Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines: A Demonstration of Economy of Force

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A paper submitted to the Naval War College faculty in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Joint Military Operations Department. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the NWC or the Department of the Navy.

ABSTRACT
Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines (OEF-P) is a joint operation administered by Special Operations Command Pacific (SOCPAC) that has been in operation in one form or another in the southern Philippines since March of 2001. Under OEF-P, the Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSOTF-P) operates hand in hand with the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to conduct civil/military operations and combat operations to limit the power and scope of the Al Qaeda linked Abu Sayeff Group and other rogue elements in the area. JSOTF-P has been successful in reducing the size of militant groups and the number and severity of terrorist attacks in the region. These achievements have led to discussions between the United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) and the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) concerning the possibility of ending OEF-P within the next year and re-directing forces and money to other areas of the GWOT.

This is pre-mature. On balance, America’s involvement in the southern Philippines has been successful but it is not over. Every month sees new kidnappings and attacks linked to the ASG and rogue elements of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). Despite eight years of U.S. COIN training and the receipt of hundreds of millions of dollars of updated military equipment and aid, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) are not ready to continue this fight alone. With only 600 U.S. troops in country and a budget of $52 million a year, OEF-P is an Economy of Force operation in the GWOT. Continued U.S. commitment to OEF-P is required to further consolidate GWOT progress and achieve the goal of enduring peace in the southern Philippines.

SUBJECT TERMS
Operation Enduring Freedom - Philippines; History and Background of and recent operations of
Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines: A Demonstration of Economy of Force

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

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Signature: __________________________

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Abstract

Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines (OEF-P) is a joint operation administered by Special Operations Command Pacific (SOCPAC) that has been in operation in one form or another in the southern Philippines since March of 2001. Under OEF-P, the Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSOTF-P) operates hand in hand with the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to conduct civil/military operations and combat operations to limit the power and scope of the Al Qaeda linked Abu Sayeff Group and other rogue elements in the area. JSOTF-P has been successful in reducing the size of militant groups and the number and severity of terrorist attacks in the region. These achievements have led to discussions between the United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) and the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) concerning the possibility of ending OEF-P within the next year and re-directing forces and money to other areas of the GWOT.

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INTRODUCTION

Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines (OEF-P) has been in operation in one form or another on the southern Philippine islands of Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago since March of 2001 (see Figure 1). OEF-P is executed by Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSOTF-P) administered by Special Operations Command Pacific (SOCPAC) under United States Pacific Command (USPACOM). The Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines mission statement is: “JSOTF-P builds capacity and strengthens the Republic of the Philippines (RP) security forces to defeat selected terrorist organizations in order to protect U.S. and RP citizens and interests from terrorist attack while preserving RP sovereignty.” Of the “selected terrorist organizations,” the Al-Qaeda linked Abu Sayeff Group (ASG) has been a critical focus and JSOTF-P has been successful in reducing their size from about 2000 fighters in 2001 to less than 300 today. In addition, the operation has reduced the number and scope of terrorist attacks in the region. These achievements have caused commentators to tout OEF-P as a model of success in the Global War on Terror (GWOT) with the potential for emulation in other Counter-Insurgency (COIN) Operations. These successes have led to discussions about the future of OEF-P between USPACOM and the global synchronizer for GWOT, the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). According to press reports, these discussions centered on the possibility of ending OEF-P within the next year and re-directing forces and money to other areas of the GWOT.

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to the ASG and rogue elements of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). Despite eight years of U.S. COIN training and the receipt of hundreds of millions of dollars of updated military equipment and aid, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) are not ready to continue this fight alone. While most observers generally acknowledge the AFP’s capacity has significantly improved over the past eight years, the AFP continues to require U.S. enabling capabilities in operations against the insurgents. With only 600 U.S. troops in country and a budget of $52 million a year (the equivalent of about 5 hours of operations in Iraq)\(^6\), OEF-P is an Economy of Force operation in the GWOT. Continued U.S. commitment to OEF-P is required to further consolidate GWOT progress and achieve the goal of enduring peace in the southern Philippines.

