FUTURE WAR PAPER

TITLE: STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION: THE NEED TO IMPROVE DEPARTMENT OF STATE’S COORDINATOR OF RECONSTRUCTION AND STABILIZATION

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTERS OF OPERATIONAL STUDIES

MAJOR MICHAEL E. MCWILLIAMS
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

AY 07-08

Mentor: Dr Gordon Rudd
Approved: ____________________________
Date: ______________________________
1. REPORT DATE 2008 2. REPORT TYPE 3. DATES COVERED 00-00-2008 to 00-00-2008

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Stabilization and Reconstruction: The Need to Improve Department of State’s Coordinator of Reconstruction and Stabilization

5a. CONTRACT NUMBER

5b. GRANT NUMBER

5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER

5d. PROJECT NUMBER

5e. TASK NUMBER

5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER

6. AUTHOR(S)

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) United States Marine Corps, School of Advanced Warfighting, Marine Corps University, 2076 South Street, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, VA, 22134-5068

8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER

9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S)

11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S)

12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

14. ABSTRACT

15. SUBJECT TERMS

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:
a. REPORT unclassified
b. ABSTRACT unclassified
c. THIS PAGE unclassified

17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT Same as Report (SAR)

18. NUMBER OF PAGES 28

19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18
Table of Contents

TABLE OF CONTENTS............................................................................................................2
DISCLAIMER ............................................................................................................................3
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS ......................................................................................................4
PREFACE ...............................................................................................................................5
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ..................................................................................................6
INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................................8
CREATION OF S/CRS .............................................................................................................10
THE NEED FOR S/CRS ............................................................................................................18
PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDED SOLUTIONS WITH S/CRS ......................................19
CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................................................24
ENDNOTES ..............................................................................................................................25
BIBLIOGRAPHY ......................................................................................................................27
DISCLAIMER

THE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED HEREIN ARE THOSE OF THE INDIVIDUAL STUDENT AUTHOR AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF EITHER THE MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE OR ANY OTHER GOVERNMENTAL AGENCY. REFERENCES TO THIS STUDY SHOULD INCLUDE THE FOREGOING STATEMENT.

QUOTATION FROM, ABSTRACTION FROM, OR REPRODUCTION OF ALL OR ANY PART OF THIS DOCUMENT IS PERMITTED PROVIDED PROPER ACKNOWLEDGEMENT IS MADE.
Illustrations

Page

Figure 1: S/CRS Organizational Chart .................................................................12

Figure 2: Civilian Corps Employment Flow.........................................................15

Figure 3: Integrated Management System for Policy, Planning, and Operations.................................................14

Table 1: Civilian Corps Composition and Deployment............................................17
Preface

My original topic for this future war paper was post-conflict reconstruction. I gained interest in this topic during USMC Command and Staff College when I was enrolled in the elective “Post-Conflict Economic Reconstruction.” I also had interest because of the ongoing situation in Iraq and the continuous debate amongst my classmates about who was responsible for this “post-conflict” part of operations.

Once my first draft was completed, my faculty advisor suggested the topic was broad and needed to be more focused. We discussed several options for ensuring the paper would have more focus and substance. After much debate, I chose S/CRS. The thrust of the research and writing was to first gain and understanding of what S/CRS was and why it was created. I determined that this organization was important to the United States Government, but it faced several challenges. Through further reading, I explored the challenges facing S/CRS; I certainly did not address every challenge, and provided some a few recommendations for the improvement of this organization. S/CRS has to potential to be a huge force multiplier on the future battlefields and the United States Military and Government should embrace its concept and continue to support to fulfill its potential.

Writing a future warfare paper on an organization outside the my comfort zone, United States Military, broadened my understanding and appreciation on why war and future war in particular, must be a holistic government approach.

I would like to acknowledge and thank Dr. Gordon Rudd for assisting in crafting this project, guiding me along the way, and reading several drafts and ensuring this project was up to standard and ready to be defended.
Executive Summary

**Title:** Stabilization and Reconstruction: The need to improve Department of State’s Coordinator of Reconstruction and Stabilization.

**Author:** Major Michael E. McWilliams, United States Marine Corps

**Thesis:** The concept and utility of S/CRS can be a valuable asset to the United States Government, but in order for S/CRS to provide the leadership and direction for the United States Government, it must address and fix a few problem areas.

