BRIDGING THE GAP: DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE’S PLANNING FOR DOMESTIC DISASTER ASSISTANCE

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE Homeland Security

by

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14. ABSTRACT

Lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina demonstrated the imperative for Department of Defense (DOD) to integrate with Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), state, and local authorities in order to provide an effective disaster response for the citizens of this nation in their time of need. The monumental changes in federal, state, and local planning for disasters in New Orleans after Katrina signify a new level of dedication to interagency coordination. DOD has a significant role to play in the federal response and as such is affected by these changes and it has made changes of its own in response. This research therefore, attempts to identify if the changes within DOD are sufficient to form the basis for an improved response to future domestic disasters. It considered the legal framework that authorizes DOD response to domestic disasters, academic research on the subject, as well as DOD’s own planning processes. Consideration is given to the organizational structure within DOD, a detailed state engagement plan strategy, and further improving interagency cooperation at the federal, state, and local level.

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DOD Civil Support, Defense Support to Civil Authorities, DSCA, domestic disaster response, Homeland Security, Planning

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT


Lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina demonstrated the imperative for Department of Defense (DOD) to integrate with Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), state, and local authorities in order to provide an effective disaster response for the citizens of this nation in their time of need. The monumental changes in federal, state, and local planning for disasters in New Orleans after Katrina signify a new level of dedication to interagency coordination. DOD has a significant role to play in the federal response and as such is affected by these changes and it has made changes of its own in response. This research therefore, attempts to identify if the changes within DOD are sufficient to form the basis for an improved response to future domestic disasters. It considered the legal framework that authorizes DOD response to domestic disasters, academic research on the subject, as well as DOD’s own planning processes. Consideration is given to the organizational structure within DOD, a detailed state engagement plan strategy, and further improving interagency cooperation at the federal, state, and local level.
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improvements in disaster response planning to ensure the safety of the citizens of New Orleans.

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<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>CEM</td>
<td>Certified Emergency Manager</td>
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<td>CONEMP</td>
<td>Civil Support Concept of Employment</td>
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<td>CONOP</td>
<td>Concept of Operation</td>
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<td>DCO</td>
<td>Defense Coordinating Officer</td>
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<td>DCE</td>
<td>Defense Coordinating Element</td>
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<td>DHS</td>
<td>Department of Homeland Security</td>
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<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<td>DODD</td>
<td>Department of Defense Directives</td>
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<td>DOTML-PF</td>
<td>Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership, Personnel, and Facilities</td>
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<td>DSCA</td>
<td>Defense Support to Civil Authorities</td>
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<td>EPLOs</td>
<td>Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers</td>
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<td>EO</td>
<td>Executive Order</td>
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<td>ESF</td>
<td>Emergency Support Functions</td>
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<td>FEMA</td>
<td>Federal Emergency Management Agency</td>
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<td>GAO</td>
<td>Government Accountability Office</td>
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<td>HD</td>
<td>Homeland Defense</td>
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<td>HSPD</td>
<td>Homeland Security Presidential Directives</td>
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<td>IAEM</td>
<td>International Association of Emergency Mangers</td>
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<td>JP</td>
<td>Joint Publication</td>
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<td>NHC</td>
<td>National Hurricane Center</td>
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<td>NIMS</td>
<td>National Incident Management System</td>
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<td>Northern Command</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
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<td>NRF</td>
<td>National Response Framework</td>
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<td>National Response Plan</td>
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<td>SAR</td>
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Over the past five years, the American public’s awareness of the environmental impacts on daily life has significantly increased. This is in part because of rising energy costs, concerns over global warming and a general increase in the number and magnitude of natural disasters around the world such as the Asian Tsunami (2004), Hurricane Katrina (2005), and the earthquake at Sichuan, China (2008). Here in the United States (US), Hurricane Katrina was the watershed event that raised the nation’s awareness to the devastating affects a significant natural disaster can have on a community (Birkland 1997, 7). In addition to demonstrating the destructive effects nature can bring to bear on civilization, Hurricane Katrina highlighted the lack of preparedness to respond to such an event. The possibility of future natural disasters of equal magnitude such as other category five hurricanes or an earthquake along the New Madrid fault is not a matter of if, but rather when. So the pressing question is simple: How will the nation respond? It is essential that government, non-government, and private organizations as well as the general public develop synchronized contingency plans in order to effectively respond to such events.

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) are the nation’s coordinators for planning and preparing for disasters of every type (for example natural and man-made). Since 2004, the National Response Plan (NRP), now the National Response Framework (NRF) has been the tool that attempts to bring together the various contingency plans. However, Hurricane Katrina proved that the NRF was not the final solution to coordinating disaster response plans. Since then, debates and research efforts have been devoted to improving the nation’s response to natural disasters of equivalent magnitude. Consideration has been given to
improving public awareness and evacuation efforts, increasing the capabilities of local and state responders and coordinating local, state, and federal operations in the aftermath of a natural disaster.

One area that received significant attention in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina was the ability of the Department of Defense (DOD) to contribute to the coordinated Federal response. Much of this criticism focused on DOD’s ability to respond in a timely and effective manner (Bier 2006, 252). As have the various other federal agencies, DOD has studied its response in an attempt to identify the areas where DOD can improve. To that end, DOD has evaluated its support to civil authorities in natural disasters and has made changes to its operations as appropriate. Changes within DOD span the areas of doctrine, organizational structure, training, materials, leadership, and facilities. One of the most significant changes that reflect the extent of change within DOD came on 1 October 2008, when the DOD officially assigned 1st Brigade Combat Team (1BCT), 3rd Infantry Division (3ID) to the United States Northern Command (NORTHCOM) for the purpose of serving as DOD’s first response unit for domestic emergencies (Cavallaro 2008). This assignment is primarily designed to support a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear or high-yield explosive response, but the forces can be tasked to respond to natural disasters if required. Along with the assignment comes the responsibility to provide personnel, equipment and capabilities in support of FEMA. In order for the 1st Brigade Combat Team to effectively prepare for the mission, the Brigade must develop an understanding of “all-hazards” emergency planning and response which reflects significant changes in DOD doctrine and training to support domestic operations. It also required the acquisition of the new equipment needed for the range of tasks that could be required by the Brigade as well
as the associated training. Finally, it requires DOD leadership at many levels to consider
the application of battle command and core leader attributes and competencies in domestic
operations. However, above all else, this decision requires DOD to re-assess its role as a
supporting agency and ensure that the changes made actually support local and state
disaster response.

This research, therefore, focuses on the question of whether: Considering changes
made up until July 2008, does current DOD planning support the civil authorities’
operations in response to natural disasters? Whether or not DOD’s planning really
postures the forces to support civil authorities in response to natural disasters can only be
answered by also considering related issues. Some of the related questions that support
this research include: What changes has DOD already made in planning support to civil
authorities? What are the legal constraints and authorities of DOD? What do DHS and
FEMA require of DOD in support of a federal response? Finally, is current doctrine
applicable to domestic disaster operations?

Definitions

Through this research the term “disaster” is used in the context of any event caused
by nature or “Acts of God” that has a devastating effect on a community. This definition is
further qualified by including only incidents where the extent of the damage overwhelms
local and state resources and requires a federal response. To this extent, the area affected
must be broad enough that it spans several jurisdictions or specifically impacts areas of
National Significance. It is acknowledged that, the term Incidents of National Significance
is no longer used in US Army doctrine; however, many primary and secondary source
documents refer to Incidents of National Significance, which is why it is included in the
broad definition for disasters. In the case of Hurricane Katrina, the disaster area clearly spanned several local and state jurisdictions, but New Orleans itself is also an area of national significance because of the important role the Port of New Orleans plays in trade and commerce for the nation, providing access to the Mississippi River region and the rest of the country. Therefore, the devastation that occurred in New Orleans is considered a disaster under the broad definition, although, this case study’s focus is limited to one parish and city.

When a federal response is required, DHS and FEMA are called upon to manage the disaster. The mechanism used to control resources in support of a local and state government is the “National Response Framework” (NRF). “This National Response Framework (NRF) is a guide to how the nation conducts all-hazards response. It is built upon scalable, flexible, and adaptable coordinating structures to align key roles and responsibilities across the nation, linking all levels of government, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector” (Federal Emergency Management Agency 2008, i). The linking of roles and responsibilities across all responders is an essential element of establishing unity of effort. Within the NRF, Federal resources are grouped based on functional areas commonly required in a disaster response; these are called “Emergency Support Functions” (ESF) (Federal Emergency Management Agency 2008, 58-59). In total there are 15 ESFs, which include the following:

1. Transportation
2. Communications
3. Public Works and Engineering
4. Firefighting
Considering the scope of the ESFs and the range of capabilities within DOD, it is easy to visualize DOD’s involvement across the full spectrum of ESFs. However, the first question that must be answered is whether or not DOD has legal authority to act or support the local and state governments as part of a federal response. This answer is often complicated; but the basic authority for supporting these operations is covered by Executive Order 12656--Assignment of emergency preparedness responsibilities. When DOD does support Homeland Defense and Homeland Security operations, it is termed “Defense Support to Civil Authorities” (DSCA) (Department of Defense 2007a, 9). Further detail of the legal authorities and DSCA operations are discussed in depth in chapter 2.