**REBELS IN MOROLAND**

The Muslim insurgency in the southern Philippines began well before September 11, 2001. Islam arrived in the Philippines in the 14\(^{th}\) and 15\(^{th}\) century with merchants and missionaries from Malaysia and Borneo\(^7\). When the Spanish arrived in the 1500s, they gave the Muslim indigenous people they encountered the name Moros because their dress and religion reminded the Spaniards of their former foes the Moors\(^8\). The Spanish friars successfully converted most of the Philippines to Catholicism, except for the southern islands. Powerful sultans on Mindanao and Sulu resisted Spanish rule and conducted land and sea raids against the Spanish and other tribes of the Archipelago for 300 years. In the late 1800s, the Spaniards finally pacified the Moros using superior gunboats\(^9\).
The Americans took over the colonial mantle from Spain after the Treaty of Paris in 1898 ended the Spanish-American War and awarded the Philippines to the U.S. Despite promises made to the Filipino resistance leaders, the U.S. government decided to maintain the Philippines as a colony. The *insurrectos* (Filipino revolutionaries) commenced a guerilla war against their new colonial masters in 1899. The Philippine War was brutal. An estimated 1 million Filipinos died on Luzon alone. Because the insurrection was primarily on the northern islands of the archipelago, the Moro *datus* (chiefs) took advantage of the distraction and re-commenced pillaging expeditions from their bases on northern Mindanao. The final *insurrectos* surrendered in 1902, allowing U.S. forces to exert their influence on the southern Philippines. Using the vicious methods perfected in the northern islands, the U.S. fared better in *Moroland* (U.S. soldiers pejorative term for the area) than the Spanish, suppressing the Moro guerillas in only eleven years. General Pershing, of World War I fame, put down the last of the major Moro rebellions at the Battle of Bud Bagsak on Sulu Island in February 1913, killing 500 and wounding 1000 Moro rebels. The harsh techniques and death tolls of these battles shade U.S./Moro relations until the present day.

Land distribution policies of the U.S. colonial government and the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) combined with the violent history of Moro suppression to sow the seeds of the current conflict. To placate communist separatists and to reduce overcrowding on the northern islands the governments in Manila decreed Moro ancestral land as public property and then gave it away to mostly Christian homesteaders. Because of these resettlement programs, Moros became a minority in their own land. One census of the island of Mindanao showed that the Moro population, as a percentage of the total population,
dropped from 76 percent in 1903 to 23 percent in 1960. This population imbalance led to inequalities in education and economic development.

Two important Moro education programs began in the 1950s to attempt to redress these disparities. In the first program, the GRP gave over 8,000 scholarships to Moro students to study at high schools and universities in Manila in order to “‘integrate’ Philippine Muslims into national life.” In the second program, the government of Egypt began in 1955 to send young Philippine Muslims to Islamic institutions across the Middle East. In the late 1960s, a group of young educated Moros emerged from these programs radicalized by the inequalities they now recognized around them. Multiple Moro activist groups developed from this tumult.

The most influential of these groups was the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) with the goal of the “liberation of the homeland of Philippine Muslims from the Philippine state.” The MNLF spawned both the MILF and the ASG. The MNLF and its armed wing, the Bangsa Moro Army (BMA), were founded in 1971 in the aftermath of the Jabidah Massacre, the killing, in 1969, of as many as 60 Moro commandos by their Christian AFP trainers. The MNLF was the political wing and the BMA was the military wing, much like the distinction between Sinn Fein and the Irish Republican Army in Northern Ireland. The first two leaders of the MNLF were trained in the scholarship drives of the early 1960s. Nur Misuari, the chairman of the MNLF central committee, was a graduate of and a teacher in the Department of Political Science at the University of the Philippines. Hashim Salamat, the vice chairman, spent eight years in Cairo studying at al-Azhar University.

In 1972, President Ferdinand Marcos declared martial law in response to a resurgent Communist insurgency and “chaos created by student activism.” In response to the
suppression of all dissent and the confiscation of weapons, the BMA went to war with the AFP. The Libyan government was an important supporter of the MNLF, enabling the BMA to field 30,000 fighters. Fighting dragged on for four years, killed approximately 60,000 people, and displaced at least half a million villagers and farmers. In 1976, the Marcos government and the MNLF signed the Tripoli Agreement, which ended hostilities and promised Moro autonomy in 13 provinces and 9 cities. The peace was short lived. Due to perceived slights by the GRP, the MNLF conducted a low-level insurgency for the next 20 years. In 1996, Misuari signed the Final Peace Agreement between the MNLF and the GRP. This agreement demobilized 30,000 MNLF combatants and created the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) with Misuari as the governor. With the creation of the ARMM, the MNLF fully transitioned from armed insurgent group to political party.

