democrats, Republicans and Independents alike favored military action against Iraq, as shown here in the combined CBS New York Times and PEW research poll:

Figure 1 CBS, New York Times PEW Research Poll

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Unfortunately, the poll also appears to shows how, as the war evolved and the reasons for going to war, such as Weapons of Mass Destruction and ties to the 9/11 attacks were not convincingly proven, public support faded.\

By 2007 public perception had fallen to wartime lows. As the following Pew poll shows, nearly six in ten Americans believed that the U.S. military efforts in Iraq were not going very well. Correspondingly, the poll shows a 54%-39% margin in favor of bringing U.S. forces home.

![Graph showing public perception of the war](image)

**Figure 2 PEW Research center poll**

In the most recent polling, the publics view appears to be turning back towards the positive. The following data shows that 48% of all Americans polled believe that the war is now going fairly well. An equal 48% say the war is still not going well. This shows a definite upturn in public opinion from the previous data that showed 67% of the people polled a year ago felt the war was not going well. It appears to shows that with the Surge strategy apparently working, the public again has a favorable view of the war.

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York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 280. Copyright reprint permission for this figure was granted on 4 March 2009 by the Command and Staff College copyrights coordinator.


What was the nature of the Civil-Military relationship at the time?

President Bush adhered to the principles of objective control in terms of his relationship with the military. Defined as, "the healthiest most effective form of civilian control of the military is that which maximizes professionalism by isolating soldiers from politics and giving them as free a hand as possible in military affairs." Effective objective control of the military is achieved through professional discourse that takes place between senior military leadership, their civilian counterparts, and politicians. This professional discourse, which ultimately leads to successful termination criteria, is tied directly to the will of the people. As Cohen writes "the professional concept of military activity, moreover, depicts political purposes in war as purely a matter of foreign-policy; and yet in practice the "high" politics of war is suffused as well with "low" or domestic politics."

The President had a strong cabinet of pro military personnel. Vice President Dick Cheney was a former SecDef, and Secretary of State Colin Powell was a former CJCS. The

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177 Ibid, 258.
national security adviser, Condoleezza Rice, had a strong pro-military background. Most importantly, SecDef Donald Rumsfeld had been the SecDef previously, under the Ford administration. All of which, on the surface, appears to be a great reprieve for the military, who had been severely neglected under the previous Clinton administration. Unfortunately for the military, and especially the Army, the new SecDef was not looking at things through the same lens that the JCS or the CJCS were. 

President Bush relied heavily on a corporate style of leadership. This played a big part in cabinet member selections. He wanted extremely competent and ultra confident personalities in each of the positions. As Herspring writes, "Bush wanted a healthy mix of differing views and attitudes, so he selected a group of individuals with strong personalities and varying perspectives on how to address the country's problems." This ensured he received the best possible information about the problems at hand. At times, this also increased the infighting among these principal players. President Bush also realized his own shortcomings, “I was not a military tactician. I recognize that. I was going to have to rely on the advice and counsel of Rumsfeld, Shelton, Myers, and Tenet.” He knew that putting together a strong team would be imperative in the war effort and the best way to do that was to rely on the experts.

These ultra type A personalities, all of which had differing perspectives on Middle East policy, were continuously at odds and vying for the President's favor. The Neo-cons (Neoconservatives) of the Vice President, the SecDef, and his deputy Paul Wolfowitz, saw the

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179 Ibid, 256, 341, See also Herspring pg 378.
184 Ibid, 16-23. “Neoconservatives-essentially idealistic interventionists who believed in using American power to spread democracy.”
need to change the status quo in the Middle East in one way: get rid of Saddam Hussein.\textsuperscript{185} On the other side was the more moderate Secretary of State, retired general Colin Powell, who sought to use diplomacy first and then overwhelming military power, if need be. Finally, somewhere in the middle was the national security adviser, Condoleezza Rice.\textsuperscript{186}

After intense bureaucratic infighting, President Bush sided with the neo-cons\textsuperscript{187} and their view of military action against the regime of Saddam Hussein.\textsuperscript{188} This is where conflict between the SecDef and the military became readily apparent. The military, especially the Army, had spent the last few years aggressively transforming itself from Cold War era heavy formations to lighter, more mobile and network-centric units, that could plug and play with other units. This was exactly what the SecDef wanted; although some of the aspects of the Army transformation may not have been in line with the SecDef's views, most were. Unfortunately, General Eric Shinseki the Army Chief of Staff and the SecDef were talking past each other.\textsuperscript{189}

