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The Interagency Marine Air Ground Task Force: Enhanced Capability for Combatant Commanders in Winning the Long War

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Executive Summary

Title: The Interagency Marine Air Ground Task Force: Enhanced Capability for Combatant Commanders for 2025 and beyond

Author: Lieutenant Colonel Calvert L. Worth, Jr., United States Marine Corps

Thesis: The creation of an Interagency Marine Air Ground Task Force (IA-MAGTF) will provide future CCDRs with a task organized force that is not only expeditionary but also possesses the interagency capacity required to conduct stability operations, theater engagement and security cooperation through 2025 and beyond.

Discussion: The on-going War on Terror has brought about the realization that immediate action is required to improve interagency cooperation within amongst the numerous agencies and departments of the USG. In concert with the State Department (DOS), the Defense Department (DoD) must take the lead in improving integrated planning for future operations. The U. S. should abandon ad hoc methodologies where it can and build the architecture required to provide Combatant Commanders (CCDRs) and their subordinate commanders with the necessary interagency expertise required to respond to contingencies. More specifically, this paper recommends that the Marine Corps take the lead within DoD with regard to interagency cooperation. In doing so, the Marine Corps combines its expertise in expeditionary operations with the future requirement for a more responsive civilian interagency force. The creation of an Interagency Marine Air Ground Task Force (IA-MAGTF) will provide future CCDRs with a task organized force that is not only expeditionary but also possesses the interagency capacity required to conduct stability operations, theater engagement and security cooperation through 2025 and beyond.

In order to fulfill manpower requirements to support the concept, The Marine Corps is expected to leverage new initiatives within DOS and overseen by the State Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization. By enhancing the capabilities of the MEF, the CCDR benefits from a more capable expeditionary force. When called upon, the MEF will forward deploy and conduct operations. However, the MEU (SOC) or SC-MAGTF (See figure 4) offer greater flexibility and provide the CCDRs with a range of options.

Recommendation: Outside of the special operations community, only the Marine Corps is postured as an expeditionary force with the ability to task organize forces to meet specific mission requirements. These scalable MAGTFs are prepared to attach forces from other services and nations as required. This inherent flexibility makes the MAGTF ideally suited for joint and inter-agency operations. The “Nation’s Force in Readiness,” provides a ready-made platform for implementation NSPD-44 directives. Most importantly, the IA-MAGTF provides the DOS and other agencies with an opportunity to provide permanent representation on Marine Expeditionary Force planning staffs and gain an in depth understanding of military operations that will be essential in winning the nations battles through 2025 and beyond.
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During the last half of the twentieth century, few anticipated the numerous challenges the United States would face in the arena of foreign relations and national security. Limited wars such as those fought in Korea and Vietnam replaced the large-scale battles that consumed millions of lives during the first and second world wars. Contingencies in Grenada, Panama and Somalia constituted small wars of varying intensity. Though the cost in human life was far less that of the world wars of the first half of the century, intervention in these lesser conflicts challenged the United States Government (USG) in different ways. Quite often, the conflicts tended to be amorphous and failed to meet traditional categorization as matters of national security. This trend is likely to continue and with no peer competitor, the new world order demands that the United States and its allies stand ready to respond to any threat posed by state or non-state actors who exploit conditions of instability in weak and failing states.\(^1\)

The 2006 National Security Strategy affirmed that future conflicts in failed states, against irregular/ non-state warriors are a permanent feature of the new world order. Adversaries are likely to continue their use of irregular methods as a means of avoiding America’s overwhelming military might and will operate from within failed states and ungoverned spaces.\(^2\) The document goes on to state that “addressing regional conflicts includes three levels of engagement: conflict prevention and resolution; conflict intervention; and post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction.”\(^3\) During such operations, the USG will employ all elements of national power in order to stabilize economies, improve the security situation, assist in transition between governments and provide reconstruction support to areas devastated by years of war and neglect.\(^4\)

The on-going War on Terror has brought about the realization that immediate action is required to improve interagency cooperation amongst the numerous agencies and departments of
the USG. On-going operations in Afghanistan and Iraq each pose specific challenges; both theaters have experienced the full spectrum of conflict but are vastly different in respect to culture, geography and government. After toppling the Saddam Hussein regime in April of 2003, numerous gaps in planning and coordination left the United States unprepared to address the many challenges of vulnerable to destabilizing forces within.\(^5\)

