Is There a DDOC in the House?: An Analysis of the Deployment Distribution Operations Center

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A paper submitted to the Naval War College faculty in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Joint Military Operations Department. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the NWC or the Department of the Navy.

General Omar Bradley argued that “Amateurs study strategy and professionals study logistics.” Recent US Military Operations in DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) have shown that from 1991 - 2003, the US military focused primarily on strategy and the deployment of combat forces yet struggled with logistics distribution at the operational level of war. In an effort to fix this recurring critical operational issue, USTRANSCOM and USCENTCOM created the Deployment Distribution Operations Center (DDOC). This paper documents the genesis of the DDOC, discusses the impacts of the DDOC on USCENTCOM and OIF, and analyzes the current status of DDOC formalization in Joint Doctrine and other Geographic Combatant Commands. Finally, this paper provides recommendations for USTRANSCOM and the other Geographic Combatant Commanders to ensure that a fully-trained DDOC can be rapidly stood up anywhere in the world to meet any type of contingency and to ensure the US military can demonstrate its operational distribution professionalism in future conflicts.

Operational Logistics, Operational Sustainment, Deployment and Distribution Operations Center (DDOC)

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IS THERE A DDOC IN THE HOUSE?: AN ANALYSIS OF THE DEPLOYMENT DISTRIBUTION OPERATIONS CENTER

by

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Signature: _____________________

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Abstract

General Omar Bradley argued that “Amateurs study strategy and professionals study logistics.” Recent US Military Operations in DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, and IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) have shown that from 1991 - 2003, the US military focused primarily on strategy and the deployment of combat forces yet struggled with logistics distribution at the operational level of war. In an effort to fix this recurring critical operational issue, USTRANSCOM and USCENTCOM created the Deployment Distribution Operations Center (DDOC). This paper documents the genesis of the DDOC, discusses the impacts of the DDOC on USCENTCOM and OIF, and analyzes the current status of DDOC formalization in Joint Doctrine and other Geographic Combatant Commands. Finally, this paper provides recommendations for USTRANSCOM and the other Geographic Combatant Commanders to ensure that a fully-trained DDOC can be rapidly stood up anywhere in the world to meet any type of contingency and to ensure the US military can demonstrate its operational distribution professionalism in future conflicts.
INTRODUCTION

General Omar Bradley argued that “Amateurs study strategy and professionals study logistics.” Recent United States (US) military operations—specifically, Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF)—have shown that from 1991 - 2003 the US military focused primarily on strategy and the deployment of combat forces yet struggled with logistics distribution at the operational level of war. In an effort to fix this recurring critical operational issue, US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) and US Central Command (USCENTCOM) created the Deployment Distribution Operations Center (DDOC). This paper discusses operational distribution issues during both Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM and OIF, documents the genesis of the DDOC, discusses the impacts of the DDOC on USCENTCOM and OIF, and analyzes the current status of DDOC formalization in joint doctrine and other geographic combatant commands. Finally, this paper provides recommendations for USTRANSCOM and the other geographic combatant commanders (GCC) to ensure that a fully-trained DDOC can be rapidly stood up anywhere in the world to meet any type of contingency and to ensure the US military can demonstrate its logistics professionalism in future conflicts.

DISTRIBUTION ISSUES DURING OPERATIONS DESERT SHIELD/STORM

Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 caused a significant threat to US interests in the Persian Gulf region. In an effort to prevent Iraqi aggression against the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, US senior leaders began frantically building up US forces in the region. This buildup mainly consisted of combat forces and very little logistical support. As Lieutenant General William Pagonis, senior US logistician during DESERT STORM stated, “The threat of
invasion overshadowed all our decisions and actions. As a result, the standard order in which units are sent into combat was resequenced. The combat troops moved up the list, and the logisticians moved down.”¹ These logistics troops were vitally needed to unload the prepositioning ships which held key supplies such as combat vehicles and ammunition. In addition to problems with the initial deployment of forces, Operation DESERT STORM also experienced serious issues with operational level logistics distribution and sustainment throughout the conflict. In their 2005 analysis of the status of Department of Defense (DOD) supply distribution processes, the Government Accounting Office (GAO) summarized the serious in-theater distribution difficulties during DESERT STORM:

