

THE STRATEGIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE TRINIDAD AND
TOBAGO DEFENCE FORCE

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Strategy

by

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ABSTRACT

APPLYING STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT METHODOLOGY TO A MILITARY FORCE IN A SMALL DEVELOPING STATE: THE CASE OF THE TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO DEFENCE FORCE, by Lt Col Rodney L.A. Smart, 189 Pages.

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ACRONYMS

BG	Brigadier General
CARICOM	Caribbean Common Market
CARIFTA	Caribbean Free Trade Association
DGDP	Directorate of Graduate Degree Programs
GDP	Graduate Degree Programs
MG	Major General
OECS	Organization of Eastern Caribbean States
TTCG	Trinidad and Tobago Coast Guard
TTDF	Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force
TTR	Trinidad and Tobago Regiment
TTDFR	Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force Reserves
US	United States

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

[I]gnorance of an organization's past can undermine the development of strategies for its future.

— Mintzberg, Ahlstrand, Lampel

This research study is about strategy, although not military strategy. Rather, using the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force as a case study, the author examines a military organization's experience in implementing strategic planning, as a model for responding to its competitive environment.

This research paper is therefore broader than military competitiveness, which forms only one aspect of the researcher's concerns. Establishing this position up front is critically important especially within a military community, since the mere mention of the term strategy to many military professionals, immediately conjures up images of military competition. Therefore, more specifically, this paper examines the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force's approach to organization strategy. In defining this term, the author slightly amends Thompson and Strickland's business focused definition, and views organization strategy as, "the combination of competitive moves, approaches, and counter-moves that the Force employs, to compete successfully and achieve its strategic direction (vision, mission, values, objectives etc.)."¹

Formed in July 1962, the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force commenced formal strategic planning as its strategic management model, thirty years later in 1992.² The

¹ Alonzo Strickland and Arthur Thompson, *Crafting and Executing Strategy: Text and Readings* (New York: McGraw-Hill/Irwin 2001), 3.

² Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force Strategic Plan 1992-2000.

decision by MG Ralph Brown, the Chief of Defence Staff, was more a strategic move rather than a technical innovation. The General, recognizing that the Government was introducing strategic planning as a mechanism to reform the Public Service, used this as leverage, to gain the Government's commitment in establishing a proper Force Headquarters.³ This indirect approach the General found necessary, since attempts by former Chiefs of Defence Staff failed to gain previous Governments' commitment for the initiative. Past Administrations while in principle agreeing with the concept, made no provisions for establishing the Headquarters, leaving an ad hoc arrangement to persist.⁴

However, since officially implementing strategic planning in 1996, and despite two condensed iterations,⁵ the Force has not assessed the effectiveness of its initial attempt. This study therefore aims to examine the level of effectiveness the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force achieved in its initial attempt at strategic planning, and if necessary, to recommend an improved model.

This paper therefore proceeds with a background and case study of the problem in Chapter 1. Chapter 2 expands on this foundation and through a comprehensive literature review, examines some of the principal academic and practical studies specific to the field of strategic management, as this study takes the approach that strategic planning is a component of the wider discipline of strategic management. Next, Chapter 3 articulates the research methodology used in the study, and emphasizes areas such as data collection

³ Major General Ralph Brown, Interview by author, Trinidad and Tobago, 6 April 2009.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Sandra Lynch, Acting Deputy Permanent Secretary, Interview by author, Trinidad and Tobago, 9 April 2009.

and data reduction. In Chapter 4, the researcher conducts an in-depth analysis of the research problem, which provides the basis for the results and recommendations made in Chapter 5

Background

Trinidad and Tobago is a small twin island republic with a combined land mass of 5,128 km² (1978 sq mi), located at the base of the Caribbean archipelago of islands.⁶ Similarly, her Defense Force is small, comprised of less than five thousand (5000) members. The Force is a division of the Ministry of National Security, and is divided into a Force Headquarters and four Formations (Units/Services). These Formations comprise a Regiment (Land Force) of brigade size, a Coast Guard (Naval/Maritime Force), an Air Guard, and a Reserve.

A Chief of Defence Staff, usually in the rank of Brigadier General, has operational command and managerial authority over the Force. On a daily basis, the Chief of Defence Staff responds to a Minister of National Security. The Minister also chairs the Defence Council that provides oversight and is responsible for the Force's development. In turn, the Minister responds to the Prime Minister and his Cabinet. The Prime Minister, his Minister of National Security, and the Chief of Defence Staff form the nucleus of the National Security Council. At the top of this structure is the President who is the ceremonial Head of State, and the Commander in Chief of the Defence Force.⁷

⁶ CIA World Fact Book. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/print/td.html>. (accessed on 1 May 2009).

⁷ The Trinidad and Tobago Defence Act, Chapter 14:01 of the Laws of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago.