**Limitations and Delimitations**

Given the range of possible disasters within the scope of the NRF, studies in emergency management and disaster response are extremely broad. The NRF identifies 15
different planning scenarios in its “all-hazards” approach to emergency management and within that each of the 15 ESFs are scalable in response capabilities. However, this research is limited in scope to only a very limited subset of the subject. It will only discuss DOD’s planning in support of civil authorities for domestic natural disasters. This is further limited to a hurricane scenario and any parallels that can be applied to other natural disasters may be highlighted as areas for consideration. In doing so, this paper will consider how DOD applies its current operational doctrine to DSCA. Additionally, it is important to note that because the federal response is always a supporting effort to local and state response operations, a concept discussed in detail later, it is important to also limit the geographical scope of the study. To that end, this research will focus on New Orleans, Louisiana, because Hurricane Katrina offers many lessons learned that support an in-depth study of the subject. Based on these initial limitations, consideration for federal planning primarily considers ESF 5, Emergency Management, although other ESFs may be mentioned to demonstrate the broader application of this research. Finally, this research does not seek to recount the events of Hurricane Katrina from a historical perspective, nor does it attempt to critique the actions of any individuals, leaders, or organizations responding to the disaster. Rather, this research uses a broad range of existing after action reports from Hurricane Katrina as a starting point for the study. This research is not wholly unique as DOD implements a continuous improvement cycle and will continue to adjust its planning based on lessons learned from every subsequent disaster, exercise and discussions with emergency management personnel. However, as a matter of practicality, this research will provide a snapshot of planning post-Katrina through the end of July 2008.
Assumptions

In conducting this research, several assumptions must remain constant in order for the research to remain relevant. The primary assumption made is that the constitutional and legal foundation of separation of powers between states and the federal government will not change. It is also assumed that the current division of responsibilities for disaster response as established by the President and the Secretary of Homeland Defense will not change. This assumption is critical to the analysis as it establishes the current operating environment in which DOD must operate. Further, the assumption that local and state responders will continue to be the preferred method of emergency management, and federal response options will only be used when the incident exceeds the capabilities of the local and state government. Related to these assumptions, the organizational responsibilities outlined in the NRF will not change, particularly for ESF 5, Emergency Management. Finally, it is assumed the current operating capabilities of local, state, and federal agencies or organizations will remain status quo.

Significance of the Study

The significance of this study is two-fold. First, it will clarify the authorities, constraints and limitations of DOD supporting domestic operations. Chapter 2 discusses in detail the debate over legislation and the appropriateness of its application given today’s operating environment. However, concisely articulating the current authorities and limitations for military planners is noteworthy. Secondly, once the legislation governing the operating environment is clarified, consideration can then be given to how DOD plans to support domestic disaster operations by considering DSCA operations in terms of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities (DOTML-
Therefore, if current DOTML-PF can be applied to support planning, conclusions and recommendations can be made to improve DOD planning. If conversely, DOTML-PF considerations for DSCA are insufficient, then recommendations for further changes within the DOTML-PF construct required are considered.

**Background**

In order to set the conditions for this study, it is important to set aside myths and biases with regard to what happened and why certain decisions were made. Knowing the factual events before, during, and after Hurricane Katrina allows the reader greater understanding of how one specific event affected one major population center. Chapter 4 discusses this historical event in establishing DOD’s understanding of the environment for future hurricane response efforts. This brief synopsis documents the development and path of the storm; actions of government officials at the local, state, and national level prior to Katrina’s landfall; and then summarizes the response to the disaster.

On Monday, 29 August 2005, Hurricane Katrina bore down on the Gulf Coast of the United States. The Mississippi Gulf Coast felt the full force of category four hurricane winds most severely, but the devastation in the city of New Orleans is what most people will remember about Katrina. Yet, it was not as if there was no warning that a category four hurricane was about to make landfall. Quite the contrary, local, state, and federal officials were tracking this storm for a week before it made its final descent onshore. On Tuesday, 23 August 2005, the National Weather Service began tracking Tropical Depression 12 in the Atlantic Ocean and issued its first advisory at 1700 hours eastern daylight time (NHC 2005, Advisory 1). By 1100 hours 24 August 2005, Tropical Depression 12 had developed into a Tropical Storm and named Katrina (NHC 2005b,
Advisory 4). The predicted path was threatening the central Bahamas and southern Florida. Six hours later, indications appeared that Katrina could develop into a hurricane (NHC 2005c, Advisory 5). In fact, by 1700 hours on Thursday, 25 August 2005, Hurricane Katrina posed an imminent threat to the southern coast of Florida (NHC 2005d, Advisory 9). By this time Hurricane Katrina had captured the attention of hurricane experts as a storm that would likely threaten some part of the US Gulf Coast because they understood that if Hurricane Katrina crossed the tip of Florida as expected and entered the Gulf of Mexico, conditions were ideal for the storm to increase in strength, creating a significant threat.

Scientists from the Louisiana State University Hurricane Center explain the conditions simply: first, there were no contrary winds that could mitigate the symmetric counter-clockwise rotation of hurricane winds; second, a consistent supply of warm water allowed the storm to maintain its strength (Van Heerden 2007, 28-29). Katrina had both these factors in her favor, and by 0500 hours on Friday 26 August 2005, it had passed over the southern tip of Florida, entered the Gulf of Mexico and was increasing in strength and speed reaching category two status by 1130 hours (NHC 2005e, Advisory 13). This same day, 26 August 2005, Governor Kathleen Blanco declared a state of emergency, authorizing the state Emergency Operations Center (EOC) to take control of emergency management and state assets to be mobilized in preparation for the storm (White House 2006, 24). Less than 48-hours after crossing into the Gulf of Mexico, Hurricane Katrina had reached category five status and its path was clearly identified up the Mississippi River with landfall for the eye of the hurricane expected to hit between New Orleans and Mobile, Alabama (NHC 2005h, Number 21). On Saturday, 27 August 2005, Governor Blanco
began implementing evacuation and contra-flow\(^1\) operations beginning that afternoon. At the same time many parishes began ordering mandatory evacuations. However, Mayor Nagin called for voluntary evacuations despite declaring a state of emergency (White House 2006, 25). As the weekend progressed, shelters across Louisiana opened to support the evacuees and residents began to prepare for the storm. Additionally, on 27 August 2005, FEMA established Level I operations, standing up the Emergency Operations Center for both Region IV (covering Mississippi) and Region VI (covering Louisiana) (White House 2006, 26). With the Level I activation, FEMA resources were beginning to be staged close the areas expected to be most affected, but outside the immediate impact area.

“That evening, President Bush signed a Federal emergency declaration for the State of Louisiana, following a request from Governor Blanco earlier that day” (White House 2006, 27). On Sunday, 28 August 2005, Hurricane Katrina continued to track on a line headed for New Orleans prompting Mayor Nagin to call for a mandatory evacuation of the city of New Orleans. Between Midnight and 0200 hours on Monday, 29 August 2005, Hurricane Katrina neared landfall traveling on a northerly path, which spared the city of New Orleans from the full force of winds around the eye of the hurricane by approximately 40 miles. Instead the eye of the hurricane came ashore near the Louisiana-Mississippi state borders, along the Pearl River (NHC 2005f, Advisory 27). Finally, by 1000 hours the eye of Hurricane Katrina was well past the city of New Orleans and the city was left to respond to the effects of the most powerful storm since Hurricane Betsy in 1965.

\(^1\)Contra-flow operations close inbound interstate lanes of traffic to the city of New Orleans. These lanes can then either be used by emergency service personnel or can be converted to accommodate additional outbound traffic. The intent of initiating contra-flow is to increase the capacity of the interstate system in order to expedite the evacuation.
What happened in New Orleans next is still much debated. The loss of critical power and communications infrastructure made accurate reporting of the status of the city immediately following landfall exceptionally difficult. According to the official White House Report on Hurricane Katrina, “as a result, local, State, and Federal officials were forced to depend on a variety of conflicting reports from a combination of media, government and private sources, many of which continued to provide inaccurate or incomplete information throughout the day, further clouding the understanding of what was occurring in New Orleans” (White House 2006, 35). What is known is that the levee system was compromised at the 17th Street Canal, Lake Ponchatrain, and along the Industrial Canal, which caused the devastating floods that overwhelmed the resources of
the city and state responders. Additionally, the city’s pumping system that removes flood water in the aftermath of storms was not functioning due to power failures or flooded pumps; this failure served to exacerbate the damage already done by the storm and failed levees. The flooding significantly increased the requirements for search and rescue operations, and forced the city, state and federal government to respond to a post-event evacuation that had never been planned.

In the week following Hurricane Katrina’s landfall the combined local, state, and federal response worked to save lives, protect property, and restore the capabilities of the local and state governments. Regardless of opinions of personalities involved in the response, the facts are unchanged. Department of Energy reports 2.5 million customers were without power, 3 million customer phone lines were damaged, over 1,477 cell phone towers were destroyed, and most of the city of New Orleans’ radio and television stations were off the air (White House 2006, 34).

Additionally, more that 39,000 persons were rescued during urban search and rescue (SAR) operations conducted by the Coast Guard, FEMA SAR Teams, local and state first responders and private citizens (White House 2006, 38). In total, over 35,000 people were evacuated from the city post-landfall. Public health and safety also quickly became an issue requiring the combined efforts of local, state, and federal responders.

As for DOD’s support as part of the federal response, on 30 August 2005, USNORTHCOM and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were authorized to take action required to support FEMA. On 1 September 2005, Lieutenant General Honore established Joint Task Force Katrina (JTF Katrina) at Camp Shelby, Mississippi, in order to provide command and control of DOD’s response force. In the course of the disaster response, more than
14,000 active duty personnel were deployed along side 50,000 National Guardsmen representing 54 states, territories, and the District of Columbia. According to the White House Report on Katrina, “Department of Defense’s resources, manpower, and advanced planning, contributed to the military’s success in the federal response, especially in areas such as search and rescue, security, and logistical support.”

