

AFRICOM: RECONSTRUCTION AND STABILITY THROUGH THE
PROVISIONAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAM-ENHANCED,
ENABLED BY UNITY OF COMMAND

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ABSTRACT

AFRICOM: RECONSTRUCTION AND STABILITY THROUGH THE PROVISIONAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAM-ENHANCED, ENABLED BY UNITY OF COMMAND, Major Derek E. Lane, USMC, 129 pages.

History illustrates that without unity of command and a mechanism to enable unity of effort, achieving strategic and regional objectives is rare. AFRICOM, a newly established Combatant Command, faces innumerable challenges within the continent of Africa from failed and failing states, terrorist organizations, a plethora of wars and ethnic cleansing, massive starvation, poverty, and disease to name but a few. With every challenge, however, there exist just as many opportunities to enhance strategic partnership, provide diplomatic, economic, and military assistance to failing states, improve regional security capacity, provide humanitarian assistance, and build both physical and economic infrastructure. The most immediate challenge for AFRICOM is developing a mechanism, or a means, that will ensure the accomplishment of US strategic and regional objectives. This mechanism must be enabled through a command and control structure that provides unity of command for all elements of national power in order to alleviate bifurcated direction and guidance that currently plagues PRTs in Iraq and Afghanistan. AFRICOM must make bold recommendations to achieve unity of command that will establish trust within supporting US Government departments and agencies as well as with African nations. As a means, AFRICOM should focus on results via a Provisional Reconstruction Team-Enhanced (PRT-E) to facilitate unity of effort and the accomplishment of US strategic and regional objectives.

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ACRONYMS

ACE	Army Corps of Engineers
ACT	Advanced Civilian Team
AFRICOM	United States Africa Command
ANA	Afghan National Army
AOR	Area of Responsibility
AU	African Union
BCT	Brigade Combat Team
BGN	Beyond Goldwater-Nichols
CA	Civil Affairs
CALL	Center for Army Lessons Learned
CAP	Community Action Program
CENTCOM	United States Central Command
CERP	Commanders Emergency Response Program
CFC-A	Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CMOC	Civil-Military Operations Center
COM	Chief of Mission
CORDS	Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support
CRSG	Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group
CSIS	The Center for Strategic and International Studies
CSP	Community Stabilization Program
CT	Counter-terrorism
DCMA	Deputy Commander for Civil-Military Affairs

DCMO	Deputy Commander for Military Operations
DFID	Department for International Development
DoD	Department of Defense
DoJ	Department of Justice
DoS	Department of State
DOTMLPF	Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities
DOT-PME	Doctrine, Organization, Training, Political, Military, Economic
ePRT	Embedded Provincial Reconstruction Team
ESC	Executive Steering Committee
EUCOM	United States European Command
FACT	Forward Advance Civilian Team
FCM	Foreign Consequence Management
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
FL-05	Flexible Leader-05
FOB	Forward Operating Base
FR-06	Flexible Response-06
FSO	Foreign Service Officer
GCC	Geographic Combatant Commander
GEF	Guidance for Employment of the Force
GOA	Government of Afghanistan
GPOI	Global Peace Operations Initiative
GWOT	Global War on Terrorism
IA	Interagency
ICS	Indian Civil Service

IGO	Inter-government Organization
IMS	Interagency Management System
IPC	Integrated Planning Cell
IRMO	Iraq Reconstruction Management Office
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
JIACG	Joint Interagency Coordination Group
LGCD	Local Governance and Community Development
LGP	Local Governance Program
LOE	Line of Effort
LOO	Line of Operation
MACV	Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
MOD	Ministry of Defense
MOI	Ministry of Interior
MOS	Military Occupational Specialty
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDS	National Defense Strategy
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
NSAM	National Security Action Memorandum
NSC	National Security Council
NSPD	National Security Presidential Directive
NSS	National Security Strategy
OCO	Office of Civil Operations
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
OGA	Other Governmental Agency
OIF	Operation Iraqi Freedom

OMLT	Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team
OPA	Office of Provincial Affairs
OPT	Operational Planning Team
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
PACOM	United States Pacific Command
PCC	Policy Coordination Committee
PCO	Project Contracting Office
PCRU	Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit
PME	Professional Military Education
PMESII	Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, Information
PRC	Peoples Republic of China
PRDC	Provincial Reconstruction Development Council
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
PRT-E	Provincial Reconstruction Team-Enhanced
PVO	Private Venture Organization
QIP	Quick Impact Project
ORF	Quick Reaction Force
R&S	Reconstruction and Stability
S/CRS	Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stability
SE	Strategic Effect
SG	Steering Group
SOF	Special Operations Forces
SOUTHCOM	United States Southern Command
SSTR	Security, Stability, Transition, Reconstruction
TSC	Theater Security Cooperation

TSI	Theater Strategic Interest
TSO	Theater Strategic Objective
TTP	Tactics, Techniques, Procedures
UCP	Unified Command Plan
USEMB	United States Embassy
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USDA	United States Department of Agriculture
USG-D/A	United States Government Departments and Agencies
VTC	Video Teleconference
WWII	World War II

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Africa Command (AFRICOM), proposed on 6 February 2007 by President Bush, is a Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) that assumed responsibility for the African Continent (excluding Egypt) from Central Command (CENTCOM), European Command (EUCOM), and Pacific Command (PACOM) on 1 October 2008. Given its unique command structure with coequal deputy commanders from the Department of State (DoS) and Department of Defense (DoD), AFRICOM has an opportunity to partner with African countries and apply theater security cooperation (TSC) and reconstruction and stability (R&S) operations in a more integrated and coherent whole of government approach. Defense Secretary Robert Gates, testifying before the Senate, stated that AFRICOM “will enable us to have a more effective approach than the current arrangement of dividing Africa between Central Command and European Command” (Gates, Secretary of Defense 2007). At the same testimony, Ryan Henry, the Defense Department's principal deputy undersecretary for defense policy stated, "This command, then, will focus on some efforts to reduce conflict, to improve the security environment, to defeat or preclude the development of terrorist networks, and then support in crisis response, whether they be humanitarian or disaster response" (Henry 2007). Additionally he stated, "We want to help develop a stable environment in which a civil society can be built and that the quality of life for the citizenry can be improved" (Henry 2007). Accomplishing these objectives will be facilitated through AFRICOM's ability to coordinate and integrate its efforts in a manner focused on Africa as a unified command,

vice the current structure that sub-divides the continent among three separate unified commands.

AFRICOM will face challenges to integrate all instruments of national power and eliminate interagency (IA) parochialisms in conjunction with a requirement to solicit input from African nations in support of common goals. In order to enable a functional interagency process, AFRICOM must implement a process that provides synergy and complimentary relationships with regard to the capabilities of all United States Government Departments and Agencies (USG-D/A) and the incorporation of non-U.S. government agencies, international partners and African nations focused on a means to accomplish its objectives. This can be done through the PRT-E.

AFRICOM is a unique Combatant Command (COCOM) while it has a military commander; its deputy commander function is co-equally divided between a Deputy Commander for Civil-Military Affairs (DCMA) and a Deputy Commander for Military Operations (DCMO). Ambassador Mary Carline Yates, the DCMA, “is the first non-DoD civilian to be integrated into the command structure of a unified command” (Ploch 2008, Summary). Her responsibilities as the DCMA will be to “direct AFRICOM’s civil-military plans and programs, and will be responsible for the policy development, resource management and program assessment of AFRICOM’s various security cooperation initiatives” (Ploch 2008, 8). The DCMO is “responsible for the implementation and execution of the command’s programs and operations” (Ploch 2008, 6).

AFRICOM, by virtue of its command structure, has unique opportunities to integrate all elements of national power and various facets of USG-D/A and, if done correctly, serve as a model for efficient unity of command and unity of effort across all

USG-D/A. In order to be successful, AFRICOM must identify a process model through which it will employ its resources that will contain elements of numerous USG-D/A while coordinating U.S. efforts with international partners, non-governmental organizations (NGO), private venture organizations (PVO) and of critical importance, African nations. Success will be measured by eliminating interagency parochialisms and bureaucratic paradigms associated with the present culture of the interagency through achieving unified action and an ability to integrate non-U.S. agencies and partners.

Background

“The United States has been involved in [stabilization and reconstruction] S&R operations for the past 15 years [in various parts of the world] with mixed success because of the ad hoc nature of pulling together interagency resources” (Arnas, Barry and Oakley 2005, 1). In reality, the U.S. has been involved in forms of S&R operations for roughly the last 110 years. However, within the last two decades, the U.S. has directed more of a focus on the seamless integration of the interagency in an attempt to ensure unity of effort. This point is especially true with regard to American involvement in Africa. Historically, U.S. involvement has been sporadic, unfocused, and disjointed as a result of failures to integrate diplomatic, information, military and economic efforts at the National level. Additionally, African issues have been a secondary priority, at best, to other regions of the globe.

To further exacerbate the integration and coordination issues the U.S. Government has faced in Africa, responsibility for the continent has been sub-divided among three Unified or Geographic Combatant Commands; CENTCOM, EUCOM and PACOM. Additionally, the Department of State (DoS) has Africa divided between two

separate bureaus, The Bureau of African Affairs and the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs. Finally, further sub-divisions exist within the Bureau of African Affairs relative to their specific areas of responsibility.

The Unified Command structure before the creation of AFRICOM was, in the words of Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, “an outdated arrangement left over from the Cold War” (Garamone 2007). The structure was simply a means to divide the globe into regions to focus a U.S. military response against the USSR and its allies. They remain today as a means through which the U.S. government views and manages the globe and to focus National Policy (McFate 2008, 10). Per the Unified Command Plan (UCP), each Unified Command is responsible for “coordination, integrating, and managing all Defense assets and operations in its designated area of responsibility” (McFate 2008, 10). In the case of Africa, having never been assigned to a single unified command, its issues have never been the priority in the view of the numerous Combatant Commanders (COCOM) responsible for various portions of the continent. PACOM’s primary focus, for example, has historically been on issues relating to North and South Korea, the Philippines, and humanitarian and disaster relief as a result of natural disasters in the Pacific Ocean region. CENTCOM’s center of gravity is the Middle East. For this reason, its focus, the majority of its military forces, and resources have been applied in a manner that has left Africa as a low priority. Sub-dividing the continent among three combatant commands violated the principles of unity of command and unity of effort and has prevented focused efforts of the U.S to accomplish national objectives to which Africa is associated.

Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) was established by CENTCOM in October 2002, in an effort to increase U.S. focus on the region and to detect transnational terrorist groups in the region and to disrupt and deny their ability to use the region as a safe haven (CJTF-HOA 2008). Additionally, CJTF-HOA has maintained a strong focus on mil-to-mil operations, civil affairs projects (building and improving schools, digging wells, providing medical and dental care, etc), and building partners within the region. This is the first significant example of the U.S. recognition of the importance of Africa; however, it only focuses on a small portion of the continent.

In spite of CENTCOM's attempt to focus its efforts in the Horn of Africa via CJTF-HOA, the U.S. Government's focus continues to be characterized by stovepipe programs enacted by various agencies without unity of effort. For example, the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) is a multilateral, five-year program designed to train and equip 75,000 military troops by 2010, a majority of them African, for peacekeeping operations (Serafina 2007, 2). Administered by the DoS, GPOI has recently lost favor with Congress, not for its objectives, but for a perceived lack of oversight and metrics through which to quantify success. Since its inception in 2004, the program has expanded to over 40 countries indicating the programs loss of focus towards Africa (Serafina 2007, 15-16). Also consider the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the plethora of programs with which it is associated. USAID manages a significant number of initiatives focused on Africa with overall annual budget numbers in the billions of dollars. Although they are all worthwhile efforts, these initiatives, coupled with initiatives and programs from other USG-D/A lack a unifying effort and a specific individual or organization with overall responsibility for U.S.

programs in Africa. USAID, just as the DoS and DoD, has sub-divided Africa into regions through which they focus and manage their programs. And just as the DoS and DoD's regions do not align, neither do USAID's, which creates additional ambiguity regarding how the U.S. views the continent and illustrates a lack of focused effort.

The biggest challenge facing the U.S. Government has been integrating the actions of the USG-D/A to ensure unity of effort and unity of command where their responsibilities either overlap or are required to facilitate each other in accomplishing a specific objective. The 9/11 Commission Report is replete with examples of interagency issues and failures within the executive departments. In the 9/11 Commission Report, reference is made to the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 that enabled the DoD to achieve greater joint cooperation as each of the services had to, in the words of Donald Rumsfeld, "give up some of their turf and authorities and prerogatives" (Kean 2004, 403). Debate continues throughout various organizations and institutions as to whether or not legislative action is required to effect similar change within the interagency to streamline the process and establish a command and control structure with a clear chain-of-command.

President Bush, via National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD-44, comes close to establishing a command and control structure with regard to R&S operations by specifically assigning the DoS as the lead agency for such operations and defining the roles of other USG-D/A who support their efforts. The President recognizes the need for improved USG-D/A integration by stating:

To achieve maximum effect, a focal point is needed (i) to coordinate and strengthen efforts of the United States Government to prepare, plan for, and conduct reconstruction and stabilization assistance and related activities in a range

of situations that require the response capabilities of multiple United States Government entities and (ii) to harmonize such efforts with U.S. military plans and operations. (The White House, National Security Presidential Directive 44, 2005, 2)

The overall intent of NSPD-44 is the establishment of the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). Instead of defining a clear chain-of-command with regard to R&S operations, the President appoints a lead agency, the DoS, creates the office of S/CRS and then directs it to coordinate its efforts via the National Security Council process. In this construct, DoS is the lead agency, but it holds no authority over the DoD and other agencies of the U.S. government it may need support from to accomplish specific objectives. Thus, the situation with regard to interagency dysfunction continues.

Reflection on the U.S. conflict in Vietnam can provide those with a keen eye a few lessons that are applicable to AFRICOM. Facing a serious insurgent threat, the U.S. in Vietnam began an advisory effort aimed at mitigating the impact of Communism while winning the hearts and minds of the local population. Several different U.S. government organizations that included the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), USAID, and the DoS participated in the effort. “Each agency developed its own program and coordinated it through the American embassy” (Andrade and Willbanks 2006, 12). There was no single command structure that tied these programs into the military command structure in Vietnam who, at the time, was primarily focused on the conflict and the application of kinetic combat power. Recognizing this, then President Lyndon Johnson attempted to empower the U.S. Ambassador, Henry Cabot Lodge, to “exercise full responsibility” over the entire advisory effort in Vietnam, using “the degree of command and control that you consider appropriate” (Department of Defense 1971, 8-9).

The President's efforts were not sufficient to correct the issue even though the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) commanding general, General William Westmoreland, and Ambassador Lodge attempted to work things out among their organizations. The creation of the Office of Civil Operations (OCO), the next step taken by the Johnson administration, provided a unifying command structure for the civilian agencies involved in the pacification effort, but it failed to include the military (Andrade and Willbanks 2006, 13). Dissatisfied once again, President Johnson created the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) program in May of 1967 via National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 362 (Johnson 1967). Additionally, the President appointed, as three-star equivalent, Robert Komer as General Westmoreland's deputy for "Pacification (Revolutionary Development)" (Johnson 1967, 1). CORDS created a very unique command structure for its time with a military commander having both a civilian deputy and military deputy, similar to a degree to AFRICOM's command structure. The most important thing President Johnson did was aligning all U.S. efforts in Vietnam under one commander, ensuring unified action.

CORDS had some success stories at the tactical level that bear mentioning as we consider the problems facing Africa. BG Philip Bolte, U.S. Army (Ret), during an interview in 1994, described some of the things his CORDS team accomplished. "We made progress in feeding refugees, building schools, improving roads, etc., but providing security was crucial. We were able to expand the area under government control . . . and we conducted cooperative operations." (HistoryNet Staff 2006). CORDS was successful because of the unity of command and unity of effort resultant from NSAM 362.

The Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) operating in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) have proven the ability to improve governance capacity and economic development on the provincial and local levels in both Iraq and Afghanistan. In comparison, CORDS and PRTs have similarities that are worth examining for future applications of their concepts. CORDS focused on improving governance and security in Vietnam, as do PRTs in Iraq and Afghanistan. CORDS was a coordinated and integrated effort by all USG-D/A, as are PRTs. PRTs in OIF are “essential to the U.S. Government’s priority of increasing Iraqi capacity so that the U.S. may transition to a more normal government-to-government relationship with Iraq” (Director, Office of Provincial Affairs, U.S. Embassy, Baghdad, Iraq 2008, 2). PRTs perform two critical functions in advancing this objective. The first is providing decision-makers with “a comprehensive, coherent understanding of the issues affecting all of Iraq” through reporting on the political, economic, and security issues within the country (Director, Office of Provincial Affairs, U.S. Embassy, Baghdad, Iraq 2008, 2). The second is “facilitating institution and capacity building at the provincial and local levels . . .” to project Iraq toward the goal of self-governance (Director, Office of Provincial Affairs, U.S. Embassy, Baghdad, Iraq 2008, 2).

