ENHANCING THE SECURITY COOPERATION MARINE AIR GROUND
TASK FORCE TO SATISFY THE NEEDS OF THE UNCERTAIN
GLOBAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
Joint Planner

by

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B.A., Villanova University, Villanova, Pennsylvania, 1994

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
2009

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# Report Documentation Page

**1. REPORT DATE** (DD-MM-YYYY)  
12-06-2009  

**2. REPORT TYPE**  
Master’s Thesis  

**3. DATES COVERED** (From - To)  
AUG 2009 – JUN 2009  

**4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE**  
ENHANCING THE SECURITY COOPERATION MARINE AIR GROUND TASK FORCE TO SATISFY THE NEEDS OF THE UNCERTAIN GLOBAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT  

**5a. CONTRACT NUMBER**  
  
**5b. GRANT NUMBER**  
  
**5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER**  
  
**5d. PROJECT NUMBER**  
  
**5e. TASK NUMBER**  
  
**5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER**  
  
**6. AUTHOR(S)**  
Vincent John Ciuccoli, Major (USMC)  

**7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)**  
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College  
ATTN: ATZL-SWD-GD  
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301  

**8. PERFORMING ORG REPORT NUMBER**  
  
**9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)**  
  
**10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S)**  
  
**11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S)**  
  
**12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT**  
Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited  

**13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES**  
  
**14. ABSTRACT**  
The United States Marine Corps (USMC) has developed the Security Cooperation Marine Air Ground Task Force (SC MAGTF) concept of force employment that will enable partner nations to foster stability in their respective regions. The USMC is prepared to be the solitary architect of this force; however the proposed employment of the SC MAGTF is a bold unilateral endeavor.  

A regionally focused security cooperation force is the ideal employment construct for the Department of Defense (DOD) but it must sufficiently integrate United States government agency capabilities and incorporate joint force multipliers.  

This thesis analyzes the potential requirement for a specialized DOD security cooperation force and determines whether a joint and interagency venture will further enhance and legitimize the US Marine Corps’ current employment concept. The aim of this research is to develop a significant contribution to the format of the SC MAGTF in order to ensure its success and permanent establishment within the regional civil-military arsenal.  

**15. SUBJECT TERMS**  
SC MAGTF, security cooperation, joint and interagency  

**16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:**  
  
**17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT**  
  
**18. NUMBER OF PAGES**  
151  

**19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON**  
  
**19b. PHONE NUMBER** (include area code)  
(U) (U) (U) (U) 151  

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Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)  
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39.18
Name of Candidate: Major Vincent J Ciuccoli, USMC

Thesis Title: Enhancing the Security Cooperation Marine Air Ground Task Force to Satisfy the Needs of the Uncertain Global Security Environment

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Accepted this 12th day of June 2009 by:

__________________________________________, Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

ENHANCING THE SECURITY COOPERATION MARINE AIR GROUND TASK FORCE TO SATISFY THE NEEDS OF THE UNCERTAIN GLOBAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT, by Major Vincent Ciuccoli, USMC, 151 pages.

The United States Marine Corps (USMC) has developed the Security Cooperation Marine Air Ground Task Force (SC MAGTF) concept of force employment that will enable partner nations to foster stability in their respective regions. The USMC is prepared to be the solitary architect of this force; however the proposed employment of the SC MAGTF is a bold unilateral endeavor.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

First, I would like to thank my “one and only” Savanna for the unselfish devotion and unbridled love she demonstrated during our stay in Kansas City. To all my United States Marine Corps brothers and sister service friends here at CGSC, especially the instructors and “Conscious Elite” from SG-17A, I thank you for keeping the faith with me when times were tough. Of course I thank my Mother and Father, as well as my sisters, for all the years of everlasting support and spirited encouragement throughout my military career. Finally, I can attest that without the mentorship, guidance, and dedicated presence of Dr Anderson, I would have faltered sometime around the first day of spring fever. Along with your fellow committee members, Ms Lombard and Mr Hodge, you epitomize the model of committed professionalism for all retired military officers and CGSC instructors to emulate.

Lastly, I would like to dedicate this thesis to the military members who have gone before and especially those who have served in the Marine Air Ground Task Force. Semper Fidelis.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE THESIS APPROVAL PAGE</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLE OF CONTENTS</td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACRONYMS</td>
<td>viii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILLUSTRATIONS</td>
<td>xiv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Background</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary Research Question</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary Research Questions</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significance</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assumptions</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limitations</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delimitations</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 2 REVIEW OF LITERATURE</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint and Expeditionary Culture</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operating Environment Implications</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Cooperation Initiatives</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Future Employment Concepts</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusions</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 3 METHODOLOGY</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 4 ANALYSIS</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Pure SC MAGTF</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctrine</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Level Guidance</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Marine Corps Directives</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Navy Directives</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Army Directives</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Air Force Directives</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>aviation combat element</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
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</tr>
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</tr>
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</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>BTT</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
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</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJCSI</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Center for Language, Regional Expertise and Culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Commandant of the Marine Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMO</td>
<td>civil-military operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Functional Area Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>field advance civilian team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
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</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
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</tr>
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</tr>
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</tr>
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</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
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</tr>
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</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
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</tr>
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</tr>
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</tr>
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</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
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</tr>
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<td>military transition team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
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</tr>
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</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>-------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# ILLUSTRATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Figure 1</td>
<td>Marine Air Ground Task Force Employment Methods</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 2</td>
<td>Operation of the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 3</td>
<td>SC MAGTF Makeup</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 4</td>
<td>Disposition of SC MAGTF Forces in GCC AOs</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 5</td>
<td>USMC Capabilities Available for the Security Cooperation Mission</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 6</td>
<td>USG Organization for Security Assistance</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 7</td>
<td>The NOC at a Glance</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 8</td>
<td>Makeup of Naval Expeditionary Combat Command</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 9</td>
<td>CRSG Makeup</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 10</td>
<td>Operational Design</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 11</td>
<td>Relationship Between Strategic Framework and COG Analysis</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 12</td>
<td>The SC MAGTF as the Operational COG</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 13</td>
<td>Operational Design’s Cognitive Map</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

On the state of nature: I make the assumption that there is a point in the development of mankind at which the obstacles to men’s self-preservation in the state of nature are too great to be overcome by the strength that any one individual can exert. The original state can then subsist no longer, and the human race would perish if it did not change its mode of existence.


Background

The rapid growth of globalization, the rise in disenfranchised states, and the turbulent operational environment necessitate change in the Department of Defense (DOD) and interagency transformation process. Long-term United States (US) security cooperation (SC) activities with potential partner nations will produce an increased willingness to support future coalition efforts. Favorable by-products of pre-emptive military collaboration may be political reform, economic development, and regional stability. However, it is necessary to examine the consequences of increased US military requirements dictated by an amended contract with interconnected societies in the international community.

The uncertain global security environment ultimately calls for all the service components and United States Government (USG) agencies to consider new “ways” and “means” to adapt to the emerging global threat. The sea service chiefs, in an attempt to concentrate the efforts of their forces, translate the essential tasks outlined in the 2008 National Defense Strategy (NDS) into a “unified maritime strategy” that satisfies the global and domestic concerns of the American people (US Department of the Navy 2007, 3). The United States Army (USA) and United States Air Force (USAF) 2008 Posture
Statements confirm this need for adaptable expeditionary forces tailored both to match shifts in the spectrum of conflict and to be capable of integrating all the elements of national power.

In order to gain a better situational understanding of the problem, *Joint Vision 2020* carves out a niche for dedicated security cooperation efforts. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) publishes this guidance to coordinate future themes in DOD strategy documents that will ensure success across the full spectrum of operations. The vision, which applies a strategic context to the complexities of the security environment, directs the use of joint tailored forces to accomplish specialized objectives. Its insight encourages an immediate transition from interoperability to true “jointness,” as a precursor to consistent interservice relationships, collaborative planning, and compatible processes. Ultimately, this recognition of unique requirements in the SC domain will lead to unity of effort and a synergetic approach to force development.

The *2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)* set the conditions for relevant and substantial warfighting capabilities that could help diversify the military options available to the combatant commander (CCDR). Two “fundamental imperatives” stimulate provisions for achieving unity of effort while enabling partner nations to defeat common enemies in a larger strategic context. Perhaps the most important priority in the QDR focus, “shaping the choices of countries at strategic crossroads,” introduces the need for particular entities to address joint SC activities (*QDR 2006*, 3). This will require mechanisms for interagency integration and improved language and cultural awareness in the units conducting engagement activities. Thorough capability portfolios further identify gaps and redundancies within each service’s homogeneous force packages (*QDR* 2006, 3).
The more comprehensive approach draws on sister service contributions to relieve the lineal stress on any one DOD department or USG agency. Ultimately, the QDR dictates a military structure, assembled with provisions for interagency participation, to accommodate the needs of the joint commander.

The Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) is developing an “operational concept” to meet US strategic aims in the QDR that satisfy security concerns within the international community, to be implemented following force reductions in Iraq and Afghanistan. Headquarters Marine Corps’ *Send in the Marines* publication introduces the Security Cooperation Marine Air Ground Task Force (SC MAGTF) concept of force employment that will enable partner nations to foster stability in their respective regions. The SC MAGTF is similar to a traditional marine expeditionary unit (MEU) task organized with ground, logistics, and aviation combat elements but specifically tailored for SC and civil military operations (Conway 2008a, 16). Figure 1 depicts the force employment options, across the continuum of operations, available within the MAGTF construct.
This unique force will provide the DOD with another expeditionary option to further augment the joint and interagency capabilities available within the geographic combatant commands (GCC). Although the USMC is poised to renew its traditional relationship with the United States Navy (USN) by generating sea based, forward deployed, SC forces to fill this niche, the conceptual format of the SC MAGTF does not currently incorporate joint and interagency capabilities as force multipliers.

With further consideration for all the elements of national power, the United States Marine Corps (USMC) can integrate all of the SC capabilities within the DOD and select agencies within the USG. If completely disregarded, the parallel and redundant employment concepts that evolve from the sister service’s drive to become “expeditionary” will counteract today’s joint focus. With an elevated concern for unity
of effort, inherent to a joint and interagency investment, the SC MAGTF will fulfill national security objectives and gain legitimacy in the international community.

The succeeding challenge is to apply military forces according to Title 10 responsibilities to effectively distribute capabilities that contribute to global needs. Setting these economy of force guidelines ensures each service’s strengths and weaknesses are properly considered. Misappropriation of unique force multipliers or misapplication of specialized military units only dilutes the original effectiveness inherent to particular service cultures. Recent obligations in the US Central Command (CENTCOM) AO have complicated demands on the total force structure resident in the DOD. The USMC continues to struggle with multiple commitments while trying to maintain its expeditionary charter and amphibious identity. In the uncertain security environment the structure of the US Marines’ most precious commodity, the MEU is periodically disrupted, complicating an already strained deployment cycle. The current operational tempo and land centric regional focus in the CENTCOM theater has also interfered with the sanctity of the MEU in such a way that training packages seldom address expeditionary maneuver warfare. Renewed ties to doctrine, such as Marine Corps Warfighting Publication *Componency*, which describes the role of the USMC component commander (MARFOR) in a joint task force (JTF) and the relationship of the CCDR with the MARFOR, are sure to reinforce future MAGTF roles (Marine Corps Combat Development Command 1998, 3).

Pre-deployment training packages focus the MEU around concentrated mission sets to prepare its units to responsively serve the CCDR and provide a forward presence throughout the globe. Although MAGTFs can deliver rotational forces for sustained
major combat operations (MCO), recent MEU assignments to the CENTCOM theater reserve role are a detriment to the USMC culture. This trend simply permits the piecemeal application of specialized MAGTF capabilities to satisfy short-term operational needs without concern for the combined arms USMC culture. Appropriate operational designs for implementing the MAGTF concept such as, the deployment of the 24th MEU to the Helmand Province of Afghanistan, can be the model for the future applications of similar units. Historical and doctrinal support for the necessity of forward deployed expeditionary units will continue to guide the principles surrounding the role of the USMC in the DOD. There is also an obvious benefit in the USMC’s resident knowledge and familiarity with the MAGTF concept that will overwhelmingly support the development of a new task organized expeditionary unit.

Traditional MEUs will continue to train for full spectrum operations and retain their charter to be the nation’s force in readiness throughout the globe. The CMC is also prepared to commit forces that will promote a partner nation’s ability to provide its own security, referred to as building partner capacity (BPC). Reinforcing the SC MAGTF with joint and USG agency support will legitimize its intentions within the international community and make it a viable force for the CCDR. Additionally, the command and control (C2) structure of a standing joint force headquarters (SJFHQ) and the resources of cross-functional planning teams will further exploit the SC MAGTF’s regionally specialized focus.

Although specific theater objectives are yet to be identified, the USMC intends to support three regions with standing SC MAGTFs--Africa, Southwest Asia, and South America. Marine Forces Pacific will continue its security cooperation efforts with
organic forces and units deployed to the US Pacific Command area of operations (Conway 2008a, 17). Upon further analytical study in the joint arena, particularly within the US Southern Command area of operations (AO), Central America and the Caribbean may provide a more suitable environment for SC forces if sea based operations become the standard employment method.

The creation of the new US Africa Command (AFRICOM), formed to conduct “sustained security engagement through military-to-military programs, military-sponsored activities, and other military operations,” is tailor made for the USMC (US AFRICOM webpage 2009). The SC MAGTF is the ideal employment construct for AFRICOM, but it is not sufficiently suited to exploit interagency capabilities or incorporate joint force multipliers. The AFRICOM AO provides an ideal venue for a joint and interagency task force that yields all the elements of national power. Ultimately, a CCDR’s theater security cooperation (TSC) plan will benefit from and justify the existence of an enhanced task force.

The Marine Corps Warfighting Lab (MCWL) recently expanded the realm of expeditionary maneuver warfare by experimentation with the “distributed operations” concept, which concentrated on increasing the capacity of marines at the platoon and squad levels. A rejuvenated concentration on the individual marine has further evolved into the enhanced company operations (ECO) concept in this uncertain global security environment. In the future, a company grade officer commanding independently from a battalion headquarters, augmented with improved intelligence, logistics, and C2 cells, will provide this smallest tactical formation with the capability to conduct sustained operations. An increased focus on mission command and tactical flexibility will
permeate the organization of small task forces. Although considerations for organization and sufficient training will ensure the units’ success across all phases of joint operations, the employment of these versatile components in the security cooperation framework is a necessary proof of concept (HQMC 2008a, 2). This trend may compliment the SC MAGTF concept; but left unfortified, its autonomous nature may also introduce emerging interoperability issues at the operational and strategic levels.

Therein is the basis for this study. Dedicated expeditionary forces that have a sustainable mission supporting security cooperation objectives should activate the entire national security apparatus. The research will focus on sea service methods that leverage enduring concepts such as Sea Basing, which provide responsive maneuver and sustainment packages to the joint force commander in order to overcome geographic, political, and military impediments. A primary examination of burden-sharing implications across the entire doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) analysis model is of great value. The desired end state is an institutionally accepted and relevant SC task force that fulfills the US military’s social contract with USG civilian leaders.

**Primary Research Question**

Could the need for a task organized regionally focused force, poised to conduct security cooperation missions, and developed under the auspices of the USMC expeditionary culture, transcend the CCDR’s vision and transform joint and interagency employment concepts?
Secondary Research Questions

Can the army’s brigade combat team (BCT), the air force’s air and space expeditionary force (AEF), the navy’s expeditionary combat command (NECC), and interagency entities integrate capabilities into the SC MAGTF force structure to alleviate possible USMC shortfalls?

Can considerations for informational, economic, and diplomatic power be included in the SC MAGTF’s mission essential task list (METL) without impacting the unit’s ability to effectively operate along military lines of operation?

Can joint force multipliers empower the SC MAGTF to complement USG civilian agencies in support of TSC efforts by contributing additional organizational leadership, regional expertise, and/or training assets?

Significance

The enduring and complex nature of stability and security operations no longer lend themselves to the more traditional makeup of a MEU. Within all six phases of a joint campaign, a requirement for balance across the full spectrum of military operations will significantly challenge the entire DOD’s security cooperation network. Furthermore, a look into the future of the US military’s global affairs reflects a more integrated service structure that includes significant representation from USG agencies.

Currently, the USMC is committed to a posture that will dedicate units to the SC MAGTF concept within its projected force expansion to two hundred and two thousand personnel, while still maintaining the current organizational makeup. Although designed to go into effect once current operational requirements diminish, the CMC’s vision will pose a substantial training requirement on select units and place significant deployment
strains on high demand/low density (HD/LD) specialties. This focus coincides with the US Army and Air Force’s expeditionary shift and remains directly aligned with the USN’s Global Fleet Station (GFS) conceptual augmentation to the Maritime Pre-positioning Force Forward (MPF (F)). A plan to integrate all service components future concepts, in the true spirit of joint operations would better serve the CCDRs in TSC efforts by developing a unified regional focus prior to deployment in a regional AO.

A study on the interoperability of new service component “means” produced during the current transformation of our forces would be of great value to the USMC. There must be a validation process to guide the entire DOD in order to alleviate operational strains deriving from the execution of joint doctrine by incompatible forces under an unfamiliar command structure. Perhaps the establishment of AFRICOM and the creation of an enhanced security cooperation task force will foster a symbiotic relationship that satisfies the USMC’s vision and regional CCDR’s TSC objectives.

If properly configured, the future of expeditionary task organized units could compliment the sea services’ twenty-first century vision and simultaneously address national security objectives. If completely disregarded, the parallel and redundant employment concepts that evolve from the sister service’s drive to become “expeditionary” in nature will counteract today’s joint focus. With an elevated concern for unity of effort, inherent to a joint and interagency investment, an enhanced SC MAGTF will solidify the USMC as the preferred expeditionary force in readiness and legitimize our nation’s efforts to promote a stable global security environment.
Assumptions

This study assumes that the US military will continue to embrace the expeditionary culture and remain dedicated to committing resources to a robust security cooperation force. Traditional logic will permit the USMC to fulfill the executive agent (EA) role for this new requirement in the DOD’s future global war on terrorism (GWOT) strategy. Assumptions offsetting established sister service and USG agency unilateral efforts will not interfere with resource and manpower commitments to an enhanced SC MAGTF. Another assumption is that partner nations will provide increased support for a leading US role in stabilizing the international community under the auspices of a SC focus. DOD and USG agency commitments to this endeavor will also assume the continued endorsement of a new administration’s foreign policy and aligned congressional budgets. A final supposition is an accepted tendency for an SC MAGTF to gain agility and flexibility with respect to organization, purpose, and strategic value once “enhanced” with joint and interagency capabilities.

Limitations

1. Analysis conducted on the SC MAGTF is limited by the availability and accuracy of information provided by Headquarters Marine Corps.

2. The individual agendas of the USG agencies and service chiefs are considered only within the constraints of documented vision statements, posture statements, and METLs.

3. The intent, or lack thereof, for sister service and interagency leadership to contribute in a manner beneficial to the SC MAGTF concept will not be considered.
4. Access to overall concepts surrounding the employment of a conceptual SC MAGTF in the entire unified command structure will also place limitations on the research; therefore, this study will focus on the AFRICOM theater of operations.