Blessed with oil and natural gas deposits, Trinidad and Tobago has one of the strongest economies in the region.⁸ Consequently, despite the nation's small size, Trinidad and Tobago has accepted the role of "regional big brother" and on several occasions in the past, provided financial assistance to her lesser-able regional neighbors. This assistance is a component of the nation's foreign policy, and especially in times of natural or man-made disasters, Trinidad and Tobago can be relied upon to render assistance to the stricken state. Along with financial aid to these countries, Trinidad and Tobago has occasionally deployed her military overseas, as a subset of her assistance package. Thus, despite its limited capabilities and size, the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force since its formation, sees itself as having a regional expeditionary role to fulfill. As a result, the Defence Force has participated in the United States (US) and later United Nations (UN) peacekeeping mission to Haiti. Additionally, the Defence Force has conducted disaster relief and reconstruction operations in Grenada, St Lucia, Montserrat, Anguilla, and Jamaica.⁹ The Defence Force also provided training assistance to regional militaries and in the past, sent military assistance training teams and individuals to Guyana, Barbados and Antigua and Barbuda, to assist in the formation of their Defence Forces.

As an element of its national power, whenever a government decides to deploy its armed forces overseas, it makes a costly financial decision. Such decisions are therefore strategically significant especially to small states like Trinidad and Tobago. In her case,

⁸ CIA World Fact Book. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/print/td.html>. (accessed on 1 May 2009).

⁹ Various operational orders and archival records accessed from the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force by the author.

the strategic significance of these decisions lies in the Government's desire to see a more integrated Caribbean region.

The Prospect of Caribbean Integration

Trinidad and Tobago's efforts at achieving Caribbean integration began in the late 1950s, with the leadership's support for the replacement of British colonial rule, and the establishment of a federation of Caribbean states.¹⁰ This experiment in governance commenced in 1960, but by 1962, it failed. Instead, each island pursued independence separately, which commenced with Jamaica and then Trinidad and Tobago attaining independence in 1962. Despite his disappointment, the first Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago, Dr Eric Williams, recommended instead the formation of a free trade association to his fellow leaders.¹¹ After much deliberation, the Caribbean Free Trade Association (CARIFTA) formed in 1968 and in 1973; grew into the Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM)

The current Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago, Patrick Manning, has renewed efforts aimed at developing an even more integrated and unified CARICOM region. Reinforcing this view, in 2005, he articulated, "Caribbean integration is perhaps the only answer to the problems that face us at this time. The objective of the Government of Trinidad and Tobago is a united, integrated, independent, Caribbean

¹⁰ Caribbean Community Secretariat, http://www.caricom.org/search_results.jsp?menu=search (accessed 1 May 2009).

¹¹ Ibid.

State.”¹² In August 2008, the Prime Minister renewed his efforts at rekindling his previous initiative to extend the economic union into a political union. Once again, the Prime Minister did not receive the support of some of his colleagues. Convinced that the matter required greater urgency, he gained the support of three of his colleagues in the neighboring southern Caribbean islands of Grenada, St Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines, with whom he signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). The MOU established the legal framework and authorized further discussions on the subject, by the three leaders.

These three countries are members of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) and in September and October 2008, the Prime Minister commenced discussions with all nine members of the body. The OECS countries are moving toward an economic union in 2009, and later political integration. The Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago’s intention is that his country will be a member of the economic union in 2011, and become politically integrated with the OECS in 2013¹³. Even more recently than that, in April 2009, the Prime Minister hosted the Summit of the Americas in Trinidad and Tobago, where he took the opportunity to communicate his vision to his fellow leaders once again. These actions appeared not to please some of the other CARICOM leaders who seemed convinced that the Heads of Government Conference should first discuss the matter of a sub-grouping among CARICOM States.

¹² Office of the Prime Minister, Trinidad and Tobago 2005, <http://www.opm.gov.tt>. (accessed 1 May 2009).

¹³ Trinidad and Tobago Guardian. <http://guardian.co.tt/news/general/2009/05/25/tt-oecs-move-closer-political-economic-union> (accessed 1 June 2009).

Notwithstanding the uncertainty, the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force cannot wait for a political decision, before it commences planning for what may eventually become an expanded role. Therefore, the Force must be proactive and anticipate the new strategies, structures, and capabilities that will be required for the future. In this regard, a new or reconfigured model for development, which extends beyond the Force's traditional local and regional concerns, may become necessary for the Defence Force's expanded role.

This requirement comes at an opportune moment for the Defence Force given that its Government recently implemented the national transformation initiative -“Vision 2020”. Vision 2020 is a multi-sectored National Strategic Development Plan that targets the transformation of all public institutions, along with other critical sectors within the national community.¹⁴ Thus, as the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force begins the process of transformation, it must take into consideration the stated intent of the Prime Minister, while aligning its policies, programs, and goals with the National Strategic Plan. This requirement brings with it new opportunities and challenges. Such challenges are not new to the Force, having faced similar circumstances in the 1980s, when the Government reformed the public sector.