AFRICOM’s endstate must be nested within U.S. National Strategy described in the National Security Strategy (NSS) and National Defense Strategy (NDS). The NDS lays out five key objectives that are directly tied into the two pillars of NSS (promoting freedom, justice, and human dignity by working to end tyranny, promote effective democracies, and extend prosperity; and confronting the challenges of our time by leading a growing community of democracies). The five objectives within the NDS are:

Defend the Homeland; Win the Long War; Promote Security; Deter Conflict; and Win our Nations Wars.

While defending the homeland focuses on defense of the US from an attack upon its territory, the NDS sets a tone regarding the DoD and the interagency. In order to be successful in defending the homeland the “DoD should expect and plan to play a key supporting role in an interagency effort to combat these threats” (Gates, National Defense Strategy 2008, 7). With regard to winning the Long War, the NDS states, “The use of force plays a role, yet military efforts to capture or kill terrorists are likely to be subordinate to measures to development . . . [and] For these reasons, arguably the most important military component of the struggle against violent extremists is not the fighting we do ourselves, but how well we help prepare our partners to defend and govern themselves” (Gates, National Defense Strategy 2008, 8). The strategy outlined in the NDS relative to Promoting Security, focuses on “building the capacities of a broad spectrum of partners as the basis for long-term security” and on strengthening the capability of the international system to deal with conflict as it occurs (Gates, National Defense Strategy 2008, 14). Deterring conflict is key to enhancing security. It will require the US to influence the political and military choices our adversaries make. The end-state for influencing these choices is to show that, by taking military action, the enemy will incur a cost that is too high and not worth the risk. The focus of achieving this objective is on interagency integration and the inclusion of an international approach (Gates National Defense Strategy 2008, 12). Winning our Nations Wars is relevant to AFRICOM in that recent adjustment to military doctrine focuses on full spectrum

conflict. Full spectrum conflict equally emphasizes the militaries requirement to prepare for offensive and defensive combat, stability operations, and civil support operations.

The NDS clearly articulates that success in future struggles will be measured in our ability to expand representational governments, implement economic programs to support development and confront common security challenges. These measures, in conjunction with international partners must focus on improving local conditions throughout the world that will serve to undermine the sources that support extremists.

Africa faces more complex issues than are found in Iraq and Afghanistan, where the lack of self-governance and economic instability negatively impact all facets of society. Additionally, the significant number of nation states, Chinese involvement within the Continent, and the existence of significant levels of natural resources serve to increase the level of planning and coordination required of the United States in order to develop an over-arching plan to accomplish strategic and regional objectives. If empowered by the U.S. Government and provided requisite resources, AFRICOM will have the ability to turn the tide in Africa, enhancing strategic partnerships, facilitating transforming democracies, strengthening its security capacity, enhancing economic development and mitigating human suffering through humanitarian assistance programs.

Problem Statement

AFRICOM, a newly established Combatant Command, faces innumerable challenges within the continent of Africa from failed and failing states, terrorist organizations, a plethora of wars and ethnic cleansing, massive starvation, poverty, and disease to name but a few. With every challenge, however, there exists just as many opportunities to enhance strategic partnership, provide diplomatic, economic, and

military assistance to failing states, improve regional security capacity, provide humanitarian assistance, build infrastructure and implement programs that will enable African nations to eventually manage their own affairs while emerging as a recognized international player in global politics and commerce. The immediate challenges for AFRICOM are establishing legitimacy within Africa, much of which views AFRICOM as an attempt by the United States to establish a permanent military presence and exploit its natural resources; Developing a process model that efficiently integrates DoD, U.S. government interagency, and international participants for achieving its objectives, and soliciting input from African nations on how the U.S. can best serve their needs must be priority one for the command. In the end, the U.S. and AFRICOM will not solve all of the issues within Africa. Their ultimate challenge will be determining where time and resources can be best applied to build political and economic pillars in the region that can, in turn, influence neighboring countries.

Proposed Research Question

Is there a more efficient means, focused on results via a Provisional Reconstruction Team-Enhanced (PRT-E) that AFRICOM should consider in order to achieve unity of command and unity of effort to accomplish U.S. strategic objectives?

Secondary Research Questions

What is the current PRT concept? What are its roles and objectives in their current state?

What is the PRT-E concept? Who contributes to them? What should their capabilities be?

What historical successes and failures regarding employment of the PRT concept have occurred to draw from with regard to modeling success for the future?

Significance

The significance of this study is to outline a way (PRT-E / PRT-EM) to achieve unified action within AFRICOM via unity of command and unity of effort with regard to all elements of national power. The intentions of this study are to highlight a microcosm of the interagency that exists within AFRICOM; recommend a way to eliminate interagency parochialisms through a process that focuses on empowering the PRT-E / PRT-EM concept enabled through a defined, functional command and control structure as the means to achieve regional objectives. The overall contribution this thesis will make to the immediate issues facing AFRICOM will be a planning concept that will demonstrate effective interagency integration, achieving unity of effort under a unified command. Most importantly, the PRT-E will provide a yet to be defined “means” through which AFRICOM can focus its integrated planning efforts in achieving success for both Africa and the U.S.

The material presented in this thesis is not intended to attempt to solve the debate with regard to USG-D/A interagency issues. This thesis will highlight some of the issues and provide examples where a lack of a unified or clear command structure exists as a means to focus a bit more narrowly on the command structure of AFRICOM. The thesis will provide a recommended way of organizing AFRICOM’s staff and employing its resources in order to accomplish U.S. National and regional objectives.

Assumptions

- The U.S. will remain committed to the sustainment of AFRICOM.
- AFRICOM will experience problems with regard to integrating the various entities from the USG-D/A that will comprise its staff.
- AFRICOM is not considering the PRT concept, in general, as a means through which to achieve its regional objectives.
- Geographical Combatant Command responsibility will continue with the status quo to be assigned to a General or Flag officer of the active military component. This assumption is critical in order to give credibility to my recommendations regarding PRT-E employment as a means to achieve Phase 0 / Phase IV operations where, by Presidential direction, the Department of State is the lead federal agency.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

“Unified Action is the synchronization, coordination, and / or integration of the activities of governmental and non-governmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort” (JP 3-0 2008, 41). The result of effective unified action, the foundations of which are found in national strategy, is unity of effort among all elements of national power, NGO’s, Inter-Government Organizations (IGO), the private sector and any allied / coalition international partner in accomplishing national strategic objectives (JP 3-0 2008, 41). AFRICOM must harness and synergize the power, knowledge, and technical skills inherent in its uniquely structured staff in order to achieve unified action in accomplishing national strategic and theater objectives.

British in the North-West Frontier, 1919-1947

The British efforts to manage the North-West frontier along Afghanistan’s eastern border from 1919 to 1947 provides a number of salient points that are applicable to the U.S. strategy in Africa. First, the British recognized the impossibility for the British military and British officials to solely manage and administer such a large landmass with a plethora of ethnic tribes and competing interests (Roe, 2005B, 20). As a result, the British used a variety of incentives and force to encourage the tribes to govern and manage themselves (Roe, 2005B, 20). One such incentive was employing highly “educated and trustworthy Indians” in the Indian Civil Service (Roe, Roe, 2005B 2005, 20). The Indian Civil Service (ICS) was originally comprised of highly educated Britons who volunteered to serve the people of India while also ensuring British goals in India

were accomplished by providing institutional administration. The inclusion of Indians in the ICS provided cultural understanding and legitimacy to the people of India. Second, recognizing the importance of continuity and cultural understanding the Britons deployed to India for tours of duty that lasted several years (Roe, 2005A, 23). This provided a significant level of institutional knowledge and facilitated continuity throughout the British organization. Additionally, the British employed Political Officers who were charged with improving the economic situation in their assigned areas. They did this through a number of limited practices such as “improved irrigation techniques, enhanced bee-keeping and small-scale silk production” (Roe, 2005A, 26). Finally, the British Army incorporated elements of the Indian Army in order to protect border inhabitants from other hostile tribesmen and to conduct military operations, when required (Roe, 2005B, 20). Just as important to achieving unity of effort and unity of command that greatly enabled their success in India, was the Britons identification and inclusion of trustworthy Indians into an integrated civil service program. The U.S. experience in pacification and stability operations in Vietnam provides another historical example where civil-military unity of effort was achieved through unity of command.

CORDS in Vietnam

While not necessarily a strategic victory, the conflict in Vietnam, particularly U.S. efforts through the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) program, provides additional lessons learned that are applicable while considering AFRICOM and its mission. The differences in the U.S. situation regarding Vietnam and AFRICOM are extensive however; the concept of a unified command structure and unity of effort relevant to the CORDS program is directly applicable to one of the most

significant challenges AFRICOM will face, achieving effective unity of effort. Formed in 1967, CORDS was placed under the control of the U.S. military in order to create a single chain of command for combat operations and pacification operations in order to unify all American efforts in Vietnam.

In 1965, the U.S. government had several agencies participating in the pacification effort, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the U.S. Information Service, and the Department of State (DoS). Each agency operated independently and coordinated individual efforts through the American embassy (Andrade and Willbanks 2006, 12). While each of these programs were inherently executed for the good of the Vietnamese people, the lack of unified effort failed to accomplish quantifiable results. Further exacerbating the unity of effort issue were the military efforts that were focused on defeating the counterinsurgency and executed without consideration of the pacification efforts, as there was no means through which to directly integrate the two efforts.

By 1966, the Johnson Administration recognized this lack of unified effort and command and began exploring options to rectify the issue. Through various studies and official visits to the region, a conclusion was reached that a significant restructure of US command and control was in order. President Johnson appointed Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge to head the U.S. advisory effort in Vietnam and gave him written authority to “exercise full responsibility” using “the degree of command and control that you consider appropriate” (Department of Defense 1971, 8-9). In President Johnson’s remarks at the swearing in of Ambassador Lodge, he noted the importance of the Ambassador and General Westmoreland working together to do what was necessary

militarily to support political and economic efforts in order to secure peace for the people of Vietnam (Woolley and Peters 2008). President Johnson's actions ultimately failed because only the advisory efforts were unified (under Ambassador Lodge) while the military effort remained distinctly separated. Although the President expected Ambassador Lodge and General Westmoreland to coordinate their efforts, the two missions were starkly different and coordination alone did not achieve unified effort.

In January 1966, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara visited General Westmoreland in Vietnam. He quickly recognized that pacification had not produced substantial results (Andrade and Willbanks 2006, 12-13). Robert W. Komer was tasked by the President to devise a solution to increase coordination between all elements of national power within Vietnam. Komer, recognizing the importance of having a unified command structure and recommended to the President that he assign the responsibility for all civil and military efforts in Vietnam to General Westmoreland. A series of interagency battles ensued that convinced the President to delay implementing Komer's recommendations with the promise that the newly created Office of Civil Operations (OCO) would achieve results the President desired. The OCO was to, in a more formal way than before, combine all civilian agencies in Vietnam under a single command. The OCO failed to achieve promised results because it continued the practice of keeping the military and civilian chains-of-command separate (Andrade and Willbanks 2006, 13).

In March 1967, President Johnson, tired of interagency bickering, decreed that Komer's plan to unify command of civilian and military matters within Vietnam was the course of action he would implement. National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 362 was issued on 9 May 1967, establishing CORDS and appointing General

Westmoreland in charge of all U.S. efforts in Vietnam (Johnson 1967). He would have three deputies, two military deputies (air and ground operations) and a civilian deputy of three-star equivalence focused on the pacification efforts. This was the first time in history where civilians were embedded into the military command structure during wartime (Andrade and Willbanks 2006, 14).

Unity of effort is essential to the successful employment of multiple agencies within the same area of operations (AO) in order to accomplish objectives in a coordinated manner and eliminate duplication of effort and interagency competition and parochialisms. CORDS, functioning under a unified command structure, began to make significant headway in the pacification effort in Vietnam unlike it had been able to do prior to NSAM 362.

Provincial Reconstruction Team

Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) were established in order to address infrastructure development necessary for the people of Afghanistan and Iraq to succeed in a post-conflict environment (Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) 2007, Foreward). PRTs are a civilian-military team characterized by interagency efforts focused on diminishing the means for conflict and developing local institutions that can take lead roles in national governance. In order to achieve these goals, PRTs focus on five areas that include governance, economics, infrastructure, rule of law and public diplomacy.




Figure 1. PRT Spectrum of Intervention.

Source: Center for Army Lessons Learned, *PRT Playbook: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, 2007), 4.

PRTs are not intended to replace or act as a host nation’s government; rather they seek to improve the capacity of the current government (Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) 2007, 3). PRTs are not cookie-cutter organizations where one size fits all. In order to shape the PRT for success, an assessment must be conducted as a means to determine what issues exist within the operating environment and to facilitate the development of a plan to address the issues that are identified. The civil-military team leadership from the DoS, USAID, DoD, and any other significant contributing agency must jointly conduct this assessment. Based on the results of the assessment, a PRT plan must be developed to achieve the desired goals within the operating environment. For

example, the PRT responsible for Iraq's Wasit province identified significant agricultural potential within the province, but lacked the technical capability to adequately evaluate the area and provide requisite courses of action to maximize the identified potential (Thompson 2008). The PRT turned to the Borlaug Institute at Texas A&M University who assembled and deployed a team of agricultural specialists to conduct an agricultural assessment (Thompson 2008). Although not complete, the Texas A&M team's initial impressions have confirmed the PRT's assessment that there is significant potential for agricultural growth within the Wasit province (Thompson 2008). In the Diyala Province of Iraq, the U.S. led PRT's agricultural advisors arranged for an agricultural exchange program where local Iraqi agricultural officials visited farms in Ohio in order to gain knowledge on state of the art farming practices (Arnold 2008). Bill Huston, the PRT's agricultural advisor, coordinated with the USDA, the State of Ohio, and the US Department of State to arrange the exchange that consisted of visits to an agricultural exposition, the Agricultural Research Center at Ohio State University, several farmers' markets and other appropriate agricultural sites (Arnold 2008). The exchange resulted in the sharing of new ideas, education in new agricultural products and new concepts and technologies the Iraqi officials intend to implement in their province to increase agricultural production (Arnold 2008).

The goals, as outlined in the PRT plan, should incorporate complimentary objectives of the U.S government, international community, and most importantly, the host nation, in addition to similar efforts being conducted in adjacent provinces or regions (Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) 2007, 5). The PRT then determines what resources it requires, based on the assessment and goals of the plan it develops (Center

for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) 2007, 5). Finally, PRT leadership requires the ability to source subject matter experts they determine to be essential to accomplish identified goals.

Unity of effort is essential to ensuring success of a PRT. It requires coordination and cooperation within each contributing USG-D/A, international partners, NGO's, IGO's, and other organizations in addition to the host nation. The PRT will receive guidance from as many different organizations as are represented by agencies providing resources to the PRT. It is of vital importance that the PRT leadership "ensure that the guidance coming in from multiple agencies is carefully coordinated and mutually reinforcing, and that they report to higher headquarters when there are inconsistencies or when difficulties occur" (Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) 2007, 14).

Coordination and guidance provided to the PRT from the national level, if not properly nested within other contributing agencies, could have negative impacts at the tactical / operational level from which the PRT operates.

PRTs stabilize an unstable area through an integrated civil-military focus characterized by a whole of government approach that employs all elements of national power to achieve its objectives. The PRT is designed to help improve stability of the host nation through building governance capacity, enhancing economic opportunities, and delivering essential public services such as security, law and order, health care, education, sanitization, and other basic services. The end state of a PRT is achieved once the host nation is capable of ensuring provisions for security and public safety are sufficient to support traditional means of development, and its political stability is sustainable upon the withdrawal of the PRT and other international forces (Center for

Army Lessons Learned (CALL) 2007, 6). Critical to the success of a PRT is achieving unity of effort with regard to each contributing member of the team.

Provincial Reconstruction Teams – U.S. Models

The US initiated the PRT concept with the establishment of the PRT in Gardez Afghanistan in December 2002. Since then, the US has established additional PRTs in Afghanistan as well as implementing them in Iraq in November 2005. US led PRTs are comprised of uniformed military service members and civilian members primarily from the DoS and USAID. Contributing to a lesser degree are the Department of Justice (DoJ), Department of Agriculture (USDA), and the US Army Corps of Engineers (ACE).