Despite the accolades given to DOD, there were still significant issues getting the right support to the city of New Orleans during the response operation. This was largely due to a lack of adequate communications and lack of unity of effort between local, state, FEMA, and DOD officials. “Ineffective communications between FEMA and other Federal departments and agencies prevented available Federal resources from being effectively used for response operations” (White House 2006, 45). This point precisely leads back to the primary question of this research. Will changes made since Hurricane Katrina enable DOD to better support FEMA during a major natural disaster?
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

For a reader who is new to the field of emergency management, an obvious question that may arise even before asking how DOD plans to respond is: Why is DOD required as part of the federal response? The answer is simply because there are gaps in disaster response. These gaps occur when the local and state capabilities cannot meet the immediate needs of a population center in the aftermath of a catastrophic natural disaster. These gaps may be in the form of equipment, personnel, training, or any combination of these that prevents a timely response. Sometimes these gaps are identifiable before a disaster occurs; at other times they may not appear until after a disaster occurs. In either case, when a federal response is required it attempts to bridge those gaps. DHS through FEMA has overall responsibility for coordinating the federal response, but neither agency actually owns the resources required to complete the disaster response operation. So other federal agencies with their range of capabilities are used to actually accomplish the tasks. Oftentimes, however, the conditions in the wake of a disaster are so austere that the only federal agency capable of responding in this environment is DOD. The next step is to analyze DOD planning in support of civil authorities’ operations, to develop an understanding of emergency management and the legal basis and authorities of DOD. This chapter will outline the academic principles of emergency management; then, it will discuss core legislation, including federal directives and doctrine that support domestic disaster response operations. Throughout this chapter the arguments for and against increasing the authorities and involvement of DOD are also discussed.
In order to fully appreciate the complexity of DOD’s involvement in supporting civil authorities’ disaster response operations, one must first understand the civil authorities’ perspective of emergency management and response. The first step is to consider the academic studies of emergency management and emergency planning. Although there are volumes of academic research into the area of emergency management, the finding of this research resulted in two generally applied principles that are thought to be most relevant. The first academic principle is the requirement for nesting emergency management and emergency planning within a four-phase model. The second core principle considered is the concept that emergencies and disaster response is always best handled at the lowest level possible.

According to Perry and Lindell, there are several contexts to consider in planning. First is emergency management, which “defines the goals, structure, and strategy used to deal with extreme events that can generate losses. The second is the public policy context. Emergency planning addresses ways to gather resources. Planning also addresses ways to influence the behavior of others in ways that minimize risk” (Perry and Lindell 2007, 2). Within the field of emergency management and planning, academia\(^2\) suggests there are four phases to any emergency: mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery (Perry and Lindell 2007, 3). Perry’s and Lindell’s concept of emergency management is useful when establishing the goals and strategies required to deal with disasters. That is to say, within each of the four phases, separate goals and strategies must be developed in order to effectively address the potential hazards, reduce risk and human suffering, and to protect

\(^2\)The broad scope of academia referenced here includes academic texts such as the John Wiley and Sons, Inc textbooks used to instruct students studying emergency planning, and is often referred to in the non-government text used in this research. The four phases of emergency planning are also used by FEMA in its instructional materials.
critical infrastructure at different stages of a disaster. When the goals and strategies for each phase are nested to support later phases the emergency plan is likely to be successful. However, if all four phases are not nested, then there are often shortfalls during the transition between phases and it is likely that resources and capabilities will not be available for subsequent phases. Therefore, the emergency management and emergency planning must be linked in order to achieve an effective response.

Unfortunately, despite the academic research that supports the concepts of nesting plans across the four phases of a disaster, many local governments’ plans fail to meet this criterion. This can occur because a local government is either resistant to planning or lacks the resources required. The resistance to planning in some cases is the result of apathy stemming from elected officials’ and the general population’s dislike for thinking about disasters (Perry and Lindell 2007, 52). According to Bier, “it is a natural organizational (and human) tendency to ignore problems for which there are currently no good solutions, rather than having to admit publicly that a solution is not yet available” (Bier 2006, 245). However, since 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina, most people accept the importance of planning in which case the failure to nest plans could be simply because there is a lack of resources available to conduct detailed planning at the local level. This was and still is the case for the city of New Orleans, which maintains a five person full-time staff of which only one person is responsible for plans (Sneed 2008).

Regardless of whether a local government lacks planning capacity because of apathy or a lack of resources, this becomes particularly problematic because the first principle of emergency management is that all emergencies are best handled at the lowest level. This principle is founded in the Tenth Amendment to the US Constitution, which
preserves the States’ powers over anything not specifically withheld at the federal level. This same consideration is generally provided in each state’s constitution from the state to the local governments. Since, each state has its own constitution and legal framework emergency response is best handled at the local level. Another reason is that state officials are most familiar with laws and regulations governing roles, responsibilities and authorities to act on behalf of the citizens.

The core principles discussed provide the emergency management community with guidelines to follow. However, the only authority to act as a federal agency on behalf of the government in response to a disaster comes from the United States’ Code (USC). The legislation set out in the USC provides specific roles, responsibilities, authorities and funding allocations for federal agencies. The USC also specifies to what extent the states are required to provide their own support. However, the USC is neither perfect nor comprehensive in its descriptions of what can and cannot be done. There are loopholes in the legislation and lawyers can argue just about any aspect of legitimacy. In the case of disaster response operations, the USC has undergone some changes since 2005, yet there are still arguments for further change to the code. The principal debate deals with the distribution of power between the states and the Federal government, and also amongst the various agencies of the federal government. A National Defense University publication summarized this debate as a challenge to the legal foundations of the nation as set forth by James Madison. “Whether the subject is separation of power, division of power, or constitutional liberties, the fundamental principle of Madisonian democracy is to disperse power throughout the structures (organizations) of government to avoid tyranny” (Keagle and Martin 2007, 6). The dispersal of power and protection of constitutional liberties is
particularly important when debating the amount of power that should be afforded to DOD. The next section lays out the USC authorities under which DOD operates, specific to its ability to perform missions within the United States and its territories. The full and updated text of the USC is available to the public through the Office of the Law Revision Counsel, the U.S. House of Representatives. ³

The primary distribution of power as it relates to DOD rests primarily in the constitution but is also codified under the USC. This separation of power supported by Madisonian principles of state’s rights over federal power is exemplified in the varying authorities for military forces within the United States. The first authority is found under the USC, Title 10, Armed Forces. Title 10 provides for the establishment and continuance of all Armed Forces (Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps) in an Active Duty status as well as in a Reserve status. This is the foundation for the standing active duty military under the DOD. The second authority for military forces is the constitutional authority of the Second Amendment under which states are allowed to maintain a militia in order to ensure their security. The USC becomes more specific in the details for maintaining a state militia. Specifically, it is the individual states’ rights and responsibility to raise, maintain, and train their militia; in today’s terminology, this is often referred to as State military status. However, there are times when the combined active duty and reserve forces are not sufficient to meet the security requirements of the nation. In this instance USC Title 32, National Guard authorizes the federalization of states’ militias.

Whenever Congress determines that more units and organizations are needed for the national security than are in the regular components of the ground and air forces, the Army National Guard of the United States and the Air National Guard of the United States, or such parts of them as are needed, together with such units

of other reserve components as are necessary for a balanced force, shall be ordered to active Federal duty and retained as long as so needed. (USC, Title 32)

This effectively provides three separate authorities for the establishment and use of military forces: active or reserve federal duty, state duty or federalized duty for state forces.

When considering a military response to a domestic disaster, therefore, all three authorities must be considered, and an appropriate mix of forces should be deployed based on the needs of the local or state authorities. In order to make this determination, it is again the authority of the USC that established the priority for domestic operations. The text of Title 32 USC also established that the National Guard forms the basis for the defense of the nation.

In accordance with the traditional military policy of the United States, it is essential that the strength and organization of the Army National Guard and the Air National Guard as an integral part of the first line defenses of the United States be maintained and assured at all times.

As indicated in the text of the USC, when it comes to security and defense of the nation, the National Guard is the first choice when military forces must be used to respond. However, federal military forces may also be required when the National Guard is not enough. In the case of planning for major natural disasters the affected state’s National Guard will be called upon to respond, followed by the National Guard units of other states that have established mutual aid agreements, and only after all those resources are exhausted will Title 10, Active Duty or Reserve forces be deployed in order to respond to the crisis. Although federalizing National Guard forces or deploying Title 10 forces may be required, this should be considered as a final resort to meeting the requirements of the
local or state authorities in order to ensure appropriate separation of power and preserve states’ rights.

In an attempt to codify this separation of military authority, Congress passed the *Posse Comitatus Act* stating the following:

> Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both. (USC, Title 18, Sect 1385)

This legislation specifically limits the ability of the military to intervene in civil affairs that are governed by the local or state authorities. However, in the case of a natural disaster there is the potential requirement for the military to respond in support of civil authorities. Under these circumstances the *Posse Comitatus Act* does not apply specifically, but does limit the type of mission that federal forces can accomplish. According to a Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report for Congress, “a number of instances where extraordinary circumstances warrant a departure from the general rule, particularly in cases where the armed forces provide civil assistance without becoming directly involved in civilian law enforcement” (Elsea 2005, 1). Therefore, provided federal military forces are not used in a law enforcement capacity, they are within legal authority to respond in support of civil authorities during a domestic disaster.