5. The scope of security cooperation activities within the context of Phase 0 “Shaping Operations” is the focus of this study. The richer blend of offensive operations in Phase 1 through Phase 5 operations prevents an accurate assessment of the SC MAGTF capabilities.

Delimitations

1. The thesis is limited to the joint and interagency construct of the SC MAGTF, its proper employment in a CCDR’s theater, and the possible command and control options. It will not attempt to predict future strategic implications.

2. This research will dictate a course that does not contradict the USMC’s Title 10 responsibility to provide expeditionary fleet marine forces and will not undermine the contemporary vision of the CMC.

3. Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC) has already validated the SC MAGTF concept in its current form so the organization, purpose, and ability of the USMC to field such a unit are not challenged.
CHAPTER 2
REVIEW OF LITERATURE

The SC MAGTF concept has emerged from prior research efforts conducted by visionary leaders in the USMC. In order to make a significant contribution to the body of knowledge, this literature review will attempt to follow a similar pattern of logic surrounding the primary research question. An exploration of links to the operating environment outlines a coherent course that codifies the need for a security cooperation task force and defines its most suitable form of employment. The study examines historical references, doctrinal publications, educational articles, argumentative monographs, posture statements, strategic documents, and future capabilities briefs to chronicle the existing literature. Four intellectual subheadings divide this analytical review—Joint and Expeditionary Culture, Operating Environment Implications, Security Cooperation Initiatives, and Future Employment Concepts. Three subcategories further divide each section—Areas of Consensus, Areas of Disagreement, and Suggested Gaps in The Bodies of Knowledge.

Joint and Expeditionary Culture

Extensive perspectives on joint and expeditionary employment methods increase the likelihood of criticism, as well as contribute to a united security cooperation task force. The importance of joint and integrated concepts is best considered in a similar historical context when the changing operational environment had significant strategic implications. Dr. Atwater examines the complexity and interservice coordination that characterized expeditionary operations in the inter-war period in *United States Army and
Navy Development of Joint Landing Operations (1898-1942). The solutions to problems following miscues in the Spanish American War identify potential policy, doctrinal, and implementation shortfalls that could undermine C2 and logistical efforts in any joint operation.

Joint planning in the early 1900s and amphibious landing operations during WWII in North Africa, followed by the final proof in concept of the MAGTF in the Korean War, will provide a setting for interservice sea based power projection. An historical look at the Amphibious Training Center, and what it achieved in advancing the science of amphibious operations, provides a solid joint perspective. Joint Forces Quarterly article, What Exactly is Jointness, and several thesis papers propose increased service interdependence and a path that directs DOD forces to consolidate efforts. This position gives credence to future enterprises that enhance the current joint and expeditionary culture.

Ike Skelton’s Whispers of Warriors compilation of essays on the new joint era recognizes that just as in 1923, there are still questions surrounding the disposition and intent of an irregular enemy. This uncertainty dictates policies that shape the security environment in ways favorable to the US and requires various diplomatic, military, and economic means to conduct security assistance. He also offers examples of army and marine cooperative efforts in the Philippines and Haiti but tempers this partial success with a call for cultural and language skills in future forces. Literature such as the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Playbook and the PRT White Paper further reinforce the consensus for forces that eliminate duplication of effort and exploit budget constraints. Data that is more recent is available in Operation Al Fajr: A Study in Army
and Marine Corps Joint Operations that solidifies the need for enduring army-marine cooperation.

Selections from the joint library, including Joint Publication (JP) 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, JP 3-0, Joint Operations, JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters, and JP 3-08, Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations, provide the framework that directs security cooperation functions in the joint environment. This body of knowledge provides the supporting effort for the study to ensure the final concept conforms to current doctrine.

Operating Environment Implications

The next step in a study reviewing a new force structure is the determination of whether prior bodies of knowledge have actually established a need for such a capability. To understand why the USMC is committing resources to a “soft power” force, non-doctrinal publications and strategy documents that dictate this niche capability were included. Thomas Friedman’s The Lexus and the Olive Tree and The World is Flat set the globalized stage that epitomizes the operating environment but JP 3-0 provides the definition for this study. Countries that tie economic development to global integration and individuals that find power in global collaboration are less likely to destabilize their region of the world because they too are invested in the system. This literature argues the importance of security cooperation in the fight against non-state actors, such as Al-Qaeda, that have also learned to use many global collaboration instruments. The culmination of both works commands the imperative to remain vigilant against threats within partner nations and to guard against a protectionist philosophy. Although the need
for security cooperation programs is uncontested in the USG, the ability of any single force or agency to cover the entire breadth of activities is questionable.

A new global security environment revolutionized the DOD’s role in US national security before the institution of dedicated transformation efforts. Thomas Barnett’s *The Pentagon’s New Map* “crystallizes recent American military history and strategy, sets the parameters for where our forces will likely be headed in the future, and outlines the unique role that America will play in establishing international security.” Phase 0 “Shaping Operations” are preemptive instruments available to the “core” that facilitate increased stability in the lawless “gap.” Not unlike Hobbes or Rousseau’s “social contract” the USG is designing the need for a new “security contract” between America and the international community. The magnitude of such an accord comes into perspective as the Pentagon begins to align future strategic ends with present day operational means.

Articles in *Envisioning Future Warfare* portray a complex strategic landscape and offer some insight on resulting national security policies. According to the two retired military authors, General Sullivan (USA) and Colonel Dubik (USA),

US military strategists can expect that their political leaders will seek ways in which to use the military element of national power—in conjunction with, and usually subordinate to, other elements of national power—to promote an environment conducive to political and economic stability abroad. (Sullivan 1995, 5)

In order to leverage a fully integrated joint task force, an army BCT, in conjunction with a MEU, AEF, and naval force fully integrated under a JTF headquarters, will produce the effects required. The authors further contend that a task organized joint
force is not sufficiently versatile and resilient to adapt to changes under conditions of uncertainty.

The 2008 National Defense Strategy (NDS) provides the most recent overarching guidance for the DOD to confront the challenges of globalization while the 2006 National Security Strategy (NSS) and 2004 National Military Strategy (NMS) continue to germinate. Discussions surrounding the spread of effective democracies and alternate methods of conflict prevention to promote responsible sovereignty are consistent themes. While shifts in geographic concentration and agency focus persist, the joint and interagency means for conducting new transformational roles constantly evolve. This research replicates a similar analytical process to confirm the strategic foundation on which a valid security cooperation task force relies.

It is difficult to find literature that argues against a US foreign policy designed to promote democracy in the international community. Although Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder’s Democratic Transitions, Institutional Strength, and War recognize the widespread success of democratic transitions, the thesis concludes that an incomplete conversion can have devastating regional effects. The reality of diverse cultures and arbitrary international borders creates conditions that have a tendency to promote aggression. Democratizing for Peace in the American Political Science Review offers another perspective; US foreign policy advances international peace as long as the strategic objectives are enduring and prevent progress reversals. The intellectual division surrounding the democratic peace hypothesis directly influences the development and employment of military power. This thesis recognizes both viewpoints and provides an
analytical framework that addresses deficiencies in current US security cooperation initiatives.

**Security Cooperation Initiatives**

The DOD and USG agencies develop methods for conducting activities with partner nations from guidance set forth in several strategic guidance documents. Individual service responsibilities are traced back to the *USAF Security Cooperation Strategy, Army International Security Cooperation Strategy, USMC Security Cooperation Strategy, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Sea Power, Marine Corps Vision and Strategy 2025, the US Department of State (DOS) and US Agency for International Development (USAID) Strategic Plan,* and the *Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) Strategic Plan.* Although diverse in nature, this body of knowledge promotes multiple ways to support national security objectives that build partner capacities and relationships that promote peacetime access for US forces. The strengths of each service and agency and their ability to dedicate specialized capabilities will be a point of departure for the consideration of a consolidated burden-sharing framework.

The strategic context section of the *2008 Army Posture Statement* confirms the global trends that stimulate conflict, characterize the international security environment, and warrant an increased emphasis on the integration of all national power elements. Provisions for logistical and other strategic support that enable joint and interagency partners to accomplish the mission, while maintaining expeditionary mechanisms, are keys to the sustainability of future SC initiatives. In an effort to redefine roles in the global security environment, the *2008 Air Force Posture Statement* outlines three guidelines--global vigilance, global reach, and global power. Strategic imperatives and
redefined capabilities that exploit the natural synergies across the warfighting domains will strengthen global stability (USAF Posture Statement 2008, 3). Both of these sister service outlooks provide some insight into the critical elements resident in military power that can be exploited by an integrated expeditionary force to counterbalance sea service critical vulnerabilities.

The official designation of committed military security cooperation forces is not documented; however, the roots of its contemporary relevance and the advantage of military advisory experience can be traced to Military Assistance and Advisor Groups (MAAG) and Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) programs in Vietnam. In Advising Indigenous Forces: American Advisors in Korea, Vietnam, and El Salvador, Robert D. Ramsey III examines USA roles in El Salvador and points out the need for designated forces to undergo cultural training and adapt organizational concepts to regional conditions. In the last half of the twentieth century, the US Army learned to adapt, while conducting foreign military training and advisory missions. This Combat Studies Institute publication discusses concepts and techniques, grounded in an historical context that can provide a suitable framework for a future conventional force satisfying an advisory role.

The USMC Small Wars Manual does not limit its focus to operations undertaken with military force but instead uses a more comprehensive approach, which includes the full range of assistance “rendered in the affairs of another state”. It also provides a comprehensive look into the relationships that must endure between the DOS and DOD as well as the civil-military relationships that must permeate the staff’s C2 structure and the forces in country. Although not directly related, this study would fall short of
expectations if the roles of SC and civil-military operations, as described in The Counterinsurgency Field Manual, go unobserved. Since counterinsurgency (COIN) operations fall under the umbrella of low intensity conflicts, SC forces must adhere to principles discussed in the manual if Phase 0 “Shaping Operations” are to succeed. Considerations for interagency and civil-military affairs, as well as advisor and staff function guidelines required for training a partner nation’s security forces, provide insight into the different instruments of national power.

As a response to FM 3-24, an Air University monograph, *Shortchanging the Joint Fight*, provides an airman’s perspective on the joint community’s tendency to discount the USAF in planning and execution of COIN operations. The air centric perspective is a valuable contribution to this research because of the information operations, precision airdrop technology, and intelligence surveillance reconnaissance (ISR) assets that improve the situational understanding of a SC force commander.

The Rand Corporation monograph, *A Capabilities-Based Strategy for Army Security Cooperation*, describes the army’s approach to TSC methodologies, as related to enhanced compatibility with potential coalition partners. Similar to some USMC, USN, and USAF studies, this publication designs a single service approach to the broader national security objectives. The development of an effective army SC planning and execution framework for working within DOD and USG programs to build partner nation capacity is well underway. This research will compliment current security cooperation enterprises, but the analysis will identify essential organizational modifications to ensure future concepts satisfy joint doctrine and operating environment requirements.
Future Employment Concepts

This section provides a summary of literature used to collect and compare data on the expeditionary culture of the USMC and the transformation motives, process, and goals developed by the sister military services in the DOD. Recent publications, such as the *Ground Forces for a Rapid Employable Joint Task Force* prepared by the National Defense Research Institute for the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), introduce concepts for smaller-scale contingencies involving joint forces with no specific relationship to security cooperation forces.

USA Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) sponsored research and wrote a report on “Unified Quest 2004” wargame in *Joint Paths to the Future Force* that raised issues including enhanced coordination in stability operations. The analysis provides input to joint interdependencies surrounding sustainment and protection functions and outlines the value of interagency participation. The DOD’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) provides “research and support to advance US foreign policy through Security Assistance and Security Cooperation,” and their website provides a host of information via briefs and journals that discuss the latest initiatives in the field (DISAM webpage 2009). The strategic priorities of the DSCA harmonized with the *DOS and USAID Joint Strategic Plan* for fiscal years 2007 - 2012 determine the regional developmental goals, which will shape DOD security cooperation capabilities.

*Joint Forces Quarterly* regularly publishes articles providing several candid examinations of multi-service cooperation and the organization of forces poised to meet future competing requirements. In *Rethinking Army-Marine Corps Roles*, a research analyst proposes a distinct division in responsibilities that compartmentalize USMC
mission sets in the expeditionary realm and drives the USA to remain concentrated on winning conventional campaigns. Another article written by a Massachusetts Institute of Technology program manager, *Interservice Competition: The Solution, Not the Problem*, reinforces the need for competition and the need for each service to retain an identity based on its culture and traditional employment methods. These non-doctrinal viewpoints to the complementary nature of joint task force (JTF) operations do not specifically address the security cooperation mission but do provide a legitimate counterargument to this research.

Perhaps the greatest body of knowledge available within the intellectual centers of the USMC, USA, and USN surrounds the sea-basing joint integrating concept. The USMC *Tentative Manual for Landing Operations*, published in 1934, and references to “Operation Iceberg” on Okinawa, provide some historical context on which to argue a joint approach to sea basing and the benefit of competition to ensure its feasibility in the operating environment. Contemporary literature generally supports a sea based approach to the security cooperation field but there are still unrealized advantages. The recent decrease in permanent terrestrial footprints resulting from regional and cultural sensitivities substantiates the strategic worth of sea based forces. Using more of a doctrinal format, the Global Security website describes DOD’s Joint Sea Basing Requirements Office approach as assuring global access by leveraging the operational maneuver of joint forces from the sea.

The *Naval Operations Concept (NOC)* from 2006 calls for “more widely distributed forces to provide increased forward presence, security cooperation with an expanding set of international partners, preemption of non-traditional threats, and global
response to crises in regions around the world where access may be difficult” (NOC 2006, 1). There is no doubt that this document, reinforced by the 2008 Posture of the United States Marine Corps, is a substantial accord that contributes to the will of the sea services to lead the security cooperation effort in the DOD.

The bulk of current studies on the intended structure and mission of the SC MAGTF are available through Headquarters Marine Corps briefs and concept papers. The USMC 2007 Security Assistance Executive Conference in New Orleans covered a host of topics on USMC security cooperation ways and means. The most significant literature on the SC MAGTF concept is the CMC’s Send in the Marines, The Long War publication. This thesis will maintain the spirit of the original employment concept and reference its conceptual intent throughout the study. These sources mainly propose a pure USMC effort but this approach will not threaten the objectivity of the final thesis product.

Conclusions

Since existing research does not address the thesis problem statement, it was necessary to consider publications that in some way answer portions of the primary and secondary research questions. The majority of previous studies provide some insight into the formulation of coordination mechanisms that must penetrate the individual service cultures. The collections of strategy documents that recommend the need for the services and government agencies to work together in the twenty-first century operating environment expose a gap in our military means within the national security architecture. Abstract literary works have not yet exploited the opportunity to discuss conceptual operational means that suggest a specialized joint and interagency security cooperation
force to transcend the vision of our military leadership. Since there is not a great deal of authoritative prior research, due to the conceptual and innovative nature of the SC MAGTF, a logical sequence following the DOTMLPF process will guide this crucial study to ensure it makes a substantial contribution to the body of knowledge on this topic.
CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY

The primary research question serves as this study’s point of departure. This research design templates independent variables to explore the possibilities introduced by the secondary research questions. A modified approach to an established analysis framework will catalog possible solutions and ultimately fulfill national security strategy expectations. The methodology chosen allows for a thorough analysis of the diverse capabilities in the security cooperation arena. The analysis explores all possible solutions that expand the sphere of influence of an enhanced SC MAGTF in the operating environment.

Accepted force development domains designated by doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) reconcile the capabilities based assessment (CBA). At the beginning of each section, criteria statements provide organized gates and contain objective factors for the analysis. Two possible conclusions that will dictate alternate courses of action or recommendations for future research simplify the responses to the criteria. They are - the SC MAGTF is properly conceived as an unmodified and unilateral effort; or the enhanced SC MAGTF is the more capable military “means” for the application of joint doctrine and interagency capabilities.

The research design satisfies joint warfighter needs and the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) framework enhances the methodology. JCIDS implements an approach that better leverages the expertise of all government agencies to improve upon existing or develop new warfighting capabilities. This requires
a collaborative process that utilizes joint concepts to identify prioritized capability gaps and integrated joint DOTMLPF and policy approaches for resolution (CJCS 2007b, A-1). The Functional Area Analysis (FAA) synthesizes existing guidance to specify the military problems studied. The Functional Needs Analysis (FNA) then examines that problem, assesses how well the DOD can address the problem given its current program, and recommends needs the DOD should address. The Functional Solution Analysis (FSA) takes this assessment as input, and generates recommendations for solutions to the needs (CJCS 2006a, 50). Figure 2 depicts how DOTMLPF fits in the CBA process as part of a FSA.

Figure 2. Operation of the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System
Source: CJCS 2006a, 6.
Doctrine criteria statement: Fundamental guidelines contained in DOD strategic
guidance and USG agency directives promote the establishment of a joint and
interagency SC venture.

The analysis section applies research data gathered to synchronize and reinforce
the other domains in DOTMLPF. Results will then ascertain the ability of the SC
MAGTF to apply doctrine that dictates proven employment methods, including special
considerations for joint and interagency coordination measures. This section ensures
institutionalized documentation integrates national security goals that prescribe
modifications to guide the development of all specialized task forces. Lessons learned
from historical joint operations uncover additional gaps, which the USG must fill before
it creates a model force structure for the future of SC efforts. An essential factor in this
analytical gate will confirm recent shifts in foreign policy and strategic guidance that
mandate a dedicated security cooperation force. This criterion will provide the literary
basis for the entire CBA.

Organization criteria statement: Applicable military and civilian organizations can
contribute to an SC force optimized to build partner capacity, mitigate regional
challenges, and ensure international legitimacy.

This domain provides the most pivotal factors in the analysis due to its immediate
impact on SC initiatives nested in strategic end states and operational objectives. The
impacts of potential organizational issues will be analyzed across sister service and USG
agency existing capabilities to identify parallel and redundant capabilities. This section
measures the proper formation of the SC MAGTF staff and considerations for the
organizational structure to include size and supporting elements. This criterion will
frame the joint and interagency critical capabilities that an SC force shall maintain, highlighting the transformational commitments within the total force structure to the expeditionary and task-organized culture. Response to this criterion will identify structural gaps and determine possible organizational solutions to the CBA.

Training criteria statement: Combined SC initiatives will stimulate pre-deployment training cycles that emphasize joint and interagency interdependence for specific missions in assigned geographic regions.

The design of a focused program that prepares an integrated and synchronized force using high payoff training packages is an essential part of the analysis. Further investigation uncovers the joint and interagency obligations that introduce continuity challenges in the training cycle, as well as possible subject matter experts (SME), EA considerations and METL modifications. All new training requirements will determine service commitments that drive military occupational specialty and skill designator combinations for an instructor base. The response to this criterion will identify educational gaps and determine possible training solutions to the CBA.

Materiel criteria statement: The integration of joint and interagency material contributions will increase the overall effectiveness of the SC force.

This is the only analysis gate, which draws on sophisticated CBA responses to generate more simplistic solutions. There are minimal considerations for materiel solutions because the USMC can generate requirements and have access to all the same sources as other USG departments. Enhancement possibilities may substantially increase available equipment due to the worldwide positioning of DOD and USG assets. The essential materiel required for intra-theater transportation, communication, and force
protection, not normally associated with forces assigned to the security cooperation mission, are certain discussion points. The response to this criterion will identify technological gaps and determine possible materiel solutions to the CBA.