The US has implemented three different PRT models. The model in Afghanistan has remained relatively unchanged since the first PRT in Gardez. In Iraq, there exist two US PRT models, original and embedded-PRTs (ePRT). In broad terms, US interests with regard to PRTs in both theaters include:

- Developing transparent, sustainable central governments that can provide for the basic needs of the population
- Promoting increased security and rule of law
- Promoting economic and political development

Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan

We're using Provincial Reconstruction Teams of military and civilian experts to help local communities fight corruption, improve governance, and jumpstart their economies. We're using Agricultural Development Teams to help Afghan farmers feed their people and become more self-sufficient...In all these ways, we're working to ensure that our military progress is accompanied by the political and economic gains that are critical to the success of a free Afghanistan. (Bush, George, W. 2008)

The establishment of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) represented a revolutionary way of dealing with the reconstruction efforts. The PRT program combined civil and military action to assist Afghan communities to discover reconciliation, facilitate regional development and transition to self-reliance (Hess 2008). There are currently 26 PRTs operating in Afghanistan with a mixture of lead-nations (Figure 2). Commanded by a military service member, the US PRT model in Afghanistan is typically comprised of an average 80 personnel, three of which are civilians representing the DoS, USAID, and USDA (Katzman, Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy 2008, 33). The remainder of personnel are military service members that make up the commanders staff, civil affairs teams, a force protection unit, intelligence officers and other specialists (Perito, United States Institute of Peace 2007). In addition to U.S. membership, PRTs also include representatives from the Afghan Ministry of the Interior (MOI) and other local nationals who serve as technical experts and interpreters and liaise with local community leaders (The White House 2008, 2). As noted in the British experience in the North-West Frontier and the U.S. CORDS program in Vietnam, integration of local nationals, both civilian and military, is critical in order to achieve unity of effort with regard to the host nation. The Afghan nationals serving on PRTs provides the PRT a higher level of initial credibility with local / tribal leaders and enables

their ability to positively affect the region. Appointing a MOI representative to the PRT was done as an effort to improve PRTs ability to build relationships and extend the reach of the Government of Afghanistan (GOA) (McNerney 2005-2006, 42). Additionally, the MOI official is a means of interface with the GOA and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) PRT Executive Steering Committee to facilitate planning and implementing projects that support the GOA's endstate.

Location (City)	Province/Command	
U.S.-Lead (all under ISAF banner)		
Gardez	Paktia Province (RC-East, E)	
Ghazni	Ghazni (RC-E). with Poland.	
Bagram A.B.	Parwan (RC-C, Central)	
Jalalabad	Nangarhar (RC-E)	
Khost	Khost (RC-E)	
Qalat	Zabol (RC-South, S). with Romania.	
Asadabad	Kunar (RC-E)	
Sharana	Paktika (RC-E). with Poland.	
Mehtarlam	Laghman (RC-E)	
Jabal o-Saraj	Panjshir Province (RC-E). State Department lead	
Qala Gush	Nuristan (RC-E)	
Farah	Farah (RC-W)	
Partner Lead (all under ISAF banner)		
PRT Location	Province	Lead Force/Other forces
Qandahar	Qandahar (RC-S)	Canada
Lashkar Gah	Helmand (RC-S)	Britain. with Denmark and Estonia
Tarin Kowt	Uruzgan (RC-S)	Netherlands. With Australia and 40 Singaporean military medics and others
Herat	Herat (RC-W)	Italy
Qalah-ye Now	Badghis (RC-W)	Spain
Mazar-e-Sharif	Balkh (RC-N)	Sweden
Konduz	Konduz (RC-N)	Germany
Faizabad	Badakhshan (RC-N)	Germany. with Denmark, Czech Rep.
Meymaneh	Faryab (RC-N)	Norway. with Sweden.
Chaghcharan	Ghowr (RC-W)	Lithuania. with Denmark, U.S., Iceland
Pol-e-Khomri	Baghlan (RC-N)	Hungary
Bamiyan	Bamiyan (RC-E)	New Zealand (not NATO/ISAF). 10 Singaporean engineers
Maidan Shahr	Wardak (RC-C)	Turkey
Pul-i-Alam	Lowgar (RC-E)	Czech Republic

Figure 2. Afghanistan PRT's

Source: Kenneth Katzman, *Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2008), 67.




Figure 3. Typical Afghanistan PRT Structure

Source: Robert M. Perito, Special Report No. 152, *The U.S. Experience with Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: Lessons Identified* (October 2005), <http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr152.html> (accessed November 26, 2008).

The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) is a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) organization responsible implementing the NATO mission in Afghanistan. ISAF's principal mechanism for rebuilding Afghanistan is the PRT (Gallis 2008, Summary). In an effort to ensure PRT activities, regardless of lead nation responsibility, are integrated within "broader political, military, and economic goals" the PRT Executive Steering Committee (ESC), chaired by the Afghan Minister of Interior and co-chaired by the ISAF Commander was established (McNerney 2005-2006, 39).

The PRT ESC provides guidance to and oversight of PRTs operating in Afghanistan (Jakobsen 2005, 15). The committee meets once a month with senior representatives from contributing nations to coordinate and guide the activities of PRTs with the ultimate goal of transitioning from PRTs to a viable and complete Afghan government (Jakobsen 2005, 15-16). The Afghan MOI representative in each US PRT is the means of access to the ESC and facilitates planning and implementation of PRT projects to ensure they are integrated with the GOA's overall goals. PRTs in Afghanistan receive daily operational guidance from the PRT Working Group, a subordinate group of the PRT ESC, and overall policy guidance from the PRT ESC (Perito, United States Institute of Peace 2007). While ISAF retains theater-level control of the PRTs, each continues to be managed at the tactical level by its lead nation (Abbaszadeh et al. 2008, 48).

Although ISAF has implemented measures to ensure PRT activities are coordinated within Afghanistan, lines of authority and clear distinction of responsibilities from the lead nation perspective are lacking in the US Afghanistan model. While each PRT has a defined leader, the leader does not have the ability to exert command authority over the other contributing agencies activities (Abbaszadeh et al. 2008, 50). As a result, the planning process is incoherent and an interagency project development plan with joint goals "does not appear to be a consistent feature of PRT decision-making" (Abbaszadeh et al. 2008, 50). Unity of effort at the PRT level is largely based on personalities. The fact of the matter is that there does not exist an executive level interagency organization specifically tasked, and empowered, with overall responsibility for coordination and oversight of PRTs (Abbaszadeh et al. 2008, 48). As a result, when there are conflicts

within the PRT, they are passed up through specific agency stovepipes for resolution (Perito, United States Institute of Peace 2007).

Staffing required civilian personnel to accomplish key tasks has been a consistent challenge for interagency departments (Gallis 2008, 8). For example, only 37 experts from the USDA have served as PRT advisors since May 2003 (U.S. Department of Agriculture: Foreign Agricultural Service 2008). These advisors have come from a variety of different agencies within the Department, indicating an inability to sustain focus due to a shortage of manpower (U.S. Department of Agriculture: Foreign Agricultural Service 2008). Figure 4 identifies authorized staffing levels for PRTs in Afghanistan. While most “authorized” billets have been sourced, it is unrealistic to expect that one representative from each of the agencies noted has the breadth of experience and knowledge to appropriately address all of the issues their agency is expected to cover. Though the interagency desires to support expanding their capabilities, they simply lack the manpower to do so. A review of the DoS website, for example, reveals an active effort to recruit personnel specifically for PRTs. Other USG-D/A are also attempting to grow their capabilities through hiring qualified personnel.

PRT	Military		Civilian					
	Auth	O/H	DoS		USAID		USDA	
			Auth	O/H	Auth	O/H	Auth	O/H
Asadabad	89	89	1	1	1	1	1	0
Bagram	63	63	0	0	2	1	0	0
Farah	99	99	1	1	1	1	1	0
Gardez	88	88	1	1	1	1	1	1
Ghazni	88	88	1	1	1	1	1	1
Jalalabad	88	88	1	1	1	1	1	0
Khowst	88	88	1	1	1	1	1	0
Mehtar Lam	88	88	1	1	1	1	1	1
Nuristan	88	88	1	1	1	1	1	0
Panjshir	55	55	1	1	1	1	1	1
Qalat	99	99	1	1	1	1	1	0
Sharana	88	88	1	1	1	1	1	0
Total	1021	1021	11	11	13	12	11	4

Figure 4. US-led PRT Staffing Levels in Afghanistan

Source: Department of Defense, *Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2008), 60.

Various sources of funding, who has access to them, who has control of them and a glaring lack of US governmental oversight has been another source of friction for the PRT. With the recent change in US military doctrine that recognizes stability operations as a core military mission, the role of the DoD and its participation in stability operations, via the PRT, was legitimized. The largest recipient of government funds, the DoD views the PRT as a tool for counter-insurgency activities (Abbaszadeh et al. 2008, 48). As such, military components of the PRT look for Quick Impact Projects (QIP) that have an immediate impact on locals in an effort to “win the hearts and minds” and to stem the tide of insurgent activities in a particular area. These projects are not always coordinated with other elements of US National power, which opens the door for critics who note that this lack of coordination results in untimely projects and duplicative efforts between the PRT,

NGOs, and other non-governmental organizations. For example, schools have been built through PRT efforts without coordination with the US Department of Education to ensure that teachers and teaching materials are available (Perito, The U.S. Experience with Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan by Robert Perito: Special Reports: U.S. Institute of Peace 2005, 9). The lack of oversight and coordination as a source of friction is exacerbated as PRTs have access to various pots of money intended that are managed by numerous agencies and intended for different, yet specific, purposes. For example, PRTs have access to the military Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds and funding from specific USG-D/A such as Local Governance and Community Development (LGCD) funds through USAID (U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight & Investigations 2008, 22). PRTs in Iraq have another resource through Quick Reaction Funds (QRF) (U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight & Investigations 2008). In Afghanistan there is no counterpart to QRF, however PRTs have access to other funding sources within ISAF. Numerous funding sources make it nearly impossible to adequately account for where funds are obligated, which makes it difficult to measure the effectiveness or impact the money is actually having. Absent of clear guidance and direction, PRTs are left to execute “tactical” level plans with no tie-in to supporting operational or strategic objectives.

Despite interagency coordination and staffing issues, PRTs in Afghanistan have accomplished noteworthy results, likely contributed to personalities and inter-personal relationships between the civil-military leadership. Despite the criticism of PRTs, they have made significant strides since their inception in 2002. They have evolved from a

primarily exclusive military composition to an increasingly civil-military team. Their ability to provide security for civilian experts from a variety of governmental agencies to non-governmental aid agencies has enabled a broadened response to a plethora of issues. In the Ghazni Province, almost every school is now open, where only a year ago many were closed due to threat and intimidation from the Taliban (Katzman, Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy 2008, 32). Additional efforts in the Ghazni Province are road improvement projects, providing medical equipment to the local hospital with new emergency services including 19 ambulances to improve care for rural citizens, and providing micro-grants for small business that improve their ability to hire new workers, restock inventory, and repair business equipment. (The White House 2008). In Khost, PRT activities focused on road building and district center construction that tie the people to their government have led to significant security improvement (Katzman, Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy 2008, 32). In the Lashkar Gah Province, PRTs have rehabilitated a high school that re-opened in February 2008 to 600 students (The White House 2008). They are also focused on assistance to repair the Kinaki Dam electrical facility to help expand access to electricity across the southern portion of the country (The White House 2008).

The greatest and very recent example that demonstrates how unity of effort facilitates successful interagency coordination can be found in a review of the political-military structure of LtGen David Barno and US Amb Zalmay Khalizad. LtGen Barno, commander of Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan (CFC-A) between 2003 and 2005, located his personal office inside the US Embassy with then US Amb Zalmay Khalizad. LtGen Barno was intent on working with his civilian counterparts to facilitate

unity of effort of all US Government activities within Afghanistan. In addition to locating his office within the embassy, LtGen Barno also enabled the civilian embassy staff through filling embassy personnel shortfalls with members of his command (Griffin 2007, 35-36). The large size of the CFC-A staff, coupled with filling embassy shortfalls, enabled LtGen Barno and Amb Khalizad to create a number of new working groups that combined military and civilian expertise (Griffin 2007, 36). These working groups contributed significantly to the U.S. ability to coordinate efforts between the civilian and military branches on reconstruction efforts (Griffin 2007, 36). While the unity of effort between LtGen Barno and Amb Khalizad was vital to success over a two-year period, their situation highlights the fact that personal relationships were the key to success vice any U.S. Government directive, order, or command and control structure. Once the two vacated their positions, their replacements separated along their functional roles of military commander and ambassador and the gains realized by LtGen Barno and Amb Khalizad were lost.

Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq

The Bush Administration, in its November 2005 “National Strategy for Victory in Iraq”, announced a strategy called “clear, hold, and build” (Katzman, Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security 2008, 39). In conjunction with the announcement of this new strategy, the Administration established PRTs in Iraq. In contrast to the Afghanistan model, US PRTs in Iraq are lead by a Foreign Service Officer (FSO) from the DoS with other team members sourced from USAID, USDA, DoD, contract personnel, and interpreters (Katzman, Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security 2008, 39). There are currently two types of PRTs operating in Iraq: Original PRTs, and Embedded PRTs

(ePRT). In both cases, the military component provides security and protection for civilian officials and specialists, allowing them greater freedom of movement in parts of Iraq that would not otherwise be possible (Tarnoff 2008, 24). The civilian component focuses on development of governance, economic improvement, infrastructure development, and providing essential services.

PRTs in Iraq have experienced many of the same issues noted in the review of PRTs in Afghanistan; therefore, they will not be re-iterated. The key difference worth noting is in the PRT structure where the leaders of PRTs in Iraq are FSOs from the DoS. Similar issues with regard to funding and overall coordination and PRT oversight are germane.

Original PRTs are made up of U.S. Embassy, Project Contracting Office (PCO), military, and other USG-D/A personnel with between 35 to 100 personnel on each team (Tarnoff 2008, 24). ePRTs are significantly smaller and structurally different than standard PRTs. ePRTs are embedded within brigade / regimental sized units with the unit's commanding officer acting as the ePRT leader (Tarnoff 2008, 25). Typical ePRTs have between 8 and 12 personnel who work with local Iraqis to stabilize the area, create jobs and meet other basic needs of the people. They play a major role in reconciliation between tribal, municipal, district, and provincial leaders (Tarnoff 2008, 25).

ePRTs, due to the fact that they are embedded within military units who contribute to the ePRTs requirements, are experiencing greater unity of effort than original PRTs. Unity of effort appears to be best achieved within the ePRTs where civilian efforts are integrated and nested within Brigade Combat Team (BCT) / Regimental Combat Team (RCT) operations cooperation and synchronization of civil-

military action at the brigade / regimental level. The unity of effort experienced between the ePRT and its military counter-part is further facilitated through coordinated and shared information flowing to and from higher levels of command within both the military and civilian side of the house. While success at the tactical level continues to improve, signs that the U.S. has not been prepared to provide adequate oversight and direction to PRTs are worth a review.

In May 2007, the US Embassy Chief of Mission established the Office of Provincial Affairs (OPA) at the minister-counselor level to support the PRT program (Special Inspector General For Iraq Reconstruction 2007, 6). OPA was established to replace the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO) (Special Inspector General For Iraq Reconstruction 2007, 6). Tasked with “synchronizing governance, reconstruction, security, and economic development assistance to the PRTs”, the OPA was not initially prepared nor staffed to effectively meet its requirements (Special Inspector General For Iraq Reconstruction 2007, 6). As the transition from the IRMO to the OPA began, a significant number of IRMO staff members finished their contracts or assigned tours of duty and rotated out of Iraq, sometimes before their replacements were present (Special Inspector General For Iraq Reconstruction 2007, 6). This resulted in an inability of the new OPA staff, with several senior positions unfilled, to capture important institutional knowledge and created experience gaps (Special Inspector General For Iraq Reconstruction 2007, 6). An additional negative impact during this transition period was neglect of the original PRTs as the immature OPA staff was focused on establishing and supporting newly fielded ePRTs. For the DoD to provide mobility assets for the PRT’s required a signed Memorandum of Agreement in November 2006 (Perito, USIPeace

Briefing: Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq 2007). The Memorandum also funding for infrastructure, life support, communications, and operating costs for the PRTs (Perito, USIPeace Briefing: Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq 2007). “The agreement ended a prolonged interagency dispute between State and Defense that delayed the startup and hampered the operation of PRTs.” (Perito, USIPeace Briefing: Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq 2007). It also illustrates the issue with regard to funding mechanisms that are in place for PRTs, an issue that has already been addressed.

Civil-military unity of effort requires effective collaboration between the military and the other elements of national power. Failure to centralize control of PRTs and funding sources are the most significant contributing factors with regard to what many critics point out as a lack of a “whole of government approach.” Although it has been over six years since the first PRT began operating, the US has failed to institutionalize the PRT concept. There are no clear objectives for PRTs. There are no measures of effectiveness and performance by which to evaluate them. The civilian agencies are not funded or staffed to fulfill their obligations overseas. Finally, PRT specific training is offered by different agencies that primarily focuses on agency specific training vice a centralized training program that integrates the various USG-D/A (U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight & Investigations 2008, 40). Historical lessons enumerated in the British experience on the North-West Frontier and the U.S. experience with CORDS in Vietnam seem to have been lost or overlooked. Coordination issues and interagency turf wars will continue at the expense of the PRTs and the people they attempt to serve until overall responsibility,

minimally for coordination, is given to one specific department that is empowered and enabled by US Government to lead the PRT effort.

Provincial Reconstruction Teams – German Model

The German Federal Government's Afghanistan policy, dated 5 September 2007, defines Germany's overarching tasks within Afghanistan. Germans are in Afghanistan primarily to help the people of Afghanistan improve their standard of living; develop responsive, efficient and good governance as a key to sustainable development; develop and improve the rule of law and respect for human rights; improve foreign and regional relations; and improve the security situation (German Federal Government 2007). One of the means employed by the German Government to accomplish their objectives in Afghanistan is Provincial Reconstruction Teams.