Trinidad and Tobago 1990s Public Sector Reform Initiative

The 1990s witnessed a new round of public sector reform by the Government of Trinidad and Tobago. On this occasion, two principal factors drove this initiative. Oddly, the first of these factors related to the private sector, and began slowly in the 1970s with

¹⁴ Office of the Prime Minister, Trinidad and Tobago 2005, <http://www.opm.gov.tt>. (accessed 21 September 2008).

the rise of Japan as an industrial power, after its devastation at the end of the Second World War. Marking this era was a period of extreme competition and intense rivalry especially between American and Japanese businesses.¹⁵ After many decades of domination, American businesses suddenly found themselves in the rare position of struggling to keep up with their Japanese competitors. Porter captured this situation in his landmark book, *On Competition*, in which Porter noted, “The Japanese triggered a global revolution in operational effectiveness in the 1970s and 1980s, pioneering practices such as total quality management and continuous improvement. As a result, Japanese manufacturers enjoyed substantial cost and quality advantages for many years.”¹⁶

Thus by the 1980s, the world was witnessing a series of mergers and acquisitions, usually of a hostile nature. The world also witnessed the rise of the transnational corporation, and aggressive global competition for customer loyalty.¹⁷ Worldwide customers, empowered by trends such as globalization and advances in communications and information technology such as the internet, were for the first time able to enjoy a more favorable balance of power. A global revolution ensued, placing the customer on a pedestal and at the center of businesses’ value proposition. Henceforth, businesses competed aggressively for customers’ loyalty and for the right to serve a demanding, cost conscious and quality- focused customer. This situation was summed up by Creech when he stated, “This new era presents new realities such as borderless marketplaces and

¹⁵ Michael Porter, *On Competition* (Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Publishing, 1998), 43.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid., 290.

discriminating consumers who are unmoved by appeals to select home built products for patriotic reasons. Consumers look for the best value (quality and durability considered) and buy that product.”¹⁸

Such was the state of the business environment in the 1980s when firms realized that in order to stay ahead of the competition, merely satisfying customers was insufficient. To maintain customers’ long-term loyalty and support, businesses had to gain or maintain a sustainable competitive advantage; firms therefore had to become more innovative. To achieve innovation, firms searched globally to discover best practices, products, and services, to delight a more knowledgeable, empowered, and fickle customer.¹⁹ Consequently, rapid and continuous change ensued, ushered in by the dawn of a new culture, symbolized by the idioms of quality, cost, speed, and service. In this new environment, change was the only constant and so pronounced were these changes, that Peter Drucker (1992), the “Father of Management”, described this period as the “Age of Discontinuity.”²⁰

Change so revolutionary held repercussions for the public sector. After all, the customers of the private sector and that of the public sector were all the same. Soon the public placed similar demands on an unprepared public sector. As bureaucratic structures however, neither competition nor delighting fickle customers drive public institutions. Instead, public institutions are historically procedural and therefore driven by the need to

¹⁸ Bill Creech, *The Five Pillars of TQM: How To Make Total Quality Management Work For You* (New York: Penguin Books USA Inc., 1994), 3.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Peter Drucker, *The Age of Discontinuity: Guidelines to our Changing Society* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers 1992).

preserve the status quo. By nature therefore, the public sector is not easily adaptable to change. Consequently, public sector organizations became incapable of responding to the “contemporary needs of society.”²¹

The second principal factor influencing the Government’s decision to reform the public sector came from initiatives in the 1990s by International Funding Institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Following the boom of the 1980s, the decade of the 90s witnessed a downturn in global and domestic economies that forced several countries, including Trinidad and Tobago, to approach the IMF and the World Bank, for financial assistance. This assistance came in the form of “conditionalities” or holistic Structural Adjustment Programs. These programs were:

designed to solve macroeconomic problems in developing countries by reducing government intervention in the economy, correcting the borrowing country’s deficits and opening the country’s economy to the global market. These programs, which consist of policies aimed at achieving economic growth, were initially designed and funded by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and later, also adopted by other major international financial institutions (IFIs). Loans are offered in return for the transformation of economic structures through varying reforms of deregulation, privatization, slimming down of inefficient public bureaucracies, reducing subsidies, and encouraging realistic prices to emerge as a stimulus to greater productivity in order to overcome the problem of increasing external debt and foster economic development.²²

Highlighting Trinidad and Tobago’s situation in this regard, the country’s Finance

Minister in his 1992 Appropriation Bill (Budget) Speech stated:

Since 1983, Trinidad and Tobago embarked on an inescapable programme of economic stabilization and structural change. The initial effort was derailed by the collapse of oil prices in 1986. Subsequently, the international situation improved

²¹ Beresford Riley and M. Nunes, “Trinidad and Tobago Public Sector Reform,” Conference, Port of Spain, 2004.