In order for federal military forces to respond, however, there is yet another set of legal parameters that must be met in order to ensure appropriate use of the military in the domestic environment. This authority is found in the USC, Title 41, section 5121, also know as the Stafford Act or the Disaster Mitigation Act. According to the USC, under this authority the President can direct agencies of the federal government to respond to natural
disasters that overwhelm local or state capabilities. The legal reasoning for allowing such action is:

(1) because disasters often cause loss of life, human suffering, loss of income, and property loss and damage; and

(2) because disasters often disrupt the normal functioning of governments and communities, and adversely affect individuals and families with great severity; special measures, designed to assist the efforts of the affected States in expediting the rendering of aid, assistance, and emergency services, and the reconstruction and rehabilitation of devastated areas, are necessary. (USC, Title 41, section 5121)

The recognition of the requirement for federal assistance however, is not a carte blanche for Presidential authority to direct federal agencies, including the military, into a disaster area. The USC also put in place carefully considered measures to ensure that states’ sovereignty is maintained despite this provision. To receive federal aid the state must request assistance from the President and a Presidential disaster or emergency declaration must be made. Equally, Section 5170 does not relieve the state of its obligation to provide assistance for its citizens. In the procedures for enacting this law, the state must also disclose the amount and type of resources applied to the response effort and must demonstrate that all possible resources are being used. Once these requirements are met and the President declares an emergency or disaster the following summarizes the specific assistance provided for under the Stafford Act.

§5170a. General Federal assistance: In any major disaster, the President may:

(1) direct any Federal agency, with or without reimbursement, to utilize its authorities and the resources granted to it under Federal law (including personnel, equipment, supplies, facilities, and managerial, technical, and advisory services) in support of State and local assistance efforts;

(2) coordinate all disaster relief assistance (including voluntary assistance) provided by Federal agencies, private organizations, and State and local governments;
(3) provide technical and advisory assistance to affected State and local governments for--

(A) the performance of essential community services;

(B) issuance of warnings of risks and hazards. (USC, Title 41)

Based on the provisions of the Stafford Act, DOD can be called upon by the President to contribute to the federal response. However, this authority does not supersede the limitations placed on the use of military force in other sections of the USC.

The authorities for DOD to provide assistance to FEMA, state or local authorities in response to a natural disaster are convoluted at best. However, the crux of legislation is aimed at balancing DOD’s authority to provide support without providing sufficient power for the military to become a tyrannical force that could threaten the constitutional liberties of the people. “Much of the preceding discussion urges the kind of consolidation and concentration of power (unity of effort) that could threaten our Madisonian principles. Therefore, it is essential to explore the appropriate balance between efficient and effective response to security challenges and protecting and preserving the same freedoms now threatened by changing security” (Keagle and Martin 2007, 6).

However, the balance of power that the legislation attempts to achieve does not represent the full limitation or authority governing DOD’s involvement in domestic disaster response operations. Rather, the Executive Branch can also confer upon DOD certain authority and power at its discretion under Constitutional authority. This is most often provided for under Executive Orders or Presidential Directives. In analyzing DOD’s authorities and responsibilities to act in domestic operations, Executive Orders 12148 and 12656 along with Homeland Security Presidential Directives Five (HSPD 5) and Eight (HSPD 8) must be reviewed.
Executive Order (EO) 12148, *Federal Emergency Management*, was enacted on 20 July 1979 by President Carter. This executive order established the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) as the executive agent for all federal emergency management. The order specifies FEMA’s responsibilities include “Federal policies for, and coordinate, all civil defense and civil emergency planning, management, mitigation, and assistance functions of Executive agencies” (U.S. National Archives and Records Administration 1979). Subsequent to the Homeland Security Act of 2002, which established the DHS, the Executive Order Amendment of Executive Orders signed by President Bush on 28 February 2003, aligned FEMA under the Department of Homeland security (The White House 2003a). However, the responsibilities and authorities provided to FEMA under EO 12148 remained the same.

Executive Order (EO) 12656, *Assignment of Emergency Preparedness Responsibilities*, was enacted on 18 November 1988, by President Reagan. EO 12656 reasserts FEMA’s responsibility for “the implementation of national security emergency preparedness policy by coordinating with other Federal departments [and] agencies and with State and local governments” (U.S. National Archives and Records Administration 1988). However, the order goes on to specify DOD’s lead responsibility for emergency preparedness, which includes the following:

(1) Ensure military preparedness and readiness to respond to national security emergencies;

(2) In coordination with the Secretary of Commerce, develop, with industry, government, and the private sector, reliable capabilities for the rapid increase of defense production to include industrial resources required for that production;

(3) Develop and maintain, in cooperation with the heads of other departments and agencies, national security emergency plans, programs, and mechanisms to ensure
effective mutual support between and among the military, civil government, and the private sector. (U.S. National Archives and Records Administration 1988)

The combined effect of EO 12148 and EO 12656 is to solidify FEMA’s responsibility for emergency management and preparedness. They also specify the responsibility of DOD to respond to national emergencies, albeit under the direction of FEMA and in close coordination with other Federal agencies and the private sector.

In addition to the standing Executive Orders, President George W. Bush also set national policy in regards to disaster response. HSPD-5 was released on 28 February 2003. The intent of the directive is to establish a “comprehensive national incident management system.” Under this policy, the President establishes the requirement for a federally mandated incident management system that will be implemented at all levels in order to enable a reasonable transition from local or state coordination to federal coordination when the Stafford Act is enacted. This directive not only mandated the full implementation of the National Incident Management System (NIMS), but also directed the establishment and review of the NRP, which serves to “integrate Federal Government domestic prevention, preparedness, response and recovery plans into one all-discipline, all-hazard plan” (The White House 2003b). Subsequent to HSPD-5, in December 2003, HSPD-8 was released as a companion directive. This directive further detailed the requirements for preparedness and support of the federal government to first responders. This support is primarily focused on preparedness goals, interoperability and establishment of preparedness goals for the nation. One of the most significant outcomes of HSPD-8 was the mandating of training and exercises across the federal government agencies. These two directives are important because they are often cited as the authority for federal agencies to conduct interagency coordination, training and exercises.
Although HSPD-5 and HSPD-8 are primarily policy documents, the wide acceptance of the NIMS and the NRP demonstrate the importance of such policy to establish and support interagency cooperation and coordination. The implementation of the NIMS is generally accepted as a success. “The NIMS’ components form a structure that attempts to decrease, not eliminate, potentially inefficient interactions between organizations attempting to respond to an incident” (Moore 2006, 21). However, the NRP was less successful in its initial implementation. Hurricane Katrina demonstrated that it is not possible to develop one comprehensive plan that would address all-hazards, across all disciplines and be applicable to every situation.

Since, its inception, the NRP has evolved into the NRF as discussed earlier in chapter one. The significant change is that the NRF now serves as a set of guiding principles that coordinates the implementation of a scalable, flexible federal response. However, there are still areas for improvement within the NRF; one particular issue specific to DOD is the requirement for providing disaster assistance in an austere environment. This is one area that DOD is particularly capable of supporting but is not specifically designated to support. A Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) report indicates this is one issue that DOD should seek to address in future discussions with FEMA. “Given the depth and breadth to which DOD can provide resources in an austere or dangerous environment, if asked to do so, it would be a logical organization to be a lead agency for that role early in the response to a catastrophe” (Miller/Strauss 2006, 3). However, until such issues are specifically addressed, the NRF is the framework within which DOD must support FEMA and other federal agencies. Therefore, it is essential that anyone involved in emergency response understand the structure of the NRF. This is
particularly important for DOD personnel, so that the support relationships are clear and
unity of effort can be achieved.

Finally, having reviewed the legislative framework and the academic approach to
emergency management and disaster response, one can now consider DOD’s involvement.
Effective 1 October 2002, US NORTHCOM was established as the newest Combatant
Command within DOD. The intent for the new command headquarters was to increase
DOD focus on homeland security with an emphasis on responding to terrorist attacks.
However, as NORTHCOM evolved between 2002 and 2005; consideration was given to
the possibility of supporting civil authorities for natural disasters. All of the preceding
laws and directives should be reflected in DOD’s domestic doctrine and policies, which
guide leaders at all levels on planning and participating in disaster response operations.
Since the enactment of the Goldwater Nichols Act of 1986, DOD was mandated to conduct
planning and operations within the context of the joint services. In other words, all
planning and operations must consider the Navy, Army, Marine Corps and Air Force
capabilities at appropriate levels. Based on this guidance, the primary doctrine for DOD is
found in Department of Defense Directives (DODD), and Joint Publications (JP); therefore
this research focuses on the joint doctrine as applicable to DSCA. It is however, important
to note that each respective service nests subordinate level doctrine to support the joint
document.