An important event that shaped the way in which the SecDef viewed the military was the response to 9/11. The President, being a man of action, wanted an immediate response and asked the SecDef to give him options. The SecDef then tasked the military, through the CJCS, to come up with a plan.\textsuperscript{190} The plan the military devised did not answer the mail in the SecDef's eyes. He felt the plan was of a Cold War mindset, with large bulky formations and exceedingly long

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\item[187] Ibid, 22.
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At the same time, the director of the CIA, George Tenet, briefed the President with a covert plan of action against the Taliban. This plan would involve both CIA advisers and their long-standing contacts with Afghani warlords. The plan called for co-opting the warlords to conduct the fighting while being supplemented with U.S. money and, most importantly, U.S. air power. The President liked Tenet’s plan and quickly agreed to it with some minor modifications, which would include some of the Army Special Forces. This infuriated the SecDef, who felt he had been cut out of the loop. These actions ultimately set the stage for how the SecDef would interact with the military and its planning for operations in Iraq.

The problem was in the SecDef’s war fighting vision as it pertained to Iraq. This was considerably different from that of the military. The question one would ask, at this point, is why should this affect the military? Due to provisions set forth by the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, the military is clearly aware that the CJCS is the President's chief military advisor. Unfortunately, Rumsfeld was not well versed in the newer legislation and was biased by the old way of doing business from his first time in the job. As Herspring writes, “Rumsfeld left no doubt in anyone’s mind that the armed forces worked for him. Regardless of Goldwater-Nichols, which made the chairman the President’s chief advisor on military affairs, Rumsfeld was determined to decide what role, if any, the Chiefs would play. If he wanted them to advise the President, he would say so—although in practice this would not happen very often.” He thought the military

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193 Ibid.
196 Ibid, 379.
had become too powerful and that they were violating principles of objective civilian control.197 In reality, he was violating the principles,198 as well as the legislation set forth in the Goldwater-Nichols Act.199

President Bush could have followed suite with his SecDef in violating principles of objective civilian control of the military in 2003 – 2007, as the war had evolved into a counter-insurgency. The war in Iraq was not going well; casualties were over 3,000; attacks on U.S. forces were at wartime highs with over 400 per month.200 The war was on the front page of every newspaper and was the main topic of all the radio and TV news programs. As was previously shown the majority of the American public now believed it was a mistake to have gone into Iraq. This was also evident in the Democrats sweeping victories in the Senate and House in the Nov 2006 elections.201

Fortunately, the President did not abuse the philosophy, even though this is what his SecDef wanted.202 As the conflict was recognized as an insurgency, President Bush started looking for viable alternatives to the status quo of training the Iraqi Army and letting them fight the insurgency, or to pull out as many within his own administration were advocating.203 In June of 2006, the NSC organized a brief for the president with different options for Iraq. One of the

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197 Samuel P. Huntington, "Reforming Civil-Military Relations" In Civil-Military Relations and Democracy, edited by Marc F. Platter, Larry Diamond (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996.), 3-4. #2. The effective subordination of the military to civilian political leaders who make the basic decisions on foreign and military policy.
198 Ibid. #3. The recognition and acceptance by that leadership of an area of professional competence and autonomy for the military.
199 Ibid, 381.
presenters was David Kagen, a former West Point professor. Kagen presented a comprehensive strategy which introduced more U.S. forces into Iraq to properly “clear hold and build” Baghdad.\textsuperscript{204} This piqued President Bush’s interest. Then in December, former Vice Chief of Staff of the Army retired General Jack Keane met with the President. Kean, who had come up with a plan in conjunction with Kagen and General David Petraeus (whom had recently been chosen as the next commander of ground forces in Iraq), briefed the President and Vice President, “…arguing that “train and leave” wasn’t a strategy for winning. He laid out a case for the “surge,”\textsuperscript{205} and they liked what they heard.

Another big part of this decision was President Bush’s personality. As Langston argues, the Presidents personality was critical in all of the decisions made beginning with going to war,\textsuperscript{206} and then in the direction the war was going. He summed up President Bush’s personality as follows:

He continuously went with his gut, making one decision after another with no or minimal deliberation beforehand. Each decision moved him closer to war.

Once George W. Bush fixed upon a policy, or began down a path to which he had publicly committed himself, he did not tolerate doubt.

He followed his beliefs—his “Vision Thing”—which instructed him that, in invading Iraq, he was leading the United States in the fulfillment of its providential mission to restore freedom to the oppressed, and also fulfilling the potentialities of his office.