Units experienced a shortage of critical spare parts and had to strip parts from inoperable equipment and trade for parts with other units. Army units, for example, experienced difficulties in obtaining spare and repair parts for the Bradley Fighting vehicles and Abrams tanks. Parts were generally available in Saudi Arabia at the theater level, but their distribution to combat units was inadequate. Mechanics and logistics personnel in combat units had to work around the formal parts distribution system and ‘scrounge‘ for needed parts. Documentation on containers packed at U.S. depots did not include adequate descriptions of container contents. Transportation and supply personnel in SWA [Southwest Asia] had to open the containers to determine their contents and destination. Containers began stacking up in the ports because the transportation system could not move them out of the port areas quickly. Material designated for specific units often never reached them because no procedures were established to document the arrival of incoming supplies, and the units, in most cases, were not notified when material they requisitioned arrived.²

Fortunately for the United States, Saddam Hussein’s inaction against Saudi Arabia and US forces deployed to the Persian Gulf region allowed time for a huge buildup of logistics. Poor operational logistics distribution processes were overcome by sheer volume and the large magnitude of the US industrial complex, much like the US military experience during World War II. If Saddam Hussein had indeed invaded Saudi Arabia, these significant logistics distribution issues could have spelled disaster for coalition forces.
DISTRIBUTION ISSUES DURING OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM

Despite such glaring problems and obvious lessons learned from Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM, the US military community did not implement many fixes to their operational logistics distribution problems. Many of the same issues that arose during DESERT SHIELD/STORM in 1990 plagued the US military 13 years later during their 2003 invasion of Iraq during OIF. One of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s major initiatives was the transformation of the US military from a large cumbersome organization into a leaner, much more responsive force capable of rapidly deploying anywhere in the world on short notice. In Secretary Rumsfeld’s mind, the US military’s method of the Time Phased Force Data Listing (TPFDL) was a prime example of a cumbersome military process that needed to change. Michael Gordon and General Bernard Trainor put it more bluntly when they stated, “Rumsfeld regarded the TPFDL as a wasteful anachronism that took decision making out of his hands. Rumsfeld wanted to be able to cut off the flow of reinforcements and support units if they were deemed unnecessary.”

Gordon and Trainor went on to say, “The decision to jettison the TPFDL delayed the establishment of the Theater Support command, which was to manage the logistics for the ground forces, and played havoc with the deployments.”

As a result of this lack of logistics support structure, operational deployment and distribution early in the conflict was extremely poor. The same GAO report which highlighted in theater distribution difficulties during DESERT STORM found the same issues during OIF in 2003:

The lack of repair parts delivery resulted in a loss of trust and confidence in logistics systems and processes, and units were forced to improvise. At times there were shortages of some spares or repair parts needed by deployed forces. Personnel noted shortages of items such as tires, tank tracks, helicopter spare parts, and radio batteries. As a result, units
resorted to cannibalizing vehicles or circumventing normal supply channels to keep equipment in ready condition. Early in the operation, inefficient packaging and palletizing of air shipments created supply backlogs in Kuwait. These backlogs delayed the delivery of supplies shipped by air to units in Iraq, which included armored vehicle track shoes, body armor, and tires. Once in theater, mixed shipments had to be manually opened, sorted, and re-palletized at theater distribution points, causing additional delays. Some mixed shipments were not marked with all the intended destinations so the contents of the shipments had to be examined. By the fall of 2003, 30 percent arriving at the Theater Distribution Center still had to be reconfigured in some way. DOD could potentially pay millions of dollars for late fees on leased containers or on the replacement of DOD-owned containers due to distribution backlogs or losses.  

Clearly, the US military had not learned its lessons in the importance of operational deployment and distribution and something drastic had to change.