The two primary DODDs relevant to this topic is DODD 3025.1, “Military Support
to Civil Authorities (MSCA)” dated 15 January 1993, and DODD 3025.15, “Military
Assistance to Civil Authorities” dated 18 February 1997. These two directives direct the
DOD to conduct planning and prepare to support civil authorities. “Under the national
civil defense policy, the Department of Defense will support civil authorities in civil
defense, to include facilitating the use of the National Guard in each State for response in
both peacetime disasters and national security emergencies” (Department of Defense.
1993, 4). DODD 3025.1 specifically outlines the authorities and responsibilities based on
the Stafford Act and the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950. It provides legal direction for
all activities supporting civil defense and supporting civil authorities. DODD 3025.15
goes further to define when DOD will act in support of civil authorities. Essential
guidance that stems from 3025.15 includes the criteria for support, which is as follows:

All requests by civil authorities for DoD military assistance shall be evaluated by
DoD approval authorities against the following criteria:

4.2.1. Legality (compliance with laws).
4.2.2. Lethality (potential use of lethal force by or against DoD forces).
4.2.3. Risk (safety of DoD forces).
4.2.4. Cost (who pays, impact on DoD budget).
4.2.5. Appropriateness (whether the requested mission is in the interest of
   the Department to conduct).
4.2.6. Readiness (impact on the DoD’s ability to perform its primary
   mission). (Department of Defense 1997, 2-3)

DODD 3025.15 also further specifies the means for requesting and obtaining
approval for support to civil authorities. While both DODD provide guidance to leaders
and planners in preparing support to civil authorities, both documents are woefully
outdated given the changes in legislation and direction from the President (HSPD’s) since
the terrorist attacks of September 11th and Hurricane Katrina. DOD does have a draft
revision, DODD 3025.dd, which rescinds both previous directives and provides updated
guidance on responding to and supporting civil authorities. However, this document has
been in draft form since October 2007, therefore cannot be considered policy until final approval is obtained.

In addition to these two directives, the DOD Homeland Defense (HD) and Civil Support (CS) Joint Operating Concept attempts to provide a framework for implementing the directives in the 2012-2025 timeframe. “It provides an overarching conceptual perspective to facilitate Joint experimentation and assessment activities and assists in the development and integration of subsequent Joint Operating, Functional, and Integrating Concepts by identifying the desired end state, effects, and operational capabilities needed to conduct HD and civil support operations (Department of Defense 2006, 11). While this publication provides a conceptual framework for both HD and civil support, more than 90 percent of the publication only addresses HD. According to the publication, it is important “to understand that while DOD must be prepared to provide support when directed to civil authorities in civil support missions, HD missions are the primary focus and a higher priority for DOD” (Department of Defense 2006, 11). Therefore, there remains little guidance for leaders responding to civil support missions such as natural disasters. Finally, it is important to note that the Joint Operating Concept has remained in draft version since September 2006, because similar to DODD 3025.xx until the Joint Operating Concept is finalized it is not considered an authoritative document.

While the Joint Operating Concept remains in draft form, DOD has taken steps to further develop doctrine to support its role in civil support activities. JP 3-26, Homeland Security, is the authoritative doctrine for DOD’s support to the National Strategy for Homeland Security, and as such provides the military element of national power in the overall strategy. JP 3-26 provides direction to the services on planning for and responding
to a vast array of HS missions. Of specific interest to this research, JP 3-26 accounts for support to civil authorities in disaster response operations under the concept of Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA).

Military Support to Civil Authorities. MSCA refers to support provided by Federal military forces, DOD civilians, contractor personnel, and DOD agencies and components in response to requests for assistance during domestic incidents to include terrorist threats or attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies. MSCA missions consist of DOD support to US domestic emergencies and for designated law enforcement, civil disturbances, and other activities. (JP 3-26 2005, 10)

JP 3-26 also provides a notional model for HS campaign planning. Under this model there are four phases of the campaign: Deter/Engage, Seize the Initiative, Decisive Operations, and Transition as depicted in the image below.

Figure 2. Notional Homeland Security Campaign Model
This model generally reflects the HD mission sets, but can equally be used in describing civil support operations and will be considered further in chapter 4.

In addition to broad guidance on the types of civil support missions that are appropriate for DOD, JP 3-26 also provides guidance on command authorities with regard to civil support missions. Although specific command authorities as described in JP 0-2 remain in effect, JP 3-26 reinforces the command authority for civil support missions from the President, through the Secretary of Defense to the Commander of Northern Command. However, JP 3-26 also emphasizes that most DOD civil support missions are undertaken in support of local, state and other federal agencies and not as the Lead Federal Agency (LFA). As with all other command authorities, this not only directs the chain of command but also the process to request and receive approval for DOD assistance. Ensuring that this command authority is clearly described is critical to adherence the USC. This is best depicted in the following diagram.
Another key command authority described in the publication is the relationship of the National Guard. “The NG [National Guard] primarily operates under three different command relationships: federal funding and federal control (10 USC); federal funding and state control (32 USC); and state status (state funding and state control)” (JP 3-26 2005, 39). Because the National Guard can operate under any of these three command authorities it is important to understand the legal implications as well as the advantages.
and disadvantages of each of these statuses to determine the most appropriate command relationship for the circumstances.

Finally, JP 3-26 provides some planning considerations for civil support missions. According to the publication DOD is primarily concerned with the response phase of an emergency. “Response operations focus on those lifesaving and sustaining functions required by the population in the disaster area” (JP 3-26 2005, 72). This theory is narrowly focused on the concept of DOD support in a large-scale response. It does not account for the activities undertaken by DOD organizations such as the Army Corps of Engineers and its responsibility for prevention; nor does it account for the broader activities under the preparation phase, such as assistance for evacuation prior to an event, or medical support under the National Defense Medical System.

While JP 3-26 provides the broad DOD guidance for DSCA, it is the responsibility of US NORTHCOM to take this strategic guidance and establish operational strategies, goals and plans in accordance with the Unified Command Plan 2004. To fulfill its responsibility NORTHCOM has published a series of strategic, operational and tactical plans to address the responsibilities and unique environment associated with civil support missions. The NORTHCOM Concept of Operation (CONOP) envisions NORTHCOM’s responsibility as synchronizing national, state and local assets providing for the defense of the nation and support to civil authorities (NORTHCOM CONOP). In respect to support for civil authorities, the CONOP merely lists the potential missions that DOD may be involved in but does not provide any further guidance.

The operational level, authoritative guidance is established in the Civil Support Concept of Employment (CONEMP). “The scope of this CONEMP includes a description
of the situation, threat, command relationships, facts, assumptions, constraints, and limitations. It contains detailed discussions of the civil support mission areas and related mission processes, planning considerations, execution, command and control, and support details required to accomplish the mission-specific operational objectives” (NORTHCOM 2004, 1-1). The CONEMP covers all areas a support to civil authorities to include disaster relief, chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive (CBRNE) response, and other support to civil authorities as required. As the CONEMP prioritizes the mission areas related to these three broad areas of civil support, assisting civil authorities in the aftermath of major disasters or emergencies is second on the list of priorities (NORTHCOM 2004, 4-10).

Additionally, the CONEMP provides a framework for tiered response and command authorities. This discussion is not specific to any one type of civil support mission, but rather can be applied regardless of the event. The tiered response and associated command structure is based on the Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO) as the primary point of contact for all DOD assistance. It further builds on the concept of a graduated response based on the needs of the local authorities or the catastrophic nature of the event.

Specifically addressing the area of disaster relief, the CONEMP is meant to provide the authoritative guidance on specific planning scenarios. The applicable scenario for this research was found in section 4.5.1.2.1 Severe Weather Incidents Relief. However, the only guidance given for responding to severe weather incidents is a description of the process for requesting support for local authorities, which mirrors the guidance provided earlier in the document. This is inadequate. Rather, consideration should be given to
providing guidance on identifying capability gaps, working with local and state authorities, and working with FEMA and other ESF lead agencies. Additionally, there are sufficient lessons learned from previous severe weather incidents, such as Hurricane Katrina, that the CONEMP should provide more specific guidance on the types of missions likely to be required of DOD forces. These might include debris removal, search and rescue, prime power distribution, logistics, transportation, and medical evacuation. There is also a requirement for guidance in regard to the relationship between the active duty forces and the National Guard. This is an area that has the greatest potential for miscommunication among DOD forces and options for command structures along with the advantages and disadvantages should be discussed. It is key to note that despite the specific guidance expected at this level, the CONEMP does cite six additional plans that are classified SECRET that provide detailed planning. However, these are all dated between 1997 and 2000, which would indicate they are likely not current with the latest changes the operational environment and should be reviewed and re-published. Finally, it is questionable whether classified documents that are not releasable to the local and state officials whom they are designed to support are the optimum solution for creating unity of effort in planning for domestic natural disaster response operations.

In summary, although these two documents, the CONOP and CONEMP, provide broad guidance on how DOD will respond, they provide little detail on how specifically DOD will support civil authorities. This is primarily a result of these being concept documents and not operational plans. However, in times of crisis, when saving lives is the priority, more should be done to develop specific plans in advance. In order for DOD to develop this sort of detailed plan, NORTHCOM must gain better situational awareness of
the types of missions and capabilities required by local authorities. Identifying the critical capabilities required is the key to deliberate planning that will reduce reaction times and improve the overall response and support to local responders. According to a Government Accountability Office (GAO) report released in April 2008, NORTHCOM has not conducted a systematic review of state plans in order to derive such information and gain an understanding of the capabilities and challenges facing the local and state authorities (GAO 2008a, 21).
CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY

This thesis attempts to answer the question: Does Department of Defense (DOD) planning support civil authorities’ operations in response to natural disasters? In order to do this, the research focuses on the legal framework for DOD support to civil authority operations and current DOD doctrine that can be applied to planning. The problem is analyzed in terms of lessons learned from New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina and the changes made since.

Research Methodology

The research conducted was categorized into three areas: academic works, legislation, and DOD doctrinal references; lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina are interspersed among the three research areas. Academic works define the nature of disaster response operations and the needs of citizens affected by disasters. These references are primarily academic texts and reports used to teach and train emergency managers or emergency management professionals. The majority of information gathered provides a greater understanding of the environment and conditions that cause federal agencies to become involved in a disaster response. The resources found under academic works also include educational materials that explain the principles, which are categorized as “best practices” in the field of emergency management.

