## Title
ASSESSING USJFCOM’S ROLE ON JOINT DOCTRINE DEVELOPMENT—AN EBO CASE STUDY

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### Abstract
On 14 August, 2008, General Mattis, Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) directed his command that, “Effective immediately, USJFCOM will no longer use, sponsor or export the terms and concepts related to Effects Based Operations (EBO)...in our training, doctrine development and support of JPME (Joint Professional Military Education).” His statement exposed a flaw in joint doctrine—that the development process is broken. With the stroke of a pen, Mattis effectively killed the remnants of the joint concept Effects-Based Operations within his combatant command. His action, however, extended an influence well beyond USJFCOM. Due to the vital role USJFCOM plays in joint doctrine concept development, EBO, a USJFCOM doctrinal concept six years in the making, was effectively provided a deathblow.

This paper will examine the existing role of USJFCOM in the joint doctrine development domain, utilizing the rise and fall of EBO, as a case study. First, it will review the history and authority of USJFCOM, followed by an analysis of the joint doctrine development process. It will then examine how EBO found its way into joint doctrine, through the sponsorship of USJFCOM, and USJFCOM’s expanding role in joint doctrine development. Finally, this study will conclude with recommendations on how to redefine USJFCOM’s role in the joint doctrine process.

### Subject Terms
Joint doctrine, USJFCOM, Effects-Based Operations, EBO, joint doctrine development process

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ASSESSING USJFCOM'S ROLE ON JOINT DOCTRINE DEVELOPMENT--AN EBO CASE STUDY

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: _____________________

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE OF CONTENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USJFCOM History</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Doctrine Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History of Effects-Based Operations (EBO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Problem With USJFCOM’s EBO In Joint Doctrine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recommendation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bibliography</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ABSTRACT

On 14 August, 2008, General Mattis, Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) directed his command that, “Effective immediately, USJFCOM will no longer use, sponsor or export the terms and concepts related to Effects Based Operations (EBO)…in our training, doctrine development and support of JPME (Joint Professional Military Education).” His statement exposed a flaw in joint doctrine—that the development process is broken. With the stroke of a pen, Mattis effectively killed the remnants of the joint concept Effects-Based Operations within his combatant command. His action, however, extended an influence well beyond USJFCOM. Due to the vital role USJFCOM plays in joint doctrine concept development, EBO, a USJFCOM doctrinal concept six years in the making, was effectively provided a deathblow.

The joint doctrine development process is broken. The role of USJFCOM in joint doctrine development has grown nearly unchecked since October 1999, when Secretary of Defense William Cohen told USJFCOM to “spell out the doctrine and refine the tactics that are going to guide and unite an increasingly joint warfighting force.” USJFCOM led the development, the employment, and the marketing effort for EBO throughout the combatant commands, for nearly six years. Under new leadership, USJFCOM intends to reverse the development of EBO and erase it from joint doctrine.

This paper will examine the existing role of USJFCOM in the joint doctrine development domain, utilizing the rise and fall of EBO, as a case study. First, it will review the history and authority of USJFCOM, followed by an analysis of the joint doctrine development process. It will then examine how EBO found its way into joint doctrine, through the sponsorship of USJFCOM, and USJFCOM’s expanding role in joint doctrine development. Finally, this study will conclude with recommendations on how to redefine USJFCOM’s role in the joint doctrine process.
At the heart of warfare lies doctrine. It represents the central beliefs for waging war in order to achieve victory. It is the building material for strategy. It is fundamental to sound judgment.