²² Adrian Leftwich, *Democracy and Development: Theory and Practice* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996).

somewhat although it continued to be volatile. The economic stabilization programme implemented in conjunction with the IMF from 1988 onwards seems to have achieved its limited, though essential, goal of remedying the imbalances in the economy generated principally by the collapse of oil prices in the mid-1980s.²³

Thus, confronted by two colossal forces - an expectant customer - the electorate, and the “conditionalities” set forth by International Funding Institutions, the Government of Trinidad and Tobago found itself with very limited choices. Acting boldly, the Administration took a holistic approach to public sector reform, and appointed Gordon Draper, as a Minister in the office of the Prime Minister, charged “with specific responsibility for Public Administration . . . [and] the implementation of the reform measures.”²⁴

Despite the Defence Force not being a public sector organization, MG Brown recognized the value of public sector reform. Consequently, on his own initiative, he approached the newly appointed minister and received the minister’s support for the Defence Force to participate in the change initiative.²⁵ Thus, the General’s action exposed the Force to the emerging global governance model known as New Public Management.²⁶

²³ Honorable Wendell Mottley, Minister of Finance, Honorable Wendell Mottley, *Bill to provide for the service of Trinidad and Tobago for the year ending on the 31st day of December, 1992*: Hansard Records, The Parliament of Trinidad and Tobago <http://www.ttparliament.org/hansards/hh19920117.pdf> (accessed 1 June 2009), 1.

²⁴ Implementation of Public Service Reform in Trinidad and Tobago: *Initial Progress Report* (1992), 1.

²⁵ Major General Ralph Brown, Interview by author, Trinidad and Tobago, 6 April 2009.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

Public Sector Reform--A New Public Management Approach

First coined by the Public Administration “guru” Christopher Hood, New Public Management introduced a revolutionary approach to improving the delivery of public goods and services. According to Hood, “It represented a marriage between economic theories (public choice theory, transaction cost theory and principal-agent theory) and a variety of private sector management techniques that have been successively introduced into the public sector.”²⁷ New Public Management came with its own lexicon; relegating previous popular terms such as “equality, common good, and justice” and replacing them with private sector language such as “efficiency, effectiveness, delivery, flexibility, measurement, and outputs.”²⁸ Considered a neo-liberalist approach, both sides of the Atlantic, represented by US President Ronald Reagan and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher embraced New Public Management. Rechristened “Reganism” in the US, and “Thatcherism” in Britain, these influential world leaders saw in New Public Management, the opportunity to reduce the cost and size of their respective public sectors. Further, by incorporating private sector practices, they hoped to improve the performance of the public sector. According to Borins, the major characteristics of New Public Management are:

- providing high-quality services that citizens value;
- demanding, measuring, and rewarding improved organizational and individual performance;
- advocating managerial autonomy, particularly by reducing central agency controls;

²⁷ Christopher Hood, *A Public Management for all Seasons: Public Administration* 69, no. 1 (Spring 1991): 3-19.

²⁸ American Association of Professors, Academe Online 2007, <http://www.aaup.org/AAUP/pubsres/academe/2007/MJ/Feat/beso1.htm?PF=1> (accessed 21 September 2008).

- recognizing the importance of providing the human and technological resources managers need to meet their performance targets; and
- maintaining receptiveness to competition and open-mindedness about which public purposes should be performed by public servants as opposed to the private sector or non-governmental organizations.²⁹

Public sector reform in Trinidad and Tobago commenced in 1992, under the banner “Transforming the Public Service: Making Plans, Dreams, Vision and Mission happen.”³⁰ The reform took a strategic approach to planning, and complemented the “wider structural and institutional reform taking place at the national level.”³¹

Accordingly, the Government made it compulsory for ministries and departments to have mission statements and strategic plans, along with strategic objectives that had to “conform to the overall policy of the Government.”³² The program began as a pilot project within four ministries, but later met with opposition as public employees debated the utility of incorporating private sector models within the public domain.³³

Unlike their Public Sector counterparts however, the Defence Force embraced strategic planning. MG Brown recognized that through this initiative, the Force had an opportunity to gain the Government’s commitment for the long sought-after Joint Force Headquarters. Additionally, strategic planning provided the Force with the prospect of a

²⁹ Sandford Borins, "New Public Management North American Style." Chap 13, In *The New Public Management: Current Trends and Future Prospects*, by K McLaughlin, S Osborne and Ferlie E. Routledge Studies, December 2000.

³⁰ Beresford Riley and M. Nunes, “Trinidad and Tobago Public Sector Reform,” Conference, Port of Spain, 2004.

³¹ Implementation of Public Service Reform in Trinidad and Tobago: “Initial Progress Report” (1992), 4-5.

³² *Ibid.*, 6.