**GENESIS OF THE DDOC**

Although Secretary Rumsfeld’s early decision to scrap the TPFDL resulted in poor in-theater distribution, he quickly recognized the problem and on 16 September 2003, designated the USTRANSCOM Commander, General John Handy, as the Distribution Process Owner (DPO) charged to “Direct and supervise strategic distribution and synchronize all participants in the end-to-end supply, transportation, and distribution pipeline.” Based on this tasking, Major General Dail (USTRANSCOM J-3), Major General Mortensen (USCENTCOM J-4), and Major General Mongeon (Defense Logistics Agency J-4), all discussed the problems with the distribution process. Although there were numerous agencies tasked with portions of logistics support, there was no single in-theater organization that had oversight over all distribution. For example, the Joint Movement Center (JMC), the in-theater organization charged with overseeing all modes of transportation in theater was mainly focused on intra-theater air and not on surface movements.
Based on these issues, Major Generals Dail, Mortensen, and Mongeon created the DDOC concept with the following mission statement: “Confirm USCENTCOM deployment and distribution priorities, validate and direct the Combined Forces Air Component Commander (CFACC) intra-theater airlift requirement support to components and Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs), monitor/direct Combined Forces Land Component Commander (CFLCC) intra-theater surface distribution support to components/CJTF’s, adjudicate identified USCENTCOM distribution and intra-theater shortfalls, coordinate for additional USTRANSCOM support, provide Total Asset Visibility (TAV) and In-Transit Visibility (ITV) for inter and intra-theater forces and materiel, and set the conditions for effective theater retrograde.”

General Handy agreed to this proposed mission statement and he received the DDOC concept approval from General John Abizaid, USCENTCOM Commander, on 12 December 2003.

This new organization given such a daunting task was staffed with competent logisticians from all the National Partners: USTRANSCOM, Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), Army Materiel Command (ArmyMC), Air Mobility Command (AMC), Joint Munitions Command (JMC), Surface Distribution and Deployment Command (SDDC), Army Field Service Command (AFSC), Air Force Material Command (AFMC), and all of the Services.

The USCENTCOM DDOC (CDDOC) Spiral 1 after action report documented the initial standup and training the CDDOC personnel received at USTRANSCOM headquarters prior to deploying to the theater:

The two-week indoctrination period was punctuated with some situational awareness on the workings of the Combined Forces Land Component Commander (CFLCC) and the Joint Movement Center (JMC) and a very basic understanding about the Air Mobility Division (AMD) and the Director of Mobility Forces (DIRMOBFOR). The team learned that
the CDDOC would be collocated with the CFLCC and that the JMC and CDDOC would be working together. The cells were told to think multi-modal, look for chokepoints, and do the utmost to provide the best details they could on cargo and force movement visibility.  

On 16 January 2004, the initial CDDOC cadre deployed to Kuwait City where it was collocated with the JMC.

Now that the DDOC concept had been established, command relationships and specific organization structure had to be established. As the DPO owner, USTRANSCOM was responsible for the DDOC, but since they were supporting USCENTCOM, USTRANSCOM gave Tactical Control (TACON) to the USCENTCOM Commander, who then delegated TACON to the USCENTCOM J-4. The DDOC was officially up and running and immediately began to produce positive results.

**IMPACTS OF THE DDOC**

In today’s day and age of shrinking defense budgets it is critical that DOD be good stewards of the taxpayers’ money and the DDOC is an excellent way to lower costs and save money. From its inception in 2003 to April 2007, the CDDOC saved DOD over $1 billion in cost avoidances and savings. The DDOC also implemented numerous initiatives that have provided tremendous results such as the single ticket initiative, pure pallet initiative, and area of responsibility (AOR) pallet and net tracker. Each of these initiatives is discussed in detail below.

One of the most important operational logistics distribution issues is Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration (JRSOI) where individuals and equipment are moved into the theater using strategic lift through the areal port of debarkation (APOD) or the sea port of debarkation. They are then moved to their final destination in theater usually
using tactical lift (air or surface). Because there was a lack of total asset visibility at the
beginning of OIF, the requests for moving individuals to their final destination did not come
until after the individuals had already arrived in theater. This forced the distribution system
to scramble while causing long delays. This also caused backups at the APOD and the
logisticians were forced to find housing for individuals until they could be moved. Under the
single ticket initiative, individuals were given a single ticket to their final destination before
they even left the continental US. This gave visibility of their movement to the entire
logistics community and decreased the wait times at the ports of debarkation (PODs). After
the single ticket initiative was implemented, the average loiter time at the PODs for
individuals decreased from an average wait time of 72 hours to 27 hours in theater.11

Under the pure pallet initiative, pallets designed for a specific location are built up
either at the origin depot or the aerial port of embarkation. The pallets are considered pure
because they do not have to be broken down in theater or at the APOD and repackaged for
each specific location or customer. Although there was more wait time at the origin, the
reduced burden on the APOD and break-bulk destinations more than made up for the
increased origin wait time. Another added benefit is because there is no break-down and
repackaging requirement in theater, the chances of incorrect supplies/equipment being put on
the wrong pallets are reduced. Ultimately, the end result was customers receiving their
shipments with the correct inventories in much shorter times.