In concert with the State Department (DOS), the Defense Department (DoD) must take the lead in improving integrated planning for future operations. The U. S. should abandon ad hoc methodologies where it can, and build the architecture required to provide Combatant Commanders (CCDRs) and their subordinate commanders with the necessary interagency expertise required to respond to contingencies. More specifically, this paper recommends that the Marine Corps take the lead within DoD with regard to interagency cooperation at the tactical level of war. In doing so, the Marine Corps combines its expertise in expeditionary operations with the future requirement for a more responsive civilian interagency force. The creation of an Interagency Marine Air Ground Task Force (IA-MAGTF) will provide future CCDRs with a task organized force that is not only expeditionary but also possesses the interagency capacity required to conduct stability operations, theater engagement and security cooperation through 2025 and beyond.

**New Requirements in Support of Winning the Long War**

As the United States looks to the future, it must improve current engagement methodologies that have been less than successful in bringing about stability around the world. In fact, the world has become less stable in the last half century. The United States Government
Accountability Office’s October 2007 report on Stabilization and Reconstruction notes the following:

The Defense Science Board’s 2004 *Summer Study on Transition to and from Hostilities* noted that since the end of the Cold War, the United States has been involved in either a stability or reconstruction operation every 18 to 24 months, these operations typically last 5 to 8 years, and they are costly in terms of human lives and dollars. These operations have increasingly become a central operational mission for the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of State (State), highlighted by experiences in the Balkans, Haiti, Somalia, Iraq, and Afghanistan.6

Because the [pattern] of instability looks as if it will persist for the foreseeable future, failed states will likely remain breeding grounds for radical ideology.7 In October 2007, John E. Herbst, State Department Coordinator for Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) stated during testimony before the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations that “If the U.S. Government is going to meet these threats, we must adapt our national security architecture.”8

Recognizing that regional stability is a key component of any future national strategy, this paper proposes the development of the IA-MAGTF as a means to bridge the existing gap in capabilities between recent USG initiatives and the United States Marine Corps’ new operational employment concept for winning the long war. In December 2005, the National Security Council took deliberate steps to improve planning and coordination between the Department of State and the Department of Defense. NSPD-44 *Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization* specifically tasked the Secretary of State with leading the effort to coordinate “integrated United States Government efforts, involving all U.S. Departments and Agencies with relevant capabilities, to prepare, plan for, and conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities.”9 The stated purpose of the document is to, “promote the security of the U.S. through improved coordination, planning, and implementation for reconstruction and
stabilization assistance for foreign states and regions at risk of, in, or transition from conflict or civil strife.”

In March 2007, S/CRS established an Interagency Management System (IMS) in order to assist Ambassadors and CCDRs in rapid response of civilian support at the operational level. The IMS could support manpower requirements for the proposed IA-MAGTF. Though the Government Accountability Officer reports that State Department progress has been slow, the IMS includes three new interagency groups that should increase the overall number of personnel within the interagency and specifically addresses the problem of mobilization of civilian personnel in response to crisis.

First, the directive established a Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group (CRSG) that is responsible for mobilizing civilian responses and developing USG policies that integrate civilian and military plans. Secondly, an Integration Planning Cell (IPC) was formed and works to integrate U.S. civilian agencies’ plans with military operations. The third organization, the Advance Civilian Team (ACT,) would be deployed to U.S. embassies to set up, coordinate, and conduct field operations and provide expertise on implementing civilian operations to the Chief of Mission and military field commanders. As a sub-component of the ACT, Field Advance Civilian Teams or FACTs will support tactical operations on the ground by integrating at the tactical level and assisting reconstruction efforts at the local level.

Possibly in anticipation of NSPD-44, DoD published DoDD 3000.5 *Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations* in November 2005. The document clearly states the importance of such operations as “a core U.S. military mission ... [and] shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DoD activities including doctrine, organizations, training, education,
exercises, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning.” Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) is already working to establish relationships with the interagency via recently established USAFRICOM and USSOUTHCOM. At present, JFCOM is working to build relationship and develop “the concepts, tools and processes that are advancing the integration of US government agencies in response to the challenges of Irregular Warfare and Stability Operations.”