³³ Sandra Lynch, Acting Deputy Permanent Secretary, Interview by author, 9 April 2009.

more closely integrated Force. Not surprisingly, on 8 July 1992, the Force became the first entity to submit its strategic plan to its Ministry. In most ways, the guidance given for strategic plans mirrored that of corporate plans. These plans included, but were not limited to:

1. a vision,
2. a mission statement,
3. core values,
4. strategic direction,
5. the general environment,
6. a SWOT analysis,
7. critical success factors,
8. strategic objectives,
9. strategic choices,
10. programmes and
11. programme implementation.³⁴

Consequently, on its own initiative and in conformity with the Government's strategic direction, the Defence Force commenced a new era of planning. The development of this first strategic plan represented a watershed in the life of the Force, as it signified a momentous shift away from a culture grown accustomed to short-term planning.

In the researcher's opinion, two principal factors were responsible for shaping this culture. First, like most public institutions, the Defence Force's growth and development

³⁴ Beresford Riley, M. Nunes,. *Trinidad and Tobago Public Sector Reform*. Conference, Port of Spain: Unpublished, 2004.

was dependent on its Government's budgetary policy. This policy authorized the periodic disbursement of funds during the annual budgetary cycle, curtailing the possibility of long-term growth initiatives. The only exception to this policy was for the acquisition of high-cost, capital-intensive items, such as procuring aircrafts and ships.

Secondly, Trinidad and Tobago's relative tranquility, and the absence of *clear and present danger*, also contributed to the country's short-term approach to planning. In combination, these factors resulted in a national culture that traditionally placed a low premium on defense and security concerns, over other national issues. By extension, these factors shaped the Government and the organization's approach to Force development.

Force Development--Pre-Strategic Planning

The Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force's development is probably unique among military institutions, as the Force's progress occurred in the absence of a formal command and control (C²) Headquarters.³⁵ The organization's initial efforts at Force planning is traceable to the period just prior to the country's independence on 31 August 1962, while it was still a member of the West Indian Federation (1958-1962).³⁶ The Federation was an experiment in Federal governance, whereby Britain agreed, by the

³⁵ Brigadier General Theodore Joseph, Interview by author, Trinidad and Tobago, 7 April 2009

³⁶ Major General Ralph Brown, Interview by author, Trinidad and Tobago, 6 April 2009.

British Caribbean Federation Act of 1956, to delegate greater autonomy to her West Indian colonies.³⁷

In order to provide for the Federation's defense, the Federal Government initially established an infantry battalion in Jamaica. Following this, the Government planned to station a second battalion in Trinidad and Tobago. To assist the Federation with its plans, Britain provided the Federal Government with the expertise of a British Army advisory team. However, in 1962, before the Government could implement the team's plans, the Federation suddenly dissolved.³⁸

Seizing the opportunity provided, the Government of Trinidad and Tobago decided to obtain its independence from Britain. As a Defence Force was a prerequisite for Independence, the Government used the plans of the British Army advisory team, to assist in the formation of the country's Defence Force.³⁹ At formation in July 1962, the Defence Force comprised a land force element, the Trinidad and Tobago Regiment, and a maritime element, the Trinidad and Tobago Coast Guard. However, despite the common unifying title, and in the absence of a Force Headquarters, the two Formations developed independently of each other.

To cater for this deficiency, the Government appointed the senior ranked officer of the Force, the Commanding Officer of the Regiment, in the position of Commander of

³⁷ Caribbean Community Secretariat, [http://www.caricom.org/jsp/community/west_indies_federation.jsp? menu=community](http://www.caricom.org/jsp/community/west_indies_federation.jsp?menu=community) (accessed 16 August 2008).

³⁸ Major General Ralph Brown, Interview by author, Trinidad and Tobago, 6 April, 2009.

³⁹ Ibid.

the Defence Force.⁴⁰ This meant that along with his substantive position as Commanding Officer of the Regiment, the office holder held additional responsibility for command, control, and the development of the Force.

Nonetheless, in this scenario, each unit developed independently, while at the Force level, planning primarily focused on convincing the Government of the need for establishing a Joint Force Headquarters.⁴¹ The first sign of a change in the Government's position came in 1970, with the return of BG Joffre Serrette from retirement.⁴² The General's return came in the aftermath of an attempted mutiny within the Regiment. Nevertheless, despite the Government appointing the General exclusively to the position of Commander of the Defence Force, the Administration still made no provisions for establishing a Joint Force Headquarters.

As can be expected, in the absence of a Staff Headquarters, the units became responsible for providing the General's with his staff requirements. This ad hoc arrangement continued throughout the 1970s and 1980s.⁴³ However, by the commencement of the 1990s, events in the external environment favored the Defence Force's efforts at establishing its Joint Force Headquarters. The first of these events was an attempted coup by the Jamaat-al-Muslimeen, a Muslim fundamentalist group. The dissidents numbering over one hundred invaded the national Parliament taking hostage

⁴⁰ Trinidad and Tobago Defence Act, 1962, Act 7 of the Laws of Trinidad and Tobago.