- General Curtis Emerson LeMay, 1968

**INTRODUCTION**

On 14 August, 2008, General Mattis, Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) directed his command that, “Effective immediately, USJFCOM will no longer use, sponsor or export the terms and concepts related to Effects Based Operations (EBO)…in our training, doctrine development and support of JPME (Joint Professional Military Education).”¹ His statement exposed a flaw in joint doctrine—that the development process is broken. With the stroke of a pen, Mattis effectively killed the remnants of the joint concept Effects-Based Operations within his combatant command. His action, however, extended an influence well beyond USJFCOM. Due to the vital role USJFCOM plays in joint doctrine concept development, EBO, a USJFCOM doctrinal concept six years in the making, was effectively provided a deathblow.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) is responsible for developing joint doctrine.² The CJCS establishes the joint doctrine development process. This process resides within the Joint Doctrine Development Community (JDDC). The JDDC comprises the CJCS, “the Services, the combatant commands, the Joint Staff, Combat Support Agencies (CSA),” and the various doctrine development agencies within the services and the joint community at large.³ A significant portion of joint doctrine debate occurs within scholarly journals and at JPME institutions such as the Naval War College, the U.S. Army War College, the Air War College, et al. The three voting members in the JDDC, namely the
General Mattis’s stated intent was to “provide the USJFCOM staff with clear guidance and a new direction on how EBO will be addressed in joint doctrine and used in joint training, concept development, and experimentation.”\(^5\) His guidance enlivened the “effects” discussion in scholarly journals, in Service doctrine development agencies, and within doctrine discussion online forums, while simultaneously halting the debate within USJFCOM. The EBO concept is not in joint doctrine. However, the EBO concept spawned two important elements of joint doctrine, “effects”, and a “systems perspective.” The term “effects” is now an element of operational design, and the “systems perspective” is an important doctrinal view of the operational environment.\(^6\) Mattis’s death blow to the EBO concept within USJFCOM raises the question of USJFCOM’s proper role in joint doctrine development. The CJCS tasks USJFCOM to assist the CJCS and the Joint Staff/J-7 with joint doctrine concept development, testing, and experimentation. Some will argue the Commander, USJFCOM, is in the perfect position to terminate a concept deemed unworthy for inclusion into joint doctrine. The counter to this argument is that USJFCOM, while tasked to lead joint doctrine development, is merely a voting partner in the JDDC, not the ultimate authority on joint doctrine. That authority resides solely with the CJCS.

The joint doctrine development process is broken. The role of USJFCOM in joint doctrine development has grown nearly unchecked since October 1999, when Secretary of Defense William Cohen told USJFCOM to “spell out the doctrine and refine the tactics that are going to guide and unite an increasingly joint warfighting force.”\(^7\) USJFCOM led the development, the employment, and the marketing effort for EBO throughout the combatant
commands, for nearly six years. Under new leadership, USJFCOM intends to reverse the
development of EBO and erase it from joint doctrine.

This paper will examine the existing role of USJFCOM in the joint doctrine
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USJFCOM’s role in the joint doctrine process.
USJFCOM HISTORY

U.S. Joint Forces Command traces its history and purpose through its predecessor, U.S. Atlantic Command (1947-1999). U.S. Atlantic Command stood up in 1947 as a geographic, unified command, responsible for the Atlantic Ocean region, consisting primarily of U.S. Navy and Marine Corps forces. General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recommended in 1993 a Unified Command Plan (UCP) revision to place the bulk of continental U.S. (CONUS) forces under a single, unified commander for providing jointly trained response forces. His goal was to improve and refine the process for how U.S. forces trained and employed in joint operations. The Secretary of Defense accepted his recommendation and revised the UCP to merge the Air Force’s Air Combat Command, the Army’s Forces Command, the Marine Corps Forces Atlantic, and the Navy’s Atlantic Fleet under a single combatant commander, renamed USACOM. This watershed in joint force development ensured that all U.S. forces would deploy throughout the world, as fully integrated joint teams, a distinct addition to USACOM’s Atlantic Ocean geographic responsibility. Thus, USJFCOM became the Department of Defense’s (DOD) primary provider and trainer of “mission-ready, joint-capable forces,” to combatant commanders around the world.