Leadership criteria statement: The C2 structure can capitalize on joint and interagency organizational leadership attributes in order to foster a symbiotic culture during centralized planning and decentralized execution of SC initiatives.

The leadership domain, which normally concentrates on how well the organizational leadership supports the implementation of an effective force, will also consider C2 aspects. This divergence will outline the USMC junior leadership’s ability to manage the security cooperation mission with responsive and reliable links to appropriate USG agencies and political leadership (CJCS 2008b, II-5). Communications plans and leadership actions will also dictate considerations for memorandums of agreements and management plans. The analysis identifies the joint and interagency leaders that possess a proper blend of regional experience, situational understanding, and diplomatic prowess. The response to this criterion will identify C2 gaps and determine possible leadership solutions to the CBA.

Personnel criteria statement: A force fortified with relevant joint and interagency SC enablers across all the elements of national power will magnify the principles of perseverance and legitimacy.

This criterion evaluates the capacity of the USMC to make an equitable personnel contribution to a formidable SC MAGTF without weakening its own full spectrum capability. The research uncovers the effects of personnel augmentation, sourced from joint and interagency entities, on USMC operational tempo (OPTEMPO). A detailed
analysis of manpower ratios is not the intent of this section; however, the size and scope of the joint and interagency crossover specialties are certain force structure concerns. The purpose is to identify specialized capabilities resident in the BCT, ASEF, and Naval Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC), as well as USG agency and US Embassy country team contributions that may improve the versatility of a SC MAGTF. Finally, this section will analyze the ability of a pure marine force to maintain continuity and an enduring presence in an assigned region. The response to this criterion will identify manning gaps and determine possible personnel solutions to the CBA.

Facilities criteria statement: The operational reach of an SC force expands with increasing access to all permanent and temporary military installations, mobility platforms, and civil infrastructure.

The importance of the GFS and MPF-F as elements of the sea base, are integral to this section of the study. The SC MAGTF may have universal access to joint and multinational facilities in most geographic regions; however, the joint and interagency enhancement process may improve its capabilities. Given the urban, coastal, and austere environments in which the SC MAGTF must operate the investigation of strategic lift challenges and deployment methods are a requisite part of the analysis. The response to this criterion will identify operating environment challenges and determine possible facilities solutions to the CBA.

This methodology channels solutions to the secondary research questions in order to focus participants on the essential aspects of the primary research question. Therefore, the DOTMLPF framework is a fundamentally sound assessment tool and analytical guide for this particular research project. The pre-determined factors in the organization,
training, personnel, and facilities criteria statements are the most valuable facets of this study but corresponding strategic guidance is the key to credible solutions. Additional requirements and specific critical variables will therefore lead to recommended and comprehensive modifications to the SC MAGTF that comply with doctrine and satisfy strategic guidance.

Following a short introduction to the current construct of the pure SC MAGTF, the next chapter will address the factors contained in this chapter’s criteria statements to bring validity and reliability to the equation using a diametric weighting system (-/0/+). The negative, neutral or positive results will indicate potential strengths and weaknesses in the SC MAGTF foundation built on sea service cultural threads. To improve on the SC MAGTF concept, the final chapter will consider the impacts on each domain of DOTMLPF and translate SC objectives into an operational design. The identification of the friendly center of gravity and associated critical factors in a proper strategic context will temper the methodology while filling the operational gaps in the SC force structure. Regardless of the materiel or non-materiel solutions, a properly executed analysis traces the implications of objective components embedded in the criteria of the DOTMLPF framework.
CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

This chapter analyzes the data gathered during research concerning the strategic and operational benefits that can authenticate the validity of an enhanced SC MAGTF. As described in chapter 3, the analysis extends across seven domains using tangible data found in USG agency and armed service directives. The objective measurement of each element substantiates potential modifications in compliance with national security cooperation policy and strategic military guidance. It begins with a section on the USMC’s conceptual plan for the SC MAGTF but the majority of this chapter is dedicated to analyzing the potential geopolitical and parochial benefits of a multi-lateral approach to the security cooperation mission. Using the standard analytical tool for designing a synchronized capability, DOTMLPF, this chapter will explore possible joint and interagency contributions to the doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities of a SC MAGTF. The assessment framework provides an optimal solution that will increase the strategic value and operational effectiveness of a SC force. The final section of the chapter will provide a logical transition into possible conclusions and recommendations for further research.

The Pure SC MAGTF

The SC MAGTF is similar to a MEU but specifically tailored to address security cooperation. These special purpose MAGTFs will have fewer firepower requirements and focus on support to building partner nation capacity (BPC) while applying the principles of strategic distributed operations to provide a persistent forward presence for CCDRs.
Organized for security cooperation activities, the SC MAGTF will feature specific mobility and sustainment capabilities commensurate with its requirements to provide training to less developed military forces. The ground combat element (GCE) represents the core of the SC MAGTF with the majority of SC training and operations provided by marines from infantry and artillery battalions. The logistics combat element (LCE) augments its combat service support functions with additional civil-military operation capabilities such as enhanced engineering, additional medical and dental support, and transportation tailored for the environment in which the SC MAGTF will operate. The aviation combat element (ACE) is task-organized with a principal focus on providing mobility, reconnaissance, and multidimensional force protection to assure freedom of action to project and operate in remote environments (Novack 2009, 3). Figure 3 illustrates the proposed makeup of an SC MAGTF including traditional elements and the additional capabilities required.
The original USMC plan to organize the SC MAGTF, as set forth in 2007, was recently adjusted following a September 2008 *How We Fight* seminar in Quantico, Virginia. Revised DC PP&O guidance places the following stipulations on the future development of the SC MAGTF:

1. Deploy to support specific events and then redeploy when mission complete. Not organized as standing or rotational organizations for the geographic CCDR.

2. Organize for specific training and operational events in accordance with the Global Force Management (GFM) process.

3. Organize for SC activities with crisis response options limited to organic capabilities. (Novack 2008, 1)

The US Marine Corps is prepared to reinforce its naval character and continue its expeditionary role by dedicating a force to global security cooperation programs. The SC MAGTF is a specialized capability that is just one extension of the USMC *Long War*...
The **Long War Concept** developed from the CMC’s recognition that as commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan draw down, the USMC needs to posture the force to meet the growing irregular threat. The vision develops a concept of employment with a supporting global force lay-down and force reconstitution plan that best postures the USMC to establish an appropriate, balanced presence throughout the globe (HQMC 2007d, slide 1). The CMC envisions a projected steady state security environment following reduced requirements in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). This will allow the USMC to focus more energy on the prosecution of Phase 0 “Shaping Operations” that assist geographic CCDRs deter aggression and conduct TSC in their respective AOs.

The *Marine Corps’ Midrange Threat Assessment 2005-2015* characterizes the future environment influenced and controlled by a variety of drivers of instability. At the operational and tactical level, warfare includes attempts to undermine popular support and legitimacy for US intervention. Creating insecurity intimidates the local populace and obligates a considerable SC presence to maintain order (Marine Corps Intelligence Activity 2005, 34). Managing these factors will require flexible forces capable of engaging a myriad of potential adversaries manipulating the operating environment to their advantage. The best way to address these causes of instability is to mitigate the environmental factors that make them possible. Providing a persistent, forward presence tailored for the lower end of the operational spectrum, the SC MAGTF will enable CCDRs to engage in the ungoverned spaces where a US presence and capacity building efforts will be so critical (HQMC 2007d, slide 5).

The **Long War Concept** is a comprehensive approach to low intensity operations that also includes marine advisors to coordinate enduring initiatives and persistent
engagement alongside interagency elements and country teams. The enhanced company operations (ECO) concept prepares conventional forces with additional intelligence, civil affairs and military police personnel to relieve significant pressure on Special Operations Command (SOCOM). The SC MAGTF will facilitate the use of 27 active duty battalions and one reserve infantry battalion in a configuration that supports the CMC’s guidance for a 1:2 deployment to dwell schedule (Novack 2008a, 1). The majority of engagements opportunities for the SC MAGTF coincide with regions of instability within the AFRICOM, CENTCOM, and SOUTHCOM areas of responsibility. Figure 4 highlights the combination of the arc of instability and the historical zone of engagement in the littorals.
The advisor deployment schedules offset the SC MAGTF periodic engagements into common theaters of operation to allow for a continuous level of effective relationships between rotating units. The advisors provide orientation to the incoming SC MAGTF units conducting sequential SC activities. Similarly, as advisor units rotate, the SC MAGTF personnel operating in the AO increase the incoming advisor’s situational awareness. Since SC MAGTFs will not be based at forward operating sites (FOS) and cooperative security locations (CSL) for extended duration deployments,
MEUs will continue to conduct SC activities during critical phases as deemed necessary by the CCDR (Novack 2008a, 1).

The lower end of the continuum of military operations consists of multiple components that fall within the realm of SC and security assistance activities (CJCS 2008, I-13). This critical segment is dependent on military BPC efforts through bilateral training and advising, as well as civil-military operations (CMO) to set the conditions for a stable region. These efforts not only help moderate the byproducts of unstable environments, they build diplomatic and economic ties with the USG. The components of Phase 0—CMO, SC, and security assistance serve to effectively dissuade potential threats by reducing their influence and eliminating their sanctuaries (Conway 2008a, 10).

Figure 5. USMC Capabilities Available for the Security Cooperation Mission
Source: HQMC 2007d, slide 10.
With respect to supported--supporting relationships the three components are closely tied together within the unilateral USMC approach to BPC. In the SC arena the MAGTF conducts the main activities such as exercises, training, and military-to-military contact programs, while the marine corps training and advisor group (MCTAG) is the supporting element. In the DOD executed, DOS funded, realm of security assistance the USMC advisors are supported by the SC MAGTF. In both cases the tasks assigned to the MAGTF or the MCTAG are identified in the operational design and mission analysis phases. The role of the advisor in security assistance is to identify activities that the MAGTF can conduct within their Title 10 responsibilities that best take advantage of their tactical and operational capabilities. The third component of BPC, CMO, employs the SC MAGTF as the supported element to ensure infrastructure development, humanitarian assistance disaster relief (HA/DR), and multilateral exercises are fulfilled with adequate human capital. The advisors work in a supporting capacity to ensure civil affairs detachments address all the necessary and potential projects in the region.

The future expansion of SC operations requires a corresponding increase in the number and availability of those who facilitate it. HQMC and Marine Corps University analyze and recommend changes to the allocation of externally assigned officers such as marine attachés, security assistance officers, personnel exchange program participants, officers attending foreign professional military education (PME) schools, and liaison officers. The objective is to exploit the varying degrees of SC expertise maintained by these officers in order to situate them at the forefront of markedly dissimilar foreign assistance programs. As the role of SC becomes ever more central to the execution of national security policy, and the scope of its demands span all the elements of national
power, vulnerabilities also increase. The limited depth of high demand capabilities across the DOD drives each service to systematically place unique individuals with critical regional skills to limit these operational weaknesses. The USMC *Long War Concept* confirms this imperative but defies the associated risk inherent to a unilateral effort. This logic inspires a detailed analysis on methods that better leverage joint and interagency entities as security cooperation enablers.

**Doctrine**

Doctrine criteria statement: Fundamental guidelines contained in DOD strategic guidance and USG agency directives promote the establishment of a joint and interagency SC venture.

The US Marine Corps’ leadership has framed the problem and the *Long War Concept* provides the solution. The SC MAGTF is the primary expeditionary means for the USMC to build partner capacity in order to achieve national security objectives. The question remains whether doctrine and more specifically, the strategic guidance encourages individual service components to create niche capabilities as an extension of their own campaign design. This section is an analytical compilation of the national security and military strategic directives associated within the security cooperation mission. The interpretation and clarification of this contemporary guidance is the most beneficial contribution to the doctrine domain. A negative (-) response at one end and a positive (+) response on the other define the lateral limits of the spectrum.
National Level Guidance

What is most important to understand before developing a new military capability, whether it be a technological advancement or a force structure adaptation, is for its inception not to revolve around outdated military doctrine. Proven military theory is not enough to ameliorate competing interests and budgetary constraints that drive each military component to posture for relevance. The “means” that each service positions at the forefront of their force structure will only secure their cultural identity if congruent with a capstone vision that supports its purpose. The guidance that drives the emerging capability must be nested within the higher level NSS all the way down to the NMS. In the case of the most recent NDS it is made quite clear by Secretary Gates made clear that “jointness” must be the guiding principle in the development of new capabilities for overseas contingency operations.

We will further develop and refine our own capabilities. We should continue to develop innovative capabilities, concepts, and organizations. We will continue to rely on adaptive planning, on integration and use of all government assets, and on flexibility and speed. Yet we must not only have a full spectrum of capabilities at our disposal, but also employ and tailor any or all of them to a complex environment. These developments will require an expanded understanding of “jointness,” one that seamlessly combines civil and military capabilities and options. (DOD 2008b, 23)

The strategic direction takes into consideration the economy of force needed to address the diversity of missions in the long war however, key warfighting principles are sometimes jeopardized in the union of dissimilar cultures. Ad-hoc joint and interagency ventures, task organized to comprehensively address specific situations, are designed to attain unity of effort but do not guarantee consistent achievements in enduring engagements.
Although guidance from the OSD is binding, to relinquish unfavorable historical data, when determining the most efficient and effective employment method for a joint initiative in a certain arena, is not a preferred technique. The speculation that civil-military cooperation and joint interoperability is synonymous with unequivocal success is reason for a close study of the roots of security cooperation. It is clear that historical security cooperation endeavors, which accomplished previous US foreign policy and national security objectives, influence all the components of the DOD total force structure.

The WWII Lend-Lease Program of 1941 that started the flow of military equipment, in significant quantities, to foreign nations contains the roots of security assistance. The next building block was the Truman Doctrine that called for US global engagement to militarily strengthen the nations of the free world. In his famous speech before congress in 1947, he stated “it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures” (The Avalon Project website 2008).

The term security cooperation was first introduced in 1997 by the Defense Reform Initiative (DRI), which proposed that certain DOD funded international programs along with their personnel and associated resources be managed alongside DOS security assistance programs authorized by the *Foreign Assistance Act*. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), originated in 1998, better reflects the enlarged SC mission and diverse functions of other agencies, the private sector, and foreign governments (DISAM 2008, 1-1). In 2004, the CJCS published a broad definition of security cooperation.
All DOD interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation. (CJCS 2008a, 490)

DOS controlled and DOD administered security assistance programs are major components of the broader defined DOD security cooperation program.

The OSD publishes strategic direction through the QDR process and disseminates it through the NDS. The CJCS provides strategic direction to the military through the NMS. This strategic management framework translates NSS strategic direction into specific enterprise-level tasks with actionable strategic guidance. The guidance sets goals that require synchronization and cooperation among the military departments and defense agencies to achieve the outcomes specified by Guidance on Employment of the Force (GEF). The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) specifically tasks CCDRs to develop campaign, contingency, and posture plans consistent with the GEF. These plans define how a JFC will conduct all DOD activities within their area of responsibility (DOD 2008c, 7). This framework ultimately ensures the DOD establishes clear planning goals for the civilian and military managers responsible for overseeing SC activities.

Within the DOD the Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM) employs the SME that identify security assistance and security cooperation programs however; United States Code Title 10 is the source of authority for armed forces matters dealing with security cooperation and Title 22 delineates the foreign relations programs categorized as security assistance (GPO Access website 2007). Figure 6 shows the placement of the DSCA in the SC architecture.
DOD’s scope of security cooperation clearly includes the long-established SA programs at its core. Separately, however, congress has given DOD many legal authorities to pursue a wide range of cooperative military programs with other countries. A SC umbrella prevails over the authorities that supervise a variety of programs, including SA. In a narrower sense, SC refers to DOD programs with other nations under Title 10 USC, thus distinguishing it from SA. The security assistance organization (SAO) administers security cooperation programs officially under DOD guidance, but ensures
that those programs are compatible with the ambassador’s vision and goals for the host nation (DISAM 2008, 4-4).

One of the key binding documents guiding the planning of SC activities is the Ambassador’s Mission Strategic Plan (MSP), which defines US national interests in a foreign country and coordinates performance measurement amongst USG agencies. The MSP creates a framework for all federal agencies, including DOD, to define priorities and articulate the objectives of their programs underscored by national strategic goals (DISAM 2008, 4-12). MSPs reflect the embassy’s program to support the DOS and USAID Strategic Plan. Once approved, the Ambassador forwards the plan for interagency and executive review. The MSP outlines the US commitment to advance the growth of democracy and good governance, including civil society, the rule of law, respect for human rights, and religious freedom in other countries (DOS and USAID 2007, 4).

Within the Defense Department structure Joint Vision 2020 identifies

The primary challenge of interagency operations is to achieve unity of effort despite the diverse cultures, competing interests, and differing priorities of the participating organizations, many of whom guard their relative independence, freedom of action, and impartiality. Additionally, these organizations may lack the structure and resources to support extensive liaison cells or integrative technology. In this environment and in the absence of formal command relationships, the future joint force must be proactive in improving communications, planning, interoperability, and liaison with potential interagency participants. (CJCS 2002, 18)

The foundation of “jointness” is the strength of individual service competencies pulled together. Our objective in implementing the joint vision is the optimal integration of all joint forces and effects. To achieve that goal, the interdependence of the services requires mutual trust and reliance among all warfighters and a significantly improved level of
interoperability—especially in the areas of command and control and sustainment. This interdependence will ultimately result in a whole greater than the sum of its parts, and will contribute to achieving full spectrum dominance through all forces acting in concert. The synergy gained through the interdependence of the services makes clear that “jointness” is more than interoperability (CJCS 2002, 34).

US Marine Corps Directives

The USMC International Issues Branch (PLU) acts on behalf of the Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies, and Operations (PP&O) as the coordinating and oversight authority to ensure USMC security cooperation efforts are consistent with US strategic plans. PLU develops SC policy and authors the CMC’s Security Cooperation Implementation Strategy and pending Security Cooperation Campaign Support Plan (DISAM 2008, 1). The branch closely coordinates with partner nation personnel and MARFOR counterparts to solidify an integrated approach in compliance with DOD’s Security Cooperation Guidance.

The USMC has an annual SC conference that gathers representatives from each of the regional marine force component commander’s (MARFOR) security cooperation planning staffs and various representatives from sister service and other DOD agencies. It is the cornerstone of the US Marine Corps security cooperation planning cycle (DISAM 2008, 1). The most recent conference served as an impetus for the budgetary, personnel, and organizational changes that the Long War Concept demands. Participants concluded that changes in the operating environment will always drive the planning and execution of global SC operations but regional MARFORs will remain the focus in support of CCDR objectives. Due to the relatively small size of the USMC, planners
continued the identification of focused activities that capitalize on the expeditionary character of the force.