463L pallets and nets may seem like insignificant pieces of equipment, but to the
logistics community, especially the air mobility community, they are the lifeblood of moving
supplies and equipment safely through the system. Since they can be used for many purposes
and there is little incentive for the end customers to return them, 463L pallets are rarely
returned into the logistics system. This results in increased costs to purchase new pallets and
increases the potential for transportation delays due to lack of available pallets. The CDDOC
created a web based tracking software tool which identifies the numbers and locations of
pallets and nets within the AOR. After less than six months, the CDDOC was able to
identify and return over 6,000 pallets and 11,000 nets back into the Defense Transportation
System.\(^{12}\)

**CURRENT STATUS OF THE DDOC CONCEPT**

Because of the tremendous aforementioned impacts on operational distribution during
the later stages of OIF, the DOD has taken steps to formalize the DDOC concept and expand
it to the other GCCs. Rear Admiral Mark Harnitchek, the USTRANSCOM Director of
Strategy, Policy, Programs, and Logistics commented on the status of the DDOC: “We are
pleased that the JDDOC [Joint Deployment Distribution Operations Center] concept was
endorsed by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council on 6 April 2007. The result has been
changes to doctrinal publications, development of specific training, and incorporation into
professional military education.”\(^{13}\) Although this formalization is a great start, the initiatives
mentioned by Rear Admiral Harnitchek are a daunting task. In its study entitled *Doctrinal
Implications of the JDDOC*, United States Joint Forces Command’s Joint War Fighting
Center listed 24 joint doctrine publications that are affected by the JDDOC concept. All 24
affected publications are listed in appendix B, but the six which are impacted the most are:

*JP 3-35 Joint Deployment and Redeployment Operations, JP 4-0 Doctrine for Logistic
Support of Joint Operations, JP 4-01 Joint Doctrine for the Defense Transportation System,
JP 4-01.3 JTTP for Movement Control, JP 4-07 JTTP for Common-User Logistics during*
Joint Operations, and JP 4-09 Joint Doctrine for Global Distribution. Each one of those publications is on its own update cycle and approving changes to joint doctrine, even minor updates, is a very time consuming and difficult process.

USTRANSCOM, as the DPO, has been designated the lead in developing the DDOC concept. Recognizing that each COCOM has its unique characteristics and issues, USTRANSCOM has not mandated that each GCC DDOC look exactly the same, but they have, however, created a generic JDDOC structure with four divisions found in Figure 1 below:

![Generic JDDOC Structure](image)

**Figure 1 Generic JDDOC Structure**

According to the DDOC template, “The Mission Division’s main taskings are the synchronization of inter and intra-theater requirements and inter-modal movements, and
optimizing modal distribution. They are also tasked with coordination and deconfliction of inter and intratheater multinational movements in concert with the Multinational Operations Integration Division.”

The stated mission of the Sustainment Division is to, “Provide strategic visibility and analysis of materiel in the global distribution system in order to synchronize and optimize the flow of sustainment, with force flow, from the source of supply to the designated GCC customer and back.” Under this division is a DLA branch which is extremely critical because many of the consumables that are vital to the warfighter such as water, food, shelter, boots, and clothing all come from DLA. This close relationship and interaction/coordination with DLA brings tremendous capability to the GCC. In addition, the Sustainment Division has key representatives from the General Services Administration (GSA), Army and Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES), Navy Exchange Service (NEX), Marine Corps Exchange Service (MCX) and the Defense Commissary Agency (DeCA).

The Information and Mission Integration Division is charged with “Ensuring theater components, military services and commercial carriers provide timely, accurate and complete ITV data in automated systems feeding Global Transportation Network (GTN) to improve ITV data quality and standardize theater ITV business rules and procedures.” Because there are a large number of data systems within each service branch and other agencies, this division is critical to ensure that all the main players are on the same page, and sharing and viewing the same information.