During employment, the IMS system provides a formal system that provides the necessary interlocutors for integrated planning and execution between DoD and the interagency. As noted by Joint Forces Command, there is inherent risk in conducting Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction Operations (SSTRO.) Much of the risk revolves around the difficulty involved in recruiting, training and maintaining USG civilian personnel needed to optimize the working relationship with DoD. In an attempt to overcome the limitation in available personnel, the Marine Corps could take the lead within DoD and begin working with Joint Forces Command to create the expeditionary model civilian support of SSTRO. Due to the paucity of available (and deployable) civilian expertise, the Marine Corps could provide its standing MAGTFs as expeditionary training models for new concepts developed within JFCOM. The Marine Corps would benefit from the exposure to the joint and interagency processes, placing the service at the forefront of DoD/interagency expeditionary operations, and further support the IA-MAGTF.

This document provides the framework for developing a fully integrated capability that enables CCDRs to work directly with State Department representatives and Ambassadors without the initial step of forming a joint task force headquarters. Instead, the CCDR can simply request deployment of an appropriately scaled IA-MAGTF.
In supporting this concept, the following assumptions are necessary:

- That the current initiatives within the Interagency Management System are maintained, and continue to be improved over time.

- That the State Department will continue to build its capacity to support SSTR operations as outlined in existing plans. Specifically, the expeditionary organizations that will provide the manpower for the Marine Expeditionary Forces.

- That manpower is sufficient to support the task organization proposed task organization with the appropriate personnel in 2025.

Organizing the IA-MAGTF

For the purposes of this paper, a Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), as the service component under the auspices of a Geographic Combatant Commander, serves as the conceptual model for the Interagency Marine Air Ground Task Force (IA-MAGTF). In order to conceptualize the future MAGTF, it is necessary examine existing organizations at the operational level and propose recommendations and modifications. Any modifications to existing structures are additive in nature and will improve top-down coordination of interagency integration and planning.

At present, the current architecture for interagency coordination resides primarily at the operational level, for planning. Specifically, the Geographic Combatant Commander or GCC employs a Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) as the primary tool to coordinate interagency efforts. The JIACG provides the CCDR with “an increased ability to collaborate with other USG civilian agencies and departments…and established regular, timely, and collaborative working relationships between other governmental agencies’ representatives and military operational planners at the combatant commands.” Members of the JIACG are integral to the team and “participate in contingency, crisis action, and security cooperation
planning.¹⁶ (See Figure 1) Unfortunately, due to current manning levels within DOS, these entities are fully formed only during contingencies, and then only at the operational level of a combatant command.

![Notional Joint Interagency Coordination Group Structure](image)

**Figure 1**¹⁷

In the conceptual model, the JIACG not only remains the central mechanism for of interagency coordination and planning for the CCDR, but is also required to assist similar formations at subordinate commands within the geographical command. Because no such entity
exists at the tactical level, DoD must demand increased support from DOS and other agencies in order to fully staff the JIACG on a full time basis in each GCC. In compliance with DoDD 3000.5, the IA-MAGTF concept requires commanders to recognize the importance of integrated planning and then seek out the required expertise to develop comprehensive plans for stabilization. Leveraging the IMS (in its mature state) will provide CCDR’s with the ability to augment subordinate headquarters as required to support the development of interagency coordination groups within their respective commands. Within MEF or smaller MAGTF formations, this organization is called the MAGTF Interagency Coordination Group or MIACG.

The creation of the MIACG will not change the structure of the MAGTF fundamentally. Rather, it provides subordinate MAGTF commanders with a capability, similar to that of the combatant commanders, to plan for complex operations with the full support of interagency expertise. Whereas the JIACG is designed to support the CCDR in operational planning, the smaller MIACG is tailored to support the subordinate commander at the tactical level. (See Figure 2) In conjunction with the development of the MIACG, DOS should provide, via the CCDR, a representative who will serve as the political advisor or POLAD to the MAGTF commander. In his capacity as POLAD, this individual will oversee the efforts of the MIACG during planning and, as the senior DOS representative, will be the conduit to the respective country teams within the region.