**Discussion:**

The creation of S/CRS is of great importance to the United States Military as it identifies an organization that anticipates being capable of executing reconstruction and stabilization operations. As an organization that is trying to gain a foothold within the United States Government S/CRS still has many obstacles to overcome.

S/CRS lacks full United States Government representation. DOS was tasked to coordinate across all United States Government agencies as Stability and Reconstruction will require a “total government” effort. If this is the case, S/CRS must be staffed with representatives from all executive branch departments of the United States Government. There is still a need to coordinate with each department; however, assigning experienced staffers from each department will ensure the synchronization and integration required for Stabilization and Reconstruction planning.

Department of State S/CRS is not fully integrated with Department of Defense. NSPD-44 directs the DOS to work with DOD in ensuring reconstruction and stabilization operations are integrated with United States Military plans. To that end, the DOS has made an effort. However, the DOS needs to take their concept to the next level of development to ensure full integration. The two departments can no longer operate independently; they are inextricably linked by the strategy of reconstruction and stabilization.

S/CRS lacks the ability to provide life support (e.g. shelter, food, water, shower, and laundry), sustainment, transportation, or communication architecture to support operations. In its current structure, S/CRS does have an “operations support” section under the Office of Civilian Readiness and Response however, this office is not similar to a logistics section in United States Military organization. Currently, if the ACT or FACT deploy, they rely on United States Military for all of their life support basic needs. If the United States Military is going to hand over operations during the transition phase to DOS, which will continue supporting reconstruction and stabilization, they will need this capability.

DOS does not have adequate programs (courses of instruction), facilities, or instructors to meet the training demand for reconstruction and stabilization operations. Nor does DOS have an educational institution to study and discuss historical reconstruction and stabilization operations. DOS does have training efforts in place to train personnel for Provisional Reconstruction Teams (PRT), but is falling short of meeting the growing demand to train other employees. DOS does not have an educational institution. The type of institution needed would be a hub of all historical
reconstruction and stabilization operations, designed for United States government employees to study historical reconstruction and stabilization operations as well as work case studies or planning problems. This institution would allow DOS to create true reconstruction and stabilization professionals and enhance future operations.

There is a critical funding shortage for non-humanitarian responses to crises. The current United States Government structure and laws governing funding constrains DOS ability to respond, deploy, and effectively allocate resources for reconstruction and stabilization. Current available emergency response funding accounts cover humanitarian and disaster assistance. Other accounts that can be used for governance, rule of law, or security assistance have not been sufficiently funded to meet anticipated requirements. Reprogramming existing resources requires tradeoffs and negotiations within or between the Executive and Legislative branches, which takes too long for rapid response. An emergency response fund managed by DOS will allow for rapid and funded response.

**Conclusion:** The S/CRS is the key link to a holistic government approach to stabilization and reconstruction. As S/CRS reaches its fourth anniversary it seems that the momentum generated from NSPD-44 has started to slow. This is evident from the issues discussed in this paper. These issues and the success of S/CRS are extremely important to DOD and the United States Military. The success not only will ensure reconstruction and stabilization operations are “harmonized and synchronized” but will decrease, the use of United States Military forces conducting these types of operations. During both the engagement or pre-conflict phase (not addressed in this paper) or in the post-conflict phases. If S/CRS fails, these operations and the United States commitment will not disappear but fall on the shoulders of the United States Military as it has in the past. With the current and anticipated future unrest around the world and the United States Government’s commitment to support failed or failing states this will likely mean an increase in the operations tempo on an already strained force.
Introduction

Failing and post-conflict states pose one of the greatest national and international security challenges of our day, threatening the United States’ vulnerable populations, their neighbors, and their allies. Struggling states can provide breeding grounds for terrorism, crime, drug trafficking, and humanitarian catastrophes, and can destabilize an entire region. Experience shows that managing conflict, particularly internal conflict, is not a passing phenomenon. It has become a mainstream part of United States foreign policy. Until now, the international community and the United States have undertaken stabilization and reconstruction operations in an ad hoc fashion, recreating the tools and relationships each time a crisis arises. If the United States is going to ensure that countries are set on a sustainable path towards peace, democracy, and a market economy, they need new, institutionalized foreign policy tools. These tools will influence the choices countries and people make about the nature of their economies, their political systems, their security, indeed, in some cases the very social fabric of a nation.