The evolution of concept papers such as *Operational Maneuver from the Sea* and *Ship-to-Objective Maneuver* into the 2005 edition of *A Concept of Distributed Operations* indicates a consistent application of the tenets of maneuver warfare to amphibious operations. These capstone concepts are embedded in General Krulak’s “three-block war” philosophy, which has grown into an operational approach that captures the way marines think about small wars (HQMC 2005a, I). The essence of distributed operations lies in the capacity for synchronized action by dispersed units, throughout the breadth and depth of the operating environment, guided and coordinated within an operational design focused on a common objective. The spatial and temporal advantage continues the traditional decentralization of authority that has been a hallmark of USMC junior leader’s decision-making process. According to the concept, units will be flexible and capable of dynamic re-aggregation to exploit opportunities or reinforce success, but remain dependent on tactical mobility assets and robust communication networks. The US Marines employed a basic form of distributed operations in Vietnam, known as the Combined Action Program, which involved squad-sized units deployed alongside Vietnamese Popular Force militia focused on area stability (HQMC 2005a, IV). As the concept matured the realization of capability shortfalls surrounding the intelligence, logistics, and C2 fields drove the indoctrination of new force structure, training, equipment, personnel policies and leader development initiatives.
The Naval Operations Concept (NOC) optimizes the combination of people and platforms to provide the right force at the right time given a particular operational requirement. Current naval force packages must be complemented by alternative, non-standardized options appropriate to a broader range of missions. Additionally, proper inclusion of joint, interagency, and private resources will provide efficient and effective force packages tailored to a specific mission. (Department of the Navy 2006, 28)

The Naval Strategic Plan frames capabilities-based strategy, links Sea Power 21 to the planning, programming, budgeting, and execution (PPBE) process, and aligns resource decisions with strategic objectives. The prime mover in the entire naval concept is the Global Fleet Station (GFS).

In a recent posture statement to congress the Secretary of the Navy, Donald Winter, spoke of reshaping the Department of the Navy by focusing on recruiting and retaining the right people. USN objectives are focused on increasing the quality of the total force and seeking qualified sailors to include special emphasis on filling the ranks of HD/LD specialties, such as explosive ordnance disposal and construction battalions, to support the other services and coalition efforts. In October 2007, the USN commissioned its newest construction battalions – amphibious (ACB) and mobile (MCB) and construction regiments (NCR), bringing them to a total of nine active duty battalions and three active duty regiments. The USN fostered trust and sustained cooperative relationships with partner nations in Pacific Partnership 2007 when a joint and interagency crew of the USS PELELIU gave aid to multiple Pacific island nations. The Seabees’ reconstruction of homes and schools devastated by a tsunami, or inoculation and treatment of children and the elderly by navy and marine medical professionals,
helped convey a positive image of the United States with local populations (Winter 2008, 7).

Figure 7 outlines the alignment of USN and USMC guidance in accordance with *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower*. Naval missions focus on expeditionary power projection, security cooperation, civil-military operations, and a forward naval presence. The guiding principles of coordinated global influence, interoperability, and persistent presence connect to the methods of distributed operations, adaptive force packaging, cultural awareness, sea basing, and BPC (US Department of the Navy 2007, 8).

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**Naval Operations Concept Construct**

| Commander’s Guidance: Leverage Historic Interdependence, Assess/Consult, Open Discussion/Debate With a Common Goal |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Strategic Missions** | **Naval Missions** | **Guiding Naval Principles** | **Methods** | **Strategic Objectives/Outcomes** |
| Homeland Defense (HLD) | Forward Naval Presence | Agility | Globally Networked Operations | Help Win the Nation’s Wars |
| War on Terror (WOT)/Irregular Warfare (IW) | Crisis Response | Coordinated Global Influence | Distributed Operations | Establish Favorable Security Conditions |
| Deterrence | Maritime Security Operations | Interoperability | Aggregate, Disaggregate, Reaggregate | Strengthen Alliances and Partnerships |
| Shaping and Stability Operations (SSO) | Sea Control | Persistent Presence | Cross Fleet Standardization | Secure US from Attack |
| Security Cooperation | Deterrence | Adaptive Force Packaging | Task Focused Training | |
| Civil-Military Operations | Security Cooperation | Precision | Cultural Awareness | |
| Operations | Civil-Military Operations | Speed | Sea Basing | |
| Counterinsurgency | Counterinsurgency | Unpredictability for Our Adversaries and Reliability for Our Friends | Building Partner Capacity | |
| Counterterrorism | Counterterrorism | | | |
| Counter-proliferation | Counter-proliferation | | | |
| Air and Missile Defense | Air and Missile Defense | | | |
| Information Operations | Information Operations | | | |

**Foundations of NOC: Leadership and Professionalism, Mission Type Orders, Global Awareness (Maritime Domain Awareness and Beyond), and Interdependence**

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Figure 7. The NOC at a Glance

The **2008 Army Posture Statement** directs the USA to recruit, organize, train, and equip Soldiers that can operate as members of joint and interagency team. This stance is made possible because of the US Army’s Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model. Its processes facilitate a transformation that demands adaptive leaders who enable joint and interagency partners to accomplish enduring missions.

In April of 2008, the Army TRADOC Commander published a study on the *Human Dimension in the Future, 2015-2024* to explore human factors across the range of military operations beyond the issues of equipping into the more subtle moral-ethical, intellectual, and physical components of leader development. General Wallace states in his introduction that

> The Army will always rely on an array of capabilities developed by other Services and the larger joint community in order to achieve its conceptual goals. Similarly, the entire joint force will regularly participate in multinational and interagency operations in the future. Thus, I strongly encourage the use of the *Human Dimension* study in our interactions with other Services and joint organizations, both to advance the intellectual dialogue regarding future operations and to strengthen the basis for defining future Army and joint requirements, in the spirit of joint interdependence. (US Army TRADOC 2008, i)

In a series of pamphlet type publications the USA consistently publishes Functional Concepts and Concept Capability Plans that look into future operations across all the roles and branches of the US Army. Specifically, the ISR capability plan supports the argument that the DOD requires a fully integrated ISR enterprise, designed around a common focus and purpose to meet the challenges of future shaping operations. Effective ISR operations require solutions to integrate all army, joint, interagency intergovernmental and multinational ISR capabilities within the operational environment (US Army TRADOC 2008, iii). Any failure to integrate capabilities and provide adaptive
solutions to ISR operations in a joint and interagency environment is clearly detrimental to the SC mission.

US Air Force Directives

A similar outlook in the *USAF 2008 Posture Statement* confirms sister service commitments to joint expeditionary operations.

Expeditionary presence reflects U.S. power and is the indispensable source of local and regional assurance, dissuasion, deterrence, and, ultimately, sovereign options. Engaging forward in times of peace and fighting forward in times of war are hallmarks of U.S. national security strategy. Therefore, the Air Force must have sufficient resources and capability to continue to maintain a sustainable, rotational base. We must retain sufficient manpower and force structure to project influence. (US Department of the Air Force, 2008, 10)

The mechanism to accomplish stated objectives, the Air and Space Expeditionary Force (ASEF), provides JFCs with a trained and ready air, space, and cyberspace force to execute their plans. The USAF will fulfill CCDR requests to secure basing and design systems that facilitate reach-back, thus maximizing forward capability while minimizing forward footprint. The USAF contends that power will flow from permanent and expeditionary basing to assure allies of US commitment while deterring adversaries from threatening national interest.

According to the Air Force Doctrine Document 2-3 (AFDD 2-3), future adversaries have unique asymmetric capabilities but lack the advantage of superiority in air, space, and cyberspace. Stated objectives include “exploiting altitude, speed, and range, airborne platforms can create effects without the impediments to movement that terrain imposes on ground forces” (US Department of the Air Force 2007, 1). There is great value in this unique airman’s perspective, in the context of airpower, to a SC program conducted in an uncertain environment.
The USAF is aware that in “distributed” security cooperation activities, a single, theater-level joint force air component commander (JFACC) commanding airpower may not always provide the adequate degree of situational awareness and flexibility in rapidly evolving operations. The JFACC that delegates some aspects of planning and decision-making to subordinate airmen positioned at lower levels, will increase the effectiveness of USAF capabilities. According to AFDD 2-3 airmen should be involved at every level to properly present USAF capabilities and limitations, and integrate these into the overall strategy (US Department of the Air Force 2007, 55). Understanding the JFC’s main effort will allow the USAF component to make more informed decisions and support a JIATF, military advisor group, or country team accordingly. Therefore, when supporting ground forces in different AOs, direct supporting relationships between specific units will enhance situational awareness of the local conditions in order to deliver the required effects. This concept of distributed forces operating on mission type orders under the auspices of a regional command is an expeditionary mindset on which the SC MAGTF will be able to capitalize.

Organization

Organization criteria statement: Applicable military and civilian organizations can contribute to an SC force optimized to build partner capacity, mitigate regional challenges, and ensure international legitimacy.

The greatest implications and issues relating to the implementation of the SC MAGTF concept extend through doctrine and strategic directives into the realm of organization. It is within this domain that a multitude of potential interservice and interagency contributions exist. Since the landing and successful siege at Veracruz in
1847 during the Mexican War joint operations have been a part of US armed forces culture. Major General Winfield Scott, the senior US Army commander, developed a plan that relied on the USN during execution. He synchronized the largest amphibious assault before WWII by leading all phases in the operation, from the initial procurement process to final command and control procedures (Clark 1996, 110). In November of 1919, the Joint Planning Committee of the Joint Board concluded that joint forces employed in a common enterprise secure trustworthy cooperation and thorough familiarization through effective coordination between the various branches of the services (Atwater 1986, 34). The identification of overlapping USA, USN, and USMC missions allowed for progressive movements in force structure to develop as all the services contributed to the advancement of the amphibious operations. Currently, JTFs capitalize on this finding by aligning the BCT, MEU, AEF, and NECC assets into one organization.

The singular ability of every military component or USG department to field a force capable of conducting SC missions for the CCDR or JFC is worthy of analysis. This section will present all the relevant security cooperation focused capabilities currently residing in the DOD and other USG agencies. The designation of “soft power” and HD/LD capabilities as well as the categorical identification of specialized mission sets is the most beneficial contribution to the organization domain. The lateral limits of the spectrum are defined by a negative (-) response at one end and a positive (+) response on the other.
The Chief of Naval Operations Guidance for 2006 called for a “better joint, allied, and coalition interoperability” to “promote peace, stability, and other US interests” (CNO 2006, 1). The Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC), started in January 2006, consolidates oversight of a disparate combat support and combat service support force structure. The command effectively integrates the man, train, and equip functions of USN distributed expeditionary warfare capabilities. The resulting adaptive force packaging is well suited for effective waterborne and ashore anti-terrorism and TSC engagement however. Of particular use to the SC force are the expeditionary logistics support group, explosive ordnance disposal units, maritime intelligence units, and combat camera. However, the largest components with the most specialized capabilities available for contribution are the maritime expeditionary security and naval construction or Seabee units. Figure 8 depicts the makeup of a traditional NECC with percentages of Seabees and security units.

Figure 8. Makeup of Naval Expeditionary Combat Command

Source: Santino 2007, slide 5.

54
The eight active and twelve reserve Seabee units provide contingency construction support for forward operations base (FOB) construction and operation, bridge and airfield maintenance, fleet hospital set-up and operation, and other civic action projects. The Maritime Expeditionary Security Force provides seaward surveillance and maritime security in bays, harbors, and near shore environments with two active and six reserve components. Each squadron sustains ISR detachments with mobile suites and is able to respond to emerging CCDR requirements with a force package tailored to minimize their operational footprint.

The need for a civil affairs presence, as an integral part of the NECC effort, became increasingly evident so in March 2006 a Maritime Civil Affairs Group (MCAG) was created to blend maritime-specific functional specialties with established USA and USMC civil affairs missions. To avoid mission duplication, MCAG leverages capabilities in which the navy already excels: port operations, harbor and channel construction and maintenance, and marine and fisheries resources. The USN asserts that this approach will address current war-fighting gaps as defined by the QDR and calls MCAG “one of the major cornerstones of NECC’s efforts” (Risner 2008, slide 3).

US Army

Individual USA service planners currently lack a clear framework for focusing USA security cooperation activities on cultivating partner capabilities. The sequencing of SC activities allows a service to construct a more focused and tailored security cooperation package to synergize efforts that maximize impact and leverage limited resources. In 2004, the US Army’s Chief of Staff General Schoomaker initiated a transformation to position the USA for expeditionary operations with modular BCTs (HQ
Department of the Army 2006, xvi). The modular nature of the tactical units closely resembles the task-organized and combined capabilities of the MAGTF. All three types of BCTs possess a multitude of capabilities that would significantly contribute to a joint and interagency SC task force. A comprehensive analysis across the breadth of warfighting functions exposes the most beneficial specialties available in the USA arsenal that can share the HD/LD burden with the USMC. Since the exact composition of a BCT can change, its organic assets and mission dependent attachments are all open for consideration.

The US Army maintains a wide range of engineer capabilities that can assist in the preparation of training facilities and the sustainment of SC activities. The range of functions including mobility, countermobility, survivability, and geospatial engineering are relevant to the enhanced force. Within the brigade special troops battalion (BSTB) reside construction and combat engineers that typically augment the standard engineer companies in the BCT. Also in the BSTB are military police (MP) that typically assist in security and force protection however, their expertise is in high demand during shaping operations. The MP can be tasked with antiterrorism, security, counter-reconnaissance, and limited law and order operations as well as assisting in the training of host nation forces (HQ Department of the Army 2006, 11-20).

The intelligence field offers a host of capabilities in the construct of the US Army BCT. The military intelligence (MI) company conducts analysis and ISR integration using a full complement of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) (HQ Department of the Army 2006, 11-27). MI personnel can contribute to the joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment (JIPOE) as well as coordinate signal, imagery, and human
(HUMINT) intelligence operations. HUMINT collection is of particular interest because it provides, through analysis, an assessment of enemy, environmental, and civilian considerations. Specialized network support personnel and special purpose intelligence remotely integrated terminal team (SPIRIT) sections that provide non-terrestrial reach required to access joint and national analytic products (HQ Department of the Army 2006, 11-29).

In the sustainment function there are multiple assets including law and medical sections. The operational law team members provide the legal expertise much needed during distributed SC operations in the operational environment. These personnel are best suited to interact with host nation (HN) legal authorities, non-governmental organizations (NGO) and private voluntary organizations (PVO) and act as intermediaries with the embassy country team. The medical company is capable of level one medical support but most importantly; it can work alongside foreign civilian and military personnel to increase their capabilities. The combat lifesavers are versatile and ideal for augmenting USN corpsman attached to casualty evacuation teams associated with USMC aviation assets. Infantry units organic to the BCT are also valuable human capital for enduring SC activities as training of partner nation forces is of the highest priority. USA forces that gained invaluable experience during stability operations in OEF and OIF can contribute to a joint and interagency SC force.

US Air Force

The USAF retains valuable and unique capabilities in the security cooperation arena that can contribute flexible and persistent options in a less intrusive manner and improve the JFC’s overall situational awareness. Air Force forces deploy and employ
under the normal AETF structure. The AETF presents a scalable and modular organization with three elements: a single air force commander, appropriate C2 mechanisms, and tailored and fully supported forces. The AETF presents the JFC with a task-organized, integrated package with the appropriate balance of capabilities, sustainment, control, and force protection (US Department of the Air Force 2007, 66). Some of the air centric support activities include communications, ISR, aerial photography, air mobility and logistics, as well as civil-military assistance.

AEF are wings, groups, or squadrons attached to an ASETF or in-place numbered air force (NAF). The USAF designates wings, groups, and squadrons with the "expeditionary" label whether in the deployment cycle or not. Squadrons and dependent groups assigned or attached to an AEF will add "expeditionary" to the designation of the unit; each wing committed to a joint operation will be designated as an Air Expeditionary Wing and each independent group will be designated an Air Expeditionary Group (AEG). The USAF configures its basic fighting unit to deploy in support of CCDR requirements to provide the synergy needed to conduct sustained and effective operations rather than operate independently.

Smaller USAF operations require only a contingent from an attached squadron to become the "expeditionary" force. The AEG is an independent group attached to an ASETF and normally the COMAFFOR exercises OPCON of the AEG. An AEG is composed of a slice of the wing command element and some squadrons. AEG’s organize without significant staff requirements so a portion of the wing provides the C2 for smaller forces smaller force structures (US Department of the Air Force 1997, 71). Therefore,
the AEG is the lowest command echelon of the AEF reporting directly to the COMAFFFOR and where possible, formed from units of a single wing.

The USAF does not maintain civil affairs (CA) units however, a variety of functional organizations and capabilities within the Air Force Reserve Command and Air National Guard, as well as the active duty force, can support or complement CA operations. These capabilities include legal; air mobility; chaplain; supply; health; security forces; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; civil engineering; bioenvironmental; and meteorological specialists who can provide operations and staff support. In order to support CCDRs, the USAF can provide specially qualified personnel for service in joint CA units in missions of primary concern to the USAF. The use of USAF personnel in SC programs is contrary to the idea that land forces normally provide the sole means of creating relationships with foreign militaries however; leveraging a suite of multidimensional joint capabilities is preferred over employment of single-dimensional solutions (Toguchi 2003, 6).

Interagency Capabilities

The idea that US military operations can remain subordinate to other elements of national power within a regional organization is causing a shift in interagency priorities. Current political leaders are requiring the military to participate in enduring stability operations alongside USG agencies while maintaining flexibility and balance in force structure and capabilities (Sullivan 1995, 7). In a recent statement given at the House Foreign Affairs Committee California Congressman, Howard L. Berman, proposed a modest reinvention of SC and SA programs in order to respond to future challenges and achieve coherency in the US foreign assistance framework (Berman 2008, 120). This
statement argues for a modified *Foreign Assistance Act of 1961* to adequately reflect a shift in core SC programs that have been “crippled by a lack of resources, coordination, and a lack of critical capacity and authorities necessary to support such programs” (Berman 2008, 120). His concern for the DOD encroachment into foreign assistance stems from a recent increase in activities such as humanitarian assistance and training in disaster response, counter-narcotics activities, and capacity building of foreign militaries. There is a growing trend in the new administration and congress to ensure DOS and USAID personnel coordinate these activities to ensure unity of effort, to relieve pressure on the overburdened DOD. This expanding initiative does not support a pure military approach to long-term national security goals however, a lack of substantial coordination amongst the multiple cabinet departments and independent USG agencies presents quite a challenge.

In April 2008, Secretary Robert M. Gates suggested a more comprehensive approach for improving the integration of national power to build the security capacity of partner nations. His proposal for an extension of the Global Training and Equipment program in Section 1206 of the *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009* empowers military commanders to assist other nations to build and sustain capable military forces. It allows both DOD and DOS to act swiftly to address emerging opportunities and it is a model of military and interagency cooperation and takes DOS Manning and funding shortages into consideration. In his view, “building partner capacity is a vital and enduring military requirement irrespective of the capacity of other departments and its authorities and funding mechanisms should reflect that reality” (Gates 2008, 90). Currently the DOD encourages the accomplishment of SC alongside
the country experts in DOS that have a full understanding of broader US foreign policy goals. Section 1207 of the *National Defense Authorization Act* allows DOD to transfer money to the DOS to bring civilian expertise to bear alongside our military and facilitate civilian support to the military, either by bringing civilians to serve with our military forces or in lieu of them.