The next category of research, legislation, identifies the USC sections and titles that define the federal government’s roles, responsibilities, and limitations in providing assistance to the state and local government. Included in this research are Reports for
Congress that debate the current application of the legislation from a historical perspective, as well as, debating the validity of certain points of the USC. Additionally, testimony by public officials and private sector advisors to Congress during Congressional Reviews or Inquiries are included in this category of research. However, only that testimony that is publicly available was used in order for this thesis to remain unclassified. Finally, state and local legislation specific to the city of New Orleans was considered to provide a more complete and accurate description of the legal authorities involved during a disaster response operation. This is required to demonstrate that gaps exists because of legislative authorities and also sets the conditions for understanding the uniqueness of a response effort in a particular population center.

Doctrine is the third category of research used in this thesis. This includes frameworks, standard operating procedures and doctrine from the DHS, FEMA, and DOD including US NORTHCOM. Along with the agencies’ doctrine recent monographs and articles about the effectiveness of such doctrine were examined. The research also identifies what was doctrine then, and what has changed in the federal response effort. This is done in an attempt to identify how DOD has adjusted its planning process to support the civil authorities and answers several of the supporting research questions.

Finally, included in all three areas of research were government official records, synopses and lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina that provide insight into what was required of DOD and how well DOD supported civil authorities. This research also includes personal accounts of individuals involved in the response effort and those affected the storm. These sources provided the background and insight into specific events during and after Hurricane Katrina. Although not the focal point of this thesis, these reports and
anecdotes were important to the research in order to understand the gaps in capabilities and the needs of the people affected by a major hurricane. Individuals currently serving in emergency management for the local, state, or federal government authored a majority of the sources. However, the academic works and the reports for Congress are authored by academic specialist in the field of research for emergency management or Homeland Security.

Analysis Methodology

The analysis compares DOD’s support to the city of New Orleans’ response during and after Hurricane Katrina to current plans to support civil authorities as described in the NORTHCOM CONOP and CONEMP. Using Hurricane Katrina as a case study allowed the research to identify what areas DOD may be required to provide support and how changes in planning may improve DOD’s support to civil authorities. This methodology allowed for analysis and conclusions based on projections of requirements and suggested areas for future improvement.

The DOD standard doctrine for identifying capability gaps and requirements for future development is often explained in terms of DOTML-PF. Therefore it was reasonable to use the same construct when considering the applicability of DOD’s plans to support civil authorities. Analysis of doctrine considered the guidance and direction provided through the DOD Directives and NORTHCOM’s CONOP and CONEMP. Organizational analysis considers how the leadership, planning and potential command structure was established both in times of crisis, and during normal operations. Training is analyzed to determine if the appropriate level of training supports improved response operations or supports an improved planning process. It also considered whether the long-
term development of leaders and planners prepares them to respond to the needs of local and state authorities. Materiel was not analyzed in detail based on the fact that in the preliminary research there was no indication that DOD was unable to perform a civil support mission because it lacked adequate equipment. Personnel capabilities were analyzed to determine whether planners had the appropriate skills, knowledge and leader attributes to coordinate effectively within the NRF construct. Facilities were not evaluated for the same reasons as materials.

The next chapter applies this research methodology to analyze the changes made to the procedures for local and federal responses to a natural disaster in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. This analysis focuses on answering the primary research question: Considering changes made up until July 2008, does current DOD planning support the civil authorities’ operations in response to natural disasters?
CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Chapter 2 reviewed the current federal and DOD doctrine for planning disaster response operations. Analysis shows that the academic principle of managing a crisis at the local level is diametrically opposed to the practical application of deliberate planning for a federal response. This is because there are political and organizational challenges to detailed planning at the local level; however, in order to plan an appropriate federal response these detailed plans are required. Regardless of this friction, however, it is imperative that both principles are upheld and are mutually supportive. This chapter will discuss how DOD as one part of the federal response can bridge the gap in planning through the application of appropriate doctrine in order to ensure a more efficient and effective federal response.

The most complex dimension of emergency management discovered in this research is the diametrically opposed nature of disaster response planning. This phenomenon occurs because the principles of handling a disaster at the lowest level and nesting planning based on the NRF cause significant friction. At the local level there are often only one or two persons in the city emergency management office that are focused on planning. Therefore the depth and breadth as well as the man-hours dedicated to conduct detailed planning for the full range of capabilities across all hazards and all ESFs are limited by the personnel capabilities of the local emergency management offices. As planning moves up to higher organizations in the scaled response framework, the available personnel to conduct detailed planning increases as does the understanding of the range of response capabilities or resources required and available. Unfortunately, because much of
the response is dependent on the lower level plans which are not developed to the same
level of detail, many higher-level plans must rely on assumptions in their planning. This
results in state and federal plans being based on false assumptions that when tested during
a real emergency result in significant gaps in the available capabilities required to respond
effectively. When this occurs, FEMA is often left with short or no-notice resource
requirements. Depending on the required capability, the first option is always to look for
support from other federal agencies to fill the gap. However, DOD “with its active duty
and reserve forces, and the potential of federalizing National Guard units, has the largest
and most diversified personnel assets in the Federal Government” (Bowman 2003, 3).
Combining the diverse capabilities and the ability to rapidly deploy them, DOD is often the
only federal agency that can respond to such gaps. Therefore, DOD is tasked to deliver the
required capability, provided it meets the legal requirements.

Since Hurricane Katrina, every level of government responsible for responding to a
hurricane or other natural disaster in New Orleans has revised its operations. At the local
level, the city of New Orleans has developed a more comprehensive plan for responding to
a disaster. The revised plan incorporates planning for all phases of the emergency to
include a detailed evacuation plan that is resourced and has been exercised. The City’s
revised plan also developed a systematic program for re-entry back to the city in the
aftermath of the disaster (Sneed 2008).

At the federal level, FEMA has made significant changes which affect the support
required by DOD. One of the most significant changes is the detailed gap analysis that
FEMA is attempting to implement. This gap analysis attempts to identify the full range of
capabilities at the local or state level in order to reduce the amount unplanned capabilities
required to respond. The gap analysis is conducted during the deliberate planning phase and considers all phases of the operation: mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery.

Considering the changes that were made just between the city of New Orleans and FEMA in planning and preparing for future disasters, the requirements for DOD support to civil authorities have changed. However, this is to a far lesser degree because the resource gaps that existed during Hurricane Katrina generally still exist. The most significant change then is that DOD is increasingly aware of the gaps and can plan more effectively. 

Generally, the support that will likely be required from DOD is best analyzed through the application of a center of gravity analysis of the situation. Combining the fundamentals of emergency management and the principles of DOD planning, the center of gravity\(^4\) is determined to be the local disaster responders. Their critical capabilities include the ability to evacuate personnel, provide shelter for evacuees, conduct search and rescue operations, respond to health emergencies, protect critical infrastructure, protect citizens and their property, and maintain law and order. The critical requirements to support these capabilities include trained responders, transportation capable of operating in an austere environment, food and water, shelter in the disaster area, fuel, communications network, and medical supplies. Having identified the capabilities and requirements that the local responders bring to the disaster response, federal authorities, including DOD, can then consider what vulnerabilities exist which would equate to a gap during a disaster. Further analysis into the capabilities and requirements also identifies the vulnerabilities to a unified

\(^4\)According to DOD, the center of gravity is “the source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act” (JP 3-0). In other words, the center of gravity is the one person, organization or entity that without it the operation would fail. Although this is typically used when analyzing enemy forces in a combat environment, it also provides a useful construct for analyzing any operation. In terms of emergency management therefore the center of gravity is determined to be the local responders.
response. Some the most critical vulnerabilities include unity of effort control structure, interoperable communications to facilitate the response, speed to deploy into the affected area and equipment capable of operating in an austere environment. Based on a similar analysis, FEMA begins to identify what federal resources are available to provide support. However, because of the austere environment often times DOD is often the only federal agency with the capabilities to fill these gaps.

Understanding the critical requirements, capabilities and vulnerabilities of the local responders provides a starting point for DOD planning. From this point, consideration of the federal response capabilities allows DOD to effectively narrow the scope of the potential support required during a disaster response operation. Before a request for support is sent to DOD the current FEMA and DOD doctrine is to analyze these requirements in terms of cost, appropriateness, resources, readiness, and legality. This provides the best possible framework in order to determine disaster assistance missions for DOD. However, this does not automatically assume that Title 10 forces are the answer to fill these gaps. When DOD considers its response, it will first consider the full range of capabilities to include the National Guard. The advantage of using the National Guard is they can perform functions that Title 10 forces cannot while filling the same gaps. “The NG [National Guard] also has the capability to operate in austere or dangerous environments and, as described above, use of Guard forces versus DOD active-duty forces depends on the magnitude of the catastrophe and the wishes of the states’ Governors”
Because this overlap exists, it is important that DOD is not only aware of National Guard capabilities and plans for responding to disasters, but rather must ensure that plans are integrated.

The type and level of assistance required from DOD to support the New Orleans authorities in the aftermath of a disaster has not have changed dramatically in the past three years. According to Ebbert, there are still more than 10,000 citizens that will require evacuation if a comparable hurricane strikes (Bier 2006, 246). Additionally, the levee system is still vulnerable to breaches and overtops which would flood the city and overwhelm local resources. In such cases, similar requirements for search and rescue teams as well as debris removal exist. What has changed is how DOD addresses its responsibilities to support civil authorities. These changes can be analyzed at the strategic and operational levels of command in terms of doctrine, organization, training, material, personnel and facilities. However, much of these changes have not been formally approved and even with the changes made to date, significant changes are still required in order to provide a more effective response.