The United States has participated in several post-conflict reconstruction operations over the years. Since 1989, the frequency, scale, scope, and duration of these “nation building” missions have increased steadily. Over the past 15 years, the U.S. has been involved in seven major post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization operations and contributed significant resources to more than ten.¹ During the Cold War, the United States mounted a military intervention about once a decade. Since 1989, United States-led interventions are close to one every two years. During the same period, the United Nations (U.N.) has engaged in peacekeeping missions about every six months. It is clear
that over the past two decades there has been no shortage of post-conflict reconstruction opportunities. With the current “Long War”, there will be no shortage of opportunity in the future.

National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)-44 states, “The United States has a significant stake in enhancing the capacity to assist in stabilizing and reconstructing countries or regions, especially those at risk of, or in transition from conflict or civil strife, and to help them establish a sustainable path toward peaceful societies, democracies, and market economies. The United States should work with other countries and organizations to anticipate state failure, avoid whenever possible, and respond quickly and effectively when necessary and appropriate to promote peace, security, development, democratic practices, market economies, and the rule of law. Such work should aim to enable governments abroad to exercise sovereignty over their own territories and to prevent those territories from being used as a base of operations or safe haven for extremists, terrorists, organized crime groups, or others who pose a threat to U.S. foreign policy, security, or economic interest.”

Current studies of the future environment suggest the next fifteen to twenty-five years will have more failing or failed states that will affect global security. This will be significant if not of “vital” interest to United States economic and physical security.

The concept of “post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction” is broad; its purpose is to promote security and economic growth following major hostilities. Stabilization, often defined as “peacekeeping” or “nation-building operations,” includes humanitarian relief, maintaining/enforcing a cease-fire, monitoring elections, and establishing police or civil defense forces. Reconstruction also involves repairing or creating infrastructure necessary to support long-term economic growth and development. Hard reconstruction incorporates building or repairing infrastructure (e.g. roads, schools), and soft reconstruction incorporates creating or improving governmental systems (e.g. legal and tax systems).
The Post-Cold War experience suggests that an ad hoc approach, with little or no coordination between government agencies, is not enough. The United States Government must work with the world community to anticipate state failure, avert it when possible, and help post-conflict states lay a foundation for lasting peace, good governance, and sustainable development. Successful stabilization and reconstruction are essential to an achievable and sustainable exit strategy for military and peacekeeping forces. In order to meet the global security threat of the future, the United States Government must take a holistic approach to stabilization and reconstruction. Toward that end, the Department of State has created the Coordinator of Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). The concept and utility of S/CRS can be a valuable asset to the United States Government, but in order for S/CRS to provide the leadership and direction for the United States Government, it must address and fix a few problem areas. Only then will the United States be prepared to deal appropriately with failing or failed states.

**Creation of S/CRS**

“*We must also improve the responsiveness of our government to help nations emerging from tyranny and war...and that means our government must be able to move quickly to provide needed assistance.*”—President Bush

On August 5, 2004, Secretary Powell announced the creation of the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) to enhance the United States’ capacity to respond to crises involving failing or failed and post-conflict states. DOS was empowered by the President with the signing of National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 44 in 2005. It has been nearly four years since S/CRS was created and there still is much work to be completed in order to meet the intent of NSPD-44. National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD-44) tasks the Department of State (DOS)
to be the lead agency for Stability and Reconstruction. Prior to this directive, DOS created the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) in July 2004. S/CRS’s official mission from NSPD-44 is straightforward: “To lead, coordinate, and institutionalize United States Government civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations, and to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife so they can reach a sustainable path towards peace, democracy, and a market economy.” NSPD-44 was written in part to clear up the chain of command issues between the Department of Defense (DOD) and DOS that seemed to have clouded early efforts in Iraq.

National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)-44 also directs that “the Secretary of State shall coordinate such efforts with the Secretary of Defense to ensure harmonization with any planned or ongoing United States Military operations across the spectrum of conflict.” The idea here was to integrate and rationalize the United States Government’s stabilization and reconstruction programs and synchronize military and civilian programs. S/CRS is a relatively small organization designed to coordinate across all United States Government agencies without necessarily assuming command and control responsibilities.