The association between joint doctrine and USJFCOM followed a parallel, but distinctly separate path. After World War II, the evident need for joint operating procedures went largely ignored until the 1980s. Several examples highlight the U.S. defense establishment’s weaknesses at communicating, coordinating, organizing, and employing across the spectrum of joint operations. Some of these examples include Vietnam, Operation Eagle Claw (Desert One, 1980) and Operation Urgent Fury (Grenada, 1983). Congress
enacted the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 in response to inter-service rivalries, organizational weaknesses, confusing command and control arrangements, and inter-agency coordination failures during these combat operations. The Goldwater-Nichols Act placed the operational control of service forces under a unified combatant commander, thus removing it from the service chiefs. It also streamlined the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff position, empowering that position as the chief military advisor to the National Command Authority. After Operation Urgent Fury, the Senate Armed Services Committee recommended a joint warfighting center, designed to integrate the services through joint doctrine and joint training. The Joint Warfare Center (JWC) was commissioned in April 1986 to assist the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commanders with joint training and exercises. Nine months later, the joint doctrine program was established, and in 1994, the JWC and the joint doctrine program merged, to become the Joint Warfighting Center, subordinate to the CJCS. The CJCS transferred control of the JWC to USACOM in 1998, thus marrying the combatant command structure with the joint doctrine development program. A year later, in 1999, USACOM became U.S. Joint Forces Command--a true reflection of its move from a Navy-centric Atlantic region command to a unified, joint command, with responsibility as a joint force provider, and as the sole source for joint doctrine, responsible directly to the CJCS.

**JOINT DOCTRINE DEVELOPMENT**

What is joint doctrine? The joint publications define it as:

Fundamental principles that guide the employment of US military forces in coordinated action toward a common objective. Joint doctrine contained in joint publications also includes terms, tactics, techniques, and procedures. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application.
Joint doctrine contains principles, which guide the joint force toward a given objective. It is authoritative, but not directive, guidance for those who employ it. It will be followed, directs the CJCS, except when a commander’s best judgment necessitates a deviation under “exceptional circumstances.”\textsuperscript{17} The CJCS directs that “joint doctrine takes precedence over individual Service doctrines, which must be consistent with joint doctrine.”\textsuperscript{18} The CJCS clearly delineates that joint doctrine is the connection between “U.S. policy and strategy”\textsuperscript{19} and the “effective application of U.S. military power.”\textsuperscript{20} In and of itself, however, joint doctrine is neither policy nor strategy. Thus, joint doctrine exists to direct and guide military employment with a joint mindset, but still allows for and encourages creativity and innovation, while fostering mission-oriented commanders. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the congressionally mandated authority for joint doctrine. Title 10 of the U.S. Code directs the CJCS to develop joint employment doctrine, formulate joint training policies, and direct the professional military education for the armed forces.\textsuperscript{21} The CJCS, however, delegated to the CDRUSJFCOM the authority responsible for leading joint concept development and experimentation and for assisting the CJCS with joint doctrine development.\textsuperscript{22} USJFCOM has the unique role, among the services and combatant commands, of providing the “analysis piece of doctrine development.”\textsuperscript{23} In a strategic context, USJFCOM is the combatant command responsible for the constant transformation of U.S. military forces toward a truly joint force. New joint doctrine is developed through validating concepts, or prototypes. Concepts become a part of doctrine after they are fully developed and tested. According to USJFCOM, joint doctrine forms the “baseline which concepts and experimentation results are compared to assess their transformational value.”\textsuperscript{24} A concept is an idea that becomes
doctrine after being tested, evaluated, and validated through the joint doctrine development process. This process consists of four stages: initiation, development, approval, and maintenance. These four stages are broken down into the following steps: 1) Project Proposal, 2) Program Directive, 3) Two Drafts, 4) CJCS Approval, 5) Joint Doctrine Publication Published, and 6) Assessments and Revisions. A concept makes the transition to doctrine as “warfighting concepts mature and lessons learned become best practices.”

The Joint Warfighting Center publishes pre-doctrinal pamphlets and handbooks to “capture emerging concepts and best practices for the warfighter and assist in the transition to doctrine.”

This process ensures the complete participation of the Services, the Joint Staff, and the combatant commands. Joint doctrine development follows a “prescribed process which insures full participation by the Services, the Joint Staff, and the combatant commands. Development and revision timelines have also been established based on multiple years of experience using the established development and revision process.”

Against the backdrop of this definition, what is EBO and how did it find its way into joint doctrine?