Changes in DOD doctrine, organization, training, and personnel would improve its ability to plan and respond effectively. The first step in this process is to finalize and publish DODD 3025.xx. The revised directive accounts for changes in legislation that occurred after Katrina such as the authority to act preemptively in times of a known crisis, for example before an impending hurricane reaches land. Additionally, this update in the
DOD directive assigns responsibility to US NORTHCOM to plan and execute DSCA operations as well as incorporate DSCA into the joint training and exercise program, and importantly, develop “an implementation plan for insuring DSCA support is emphasized in command assessments” (Department of Defense 2007a, 6). The significance of this directive is that it ensures appropriate emphasis on DSCA and reduces the risk of DSCA missions being overlooked in planning because of a greater emphasis on HD missions.

As noted in chapter 2, the NORTHCOM CONOP and CONEMP also serve as operational level authoritative doctrine for planning DSCA operations. However, the broad nature of the documents and the lack of specific guidance in fact provide little insight into how DOD will actually respond. It is recommended that, as a minimum, the CONEMP provide more specific guidance for DSCA planners. This guidance should include two critical aspects: a whole of Defense approach that considers the four phases of emergency planning. First, the whole of Defense approach means that planning should incorporate the activities of all DOD organizations such as the US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) and the US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM). This would provide the interdepartmental coordination of all defense activities and ensure supporting activities are aware of the full scope of requirements during a disaster response. This would prevent defense agencies from expecting support from other agencies that has not been previously coordinated and which may reduce available assets for response operations. An example of this is the detailed planning required to coordinate airlift of defense assets into a disaster area while simultaneously expecting the same assets to conduct evacuation operations.
The second critical aspect of planning guidance is the need to consider all four phases of emergency planning. This is most applicable at the strategic and operational levels of command. For example, developing the plans starting in the mitigation phase, where USACE is a significant player, allows DOD to ensure steps are taken early to reduce the gaps in capability and in turn reduce the requirements for a substantial military response effort. This concept also allows DOD to better identify the remaining gaps. DOD can then set conditions such as pre-staging equipment or resources in the phases prior to the disaster. Finally, in the recovery phase, consideration can be given to increasing the capacity of local or state responders (equipment, training, technical expertise) during the redeployment of forces, which could reduce future gaps. This concept is not original in thought, merely the application of joint operations planning principles as discussed in JP 3-0 described in the domestic environment.

In a similar manner, a range of military operations also discussed in JP 3-0 can be applied in the domestic environment. Specifically, the concept of developing a state engagement plan to better plan, prepare and respond to domestic disasters. According to JP 3-0, “military engagement is the routine contact and interaction between individuals or elements of the Armed Forces of the United States and those of another nation’s armed forces, or foreign and domestic civilian authorities or agencies to build trust and confidence, share information, coordinate mutual activities, and maintain influence” (JP 3-0 2006, I-8). In a domestic setting, this concept would partner DOD planners, leaders and organizations with local, state, and other federal agencies to achieve a similar goal. Specifically, this partnership should be considered at the DCO/DCE level where planning expertise specific to the state and local communities within states would increase DOD’s
understanding of the operational environment during a domestic disaster. Such partnership would also facilitate improved situational awareness of the capabilities and gaps that would enhance DOD’s deliberate planning and may create opportunities to better utilize DOD assets before a disaster, reducing the risk to persons, property, and key infrastructure which could ultimately reduce the amount of forces required during a response operation. Significantly, there is no legal restriction to such activity.

While the doctrinal changes are considered, equal consideration must also be given to the appropriate organizational structure to support the doctrine. The establishment of NORTHCOM as a Combatant Command has gone a long way in improving DOD’s focus on domestic security, additional changes within the organizational structure must also occur. Specifically, the Defense Coordinating Element (DCE) that provides tactical, operational, and strategic coordination must become a joint organization. This not only meets the intent of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, but also is a logical solution for providing better support to the civil authorities. This can be accomplished through increasing the capacity of the planning and logistics staff sections to become joint sections, establishing the DCO as joint positions and incorporating the Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers (EPLOs) into the command structure of the DCE.

First, assigning the DCO positions as a joint billet allows NORTHCOM to select commanders for each region that have the experience and knowledge more closely aligned with the likely response force. In the case of selecting appropriate joint force commanders as DCOs, that determination would be based on the most likely threat and the subsequent response required in order to assign an officer with the appropriate experience and knowledge to respond quickly and effectively. For example, consider FEMA Region VI
the major weather threats are from hurricanes in Louisiana and the Gulf Coast of Texas, and tornadoes in the other states. A quick assessment of the threats and local capabilities indicates the majority of DOD involvement in a disaster response operation would be providing search and rescue, debris removal and transportation for supplies and for other federal agencies. Given this mission set, it is likely that the preponderance of forces would be ground forces and likely Army. Therefore, the DCO for the region should be an Army officer. In another circumstance, if the major threat for the region was a nuclear hazard, then a naval officer with a nuclear background may be more appropriate.

The second recommendation, expanding the planning and logistics staff, allows a planning team dedicated to each state in the region. This fosters detailed planning through the establishment of area subject matter experts (SME). It is envisioned that this team of two personnel per state would become the SME on the terrain including the human dimension, most likely threats, key state and local officials and their comprehensive plans. These SME must apply the all-hazards approach to planning while synchronizing all activities within FEMA’s planning. The advantage is this organizational structure creates a dedicated staff to conduct planning and closely consider the lower-level plans in order to better identify possible support requirements that DOD will have to fill. Making these positions joint provides the expertise to bring the full range of military options into the planning early. Additionally, shifting this focus from the EPLO to the DCE creates a capability to conduct planning and outreach on a full-time basis.

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6It is likely there are other major threats that should be considered; however, because this research focused on weather events that is the perspective for this recommendation. Certainly, all-hazards threat analysis should be applied to this theory.
Finally, incorporating the EPLO into the command structure of the DCE establishes a unity of command that may not otherwise be present if individual service representatives have chains of command through the services and not centralized through the DCO to higher. “Unity of effort is a “comprehensive approach”—that requires effective coordination and integration among federal government departments and agencies, NGOs [non government organizations], IGOs [inter-government organizations], the private sector, and among nations in any alliance or coalition throughout an entire operation” (JP 3-0 2006, II-3). In accordance with JP 3-0, Joint Operations, unity of effort is essential to the success of any operation. This becomes even more important when the effort must synchronize the operations of DOD with other federal agencies as well as the local and state authorities.

The combined outcome of the previous three recommendations is a revised command structure that is depicted by the following organizational structure chart.

Table 1. Proposed DCE Organizational Structure
This organization is based on functional command structure during routine operations. However, during an emergency the organization structure is flexible enough to be reorganized in support of the crisis. Using the example of a hurricane event, which develops in the Gulf of Mexico and is tracking to make landfall in the US Gulf Coast, and based on the recommendations provided, it is envisioned that the DCE would establish its Emergency Operations Center and stand-up 24-hour support within FEMA Region VI as per standard operating procedures. In this example the organization structure might be depicted as below.

Table 2. Proposed Organizational Structure (During Crisis Operations)
This type of flexible command structure may appear similar to the concept of a standing joint force headquarters (core element) (SJTF (CE) as described in JP 3-0. This is intentional as the principles for establishing a SJTF (CE) is the same principle for maintaining the DCE. “The SJFHQ (CE) is staffed during peacetime to provide a core element of trained personnel that may serve as both a nucleus of key functional and C2 [command and control] expertise and a foundation on which to build, through augmentation, the joint C2 capability for specific mission areas” (JP 3-0 2006, II-15). In a domestic environment applying this structure allows the DCE to develop the subject matter expertise specific to each state for all-hazards planning. Maintaining this structure during a crisis would increase the effectiveness of the response because of the resident expertise of the capabilities and challenges of the local authorities and potential requirements for DOD response.

The recommended changes in organizational structure and doctrine require DOD to establish a foundation of adequately trained individuals to fill such positions. Currently, NORTHCOM’s solution for training is a multi-tiered program incorporating FEMA Independent Study Training Series 700 (NIMS) and 800 (NRF) along with an introduction to DSCA in a two-phase training session. DSCA Phase I is a distance-learning package that reviews the fundamentals of IS 700 and 800 and introduces students to DOD’s responsibilities and organization established to support DSCA missions. DSCA Phase II is a 32-hour seminar that again reviews the fundamentals covered in Phase I, but goes more in depth on the legal authorities, the DOD organizations that typically respond to an event, and the process required for civil authorities to request support (U.S. Army North G7). This training culminates in a capstone tabletop exercise that attempts to place students in
scenarios where they will make decisions either as part of the DCE, the Joint Force Land Component Commander (JFLCC) or NORTHCOM.

While this training is effective in providing students with an overview of DSCA, it falls short in preparing individuals to plan an effective response. The program lacks detailed discussions of the capabilities of other federal agencies with which DOD must coordinate. Most specifically, there is little to no direct contact with FEMA planners to discuss planning and coordination conducted at their level. Equally lacking is contact with state and local planners who can provide a perspective of the capabilities and limitations of their response. Because these elements are missing from the training program, it does not accurately portray the DSCA environment or prepare planners for the challenges they will face.