Because most of our operations in the future will most likely either involve other nations’ combat forces, or require logistical support from coalition partners, the DDOC also has a Multinational Operations Integration Division given the mission to “Act as the single
point of entry for coordinating strategic to operational requirements and execution of common user modes for Multinational and Interagency users of the US global distribution system.\textsuperscript{17}

USTRANSCOM has also created a recommended JDDOC manning document which identifies the generic staffing and individual requirements. This manning document, which is located in USTRANSCOM’s JDDOC Template 3 (also in appendix C), identifies the recommended personnel for each division and identifies the duty title, tasked grade, recommended skill military operational specialty (MOS)-designator, which individual Service, and the recommended source for each individual. The draft manning document consists of 50 individuals of which USTRANSCOM recommends that 12 should come from the combatant commander’s staff, 19 should come from in-theater plus-up sent from the individual Service components or functional combatant commander staffs during minor contingencies, and 19 should come from National Partners which include DLA, JMC, and other national agencies during major contingencies.

In addition to these specific individuals, USTRANSCOM has also published training guidance, both individual skill set training and collective training. It is assumed that those individuals that possess the required military or civilian specialty will already have the necessary individual training. The collective training recommendations are divided into the main personnel sourcing categories including National Partners and GCCs. The training topics include Situational Awareness, Plan, Decide and Execute Cycle, Software Familiarization Training, and other miscellaneous training. Each of these tasked services is responsible for the funding of this training, which could be an issue in the future if budgets
continue to get cut. It is important that USTRANSCOM monitor the services and National Partners to ensure they are funding the required training in their budgets.

USTRANSCOM understands standing up and maintaining a DDOC takes a tremendous amount of personnel so it has created a scalable concept depicted below in Figure 2:

![JDDOC Augmentation Diagram](image)

**FIGURE 2: JDDOC Augmentation**

Under this concept, each individual GCC is responsible to stand up and staff its own DDOC using personnel already on its staff. Day-to-day operations would be managed by these personnel; the GCC does not receive additional personnel for the day-to-day operation. These manning slots are listed in appendix C under the heading ‘Core Positions.’ During a contingency, the DDOC would receive augmentation from logistics individuals already in-theater and assigned to that GCC. These slots are listed in appendix C under the heading ‘In-theater Plus-Up and IMA Positions.’ During a major contingency, the DDOC would be further augmented by National Partners, which are also listed in Appendix C listed under the heading ‘National Partner Augmentation Positions.’ This scalability minimizes the day to
day burden on the GCC, gives the GCC flexibility, and also meets their needs during a major contingency that requires large amounts of deployment and distribution.

CONCLUSIONS

Since its inception in late 2003, the DDOC has proven itself to be a key capability in logistics distribution at the operational level of war. USTRANSCOM and the GCCs continue to refine the concept and increase the capabilities and impacts of the DDOC. The Joint Warfare Fighting Center confirmed this view by stating, “The JDDOC provides a significant organizational improvement in supporting geographic combatant commanders.”

A significant lasting benefit of the DDOC concept is a closer relationship between DLA and the GCCs. Within the defense logistics community, DLA has long been derided as unresponsive and not truly understanding the needs of the warfighter. Army Colonel Richard Brooks, DLA’s deputy chief of distribution reutilization who served as the first DDOC Sustainment Division Chief commented on the better working relationship between USTRANSCOM and DLA: “There was a great appreciation from USTRANSCOM partners about the magnitude of DLA’s operations to sustain the forces. The DLA partners also appreciated and saw first hand how stressed the defense transportation system is and what a challenge it is to balance deployment and distribution.” Further contact between the GCCs and DLA in the context of a DDOC will only serve to strengthen the relationship and provide more benefits to the GCC and ultimately the warfighter.