The German concept of the PRT is an organization headed by a dual civil-military leadership structure. The military leader is from the Bundeswehr, with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs providing a diplomat as the leader of the civilian component (Die Bundesregierung 2007). The military component's primary focus is on liaison tasks to observe and influence the regional security situation through normal military activities and through a system of contacts throughout their AO (Walther 2007). Specific areas of focus for the military consist of reinforcing regional stability; establishing a secure environment for the PRT to operate within; promoting and supporting the establishment of security; and training the Afghan National Army (ANA) through Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (OMLT) (Walther 2007). The civilian component of the PRT is primarily focused on enabling the influence of the central government of Afghanistan's throughout the region; reinforcing civility within the society, promoting

reconstruction and sustainable development, establishing and supporting political and administrative functions; and promoting the development of the police and security forces (Walther 2007).




Figure 5. German PRT Structure – Kunduz, Afghanistan
 Source: Peter Jakobsen, *PRT's in Afghanistan: Successful But Not Sufficient* (Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, 2005), 24.

During the formulation stage of the German PRT concept, there was a major point of contention between the contributing civilian agencies. The principle of *Ressortprinzip*, or department principle, is a constitutionally enshrined principle that grants German federal ministries a significant degree of autonomy in policy formulation and implementation (Abbaszadeh et al. 2008, 26). With the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) providing the civilian component “leader”, the remaining departments raised concern with regard to subordination of their specific agendas to the political agenda of

the MFA. On the ground, these issues are resolved through meetings several times per week where the civilian component of the PRT coordinates and discusses ongoing projects, future planning, intelligence, security, and other topics (Abbaszadeh et al. 2008, 28). There are also signs of positive interagency interaction during the initial stages of German PRT development. Interagency reconnaissance teams conducted a collaborative assessment of potential PRT locations in 2003 with an integrated list of rating criteria for site selection (Brandstetter 2005, 8)

While the MFA is focused on political issues and provides the civilian lead, the Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development (MEC) provides development expertise and controls the purse strings. Unique to the German PRT is the fact that the MFA leader has little control over budget allocations of the MEC (Abbaszadeh et al. 2008, 27). The MFA leader, in conjunction with the other contributing agencies, only has an advisory / recommending role in budget allotments (Abbaszadeh et al. 2008, 27). The success of the German PRT model, with its strict separation between ministries, exemplifies their ability to achieve unity of effort with regard to their interagency. In addition to unity of effort within the PRT, steps are taken in Berlin to mirror and facilitate interagency cooperation at the ministry level. The MFA coordinates activities supporting the PRTs at the ministry level by means of an inter-ministerial Steering Group (SG) (Brandstetter 2005, 10).

Compared to US and British PRT models, German PRTs include a greater number of civilian personnel and a greater degree of separation between the military and civilian components. Through this separation, the German PRTs enjoy relatively good relationships with NGO's (Jakobsen 2005, 26). A strict separation in tasks coupled with

the civilian and military components living and working on different camps and office buildings has facilitated confidence in the PRTs by NGOs. Meetings are held monthly between local NGOs and the PRT to prevent duplication of effort with regard to assistance projects and to coordinate future projects (Abbaszadeh et al. 2008, 30).

The capabilities and contributing agencies to the German PRT were chosen to meet the requirements of facilitating the nation building process (Brandstetter 2005, 14). Although strict separation exists within the PRT relative to roles and responsibilities, the interagency structure is complimentary in that each represented agency depends on another to ensure success. German officials have expressed general satisfaction with their PRTs for two primary reasons: (1) They are having a positive impact on the people of Afghanistan through improvements and reconstruction efforts and, (2) they have served as a catalyst for positive and improved interagency cooperation in the field and in Berlin (Abbaszadeh et al. 2008, 30). A recent impact assessment in the Kunduz region, one of two regions where German PRTs have been established, noted high confidence levels from the local Afghans in the Kunduz PRT (Abbaszadeh et al. 2008, 30). Specifically cited areas of satisfaction were in progress of water access, sanitation, education and road infrastructure improvements (Abbaszadeh et al. 2008, 30).

Provincial Reconstruction Teams – British Model

The United Kingdom's (UK) deployment of its first PRT was on 10 July 2003, with the deployment of the Mazar-e Sharif, Afghanistan PRT (Afghanistan Group, FCO 2005). Subsequent British PRTs have been deployed to Maymaneh and Lashkar Gah, Afghanistan and Basra, Iraq. The Mazar-e Sharif PRT established the British model, characterized by strong civil-military coordination (Abbaszadeh et al. 2008, 42).

Although the command structure of British PRTs has not been exactly identical, this thesis will focus primarily on the Mazar-e Sharif PRT for purposes of evaluating their model.

British PRTs are comprised of military, political, and development components that jointly lead the PRT (Jakobsen 2005, 21). Interagency coordination between the Ministry of Defence (MOD), Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), and Department for International Development (DFID) was institutionalized through the establishment of the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit (PCRU) in July 2004, later renamed the Stabilisation Unit (Abbaszadeh et al. 2008, 43). Integration and coordination at the team level is reinforced at the ministry level at home in the UK.

The FCO, MOD, and DFID are relatively small when compared to their American counterparts. Their small size, coupled with the fact they are located close to each other serves to facilitate good interagency coordination (Abbaszadeh et al. 2008, 43). This coordination results in greater unity of effort at the national level, which trickles down to the PRT level. Also contributing to successful unity of effort is the Stabilization Unit. The Stabilisation Unit is a jointly owned organization consisting of members from the FCO, MOD, and DFID (British Stabilisation Unit n.d., British Stabilisation Unit n.d.).

The role, or mission, of the Stabilisation Unit is “to support countries emerging from violent conflict, at the request of its parent Departments or Cabinet Office. It provides [specialized], targeted, rapid assistance where the UK is helping to achieve a stable environment that will enable longer term development to take place” (British Stabilisation Unit n.d.). It accomplishes its mission through three key tasks: Joint assessments and planning; increasing deployment capacity; and sharing lessons learned

(British Stabilisation Unit n.d.). Through joint assessment and planning, the Stabilisation Unit helps the UK Government Departments develop a common understanding of the issues within a country in order to develop a unified plan of action that represents a whole of government approach to resolve identified issues (British Stabilisation Unit n.d.). The Stabilisation Unit acts as a force provider to provide civilian personnel, separate from what the MOD provides for security of the PRT, capable of addressing identified issues (UK Department for International Development 2006). Through sharing lessons learned, the Stabilisation Unit identifies and shares best practices, within the UK and with international partners, on how to best support post-conflict countries (British Stabilisation Unit n.d.).

The British PRT model demonstrates a high level of inter-governmental ministry coordination characterized by clear lines of responsibility for each ministry and a heavy reliance on civilians. For example, the Ministry of Defence, like the US DoD, is the largest and best resourced of the three contributing ministries. Unlike the US DoD however, the British MOD is not capable of granting funds and QIP; so all development grants for UK PRTs are managed by the DFID (Abbaszadeh et al. 2008, 43). While the DFID representative(s) on the PRT manage and coordinate setting project objectives and funding, the FCO representative(s) focus primarily on institution building, governance, and rule of law.

Citing the British PRT in Mazar-e Sharif, Michael McNerney observed that the military and civilian components were “trained and deployed together and understand that their mission was to support both military and civilian objectives” (McNerney 2005-2006, 39-40). In addition to interagency training, the British also engage in

predeployment consultation and coordination with the United Nations (UN), NGO's and the local community they intend to deploy to (Abbaszadeh et al. 2008, 44). Training and deploying together fosters unity of effort at the PRT level that is reinforced by ministry level activities. The British Government successfully implements a whole of government approach in regard to its PRTs in Iraq and Afghanistan through its independent ministerial level agency, the Stabilisation Unit, joint training programs and support. An important aspect of their interagency coordination is their maintenance of clear and distinct lines of responsibility from the ministry level down to the PRT level.

The U.S. Government and Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations

Stability Operations is “an overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.” (JP 3-0 2008, GL-25)

The military history of the United States is characterized by stability operations, as opposed to the popular belief that most military action has been more conventional in nature (Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center 2008, 1-1). U.S. Government leadership and interagency members have acknowledged the critical importance of stability operations, as has the US Military. This acknowledgement was codified when President Bush issued National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 44 and is reflected in recent military doctrinal changes that recognize stability operations as of equal importance to offensive and defensive operations. An ongoing debate within the US Government is how to best coordinate the assets and organizations charged with executing SSTR operations. The biggest challenge is integrating the

components of the interagency to provide a “whole of government” approach with an effective command and control structure that is empowered to harness the capabilities of the interagency with a unifying set of national objectives. The root of this challenge has been present throughout our history, and we have yet to resolve it.

From the military perspective, SSTR operations have historically been viewed as someone else’s job. The military is for “fighting and winning our nations wars”. Yet a review of our history reveals that over the past more than two centuries, the military has been involved in only 11 wars that were of a conventional nature (Yates 2006, 1). In contrast, during the same period the military has been involved in several hundred engagements that would be considered today as “stability operations” (Yates 2006, 2).

During our nations expansion from its early eastern boundaries towards to the west in the late 1700s throughout the early 1800s, the military played a significant role. Soldiers were responsible for building, improving and securing vital transportation networks (Yates 2006, 4). They provided security for US citizens moving toward the west from garrisons scattered throughout the country (Yates 2006, 4). The US Army was heavily involved in pacification efforts focused on the Native American population with activities spanning from police work, unconventional, and conventional warfare (Yates 2006, 4). They even employed Native Americans who served as interpreters and as guides. Throughout the Armies activities in the western expansion of the US, they played vital roles in expanding the Nations communications infrastructure, transportation network, facilitated local education, and stimulated economic growth (Yates 2006, 5). During the Mexican War, military governors devised plans to feed the poor, provide for basic sanitation, and supported public institutions (Yates 2006, 5). At the conclusion of

our own Civil War, legislation passed in 1867 put the Army in virtual complete control of Southern reconstruction, answerable only to Congress for its actions (Yates 2006, 5). Through a series of military districts, the Army maintained order, provided for security, initiated measures to establish new state governments, hold elections, and re-establish the South's economic infrastructure (Yates 2006, 6-7).

The U.S. Military experience in a number of small wars throughout the late 1890's and early 1900's closely mirrored its activities during the Mexican and Civil Wars. In Cuba for example, Major General Leonard Wood, serving as the military governor, initiated public works, health and sanitation programs, installed a US modeled education system, organized and trained a national military, and established a civil administration throughout the island (Yates 2006, 8). In the Philippines, US military forces emulated much of what Major General Wood had done in Cuba. They too established health and public sanitation programs and reformed the judicial and penal systems (Yates 2006, 8). Eventually, these "small wars" became the forte of the U.S. Marine Corps who, in 1940, published the "Small Wars Manual".

The "Small Wars Manual", written based on Marine Corps experience in the late 19th and early 20th century, encapsulated what it had taken for Marines to conduct what we today call full spectrum operations. Though antiquated, the manual covered issues that are still applicable today such as: "Relationship with the State Department, Military-civil relationship, Training, Disarmament of a Population, Military government, and elections processes" to name a few (United States Marine Corps 1940). The manual emphasizes a current practice of PRTs, the integration of "native troops" with Marine units to ensure their assumption of national responsibilities of restoring law and order as

an agency of the host nation government (United States Marine Corps 1940, SWM 1-5). As if to predict the future, the manual cautions against becoming complacent and overconfident, describing future opponents as an adaptive enemy who will use their knowledge of culture and of the country to his advantage (United States Marine Corps 1940, SWM 1-6). The manual recognizes the importance of unity of effort as well by stating, “The efforts of the different agencies must be cooperative and coordinated to the attainment of the common end” (United States Marine Corps 1940, SWM 1-9). Finally, an entire section dedicated to the Marine Corps interaction with the State Department identifies the lack of defined principles of what was termed “Joint Action”, but called for adherence to standing Navy Regulations and encouraged cooperation and integration (United States Marine Corps 1940, SWM 1-19 - 1-20). The fact that the manual was moth balled soon after it was drafted illustrates the failure of the military to recognize the importance of SSTR operations and, to small degree, the enduring failure of the government as a whole to resolve interagency issues.

In 1942, the military began planning for the anticipated occupation at the conclusion of World War II (WWII) by establishing a school to train military members who would participate in post-war stability operations (Yates 2006, 11). These soldiers were prepared to disarm the population, institute local levels of government that were tied to an overarching national government, and restore and maintain basic services. Eventually, the US military vetted local leaders in a selection process aimed at transferring governmental authority to German nationals. Police forces, initially unarmed, were established and served alongside of the US military functioning in a police capacity. These German Policemen were eventually allowed access to service

weapons and, in addition to the transfer of government, assumed responsibility for independently policing.

Although the establishment of CORDS came too late in the Vietnam Conflict to turn the tide, as previously noted, its integrated civil-military approach to pacification efforts yielded significant results. The reluctance on behalf of both civilian and military leadership to unify the pacification efforts with the conventional military efforts can, to a degree, still be seen today.

To the credit of the military, several concepts to improve their ability to execute successful SSTR operations and to improve interagency participation have been explored and utilized to varying degrees. Joint Forces Command, in collaboration with elements of the interagency, initiated the Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) concept. The concept resulted from a need identified during *Exercise Millennium Challenge-02* (United States Joint Forces Command 2006, iii). As developed, “the primary role of the JIACG is to enhance interagency coordination” (United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfighting Center 2007, vi). Intended to be a fully integrated element within the staff of a Combatant Commander, the JIACG’s role in joint strategic planning is focused on three primary subsets: security cooperation planning, joint operational planning, and force planning (United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfighting Center 2007, vi) (Figure 6). The JIACG enables appropriate integration of interagency contributors and establishes an atmosphere of trust and cooperation to provide a “whole of government” approach and accomplish unified action in execution (United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfighting Center 2007, vii, I-1).




Figure 6. Integrating the Interagency Community

Source: U.S. Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfighting Center, *Commanders Handbook for the Joint Interagency Coordination Group* (Suffolk, VA: Government Printing Office, 2007), I-2.

Results from incorporating the JIACG concept during two EUCOM exercises, *Flexible Leader-05 (FL-05)* and *Flexible Response-06 (FR-06)*, highlight positive contributions of the interagency to military scenario planning. *FL-05* was an exercise designed around a failing state and stabilization operations scenario (McCrillis, Trip Report for FLEXIBLE LEADER-05 (FL-05), November 8-18 2004, 1), while *FR-06* was designed around a Foreign Consequence Management (FCM) and Counter Terrorism

(CT) response exercise (McCrillis, Trip Report, Exercise Flexible Response-06, October 31-November 4 2005, 1). Each exercise resulted in overall positive interaction between the military and civilian planners. Interagency participation during *FL-05* was significant enough to demonstrate what the interagency can bring to the table in support of a failing state / stabilization scenario (McCrillis, Trip Report for Flexible Leader-05 (FL-05), November 8-18 2004, 1). The DoS provided four personnel: 2 from S/CRS, 1 from a Regional Bureau, and 1 from USAID. The DoJ provided 2 personnel, the Treasury Department provided 1, the USDA provided 1, as did the Department of Commerce (McCrillis, Trip Report for Flexible Leader-05 (FL-05), November 8-18 2004, 1). The interagency team was effective in correcting and validating assumptions made by the EUCOM military staff, actively participated in operational planning team (OPT) sessions, and even went so far as to include elements of their parent agency in Washington D.C. via Tandberg Video Teleconference (VTC) sessions, enhancing their participation and capability in the exercise (McCrillis, Trip Report for Flexible Leader-05 (FL-05), November 8-18 2004, 1, 2).

A number of cultural differences were identified during *FR-06* that reinforces what many critics have previously enumerated. The interagency has often been criticized for what is perceived as their lack of a planning framework. Despite this perception, interagency participants in *FR-06* noted that the interagency planning processes are the result of long term stability within the agencies and relationships that sustain on the basis of institutional knowledge (McCrillis, Trip Report, Exercise Flexible Response-06, October 31-November 4 2005, 1). Additionally, they are continually frustrated by the high turnover rates in military staffs and the need to continually teach new military staff

members about their core issues and procedures (McCrillis, Trip Report, Exercise Flexible Response-06, October 31-November 4 2005, 1). From the military perspective, a number of military staff members argued that civilian agencies and / or embassies cannot be trusted regarding certain operations for fear of risking operational security. One military member was quoted as saying, “Civilian folks should sometimes just stay in their lanes” (McCrillis, Trip Report, Exercise Flexible Response-06, October 31-November 4 2005, 2).

Despite a number of means to institutionalize the JIACG, it remains only as a concept with no clear definition or direction. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) produced a number of prototype models to experiment with the concept in addition to sharing information and ideas with Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), who began experimenting with a similar concept to support the war on drugs (McCrillis, Joint Interagency Coordination Group 2008). Subsequent to these experiments and trials in exercise planning scenarios, JFCOM developed a Draft DoD Instruction on JIACG implementation (McCrillis, Joint Interagency Coordination Group 2008). The Draft Instruction was killed by the Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) due to a variety of political reasons and the fact that the OSD does not have the authority to mandate the actions of other USG-D/A (McCrillis, Joint Interagency Coordination Group 2008). Currently, COCOMs employ JIACGs in various forms however; activated reservists fill a significant number of interagency billets because the interagency departments do not have the ability to staff COCOM requirements (McCrillis, Joint Interagency Coordination Group 2008). Finally, to illustrate yet again the significance of cultural issues between the USG-D/A, members of the OSD’s policy branch voiced concern over the JIACG

concept as recommended in the JFCOM Draft Instruction. In their view, the risk of Combatant Commanders coordinating directly with other elements of the US Government (USG) would likely result in bypassing of the Joint Staff J-5 (McCrillis, Joint Interagency Coordination Group 2008).