In addition to the DSCA course, NORTHCOM has partnered with the University of Colorado in establishing the Homeland Security/Defense Education Consortium, which is “a network of teaching and research institutions focused on promoting education, research, and cooperation related to and supporting the homeland security/defense mission” (GAO 08-251 2008a, 35). According to a recent GAO report, NORTHCOM is also committed to increasing its partnership with other federal agencies and private industry. “The goal is to develop educational opportunities for interagency and state/federal environment planners to inform them of other agencies’ homeland security responsibilities to improve overall cooperation and coordination” (GAO-08-251 2008a, 34). Based on this goal, NORTHCOM should consider expanding the program to correspond with the industry standard for certifying emergency managers, which is the Certified Emergency Management qualification offered through the International Association of Emergency
Mangers (IAEM) (IAEM 2008). This program is a combination of education, training, experience, and contributions to the profession. The benefit for expanding the training is best stated in the IAEM.

A Certified Emergency Manager® (CEM®) has the knowledge, skills and ability to effectively manage a comprehensive emergency management program. A CEM® has a working knowledge of all the basic tenets of emergency management, including mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery. A CEM® has experience and knowledge of interagency and community-wide participation in planning, coordination and management functions designed to improve emergency management capabilities. (2008)

The qualifications described meet the training needs of DOD and will also ensure planners are better prepared to coordinate effectively with emergency managers and other disaster response professionals. Remembering that during DSCA missions DOD is in support of civilian agencies, it should adopt their best practices to ensure interoperability. Finally, DOD and specifically NORTHCOM must inform potential planners and members of the defense community of the training opportunities available. Based on experience in conducting this research, the access to information on these educational opportunities is limited to individuals in the educational institutions and is not widely disseminated.

The final area of analysis conducted in this research considered the personnel assets available to conduct planning for civil support missions. Currently, there are no military specializations in homeland security for officers, warrant officers or enlisted members of any service. However, research does not indicate that such specific career field specialization is actually required. In fact, the broader expertise of the military forces ensures planners operating in the DSCA community are better able to articulate the capabilities of their respective service, branch or functional area. However, as NORTHCOM and DOD develop a cadre of individuals with training and education in the
field of civil support, there should be recognition for these individuals and their qualifications. For an Army officer this is easily translated into an Additional Skill Identifier (ASI) and would also be recognized in the Education portion of their official personnel file. Additionally, individuals who achieve the CEM qualification should receive recognition in the technical qualifications/certifications of their personnel file. In doing this, DOD can better track individuals with expertise in the field of Homeland Security and can be considered for key leadership or planning positions in the future.

Deliberately establishing a cadre of experts in the field of Homeland Security is just one step in a long process for DOD to continue improving its support to civil authorities. Other areas for improvement are the education, training, organizational structure, and doctrine. The analysis applied current higher-level military doctrinal concepts to the emerging field of civil support. The initial conclusion is that DOD doctrine, applied appropriately to the civil support mission, adequately supports DOD’s DSCA mission. The recommendations provided demonstrate one method of applying this doctrine to achieve a more effective civil support operation.
CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS

This thesis has explored the effectiveness of DOD planning in light of changes made after Hurricane Katrina. The focus was an attempt to identify if these changes are sufficient to form the basis for an improved response to future domestic disasters. It considered the legal framework that authorizes DOD response to domestic disasters, academic research on the subject, as well as DOD’s own planning processes. The final conclusion is that the changes made have improved DOD’s ability to respond effectively, but there are always opportunities for continuous improvement.

Based on the literature reviewed, DOD’s planning is within the legal construct of the USC. There is little evidence to show that greater or more restrictive authority is required to ensure a timely and effective response for future natural disasters without disrupting the constitutional balance of powers between the states and the federal government. However, the detailed planning required by DOD to anticipate and plan prior to an event does conflict with some local and state planning parameters. One solution is to establish solid relationships with the local leaders and offer technical assistance in planning and exercise development. This can best be accomplished through the DCO and DCE if adequate personnel and resources are assigned to meet the requirements of each specific region.

Of the analysis provided and the recommendations for areas of continued improvement, the two changes that could make the greatest impact in the near term are the revised organizational structure of the DCE and the development of a detailed state engagement plan. The revised organizational structure allows DOD to establish the subject
matter expertise required to effectively anticipate and respond to civil authority’s requirements. The proposed organizational structure allows for the greatest flexibility in establishing a joint task force when a substantial force is required to respond effectively. Additionally, fully integrating the EPLOs into the organization structure is a critical component of establishing unity of command for joint forces responding to a disaster. The outcome of such changes to the organizational structure is a synchronized DOD response that brings to bear the full range of capabilities from all services, the reserve component, and federalized National Guard.

Equally important to improving DOD’s response to disasters is a detailed state engagement plan. This provides DOD access to the information required to develop deliberate plans focused on supporting the local and state authorities. It enables DOD to coordinate with local and state authorities early, and develop a thorough understanding of the capabilities and requirements for supporting the local authorities. The state engagement also provides the opportunity for DOD to set the conditions for effective response through mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery operations to continually improve the level of planning and the capabilities of the local authorities. This would reduce the amount of time required for substantial federal military forces to be actively involved in the response. In developing the state engagement plan, DOD must remain mindful that all activity must be coordinated through FEMA as the lead federal agency. However, FEMA’s capabilities to plan with and or actively participate in the development of a state engagement should not inhibit DOD from working with local or state responders, as there are no legal restrictions to prevent DOD from working at this level.
The interdependence of these two recommendations however, increases the difficulty of achieving the objective of improving domestic disaster response operations. In order to actively engage the state and local authorities ensure that state and local plans are nested within FEMA plans, and conduct the actual planning, DOD must increase its capability to conduct such interagency coordination. The best method is through operational level, centralized planning conducted through the DCE. The DCE has established interagency agreements with FEMA and with state and local officials. Therefore, it is logical to build upon this structure in order to foster the relationships established and continue to build capacity at the local and state level without infringing on state or local authorities.

DOD’s role to support civil authorities during domestic disaster response operations requires detailed planning balanced with careful consideration of the state and local plans. DOD has the appropriate legal and doctrinal authorities to adequately balance this requirement. However, the application of DOD’s planning methods can and should improve in order to develop closer interagency ties and a solid working relationship with the local and state authorities. A critical aspect of improving the working relationship with interagency partners as well as state and local authorities is the releasability of information required to support their plans. The current DOD concept of operations and employment is not adequate to inform these organizations of DOD’s support capabilities. The fact that the operational plans are classified is contrary to the intent to develop open working relationships that support state and local authorities. Therefore, the operational plans to support civil authorities should be de-classified to the greatest extent possible. Additionally, DOD must also engage the broader public and improve its strategic
communications efforts to best inform the citizens of its support to civil authorities. Open communications and planning at all levels will improve the cooperation and coordination required to achieve unity of effort in disaster response operations.

In line with developing interagency cooperation and building relationships with local responders, DOD must consider how it is training its planners who work in this environment. It is important to understand that DOD is ensconced in doctrine that dictates how planning is conducted. However, most other government agencies, state and local authorities do not conduct planning in the same manner. Therefore, DOD should incorporate best practices and training in order to prepare its personnel to conduct close coordination with other emergency managers. This can easily be accomplished through the addition of training requirements, such as the FEMA Independent Study program and the IAEM Certified Emergency Manager program. This will develop at least a common understanding of the principles of emergency management and planning, and will also provide key opportunities for planners to interact with non-DOD emergency managers and planners. Then, once DOD begins to develop this personnel capability, it is critical to track the individuals with this expertise. This is an important element of improving DOD’s response because it will ensure that properly trained individuals are called upon to work with civilian authorities in a time of crisis and will allow DOD to further expand its capability gradually until it becomes a robust capability. Assigning an Additional Skill Identifier is one way to track Army officers with these qualifications and similar tracking mechanisms should be applied across all the services for officers and enlisted personnel.

This thesis has considered the broad scope of DOD’s planning to support domestic disaster response operations. It is neither comprehensive from an all-hazards planning
perspective, nor from a whole of government perspective. This thesis should serve to establish a new start point for future research. The impact that Hurricane Katrina had on the Gulf Coast of the United States was so significant that not only did the nation rebuild the affected communities, but it also had to rebuild how the nation responds to natural disaster at the federal level. The 2008 hurricane season demonstrated a significant shift in local, state, and federal coordination based on the lesson learned from Katrina. This should therefore become the start point for future research into how effectively the federal government responds to local and state needs during a crisis. Areas of research that require more consideration include greater depth into the human resources implications of recommendations proposed here both for the organizational structure and the tracking of individuals with emergency management education or experience. Another area to consider is recommendations for the development of doctrine that supports best practices in an all-hazards emergency management response for DOD. Further, research into the application of the current doctrine and organization for a larger scale disaster, such as a New Madrid Seismic fault event, would also be significant. In such research, consideration should be given to how the US should build on the current interagency-tiered response in order to incorporate international assistance that may be required.

DOD will always uphold its responsibility to support and defend the Constitution of the United States and to protect the nation from enemies foreign and domestic. This includes being prepared to respond to the threat and devastation caused by nature. In accordance with its professional commitment to continuous improvement, it is without doubt that both DOD and NORTHCOM will seek out ways to ensure a more effective and efficient response in time of natural disasters. In doing so, it is imperative that DOD
continues to work with FEMA, state and local authorities to develop plans that best support the citizens of this nation in their time of need.


Moore, Maximo A. 2006. “Rescuing DoD from too much of a good thing: The wrong kind of disaster response.” Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, Ft Leavenworth, KS.


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