This long transition of the MNLF away from its insurgent roots toward the mainstream drove the creation of both the MILF and the ASG. The MNLF vice-chairman, Salamat, formed the MILF in the late 1970s. The MILF worked primarily on parallel aims as the MNLF with an emphasis on incorporating Islam as the basis of any political action. Filipino Mujahedeen returning from and radicalized by the Soviet war in Afghanistan formed the ASG in the late 1980s. The ASG was named for its founder, Ustadz Abdurajak Janjalani, whose nom de guerre in the Afghan war was Abu Sayeff (Father of the Swordsman) in honor of Afghan resistance leader Professor Abdul Rasul Sayeff. Janjalani wanted to form an Iranian-inspired Islamic state in the southern Philippines free from non-Muslims.

Both groups established ties in the early 1990s with Al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), the Indonesian terrorist group responsible for the Bali bombings in 2002 and 2005. These ties led to money from Saudi Arabian charities and the establishment of training camps.
for MILF, ASG, and JI fighters in the southern Philippines by Al Qaeda members.\textsuperscript{31} Osama bin Laden sent his brother-in-law, Muhammad Jamal Khalifa, to Manila to provide financial and training assistance. Evidence has shown that terrorist groups in the Philippines provided sanctuary in the 1990s to both Ramizi Yousef, the coordinator of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and Yousef’s uncle, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the principle planner of the September 11\textsuperscript{th} attacks.\textsuperscript{32}

The formation of the ARMM in 1996, the attacks of 9/11 and the subsequent crackdown of the ASG by OEF-P lead the MILF to repudiate its ties to Al Qaeda and the JI. Although publicly the MILF vehemently objected to the ARMM and vowed to continue the fight for an independent homeland, they privately continued to pursue peace with the GRP.\textsuperscript{33} After many false starts, the GRP and MILF almost signed a lasting peace agreement in August 2008. The draft agreement expanded upon the area and power controlled by the present ARMM. It gave the Moros true autonomy over almost all internal affairs including police, internal security, education, and financial institutions.\textsuperscript{34} Unfortunately, not everyone affected in the new region was happy with this arrangement. Concerned citizens, mostly Christian landowners, filed a petition with the Supreme Court of the Philippines to stop this action. The Supreme Court halted the discussions and then determined that the agreement was unconstitutional.\textsuperscript{35} Because of the deadlock “rogue rebel leaders” associated with the MILF went on a rampage in Mindanao.\textsuperscript{36} To date these rampages have killed dozens of civilians and displaced more than 500,000 people from their homes.\textsuperscript{37} These battles dealt a serious blow to the MILF/GRP peace process but with the MILF having de facto control over most of the southern islands, it must continue for true peace to occur.
With the MILF moving towards peace and away from armed insurrection the ASG became more militant. ASG’s first foray into terrorism was the bombing of a Christian missionary ship, the *M/V Doulos*, in Mindanao in August 1991 killing two and wounding forty others.\(^{38}\) Between 1991 and 2000, ASG engaged in 378 terrorist activities that resulted in the death of 288 civilians. The death of the ASG leader, Ustadz Janjalani in 1999 lead to the splintering of the group into two major factions, one each on Basilan and Sulu Islands. With the death of Janjalani, the group’s religious underpinning was gone and its members became more interested in kidnapping for profit than instituting a new Islamic State.\(^{39}\) The ASG became bolder and bolder in their kidnapping activity in 2000 and 2001, leading to the direct involvement of U.S. troops in the southern Philippines.