**HISTORY OF EFFECTS-BASED OPERATIONS (EBO)**

There is no accepted definition of EBO, despite the concept’s birth nearly 20 years ago. Due to this lack of definition, the EBO concept spawned numerous, interchangeable terms, such as “effects-based planning,” “effects-based thinking,” “effects-based operations,” “effects-based approach,” or “effects-based approach to operations.” The USJFCOM pre-doctrinal pamphlet, entitled “*Operational Implications of Effects-Based Operations,*” defines EBO as “operations that are planned, executed, assessed, and adapted based on a holistic understanding of the operational environment in order to influence or change system
behavior or capabilities using the integrated application of selected instruments of power to achieve directed policy aims.\textsuperscript{30} Numerous EBO proponents contend that war has always been effects-based. One EBO analysis associates EBO with Sun Tzu, Napoleon, Eisenhower, and Schwarzkopf for two reasons. First, these generals understood and appreciated the fact that war must utilize all the instruments of national power. Second, these generals would agree with the need to maximize each instrument’s positive impact, while “minimizing undesirable ones,” and complementing the actions of the other instruments of national power.\textsuperscript{31} One of the most vocal EBO critics, Milan Vego, calls this analysis “a gross distortion because Napoleon I was the leading practitioner of the objective-based warfare.”\textsuperscript{32} Vego claims that effects-based warfare is rooted in airpower theory, which is the most commonly shared view of EBO from both sides of the debate.

Guilio Douhet, the Italian airpower theorist, argued that the military is but one element of a nation’s strength--and that the “sum total of a nation’s strength is involved in war.”\textsuperscript{33} He advocated that airpower was the overwhelmingly decisive element of military power, superior to ground and naval forces. One of his arguments was rooted in defense--how extremely difficult it is to defend against overwhelming airpower.\textsuperscript{34} Airpower theorists, Britain’s Hugh Trenchard, and the American William “Billy” Mitchell, joined with Douhet in advocating a new approach to warfare, one that achieved effects that would lead to enemy capitulation without resorting to attrition warfare.\textsuperscript{35} One example was the decision to attack ball-bearing plants during the Combined Bomber Offensive in Germany during World War II (WWII). The rationale held that attacking the ball bearing plants would drastically undermine the war-machine capabilities of the German military.\textsuperscript{36} Albert Speer, the German Minister of Armaments, confirmed the efficacy of this idea after the war, “Armaments
production would have been critically weakened after two months and after four months would have been brought completely to a standstill.”

The Air Force experience during the Gulf War forms the foundation for modern EBO thought. According to Lieutenant General David Deptula, the concept of “effects-based operations as a principal means of conducting warfare” was born on the first night of the Gulf War in 1991. On this evening, coalition forces simultaneously targeted taxiways, runways, electrical and communication systems, command bunkers, satellite downlink facilities, chemical and biological weapon facilities, surface to air missile sites, the Republican Guard, oil storage facilities, bridges, military support and naval facilities. Deptula was one of the principal planners who, under the tutelage of Colonel John Warden, devised the war plan in the Air Force’s war planning division, known as Checkmate. Warden, one of the modern Air Force’s preeminent theorists, advocated that, with technological improvements in warfighting capabilities, multiple centers of gravity could be attacked simultaneously, rather than sequentially. He also introduced a planning concept, inherent in EBO, of applying appropriate force to achieve specific effects, rather than submitting to unnecessary attrition warfare. Warden leveraged modern technology to apply force through the air, one of the key enablers not available to previous airpower theorists. He enhanced his theory on warfare in 1995, when he authored “The Enemy As A System,” in the Airpower Journal. Warden viewed the enemy as a system of multiple systems. He wrote, “Thinking of the enemy in terms of a system gives us a much better chance of forcing or inducing him to make our objectives his objectives and doing so with minimum effort and the maximum chance of success.” One of the greatest challenges to the EBO concept has
been in applying the Air Force’s effects-based “strategic targeting” doctrine to affect system behavior across the entire range of military operations.