The Coordinator for S/CRS reports to the Secretary of State and has five sections under its control; Office of Strategic Communication, Office of Conflict Prevention, Office of Civilian Readiness and Response, Office of Planning, and Office of Resource Management, as outlined in the organizational chart below.
S/CRS works across the United States Government and with the world community to anticipate state failure, avert it when possible, and help post-conflict states lay a foundation for lasting peace, good governance and sustainable development. Its core objectives include Monitor and Plan, Mobilize and Deploy, Prepare Skills and Resources, and Prepare Skills and Resources. Monitor and Plan refers to developing clear policy options concerning states and regions of greatest risk and importance and lead United States planning focused on these priorities to avert crises, when possible. Mobilize and Deploy is the coordination the deployment of United States resources and implementation of programs in cooperation with international and local partners to accelerate transitions from conflict to peace. Prepare Skills and Resources establishes and manages an interagency capability to deploy personnel and resources in an immediate surge response and the capacity to sustain assistance until traditional support
mechanisms can operate effectively. Learn from Experience incorporates best practices and lessons learned into functional changes in training, planning, exercises, and operational capabilities that support improved performance. Coordinate with International Partners works with international and multilateral organizations, individual states, and NGOs to plan, accelerate deployment, and increase interoperability of personnel and equipment in multilateral operations.

The core organizational functions include Early Warning and Prevention, Planning, Best Practices and Sectoral Coordination, and Response Strategy and Resource Management. The Early Warning Branch oversees a broad-based global monitoring program to identify states at risk of instability. The Conflict Prevention Branch coordinates conflict prevention and mitigation efforts within the U.S. Government, and actively consults with NGOs and international partners on best practices and new policy tools to help define policies to strengthen fragile states.10 The Planning Office is developing a process to bring together all elements of a United States conflict response in crisis. The planning framework will facilitate coordination between civilian agencies, peacekeeping forces, and the United States military, when necessary. It will lead S/CRS planning and implementation efforts, in cases where S/CRS is tasked to support or undertake planning for a conflict response. The planning office will continually draw upon sectoral experts in S/CRS and throughout the Government to inject lessons learned and technical expertise into the planning process.11 The Best Practices and Sectoral Coordination Office is the home in S/CRS for technical expertise, monitoring, evaluation, and lessons learned. This office supports planning and conflict prevention efforts and maintains strong relationships with the United States Government community, academia,
think tanks, NGOs, private sector, and international partners. The office will draw on its sectoral expertise and relationships with other Government and outside experts to publish thematic guides, host lessons-learned roundtables and expert groups, and develop monitoring and evaluation systems to better gauge the effectiveness of United States efforts in conflict countries. The Response Strategy and Resource Management Office is responsible for developing and deploying United States resources in support of reconstruction and stabilization operations. Its goal is to build capacity to provide an immediate surge response, allowing time for the more traditional support mechanisms to address longer-term needs. The office coordinates efforts within the United States Government community to provide the best use of current capabilities while moving to fill gaps where existing financial, personnel, training information and management systems need strengthening.

In order to meet NSPD-44 requirements for establishing a strong civilian response capability, State and other United States agencies are developing three corps of civilians to support stabilization and reconstruction operations. The Active Response Corps (ARC) is comprised of full-time Federal employees from departments and agencies available to deploy in twenty-four to forty-eight hours. The Standby Response Corps (SRC) are full-time Federal employees in regular positions available to deploy within thirty days. The SRC could face challenges in implementation as it could deplete executive departments of key personnel. The Civilian Reserve Corps (CRC) consists of state and local government and private sector specialists with skills that are either absent or are insufficient within the Federal government. The civilian reserve corps is drawn into
government service as required. Table 1 summarizes the three civilian corps and Figure 2 shows the employment flow.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Composition of volunteers</th>
<th>Deployment</th>
<th>Responsibilities</th>
<th>Personnel, as of 2007</th>
<th>Government-wide personnel goal, for FY 2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Active Response Corps (ARC)</td>
<td>Current State employees serving 1-year rotations as first responders</td>
<td>Within 24-48 hours for 3-6 months</td>
<td>Deploy to unstable environments to support a U.S. mission, engage with a host country government, and conduct assessments in the field</td>
<td>• 11 filled positions; • 15 approved temporary positions</td>
<td>265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standby Response Corps (SRC)</td>
<td>Current and retired State employees available as second responders</td>
<td>Within 30-60 days for up to 6 months</td>
<td>Deploy to unstable environments to assist ARC when additional or specialized personnel are needed</td>
<td>• 91 current State employees ready to deploy; • 209 retirees on roster</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian Reserve Corps (CRC)</td>
<td>Non-U.S. government employees with expertise in critical areas serving 4-year terms</td>
<td>Within 30-60 days for up to 1 year</td>
<td>Rapidly deploy to a country in crisis to conduct assessments; design, implement and evaluate programs; manage contractors, etc.</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Three Civilian Corps under Development
Figure 2: Civilian Corps Employment Flow