The development and management of the US security assistance program requires the active participation and cooperation of all branches of the USG. Within the executive branch, several departments have an active role in security assistance. By law, the secretary of state is responsible for the continuous supervision and general direction of the security assistance program. Although other governmental departments including the Departments of Transportation, Agriculture, Treasury, and Commerce play key roles, the DOD still has the largest support role from a level-of-effort standpoint (DISAM 2008, 3-20).

The security assistance office (SAO) is only one of numerous organizations within the USG and DOD that contributes to the security assistance (SA) mission. However, the role of the SAO is unique because it acts as the primary interface with the host nation on SA issues. Equally important, the SAO is generally the lead agency within each GCC for the execution of most of DOD’s security cooperation programs in the assigned country. The generic term SAO encompasses all DOD organizations, regardless of actual title or size, located in foreign countries to carry out SA management functions under the *Foreign Assistance Act* and the *Arms Export Control Act* (DISAM 2008, 4-1). The DOS retains the primary responsibility for the implementation of SA activities within
the executive branch. The SAO thus administers SA programs officially on behalf of the ambassador, even though DOD personnel execute the majority of activities.

Joint Interagency Task Forces (JIATFs) were created in 1994 for counterdrug operations and combatant commands now employ Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACG) to be multifunctional advisory elements that represent the civilian departments and agencies to facilitate information sharing across the interagency community (Birmingham 2003, 3). There is an assumption that a JIACG at the CCDR level will ensure unity of effort throughout the execution of a TSC initiative since no organizations currently exist to achieve a synchronized interagency effort with military means. The responsibility to establish a symbiotic relationship with other actors in the region to consolidate strategic gains remains with the SC personnel at the tactical level. A conceptual JIATF introduced in a military AO, induces the essential lateral coordination and mutual understanding amongst small unit leaders. This coincides with the USMC’s movement from generalized distributed operations to progressive imperatives such as enhanced company operations.

National Security Presidential Directive 44 tasks the secretary of state with coordinating USG reconstruction and stabilization efforts with the secretary of defense strategic plan to “ensure harmonization with any planned or ongoing US military operation at the planning and implementation phases” (DOS, S/CRS 2008, slide 4). In order to address the challenges of a unified operating system and ensure unity of action the DOS, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) is in charge of the civilian response capability. The primary “means” for USG agencies to conduct SC activities are the Advance Civilian Team (ACT) and provincial level Field
Advance Civilian Team (FACT). The S/CRS provides the US Ambassador with the capability to integrate activities in order to achieve unity of effort in the development and execution of reconstruction and stabilization plans. The FACTs help to integrate planning and resource allocation, operations, knowledge management and strategic communication. The more robust Civilian Response Corps includes representation from eight civilian agencies--Departments of State, Agriculture, Commerce, Health & Human Services, Homeland Security, Justice and the Treasury, and the US Agency for International Development (DOS, S/CRS 2008, slide 9). Figure 9 illustrates the role and mission of the ACT and breakout of the FACT within the Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group.

**Figure 9. CRSG Makeup**

*Source: DOS, S/CRS 2008, slide 7.*
A provincial reconstruction team (PRT) is an interim civil-military organization designed to operate in semi-permissive environments usually following open hostilities. The PRT is intended to improve stability in a given area by helping build the host nation’s legitimacy and effectiveness in providing security to its citizens and delivering essential government services (CALL 2007, 1). PRTs focus on the operational and tactical level but their interagency nature cuts across all sectors, and aligns with, corresponding national security efforts. As interruptions form in lines of operation between various “soft” and “hard” national power decisive points, PRTs refine operational guidance from higher headquarters to achieve unity of effort. Integrated appropriately, PRTs serve as combat multipliers for both the JFC and the USG development agencies engaged across the stability and reconstruction sectors.

**Training**

Training criteria statement: Combined SC initiatives will stimulate pre-deployment training cycles that emphasize joint and interagency interdependence for specific missions in assigned geographic regions.

If a joint and interagency organization undertakes the SC mission, a significant amount of pre-deployment training must occur. The current trend in an operational design focused on the Phase 0 shaping effort relies on the ability of a military force to understand the unique characteristics of a particular region. This involves a complete grasp and understanding of all situational variables designated in joint doctrine as – political, military, economic, social, informational, infrastructure, physical environment, and time (PMESII-PT). The knowledge and ability of operational forces and tactical units to interact within the context of a specific SC initiative is imperative. This section
will present the entire spectrum of training and education opportunities available in the USG for a force preparing to deploy in support of a CCDR’s TSC plan. The objective is to identify ideal training institutions, mission essential task guidelines, and existing joint and interagency formats. A negative (-) response at one end and a positive (+) response on the other define the lateral limits of the spectrum.

US Marine Corps

The Security Cooperation Education and Training Center (SCETC) is responsible for implementing and evaluating US Marine Corps security cooperation education, training, and programs in order to support marine component efforts that participate in the BPC mission (SCETC website 2008c). SCETC’s Operations and Training Branch is responsible for the identification of appropriate security cooperation mission essential tasks and the publication of the security cooperation training and readiness manual that will guide marines units executing SC missions. The branch currently supports training for deploying transition teams, trains designated security cooperation advisor/training teams from both the USMC and other government agencies, and coordinates military-to-military events not supportable by the regional marine components (Hesford 2008, 2). This branch is responsible for the training packages associated with a specified SC MAGTF.

SCETC’s Civil Military Operations Branch provides outreach to service and partner organizations and coordinates civil military operations education and training. This branch is primarily involved in developing a civil affairs qualifying course and providing training and support for USMC civil affairs groups (CAG) (Hesford 2008, 3). The presence of artillery battalions currently serving as provisional CAGs exposes
shortfalls within the USMC civil affairs military occupational specialty (MOS). The preparation of USMC expeditionary forces for deployment will only increase the number of observers and controllers needed for mission readiness exercises.

At the USMC Future Conflict Conference in April of 2008, Training and Education Command (TECOM) examined developing concepts for the hybrid fight. The Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) processes universal needs statements (UNS) from operational forces through the DOTMLPF domains and MCWL validates the need for a training response (US Marine Corps, TECOM 2008b, slide 5). These emerging requirements dictate formal training programs that will introduce systematic changes and solidify the future theme of service level initiatives. Within TECOM’s purview is the Center for Irregular Warfare, which coordinates doctrine with training and identifies seams across DOTMLPF domains with PP&O and the Center for Naval Analysis. Increased coordination with the US Army’s IW center in the Pentagon, TRADOC, Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA), SOCOM’s IW Directorate, and the USAF IW Center is the emphasis during joint conferences and exercises. In June 2008 USJFCOM’s Joint Irregular Warfare Center (JIWC) was formed to integrate the wide range of training activities and leverage existing resources within DOD and interagency departments to meet Commander of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and CCDR collaborative requirements (JIWC website 2008).

The Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning (CAOCL) is the central US Marine Corps agency for operational culture formed to provide cultural and lingual knowledge through training and education for forces operating in the joint expeditionary environment (CAOCL website 2008). Specific to marine interaction with foreign civilian
and military personnel the center’s charter complies with the CMC’s 2008 Posture Statement, which demands enhanced regional and cultural knowledge in the USMC. Experts assigned to the MAGTF training program then apply operational forces consistent with core warfighting functions. Through focused exercises and a robust pre-deployment training program the MCWL exposes the MAGTF to experimental concepts while maintaining proficiency in tailored METLs that address joint and interagency SC operations. Large-scale exercises will enhance MAGTF capabilities relating to cultural and dynamic decision-making during expeditionary operations and interoperable littoral power projection in a joint and interagency environment (US Marine Corps, TECOM 2008b, slide 54).

US Navy

The US Navy’s, Naval Education and Training Security Assistance Field Activity, (NETSAFA) implements three separate but interrelated functions as the principal support and coordination activity for Navy SC training. NETSAFA is the US Navy’s agent for international education and training that coordinates training support to international governments and international organizations. As a field activity of the Naval Education and Training Command (NETC), NETSAFA serves as a focal point for all security assistance training program issues, coordination and advice within the USN. On their official website the NETSAFA Commanding Officer, Admiral Yeager precisely states The NETSAFA Strategic Plan calls for us to do our part in projecting the Navy vision as defined in The Cooperative Maritime Strategy for 21st Century Seapower through our support of the Security Assistance Program, as authorized by the Foreign Assistance and the Arms Export Control Acts. Our mission is in support of your endeavors in your position as the front line interface with our allies and friends in carrying out our mutual security interests and U.S. foreign policy. We are dedicated to helping you meet the challenges and changes of
Security Assistance in an era of defense downsizing, changing threats, increased overseas competition, congressional interest, and new information technology. In our Strategic Plan, we have enlarged our concept of teamwork; welcoming our customers to take greater advantage of the availability of U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard training – and it is through your membership on this team that we can best provide this advantage (NETSAFA 2008, I-1).

In January 2008, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) released the USN Language Skills, Regional Expertise and Cultural Awareness Strategy, which dictates a fully developed Center for Information Dominance’s Center for Language, Regional Expertise and Culture (CLREC). The Center will leverage existing instruction to facilitate professional development of foreign area officer (FAO), intelligence, information warfare, and crypto-logic personnel to enhance relationships with emerging partners (CNO 2008, 11). As the PPBE process incorporates the LREC PPBE process, it will directly train selected post-accession personnel and ultimately influence the pre-deployment training cycle Navy-wide. The LREC strategy complies with the overarching Navy Strategic Plan, which states

We must seek to understand, and embrace when possible, the strategic objectives of our partners. Navy will continue to conduct shaping initiatives such as security assistance, security cooperation, proactive humanitarian assistance and crisis response while promoting Global Maritime Partnerships, Maritime Domain Awareness and Global Fleet Stations to increase trust, confidence and capabilities of our maritime partners. (Chief of Naval Operations 2006, 12)

US Army

The US Army’s Security Assistance Training Field Activity (SATFA) at the USA Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) is responsible for planning, developing, and executing SA training. The SATFA tasks other USA major commands to carry out training according to the country’s specific needs and coordinates the programming, scheduling, implementation, and funding of training provided by other major commands.
The US Army’s Security Assistance Training Management Organization is the interface between the army and the SAO for the conduct of overseas army training supported by CONUS-based teams and the provision of training support and literature.

External to TRADOC but managed by the US Army is the Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA) tasked with analyzing lessons from contemporary operations. The JCISFA advises CCDRs and service chiefs on appropriate doctrine and further develops proven tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) to prepare for future missions (JCISFA website 2008). The JCISFA chartered the USA as the EA in 2006 to concentrate efforts on rebuilding partner nation’s security forces as part of a larger regional engagement strategy. The organization serves as a focal point for joint and interagency efforts and includes officers from the USN, USAF, and USMC as well as 10 interagency civilians (DOD 2006a, 2). The US Army further contributes using its Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) in Carlisle, Pennsylvania for senior level audiences. The PKSOI integrates emerging policies, concepts, and doctrine across the military and interagency network to expand and synchronize the breadth of leader development. Its most recent publication, The New Balance: Limited Armed Stabilization and the Future of US Landpower recognizes the growing need for a well trained deployable advisory capacity in general purpose forces as well as SOF. Due to the consequences of a non-permissive environment, even during Phase 0, SC forces will need to “assume responsibility for enabling and facilitating the delivery and employment of nonmilitary resources and effects” (Freier 2009, 79).
The US Air Force’s Security Assistance Training Squadron (AFSAT), a component of the Air Education and Training Command (AETC), is the executive agent for managing all SA training. The AFSAT administers and accounts for international training funds allocated for the training, administration, and support of military transition teams (MiTT) furnished from USAF resources. To reinforce the spirit of air power “from the ground up” USAF HQ tasks future contingency operation training programs in its most recent charter (US Department of the Air Force 2009, 1).

The USAF must provide Expeditionary Combat Support capabilities to CCDRs in support of their strategic objectives. Our ECS Airmen must be prepared to operate across the full-spectrum of contingency operations. Their training must be standardized and relevant and we need to eliminate duplication in our process. To focus this critical effort, I am tasking the USAF Expeditionary Center to execute all assigned advanced ECS pre-deployment training courses. (US Department of the Air Force 2009, 1)

The USAF’s largest contribution to training resides in The Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM), an organized directorate within DSCA located at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio. The USAF, as the executive agent, provides logistics and administrative support to DISAM with reimbursement from DSCA. DISAM has the following responsibilities:

1. The conduct of courses of study that will prepare military and civilian personnel for assignments in SA management positions.
2. The conduct of research in defense SA concepts and methods.
3. The assembling and dissemination of information concerning new policies, methods, and practices; and
4. The provision of consulting services to the office of the secretary of defense (OSD) and military departments. (DOD 1993, 6)
The individual training modules available to an embryonic task force are of marginal value for training large numbers of people because of capacity limits. If the training pipelines produce niche training opportunities that could be part of a service initiative then the need for a long term joint and interagency training investment strategy still exists. There is not an immediate need for a collocated facility to conduct joint training.

In 2000, DSCA announced the creation of the Defense Security Cooperation Certificate Program designed to broaden SC personnel technical knowledge of security cooperation policies and procedures, to enhance their relevant management skills, and to provide them the necessary tools to learn about and adapt to the constantly changing security cooperation environment (Currie 2000, 121).

Joint and Interagency Training Guidance

The passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act of 1986 fundamentally rearranged the power channels in the DOD and strengthened the authority of the CCDR. The ensuing comprehensive review of PME by the House Armed Services Committee placed greater influence on joint institutions and training exercises (Skelton 2004, 29). Service expertise has always come first but balancing service and joint training is a necessity for an effective SC force. The Security Assistance Management Manual, Chapter 10 outlines training management, however for overall general guidance and The Joint Security Assistance Training (JSAT) Regulation provides further direction. Each chapter of the JSAT begins with a DOD section followed by 14-5 International Training MILDEP-specific instructions. The training environment has changed significantly since the 2000 publication of the JSAT. A replacement regulation, the Joint Security
Cooperation Education and Training (JSCET) Regulation is in final review and replaces the JSAT sometime in 2009 (DISAM 2008, 14-4).

It is advantageous for service members to gain early exposure to joint military dialogue. The results will lower DOD costs, reduce redundancies, downsize overall infrastructure, foster teamwork, and nurture “jointness”. Opportunities diminish once service members mature in advanced training programs and begin working with operational equipment unique to their services, or once they learn to employ equipment as required by their service doctrine (Viccellio 1995, 45).

A key mechanism of security cooperation training is inculcating interagency cooperation into leaders at every government agency. Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 56 aims to create “a cadre of professionals familiar with this integrated planning process to manage future operations” (Hamblet 2000, 95). As a response, the National Foreign Affairs Training Center and National Defense University have joined the service colleges in integrating interagency training into the curriculum. A former foreign-service officer argues that success in military operations other than war calls for “greater than ever cooperation between civilian and military operators” (Lore 1998, 64). The trust and cooperation that results from exposing leaders to the doctrine, attitudes, and capabilities of other agencies in an academic setting are essential to SC mission success. In contingency operations in Haiti and Somalia, processes contained in the PDD 56 framework met the principal objective of enhancing the effectiveness of interagency coordination that occurred during Phase 0.

According to General Mattis in a March 2009 report on the status of USJFCOM to congress
USJFCOM is prepared to support the recent DOD establishment of an expeditionary civilian workforce. Working with military forces when needed, expeditionary civilians will provide new perspectives and expertise to complex challenges our military leaders are tasked to solve. This visionary effort is the most direct application of the whole-of-government approach to date, and it hopefully will spread to other departments. Sourcing of expeditionary civilians over extended periods through multiple rotations requires the attention and support of our civilian government counterparts. (Mattis 2009, 17)

To encourage interagency participation in military efforts, USJFCOM publishes the *Partnership Opportunity Catalog* with a listing of DOD exercises and training events, which provide USG agencies with opportunities to integrate and train.

**Materiel**

Materiel criteria statement: The integration of joint and interagency material contributions will increase the overall effectiveness of the SC force.

The analysis of the problem does not expose many technological vulnerabilities particular to the SC MAGTF operational concept. This domain is mainly limited by the potential resource and budgetary strains already placed on the DOD by executive and legislative decision-makers. In addition, a focus on technology could detract from the ability of an SC force to employ human capital as a means to improve relationships with partner nations. Therefore, this section will present the analytical results from focused research outside the scope of a train and equip mission or foreign military sales (FMS). The objective is to identify potential intelligence gathering contributions to the SC mission. A negative (-) response on one end and a positive (+) response on the other define the lateral limits of the spectrum.

It is important to understand that specialized ISR technology enables the accomplishment of SC initiatives especially by improving the leader’s situational
awareness and contributing to joint C2. The critical requirements that this study has uncovered do not affect the composition of the SC force since acquisition and procurement processes are streamlined. A good example of air power materiel technology acting as a force multiplier in a low intensity conflict was during the Malayan Emergency in the mid 1950s. The British Royal Air Force played various roles including transport, reconnaissance, and support for psychological operations. As operations moved farther and deeper into country intra-theater lift, supply drops, medical evacuation, and command and control became more difficult. Aircraft used for aerial photography, leaflet, and loudspeaker operations extensively contributed to the efforts of ground personnel (Clutterbuck 1966, 63). Although this is a rudimentary application of air assets it is the basis for potential EC-130E Commando Solo support for localized communications targeting missions including psychological and civil affairs broadcasts.

In September of 2007, the Harvard Carr Center’s Project on the Means of Intervention co-sponsored a US Army War College Strategic Studies conference on Air and Land Power in Counterinsurgency Operations: Implications of a Civilian Center of Gravity in Washington, DC. A major finding in the final report suggests that the USAF can contribute in the operating environment by dedicating intelligence, electronic warfare, increased mobility, surveillance, and space control assets in COIN (Moselle 2007, 8). One example of a materiel solution to logistical concerns during the execution of SC programs is the Joint Precision Delivery System (JPADS). It increases the chances for precise and on-time resupply for ground forces operating in an uncertain security environment while minimizing danger to convoys (Dunlap 2008, 45).
Leadership

Leadership criteria statement: The C2 structure can capitalize on joint and interagency organizational leadership attributes in order to foster a symbiotic culture during centralized planning and decentralized execution of SC initiatives.

One of the biggest challenges for a leader is implementing a clear vision that accompanies strategic level guidance. There is a high degree of difficulty involved in the integration of multiple cultures tied to objectives with core tasks outside of the normal purview of conventional forces. The consistent interaction of joint and interagency forces and synchronized efforts at the national strategic level does not automatically translate into unity of effort down to the operational and tactical levels. The USMC unilateral approach capitalizes on the gains from OIF and OEF experience and continuing within the framework of enhanced company operations (ECO). If interagency personnel augment the SC MAGTF force, the cognitive dissonance that may evolve between unfamiliar cultures is definitely a point of contention. This section will indentify the breadth of leadership options available in DOD with particular attention paid to the ability of USMC and sister service leaders to act appropriately on mission orders, take the initiative and extend influence. A negative (-) response at one end of the spectrum and a positive (+) response on the other define the lateral limits of the spectrum.

Ground Commanders

The USA is committed to “Leader training and development to make Soldiers culturally astute and better able to integrate and complement the other elements of national power” (US Department of the Army 2008a, 9). The long-time army concept of mission orders is representative of the type of decentralized command that the SC force
needs. FM-1 states “the distribution, speed, and simultaneity of integrated joint operations and the design of the modular force mandate conducting operations with mission command“ (US Department of the Army 2005, 3-33). It is within this culture that a leader defines the command climate, which allows forces to adapt and succeed, despite the chaos of combat. The integration of land forces operating under the same set of values and guidelines will prevent the need for implementing complicated cultural changes that could defeat the progress of small unit level SC forces.