He had a passionate contempt for Saddam Hussein and for the allegedly soft way in which he had been treated in the recent past.\textsuperscript{207}

Another indicator of President Bush’s personality was in his ability to reach down and find people who were unafraid to give the hard answers. For example, the initial surge

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  \item\textsuperscript{206} Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E.Trainor, \textit{Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Iraq Invasion and Occupation of Iraq} (New York: Pantheon Books, 2006), for a look at decisions made by President Bush leading up to the war see page 17.
  \item\textsuperscript{207} Thomas S. Langston, “The Decider's Path to War in Iraq and the importance of Personality” In \textit{The Polarized Presidency of George W. Bush}, edited by George C. Edwards III and Desmond S. King, (Oxford New York: Oxford University Prss, 2007), 167.
\end{itemize}
plan from the pentagon only called for two brigades. When President Bush asked the newly appointed commander of ground forces in Iraq Gen Petraeus what he would need to win in Iraq he told the President that he needed five brigades and that is what he got. Through this, President Bush received timely, accurate assessments and advice from the field. With the recommendation of the "Surge" forces, the future commander of ground forces in Iraq painted a factually based recommendation, giving the Commander-in-Chief a viable option for moving ahead with the war. This recommendation certainly was not a popular option, within the administration including the SecDef, or with the American people, as was shown earlier in the poll data.

Something else his “gut” told him was that it was time to make not only big strategy changes, but also some personnel changes that would complement the new strategy. The day after the Democrat’s sweep of the Senate and the House, the White House announced the resignation of SecDef Rumsfeld. Robert Gates was announced as his replacement. Gates, a former head of the CIA, was on record as a member of the Baker-Hamilton commission as being for a surge of forces in Iraq and was enthusiastic about the President’s decision.

President Bush's successful use of the principles of objective control of the military, in which he believed in the professionalism of his senior leaders, and the mechanisms in place by Goldwater-Nichols, as well as what his “gut” told him, allowed him to make the decision for the “Surge.”

**What was the nature of the military's perception**

The military perception of the war in Iraq has gone through three stages; why now, status quo, and let's get it done. These phases of perception cover the time leading up to the war, the

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209 Ibid.
stalemated years up to the announcement of the Surge and, finally, post surge. Throughout the stages, the military always thought they could win.210

The senior leaders first perceptions were that of why now. Mainly this was a timing issue, which has been clearly documented in many pre-war documents. The majority opinion was that the war in Afghanistan should be prosecuted to the fullest and when complete, if the evidence existed, to move on to Iraq.211

The second stage status quo, which was to train the Iraqi Army and let them fight the insurgency, is meant to illustrate the JCS opinion that more troops were not needed. As Barnes writes, "the joint Chiefs were disinclined to send more troops to Iraq or adopt a new strategy."212 At the same time, the Baker Hamilton commission’s report had come out which recommended pulling out of Iraq. At the time the JCS had some legitimate reservations for not sending more troops:

The Chiefs had real grievances to air, and they didn't hold back. Schoomaker cited the stress on combat forces from repeated tours of duty in Iraq and Afghanistan. That, Bush told me, was "the main thing I remember from that meeting. That was clearly a factor in some of the people around the tables thinking... if you sustain our level, much less increase the level, you could, Mr. President, strain the force, which is an important consideration."

Bush agreed that strain was a problem. Then he delivered a sharp rejoinder, touching on a theme he returned to at nearly every meeting on Iraq. "The biggest strain on the force would be a defeat in Iraq," he said. Winning trumped strain. To alleviate the strain, the president committed to enlarging the army by two divisions and increasing the size of the Marine Corps. The Chiefs had two more complaints. The military, practically alone, was carrying the load in Iraq. Where were the civilians from the State Department and other agencies? Again, Bush agreed with their point. He promised to assign more civilians to Iraq. (The number of provincial reconstruction teams was soon doubled.) Their final problem was the unreliability of Iraq's Shia government and Army. Would Iraqi forces show up and do their part in the surge? And would they act

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211 Ibid, 17.
in a nonsectarian manner, treating Sunnis the same as Shia? Bush said he would get a public commitment on both counts from Maliki before making a final decision on the surge.213

President Bush listened to these concerns and acted upon them to gain the JCS support, which he did, and the Surge was on.

Currently, the military's focus is solely on victory in Iraq. The security provided by the Surge, at this point, appears to have provided that. If this turns out to be the case, the President's decision to go against public opinion, as well as some senior officials, to intensify the war in Iraq, will be seen as the most important decision to achieve victory.