With the additional requirement to work with DOD to “harmonize and synchronize with United States Military operations across the spectrum of conflict,” S/CRS is in the process of preparing capabilities to mobilize and deploy. The DOS has created the Interagency Management System (IMS) for Reconstruction and Stabilization. This will assist Washington-Policymakers, Chiefs of Mission, and Military Commanders in managing complex engagements by ensuring coordination among all United States Government stakeholders at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. It is intended to facilitate and support integrated planning for United States Government, joint interagency field deployments, and joint civilian operations. When a significant crisis occurs, the Secretary of State may decide to activate the IMS based on a senior-level policy decision with the National Security Council. Figure 3 show Interagency Management System for Planning, Policy, and Operations. The central components of IMS consist of:

- **ACTIVE RESPONSE CORPS (ARC)**
  - USG staff trained and ready to go in 48 hours to one week.
  - Standing agency capacity for rapid response.
  - Will assess situation, design response and begin S&R implementation.

- **STANDBY RESPONSE CORPS (SRC)**
  - USG employees.
  - Civilian agency employees who have ongoing job responsibilities but are trained and available for deployments.
  - Deployable in 30 days for up to 180 days.

- **CIVILIAN RESERVE CORPS (CRC)**
  - USG employees when mobilized.
  - Have regular jobs outside the USG.
  - Deployable in 30-60 days.
  - Provide sector-specific civilian response expertise.

**DAYS FOLLOWING A CRISIS**
The Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group (CSRG), which is a crisis-specific, Washington-based decision-making body with a planning and operations staff, is based on regional areas. The Integrated Planning Cell (IPC) is a civilian planning cell, formed upon crises, which will deploy and integrate with relevant Regional Combatant Commanders (RCC) or equivalent multinational headquarters. The Advanced Civilian Teams (ACT), formed upon crises, consists of one or more interagency field management, planning, and coordination teams to support commanders in the field. These teams are intended to integrate with existing Embassy and USAID mission structures and personnel, and to work with the Joint Task Force Commander. The Field Advanced Civilian Teams (F-ACT), formed upon crises, provide the commander the maximum capacity to implement Reconstruction and Stabilization programs at the provincial or local level. These teams are intended to work with field units or division and brigade forces.

Figure 3: Interagency Management System for Planning, Policy, and Operations.
The need for S/CRS

The last two United States Administrations have explicitly identified failing or failed states as United States’ national security concerns since 1998. The past three National Security Strategy documents all identify threats from states that are described as failing or failed. These threats include providing safe havens for terrorists; causing conflict, regional instability, and humanitarian crisis; undermining efforts to promote democracy; and, good governance. President George W. Bush, in his 2005 National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 44, states, “the United States should work…to anticipate state failure, avoid it whenever possible, and respond quickly and effectively when necessary and appropriate…”

There are two competing visions for addressing failing or failed states. One vision questions the appropriateness of using failing or failed states as a lens through which to identify national security threats. The policy makers with this vision, instead, want to develop a strategy to combat threats such as international terrorism, transnational crime, and nuclear proliferation, regardless of how strong a state is. These critics discourage institutionalizing potentially costly United States’ reconstitution and stabilization capabilities. Furthermore, the critics believe that strengthening states is an inherently Western idea or model and may not be appropriate in all situations.

The other side of the spectrum is those who advocate a holistic government approach to strengthen failing or failed states. These policy advocates perceive failing or failed states as presenting multiple challenges to political stability, military and security capabilities, and developing and humanitarian needs. They recommend planning to coordinate all aspects of United States policy toward failing or failed states. The current
administration is in this camp and has set out to transform the United States’ National Security institution “to meet the challenges and opportunities of the 21st century,” which includes strengthening failing or failed states.\textsuperscript{16} Thus, the United States has created the State Department’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS).