The USJFCOM Commander recently promulgated a vision for the integrated execution of joint command and control responsibilities. In concert with DOD’s C2 Strategic Plan, it promotes furthering PME and training for leaders to improve their situational understanding of the operating environment (Mattis 2008, 12). According to General Mattis (USMC), USJFCOM will act as the central coordinator for creating and delivering effective training and education to support “leader centric” C2 that will emphasize the fundamental interdependency between commander’s intent and subordinate initiative.

The Army’s Leadership Requirements Model in FM 6-22 contains comprehensive attributes and competencies for leaders preparing to participate in SC programs. The manual states, “influencing outside the normal chain of command is a new way to view leadership responsibilities” (HQ Department of the Army 2006, A-2). The complex coordination inherent to the joint and interagency environment challenges leaders to constantly implement diplomacy, negotiation, and conflict resolution functions to build trust outside the traditional lines of authority (HQ Department of the Army, 2006, A-2).
Former USMC Commandant, General Charles Krulak, described the SC commander’s increased sphere of influence.

A commander must be able to wield influence throughout both the spatial and temporal depth of the battlespace in a synergized effort aimed at achieving his purpose. With exponentially exploding technology in weapons and our ability to process information, the ability to optimize the command and control structure will take on even greater importance. Herein lies one of the great challenges we face in the continuing development of joint doctrine. We must optimize a commander’s ability to focus a growing resource base while enhancing his ability to deal with an increasingly complex set of tasks and conditions. The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 provides a framework to do just that. It mandates that we provide a joint force commander (JFC) with the best force-resource base available, without regard to the military department or departments from which we must draw the assets. It is the springboard from which we overcome service parochialism and fight a joint fight. Joint doctrine is our key to organizing for that joint fight. (Krulak 1997, 21)

In August 2008, the CMC signed *A Concept for Enhanced Company Operations*, to increase the effectiveness of all military occupational specialties in the MAGTF. This concept along with *The Long War* and *Marine Corps Vision and Strategy 2025* built upon the 1996 *OMFTS* and 1997 *STOM* concepts. *ECO* describes an operational approach that maximizes the tactical flexibility offered by mission orders delivered via the commander’s intent (HQ Marine Corps 2008a, 2). The idea of a company sized MAGTF is envisioned to clarify the agility and flexibility of this maneuver unit. Intelligence gathering and mobility platforms joined with unmanned aerial systems and tailored C2 packages provide the leader with the appropriate tools for success. Extensive virtual decision-making training for small unit leaders mitigates the identification of medical evacuation and logistical support risk factors.
Regional Entities

The DOD recently transferred management responsibilities for many of the authorized international programs to DSCA but multiple DOD entities and the CCDRs continue to manage many SC programs. What further complicates the management of security cooperation is that the USG mainly communicates with the host nation through the embassy defense attaché (DATT) office and SAO. These two execution points for security cooperation within a country require a tremendous breadth and depth of knowledge and skills. This baseline includes the inner workings of multiple international programs that are initiated, funded, and managed by several government agencies (DISAM 2008, 1-1).

To be effective, the SC force leader must cultivate relationships with, and respond to, a variety of organizations, agencies, and individuals; both US and host nation. Many organizations and individuals lay claim to SC resources that will only further their own missions and agendas, which gives rise to conflicts in priorities and competing interests. Much like the SAO the small unit leader will respond through two chains of command: one through the embassy and the other through the area CCDR. A key challenge for the USMC leader is to respond to the direction of the ambassador while at the same time satisfying requirements levied by the area CCDR. The leader must interact with the DATT at the embassy and the regional CCDR because of their influence, advice, and expertise, not because of his authority. The successful enhanced company leader knows how and when to leverage his influence with other players – the ambassador, interagency personnel and host nation representatives – to maximize the advancement of USG foreign policy and national security goals.
Establishing a good working relationship begins with a sharing of interests and ideas. The SC leader recognizes that there is a common foundation upon which to build rapport with host nation military counterparts. Using common ground delineated by the complexity of military doctrine, force structure, training, and logistical support the small unit leader can closely identify with partner nation militaries. The successful SC leader also takes a sincere personal interest in the host nation’s culture, history, customs, and religion, and cultivates relationships with local counterparts, which often forms the basis of life-long contacts and friendships (DISAM 2008, 4-17). Within the professional relationships, the SC leader is sure to face unexpected and difficult situations. The decentralized approach to the SC mission does not address the potential decisions that may encroach on sensitive US foreign policy positions or business ethics. The leader must be empowered to act within a pre-determined scope of authority in order to handle these and other difficult inquiries, with tact and honest professionalism. The discredit that can result from duplicity, failure to respect host nation concerns or the inability to fulfill a commitment will have second and third order effects (DISAM 2008, 4-17).

Proven Relationships

A classic example of effective organizational leadership during integrated joint and interagency Phase 0 type operations is the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT). PRT leaders understand the interdependent relationship of all participants, military and civilian since they must orchestrate their efforts to achieve unity of effort and coherent results. When adequate civilian capacity is not available, military forces typically fill the gap. To build effective working relationships, PRT leaders gain knowledge on the roles
and capabilities of host nation partners and civilian entities to harmonize political, social, informational, and economic programs (JFCOM Joint Warfighting Center 2007b, 8).

Learning to work with multiple agencies and organizations is essential tactical level leadership of SC programs because there is a wide array of actors involved in a stabilization and reconstruction effort, internal and external to the force. Since these actors do not always have an effective means of communicating with each other, past PRT officials have expressed that they were often uninformed about other US organizations’ related programs and activities underway within their provinces (JFCOM, JWC 2007b, 9). The cultural differences in communities exacerbated by agency protocols act as impediments to information sharing and detract from mutual understanding of the situation. In addition, time limits outlined by deployment schedules and expanding responsibilities challenge the SC leader’s commitment to a sense of connectivity and open communication. The fast-paced, chaotic environments in which PRTs operate in Afghanistan make openly sharing new ideas and information more useful than the traditional practice of closely managing information flow through established hierarchy (CALL 2007, 49). It is within this type of climate that the SC leader must generate and thrive.

**Personnel**

Personnel criteria statement: A force fortified with relevant joint and interagency SC enablers across all the elements of national power will magnify the principles of perseverance and legitimacy.

The personnel domain is the very essence of the problem. The marine component of Joint Forces Command, Marine Forces Command, is the force provider and plays a
crucial role in coordinating USMC SC missions. Through the utilization of force requirements data systems and a periodic synchronization conference, this component command addresses all force requirements involving US Marine Corps equity, recommending sourcing solutions as appropriate. This is critical to building partner capacity because the current operational tempo makes sourcing deployed training or advisory requirements a continual challenge (Hesford 2008, 3). Sister service and interagency unilateral commitments to the SC mission have lead to a total force laden with redundant specialized capabilities. The current joint focus has not provided enough direction to alleviate the strain on each military component. The objective of this section is to identify the available personnel resident in the DOD and other USG agencies that can support the SC effort. A negative (-) response at one end and a positive (+) response on the other define the lateral limits of the spectrum.

Interagency

The DOS and DOD are aware that in the past there is no single department, no institution in the USG, capable of accomplishing Phase 0 on their own. The DOS is transforming to become “expeditionary” and operate in ungoverned spaces and the 2009 budget created 1,100 new Foreign Service Officers, and 300 new USAID officers to rebuild the civilian professional corps (Rice 2008, 86). The resulting Civilian Stabilization Initiative (CSI) creates a rapid response capacity for the deployment of civilians in shaping operations alongside the military. The CSI consists of three kinds of civilian responders:

1. An active response corps of diplomats and interagency federal employees who are selected and trained for this capability.
2. A standby response corps of federal employees.

3. A civilian reserve corps of private sector, local government and civil society experts with specialized skill sets. (Rice 2008, 93)

In 2008, the Bush Administration designed the CSI to strengthen the USG’s response to stabilization and reconstruction crises. While it is funded from the DOS budget, it provides for the creation of a small active interagency force and a larger Standby Response Corps, of which almost half will be based at USAID. Likewise, the Civilian Reserve Corps will allow the DOS, and USAID as the development agency, to draw on expertise from citizens across the United States in municipal and local government, the private sector, and non-governmental partners (Fore 2008, 26). Working alongside the active and standby corps, these city managers, community police advisors, municipal utility engineers, and other experts allow USG agencies to participate in DOD led SC initiatives.

Enabling Personnel

Critical requirements for the success of a distributed SC force demand USAF cooperation. If the SC force is supported by intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets to develop a common operating picture, and intra-theater airlift platforms to increase operational reach, as well as aero-medical evacuation platforms to provide expeditionary medical system; there will be a corresponding requirement for personnel augmentation. The intent of SC MAGTF enhancement is not to increase the USAF contributions to in-lieu-of (ILO) tasking; non-traditional jobs for air force personnel that includes “detainee operations, interpreters, convoy operations, explosive ordnance disposal, and police training” (Faykes 2007, slide 5). An increase in
USMC and USA human capital will drive a commensurate requirement for USAF
traditional support roles rather than ILO tasks. According to USAF Chief of Staff
General Norton Schwartz, the AEF will continue to augment the JFC with airmen. The
categories for non-standard tasking identified by DOD are:

1. Joint Force/Capability Solution: military members from one service who
perform their core mission in place of military members from another service.

2. Ad-hoc: military members from one service combined with military members
and equipment from another service into a single deployable unit such as a
provincial reconstruction team (PRT).

3. ILO: military members performing mission capabilities outside of their normal
competencies. (Buzanowski, Terminology Change for ILO Tasking website 2008)

According to a September 2008 statement by the USAF Deputy Chief of Staff for
Manpower and Personnel to Congress, the culture, region, and language (CRL) program
will serve as a transformation roadmap. The US Air Force’s CRL Program is consistent
with OSD guidance and its efforts will produce “Airmen with key joint warfighting
capabilities - congruent with our vision of Airmen capable of influencing the outcomes of
US, allied and coalition operations and maximizing operational capabilities by Building
Partnership Capacity” (McDade 2008, 2). Much like the other USG components the
USAF realization that critical investments will stretch specialty community resources is
evidence of the trade-offs that all the services are willing to make to satisfy JFC
requirements.

Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations

CA contributions to SC include liaison and coordination with the GCC staff,
Embassy Country Teams, multinational forces, indigenous security forces, other
government agencies (OGAs), intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). In the preparation phase, CA personnel are uniquely qualified to train and prepare others for conducting SC activities due to their area and linguistic orientation, cross-cultural communications, and experiences in military-to-civil and HN advisory and assistance activities. CA can also conduct assessments during SC efforts in order to collect current open-source information obtained in the course of their normal duties before a crisis in the GCC’s AO (HQ Department of the Army 2007, 70). In 1996, a EUCOM JTF executed Operation Guardian Assistance with primary efforts at a forward operating base (FOB) for advisor assistance. The USAF used a tailored air operations cell rather than a JFACC to control pre-positioned P-3 reconnaissance aircraft in the joint operations area (JOA) (Smith 1999, 98). The joint special operations task force (JSOTF) consisted of a communications team and the USA provided a civil military operations center (CMOC) under the JTF headquarters. The civil military operations center was augmented with logistics, engineering, and medical personnel with experience in both Africa and humanitarian operations.

Significant demands on civil affairs forces place a large strain on the USMC’s two CAGs. The USA and USN have begun to expand and are suitable force providers for personnel with the correct training. According to LTC Pamela Brady, the civil information officer during Operation Join Endeavor, “civil affairs will become a critical element as the civil-military interface becomes more dominant than tactical elements in future peace operations” and “the future is promising because combat arms and civil affairs complement each other’s efforts” (Brady, Pamela 1997, 47).
In the realm of Special Operations Forces (SOF), there exists a great deal of capabilities capable of conducting SC activities. TSC operations conducted by US Army SOF (ARSOF) with supporting CA and psychological operations (PSYOP) personnel present a politically viable means to maintain information superiority. A recent US Army War College strategy research project argued for the employment of a forward deployed and continuous engaged ARSOF task force capable of enhancing interoperability with joint SC forces (Zeigler 2003, 12). The monograph stresses the pivotal role of psychological operations in positively influencing the actions of indigenous populations and civil affairs in building enduring foundations for civil societies. The US Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (Airborne) is the headquarters for these units with approximately 96 percent in the reserve component. The command has one active duty psychological operations unit, the 4th Psychological Operations Group (Airborne), and one active duty civil affairs unit, the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion (Airborne). It also has four reserve CA commands, seven reserve CA brigades, and 24 reserve CA battalions, two reserve PSYOP groups totaling eight reserve PSYOP battalions (Global Security Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command website 2005).

Advisors

The US twelve-year ad hoc response to the civil war in El Salvador is a model for future small-scale security cooperation efforts. During the late 1980s, a US Military Group (MILGROUP) from SOUTHCOM oversaw the expansion of the El Salvador armed forces (Ramsey 2006, 83). The group was divided into Operations Plans and Training Teams made up of USA, USMC, and SOF personnel but did not experience a
formal preparation and training program that specifically addressed how to effectively interact with the host nation (Castrillo 1993, 4). Today, the USA is the executive agent (EA) for the Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA) that was created in 2006 to provide a full range of support to DOD and other USG agencies in order to develop and enhance security force assistance capabilities (JCISFA brief 2009, slide 5). Historical examples of SFA include the USMC’s Georgia Train and Equip Program as well as MiTTs and border transition teams (BTT)s in Iraq and Afghanistan. The JCISFA is in the process of cross-referencing all service training center periods of instruction to find commonalities in the current advisor METLs. This will generate universal advisor skill sets that focus on specific core enabling and developing categories.

In the summer of 2008, the USA’s Future Theater Military Advisor and Assistance Group (TMAAG-F) gained recognition in a Ft Leavenworth Lamp article as the military engagement organization best suited to work alongside partner nation governments. Its purpose to develop security and civil-control capacity when invited into pre-hostile areas of US partner countries is similar to the mission of an SC MAGTF (Leavenworth Lamp website 2009). The TMAAG-F originated from exercise “Unified Quest 2007” to fill the US Army’s inability to meet CCDR'S TSC and military engagement requirements. The SC tasks the TMAAG can perform include some forms of security assistance and indirect support to foreign internal defense (FID), focused on the brigade level and below, which emphasize BPC that reduces US military requirements. Its headquarters only directs its three detachments and is not a rotational asset to provide direct operational command and control over external units conducting SC activities in country (Small Wars Journal website 2009).
The Human Terrain System (HTS), another TRADOC proof of concept, complements the TMAAG-F as a general-purpose force with language training and cultural education for a specific region. The near-term focus of the HTS program is to improve the military’s ability to understand the highly complex local socio-cultural environment and assist the USG in understanding foreign countries before an engagement within that region. HTS was developed in response to identified gaps in the commander’s understanding of the local population and culture, its impact on operational decisions, and continuity of socio-cultural knowledge amongst follow-on units (Human Terrain System website 2009). The HTS’s main component is the Human Terrain Team composed of military personnel, linguists, area studies specialists, and civilian social scientists. Teams first deployed to Afghanistan with the USA and USMC in 2007 to assist high-level commanders with a better understanding of people, customs, and beliefs of the indigenous population (Jewett 2007, 2). The socio-cultural information serves as an intellectual common operating picture at the tactical level and optimizes situational awareness for rotational forces.

In an April 2008 Armed Forces Journal article, the authors challenge the DOD to design an integrated structure that increases the effectiveness of the armed force’s advisor and assistance programs (Armed Forces Journal website 2009). There is a duplication of effort amongst the services however; the approaches are different as evident in a recent proposal by the USMC to resurrect the apparatus known as the Military Advisory and Assistance Group (MAAG) from the First Indochina War. The MAAG is a joint organization operating within selected countries as a critical link between the HN military, the ambassador and DOD. Marines, who fulfill the MAAG according to JMD
requirements, report to the MAAG commander who in turn reports to the MARFOR commander supporting the respective CCDR. This command relationship does not account for shifting US Ambassador requirements outside of the CCDR’s purview and can facilitate desynchronized efforts. The Marine Corps Training and Advisor Group (MCTAG) will constitute a subordinate element of the MARFOR and will interface with the MAAG while acting in an advisory capacity with HN forces aimed at building partner capacity in the security sector. Supporting the MCTAG efforts will be the persistent training efforts of the SC MAGTF, operating from a GFS or CSL. The MCTAG will potentially act as the principal coordinator for SC MAGTF and MEU activities in the region, providing critical continuity and links with HN forces that will maximize capacity building efforts (HQMC 2007d, slide 10).

The USMC uses its MCTAG to compliment its force allocation in SOCOM’s MCSOAG while the USAF has also created a dedicated force structure. Branching from its combat aviation adviser unit, the USAF is capitalizing on language and cultural proficiencies by creating the Coalition Center for Irregular Warfare and an irregular warfare seminar at the Air Force Special Operations School. The USA stands by its BCT structure, as the primary form of employment for rotating transition teams however, there are dissenting opinions. One alternative is to create specialized stabilization and reconstruction maneuver units optimized with engineers, military police, civil affairs, psychological operations, intelligence, and advisor units. The second force structure proposal argues for an army advisor corps of 20,000 members in 750 adviser teams formed to build partner nation capacity (Drohan, Armed Forces Journal website 2009).
Facilities

Facilities criteria statement: Access to all permanent and temporary military installations, mobility platforms, and civil infrastructure increases the operational reach of an SC force.

The intent of the facilities domain is to combine training and basing opportunities into a coherent effort to consolidate gains made across the entire range of available infrastructure. This section will provide an analysis of the current platforms and installations available to the SC force. A negative (-) response at one end and a positive (+) response on the other define the lateral limits of the spectrum.

Sea Services

A recent government study on rapidly employable joint task forces certifies the need for dedicated airlift to augment the nation’s sealift platforms due to the extended time required for loading, unloading, and initial maneuver of forces into an AO (RAND 2000, xv). The Long War Concept realizes this need and “operationalizes” the NDS concept by providing concessions for the GFS, joint high-speed vessel (JHSV), and MPF (F) capabilities. Since the SC force must be able to operate in the littorals and beyond, a requirement for FOS and CSLs to connect sea bases may contradict a singular focus on a USN approach.

The Sea Basing Concept is a force enabler, designed to project forces and work in concert with expeditionary airfield and seaport construction to access to the JOA. Inherent protection offered by sea basing provides the JFC with the option to posture more joint sustainment support in a lower threat environment. Although first developed
for forcible entry in Phase 2 “Seize the Initiative”, the sea base is also a prime candidate for dispersed and prepositioned joint support with a minimal footprint ashore.

The USN is exploring innovative concepts that will further support national security and CCDR regional objectives. The platforms of a GFS tap into sea basing for persistent operations to coordinate adaptive force packages within an extended joint operations area. The GFS offers a means to increase regional maritime security through the efforts of joint and interagency cooperation. The sea base serves as a modular headquarters for regional operations with the capacity to repair and service all assigned transport platforms. Additionally, the GFS provides medical facilities, an information fusion center, and some support capability while complementing the Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) deployment cycles. The JHSV-2 Swift deployed as the pilot GFS deployment in the Southern Command AO in April 2007 for six months with US Navy, US Marine Corps, and US Coast Guard training teams, plus State Department personnel embarked (Sohn 2009, 50).