**U.S.–PHILIPPINE RELATIONS IN THE 21\(^{\text{ST}}\) CENTURY**

The U.S. maintained bases on Philippine soil until 1991, when the GRP refused to renew the base leases. These base closings led to an almost decade long cooling in U.S./Philippines relations. Before 2001, the amount of military aid to the Philippines had dropped to less than $2 million annually.\(^{40}\) The signing of the Visiting Forces Agreement in 1998 led to a re-establishment of ties between the two countries.\(^{41}\) Kidnappings by the ASG in 2000 caused even closer ties to form.

By the end of 2000, the ASG kidnapped more than 50 Western hostages and obtained more than $20 million in ransom for their release. In response to this growing threat, USPACOM obtained permission to train an AFP light reaction company (LRC) as a national counterterrorist force for the Philippines. SOCPAC established a camp on Luzon Island in
March of 2001 for organizing and training the LRC. On May 27, 2001, the ASG launched its most daring kidnapping yet. In an amphibious assault across 200-miles of open ocean, the Basilan faction of the ASG, led by Ustadz Janjalani’s younger brother, Khadaffy Janjalani, attacked the Dos Palmos resort on Palawan Island. The ASG militants took more than 20 hostages, including three Americans, the missionaries Gracia and Martin Burnham and California businessman Guillermo Sobero. This well coordinated operation took intense planning and rehearsal, and reinforced the need for a well-trained LRC in the Philippines.

After the attacks of September 11, 2001, the Philippines’ president, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, was one of the first heads of state to show support to America. The Philippines soon joined the Coalition of the Willing. This led to the creation of OEF-P to hunt down the Al Qaeda linked ASG. President Macapagal-Arroyo walked a political tightrope with her public support for the U.S. On the one hand, supporting the GWOT led to immediate financial benefits for the GRP. President Bush pledged $150 million in counterterrorism assistance, including $100 million of military equipment. On the other hand, the expansion of the LRC training camp into OEF-P raised the ire of her opponents in the Philippine Congress. They did not want foreign troops fighting a war on Philippine soil. In order to mitigate this opposition, the U.S. government placed its troops under very limited Rules of Engagement (ROE). They could not participate in combat operations and were only allowed to shoot in self-defense.

The first major action of the JSOTF-P in executing OEF-P was the Balikatan exercise on the island of Basilan in February 2002. Balikatan, Tagalog for “shoulder to shoulder,” is an annual bilateral exercise between the U.S. and GRP that began in 1981. Balikatan 2002 was more than an exercise; both American and Filipino forces used it as a cover for a larger
effort. Some 1500 American troops involved in Balikatan 2002 conducted the following operations:

- Denying the ASG sanctuary
- Surveying, controlling and denying ASG routes
- Conducting local training to overcome AFP weaknesses and sustain AFP strengths
- Supporting operations by the AFP LRC in the area of responsibility (AOR)
- Conducting and supporting civil-affairs operations in the AOR

The AFP used the exercise as a means to continue its search for the Burnhams. They moved Army and Marine battalions onto Basilan Island in order to increase the number of personnel available to rescue the two captured American missionaries.

Balikatan 2002 was enormously successful. The combined efforts of U.S. /AFP forces drove the ASG from Basilan Island and the many civilian infrastructure and medical assist visits that were conducted helped to improve the image of the AFP and U.S. troops among the local population. Unfortunately, when the ASG left Basilan they also took the Burnhams with them (Sobero had already been killed and beheaded).

The ensuing search for the Burnhams served as a model for all future combined U.S. /AFP operations. The limited ROE that U.S. soldiers operated under prevented them from actually hunting the kidnappers. However, they could provide logistical assistance and intelligence to the AFP troops conducting the search. The AFP tracked the Burnham kidnappers to Mindanao. On their 17th rescue attempt in more than a year, the AFP overran the camp holding the Americans. Unfortunately, the ensuing firefight killed Martin Burnham
and wounded Gracia. Once the firefight started, a US MH-60L Black Hawk, flown by Special Operation troops, flew to the scene for support and medevaced Gracia to safety.