The creation of S/CRS is of great importance to the United States Military as it identifies an organization that anticipates being capable of executing reconstruction and stabilization operations. This will allow a large portion of the deployed United States Military forces to re-deploy once operations enter the transition phase. This certainly does not mean the United States Military does not have a responsibility in reconstruction and stabilization operations. DOD directive 3000.05 indicates reconstruction and stability operations are important enough to be a core capability on par with combat operations. This simply means that an organization has been identified that can provide relief to a strained operational tempo by leading the effort in regards to reconstruction and stabilization. As an organization that is trying to gain a foothold within the United States Government S/CRS still has many obstacles to overcome.

**Problems and Recommended Solutions with S/CRS**

**Problem 1.** S/CRS lacks full United States Government representation.

**Discussion to Problem 1.** DOS was tasked to coordinate across all United States Government agencies as Stability and Reconstruction will require a “total government” effort. If this is the case, S/CRS must be staffed with representatives from all executive branch departments of the United States Government. There is still a need to coordinate with each department; however, assigning experienced staffers from each department will
ensure the synchronization and integration required for Stabilization and Reconstruction planning. Only when each department of the executive branch has full-time representation in S/CRS, and that representation is their primary obligation, will S/CRS be fully prepared in the area of integration and planning for future Stability and Reconstruction. Currently, S/CRS staff comes from the State Department, USAID, Office of Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, JFCOM, Army Corps of Engineers, and the Department of Justice. The most notable executive department missing from S/CRS is the Department of Treasury. Not until there is complete full-time representation from each executive branch department will S/CRS truly be able to put forward a “total government” effort.

**Recommended Solution to Problem 1.** Each department of the executive branch must provide an individual or individuals to S/CRS as their primary duty. This partnership will enable a total government approach.

**Problem 2.** Department of State S/CRS is not fully integrated with Department of Defense.

**Discussion to Problem 2.** NSPD-44 directs the DOS to work with DOD in ensuring reconstruction and stabilization operations are integrated with United States Military plans. To that end, the DOS has made an effort. However, the DOS needs to take their concept to the next level of development to ensure full integration. The two departments can no longer operate independently; they are inextricably linked by the strategy of reconstruction and stabilization. While it makes sense to look at the world through regional focus, the DOS has six bureaus and DOD has five Regional Combatant
Commanders (RCC). Aligning these regions would be a logical step toward more effective collaboration.

The Integrated Planning Cell (IPC) will, during crises, deploy to Regional Combatant Commander to integrate and synchronize the planning effort. This current concept will only deploy the IPC during crises and exercises, when plans are about to be finalized or executed. Planning efforts for each of the RCCs occurs year-round and to think S/CRS can fully integrate and synchronize as plans are finalized is falling short of their purpose. Locating and permanently assigning the IPCs to each RCC will allow for total emersion in the RCCs planning efforts. This emersion will ensure S/CRS is “harmonizing and synchronizing” all efforts with DOD. This coordination and everyday integration will ensure the IPC influences conditions for reconstruction and stabilization. Surging the IPC during crises does not mitigate the need for them to be part of everyday planning with the RCC.

**Recommended Solution to Problem 2.** DOD and DOS must align their regions to synchronize planning and execution efforts. DOS’ six bureaus and DOD’s five RCCs should be completely aligned. Neither arrangement is judged superior, but the current disparity is not conducive to effective interagency cooperation. Aligning the regions is a logical step toward more effective collaboration.

The two departments must be fully joined during the deliberate planning process. The collocation and permanent assignment of the IPCs to each RCC will ensure DOD and DOS are fully integrated during deliberate planning, not just during crises planning and execution. This integration will ensure synchronization.
**Problem 3.** S/CRS lacks the ability to provide life support (e.g. shelter, food, water, shower, and laundry), sustainment, transportation, or communication architecture to support operations.

**Discussion to Problem 3.** In its current structure, S/CRS does have an “operations support” section under the Office of Civilian Readiness and Response however, this office is not similar to a logistics section in United States Military organization. Currently, if the ACT or FACT deploy, they rely on United States Military for all of their life support basic needs. If the United States Military is going to hand over operations during the transition phase to DOS, which will continue supporting reconstruction and stabilization, they will need this capability. Without an adequate support and sustainment capability, it will be impossible to support reconstruction and stabilization. Without transportation assets or communication equipment the ACTs and FACTs will not be able to move around the battlespace or effectively command and control their efforts. The ability to contract life support and transportation is certainly possible, but in many third world countries the ACT or FACT will find themselves that this may not be feasible. For DOS to ensure its ACT and FACT are fully capable of accomplishing their mission they must possess a life support, transportation, and communication capability. This will require additional funding and additional force structure within S/CRS.