The goal is to provide the CCDR with a flexible and responsive force of choice, and therefore it is essential that interagency capabilities match the expeditionary nature of a Marine Corps formation. Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 3 Expeditionary Operations stresses the adaptability of the MAGTF. Its modular nature allows the formation to expand “by simply adding forces as needed to the core units of each existing element.” In this instance, the IMS
must be responsive and capable of augmenting both the command element and the GCE components of the MAGTF. Because the recruiting training and fielding qualified personnel will be an extended process, the concept envisions forming MIACGs only within all three standing MEFs during the initial phase, and then working to staff subordinate MAGTFs as the number of civilian personnel increases.

At a minimum, the IA-MAGTF must have the ability to pull expertise not only from DOS, but also from the Department of Justice (DOJ), the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the Department of Energy (DOE), the Department of Labor (DOL), the Department of Commerce (DOC) and regionally specific Inter-Governmental Organizations (IGOs). To be most beneficial, each agency must also work with JFCOM in the development of concepts and doctrine that support employment.
MEFs, Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs) and the Security Cooperation MAGTFs (SC-MAGTF), will require interagency support for periods of eighteen months or more. The Commandant would request support through the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff to DoD, and support would be provided via the IMS. In order to develop strong relationships between the MIACG and its supported headquarters, it is anticipated that some personnel would be assigned to the MEF for the eighteen month deployment cycle of each MEU. Most important amongst the members of the MIACG is the Political Advisor or POLAD.

The POLAD must be present during all phases of the MAGTF’s training cycle. As the principle advisor to the commander, he must become familiar with all facets of the units training and fully understand the capabilities and limitations of general purpose forces. Though the State Department and other agencies frequently send members to staff colleges within DoD, ideally future POLADs would also be graduates from advanced schools such as the School of Advanced Warfighting. The POLAD will have a counterpart a higher headquarters capable of assisting him with requesting appropriate personnel to staff the MIACG, and ensure the unit is prepared to meet specific regional challenges and contingencies.

The organization that is most important for execution is the CMOC; here civilian goals and objectives fully integrated with military capabilities for execution. (See figure 3) Marine Corps Reference Publication 3-33.1A clearly states that the essence of the CMOC lies not in its architecture, but in its functional capability. Whereas most CMOCs are formed after mission requirements have been identified, the IA-MAGTF is inherently proactive and responsive to the operating environment of the future.
As the U.S. Marine Corps increases its end strength to 202,000 it should consider adding an active duty Civil Affairs Battalion to each MEF to enhance the MAGTF. Specifically, increasing the number of Civil Affairs personnel available to support each MEF would enable MEF commanders to maintain the core elements of Civil Affairs Group (CAG) at all times. Most importantly, the increase in personnel would allow the MAGTF to appropriately staff subordinate IA-MAGTFs with Civil Affairs Detachments (CA Det). (See figure 4) In combination, the addition of interagency and civil affairs expertise allows for a more comprehensive approach to planning, from warning to execution.

In addition to improving planning, IA-MAGTF provides a mechanism for formalizing relationships between the Marine Corps and the interagency. Augments from the interagency would be expected to mirror the regional focus of each of the MEFs and in that manner provide a
level of efficiency to the training process. The goal is to maximize training opportunities prior to
deployment and leverage regional expertise whenever possible. This is also consistent with the
need to conduct security cooperation and theater engagement missions while deployed.
Eliminating ad hoc procedures and forming habitual relationships provides the MAGTF
commander and GCCs with a fully functional and expeditionary force, capable of performing a
wide range of tasks.

Operationalizing the Concept

Permanent interagency representation within the IA-MAGTF is a distinguishing feature that is
unlikely to be replicated across all of the units of the same size due to continued manpower
limitations; therefore, the Marine Corps should assume the lead within DOD and focus initially
on its most expeditionary forces. To enhance the capability of the standing headquarters, NSPD-
44 directed that DOS develop a rapid response force. Since 2005, State has established two
internal units made up of State employees—the Active Response Corps (ARC) and the Standby
Response Corps (SRC). When required, the Marine Corps can and should leverage these
organizations to build interagency capacity within forces outside of the MEU or SC-MAGTF
cycle.