Civil-Military Operations Centers (CMOCs) are an operational organization of the military that are designed to be utilized in a variety of situations. For purposes of this thesis, we will evaluate its applicability to SSTR operations. Defined by Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, the CMOC is:

An organization normally comprised of civil affairs, established to plan and facilitate coordination of activities of the Armed Forces of the United States with indigenous populations and institutions, the private sector, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, multinational forces, and other governmental agencies in support of the joint force commander.

Its main function is coordination of efforts between various organizations in order to achieve unity of effort. Usually led by a civil affairs officer, the CMOC is designed to work for an operational commander and serve as the commander's single point of contact for coordinating civilian-related activities from organizations outside of the commanders operational control (Arnas, Barry and Oakley 2005, 20). CMOCs have been successfully employed in Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan (Arnas, Barry and Oakley 2005, 20). PRT's in Afghanistan, possessing two separate Army civil affairs (CA) teams, utilize one of the CA teams to run a CMOC to coordinate activities with the UN and NGOs (Perito, USIPeace Briefing: Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq 2007, 2). Croc's, as demonstrated in a number of operations, have the ability to serve a valuable role in coordinating efforts with external agencies to ensure unity of effort and to prevent

redundant activities, thereby maximizing the capabilities of each contributor in SSTR operations.

The requirement for post-war SSTR operations, while historically predictable, was simply either overlooked or purposely ignored during OEF and OIF planning. Immediately after seizing Baghdad and overthrowing the Baathist regime, the lack of Phase IV and V planning was painfully obvious. In the words of some military members, there seemed to be an “operational pause” to figure out what to do next. While noteworthy efforts have been made toward achieving stability in Iraq and Afghanistan, the current structure of the US Government's national security apparatus simply does not support the necessary integrated “whole of government” response. This is largely due to the stove-piped departmental system at the national level where different agendas and culture, and the competition for limited funds exists. *The 9/11 Commission Report* identified interagency coordination as one of the largest problems the US faces with regard to executing national security policy (Kean 2004). As a result of the integration issues, the US continues to be unsuccessful in cohesively planning, coordinating, and implementing its national security strategy in regard to SSTR operations.

In addition to efforts of the military to improve its processes relative to integrating civilian USG agencies in operational planning and execution, the civilian agencies have also attempted to improve integration. President Bush issued NSPD 44 “Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization” in an effort to more effectively coordinate the elements of national power by appointing the DoS as the lead USG agency for stability and reconstruction operations. The cornerstone of NSPD 44 was the establishment of the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and

Stabilization (S/CRS). The core mission for S/CRS is “to lead, coordinate and institutionalize U.S. Government civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations, and to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife, so they can reach a sustainable path toward peace, democracy and a market economy” (Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization n.d.). While NSPD 44 instructs the DoS to “coordinate” the efforts of all USG-D/A and defines “what” each element of the interagency must do, it repeats mistakes of President Johnson with regard to pacification efforts in Vietnam by failing to establish unity of command for those efforts. With department secretaries on a level plain with regard to a “rank structure”, and absent directive Presidential guidance, department secretaries simply cannot effectively “lead” other departments.

S/CRS, in an effort to establish a framework from which to execute their NSPD 44 assigned responsibilities, developed the “Interagency Management System for Reconstruction & Stabilization” (IMS). Approved by S/CRS coordinator Ambassador John Herbst on 22 January 2007, the IMS is designed to assist USG agencies in Washington, US Embassy (USEMB) Chiefs of Mission (COM), and military commanders manage complex R&S operations while ensuring integration of all elements of national power (Department of State, 2007A, 3). The IMS consists of the following entities (Department of State, 2007A, 3-5):

- Country Reconstruction & Stabilization Group (CRSG):
 - Washington DC based, acts as the central coordinating body for the USG effort.
 - Prepares the overall government strategic plan.
 - Manages the interagency process and facilitates preparation of strategic planning guidance for approval by the Principals’ Committee.

- Once the USG strategic plan is approved, facilitates interagency planning and operations in support of the plan.
- Integration Planning Cell (IPC):
 - Deploys to the GCC, comprised of relevant IA planners and experts.
 - Deploy to a GCC as a result of a DoD issued warning order and at the request of the Secretary of Defense.
 - Falls under COM authority; coordinates with CRSG, COM, and GCC.
 - Supports the GCC staff by integrating civilian and military planning processes and operations.
 - Provides country-specific expertise.
 - Liaisons with Washington agencies and civilian field elements
- Advance Civilian Team (ACT):
 - Deploys to the country where operations are to be conducted
 - Forms the R&S IA staff under the COM authority
 - Coordinates and supports execution of the US R&S plan(s) with USG civilian and military agencies.
 - Capable of performing assessments and coordinating or conducting operations in permissive and non-permissive environments.
- Field Advance Civilian Teams (FACTs)
 - Deployed via the ACT at the request of the COM to establish a US presence and provide information about conditions on the ground.
 - Provide field capacity to the COM to implement R&S programs at the provincial or local level.

In addition to establishing the framework for the IMS, S/CRS established a set of criteria that must be met in order to initiate a national response for both long-term and immediate crisis situations through its publication of “*Triggering Mechanisms for ‘Whole-of-Government’ Planning for Reconstruction, Stabilization and Conflict Transformation*” (Department of State, 2007B). According to the *Triggering Mechanisms for “Whole-of-Government” Planning for Reconstruction, Stabilization and Conflict Transformation* proposals for initiating “whole of government” R&S planning should be based on the following criteria (Department of State, 2007B, 1-2):

- Importance: Impact on US national security and foreign policy
- Magnitude: Regional impact; potential scale of humanitarian needs; potential for significant US military involvement

- Likelihood: Probability of a crisis occurring, as indicated by various intelligence community watch lists, USAID, and/or assessments by the UN or other international organizations
- Capacity: Ability of the impacted country and neighbors to respond effectively to the crisis

To better anticipate requests to initiate the planning effort, the R&S Policy Coordination Committee (PCC) holds semi-annual “Planning Guidance” meetings to identify countries that are likely candidates for US intervention (Department of State, 2007B, 2). Based on this list, S/CRS will coordinate scenario-based planning processes for each country to produce and maintain a foundation for potential US intervention (Department of State, 2007B, 2). If elevated to actual implementation and a CRSG is stood up for the situation, it will assume responsibility for the subsequent planning process (Department of State, 2007B, 3).

The IMS and *Triggering Mechanisms for “Whole-of-Government” Planning for Reconstruction, Stabilization and Conflict Transformation* appears to provide a solid foundation from which to execute SSTR operations, however, flexibility in execution will be key to ensure success. Staffing, as previously noted in regard to on-going IA efforts, poses an issue to the IMS that must be addressed through funding and hiring of qualified personnel. Finally, the creation of S/CRS, its response to the Presidential direction contained in NSPD 44 through developing the IMS, and its subsequent staffing and approval by the other primary USG-D/A, demonstrates positive signs of desire from the interagency to achieve unity of effort at the National level.

DoD Directive 3000.05, *Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations*, compliments Presidential guidance from NSPD 44 and the on-going efforts of the DoS S/CRS. DoD Directive 3000.05 elevated SSTR to a core

competency, equal to that of major combat operations in addition to adopting organizational changes within the DoD for support to SSTR operations (England 2005, 2). The Undersecretary of Defense for Policy is directed to coordinate all DoD relations with the DoS through the S/CRS, to develop a list of countries and areas where US military engagement in SSTR is probable in conjunction with relevant USG-D/A, and to ensure that stability operations are incorporated into strategic policy guidance (England 2005, 4). The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Military Departments, and OGA's were directed to establish leadership positions within their organizations focused on SSTR and to ensure that all levels of professional military education (PME) incorporated SSTR specific training (England 2005). While the Directive is lacking in how change at the operational level will be implemented, it provides ample guidance to higher levels and signifies the increasing recognition of how important SSTR operations are now and will be in the foreseeable future.

Since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, a plethora of studies have been conducted, just as many reports have been written, and recommendations have been made with regard to interagency issues that generally all say the same things. The *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols (BGN)* project that began in November 2002 was conducted by The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) to research and make recommendations for improving interagency coordination. Its March 2004, Phase I Report noted the US's failure to effectively integrate the "political, military, economic, humanitarian and other dimensions" of complex contingency operations "into a coherent strategy for a given operation" (Center for Strategic and International Studies 2004, 60). While the 9/11 Commission Report focused on the coordination and management of the

intelligence community, its “broader message is the need for fundamental reform in the interagency system supporting the President” (Donley 2005, 1). The majority of the recommendations resultant of the BGN project have, to varying degrees, been implemented across all USG-D/A. Success in implementation is routinely noted in the recognition of the importance of unity of effort. However, they continue to fail in ensuring unity of effort by neglecting the unity of command concept.

As the debate on interagency coordination continues to rage, the fact remains that the US does not presently have a clearly defined system or mechanism that enables unity of effort with regard to the elements of national power. AFRICOM, however, through its uniquely “interagency flavored” staff has an opportunity to employ the PRT-Enhanced (PRT-E) to strengthen the United States’ position in the region while improving regional stability, security, and economic viability of African Nations. To do this, however, the AFRICOM COCOM must be empowered to conduct joint / interagency planning coupled with the ability to direct and oversee the joint / interagency plans execution, inclusive of all contributing USG-D/A. This would strengthen the planning efforts at the GCC level with the COCOM in charge, and ensure unity of effort through unity of command. Successful implementation of this model to achieve effective unity of effort at the operational level may just provide the impetus for a Goldwater-Nichols like measure of reform for the entire interagency system.

U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM)

1 October 2008 marked the day AFRICOM established as a US Geographic Combatant Command. Unifying Africa under a single COCOM, with the exception of Egypt, will provide greater unity of command for ongoing and future US efforts from a

DoD perspective. This unity of command eliminates seams between GCC's that previously existed, and enables a more holistic application of USG capabilities in a synergized manner. Egypt remains CENTCOM responsibility due to its strong relationship with the Middle East and its involvement with Israel (McFate 2008, 11).

The US has considerable national security interests in Africa. The 2002 NSS states "America is now threatened less by conquering states than...by failing ones" (The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 2002, 1). Failing states create an environment of safe haven where terrorists' organizations can recruit, train, plan operations, and conduct operations from. Africa encompasses the majority of failing states from throughout the globe, making it a key target for US involvement in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) (McFate 2008, 12). The GWOT, coupled with American interest in Africa's natural resources, its desire to assist in improving the lives of African citizens, and the Peoples Republic of China's (PRC) increasing involvement within the continent have served to elevate the importance of Africa regarding US national security. Natural resources within Africa have the ability to bolster US energy security, countering the significance of Middle Eastern oil and gas production. Likely to grow, the US currently imports 22 percent of its oil from Africa (Morrison and Hicks 2007, 1). As an increasingly growing importer of energy resources, the PRC continues to expand its influence within Africa at the same time the US is attempting to increase its own influence.

AFRICOM's strategic approach to its mission is comprised of "indirect and direct elements" (Ward 2008, 1). The indirect element focuses on enabling African states to address their security challenges and is the command's main effort (Ward 2008, 1). The

direct element consists of AFRICOM's contributions to USG and international efforts to improve security and stability in Africa's most troubled (Ward 2008, 1). Acknowledging limited resources, monetarily and in personnel, AFRICOM's Theater Strategy identifies a number of criteria in order to identify where to best apply its resources.

First, AFRICOM's Theater Strategy describes three general categories that African governments fall into. First are the African states that demonstrate continuing progress through liberalization and, to a lesser degree, through democratization, the smallest of the categories (Ward 2008, 2). These developments are founded on stability and improving governance (Ward 2008, 2). The second category, the largest of the three categories, is comprised of states that demonstrate stability as a result of authoritarian regimes (Ward 2008, 2). The final category of states is comprised of those that have simply failed (Ward 2008, 2). As one of the criteria for application of US resources, AFRICOM will seek to support countries that fall into one of the first two categories.

Informed by US national strategic guidance, AFRICOM's Theater Strategy establishes Theater Strategic Interests (TSI) to apply to each African nation in order to determine its relative importance to the US and serves as the second criteria for application of US resources (Figure 7). Next, AFRICOM's Theater Strategy identifies overlap between US interests and those of the African Union in order to develop, coordinate and prioritize its activities in an effort to achieve interests common to the US and its African partners (Figure 8) (Ward 2008, 11). Finally, AFRICOM describes the three strategic endstates mandated in the *Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF)* and a number of associated Theater Strategic Objectives (TSO) and supporting Strategic Effects (SE) (Ward 2008, 12-15). The three strategic endstates are:

- Endstate 1: “African countries and organizations are able to provide for their own security and contribute to security on the continent” (Ward 2008, 12).
- Endstate 2: “African governments and regional security establishments have the capability to mitigate the threat from organizations committed to violent extremism” (Ward 2008, 12).
- Endstate 3: “African countries and organizations maintain professional militaries that respond to civilian authorities, respect the rule of law, and abide by international human rights norms (Ward 2008, 12).

Among the TSO’s are that the US and designated African states maintain assured access throughout the area of responsibility (AOR), the American population is protected from deadly diseases emanating from Africa, US military support to holistic and enduring USG efforts in designated states improves governance and increases stability, and continental peace support operations are effective (Ward 2008, 13-15). AFRICOM will apply this criterion when evaluating which African nations are better suited and ready for increased US assistance.

<p>Vital Interests – broad, overriding importance to the survival, safety, and vitality of our nation</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Prevent attacks against Americans by transnational threats emanating from Africa • Prevent the acquisition, transfer, or transit of WMD • Deter and contain pandemic influenza in the AOR • Maintain freedom of movement into and through the USAFRICOM AOR • Maintain assured American access to African natural resources
<p>Important Interests – do not affect our national survival, but they do affect our national well-being and the character of the world in which we live</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Foster the prevention, mitigation, or containment of inter- and intra-state conflict in Africa • Foster sustained stability in Africa
<p>Humanitarian Interests – in some circumstances, our nation may act because our values demand it to save lives, but also prevent crises from getting worse and becoming a greater drain on resources.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Foster conditions of greater food security, water security, gender equality, and increased opportunities for education in Africa • Mitigate the effects of significant humanitarian crises or natural disasters

Figure 7. AFRICOM Theater Strategic Interests

Source: General William Ward, *United States Africa Command Theater Strategy 2009-2019, A Strategy for Security & Stability in Africa* (Stuttgart: Government Printing Office, 2008), 11.




Figure 8. The Convergence of American and African Union Interests
 Source: General William Ward, *United States Africa Command Theater Strategy 2009-2019, A Strategy for Security & Stability in Africa* (Stuttgart: Government Printing Office, 2008), 12.

AFRICOM’s Theater Strategy does not provide a specific list of African nations they have identified having met a requisite number of criteria for the application of AFRICOM’s time and resources. It does, however, note that AFRICOM will weight the indirect element in order to enable “Africa’s willing and capable states to address African security challenges” (Ward 2008, 15). When applied, the indirect element is designed to reinforce previous success in liberalization and improved governance in “designated”

African states (Ward 2008, 15). Key to this reinforcement is AFRICOM's desire for these "designated" countries to serve as examples for their neighboring countries (Ward 2008, 15). Progress in one country may provide the required catalyst to promote the spreading of stability throughout entire regions and, eventually, the continent. Additional benefits of AFRICOM's indirect element are geared toward balancing the development of near-term capacity, accountability, and oversight within the defense sector, focusing on bilateral engagement to advance Africa's regional institutions, and improving the effectiveness of ongoing UN and African Union (AU) peacekeeping missions (Ward 2008, 16). AFRICOM's overall involvements through its indirect and direct elements are focused on five lines of effort (LOE), four of which are unclassified (Figure 9).

Ultimately, AFRICOM's Theater Strategy is aimed at protecting and advancing US national interests within Africa through supporting long-term stability throughout the continent (Ward 2008, 22). AFRICOM recognizes that the military element of national power cannot single-handedly achieve US national objectives. It seeks to collaborate with other USG agencies, nations within Africa, and international governmental and non-governmental partners in order to achieve lasting stability.




Figure 9. AFRICOM Lines of Effort Diagram

Source: General William Ward, *United States Africa Command Theater Strategy 2009-2019, A Strategy for Security & Stability in Africa* (Stuttgart: Government Printing Office, 2008), 18-20.

CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY

Chapter 2 provided a summary of relevant historical and current literature that will be subject to analysis in chapter 4 in order to answer the primary and secondary research questions of the thesis. This chapter will identify the methodology to be used in the conduct of the analysis of the material presented in chapter 2 and to shape recommendations and conclusions in chapter 5. In review, the primary question is: Is there a more efficient means, focused on results via a Provisional Reconstruction Team-Enhanced (PRT-E) that AFRICOM should consider in order to achieve unity of command and unity of effort to accomplish U.S. strategic objectives? The secondary research questions are: What is the current PRT concept? What are its roles and objectives in their current state? What is the PRT-E and PRT-EM concept? Who contributes to them? What should their capabilities be? What historical successes and failures regarding employment of the PRT concept have occurred to draw from with regard to modeling success for the future? The methodology to be used to analyze the literature is a hybrid qualitative model based on relevant aspects of the doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) model and the political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and information (PMESII) model.

Collection of the literature reviewed in Chapter 2 was intended to highlight historical successes and failures regarding situations where application of more than two elements of national power were required to achieve a national end state. It also intended

to set the stage for applying the PRT concept to AFRICOM, a GCC still in its infancy and that is embracing a uniquely flavored staff with more interagency focus than has been demonstrated by other GCC's. It was through the literature review that the following elements from DOTMLPF and PMESII were identified as befitting for conducting the analysis, and thus comprise the hybrid model to be used: Doctrine, Organization, Training, Political, Military, and Economic (DOT-PME).

Subjects of Analysis

Through the literature review, it became evident that there existed two primary foci for analysis: 1) The organization of the command structure for AFRICOM and how it should be structured to support the PRT concept and 2), the composition and capabilities of the PRT concept as applied to African nations.

Doctrine

Doctrine refers to current military doctrinal publications, standing operating procedures, regulations, and national and interagency policy and directives that regulate the way USG institutions operate.

Organization

Organization considers a units mission statement, current table of organization and how it is organized, joint and interagency requirements within an organization, manning level requirements, skill set requirements of contributing agency members, command relationships, and how the organization supports unity of command and unity of effort.

Training

Training evaluates current US training mechanisms specifically tailored to the integration of the various USG-D/A's toward a common objective, service / agency specific training and training objectives – each of these specific to SSTR missions.

Political

The political aspect of analysis pertains to the USG-D/A's, US Ambassadors / Chiefs of Mission, NGO's, governments of African nations, US diplomacy and the elements / application of soft power.

Military

This section pertains to the contribution of US Forces (Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Special Operations Forces (SOF)), their capabilities, and resources.

Economic

The economic consideration evaluates US funding mechanisms and how they are accessed / expended / managed by current PRT models of various nations.

This thesis will apply the DOT-PME model to answer the primary and secondary research questions. Some of the DOT-PME characteristics may prove to be more applicable than others, and some characteristics may not be applied at all. The objective of this thesis is to determine whether or not AFRICOM, in its current state, is poised to most efficiently accomplish US National Strategic and Regional objectives and whether or not it has the required means with which to do so. The implications of this thesis and its recommendations must be considered objectively and without prejudice based on ones perspective. The literature review identified a number of situations where we, the US,

have and continue to get it right. It also identified significant cultural paradigms within USG bureaucracy that demand attention and resolution. The complexities we face as a nation with regard to SSTR operations coupled with the fact that the requirement to execute SSTR operations continues to increase requires consideration regarding whether or not we are doing so in the most efficient way.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

The nexus of the problem statement from Chapter 1, from which the primary and secondary research questions were derived, lies in AFRICOM's ability to develop a process model that effectively integrates DoD, U.S. government interagency, and international participants to achieve U.S. strategic objectives. Additionally, soliciting input from African nations regarding how the U.S. can best serve to meet the challenges they face (nesting African objectives within U.S. objectives) must be a priority for AFRICOM. This chapter will apply the DOT-PME methodology presented in Chapter 3 to analyze what the current PRT concept is and what its roles and objectives are. This will naturally yield answers to the secondary research question pertaining to historical successes and failures that will help model success for the future. While answering the remaining secondary research questions, parallels will be drawn from other historical situations presented in the literature review to reinforce and validate success to be applied in the conclusion of the thesis. Finally, this chapter will apply the DOT-PME methodology to the remaining group of secondary research questions, "What is the PRT-E and PRT-EM concept? Who contributes to them? What should their capabilities be?" in an effort to answer the primary research question in Chapter 5. The primary research question is: Is there a more efficient means via a Provisional Reconstruction Team-Enhanced (PRT-E), that AFRICOM should consider in order to achieve unity of command and unity of effort to accomplish U.S. strategic objectives?

Doctrine

The military is the only USG department that possesses “doctrine” in the true sense of the word. The remaining USG-DA’s use standing operating procedures, regulations, and national and interagency policy and directives, among other means, to govern the way they operate. For purposes of this thesis, the term “doctrine” will be generically used in reference to this collective body of guidance. The events of 9/11 and the ongoing Global War on Terror required each USG-D/A to evaluate existing paradigms and make significant changes in doctrine to adequately address the current situation faced by the US.

Previously focused on defensive and offensive operations, the military has recently expanded its doctrine to include stability and civil support operations. DOD Directive 3000.5 elevated stability and civil support operations to core competency operations, equal to that of major combat operations. The US Army’s recently published FM 3-0, *Operation*, and FM 3-07, *Stability Operations* are clear examples of the military’s acknowledgement of the changing operating environment that is currently dominated by SSTR operations. Additionally, the Army’s Center for Army Lessons Learned published *PRT Playbook: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures* in September 2007. This handbook serves as a guide to prospective PRT commanders and PRT members. These three significant publications not only adequately address the role of the military in SSTR operations, but also address other elements of national power with an emphasis on unity of effort to accomplish national objectives.

The remaining USG-D/A’s have also initiated institutional changing policy and directives in an effort to address their role in the GWOT. Upon receiving Presidential

guidance through NSPD-44, the DoS created the S/CRS and, in conjunction with other USG-D/A's, began soliciting additional funding and manpower to facilitate PRT's in Iraq and Afghanistan. The S/CRS developed and instituted the IMS, a framework for interagency planning and coordination that had not existed before, with appropriate written guidance. In collaborative effort to capitalize on recent doctrinal changes and improve interagency coordination, a number of after action and lessons learned meetings throughout all USG-D/A's have been held to capture input from PRT's and improve governmental process that support them.

Recent changes in doctrine validate that the leadership within each USG-D/A recognize the critical importance of stability and support operations. While the noted changes in doctrine are not all inclusive, among others they provide an adequate doctrinal framework from which to address SSTR operations.

From an international perspective, both the German and British PRT models more clearly divide the military and political elements responsibilities than do the US models. For the Germans, the military component of the PRT focuses on reinforcing regional stability; establishing a secure environment for the PRT to operate within; promoting and supporting the establishment of security; and training the Afghan National Army (ANA) through Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (OMLT) (Walther 2007). These tasks are clearly of a military focus and do not muddy the waters between the military and political responsibilities of the PRT in general.

The British and German PRT models are similar in the way they divide responsibilities for the military and civilian components. The military component of the British PRT, similarly to the German PRT, primarily focus on military tasks relating to

security. Where the British stand out, however, is through aligning their military components activities, guided by doctrine, with the civilian component through coordinated pre-deployment training. This serves to create a more focused team where each contributing agency understands how their mission supports the overall national objective of their country (McNerney 2005-2006, 39-40). The British see the PRT serving two supporting purposes: (1) co-locating the resources and personnel from each of the governments ministries, and (2) supporting the Iraqi and Afghani governments through increasing their ability to govern and serve the needs of their people (Abbaszadeh et al. 2008, 42). Regarding their PRT's ability to effectively integrate NGO's, the Mazar-e-Sharif PRT, for example, coordinated closely with NGOs during pre-deployment planning and after deploying to Afghanistan to ensure the PRT did not attempt to do work NGO's are better suited for and to avoid duplicative and wasteful efforts (Abbaszadeh et al. 2008, 44). Examples where U.S. PRT's have built schools where no teachers existed and medical clinics without appropriate medical support personnel have served to frustrate efforts of NGO's (Perito, The U.S. Experience with Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan by Robert Perito: Special Reports: U.S. Institute of Peace 2005, 9).

For both the Germans and the British, the military components are responsible for military tasks supported by their doctrine, an advantage over their US PRT counterparts. While tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) are naturally developed to overcome changes in the operating environment, their military components are predominantly tasked to provide PRT support that aligns with what their military doctrine prepares them for.

Organization

Inherently transitional, the mission of a PRT, along with its structure, personnel, resourcing and planning process, must be adaptable to its current environment with an ability to evolve over time as situations change (Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization 2008, 6). Due to its transitional nature and the varying environments in which they operate, it is impossible to develop a definitive single mission statement that is applicable to every PRT. That being the case, each PRT should be resourced and capable of accomplishing four general objectives: 1) Improve stability, 2) Increase local institutional capacity, 3) Facilitate reconstruction activities, and 4) Execute a strong strategic communications program (Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) 2007, 6). Specific mission statements for each PRT should be derived from these four general objectives as they apply to the operational environment applicable to each individual team.

Regardless of the nationality of existing PRT's, they are all generally structured as a joint civil-military unit consisting of 50 to 300 personnel (Jakobsen 2005, 11). A standard table of organization has not been permanently established for PRTs for good reason. Manning level requirements must be determined based on a preliminary assessment of the area in which the PRT will operate and organized in response to the environment (Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization 2008, 6). Once the preliminary assessment is conducted, PRT leaders must have the ability to source the PRT in a manner that provides requisite levels of expertise in the areas of need that are identified. For example, a PRT operating in a rural agricultural based area might require significant numbers of experts from the Department

of Agriculture, where a PRT operating in an urban environment might have a requirement for representatives from the Department of Commerce to address financial institution development. As successfully illustrated in Iraq's Wasit Province, the US PRT identified a need for agricultural development assistance and was able to tap into the needed expertise through coordination with the Texas A&M University who provided a team of agricultural specialists to confirm the potential for agricultural growth within the province (Thompson 2008). Where the US has not enjoyed success however, is in its ability to consistently provide PRT's with required civilian experts due to difficulties finding volunteers from existing employees and difficulties in recruiting and training new personnel (Perito, USIPeace Briefing: Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq 2007). The DoD has stepped in and provided civil affairs personnel to fill a number of unfilled DoS billets, even though they may not be trained to function in that specific job (Tarnoff 2008, 27). Ultimately, structuring a PRT is situation dependent and must be based on the assessment of a joint civil-military team considering security, institutional / regional potential, and needs existing within the PRTs specific area of operation. To ensure the PRT is postured for success, the USG must develop the capacity to source required personnel.

Command relationships and organizing the PRT in a manner that provides unity of effort is key to the PRTs success. Historically, the US has not effectively integrated its civilian agencies and departments with its military component very well. The hard road to the relatively recent historical example regarding US pacification efforts in Vietnam and the CORDS program illustrates this. It was not until President Johnson, frustrated by the inability or unwillingness of government agency leaders to unify combat and

pacification efforts, mandated a single command structure through NSAM 362 that all elements of national power were unified in Vietnam (Johnson 1967). Other examples of integration and unity of effort being done well are usually resultant of situations where leaders personalities are the impetus for success vice any prescriptive direction from a higher authority, as noted by LtGen David Barno and US Amb Zalmay Khalizad's development of a unified staff in Afghanistan (Griffin 2007, 35-36). Another significant example of functional interagency unity of effort is found in the interaction between Ambassador Robert Oakley and LtGen Robert Johnston, USMC, during Operation Restore Hope. Key to their success was that, first they got along (Oakley and Casey 2007, 149). Second, due to the US Liaison Office not being large enough to constitute a formal Country Team, the two "agreed on alternative informal coordination mechanisms" (Oakley and Casey 2007, 149). Both leaders' deputies played a significant supporting and collaborative role through attending all meetings of their boss's counterpart and Oakley and Johnston agreed to meet daily to ensure their efforts were coordinated and complimentary (Oakley and Casey 2007, 149). Unfortunately, in the both previously noted cases, once there was a turnover of the primary leaders, both situations eroded along agency paradigms to the detriment of the overall mission. "PRTs require integration at all levels for command, guidance, planning and support to achieve unity of [effort]" (Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization 2008, 7). PRT's must be led by the appropriate agency based on the developed mission of the PRT and expertise required to accomplish the mission, not by the agency that provides the preponderance of resources (Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization 2008, 7). Additionally, PRT's must

be enabled through a framework that provides direction from appropriate USG-D/A's and allows for bottom-up refinement based on assessments of the operating environment and team requirements to satisfy its specific mission (Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization 2008, 7). NSPD-44 assigned responsibility for S&R operations to the DoS and directed the establishment of the Office of the Coordinator for Stability and Reconstruction. NSPD-44 fails, however, to assign ultimate responsibility to a specific agency or department. In order to effectively integrate all required elements of national power to provide unity of effort in S&R operations, this organization (S/CRS) must be empowered to organize and direct the actions of other USG-D/A's as opposed to its current role as a "coordinator" as stipulated in NSPD-44.

Currently, there are a number of different PRT models. The US operates two distinct models, original PRT's and embedded PRTs (ePRTs). Coalition partners also have their own flavor of PRT structures. As previously stated, to specify a standard structure for a PRT is counter-intuitive. PRT structures must result from an assessment of the operational area and a troop-to-task process to validate personnel and capability requirements. However, for PRT's operate at optimum efficiency and to be successful, unity of effort through unity of command must be achieved. "The US has not had a structured solution for civil-military integration" since the CORDS effort in Vietnam (Oakley and Casey 2007, 149). Relying on personalities to cooperate is not an acceptable course of action. Informal coordination measures can be productive when backed by good leaders however, without responsibilities being formalized, interagency

coordination will be as good or bad as individual leaders personalities (Oakley and Casey 2007, 149).

Training

The US Marine Corps has developed a training model that ensures its forces are capable of accomplishing its general mission of winning our Nations wars. Entry-level training, for both officers and enlisted personnel, reinforce that every Marine is a rifleman first. To teach basic infantry tactics, every Marine Officer attends The Basic School where a concentrated period of instruction ensures every Marine Officer can perform basic infantry platoon commander duties and platoon tactics. Enlisted Marines attend Marine Combat Training, a basic period of instruction where each Marine becomes proficient in basic infantry tactics, the Marine Corps bread and butter. The next step in the training pipeline for a Marine is technically specific training in one of a variety of Military Occupational Specialties (MOS). This MOS training prepares each Marine, whether commissioned or enlisted, to perform a specific skill adequately in an entry-level position during their first unit assignment. During a Marine's first unit assignment, extensive on-the-job training enables significant growth and maturity in technical skill that prepares each Marine to progressively accept greater responsibilities. Through continued professional military education (PME), Marines at all levels are required, not encouraged, but required to refine and enhance both their war fighting and technical skills. This ensures the Marine Corps as a force in readiness, prepared to answer the Nations call at any time. Key to being a force in readiness is the thorough understanding, by all Marines, of the Marine Corps basic mission and that the existence of every MOS in

the Marine Corps is ultimately designed to support its corps mission of winning our Nations wars.

PRTs are comprised of personnel from various departments and agencies. Each must first bring an understanding of their parent organization's mission, capabilities, and limitations as are pertinent to the mission of the PRT. This understanding must be established, as the Marine Corps does, by an organizational training program. The challenge then is how to best integrate the capabilities of each contributing department and agency into the PRT in order to accomplish the teams mission. This integration must begin before the individual deploys to the PRT and will be best served through an interagency training program. The power of one USG-D/A alone is not sufficient to achieve national objectives; all elements of national power must work cohesively and in a complimentary manner. This cohesiveness will only be truly achieved through training in a benign environment, not in the operational environment.

For US led PRTs in Afghanistan, the Army provides training for Army, Navy and Air Force personnel (U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight & Investigations 2008, 40). Centered in Ft Bragg, the Army's PRT training is provided to active duty, guard, and reserve forces set to deploy for service on a PRT (U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight & Investigations 2008, 40). PRT commanders and senior military staff members receive theater and mission specific training for a three week period just prior to their teams arrival for general pre-deployment training (U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight & Investigations 2008, 40). Several weeks after the military PRT members training is

concluded, civilian members (who desire to attend) arrive at Ft Bragg for classroom and field training, focused primarily on survival skills and preparing them for participation in a mission rehearsal exercise (U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight & Investigations 2008, 40). Iraq specific PRT training for civilian members is limited to classroom instruction only, as there is currently no program that provides field training to them (U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight & Investigations 2008, 40).

Current programs fall short of providing the level of training required of both military and civilian personnel as the majority of either group does not possess previous civil-military interaction (Abbaszadeh et al. 2008, 9). The PRT training at Fort Bragg doesn't even train the military and civilian members at the same time, eliminating a perfect venue to begin achieving cohesion and collective understanding. The DoS has developed a PRT-related training program based in a classroom environment that is offered at the Foreign Service Institute (U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight & Investigations 2008, 40). The training is offered to members of any USG-D/A, however it is not mandatory, even for DoS personnel (U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight & Investigations 2008, 40).

The House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations conducted more than 94 surveys and interviews of previous and current PRT members between September 2007 and March 2008. Eighty-six percent of those surveyed cited significant challenges with regard to the quality of training they received, with sixty-nine percent rating it as completely insufficient (U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on

Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight & Investigations 2008, 69-70). The most common recommendation for improving future training was that the team should train as a team, with military and civilian PRT members participating collectively prior to deployment (U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight & Investigations 2008, 70).