**Recommended Solution to Problem 3.** S/CRS develops a logistics or support section comparable to that of the United State Military, which will enable the ACT and FACT to sustain themselves during deployed operations. Only when S/CRS posses this capability will it be truly operational.
**Problem 4.** DOS does not have adequate programs (courses of instruction), facilities, or instructors to meet the training demand for reconstruction and stabilization operations. Nor does DOS have an educational institution to study and discuss historical reconstruction and stabilization operations.

**Discussion to Problem 4.** DOS does have training efforts in place to train personnel for Provisional Reconstruction Teams (PRT), but is falling short of meeting the growing demand to train other employees. The Active Response Corps (ARC), Standby Response Corps (SRC), and Civilian Response Corps (CRC) are all to be trained in order to meet their mission and deploy. This civilian corps will be a heavy training burden on DOS as its membership is anticipated to be close to 5,000 members by 2009.

DOS does not have an educational institution. The type of institution needed would be a hub of all historical reconstruction and stabilization operations, designed for United States government employees to study historical reconstruction and stabilization operations as well as work case studies or planning problems. This institution would allow DOS to create true reconstruction and stabilization professionals and enhance future operations.

**Recommended Solution to Problem 4.** DOS should create a reconstruction and stabilization training center staffed to meet the growing needs. DOS should create a Reconstruction and Stabilization Institute or Center. This institute or center could be similar to the Asia-Pacific Center or the United States Marshal Center. The Institute or Center will enable the ongoing study and education of United State Government employees to study and analyze past reconstruction and stabilization operations, which will enhance preparations for future operations.
Problem 5. There is a critical funding shortage for non-humanitarian responses to crises.

Discussion to Problem 5. The current United States Government structure and laws governing funding constrains DOS ability to respond, deploy, and effectively allocate resources for reconstruction and stabilization. Current available emergency response funding accounts cover humanitarian and disaster assistance. Other accounts that can be used for governance, rule of law, or security assistance have not been sufficiently funded to meet anticipated requirements. Reprogramming existing resources requires tradeoffs and negotiations within or between the Executive and Legislative branches, which takes too long for rapid response. An emergency response fund managed by DOS will allow for rapid and funded response.

Recommended Solution to Problem 5. Congress must fund an emergency response fund for reconstruction and stabilization that is managed by DOS.

Conclusion

The S/CRS is the key link to a holistic government approach to stabilization and reconstruction. As S/CRS reaches its fourth anniversary it seems that the momentum generated from NSPD-44 has started to slow. This is evident from the problems discussed in this paper, many of which have been around since S/CRS inception.

These issues and the success of S/CRS are extremely important to DOD and the United States Military. The last two Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Myers and Pace, and Defense Secretary Gates have publicly voiced support for S/CRS and have asked the United States Congress during testimony to increase funding to ensure its success. The success not only will ensure reconstruction and stabilization operations are
“harmonized and synchronized” but will decrease, the use of United States Military forces conducting these types of operations. During both the engagement or pre-conflict phase (not addressed in this paper) or in the post-conflict phases. If S/CRS fails, these operations and the United States commitment will not disappear but fall on the shoulders of the United States Military as it has in the past. With the current and anticipated future unrest around the world and the United States Government’s commitment to support failed or failing states this will likely mean an increase in the operations tempo on an already strained force.

There are certainly additional ideas for S/CRS to better prepare itself to address future threats. The recommendations provided in this paper will make great strides in ensuring the United States no longer takes an ad hoc approach to stability and reconstruction operations in failing or failed countries.

1 The seven are Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Liberia, Afghanistan, and Iraq. During this period the U.S. Government also devoted significant capabilities and resources to a variety of other post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction efforts, including in Cambodia, Mozambique, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Colombia, and East Timor, among other places. (Source: RAND; Center on International Cooperation).
2 Dobbins, Shaping Policy Priorities of Post-Conflict Reconstruction: NATO Role in Nation Building
4 MCTAG, Diagnosing the Future: Patterns, Trends, and Implications, Brief August 2007.
7 George Bush, “NSPD-44,” 7 December, 2005
8 George Bush, “NSPD-44,” 7 December, 2005
15 George Bush, “NSPD-44,” 7 December, 2005
Bibliography