Each MEF headquarters should receive priority for ARC and SRC representation as the
primary means of staffing the required MIACGs within each MEU or SC-MAGTF. CRC
augmentation would be requested and allocated by the Component Commander via normal
request for forces protocol. Because the Marine Corps employs a rotational deployment cycle,
units will be capable of maintaining a level of expertise not enjoyed by more stationary forces
within DoD.
Although the MEF provides a fine model for building the IA-MAGTF, smaller MAGTF formations may offer the CCDR more flexibility and responsiveness. In this instance, the changes recommended heretofore, still apply. By enhancing the capabilities of the MEF, the CCDR benefits from a more capable expeditionary force. When called upon, the MEF will forward deploy and conduct operations. However, the MEU (SOC) or SC-MAGTF (See figure 4) offer greater flexibility and provide the CCDRs with a range of options. The IA-MAGTF concept holds true at the subordinate level, but again focuses on tactical or local operations. It is at this point that building capacity within the MEU or SC-MAGTF positions the force to receive and integrate FACTs, DARTs or members from other organization and immediately employ the assets.

![Notional IA-MEU/SC-MAGTF Diagram](image)

**Figure 4**

**Conclusion**

*The role of forward-deployed naval forces will grow even more critical as crises become more frequent, more unpredictable, and more difficult to resolve. Marines will be called upon to support, conduct, and in some cases, lead interagency crisis response operations. In such contingencies, the MAGTF’s ability to establish immediate presence and access into the crisis area will be key. As the “first to respond” force, the MAGTF must be in or close to the intended AO, ready to gain access*
through forcible entry, and organized, trained, and equipped to respond to a wide variety of challenges."

--- MCDP 1-0

Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1-0, *Marine Corps Operations*; states that Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare is the “capstone concept” of the Corps and “focuses our core competencies, evolving capabilities and innovative concepts to ensure that the Marine Corps provides the joint force commander with forces optimized for forward presence, engagement, crisis response, and warfighting.” Outside of the special operations community, only the Marine Corps is postured as an expeditionary force with the ability to task organize forces to meet specific mission requirements. These scalable MAGTFs are prepared to attach forces from other services and nations as required. This inherent flexibility makes the MAGTF ideally suited for joint and inter-agency operations.

Understanding that the U. S. Marine Corps will remain a general purpose force (GPF) for the foreseeable future, the establishment of the IA-MAGTF simply provides the CCDR or Joint Forces Commander (JFC) with a robust organization that provides flexibility. While the proposed configuration draws from new directives on SSTR, it also supports the Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept. In response to increased possibilities of IW, the document calls for “rebalancing GPFs in order to enhance their adaptability and improve their capability to operate against potential adversaries who have mobilized their populations to resist and oppose US military intervention in their countries.” Adaptations can be made within the framework of the MAGTF to allow its employment in response to any contingency.

DoDD 3000.5 directed that stabilization operations be characterized as a core mission that will be trained for and supported. Though DoD will certainly face challenges during implementation of the directed changes, it must be assumed that the U.S. will continue to place SSTR operations high upon its list of priorities and provide the necessary impetus to bring these
directives to fruition. This effort will require DOS to allocate scarce resources in a manner that
provides capability without redundancy. In this regard, the Marine Corps, as the “Nation’s Force in Readiness,” provides a ready-made platform for implementation NSPD-44 directives.

The IA-MAGTF outlined in this paper offers two key capabilities to the CCDR. First, the force possesses the ability to conduct interagency planning from the initial planning stages of an operation through employment at the tactical/local level. Secondly, the concept emphasizes long term and habitual relationships as a means to optimize planning and provide comprehensive approach to complex problems. Finally, the composition of the IA-MAGTF is built upon the solid foundation of the scalable, adaptable and expeditionary nature of the Marine Air Ground Task Force.

The creation of the IA-MAGTF is the next step in the evolution of the Marine Corps and is consistent with on-going initiatives such as the Security Cooperation MAGTF (SC-MAGTF) and Distributed Operations. DoDD 3000.5 directs the U.S. military to “perform all tasks necessary to establish or maintain order when civilians cannot do so,” and further states “performing such tasks can help secure a lasting peace and facilitate the timely withdrawal of U.S. and foreign forces.” The IA-MAGTF leverages military capability but has more to do with enabling interagency so as to demonstrate excellence in the other three elements of national power. This capability and capacity extends US operational reach, multiplies forces available, and provides increased options for defeating our adversaries.”