Civil-military integration requires collaboration and a shared vision of a particular mission and its associated endstate. US-led PRTs have deployed with limited preparation and training for working within a civil-military construct (McNerney 2005-2006, 39). On the other hand, members of British-led PRTs train and deploy together, which fosters an understanding of their mission and how civil-military personnel compliment each other to achieve team objectives (McNerney 2005-2006, 40). Current US training programs, specific to PRTs, are insufficient and fail to adequately achieve cohesion, a key element to achieving unity of effort. Michael J. McNerney, on a trip to Afghanistan, interviewed both military and civilian personnel assigned to PRTs. Comments made by each “side” illustrate issues that are likely a result of the poor training and education process and reflected frustration among team members. For example, one civilian member who was a retired military service member, commented that “this place is completely dysfunctional” as he, and other civilians perceived, that the military personnel were hesitant to support them and did not treat them as members of the team (McNerney 2005-2006, 37).

Military members reported disappointment in the civilian members of the PRT as they were perceived to have little authority vested in them by their parent department, did not completely understand their role on the PRT and usually reported for duty with little to no resources (McNerney 2005-2006, 37). Without an institutional and mandatory

integrated training program that explains capabilities, limitations, and legitimate expectations, each element of a PRT is left to personalities and figuring it out “on the fly”.

Political

Carl von Clausewitz stated that, “war is an extension of politics”. While we are not at “war” in or with any African country, our military activities there are certainly an extension of U.S. policy. As noted in the literature review, aligning political objectives with each element of any national governments participating agencies is key to realizing an endstate. Historically, the U.S. has not experienced cohesive interaction within each of its governmental departments and agencies. As recorded in the U.S. experience in with pacification in Vietnam, military and civilian leaders failed to unify U.S. efforts until President Johnson took direct action (Andrade and Willbanks 2006, 14). Only after the President mandated a unified command did the efforts of pacification become fruitful. We have seen the same interagency coordination issues in Afghanistan and Iraq. The structure of USG-D/A’s is unified only at the Presidential level. Through the National Security Council (NSC), he directs and manages the efforts of each department and agency. Since its establishment in 1947, presidents have used the NSC to varying degrees based on their political agendas (Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State 1997). Below the Presidential level, the executive branch is stove-piped and inadequate in providing governmental unity of effort.

Unity of command and effort are timeless principles that, when achieved, ensure clear guidance and direction are synchronized across all functions of any organization working toward a common endstate. U.S. policy makers from various departments and

agencies have stipulated the U.S. desire for the governments of Iraq and Afghanistan to adequately govern their countries and provide for the basic necessities and common defense of their people. To that end, the U.S. has been actively engaged in both countries for the better part of this decade with PRT's as a significant focus of effort to assist each in achieving this endstate. Consistent criticism, both internal and external, of the U.S. approach has been in its failure to achieve unity of effort across all elements of national power. The latest, most significant effort on behalf of the U.S. to mitigate this was when President Bush assigned the DoS the responsibility for SSTR operations via NSPD-44. Created as a result of NSPD-44, the Office of the Coordinator of Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) is charged to "coordinate" the efforts of the U.S. Government. The key here is the word "coordinate". S/CRS, through the Secretary of the Department of State, does not have the authority to direct the activities of other governmental departments and agencies nor does it have the requisite funding and manpower to accomplish the objectives expected through NSPD-44. The Interagency Management System (IMS) was developed to provide a framework to facilitate the S/CRS in coordinating the various elements of the USG in the execution of SSTR operations. Depending on the situation, S/CRS is responsible for coordinating the activities of two or more USG-D/A's. Complicating the coordination responsibilities of the S/CRS are the U.S. Ambassadors to each country. The President's direct representative to a particular country, the Ambassador falls directly under the President and is beholden to no one other than the President.

The IMS construct provides the S/CRS the ability to coordinate USG efforts through the CRSG. A Washington D.C. based organization; the CRSG is the central

coordinating body for the USG effort. The IPC deploys to the appropriate GCC, is composed of relevant IA planners and experts, falls under the authority of the Embassy's Chief of Mission (COM) and coordinates with the CRSG, COM and GCC. Figure 10 graphically depicts the coordinating mechanism of the USG. In the end, no one individual or agency is actually responsible for the whole of USG SSTR operations. Ultimately left to a myriad of coordinating efforts, personalities become a deciding factor in the overall effectiveness of American policies. As demonstrated in Afghanistan by LtGen David Barno and US Amb Zalmay Khalizad, when personalities and goals align positive results may be achieved. Their ability to create a unified staff was critical to a number of their initial successes (Griffin 2007, 35-36). On the other hand, depending on personalities is hardly an appropriate course of action in implementing U.S. policy.

NGO's, obviously, do not fall under any level of control by the USG. Efforts to include them through coordination are an objective of the USG in order to incorporate their capabilities in achieving US national objectives. Efforts at the tactical / PRT level to incorporate NGO capabilities are positive, although efforts at the governmental level need improvement. For example, in Afghanistan, PRT representatives served as key members of the Project Review Committee and coordinated with NGO's to maximize the impact of USG sponsored projects and NGO sponsored projects for the greatest effect on local citizens (Hernandorena 2007, 132). Similarly, through coordination and diplomacy, the USG actively solicits input and participation from African governments in order to provide assistance in stabilizing the continent and to protect US national security interests.




Figure 10. United States Command & Control Diagram for R&S Operations
 Source: Department of State, *Interagency Management System for Reconstruction and Stability Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2007)

Performance in the political arena by US military officers at the PRT level has been a source of friction. Military officers are not trained to perform political functions normally reserved for DoS or other USG-D/A personnel. Manpower shortages within the interagency, however, have required military officers to fill the void (U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight & Investigations 2008, 25). In the June 2008 DoD Report to Congress on the progress of security and stability in Afghanistan, for example, U.S. PRTs were staffed, on average, at 88 military members to two or three Other Government Agency (OGA) members

(primarily from DoS, USAID, and USDA) (Department of Defense 2008, 60). At the PRT, or tactical, level the inability of an untrained military member to fully understand the complexities of tribal, regional, and national level politics may serve to ultimately undermine accomplishing a specific objective.

Additionally, there exists significant apprehension over US motivations for creating AFRICOM (Ploch 2008, 23). Long-standing memories of colonial rule are etched in the hearts and minds of many Africans who see the creation of the AFRICOM potentially as a “neo-colonial effort to dominate the region militarily” (Ploch 2008, 23). Others view AFRICOM as a positive move that may bring increased attention, resources and assistance to the continent (Ploch 2008, 23). Recognizing these challenges, AFRICOM is actively implementing strategy to mitigate negative international perception of the US through soliciting “more effective political, diplomatic, and economic initiatives...” to address on-going conflicts and other issues associated with Africa (Ward 2008, 20). This includes actively soliciting input from African nations.

From a historical perspective, the British experience in the North West Frontier highlights the importance of native inclusion. The British actively sought to include capable Indians in various facets of government and encouraged their military to protect border inhabitants from other hostile tribesmen and to conduct military operations, when required (Roe, 2005B, 20). The most important and most applicable lesson learned from the British experience in the North West Frontier is their appreciation for Indian culture. Recognizing the importance of continuity and cultural understanding the Britons deployed to India for tours of duty that lasted several years (Roe, 2005A, 23). This

provided a significant level of institutional knowledge and facilitated continuity throughout the British organization.

Recent success enjoyed by both the Germans and British are relevant to shaping a “whole of government” approach for the US regarding AFRICOM. Regarding NGO’s, from an international perspective as applies to current PRT models, both the German and British enjoy positive overall relationships. Through proactive efforts on behalf of their governments to include NGOs in both pre-deployment training and routing planning meetings once operating in theater, NGO’s are more likely to operate within the British and German AO’s and collective confidence between the two are increased (Abbaszadeh et al. 2008, 30, 44). This confidence enables greater results through coordinated efforts between governmental and non-governmental agencies.

Inter-governmental agency cooperation at the national level has been key to British and German PRT success. Clear lines of responsibility are the trademarks of the German model. While each German ministry contributes to the PRT at the tactical level, the lines of responsibility for supporting the PRT from the ministerial component at the national level are specific and do not overlap. This construct, by its very nature, requires inter-ministry cooperation to yield success at the PRT level.

The British Stabilisation Unit, a jointly owned organization consisting of members from the FCO, MOD, and DFID, is the hallmark example of interagency coordination and collaboration (British Stabilisation Unit n.d.). Focused on support to countries emerging from violent conflict, the Stabilisation Unit unifies each element of the British government with a single focus. The Stabilisation Unit enables the British

government to concentrate on countries with a specific set of common problems, while the remainder of the British government is left to handle the remainder of national policy.

Military

Although PRTs in Afghanistan are, by definition and in practice, a joint civil-military organization, the majority of the PRTs are comprised of military personnel (see fig 11). Navy or Air Force officers command Afghanistan PRTs, with the team being comprised from various services (United States Government Accountability Office 2008, 9). PRT staffing is conducted through the joint sourcing process, in which service components provide personnel in response to request for forces from the Commander, CENTCOM (United States Government Accountability Office 2008, 9). The military component of the PRT comprises the primary source for PRT activity within the PRT's area of operation. DoD has a notional staff plan that accounts for 80% of the military component of the PRT serving in a support role, with 50% of that tasked with providing security and 30 percent providing service and operational support (Figure 11) (United States Government Accountability Office 2008, 7). The remaining 20 percent of the military component of the PRT is comprised of the commander, civil affairs officers, engineers and non-commissioned officers in leadership roles (United States Government Accountability Office 2008, 7).

	DOD	State^a	USAID^b	USDA	TOTAL
2008					
U.S.-led PRTs	1021	11	11	12	1055
Other PRTs	N/A	7	8	0	15
Total	1021	18	19	12	1070
2007					
U.S.-led PRTs	994	11	11	7	1023
Other PRTs	N/A	7	9	0	16
Total	994	18	20	7	1039

Figure 11. Number of U.S. Military and Civilian Personnel Assigned to PRTs in Afghanistan, 2007-2008

Source: U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan and Iraq* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2008), 9.

The military component of Afghanistan PRT's performs a variety of tasks ranging from development, reconstruction, governance activities, PRT security, and administrative tasks. Fruits of their labor are illustrated in school construction projects, health care clinic construction or refurbishment projects, road infrastructure improvement projects, assisting with communication between provincial and central government entities, and assisting with developing increased provincial government capacity (United States Government Accountability Office 2008, 8).




Figure 12. Structure of US-led PRTs in Afghanistan

Source: U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan and Iraq* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2008), 7.

In Iraq, the “official” military contribution to PRT’s and ePRT’s is significantly less than in Afghanistan. PRT’s in Iraq, as of August 2008, ranged in size from 10 to 45 personnel with ePRT’s consisting of 10 to 20 personnel (United States Government Accountability Office 2008, 12). PRT’s in Iraq, a joint civil-military organization, are lead by State Department Foreign Service Officers, but rely heavily on the military for security, food, housing, and other support (United States Government Accountability

Office 2008, 12). While the personnel size of the PRT / ePRT appears significantly smaller than those in Afghanistan, the numbers are elusive. For instance, military forces providing security and transportation services to the PRT are not reflected in the PRT's force composition (United States Government Accountability Office 2008, 13).

According the DoD, the military provides between 750 and 900 uniformed service members to provide movement security for PRTs (United States Government Accountability Office 2008, 14). Additionally, PRT's and ePRT's are resident on military forward operating bases (FOB) where the military provides housing, food, and other basic services (Perito, Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq 2007, 2). The DoD also provides civil affairs companies, consisting of approximately 40 personnel each, to support each PRT (United States Government Accountability Office 2008, 14)

The military provides the deputy team leader for regular PRT's in Iraq in addition to civil affairs soldiers and a security force (Perito, Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq 2007, 4). The focus of the deputy team leader is to facilitate the management of daily team operations, serve as the team leaders chief of staff, and to liaise with FOB commanders for logistics, transportation, and security requirements of the PRT (Perito, Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq 2007, 5). Besides security functions, the DoD contribution of civil affairs soldiers to the PRT enable not only doctrinal CA functions for the PRT, but also provides the PRT with important substitutes for civilian agency vacancies on team (Perito, Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq 2007, 6).

Regardless of theater and composition of the PRT, key to enabling the PRTs ability to conduct stability and reconstruction operations is the security apparatus provided by the military. Although several different US PRT models exist, common to

all are providing: security, basic services such as food and housing, and to varying degrees infrastructure improvement projects, humanitarian assistance, governmental capacity building, and civil affairs activities.

Economic

As previously discussed, the US has two relatively distinct PRT models, original PRT and ePRTs. Original PRTs in Afghanistan and Iraq differ in regard to PRT leadership. A member of the military usually commands PRTs in Afghanistan while PRTs in Iraq are lead by a Foreign Service Officer (FSO) from the DoS. ePRTs, found only in Iraq, are also lead by FSOs. Funding for US led PRTs in Iraq and Afghanistan differ as well, hence this thesis will evaluate each separately.

US led PRTs in Iraq and ePRTs work together with community and Iraqi government leaders in order to identify projects that may be implemented with US funding through forming Provincial Reconstruction Development Councils (PRDC) (Tarnoff 2008, 25). The intent of the PRDCs is to strengthen local governments and to provide more lasting support to US projects (Tarnoff 2008, 25). Programmatic, or direct, funding for these projects originates primarily from various sources. The Quick Response Fund (QRF),” established to accelerate economic, social, and civil society development”, is jointly administered by DoS and USAID (United States Government Accountability Office 2008, 15). Secondly, the PRDC program has its own line of funding designed to pay for small-scaled infrastructure projects in an effort to enable provincial governments to deliver essential services (United States Government Accountability Office 2008, 15). PRTs also have the ability to coordinate with other US funded programs that include USAID’s Local Governance Program (LGP), Community

Action Program (CAP), and the Community Stabilization Program (CSP) (United States Government Accountability Office 2008, 15). Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP) funding is also available through the DoD (United States Government Accountability Office 2008, 15). CERP funding has been described as “walking around money”, intended to support quick impact projects to “win hearts and minds” throughout Iraq (Tarnoff 2008, 29).

USAID programs, the LGP, CAP and CSP, are for programs that address local-level concerns (Tarnoff 2008, 25). The LGP was designed to fund projects that promote representative citizen participation in local government institutions (United States Government Accountability Office 2008, 15). An additional focus of LGP funding seeks to support projects that “build management and knowledge skills of provincial government personnel” (Tarnoff 2008, 26). CAP funds are intended for projects that are identified by local leaders and representatives to facilitate democratic governance, meet local needs, and provide short-term employment opportunities (Tarnoff 2008, 25). The CSP seeks to support programs address economic needs to provide youth programs, vocational training, and short-term projects that generate employment in the area of essential services and public works (Tarnoff 2008, 25-26) (United States Government Accountability Office 2008, 15). The ultimate intent of the CSP is focused on reducing incentives for young men to engage in insurgent activities and reduce sectarian violence (United States Government Accountability Office 2008, 15).

According to the DoS, \$600 million in Economic Support Funds were allocated to the PRDC program in FY07 (United States Government Accountability Office 2008, 15). Under the LGP, \$90 million was provided to PRTs in FY07, and \$54 million in FY08

(United States Government Accountability Office 2008, 15). The CAP was allotted \$70 million in FY07, and about \$105 million in FY08 (United States Government Accountability Office 2008, 15). The CSP received \$379 million in FY07, and \$100 million in FY08 (United States Government Accountability Office 2008, 15). Finally, the DoD obligated \$898 million in CERP funding for PRT related projects during FY07 (United States Government Accountability Office 2008, 16). The Iraqi government has recently initiated its own CERP fund with similar objectives as the US CERP fund. (Tarnoff 2008, 29). Managed by the US military, \$300 million was allotted to establish the fund (Tarnoff 2008, 29).

In Afghanistan, the DoD is responsible for funding nearly all of the costs associated with PRTs (United States Government Accountability Office 2008, 10). This includes security, life support, logistical sustainment, and housing costs (United States Government Accountability Office 2008, 10). Although the DoD does not track the cost of operating PRTs separately from other operational costs in Afghanistan, they estimate that the cost to establish a PRT at \$20 million (United States Government Accountability Office 2008, 10). There is only one source of programmatic funding for Afghanistan PRTs, but just as PRTs in Iraq, they have the ability to coordinate with other US funded programs for access to additional money (United States Government Accountability Office 2008, 11). CERP funds provide the sole source of programmatic funding and enables PRT commanders to approve projects up to \$25,000 (United States Government Accountability Office 2008, 11). During October 2006, PRTs began to implement the new Local Governance and Community Development Program (LGCD), funded and managed by the USAID (Abbaszadeh et al. 2008, 49).