⁴¹ Major General Ralph Brown, Interview by author, Trinidad and Tobago, 6 April 2009.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Brigadier General Joseph Theodore, Interview by author, Trinidad and Tobago, 7 April 2009.

the Parliamentarians and employees. The rebels also conducted simultaneous attacks on the Police Headquarters, and the national television station, the latter where employees were held hostage. Contributing to the chaos and confusion was a simultaneous spate of lootings and fire bombings throughout the city.⁴⁴

In response, the Defence Force remained resolute under BG Theodore's command, and engaged the insurrectionists until they surrendered in defeat. As this was primarily a land force operation, the country awarded the Regiment with the Trinity Cross, the nation's highest award.⁴⁵ This attempted coup, resulted in the national community becoming more aware of defense and security matters, and assisted in the Force's efforts at establishing a Joint Force Headquarters. The second event however, was less dynamic, and resulted from the previously mentioned Public Service Reform initiative of 1992.

Force Development--A Strategic Planning Approach

On BG Theodore's retirement in 1991, newly promoted BG Ralph Brown (later MG), succeeded to the Office of Chief of Defence Staff.⁴⁶ In the changing environment of the era, the new Chief of Defence Staff realized the value of taking a long-term approach to planning, and adopted the strategic planning developmental model.⁴⁷

⁴⁴ Selwyn Ryan, *The Muslimeen Grab for Power: Race, Religion and Revolution in Trinidad and Tobago* (Port of Spain, Inprint Caribbean, 1991)

⁴⁵ Trinidad and Tobago National Library and Information System Authority. http://www.nalis.gov.tt/NationalAwards-Emblems/Culture_TrinityCross.html. (accessed 1 May 2009)

⁴⁶ Major General Ralph Brown, Interview by author, Trinidad and Tobago, 6 April 2009.

⁴⁷ Major General Ralph Brown, Interview by author, Trinidad and Tobago, 6 April 2009.

In formulating the strategic plan, General Brown took a top-down approach, and formed a Joint planning team consisting of senior officers from throughout the Force.⁴⁸ This team took a comprehensive approach to planning, and for the first time in the Force's history, jointly formed a common operating picture to examine threats and opportunities existing within the environment. Of particular concern during this planning initiative, were the Jamaat-al-Muslimeen's previous actions, and other emerging domestic, regional, and global security issues.⁴⁹

Internally, due to mushrooming missions and roles, the planners considered several joint issues such as force improvement, force rationalization, organizational growth and development, and equipment and infrastructure modernization.⁵⁰ Thus, learning from the events of 1990, the planning team developed a comprehensive strategic plan, addressing various probable scenarios in the operating environment.⁵¹

By July 1992, the planning team completed its work and MG Brown promptly dispatched the strategic plan to the Ministry of National Security.⁵² The plan did not receive immediate attention, until March 1993 when the Defence Council appointed a committee chaired by retired Chief of Defence Staff, BG Theodore, to review MG Brown's proposal.⁵³ In April 1993, the review committee submitted its recommendations

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force Strategic Plan 1992-2000.

⁵⁰ Major General Ralph Brown, Interview by author, Trinidad and Tobago, 6 April 2009.

⁵¹ Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force Strategic Plan 1992-2000.

⁵² Major General Ralph Brown, Interview by author, Trinidad and Tobago, 6 April 2009.

⁵³ Brigadier General Joseph Theodore, Interview by author, Trinidad and Tobago, 7 April 2009.

to the Council. These recommendations however remained in abeyance until 1996, when a change in Government brought Brigadier Theodore to the Office of the Minister of National Security.⁵⁴

In his new capacity, BG Theodore presented the review committee's recommendations to the Defence Council. These recommendations primarily focused on officially establishing the Defence Headquarters as a Joint Staff Headquarters. The Council accepted the General's recommendations, deeming the plan "the strategic way forward for the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force."⁵⁵ BG Theodore next presented the review to his Cabinet colleagues who approved the plan, officially clearing the way for the Minister to commence implementing "aspects of the plan."⁵⁶

Force Development--Post Strategic Planning

Despite the length of time it took for the final acceptance of the plan, necessity forced the implementation of certain strategic objectives of the plan. One such example was the establishment of the Second Infantry Battalion in 1993. At the strategic level, the intent for the plan was to establish the Defence Force Headquarters, and to create a more closely integrated Force.⁵⁷ To reflect this, the term *Joint Staff Headquarters* replaced the term Defence Force Headquarters. The plan also formally defined the roles of the Force,

⁵⁴ Ibid

⁵⁵ Sandra Lynch, Acting Deputy Permanent Secretary, Interview by author, Trinidad and Tobago, 9 April 2009.