After the successful conclusion of Balikatan 2002 and the rescue of Gracia Burnham, JSOTF-P contracted from 1500 to 600 troops. The U.S.’s role in the Philippines continues to be to conduct the fight “through, by and with” the AFP. The AFP leads all of the combat missions and is the public face on civil-military operations. From 2002 until 2007, the U.S./AFP team chased the ASG from Basilan, across Mindanao and onto the island of Sulu. JSOTF-P also conducted various Humanitarian Assistance (HA) and Civic Action (CA) operations to win the trust of the local populace. These combat and HA/CA operations resulted in the death of Khadaffy Janjalani in late 2006 and the reduction of the ASG from an estimated high of 2,000 fighters in 2001 to approximately 200 today. Figure 2 shows a visual representation of JSOTF-P operations from 2001-2007.

**WHY OEF-P MUST CONTINUE**

The successes that the JSOTF-P has achieved in the past eight years can make it seem that OEF-P is over. The ASG is a shadow of its former self and 200 fighters do not appear to present a significant threat to the U.S. or its allies. There are four reasons why OEF-P must continue: it remains an important fight in the GWOT, the ASG are very resilient and flexible, the rogue elements of the MILF remain a real threat to peace and stability, and the AFP is not ready to take over.

Why is OEF-P an important fight in the GWOT? The southern Philippine Islands have not been peaceful for 500 years. The current level of violence is nothing compared to
the ongoing drug-cartel wars in Mexico, which killed an estimated 6,000 people in 2008.\textsuperscript{54} While it is true that, compared to other ongoing conflicts, the Philippine Muslim insurgency is not especially violent, the demonstrated link between the ASG and Al Qaeda/ JI is the key to understanding why we must continue. If the U.S. leaves the ASG in the southern Philippines to their own devices, they will go back to what they did before; kidnap for ransom to fund terrorist acts with and training camps for Muslim extremists from across Southeast Asia. These extremists can affect events in the rest of the world by attacking the significant merchant transit lanes that pass near the Philippines. The implications for regional security are even more severe. The Sulu Archipelago is centrally located for terrorists to strike targets in Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Australia and the rest of the Philippines. JI members linked to the bombings in Bali took refuge in the archipelago.\textsuperscript{55} Indonesia’s largely successful COIN operations against JI would be severely impaired if they are allowed to establish a sanctuary in the Philippines. Thus, OEF-P is truly an Economy of Force operation. Per the definition in Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations: “Economy of Force is the judicious employment and distribution of forces. It is the measured allocation of available combat power…to achieve mass elsewhere at the decisive point and time.”\textsuperscript{56} COIN activities in the Philippines keep the ASG and by extension the larger terrorist networks of Al Qaeda and JI busy and prevent the ASG from getting larger and deadlier.

The ASG has shown itself to be extremely flexible and has continued to evolve in order to survive. Every time they were defeated in one area or on one island, they have regrouped and reconstituted somewhere else. The ASG first demonstrated this in 2002, after the Balikatan exercise successfully ejected the ASG from Basilan Island and hunted down the Burnham kidnappers on Mindanao. The killing of many of the ASG members on Basilan and
Mindanao allowed Khadaffy Janjalani to consolidate his power over the various factions of the ASG.\textsuperscript{57} Janjalani concentrated his fighters on Mindanao and, exploiting a relaxation of force protection by U.S. forces after the completion of Balikatan, instituted a bombing campaign in the fall of 2002 that killed or wounded about 50 people. Among the casualties were two special-operations soldiers; one was killed and the other was seriously injured.\textsuperscript{58}