In Afghanistan, CERP funds have been utilized to engage in projects related to the provision of essential services such as water and sanitation, and projects related to rule of law and governance (United States Government Accountability Office 2008, 11). They have also been used to repair property damaged through military operations (United States Government Accountability Office 2008, 11). LGCD funding supports projects designed to improve the capacity of local and provincial government institutions, encourage civil society activity, and to promote overall security and stability (Abbaszadeh et al. 2008, 49). In order to access and spend LGCD funds, USAID representatives within the PRT submit proposals that are consistent with the programs goals to the USAID mission in Kabul for approval (United States Government Accountability Office 2008, 11). CERP funding expenditures during FY07, according to the DoD, was \$109 million, with an additional \$110 million in FY07 and \$63 million in FY08 provided through the LGCD (United States Government Accountability Office 2008, 11). Additional funding not tied directly to PRTs, but coordinated to compliment PRTs and overall US objectives within Afghanistan, include the Alternative Development Program and other national development programs for road construction, democracy and health services (United States Government Accountability Office 2008, 11-12). Through the Alternative Development Program, USAID received \$228 million in FY07 and \$176 million in FY08 (United States Government Accountability Office 2008, 11). USAID obligated \$1.14 billion in FY07 and \$706 million in FY08 for other national development programs (United States Government Accountability Office 2008, 12).

PRT capabilities have developed over time, however, PRT planning and operations remain decentralized with a noted absence of clear objectives and guidance from relevant USG-D/A's who source them and from higher operational commands in the countries within which they operate (U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight & Investigations 2008, 18). With access to ample funding and this lack of overarching guidance, PRTs are often left alone to decide what projects they will accomplish based on their judgment and tightly focused viewpoint. As a result, the ability to effectively evaluate their performance does not exist (U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight & Investigations 2008, 18). The problem with multiple assistance programs that are implemented by different agencies with different funding sources is the lack of not only programmatic priorities, but more importantly the lack of a coherent overall US endstate. PRTs, part of the overall US plan, lack an integrated decision-making process and prioritization of effort that facilitates the accomplishment of US strategy within Iraq and Afghanistan. There is currently no "unity of funding" to support PRTs (U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight & Investigations 2008, 32). While ample sources of funding exist, access to them is confusing as each funding source has its own authorities and limitations (U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight & Investigations 2008, 32).

Coordinating the efforts of PRTs relevant to funding and executing projects with NGO's has been problematic. Additionally, projects are not always coordinated with other elements of US National power, which opens the door for critics who note that this

lack of coordination results in untimely projects and duplicative efforts between the PRT, NGOs, and other non-governmental organizations. For example, schools have been built through PRT efforts without coordination with the US Department of Education to ensure that teachers and teaching materials are available (Perito, *The U.S. Experience with Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan* by Robert Perito: Special Reports: U.S. Institute of Peace 2005, 9). The lack of funding oversight and coordination as a source of friction is exacerbated as PRTs have access to various pots of money that are managed by numerous agencies and intended for different, yet specific, purposes. Restrictions on what can be done with CERP funds differs what can be done with LGCD funds, etc. Lacking clear guidance and direction, PRTs are left to execute “tactical” level plans with no tie-in to supporting operational or strategic objectives.

Jointly owned by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), the Department for International Development (DFID), and the Ministry of Defense (MOD), Britain’s Stabilisation Unit provides a model for SSTR operations that has not only increased interagency unity of effort, but also possesses unity of funding. The Stabilisation Unit is responsible for managing the Stabilisation Aid Fund, currently set at £269 million, that comprises the primary source of funding for British PRTs (British Stabilisation Unit n.d.). Not only does the joint ownership of the Stabilisation Unit increase unity of effort at the PRT level, its common funding mechanism alleviates ambiguity and provides a common frame of reference with regard to fund availability, accessing funds, and what the priorities for the funds are.

US-led PRTs have certainly accomplished much since their inception in 2002. Their relevance for the future is contingent, ultimately, on unity of effort through unity of

command. The Brits, through the creation of the Stabilisation Unit, got it right by ensuring the three main ministries who fund and source their PRT's each own equal responsibility in providing guidance and ensuring their actions are nested within their strategic and operational objectives. Efforts on behalf of President Bush through NSPD-44 and the establishment of S/CRS, the DoD through DoD Directive 3000.05, DoS's development of the IMS, and the US Army Manual FM 3-0 are examples of positive signs of the recognition within senior US governmental and military leaders that greater interagency cooperation is required for the US to secure strategic endstates. As US involvement in Iraq begins to taper off and involvement in Afghanistan increases, the newly created GCC, AFRICOM, will face a variety of challenges where US strategic interests are at stake. We will do well to apply lessons learned from throughout history, and specifically those from Iraq and Afghanistan that are relevant to security, stability, transition and reconstruction operations. For just as vast as the continent of Africa is, so too are the opportunities for the US and its international partners to initiate SSTR operations in coordination with African nations to provide for basic and essential services, governance, the rule of law, and humanitarian aid and relief. Failure on our part to adequately address the issues within Africa will result in opportunity for other nations such as China to increase their influence and for terrorist organizations to establish safe-havens from which to plan and launch acts of terror throughout the globe.

CHAPTER 5

RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

PRTs must have clear objectives against which to measure success or from which to identify alternate ways and means for achieving success. They must have a clear, unified chain of command to achieve unity of effort. They must have the right resources both in terms of funding and in terms of qualified personnel. Funding streams must make sense so they can be coordinated or deconflicted. (U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight & Investigations 2008, 31)

PRT's, though faced with a plethora of issues and problems, have evolved to a point where they are making positive impacts on the governments, militaries, and populations of Iraq and Afghanistan. Their utility as one of several means to accomplish US / coalition objectives in Iraq and Afghanistan has been proven to the extent that, as a concept, AFRICOM should recognize their applicability as a means to enable the accomplishment of US objectives within Africa. Given the PRT concept as a means, ensuring unity of effort at the team level poses a significant challenge that must be resolved. This thesis has demonstrated through a review of history and literature that without unity of command and a mechanism to enable unity of effort, achieving strategic and regional objectives has been rare.

The most immediate challenge for AFRICOM is developing a mechanism, or a means, that will ensure the accomplishment of US strategic and regional objectives. This mechanism must be enabled through a command and control structure that provides unity of command for all elements of national power in order to alleviate bifurcated direction and guidance that currently plagues PRTs in Iraq and Afghanistan. AFRICOM must make bold recommendations to solicit unity of command that will establish trust within

supporting USG-D/A's as well as with African nations. AFRICOM itself cannot mandate unity of command. It must, however, be cognizant of previous successes such as CORDS in Vietnam and historical challenges as recent as the current PRT concept in Iraq and Afghanistan. Cognizant of these issues, AFRICOM should leverage appropriate lessons learned from each as it articulates an argument to national level leadership to mandate unity of command in an effort to embolden the command as the USG's premier organization with overall responsibility for US efforts in Africa. Simply relying on coordination between significant numbers of ambassadors, each likely to have their own vision for their particular piece of the African continent, and the various USG-D/A's, each with its own organizational priorities and mandates, will not suffice. This is not to say that AFRICOM should have autonomy in executing US strategy relevant to Africa. Regarding Ambassadors, they must remain as a distinct resource to the President and should not subordinate their function to that of the combatant commander. Reality is that the USG requires independent and separate lines of authority to the President to ensure a system of checks and balances. These lines of authority can be constructively reduced, yet still provide independent evaluation of a situation. Differences between the leaders, ambassadors and the COCOM, can be minimized through effective coordination.

Recommendations

Based on the review of literature in Chapter 2, historical successes and failures with regard to reconstruction and stability operations were identified from a US and international perspective. These successes and failures were significantly determined by the command and control relationships between the various contributing agencies providing personnel and resources to each particular situation. Subsequent analysis of

that information in Chapter 4 facilitates the following recommendations for consideration regarding AFRICOM as it continues to evolve and attempts to become a relevant and legitimate player within the African continent:




Figure 13. AFRICOM Headquarters Organization

Source: Haynesly Blake, LtCol, USMC, AFRICOM OPLOG Current Operations Department

Figure 13 is the current organizational structure of AFRICOM’s headquarters. What makes AFRICOM unique among its GCC peer commands is its inherent interagency flavored staff. By the very nature of its staff composition, significantly weighted with representatives from the interagency and its co-equal civilian and military

deputies, AFRICOM possesses an innate ability to plan and execute its national level tasks and regional strategy in a holistic manner inclusive of all elements of national power. Unfortunately for AFRICOM, they are not empowered with unity of command of all elements of US national power. Relying on coordination with other USG-D/A's to accomplish national objectives; AFRICOM will struggle to adequately and efficiently accomplish its strategic and regional objectives. History has demonstrated that even under the best of circumstances the clash in personalities and organizational priorities create significant obstacles to effectively implement strategic and regional initiatives.

Recommendation 1: Articulate the necessity of unity of command over all elements of US national power and create the office for the Director of Reconstruction and Stability.

Figure 14 illustrates the recommended addition of the office for the "Director for Reconstruction and Stability" to AFRICOM's organizational structure. This addition will provide AFRICOM the ability to serve as the preeminent representative organization for the US. It will enable AFRICOM, through unity of command, to holistically apply all elements of national power to achieve US national objectives within the continent. It also allows for appropriate checks and balances through the ambassadorial structure currently in place. Additionally, it capitalizes on the IMS through which all USG-D/A's can leverage their capabilities simultaneously through an integrated command and control structure.




Figure 14. Recommended Addition to the AFRICOM Command and Control Structure of the “Office for the Director for Reconstruction & Stability”

Recommendation 2: Recognizing the applicability of the PRT concept as a key means through which to accomplish US strategic and regional objectives, Figure 15 is the recommended organizational structure for the PRT-E. Considering applicable successes and failures of the current PRT structure, the PRT-E is organized and staffed to ensure unity of effort at the tactical (or team) level. Enabled through unity of command at the COCOM level, the PRT-E is designed to operate throughout permissive to non-permissive environments. Based on a preliminary assessment of a specific operating environment, conducted in collaboration with the host nation, the PRT-E leadership will

have the ability to determine manpower requirements based on validated short, mid, and long term goals / projects that are coordinated by the COCOM, embassy country team, and the host nation government.




Figure 15. Recommended Organization Structure for the PRT-Enhanced

Recommendation 3: Aligning with AFRICOM’s Theater Strategy that notes its desire to seek “willing and capable states to address African security challenges” and to reinforce success in liberalization and improved governance in “designated” African states, the following countries (Figure 16) are recommended as initial countries that

AFRICOM should consider to invest time and resources in based on both US and African national security interests (Ward 2008, 15).

Nation	Nation Interest	US Interest	African Interest	Focus Area for US Involvement
Kenya	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Maritime security • Trade • Combating terrorism • Fostering democracy • Domestic Stability 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Maritime security • Trade • Natural resources • Combating terrorism • Fostering democracy • Domestic Stability 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Anti-piracy • Trade • Combating terrorism • Border security • Democratic nation • HIV / AIDS reduction • Economic integration • Regional Stability 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Anti-piracy • Mil-to-mil TSC • Infrastructure improvement • Foreign Direct Investment • Humanitarian Aid • Governance / Rule of Law • HIV / AIDS reduction
Gulf of Guinea Nations - Ghana - Cote d'Ivoire - Togo	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Energy expansion • Trade • Maritime security 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Energy / natural resources • Trade • Maritime security 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Energy resource infrastructure development • Security of energy resource infrastructure • Development / protection of natural resource capacity • Wildlife management • HIV / AIDS reduction • National border security 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Maritime TSC • Mil-to-mil TSC • Infrastructure improvement • Governance / Rule of law • Foreign Direct Investment • Humanitarian Aid • Wildlife / eco development & protection • Drug eradication
Botswana	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Partnership w/US • Natural resource trade • Promote Botswana's successful democracy w/in Africa 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Partnership w/in southern portion of continent • Natural resource access (diamonds) • Promote Botswana's successful democracy w/in Africa 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Development assistance with its successful / growing economy (pillar w/in Africa) • HIV / AIDS reduction • Agricultural capacity • Tourism 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mil-to-mil TSC • HIV / AIDS reduction • Infrastructure development • Foreign Direct Investment
Nigeria	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Maritime security • Trade • Energy expansion • Facilitate continuing civilian rule → develop democracy 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Maritime security • Trade • Energy / natural resources • Facilitate continuing civilian rule → develop democracy 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Security of energy / natural resources in Niger Delta region / waterways • Trade • Border security • Spread of democracy 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Maritime TSC • Mil-to-mil TSC • Infrastructure improvement • Governance / Rule of law • Foreign Direct Investment • Humanitarian Aid • Wildlife / eco development & protection • Agricultural development

Figure 16. Recommended African Nations for Initial AFRICOM Partnership
Source: Central Intelligence Agency *The World Factbook*, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook> (accessed April 2, 2009).

Recommendation 4: Figure 17 is a general set of lines of operation (LOO) recommended to provide a starting point for AFRICOM to establish LOO's for each of the African nations it chooses to partner with a PRT-E. The ultimate focus of these LOO's is improving the confidence of the people, for without their confidence achieving enduring stability and legitimate governance is impossible.

Logical Lines of Operations




Figure 17. General Logical Lines of Operation for AFRICOM

Enabling Recommendations

In order for AFRICOM to be successful in their application of the aforementioned recommendations, a number of enabling recommendations must be addressed. First, S/CRS must be fully funded and staffed in order to ensure appropriate lines of financing and personnel with required subject matter expertise are available for the AFRICOM commander and his staff to employ.

Secondly, it is recommended that PRT-E's be civilian led and supported by the military, if required at all, based on an assessment of the operational environment. There

are specific tasks that the military is well suited to perform, however to overcome any perception that AFRICOM is an attempt to “militarize” Africa, civilians should lead the PRT-E with military objectives nested within overall PRT-E objectives.

Thirdly, interagency training must be institutionalized and mandatory for PRT-E members prior to deploying to the AFRICOM AOR. This training must focus on educating the PRT-E regarding capabilities and limitations of each contributing USG-D/A, expectations of NGO’s and how their capabilities may be incorporated and leveraged to facilitate overall PRT-E objectives, and provide enough time for adequate training to support rotations in staff members. Additionally, PRT-E pre-deployment training must address the culture and language of its specific operating environment. The most important focus of PRT-E training should be eliminating interagency parochialisms and to foster interpersonal relationships that emphasize the whole of government approach to resolving issues within Africa and to highlight that no one USG-D/A can do it alone.

Finally, development of measures of performance (MOP) and measures of effectiveness (MOE) to ensure the PRT-E’s long-term goals and objectives are being accomplished must be identified and promulgated. Reporting mechanisms must be developed and executed in an integrated manner with established timelines for reporting in order to adequately assess the teams’ accomplishment of its objectives.

Conclusion

The US has considerable national security interests in Africa. As a result, the US Government cannot allow the same mistakes with regard to SSTR operations as they have in Iraq and Afghanistan. AFRICOM has the potential to synergize a cohesive whole

of government approach within Africa, but faces significant challenges the US must adequately address to ensure the commands success. Assisting willing African nations in the establishment of security must be priority one for AFRICOM. This will ensure legitimacy of subsequent efforts and will begin to improve the confidence of the people of Africa and their governments. Addressing development challenges within Africa must be linked with security sector reform in order to ensure enduring success. Additionally, AFRICOM will have to bridge the divide that exists between NGO's and PVO's in an effort to incorporate their capabilities and funding and to coordinate their activities to better respond to African challenges and eliminate unnecessary duplication in effort.

AFRICOM will also have to deal with international competition for legitimacy and cooperation within Africa. For example, the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) is emerging as a significant peer competitor of the US with regard to investment, development, and trade within Africa. Currently, there are over 700 Chinese state companies conducting business within Africa, making them the third largest source of foreign trade with Africa behind the US and France, but ahead of the UK (McFate 2008, 14). The US must effectively mitigate and counter the PRC as they continue to expand their influence within Africa. This is another reason for AFRICOM to have unity of command and to serve as the focal point of US involvement within the continent.

Working to overcome African perceptions that AFRICOM is an attempt at US militarization in Africa is yet another obstacle that must be cleared in order to accomplish strategic and regional objectives. The US must be sensitive to the colonial legacy within Africa and how that creates suspicions about AFRICOM and US intentions. Colonial governments established within Africa did very little to establish African governance and

to develop civil societies (Putman 2008, 6). Education was neglected; manufacturing and agricultural capacity was under-developed as colonists selfishly exploited the continent without consideration for its future (Putman 2008, 16).

PRT-Es must have a clear, unified chain of command in order to achieve unity of effort. They must have access to the appropriate subject matter experts and have ready access to funding, preferably controlled and managed by their higher headquarters, vice control by various parent departments and agencies. The AFRICOM COCOM must be empowered to conduct joint / interagency planning with the ability to direct and oversee the joint / interagency plan inclusive of all contributing agencies. This will strengthen the planning efforts at the COCOM level, with the COCOM in charge, to ensure unity of effort through unity of command. Success at the COCOM level may provide an adequate example and impetus for a Goldwater-Nichols like measure of reform for the entire interagency system.

Recommendations for Further Study

In order to mitigate the “militarization” perception of AFRICOM, should AFRICOM be commanded, or led, by a civilian?

What efforts should the USG take in order to ensure the legitimacy of AFRICOM, especially in the face of PRC acceptance / involvement within the Continent?

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