**THE PROBLEM WITH USJFCOM’S EBO IN JOINT DOCTRINE**

In the joint doctrine context, Effects-Based Operations is a concept, or prototype. Joint doctrine defines a concept as a foundational statement, or building block, for future doctrine development. Concepts are a vision of what “may be,” whereas “doctrine captures what is.” The term EBO itself is missing from joint doctrine. Of the terms associated with EBO, only “effects” was added to the Joint Publications, as an “element of operational design,” associated with the operational design terms end state, objective, and task.

After the Gulf War, “effects-based thinking” slowly began to work its way into the joint mindset. In 1995, the CJCS published Joint Vision 2010 (JV2010). This document served as a template to guide a transformation in joint warfighting operations. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John M. Shalikashvili directed JV2010 to leverage future technology as a way to improve joint operations:

> By 2010, we should be able to change how we conduct the most intense joint operations. Instead of relying on massed forces and sequential operations, we will achieve massed effects in other ways. Information superiority and advances in technology will enable us to achieve the desired effects through the tailored application of joint combat power.

Through the joint warfighting transformation, EBO remained a fluid concept, uneasy to define. In 1998, USJFCOM was delegated responsibility for the development and experimentation of future joint operating concepts, using Joint Vision 2010 as a template. In December 2000, USJFCOM conducted an experiment to “gain insights and further develop the requirements for Joint forces to plan and execute effects-based operations.” One year later, USJFCOM’s J9 Concepts Department published the seminal “Effects-Based
Operations” 2001 white paper. The white paper explained, “how a better understanding of the adversary and the increased involvement of other national agencies will lead to better-reasoned options to engage potential adversaries and the ability to adapt operations more quickly in response to the dynamic environment that will characterize future conflict.” This effort by USJFCOM marked the beginning of EBO as a joint doctrine concept.

From 2001 until General Mattis’s decree, USJFCOM led the development of the EBO concept. USJFCOM “turned over a large portion of that work to contractors.” While the host of contractors contributed immensely to the discussion on EBO, the rapidly expanding concept spawned increasing confusion. When military theorists met the scientific community, neither could effectively define the emerging concept. The Military Operations Research Society (MORS) held a conference in 2001 to discuss the validity of EBO as a concept. One year later, MORS met to define EBO, but also to explore the analytical challenges facing the operations research community, in supporting EBO. In attendance were Major General Deptula, USAF, Graham Kessler, J9, USJFCOM, and Ed Smith, a Boeing employee and one of the foremost authors on EBO. Deptula referred to EBO as a “way of thinking,” Mr. Kessler labeled EBO, “a common frame of reference between DOD and other agencies,” and Dr. Smith described how EBO brings together multiple actions aimed at shaping behavior, whether “friends, foes, and neutrals, in peace, crisis, and war.” Deptula was questioned by a research analyst, “What can the analytic community do to help the warfighter know when the effects being created are getting you closer to the objectives?” He responded that he would like to see tools that would model physical and cognitive effects before an attack was launched. Dr. Smith argued at this same conference for connecting EBO to another concept, Net Centric Warfare (NCW). NCW is just one of the numerous
concepts attached to the EBO concept over the years, adding to the difficulty in defining the concept for the joint doctrine community. The outcome from this conference was that because of uncertainties, “EBO-related effects are often not something on which to depend, but something that, if attained, could make a major difference.”\textsuperscript{51} This example supports the argument made by some EBO critics that the EBO concept started out muddled and only became more so when outsourced to contractors.

The issue here is not with hiring contractors. The problem lies in outsourcing a large portion of the “way we fight” to contractors such as Northrop-Grumman, Booz, Allen, and Hamilton, Boeing, SoSACorp, and a host of others, without clearly defining the objective. Today, it is doubtful anyone within USJFCOM’s influence is unclear what General Mattis’s position is on EBO. This raises the question of how clear was the guidance USJFCOM gave over the six-year EBO development period. The guidance, as reported from the 2002 MORS conference, was vague. This situation created a massive financial incentive for the research community to aid USJFCOM in defining and redefining a concept. Traditional military planning comes from the top down, derived from national defense and military strategy. Without clear top down guidance, EBO became a contractor-led, bottom up approach to doctrine development. In September 2008, USJFCOM’s Joint Concept Development and Experimentation Directorate announced a re-competition for one of its larger contracts—a $478 million contract to support USJFCOM’s concept experimentation efforts.\textsuperscript{52} These examples raise a serious concern about the role of contractors in joint doctrine development, when the art of command is absent or unclear.