In 2003, again the ASG were on the run. They had been driven from western Mindanao and all but destroyed. They reconstituted in central Mindanao and Janjalani re-established links with JI. With links re-established the two terrorist groups launched the deadliest terrorist attack in Philippine history by sinking \textit{SuperFerry 14} in Manila Bay and killing 116 in February 2004.\textsuperscript{59} More recently, in April 2008, the AFP reduced its presence on Sulu Island citing the killing of Khadaffy Janjalani in 2006 and the supposed pacification of ASG elements on the island. According to the commanding general on the island, “Sulu needs fewer troops since the threat problems have remarkably dropped and the threat level is now more manageable.”\textsuperscript{60} The table below illustrates some of the violence and kidnappings that have happened since this statement, and illustrates that it was premature it:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Terrorist Activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>June 8, 2008</td>
<td>3 news crew kidnapped by ASG on Sulu\textsuperscript{61}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 2008</td>
<td>2 development workers kidnapped on Basilan\textsuperscript{62}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 8, 2008</td>
<td>5 Philippines Marines killed on Sulu and Basilan\textsuperscript{63}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2009</td>
<td>3 schoolteachers kidnapped on Mindanao\textsuperscript{64}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 15, 2009</td>
<td>3 International Red Cross members kidnapped on Sulu\textsuperscript{65}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 16, 2009</td>
<td>3 schoolteachers kidnapped on Mindanao\textsuperscript{66}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 17, 2009</td>
<td>3 Soldiers killed, 19 wounded on Basilan\textsuperscript{67}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 19, 2009</td>
<td>1 Soldier killed, 5 wounded on Sulu\textsuperscript{68}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2, 2009</td>
<td>6 Marines injured by land mine on Sulu\textsuperscript{69}</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If JSOTF-P and AFP do not keep up pressure on the ASG they will strike again.
The majority of this paper has focused on the ASG but Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago will not truly be at peace until the GRP deals with the MILF, specifically the “lost commands.” “Lost commands” are rogue elements of the MILF that have broken away from the MILF central committee and operate on their own as kidnapping gangs. They provide important bases of operation for the ASG and seriously influence the security of the region. These “lost commands” were responsible for the death and destruction that followed the failed peace talks in August 2008. Currently the MILF are not a stated target of the JSOTF-P because peace negotiations have been ongoing between the MILF and GRP, however the “lost commands” are as much a nuisance to the MILF as they are to the AFP. JSOTF-P is the only force in the area that has the independence to act as a mediator between the deadlocked MILF and GRP and persuade them to work together to limit or destroy the power of these rogue elements.

Finally, the AFP is not ready to take over this fight. There are three reasons for this: they do not have the required equipment, the Muslim insurgency is not its main concern, and they may not have the people’s trust. First, their equipment is old. Most of it is from the Vietnam era. As one example, the Army has only 40 UH-1 Heuys to cover the whole country. The AFP does not have the organic Intelligence, Reconnaissance, and Surveillance (ISR) assets required to locate and track the insurgents. Currently all ISR is provided by U.S. manned and unmanned aerial vehicles. While the U.S. provides about $60 million in foreign military sales financing per year, not all of that has made it to the fight in the south. The GRP has used some of this aid to beef up the AFP’s response to a different insurgent group.

This leads to the second reason the AFP are not ready for the fight. They are still fighting a 40-year-old communist insurgency against the New People’s Army (NPA), the
military wing of the Maoist-leaning Communist Party of the Philippines. The AFP sees this fight as their Main Effort. President Macapagal-Arroyo has vowed to stamp out the 5,000-member-strong NPA by the end of her term in 2010.71 If the Americans pull out, the GRP will more than likely shift the majority of the forces in the south to fight the NPA.

Third, the AFP may not have the trust of the people. People are the center of gravity in COIN operations. Without that trust, COIN is very difficult. Many of the troops are from the Christian north and do not come from the same linguistic or cultural background as the Moro people. In addition, the AFP has a demonstrated potential for corruption and brutality in its ranks. Gracia Burnham alleges that multiple times during her captivity with the ASG in 2001 and 2002, she saw evidence of members of the AFP tipping off her captors about upcoming raids and attacks.72 On September 7, 2001, a Philippine Senate committee heard testimony that supports Mrs. Burnham’s allegations. Witnesses testified that the ASG had paid off AFP officials to allow them to escape from a military cordon in June of 2001.73 Finally, members of the AFP have taken the law into their own hands. In 2007, a U.N. investigation and an independent commission in the Philippines both linked the AFP to more than 800 unexplained killings or disappearances.74

CONCLUSION

The battles in the southern Philippines did not start with 9/11 or the American 20th century colonialists. The roots go back hundreds of years. Thus, it will take time, perhaps a long time, and a lot of hard work to bring true peace to the region. OEF-P, implemented by JSOTF-P, can do this, if the U.S. and Philippine governments allow it. The AFP does not
ever need to take over the whole fight. They are doing the lion share of the work now and do not require the state of the art equipment to lead combat missions into the jungle as long as the U.S. is there to back them up. This equipment is not useful at all for the real heart of COIN, HA and CA. HA and CA goes a long way in boosting the image of the AFP in the minds of the people. This can only have good long-term effects.