RECOMMENDATIONS

USTRANSCOM and USCENTCOM have made a great deal of progress in codifying and formalizing the DDOC concept, but more could be done in the areas of standardization
and training. USTRANSCOM has done a great deal to ensure as much standardization across the various GCC DDOCs as possible, and although it is not reasonable to assume that all the DDOCs will be as robust as USCENTCOM, it does not appear that the other combatant commands (COCOMs) have made significant progress in developing their DDOCs. A review of the central USTRANSCOM DDOC website reveals that US Southern Command has very limited information on their DDOC, and US European Command only has an initial operating capability briefing dated 2005. Due to the specific lack of need of an active DDOC in these COCOMs and the current emphasis on USCENTCOM, this lack of fidelity is understandable; however, it is important that the hard work be done in peacetime and the lessons learned and incorporated before a crisis occurs. After a crisis occurs is not the time to create and train an organization, as attested by the previously discussed issues with US logistics distribution during Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM and OIF.

Training, both individual and collective, is another recommended area for improvement. Although USTRANSCOM’s template of DDOC manning is a good start, USTRANSCOM should mandate that each respective agency provide the specific name of the individual placed against a specific line number in the DDOC manning document. For example, DLA is responsible to provide a DLA branch chief (line number SD1-001) to the DDOC. DLA should select a qualified individual, notify that individual that if a DDOC is required to be stood up and if he/she will be deploying, and DLA should inform USTRANSCOM of his/her selection. Each of the combatant commanders, Services, and other National Partners should do the same so that USTRANSCOM has a specific listing of names to fill each requirement. Although it would be up to each individual agency’s discretion if it needed to swap individuals out, such changes should be given to
USTRANSCOM immediately so USTRANSCOM can ensure they have a current, up to date DDOC roster. Once these individuals are specifically named, each agency should notify these individuals how long they are going to be tasked against the DDOC, and the agencies should ensure that the tasked individuals do indeed receive the individual training recommended in the USTRANSCOM DDOC template. This will also help the individuals mentally and physically prepare for a deployment.

USTRANSCOM does address collective training, but it should be more directive with the collective training requirements. The current template states, “The GCC should conduct the collective training for in-theater plus-up personnel sourced from within the theater. Collective training for in-theater plus-up personnel and National Partner (NP) augmentees should ideally take place in CONUS prior to deployment; if not possible then the training can be conducted in-theater. The NPs should establish a lead agency for the training.” In order to make collective training more effective, USTRANSCOM should send a team of trainers to conduct DDOC training exercises at regular recurring intervals for each specific COCOM using the individuals who have been identified by their respective agencies. The exercises should be modeled as closely as possible to Joint Doctrine and should therefore exercise the scalability aspect of the DDOC. The core staff should begin exercising first; subsequently the exercise should be expanded for a minor contingency, and finally expanded to a major contingency in order to incrementally bring in those individuals that have been designated on the manning template. This would create the most realistic scenario possible.

These training exercises could last for about a week and would ensure that the various members get to know each other and their capabilities, and then learn to work together.
Realistic exercises requiring in-theater plus-up and eventually the National Partners would also provide an impetus to the respective agencies to ensure that their personnel are indeed receiving the required individual training prior to attending these exercises. USTRANSCOM could provide specific theoretical logistics distribution problems for the groups based on real world examples and issues learned from the USCENTCOM DDOC. Individuals who have served in the USCENTCOM DDOC could be neutral observers and help provide feedback to ensure the best possible training, and give feedback on how the real world problems were solved. Each of these problems could then be tailored for each respective COCOM that is being exercised.

The final recommendation is for the entire DOD community to fully embrace the DDOC concept, continue implementing it into joint and Service doctrine, and ensure that doctrine is followed in future conflicts. As stated by Lieutenant Colonel Mordente in his DDOC article in the Air Force Journal of Logistics, “The challenge to future Joint Military operations will be to maintain discipline in the system and execute Joint doctrine as it is written.” Yes, doctrine can and must change it if needs to, but there is a danger in abandoning a doctrinal concept before fully attempting to make it work. The DDOC has shown that it is a sound organizational structure and can produce great results for the Combatant Commander if staffed with competent logisticians.