Lt. Gen. Paul Van Riper, USMC (Ret), a vocal EBO critic, pinpoints the EBO/contractor problem. Van Riper describes how EBO got out of hand during its
conceptual phase. He separates EBO into three classifications. The first classification is the USAF vision for EBO. In the 1991 Gulf War, Col John Warden and then Lt Col David Deptula espoused using precision fires focused on a system, comprised of multiple target sets, or centers of gravity. This approach sought to move beyond attrition warfare by answering the question, “How can we best achieve the desired effect with a scarcity of resources?” Van Riper describes the second classification—the Army version of renaming fire support coordination to effects coordination. The aim was to advance from a focus on coordinating fire support with movement to coordinating all available “means and methods effectively and efficiently.” This renaming convention was short-lived, and in 2007, the Army reverted back to fire support coordination center and fire support coordinator. Van Riper is most critical of the third class of EBO, the USJFCOM-created version present in joint doctrine. He faults this version for three reasons, 1) a “distorted description of system theory,” 2) the untenable systems construct, political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and information (PMESII), and 3) a “new and puzzling description of the association of effects to objectives, missions, and tasks.” Van Riper provides a scathing criticism of EBO; however, in so doing, he also levels criticism at USJFCOM, especially the USJFCOM contractors. In criticizing the systems approach necessary to support USJFCOM’s version of EBO, he concludes, “We might suspect that the contractors who wrote the software programs to support this fundamentally flawed idea were motivated more by the bottom line than the actual value of the capabilities delivered.”

Where is the line between concept and doctrine? The Joint Warfighting Center, a sub-component within USJFCOM, published the “Commander’s Handbook for Effects Based Approach to Operations” (EBAO) in 2006 to provide “perspective and a common,
practical baseline for continuing EBO evolution.” The handbook was published a mere 10 months before the revised Joint Publication 3-0 (JP 3-0), *Joint Operations*. It clearly states EBO is not doctrine, although it provided the “principles, procedures, and techniques” for evolving joint doctrine. It “serves as a bridge between the joint prototype and its migration into doctrine. As such, it is intended to inform doctrine writers, educators, and trainers of effects-based ideas for inclusion in joint doctrine, education, and training.” A month after releasing the Commander’s Handbook, USJFCOM published a companion supplement to the handbook on the theory of an effects-based approach to operations. The handbook served as a “response to the request of many potential joint and Service users for a definitive publication on ‘how’ echelons at the theater strategic and operational levels can employ effects-based procedures and techniques, particularly during the planning, execution, and assessment of an operation.” Ten months prior to a revised JP 3-0, the Commander’s Handbook was acting as a “definitive publication” on EBO; however, when JP 3-0 was published, the bulk of the EBO concept was gone. Thus, the handbook acted as a USJFCOM-produced ‘definitive publication’ on how to employ EBO, but not doctrine. It is difficult to grasp how, in the ten months between pre-doctrine and doctrine, the remaining concept of “effects” as an element of operational design was fully developed, validated, and tested. When JP 3-0 was published in September 2006, with remnants of the EBO concept—the line between concept (practiced for 10 months) and new doctrine became blurry.