This paper has illustrated how and why the Marine Corps should take the lead with regard to interagency cooperation and rapid deployment of civilian personnel in support of SSTRO. This concept further enhances the Marine Corps’ capacity to employ the MAGTF in support of CCDR’s and reinforces CMC’s current concept for employment in the Long War. Most
importantly, the IA-MAGTF provides the DOS and other agencies with an opportunity to provide permanent representation on Marine Expeditionary Force planning staffs and gain an in depth understanding of military operations. The United States Government Accountability Office supports such an action. GAO report 08-228T states, “unity of effort in complex interagency operations requires moving beyond the current process of “interagency-izing” military campaign plans… [and] requires a truly interagency campaign planning process in which agency planners can be brought together to develop integrated plans to meet common objectives, as articulated by the President and the NSC.”

This plan is consistent with the commandant’s desire to return to the Corp’s naval roots as quickly as possible, but also maintains a relevant linkage to the national security strategy and postures the Corps as the “force of choice” for developing and maintaining long-term relationships around the globe. More frequently, the USG will call upon the Marine Corps to take the lead in engaging with its strategic partners during protracted regional and global campaigns against state and non-state adversaries around the globe. As outlined in MCDP 1-0, the Marine Corps will continue to play an important role in the future conflicts and “will be called upon to support, conduct, and in some cases, lead interagency crisis response operations. In such contingencies, the MAGTF’s ability to establish immediate presence and access into the crisis area will be key.”28
Notes


2 NSS. 1.

3 NSS, 15.

4 NSS, 16.

5 Numerous accounts have documented the USG interagency dysfunction of Phase IV operations in Iraq. Amongst the best accounts are “Fiasco” written by Thomas E. Ricks, “Cobra II” Gordon and Bernard Trainor and finally, “The Assassins Gate,” by George Packer.


10 NSPD-44, 2.


12 GAO-08-228T, 6-7.


14 From the testimony of Rear Admiral Dan Davenport, U.S. Navy. Director, Joint Concept Development and Experimentation Directorate, United States Joint Forces Command. Before the House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations & Committee on Terrorism and Unconventional Threats and Capabilities. United States Joint Forces Command. 26 February, 2008.

Join Publication 1-0, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, 14 May 2007, pp. VII-7

Figure II-3. Notional Joint Interagency Coordination Group Structure, from JP 3-08 vol. 1, p. II-21.

U.S. Government Accountability Office Report 07-549, “Military Operations: Actions Needed to Improve DoD’s Stability Operations Approach and Enhance Interagency Planning,” May 2007, p 25-28. For example, officials agreed that at the strategic level, the many organizations that can play a key role in stability operations should be present to represent their respective organizations, and that those representatives can help facilitate a mutual understanding of the overall contributions, capabilities, and capacity of each organization. These representatives can also develop a better understanding of DOD and the process used to develop military plans. At the operational and tactical level, DOD officials agreed that, ideally, they need consistent access to interagency personnel from other government agencies that have been authorized by their organizations to establish coordinating relationships with the military. Specifically, European Command officials commented that they would benefit from subject matter experts from non-DOD organizations at the operational level who can (1) participate in the planning process and (2) increase the probability that planned contributions from non-DOD organizations in stability operations can actually be provided. Similarly, Pacific Command officials stated that to facilitate interagency coordination at the operational and tactical levels, several issues such as liaison authority, willingness on the part of other agencies to work with DOD, and coordinating mechanisms must be addressed. The department has also recognized that nongovernmental organizations should participate in DOD’s planning process, where appropriate.

Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 3, Expeditionary Operations, (United States Government as represented by the Secretary of the Navy, 1998) 73.

Figure III-5. Notional Composition of a Civil-Military Operations Center, from JP 3-08 vol. 1, 3-18.

Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1-0, Marine Corps Operations, (United States Government as represented by the Secretary of the Navy, 2001) 2-5.

MCDP 1-0, 2-14

MCDP 1-0, 3-13.

Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept, version 1.0, February 2007, p. 13

DoDD 3000.5, Oct 2005, 2.
26 DoDD 3000.5, Oct 2005, 2.

27 IW-JOC v1.0, 1.

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