Implementation of these recommendations is critical for the US Department of Defense to ensure a fully-trained DDOC can be rapidly stood up anywhere in the world to meet any type of contingency, to ensure proactive and responsive support to the combatant commander, and to ensure the US military can demonstrate its operational distribution professionalism in future conflicts.
NOTES


7 Ibid, 1.

8 Ibid, 3.

9 Ibid, 3.


12 US USCENTCOM, Spiral 1 Report, 11.


14 Ibid, 2-5.

15 Ibid, 2-10.

16 Ibid, 2-12.


18 Joint Warfighting Center


APPENDIX A

LIST OF ACRONYMS

AMC – Air Mobility Command
APOD – Aerial Port of Debarkation
CDDOC – USCENTCOM Deployment Distribution Operations Center
CFACC – Combined Forces Air Component Commander
CFLCC – Combined Forces Land Component Commander
CJTF – Combined Joint Task Forces
DDOC - Deployment Distribution Operations Center
DLA – Defense Logistics Agency
DOD – Department of Defense
DPO – Distribution Process Owner
GAO – Government Accounting Office
GCC- Geographic Combatant Commander
ITV – In-Transit Visibility
JDDOC – Joint Deployment Distribution Operations Center
JMC – Joint Movement Center
JRSOI - Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration
MSC - Military Sealift Command
OIF – Operation IRAQI FREEDOM
SDDC – Surface Deployment Distribution Command
TACON – Tactical Control
TAV – Total Asset Visibility
TPFDL – Time Phased Force Deployment Listing
USCENTOM – United States Central Command
USEUCOM – United States European Command
USSOUTHCOM – United States Southern Command
USTRANSCOM – United States Transportation Command
APPENDIX B

LIST OF AFFECTED JOINT PUBLICATIONS

1. JP 3-05.1 JTTP for the Special Operations Task Force Operation
2. JP 3-07.6 JTTP for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance
3. JP 3.08V1 Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations, Vol 1, 9
4. JP 3-10 Joint Doctrine for Rear Area Operations
5. JP 3-10.1 JTTP for Base Defense
6. JP3-17 Joint Doctrine and JTTP for Air Mobility Operations
7. JP 3-18 Joint Doctrine for Forcible Entry Operations
8. JP 3-30 Command and Control for Joint Air Operations
9. JP 3-31 Command and Control for Joint Land Operations
10. JP 3-35 Joint Deployment and Redeployment Operations
11. JP 4-0 Doctrine for Logistics Support of Joint Operations
12. JP 4-01 Joint Doctrine for the Defense Transportation System
13. JP 4-01.2 JTTP for Sealift Support to Joint Operations
14. JP 4-01.3 JTTP for Movement Control
15. JP 4-01.4 JTTP for Theater Distribution
16. JP 4-01.5 JTTP for Transportation Terminal Operations
17. JP 4-01.7 JTTP for use of Intermodal Containers in Joint Operations
18. JP 4-02.1 JTTP for Health Service Logistics Support in Joint Operations
19. JP 4-02.2 JTTP for Patient Movement in Joint Operations
20. JP 4-07 JTTP for Common-User Logistics during Joint Operations
21. JP 4-08 JTTP Joint Doctrine for Logistics Support of Multinational Operations
22. JP 4-09 Joint Doctrine for Global Distribution
23. JP 5-0 Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations
24. JP 5.00.2 Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures
APPENDIX C

JDDOC MANNING TEMPLATE (TAKEN FROM JDDOC TEMPLATE 3)

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Denotes Core positions
*Denotes In-Theater Plus-Up Personnel and IMA positions*

Denotes National Partner augmentation positions
## APPENDIX C (CONTINUED)

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| SD02 | 020  | SOF SUSTAINMENT REPRESENTATIVE | GS-1286-ID | 90A/92A USA, 21R4 USAF, 3100/1100/4510 USN, 0402/3902 USMC | | Component Command | | |
| SD02 | 021  | SR. JOINT AMMUNITION REPRESENTATIVE | GS-1286-ID | AMMUNITION SPECIALIST | | Joint Munitions Command | | |
| Support Branch | | | | | | | | |
| SD02 | 022  | | | | | | | |

This branch may contain functional representatives of GSA, DECA, AAFES, NEX, MCX and other non-Service national agencies or organizations deemed necessary by the RCC.

Denotes Core positions

*Denotes In-Theater Plug-Up Personnel and IMA positions*

*Denotes National Partner augmentation positions*

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# APPENDIX C (CONTINUED)

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*Denotes Core positions*

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BIBLIOGRAPHY