What is also made clear is the professionalism of the senior military leadership and the growth that has occurred by the professional military officer since Vietnam. Cohen argues that this ultra professionalism may have hamstrung military officers in the past, even suggesting that it played a part in the Vietnam failure. The military professional before felt they were not meant to speak their minds, that they should salute the flag and move out. The current group of senior military leaders, who witnessed the ruin that this caused firsthand, realized that it is their duty to speak, provide the best advice possible and to adamantly defend that advice.214

Summary

There appears to be an unprecedented occurrence in which the President has disagreed with public opinion and the will of the people; instead, he has used the advice of his most trusted

civilian advisors as well as the military and then trusted his “gut”\textsuperscript{215} to make his decisions. In that decision, the President allowed senior military leaders to set the agenda for war.

Conclusion

“We except this war for an object -- a worthy object -- and the war will end when that object is attained. Under God, I hope it will never end until that time.” -- Abraham Lincoln²¹⁶

The research question asked: What, if anything, has changed in civil-military relations from the Vietnam War, under the leadership of Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson, to the current war Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), under the leadership of President George W. Bush, which may have accounted for the different outcomes? Through the course of this research, the author has attempted to uncover what those changes are and how they affected the conflicts.

The research has shown the positive effects of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, and how the Act has improved civil-military relations through streamlining chain of command procedures concerning the CoCom and the President. Did the legislation do enough? No, it is time to revise and update the legislation, which is an intriguing area for future study, but is well beyond the scope of this monograph.

This research also attempted to illustrate how Huntington’s forms of control of the military, objective and subjective, are still relevant today, and have shaped Presidential decision making during the two periods of war. As evidenced by the two case studies, objective control when the principles are not violated, yields more productive results; however, as Cohen has written, a hybrid using characteristics of both, is probably the best approach.

Another major factor is personality. The personality of the person in charge is the deciding factor that can trump all others in our American systems. All of our systems have a fatal flaw in that they are subject to the whims of the personality of the boss. Be that the weak personality of President Johnson, that let SecDef McNamara override the system or, today with

President Bush’s strong personality which, ultimately, clashed with SecDef Rumsfeld’s ultra strong personality, until finally, Rumsfeld was pushed aside by the President in order to maintain his own personality.

This author also believes a change has occurred in the professionalism of the officer corps since the Vietnam era. The achievement of being a professional is no small task that should not be glazed over and is the foundation of a military officer’s credibility. Civilian schooling and professional military education have contributed to a military officer’s ability to speak with conviction concerning the way ahead. This credibility gives the officer legs on which to stand and speak, and is not easy to come by. Tough, realistic training at all levels is the bedrock of our credibility. It creates leaders who can persuasively articulate winning strategies to their civilian leadership, allowing civilian leaders to trust the military to prosecute a conflict to an agreed-upon termination. Additionally, Cohen states, “Many, perhaps most officers spend entire military careers without participating in a real way in war. And even those who do fight in wars do so for very small portions of their careers, and very rarely occupy the same position in more than one conflict.”

This training, which sometimes takes a backseat in times of war due to operational requirements, must be continued to maintain a professional officer corps.

**Areas for future study**

An area of future study to better understand the civil-military relations of the two eras would be on how popular opinion manifests itself. Did popular opinion shape the interaction between the media and the government or the military? This author suspects that it did, and the follow on would be what impact did the media then play in shaping the course of events. A second area of interest dealing with popular opinion is how did it affect elections? Both

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218 This author’s observations, in preparing multiple units for rotations to Iraq, and the Horn of Africa.
President’s Johnson and Bush were re-elected during the conflicts. What were the effects of these mandates, given to the Presidents, on the conflicts course of action?

A second area for future study is how the President or the officer corps in the contemporary operating environment uses STRATCOM. More specifically how did Gen Petraeus use the re-making of Counter-insurgency as a STRATCOM to further the ideas from the new FM 3-24 Counter-insurgency manual to shape the fight in Iraq? How effective and important was his use of the media in shaping this, was this successful or not?

A third area for future study would be a revision of Goldwater-Nicholls at the level of whole of government reform. This author believes an update should include a National Security Council centric organization that would force the Departments of Defense, State, and Homeland Security to operate on equal footing, sharing power within the government. This would ensure that government in whole would speak with one voice. The reform would be focused on a whole of government transformation, modeled on how the Goldwater–Nicholls Act reformed the Department of Defense.

This monograph uses two snapshots in time of civil-military relations, the significance of its findings apply, in general, to all students interested in civil-military relations, as well as decision making. Whether looking at times of war or peace, civil-military relations play a significant role in all matters pertaining to the running of our military; the decisions made by our civilian leadership can influence even the smallest facets of military life, and should be continuously studied.
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