USJFCOM printed the Commander’s Handbook, and other pre-doctrinal publications, then disseminated them throughout the combatant commands, in an effort to “advance the conduct of joint operations.” The introduction described how organizations were utilizing EBO in “ongoing joint and Service operations.” It detailed the use of EBO in combatant
commands, through the efforts of the Standing Joint Force Headquarters, and as ‘best practices’ in major exercises. Operations headquarters in Iraq and Afghanistan were trained on EBO and were applying its tenets in warfare.\textsuperscript{62} USJFCOM “sold” the Commander’s Handbook as a book with readily applicable procedures and techniques. The system broke down when EBO went from concept to “customary doctrine.” USJFCOM thoroughly involved itself in transformation and concept development. It encouraged the adoption of EBO. It spread the USJFCOM version of EBO throughout the combatant commands, but the concept was never vetted through the joint doctrine development process. As the EBO concept became more convoluted, the Services turned away from USJFCOM’s EBO concept. Army and Marine Corps doctrine writers became fed up with USJFCOM’s EBO version and rejected it outright.\textsuperscript{63} The Air Force version of EBO is very different from the USJFCOM version outlined in the Commander’s Handbook. The Air Force joined the other services in rejecting the deterministic version of EBO, with terms like predictive awareness.\textsuperscript{64}

Joint concepts must be subjected to experimentation and real-world use. One challenge for joint concept development is to remain firmly rooted in current doctrine, while experimenting with future concepts. The use of EBO in Joint Task Force (JTF) headquarters certification illustrates another blurring line between current doctrine and future concepts. In February 2006, Commander, Naval Forces Europe/Commander, 6\textsuperscript{th} Fleet (CNE-C6F) transferred to the USS Mount Whitney to undergo JTF training. This training was a step in certifying CNE-C6F as a deployable JTF headquarters. It focused on employing joint doctrine and standard operating procedures, but it also integrated an effects-based approach to operations. It included four days of classroom instruction, and EBO was thoroughly integrated into the planning process.\textsuperscript{65} One could argue that for future concepts to be
validated, they must be thoroughly tested in the “real world,” through experimentation and application. The Joint Staff, J7, shares this view.\textsuperscript{66} The issue goes beyond experimentation and application. A clear line must always be drawn, between joint doctrine and concept. It is joint doctrine, not joint operating concepts, which guide the employment of joint forces, and that must guide the certification of JTF headquarters.

Where is EBO today? Despite USJFCOM’s definitive publications on the theory and practice of EBO, the term EBO was not included in the most recent JP 3-0, \textit{Joint Operations}, or JP 5-0, \textit{Joint Operation Planning}, the true definitive joint publications.” However, joint doctrine added the term effects as an operational design element. Joint Pub 3-0 includes a discussion of the effects-based approach as an operational design element that helps commanders to “clarify the relationship between tasks and objectives by describing the conditions that need to be established to achieve the military objectives and attain the end state.”\textsuperscript{67} Despite the inclusion of effects in joint doctrine publications, the debate continues in professional journals as to the efficacy of EBO related concepts.

For several years prior to the revised JP 3-0 and JP 5-0, EBO was a Special Area of Emphasis (SAE) in JPME--submitted for consideration to the CJCS by USJFCOM. The purpose of the SAE is to “ensure the currency and relevance” of the JPME colleges’ curricula. In January 2006, the CJCS released an SAE, submitted by USJFCOM, which directed JPME curricula to instruct EBO as a “holistic understanding of the operational environment.”\textsuperscript{68} The desired learning outcome was to understand how effects-based thinking would influence “system behavior or capabilities using the integrated application of selected instruments of power to achieve directed policy aims.”\textsuperscript{69} Without definitive guidance or definitions in joint doctrine, this would seem a flawed effort at best. The Joint Staff J7, Joint
Doctrine and Education Division, authored a commentary in early 2009, which contrasts sharply with the 2006 pre-doctrinal CJCS guidance to JPME schools. They make it very clear that the term effects-based operations is found nowhere in joint doctrine publications. They added, “the inclusion of ‘effects’ as an element of operational design in both JP 3-0 and JP 5-0 should not be construed as U.S. joint doctrine blanket acceptance of EBO/Effects-Based Approach to Operations (EBAO) in the fullness of those ideas. Even considering that there is no definitive treatise on what constitutes EBO/EBAO, a nonpartisan analysis of the center mass of EBO/EBAO thinking would show that the bulk of the construct was not incorporated into joint doctrine.”