A Government Accountability Office Report on Force Structure determined that joint sea basing is one of several evolving concepts for projecting and sustaining forces without relying on immediate access to nearby land bases and clearly identified sea basing as a critical future joint military capability (GAO 2007, 29). That conclusion identifies sea basing needs well beyond today’s USN and USMC operating capabilities. Furthermore, the sea basing approach is a fundamental task-organized system that leverages the USMC MPF (F), and can include ESGs with an embarked MEU aboard amphibious warfare ships.
The flexibility that sea basing contributes to the JFC’s decision-making capability enables five key maneuver advantages:

1. The ability to move the force quickly and unchallenged to a theater

2. An ability to arrive and assemble at sea with a task-organized combatant structure necessary to accomplish the predicted mission package.

3. The ability to employ forces ashore vertically or by surface ship.

4. An ability to fully sustain forces ashore from a maneuvering sea base.

5. The ability to reconstitute or redeploy forces at sea for follow-on missions.

(Jenks, Quantico Sentry website 2009)

US Air Force

To support the forces properly in joint expeditionary operations, the United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) requires a capability designed specifically to rapidly establish initial theater port of debarkation deployment and distribution operations. The joint and expeditionary nature of this requirement demands a jointly trained force structure, comprised of surface and air elements. The JTF-Port Opening (PO) concept builds upon that requirement, emphasizing the JTF-PO significance to expeditionary operations and its support to the geographic CCDR or the JFC (Schwartz 2007, 5). Exercise Ardent Sentry 2006, 163 personnel with a twelve-hour response time from Air Mobility Command’s contingency response group, tested the emerging capability.

Basing USAF assets within the JOA can provide unique advantages compared to main operating base (MOB) or theater basing. Almost every aspect of airpower is more effective if based closer to the JOA because it increases the Airmen’s understanding of the operational environment. The negative effects of basing inside the JOA include force
protection concerns due to an increased footprint and increased logistical and communication requirements (US Department of the Air Force 2007, 71).

Theater Application

If the SC MAGTF has assigned airlift platforms dedicated through TRANSCOM its limitations on logistical resupply of deep and dispersed operations will not be so great. Additional USAF strategic lift capabilities facilitate air insertion operations and aerial reconnaissance. Using consistent CSL and FOS locations to extend the operational reach of maritime forces increases the responsiveness and synergy of the entire operation. A CSL is a host-nation facility with little or no permanent US personnel present. The pre-positioned equipment or pre-coordinated supply arrangements sustains SC activities. A FOS is an expandable facility with a limited US military support presence and some prepositioned equipment that hosts rotational forces for regional training (Global Security US Military Facilities website 2009).

The establishment of AFRICOM provides an opportunity to conduct a fresh assessment in the context of AFRICOM's mission and determine the CSL arrangements needed to meet theater security cooperation needs across the continent. Pending the completion of this assessment, Africa CSLs in EUCOM's current (FY2009) master plan remain in AFRICOM's plan (Ward 2008, 19). The ability to conduct TSC and other activities on the African continent relies on unhindered mobility. Vast distances, combined with very limited civilian rail, road, and air transportation infrastructure, constrain the full range of AFRICOM engagement and contingency activities. There is limited intra-theater commercial airlift, and EUCOM's current fleet of C-130s does not possess the range or capacity to support rapid movements throughout the region. The
expanse of the African continent, coupled with limited commercial airlift availability, requires military airlift to ensure mission success. The near term requires an increase in the quantity and capacity of military air and rapid sealift platforms made available to AFRICOM.

Conclusions

The debate over the benefits of “jointness” has existed in the political landscape and the national defense structure since the interwar period. The competitive struggles that ensued over strategic relevance highlighted budgetary constraints that permeated healthy interservice rivalries in the embryonic stages of the JCS. Historical joint operations, both successful and unsuccessful, provide a basis for the doctrine and military theory that today influences DOD strategy documents and individual service component’s guidance. Through this objective lens the USG will continue to promote future joint and interagency ventures to relieve pressure on the procurement system as well as concentrate military and interagency capabilities on NSS objectives.

A closer look at the outcome of a joint and interagency venture using mechanisms that explore the conduct of operations in the operating environment can illuminate the perceived benefits of a joint and interagency venture. The results of a joint strategic crisis exercise contain multiple variables however data points certainly highlight a tendency for “doctrinal rigidity” (RAND Arroyo Center 2006, 55). The associated wargame creates an underlying assumption that the US joint force can somehow adapt to the unpredictable nature of the operating environment. This contradicts the common understanding of a future adversary that embraces asymmetric warfare to counter conventional military superiority. Since doctrine cannot universally apply in the case of a
hegemonic state, it is important to closely analyze the specific characteristics of an SC
mission in specific regions of the world. An operational design must consider the
realities of a specific AO in order to capture the lines of operation on which a specialized
military capability will operate. Within this framework, there may be considerations for
synchronized actions across the diplomatic, information, military, and economic (DIME)
elements that will exponentially increase the effectiveness of the entire SC effort. These
critical capabilities and requirements embedded in each “way” must contribute to the
overall end state of the mission. Joint doctrine may provide the guidelines for the
structure and implementation of a joint and interagency expedition if unity of effort is the
optimal goal.

The next chapter will develop the results from the analysis using the AFRICOM
AO as the strategic setting because it is a growing joint and interagency structure.
According to the Pentagon, AFRICOM’s primary mission will be "shaping" activities
designed to ameliorate troubling trends before they reach a crisis, rather than traditional
operations involving the use of force. Though focused on conflict prevention, this stated
objective requires some form of military presence to provide security once order and
stability return to the region. For it to be successful AFRICOM will have to devise a
strategy that could play a more constructive and continuously engaged role in supporting
these critical peace restoration strategies that are presently being undertaken. The USG
will have to employ an array of complimentary national power instruments to address the
plethora of challenges that face Africa (Swart, Consultancy Africa Intelligence website
2009). The path to success originates from JIATF employment principles, which indicate
the inevitable transformation of an overall strategy that restores peace and stability to the African continent.
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The final chapter gathers the findings of the DOTMLPF analysis to formulate informed conclusions and recommendations on the SC MAGTF concept. First, a recap of each domain’s analysis exposes the positive and negative effects of enhancing the pure USMC force with sister service and USG agency force multipliers.

Doctrine

All reviewed military guidance and policy is an extension of joint doctrine and coincides with USG agency directives. The documents support the USMC development of “means” to achieve SC objectives in compliance with strategic objectives. The evidence also points to a need for a strategic level asset that operates independently of service level prerogatives. The “whole of government” approach ensures SC efforts coincide with multiple strategic dimensions that require extraordinary coordination. Therefore, correcting deficiencies within the doctrinal framework ensures all stakeholders’ interrelated goals are part of a collaborative effort. Before tactical level forces improvise, the USG must satisfy planning and execution shortfalls at the strategic level in order to mitigate operational risk. The USMC is gathering a guiding coalition to ensure it limits inefficiencies in the system but the documentation consistently refutes a unilateral approach. The analysis yields an overall positive (+) result.

Organization

This organization and structure of the SC force is the key to ensuring assigned personnel complete programs according to CCDR TSC objectives. The task-organized
and expeditionary nature of a MAGTF is consistent with the construct of formidable Phase 0 capability. The USMC has adequate support from its entire combined arms team but as evident in the analysis, sister service and other USG agencies are oriented on similar expeditionary and modular trends. There is an increasing chance for additional redundancy in country with an SC arena already inundated with country teams, advisors, task forces, and independent service rotational forces. Any newly constructed force should consolidate units to increase the capacity of forces to capitalize on all regional opportunities. In this domain, the SC MAGTF causes a larger imbalance in resource allocation for USG and DOD entities already plagued by weak horizontal integrating tools. The analysis yields an overall positive (+) result.

Training

Ongoing efforts by all USG departments and agencies to correct training shortfalls in SA and SC realms, tempers the research. The USMC has established adequate provisions for a pre-deployment cycle consistent with traditional MAGTF training packages. The adjustment of core and essential tasks to comply with CCDR regional demands is the object of USMC initiatives. There is no evidence that suggests any other service or agency is poised to lead a consolidated training program without the expertise resident in the USMC. At this point, any added benefit from combining existing programs to prepare a SC force before deployment will potentially sacrifice the advantages of a pure USMC force oriented to the sea service culture. The analysis yields an overall neutral (0) result.
Materiel

As mentioned in the analysis chapter under the materiel domain there are limited technical solutions to the tactical and operational problems faced by a SC force. The repetitive links between USMC and USN initiative positions the SC MAGTF to consistently gain access to all the necessary equipment and materiel needed for successful operations. The utilization of USAF ISR assets is a force multiplier when distributed operations dictate decentralized execution in isolated AOs. The analysis yields an overall positive (+) result.

Leadership

The leadership assigned to any SC force involved in Phase 0 operations will be challenged by the complexity of the situation as dictated by the interests, demands, and desires of competing entities. The growing trend for junior leaders in the operational environment is one of expanded influence beyond the normal chain of command. There is no substitute for quality decision-making when constant corrections to the mission are necessary. The absence of direct lines of coordination between military and civilian forces may require strategic level alignment but adjacent leaders in a parallel structure can also satisfy the requirement for unity of effort. Without unity of command, information sharing will foster a mutual understanding and cooperative trust that produces manageable reporting mechanisms. USMC and USA small unit leaders in OEF and OIF demonstrated the ability of ground force commanders to fight impediments to a homogeneous culture. It is this assimilation process that is at the very core of the leadership domain. SC MAGTF leaders familiar with distributed operations are not
adequately prepared to interface with the complex network of SC and SA assets in the region. The analysis yields an overall positive (+) result.

Personnel

A thorough analysis of additional capabilities available in DOD uncovers a method for alleviating some of the pressure on already strained HD/LD units. All SC programs are human intensive and some of the advisors, CA, and PSYOPS personnel available in the USA will sufficiently compliment the force. The SC MAGTF’s connection with the USN does not account for force augmentation by specialized maritime personnel trained to conduct SC programs. The manpower available in select USN and USAF occupational specialties is essential to the success of a well-rounded force. The breadth of USG agency contributions to the CRF complies with ongoing initiatives introduced by the Chief of Mission (COM). In order to avoid program fratricide and promote effective stewardship all SC personnel must develop good working relationships as a composite unit. This interdependent networking will lead to operational coverage far better than that achieved by independent advisor and CA entities. The analysis yields an overall positive (+) result.

Facilities

The SC MAGTF has access to the very best employment platforms available to DOD. The addition of USAF personnel and materiel will not affect the allocation of TRANSCOM assets made available to the CCDR. The GFS and MPF (F) configuration is very capable of augmenting the CSL and FOS apparatus available to a pure USMC that deploys on amphibious shipping. The analysis yields an overall neutral (0) result.
Conclusions

The aggregate outcome clearly supports enhancing the SC MAGTF but the complexity of a joint and interagency venture cannot be overlooked. The USMC’s Expeditionary Force Development System (EFDS) governs a systematic approach for MAGTF capability development. Focusing on service and joint operations, the EFDS process integrates combat developments across all functional warfighting capabilities in the USMC and joint operating environment. The Commanding General, MCCDC, acting as the Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration, through the Capabilities Development Directorate (CDD), is the owner of the EFDS. In concert with MARFORs and the supporting joint establishment, the CDD ensures that the fielding of all warfighting capabilities is integrated across the spectrum of DOTMLPF (HQMC 2008c, 5).

As limitations to a pure USMC effort evolve in the EFDS process the challenge to mitigate operational and tactical risk migrates to the CCDR and more specifically the MARFOR component commanders. At the How We Fight Seminar, HQMC personnel discussed the role of the regional MARFOR headquarters supporting SC activities in order to comply with Componency doctrine. Currently, there is a shortage of specialized personnel in the MARFORs to support the planning and coordination of marine SC activities embedded in the CCDR strategic plan. This has a definite effect on the future role of expeditionary enablers such as MCTAG or regional coordination cells to support the introduction of USMC forces into regions with active SC initiatives (Novack 2008a, 6).
Therefore, the question remains whether we can still have each service and USG agency do what they do best while concurrently challenging all entities to work closely together in the SC enterprise. As the services continue their commitment to doctrine, protect their investments in training, and develop their leaders according to their culture it becomes more apparent that national level strategy drives them closer together. As services manipulate Title 10 responsibilities to conduct ancillary missions alongside primary missions, departments begin to resemble each other. The need for all forces to perform across the entire spectrum of conflict results in the duplication of programs and redundancy in capabilities. Also budgetary and political constraints continue to restrain all USG entities within the uncertain global security environment. These realities are forcing all joint and interagency forces to contend with their own relevant existence, which leads to a common focus and understanding on security cooperation. The preeminent nature of Phase 0 operations ultimately inspires joint and interagency commitments to a culture of mutual reliance and trust in order to prevent future conflicts that could overburden operational forces.

Reasonable conclusions from the research and analysis confirm the ability of a task organized SC force, developed under the auspices of the USMC expeditionary culture, to satisfy regional CCDR’s joint and interagency objectives. In much the same way that functional unified commands such as TRANSCOM operate, SC initiatives must be free of service prerogatives and agency parochialism. To operate effectively alongside different interagency cultures requires interdependency but it does not mean that each entity should forget what it does best.
In the spirit of the Goldwater Nichols Act, the independent Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces was formed in 1994 (DOD, Commission on Roles and Missions website 1995). Its advisory group made key recommendations on enhancing joint military capabilities while sustaining force structure that reinforced the needs of the CCDR rather than individual service chiefs. This evolved into the current goal; a comprehensive architecture that shapes the total force and meets the military requirements outlined in the NSS. There should be no further incentive for organizational approaches that do not achieve fiscal efficiency whether in the acquisition process or within the realm of future capabilities development.

All security cooperation objectives originate within the realm of security assistance hence; parallel lines of operation (LOO) accompany each SC mission. The DIME “ways” indefinitely lead to a common end state delineated by national and theater level guidance. The elements of “soft power”—informational, economic, and diplomatic—can be included in the SC MAGTF’s sphere of influence without impacting the unit’s ability to operate along unsophisticated lines of operation.

Given similar “ends” and harmonious “ways”, it follows that all civil and military stakeholders should seek to create opportunities in the operating environment using integrated “means” that are both effective and efficient. As all USG departments and agencies gain awareness of each other’s strengths and weaknesses it is incumbent on their leaders to eliminate redundant capabilities and streamline organizational structures in order to create dynamic efficiencies (Kirtland 1995, 1). While taking a systems approach to the SC enterprise, all communities, services, and departments of the USG capable of employing elements of national power must coordinate, communicate, and synchronize
activities in time and space. Unity of effort is more important than unity of command in this case because of the protracted and enduring nature of SC activities. The engine or driving force can still be the USMC but at the operational level, all SC entities such as the JIATF, advisor groups, and embassy country teams must coordinate actions.

It is evident that joint force multipliers will empower the SC MAGTF to complement USG civilian agencies in support of TSC efforts by contributing additional organizational leadership, regional expertise, and/or training assets. The strengths of each sub-culture optimize the force and reinforce the USMC’s conceptual design without challenging its EA role. According to Marine Corps Vision and Strategy 2025 (MCV&S 2025) the USMC must posture itself to be the nation’s premier expeditionary force of the future. Beneficial decision processes use the mission analysis format to translate the strategic objectives set forth in MCV&S 2025 into essential tasks. These tasks will be continually validated and verified during Executive Off-Site conferences and modified as necessary by members of the Marine Requirements Oversight Council, before the CMC makes final institutional decisions (HQMC 2008c, 2). The methodology discussed in chapter 3 and implemented in chapter 4 does not simulate the process, however, it sets the stage for the final recommendations. The final section establishes the links between specified operational tasks and the joint and interagency capabilities of an enhanced SC MAGTF.

**Recommendations**

The best way to examine all the implications of a SC endeavor is to reflect on the origins of the operational approach. The USMC has done a thorough analysis of national level guidance and sea service directives and concluded that a slight adjustment to the
MAGTF concept satisfies the SC mission. A complete replication of this procedure is not necessary, however; a simplified version of the operational design process will further codify this research paper’s recommendations by connecting the ends, ways, and means to a friendly center of gravity analysis. It is through this fundamental process that relevant critical capabilities (CC), critical requirements (CR), and critical vulnerabilities (CV) will prompt creative modifications to the SC MAGTF concept.

Recently, HQMC, PP&O altered the employment concept to accommodate overextended obligations across the globe across the continuum of military operations. Instead of reducing weaknesses in the overall US security cooperation strategy the SC MAGTF exposes additional CVs. The responsibility to find a solution to this problem should not lie solely on the MEF or the sea service culture. That said, according to the current PP&O plan, the SC MAGTF is to be optimized for the following tasks:

1. Train partner nation security forces (military and police) that are already in place in certain areas: small unit tactics, marksmanship, integration of combined arms, leadership, equipment maintenance, intelligence cycle, manpower management, and communications.

2. Assist partner nation in forming new security forces, to include recruiting, organization, equipping, and entry-level training.

3. Assist partner nation in improving infrastructure: roads; water sourcing, purification and distribution; small structures.

4. Integrate with DOS and/or USAID to ensure a long-term regional approach to assistance. (Novack 2009, 1)

When a CCDR requests forces from JFCOM or SOCOM and the mission requires a conventional USMC commitment, the MEF will train, organize, and equip forces under the cognizance of an assigned SC MAGTF Commander. Once deployed the regional MARFOR under the direction of the CCDR will retain control of the force. Although the
JFC unequivocally conducts a thorough mission analysis the pure SC MAGTF approach cannot succeed in the near term. Limitations currently include the lack of regional cultural and lingual expertise in the MEF, Title 10 funding challenges, and the tempo of forward presence and engagement in OIF and OEF. These shortfalls will exist until a steady-state security environment prevails over uncertainty therefore a more comprehensive operational design is in order.

The Department of the Army draft version of FMI 5-2 Design provides a layered architecture for the operational design process. According to the interim manual “Design is fully compatible with an approach that integrates the collaborative efforts of the departments and agencies of the United States Government to achieve unity of effort toward shared understanding and shared goals” (HQ Department of the Army 2009, preface). A focus on cognitive tools and the principles of battle command will help the SC force leader succeed in the operating environment conflict but more importantly design is a way of organizing conceptual work to assist in the formulation of operational concepts. The roots of this doctrine, found in Dr Kem’s Campaign Planning, uses the ends-ways-means technique to provide a coherent methodology, which links actions in the TSC plan to national security objectives in a particular theater (Kem 2006, 56).

Another theoretical framework on operational design, presented in October 2008 by Dr Jeffrey M. Reilly to the Department of Joint Warfare Studies at the Air Command and Staff College, links operational design with decision analysis to substantially reduce operational risk and increase the probability of a plan surviving first contact (Reilly 2008, 1). Although a portion of his theory refutes joint doctrine’s depiction of the relationship of operational art to operational design, its general conformity to JP 3-0 and 5-0 make it a
suitable point of departure. Figure 10 depicts current doctrine, which states, “Operational design is the conception and construction of the framework that underpins a joint operation plan and its subsequent execution. While operational art is the manifestation of informed vision and creativity, operational design is the practical extension of the creative process (CJCS 2006b, IV-2).