⁵⁶ Brigadier General Joseph Theodore, Interview by author, Trinidad and Tobago, 7 April 2009.

⁵⁷ Major General Ralph Brown, Interview by author, Trinidad and Tobago, 6 April 2009.

and proposed “a revised structure, to enable the Force “to maximize its administrative and operational efficiency while optimizing the use of available resources.”⁵⁸

Structurally, the office of the Chief of Defence Staff was co-located at the Ministry of National Security, to enable the incumbent to be more readily accessible to the Minister.⁵⁹ Recognizing the absence of a future planning capability within the Force, the plan aimed to relieve the Chief of Defence Staff of routine administrative functions, thereby releasing the office holder to “concentrate on the formulation of plans and policies and the processing of Defence Force matters at a Ministerial/National level.”⁶⁰

Additionally, the plan revised the structure of the Defence Force Headquarters and formalized the Continental Staff System, instituting in the first instance, the J1-J5 staff branches. To provide oversight to these branches, the plan placed responsibility for the joint staff under the command of two principal staff officers- Staff Officers Administration, and Operations and Training respectively.⁶¹

To assist in realizing the Joint Force concept, the plan authorized the co-location of the Regiment and Coast Guard Headquarters, with that of the Joint Staff Headquarters. Finally, along with this restructuring, the titles of Commanding Officers of the Regiment

⁵⁸ Brigadier General Joseph Theodore, A Proposal for the Revision of the Structure and Operations of the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force, August 1993, 1.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Brigadier General Joseph Theodore, A Proposal for the Revision of the Structure and Operations of the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force, August 1993, 1.

⁶¹ Ibid.

and Coast Guard, changed to Commander Land Forces and Commander Maritime Forces respectively.⁶² This situation has therefore led to the following questions:

Primary Research Question

How effectively has the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force implemented strategic planning as a strategic management approach?

Secondary Research Questions

1. How did the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force conduct Force Development planning, prior to the introduction of strategic planning?
2. Why did the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force implement strategic planning in 1992?
3. How did the Defence Force formulate the strategic plan?
4. What were the strategic goals of the plan?
5. What was the Defence Force's competitive strategy?
6. Did the Government accept the strategic plan?
7. What were the principal benefits/successes the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force achieved through implementing strategic planning?
8. What were the principal challenges/failures the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force experienced through implementing strategic planning?
9. Should the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force implementation of strategic planning prove ineffective, is there a more effective model that the Force may employ to improve its effectiveness?

⁶² Ibid.

Significance of the Study

This study is significant in several ways. First, it seeks to address the perennial problem faced by organizations globally, in implementing strategic management approaches. More specifically, the study sets out to examine some of the unique challenges faced by militaries in small developing states, in their efforts at achieving operational excellence in the contemporary operating environment.

Usually, small developing states are resource challenged nations, and rely on their militaries to provide a wide range of services that may extend from national defense, to community and youth development. When such a state exists in a perpetual threatening environment, national defense is *too important to be left to the military* alone, and therefore is high on the national agenda. When however a state exists in relative tranquility, or in an intermittently threatening environment, defense matters usually compete assiduously against all other national concerns. Thus, the military finds itself consistently having to keep the nation focused on the national defense agenda. Trinidad and Tobago, located in the Americas along with the world only remaining super power, falls within the latter category. Such environments however can be deceptively intriguing and demanding. Coupled with resource constraints, an environment may one day require a Force to defend its nation against insurrectionists, while on the following day, require the deployment of the same resources to render assistance to a hurricane-ravished community or neighbor.

Secondly, this study is relevant to both military and civilian organizations, but particularly public institutions, that must adopt/adapt new strategies and approaches. These new approaches have become necessary due to the increasing level of complexity

and change taking place in the global environment, especially now, that the world appears to be approaching a global recession.

Additionally, militaries of small developing states must also contend with the *CNN factor*-the instantaneity of global television-where citizens of these states expect their troops to be just as proficient, as troops from states that are more capable.

Therefore, while this study examines how a small military force strategizes to compete in its environment, this study is significant to all organizations.

This research project therefore undertakes a challenging proposition, made even more difficult by the general dearth of information on the strategic development of small military forces. In fact, the review of the literature revealed the absence of any sizeable body of literature on these organizations. This was awakening, taking into consideration that small and micro militaries are the most common forms of military organizations worldwide. Undoubtedly, the world's focus is fixated on medium to large military forces; micro-militaries it seems do not provide the same fascination. This study will therefore contribute to the small body of research previously published on this topic.