While the ASG do not constitute an existential threat to the survival of our nation, they are a real threat to our allies and potential allies in the region and the U.S. must stop them from continuing their activities. If we let up pressure now, the next SuperFerry 14 could make the twin towers look like child’s play.
Figure 1
OEF-P BACKGROUND
(2001-2007)

2001: Assessment
2002: In BALIKATAN 02, enter Basilan and begin advise/assist ops, build popular spt for GRP; ASG displaces
2007: LCE established to support "humanitarian offensive"
2003: Security Assistance in Zamboanga under BAYANIHAN USG-GRP implementing Agreement; ASG continues to move east and links up with MILF and JI
2004: Form Combat Advisory Teams, enter Central Mindanao, add NAVSOF; ASG/MILF/JI share training
2006-2007: Operation ULTIMATUM I & II; ASG and JI on the run KIA: KJ & Solaiman
2005: AFP Ops, Layas Pugad, Add AFOSOF; ASG evicted by MILF and moves to Jolo
2005: Enter Jolo ahead of ASG

• Disruption of ASG and JI operational planning forcing their displacement and/or withdrawal from areas
• Sustained pressure on Terrorist Groups with AFP
• Established safer and more secure environments that are conducive to economic development
• Reduced local support for ASG and JI and increasingly put a Philippine force in the lead for activities

www.socom.mil/iw/GSC%20Briefing/JSOTF-P_Overview_Brief_FEB_2008_ver%202.ppt

Figure 2
NOTES
(All notes appear in shortened form. For full details, see the appropriate entry in the bibliography)

3 The term Global War On Terror has fallen out of favor as the official term for these operations but I believe it is the clearest and most accepted form for talking about the US worldwide operations against terror organizations.
8 Forbes-Lindsay, The Philippines under Spanish and American Rules, 104.
9 Ibid. 150.
11 Feuer, America at War / The Philippines, 1898-1913, xiv.
12 Ibid. 225-236.
13 Tuminez, "This Land is Our Land: Moro Ancestral Domain and Its Implication for Peace and Development in the Southern Philippines," 79-80.
15 Abuza, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia : Crucible of Terror, 36.
16 McKenna, Muslim Rulers and Rebels, 143-144.
17 Ibid. 155-157.
18 Mercado, "Culture, economics and revolt in Mindano: The origins of the MNLF and the politics of Moro separatism," 157, 160.
19 Jabidah is the name of a supposed Moro commando unit that President Ferdinand Marcos was training on Corregidor Island for operations in the Malaysian province of Sabah. In the 19th century, the Sulu sultanate ruled Sabah and leased it to the British North Borneo Company. There are many cultural, familial, and religious ties between the peoples of Sabah and the Sulu Archipelago. Based on these ties and as the successor to the Sulu sultanate, the GRP claimed the province when the British North Borneo Company left in 1962. In a plebiscite, the people of Sabah voted in 1963 to join the new government of Malaysia causing the GRP to break off diplomatic relations with Malaysia. President Ferdinand Marcos re-established diplomatic ties in 1966 but secretly instituted a clandestine program to send Moro insurgents into Sabah to undermine the Malaysian government. Marcos’ government recruited the first contingent of Moros on the island of Sulu and, after initial training, sent them in early 1968 to Corregidor Island in Manila Bay for further preparation. In March of that year, a shooting incident occurred on the island. While the true nature of what happened was never revealed, a survivor reports that as many as 60 Moro commandos were killed by their military trainers in retaliation for complaints of conditions on the island. See also Arula vs. Espino, et al, on http://www.lawphil.net.
22 McKenna Muslim Rulers and Rebels, 141-144.
24 Mercado, "Culture, economics and revolt in Mindano," 161.
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32 Boot and Bennet, “Treading Softly in the Philippines,” 23.
33 Ibid. 464-470.
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67 Wee, "Soldier Dead in Basilan Clash," S1/11.
68 Ibid.
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71 Karniol, "Communist Threat Still a Priority," 15.
73 Rubrico, "'Very damning evidence' vs AFP," 11.
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