![Elements of Operational Design](image)

Figure 10. Operational Design

Source: CJCS 2006b, IV-5.

The CCDR receives strategic direction in the initiation phase of the JOpp. This design process uses the AFRICOM Commander’s strategy of “active security”. The next vital step is framing the problem using the elements of operational design. Of benefit to
final recommendations is a critical view of the operational approach surrounding the manifestation of an SC MAGTF and the relationship between the end state, objectives, centers of gravity (COG), decisive points and lines of operation (LOO). The resulting cognitive framework exposes the risk of a pure SC MAGTF endeavor not fortified with joint and interagency enhancers.

The emphasis shifts amongst the elements of operational design variables depending on the particular objectives within a certain theater and region therefore this section uses the AFRICOM AO as the operational setting. AFRICOM’s command strategy states:

Ultimately, AFRICOM will focus its effort on promoting the following theater objectives:

1. African countries and organizations can provide for their own security and contribute to security on the continent.

2. African governments and regional security organizations possess the capability to mitigate the threat of violent extremism.

3. African countries maintain professional militaries responsive to civilian authorities and that respect the Rule of Law and international human rights norms. (Ward, 2008, 8)

To achieve these ends, the AFRICOM Commander testified to congress in March of 2008 that,

AFRICOM's strategy of Active Security will focus on establishing and sustaining reliable partnerships while developing security partner capacity at the theater, regional, and state levels. AFRICOM will help develop capable militaries among our partner nations, and promote civilian control of the military through continued professionalization of African military forces. AFRICOM will strengthen regional security capacity, and promote the development of our African partner's deployment capabilities. (Ward, 2008, 8)

There is an assumption that this strategy includes considerations for all the elements of national power because USG officials fill key positions on the AFRICOM
staff. DOS representatives fill the positions of Deputy to the Commander for Civil-Military Activities position and Foreign Policy Advisor. In addition, an official from USAID fills the Development and Humanitarian Assistance Advisor position and a US Treasury official is working within AFRICOM's Strategy, Plans, and Programs Directorate (Ward 2008, 15). The interagency team also includes representatives from the US Department of Commerce, Department of Agriculture, and Department of Energy with preparations for expertise from Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Customs and Border Protection, and the Transportation Security Administration. The command also supports the DOS’s civilian response team concept and plans to integrate those assets into its mission profiles.

To simplify the process a selected end state – “African countries and organizations can provide for their own security and contribute to security on the continent” - is used to assess critical linkages. This end state is ideal because it prompts lines of operation that demand ways and means from all the elements of national power. The AFRICOM 2008 Posture Statement provides the other variables in AFRICOM’s “battle command” understanding of the operational environment, including all the associated facts and assumptions. These factors are important because they form the lens through which the commander formulates strategy and selectively task organizes assigned forces.

According to the Reilly model the next step is to connect the end state and objectives with the COG. For the purposes of this examination, the friendly COG analysis for a US lead SC initiative is of the utmost importance because it outlines the adversary’s perspective of such an endeavor.
Any design developed that does not assess friendly centers of gravity and decisive points creates a serious flaw in the operation. Analyzing friendly centers of gravity and decisive points identifies what the friendly forces must protect and allows the friendly forces to prioritize defensive operations and the use of scarce resources. (Reilly 2008, 26)

Interconnected decisive points are then placed on physical and logical LOOs to help envision the concept of operations and synchronize the military activities with that of the diplomatic, informational, and economic “ways”. The LOOs coincide with the “super” CCs that must directly lead to the end state or “ends”. Figure 11 provides a graphic depiction of this conceptual framework linking CCs (expressed using verbs), which provide insight into the “ways” and CRs and CVs (expressed as nouns), which provide insight into the “means” (Kem 2006, 56).

![Relationship Between Ends, Ways, and Means and the COG–CC–CR–CV Construct](source)

Figure 11. Relationship Between Strategic Framework and COG Analysis

The AFRICOM Commander’s 2008 statement to Congress also provides the LOO, or methods, for the accomplishment of theater objectives in this AFRICOM example. These specific super CCs (from General Ward’s statement) are ways that the SC force can use to conduct Phase 0 type operations.

1. Establish and sustain reliable partnerships
2. Develop security partner capacity at the theater, regional, and state levels
3. Develop capable militaries among our partner nations
4. Promote civilian control of the military through continued professionalization of African military forces.

The majority of generic activities in Phase 0 falls outside of JSCP directed operational plans and therefore remains dependent on CCDR prerogatives as defined in corresponding SC plans. This imperative ensures a level of flexibility that empowers the JFC to implement reactionary measures in an ever-changing security environment. The TSC plan reinforces the linkages between pertinent shaping efforts and future contingency operations. Phase 0 operations--inclusive of normal military and routine interagency activities--solidify relationships with partner nations and continuously enhance international legitimacy in support of national strategic objectives (CJCS 2008b, IV-27).

They are designed to assure success by shaping perceptions and influencing the behavior of both adversaries and allies, developing allied and friendly military capabilities for self defense and coalition operations, improving information exchange and intelligence sharing, and providing US forces with peacetime and contingency access. “Shape” phase activities must adapt to a particular theater environment and may be executed in one theater in order to create effects and/or achieve objectives in another. (CJCS 2008b, IV-28)
The JFC and the SC task force must retain certain capabilities to effectively shape the nature of potential future operations in the theater of operations. According to JP 3-0, these actions “enhance bonds between future coalition partners, increase understanding of the region, help ensure access when required, strengthen future multinational operations, and prevent crises from developing” (DOD 2008b, V). Specific capabilities are dependent on the tactical setting and regional timing of each BPC engagement but a generic friendly force COG analysis pinpoints critical capabilities within the categories specified by JP 3-0. In addition to train and equipment efforts and the maintenance of AO access, ISR and communications are critical enablers for the SC force. Categorized within the realm of stability operations are other CCs that include “conducting collaborative interagency planning to synchronize the civil-military effort, confirming the feasibility of pertinent military objectives and the military end state, and providing for adequate intelligence, an appropriate force mix, and other capabilities” (CJCS 2008b, V-4).

Military forces are best suited to complement and reinforce the other elements of national power rather than consistently lead TSC efforts. Since USG agency lead endeavors have the same CRs, the universal remedy is a proper mixture of redundant capabilities identified in chapter 4. Within the DOTMLPF domains lay the necessary elements for success: doctrine, training, and leadership—preparedness; personnel and organization—legitimacy; materiel and facilities—sustainability. A SC MAGTF assigned to conduct shaping operations in the AFRICOM AO could potentially become the friendly operational COG, in much the same way an embassy country team, PRT, or SOF advisor team. The requirements in Figure 12 are essential attributes for the conduct of
associated CCs. The CVs are not unique to the SC MAGTF because they thrive in any homogeneous SC force, civilian or military.

**Operational Center of Gravity - Friendly**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CoG</th>
<th>Critical Capabilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Security Cooperation Marine Air  
Ground Task Force | Conduct civil-military operations          |
|                    | Conduct mil-to-mil training                |
|                    | Conduct humanitarian operations            |
|                    | Conduct engineering operations             |
|                    | Conduct ISR                                |
|                    | Conduct security force assistance           |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Critical Requirements</th>
<th>Critical Vulnerabilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adequate doctrinal guidelines</td>
<td>DIE enablers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural and linguistic expertise</td>
<td>Continuity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secure lines of communication</td>
<td>Legitimacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robust command and control</td>
<td>Coherent effort and coordinated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Versatile leadership</td>
<td>information sharing with other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIE enablers</td>
<td>SC stakeholders, i.e. sister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unified effort and coherent purpose</td>
<td>service and USG agency entities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continuity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimacy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordinated information sharing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 12. The SC MAGTF as the Operational COG

The elements of DIME are the “ways” nested within the TSC plan. The engagement plan’s operational objectives achieve the strategic “ends”, which originate from overarching guidance in the NSS. When the CCDR assigns SC task forces to a specified mission and region it becomes the “means” to accomplish the focused objectives. The SC task force commander inevitably extends influence to harness theater level CRs, in order to efficiently employ “super” CCs and effectively protect CVs. Streamlining CRs reduces duplication of effort and increases economy of resources, which subsequently enhances and protects the friendly COG. Any entity operating
outside of the comprehensive SC plan in a unilateral or unsynchronized effort represents the essence of an operational level CV. Simple fortifications to a homogeneous military unit will reduce vulnerabilities in the CCDR’s TSC plan and increase the effectiveness of the Ambassador’s MSP.

The most significant CVs for a pure SC MAGTF, as outlined in Figure 12, are centered on the lack of legitimacy and perseverance that comes with a muscular force tasked with episodic engagement guidelines. Force multipliers from the other elements of national power and joint military enablers would only add to a more coordinated and coherent effort. Without the organization, training, and diverse leadership that comes along with such a shared burden this SC MAGTF operational approach will produce limited effects. The USMC unilateral effort can therefore accomplish short-term goals without ever contributing to the long-term strategic objectives that demand an enduring presence.

Phase 0 generally complements the objectives of the overall theater engagement plan and must include particular decisive points along specified LOOs in order to satisfy the particular demands of stability operations. An operational design for shaping operations can have a pure military LOO if the “way” strictly requires DOD decisive points. A more realistic approach demands a mix of “soft” and “hard” power along each LOO to efficiently and effectively accomplish a coherent end state. Figure 13 is Dr Reilly’s version of an intellectual map that assures alignment of ends, ways, and means that can be used in a blended joint and interagency approach to the SC mission.
The best recommendation for an employment concept lead by the sea services should incorporate joint and interagency enablers from its inception. The risk to the COG, aggravated by competitive service prerogatives and civil agency’s resource shortages, is easily mitigated by these “preemptive” contributions. To envision the new operational design, the designer links the national and theater level objectives with decisive points along LOO to protect the friendly COG. Sister service expeditionary forces such as the BCT, the AEF, and the NECC can decidedly integrate capabilities into the SC MAGTF force structure to alleviate possible USMC shortfalls and reduce pressure on critical vulnerabilities. Followed by a non-standard allocation of FACT personnel, or a mini Civilian Response Corps, the enhancement process is sure to reinforce the overall
unity of effort. The following recommendations are made to enhance the pure SC MAGTF:

1. Fortify the SC MAGTF with cultural and lingual expertise from the total force to spread the strain on HD/LD capabilities in the DOD. This additional human capital should join the unit in its initial training phase and contribute to the continuity of effort in the region. The rotational commitment of a GCE from USA brigades or USMC regiments is ideal for an enhanced SC MAGTF in order to account for regional continuity. Sister services should also collaborate with the USMC to augment the ACE with intra-theater lift assets and further enable the LCE with sustainment resources.

2. Qualify the “soft power” of a SC MAGTF with interagency personnel from an established JIACG or JIATF operating within the assigned region. The Civilian Response Corps should maintain an intellectual presence within the planning and execution of all DOD implemented SC missions. In order for already strained USG agencies to commit significant amounts of human capital to an Enhanced SC MAGTF, considerations for increased manpower allocations should be budgeted accordingly.

3. Saturate the pre-deployment training cycle with multi-service and interagency education opportunities. The assigned personnel should have access to the full range of SC preparatory establishments and diverse approaches to the theater objectives. The METLs should be generated based on enduring SC missions but specified to fit the strategic setting of each CCDR and/or Ambassador’s mission sets. A system similar to the ARFORGEN model can ensure proper reset and train periods are synchronized with rotational deployments.
4. Furnish the SC MAGTF with a full complement of ISR and communications equipment along with associated manpower to amplify the operational reach of the force. The resultant common operating picture significantly contributes to the situational understanding of distributed forces. Both USG agency and USAF unmanned aerial vehicles as well as strategic C2 platforms can exponentially increase the effectiveness of a small expeditionary force conducting Phase 0 operations.

5. Reinforce the SC MAGTF with joint military leadership familiar with enhanced company operations to effectively coordinate civil and military lines of operation. There should be a requisite parallel command structure between the Ambassador and the CCDR that surrounds the efforts of embassy country teams, special operations forces, and other NGOs, OGAs, and PVOs in the region.

The MAGTF is a proven employment concept across the full continuum of operations. This intrinsic ability of its expeditionary combined arms team to conduct Phase 0 “Shaping Operations” independent of strategic support networks has historical roots. The “small wars” moniker was connected to the “ordinary expedition of the Marine Corps” in 1940 and will forever be part of USMC heritage (HQMC 1940, 1). The advantages of a homogeneous effort that applies organic sea service assets and doctrine are still relevant today. Concepts such as ECO and combined arms maneuver warfare are key elements in the sea based expeditionary force that leverages joint and interagency capabilities to achieve success. Within the leadership and facilities domains the pure SC MAGTF has certain advantages. By applying philosophical measures of effectiveness it would be easy to deduce success from the principles of unity of command and simplicity. Established C2 networks, engrained small unit leadership attributes, and knowledge of
USMC warfighting principles all contribute to the elementary employment of sea based power projection. On the surface it appears that enhancing any MAGTF is counterproductive since the tools for success are embedded in the unified maritime culture however, a myopic view exposes substantial weaknesses. These imperfections exposed in chapter 4 and codified in the center of gravity analysis indicate the predominate advantages of enhancing the SC MAGTF.

The cyclic nature of geopolitical affairs that affect hegemonic postures temper the ability of a unilateral special purpose MAGTF to succeed in a traditional SC operational approach. The Corps’ historical success does not assure routine accomplishments in the unpredictable operational landscape, even when reinforced by service specific guidance. It is now important to remain versatile and flexible without sacrificing other principles of warfare. Those most in jeopardy, in a pure USMC initiative, are economy of force, mass, and security. The absence of these enduring principles only amplifies the misapplication of additional joint operational imperatives mentioned in the analysis. Without perseverance and legitimacy the solitary gains made by a military force are in jeopardy of threatening the comprehensive effort. Using these logical measures of effectiveness it is possible to monitor the success of a pure SC MAGTF versus an enhanced SC MAGTF in a specified operational setting.

The synergetic and economical employment of joint and interagency enablers, alongside the expeditionary power of the navy-marine team, exponentially increases the effectiveness and performance of an SC MAGTF. The USMC must capitalize on the evolution of expeditionary operations across the DOD and other USG departments. By embracing the role of executive agent and lead proprietor for the SC task force in a
distributed environment the USMC can position itself to fulfill the CMC’s intent to
“provide the force of choice to answer our Nation’s call to action” (Conway 2008, forward). The 2008 Expeditionary Maneuver from the Sea capstone concept highlights the USMC’s distinguished ability to rapidly task-organize forces to execute expeditionary operations in remote environments. It further depicts increased demands on a force refined by limited resources that cannot specialize capabilities for every potential situation (MCCDC 2008, 3). Contemporary national level strategy and prescribed doctrine is adjusted to direct a stance commensurate with the operating environment’s unique constraints and restraints.

The tradition of expeditionary SC activities in the late 19th century are alive and well today in the roots of MAGTF power projection. It is upon this foundation that the USMC will continue to thrive in the midst of a challenging operational environment. The USG will reward the DOD and respect the altruistic behavior of the top Marine decision makers who champion joint and interagency operational capabilities. By enhancing the SC MAGTF the USMC transforms joint doctrine and national policy into reality from the very start. The delivery of this preemptive operational approach demands a level of civil-military wisdom and service ingenuity found in the senior leadership of the Corps.

According to the Small Wars Manual

It is the duty of our statesmen to define a policy relative to international relationships and provide the military and naval establishments with the means to carry it into execution. With this basis, the military and naval authorities may act intelligently in the preparation of their war plans in close cooperation with the statesman. There is mutual dependence and responsibility, which calls for the highest, qualities of statesmanship and military leadership. The initiative devolves upon the statesmen. (HQMC 1940, 2)
It is with this “statesmanship” that amongst the challenges of the uncertain future the USMC can lead a whole of government approach to the SC mission. The PRT and JIATF models, which constantly strive for unity of effort and purpose, are the prototypical employment methods for future endeavors. This type of blended force stimulates interdependent relationships and provides the template for galvanized structures, such as the Enhanced SC MAGTF, that satisfy the civil-military “social contract” bound by the uncertain future of the global security environment.

Recommendations for Further Study

A simplified intellectual framework provides a blueprint for further study on the implications of an Enhanced SC MAGTF. The analytical insight provided by this research paper provides the motive for future joint and interagency ventures outside of traditional employment concepts. Some questions that need answers are:

1. Can a SJFHQ effectively employ the flexible and expeditionary nature of a security cooperation task force, enhanced with joint capability sets and interagency assets, to ensure its forward presence across the globe?

2. Can a robust JIATF embarked alongside a special purpose MAGTF use the Sea Basing Concept as a means of conducting training concurrently with the planning and execution of SC initiatives?

3. Can the production of a cognitive map surrounding Phase 0 “Shaping Operations” for each geographic combatant command be of value to the service components and USG agencies attempting to consolidate SC gains in assigned regions of the globe?
GLOSSARY

The definitions to the terms listed below represent how each is understood for the purposes of this document.

Center of gravity (COG)--The source of moral or physical strength, power, and resistance that provides freedom of action, physical strength, and will to fight (CJCS 2008b, IV-10).

Continuum of military operations--The full range of military operations including Phase 0: Shape the environment; Phase 1: Deter the enemy; Phase 2: Seize the initiative; Phase 3: Dominate the enemy; Phase 4: Stabilize the environment; and Phase 5: Enable civil authority (Conway 2008a, 8).

Ends--From the perspective of the military instrument of national power, this guidance should provide the purpose of military operations and define what constitutes success. The purpose, interests, and objectives that a state or non-state actor pursues within the hierarchy of strategy (CJCS 2006b, III-5).

Expeditionary force--An armed force organized to achieve a specific objective in a foreign country (CJCS 2008b, GL-13).

Globalization--The broad interpretation of a universal process characterized by de-territorialized communication, free trade economic integration, and the proliferation of technological innovations by which the social structures of the western world, such as capitalism and industrialism, spread across the globe to transform pre-existing cultures.

Hard Power--The coercive ability of a hegemonic state to control its environment and achieve strategic objectives through tangible “ways” and “means”, i.e. military power.

Lines of operation (LOO)--A logical line that connects actions on nodes and/or decisive points related in time and purpose with an objective(s) (CJCS 2008b, GL-19).

Means--From the perspective of the military instrument of national power, the forces, programs, and resources that guidance should commit or allocate to achieve strategic objectives (CJCS 2006b, III-5).

Operational environment--A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of military forces and bear on the decisions of the unit commander (CJCS 2008b, II-20).

Security cooperation (SC)--All DOD interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific US security interests, develop
allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation (CJCS 2008a, 490).

Soft power--The co-optive ability of a hegemonic state to influence other state and non-state actors by aligning interests without force, i.e. diplomatic, informational, and economic power (Nye 1990, 14).

Unity of effort--Coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization – the product of successful unified action (CJCS 2007a, GL-11).

Ways--From the perspective of the military instrument of national power, the policy and methods of employing military capabilities to achieve the “ends” within the hierarchy of strategy (CJCS 2006b, III-5).


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