The article then suggests further debate on the topic in order to refine the concept for future doctrine revisions. This suggests another example in which USJFCOM put the cart before the horse.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

The Joint Staff, Unified Commands, and the services all have inputs into joint doctrine, which then coalesces into an imperfect consensus. USJFCOM has the distinct job, above all other service components and combatant commands, to assist the CJCS directly in joint doctrine development, specifically because of its charter for transforming the joint forces. Since 2001, when USJFCOM published its EBO white paper, the EBO concept has grown, matured, been employed, exercised, and tested. Yet it eludes definition. USJFCOM was responsible for the concept. It led the development of the concept and caused it to be permeated throughout the entire joint force. It authored the most definitive publication yet on EBO—the Commander’s Handbook. However, by outsourcing the bulk of this important concept mostly to contractors, USJFCOM lost control of the process. USJFCOM’s role in joint doctrine development, with respect to EBO, grew beyond its own span of control.
General Mattis’s decree was a necessary step to reset USJFCOM’s thinking about the concept. Nevertheless, his bold actions have drawn fire from critics who claim it is not USJFCOM’s place to reset joint doctrine--that belongs to JCS J7, and ultimately, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Therefore, it is in the best interest of the joint doctrine community that the CJCS delineate oversight that is more specific for USJFCOM in its doctrinal transformation efforts. The current process, which saw five years of robust EBO growth in concept and in practice, resulted in the majority of the EBO concept being withheld from joint doctrine, and not enough discussion on how to embed “effects” into joint planning and operations. As previously noted, the only problem with this is the fact that the EBO concept, as outlined in USJFCOM’s Commander’s Handbook, had thoroughly permeated much of the combat force, only to be undone by official joint doctrine.

Furthermore, CJCS should step in and adjudicate the current discussion on effects-based thinking. Mattis’s guidance to his command regarding joint doctrine has a significant effect on each of the combatant commands as well. Some view Mattis as hostile to EBO. This is not necessarily the case. He argues there are benefits derived from some elements of effects-based thinking, and that we should embrace the best lessons learned from this concept. He maintains, however, that they should not be a replacement for time-tested, commander-directed, principles of war and operational art.

In addition, the Department of Defense should provide clear guidance in the upcoming Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) on whether effects-based operations are the transformation needed in the U.S. military. The process must happen from the top down. Successful EBO requires a holistic view of the operational environment, with a systems view
capable of modeling and shaping behavior. It requires interagency and multinational cooperation and it must be designed to achieve national policy objectives. This requires transformational joint doctrine and further interagency cooperation reform. The interagency transformation process commenced by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld is beyond the scope of USJFCOM’s authority. However, the transformation process must provide the strategic guidance USJFCOM needs to remain the lead agent for military transformation in the DOD.

CONCLUSION

When General Mattis declared EBO virtually dead in USJFCOM, he unwittingly exposed a flaw in the joint doctrine development process. The flaw is in USJFCOM’s powerful and largely undefined role in the process, not in the process itself. USJFCOM’s influence grew beyond its span of control, and there was very little to limit its growth. Mattis exemplifies a strong commander who establishes a clear commander’s intent for his subordinates to follow. It is possible he stifled some of the future debate on the transformational EBO concept, but it is certain he enlivened the EBO discussion. After General Mattis departs USJFCOM, it is unclear what will become of EBO. After a decade of transformation, it is time to redefine USJFCOM’s role in the joint doctrine process.

34 Ibid., 55.


39 Ibid.


41 Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, 539.

42 Buer, 4.

43 Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 5-0, XV.


48 Hayes and Iwanski, 23.

49 Ibid., 28.


51 Ibid., 29.


54 Ibid, 83.

55 Ibid.

56 Ibid.


58 Ibid, i.

59 Ibid., 2.

60 Ibid., i.

61 Ibid.

62 Ibid.

63 John Hunerwadel, Air Force Doctrine Center, email message to author, April 28, 2009.

64 Ibid.


68 Peter Pace, 2006 Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) Special Areas of Emphasis (SAEs) CJCS, SAE, 17 January 2006.

69 Ibid.

70 Joint Staff J7 Joint Doctrine and Education Division Staff, “Effects-Based Thinking in Joint
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