The study also intends to provide a greater understanding of the challenges faced by militaries in small developing states that must respond to changes in the domestic and global environments, such as New Public Management and international financing. Therefore, the study joins a growing body of research conducted at the US Army Command and General Staff College, (College) examining strategic change and development within military organizations. The findings and recommendations of this paper will add value to the existing body of research. Notwithstanding, while influenced by previous research, this study will intentionally diverge from the foundation previously

laid by fellow students and faculty members at the College. While most research has focused on the topic from the perspective of change management, this paper takes a strategic management approach toward examining strategic change and development. More specifically, while the researcher reviewed the theses and papers of Doll and Miller, Kidd, and Jeffress, this study diverges from their approach. One immediate benefit of taking such a different approach is the ease of making connections between strategic management and military planning. This is particularly so with the planning perspective of strategic management, whose early roots can be traced to the military's approach to long term planning.

Despite the different approach however, this study intends to add another chapter to the growing body of knowledge on organizational change and development, laid by fellow researchers. In this regard, the researcher expects that this study will provide military planners, researchers, practitioners, readers, and general enthusiasts, with an alternative view to understanding and applying strategic change initiatives, within military and civilian organizations.

Definitions

Bounded rationality: The process which affects one's ability to make rational choices due to "insufficient information, limited cognitive capacity and weak will power".⁶³

Commonwealth Caribbean: Caribbean islands which were former colonies of Great Britain.⁶⁴

⁶³ Toby Harfield, *Strategic Management and Mike Porter: A Postmodern Reading* (1997)
3. http://www.mngt.waikato.ac.nz/ejrot/Vol4_1/harfield.pdf (accessed 30 March 2009).

Game Theory: A mathematical method of decision-making in which a competitive situation is analyzed to determine the optimal course of action for an interested party, often used in political, economic, and military planning.⁶⁵

New Public Management: A public sector management approach representing a marriage between economic theories (public choice theory, transaction cost theory and principal-agent theory) and a variety of private sector management techniques that have been successively introduced into the public sector.”⁶⁶

Satisficing: A combination of the words satisfy and suffice which explains the process of decision/strategy-making where individuals are prepared to accept a workable solution rather than persists in finding the optimum one.⁶⁷

Strategic Management: The art, science, and craft of formulating, implementing, and evaluating cross-functional decisions that will enable an organization to achieve its long-term objectives.⁶⁸

Strategy: The combination of competitive moves and business approaches that managers employ to please customers, compete successfully and achieve organizational objectives.⁶⁹

⁶⁴ Ivelaw Griffith, *Quest for Security in the Caribbean: Problems and Promises in Subordinate States* (New York M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1993), 1.

⁶⁵ <http://www.thefreedictionary.com/game+theory>

⁶⁶ Christopher Hood, “A Public Management for all Seasons,” *Public Administration* 69, no. 1 (Spring 1991): 3-19.

⁶⁷ Toby Harfield, *Strategic Management and Mike Porter: A Postmodern Reading* (1997) 3. http://www.mngt.waikato.ac.nz/ejrot/Vol4_1/harfield.pdf (accessed 30 March 2009).

⁶⁸ David Fred, *Strategic Management* (Merrill Publication Company, 1989).

Structural Adjustment Programs: Programs designed to solve macroeconomic problems in developing countries by reducing government intervention in the economy, correcting the borrowing country's deficits and opening the country's economy to the global market. These programs, which consist of policies aimed at achieving economic growth, were initially designed and funded by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and later, also adopted by other major international financial institutions (IFIs). Loans are offered in return for the transformation of economic structures through varying reforms of deregulation, privatization, slimming down of inefficient public bureaucracies, reducing subsidies, and encouraging realistic prices to emerge as a stimulus to greater productivity in order to overcome the problem of increasing external debt and foster economic development.⁷⁰

Assumptions

While acknowledging that there is a difference between a military force and a business organization, the assumption is made of the existence of a symbiotic relationship between all organizations. Therefore, a military force can benefit from studying business strategy and organization theory. This study accepts the definition that strategic management is an all-encompassing term embracing strategic change models such as strategic planning, knowledge management, six sigma, and the balanced scorecard etc.

⁶⁹ Alonzo Strickland and Arthur Thompson, *Crafting and Executing Strategy* (New York: McGraw-Hill/Irwin 2001), 3.

⁷⁰ Adrian Leftwich, *Democracy and Development: Theory and Practice* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996).

The researcher is assuming that a strategic management approach is a beneficial model in undertaking strategic change and development.

Limitations

The researcher found that the principal limitation of this study was the absence of rigorous academic research regarding the military's application of strategic planning. Understandingly, for fear of revealing their Achilles heel, operational security concerns require militaries, regardless of size, to be secretive. Hence, unless legislative requirements direct disclosure, these institutions are reluctant either to publish, or to allow the public access to information revealing their challenges or failures in this regard. The author therefore found it extremely difficult to gain information on past research into the strategic planning experiences of small and micro-militaries.

Additionally, because the conduct of this research study is from the US, the researcher also found difficulty in gaining ready access to information on the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force. While returning to Trinidad and Tobago to interview members of the core group proved extremely valuable, however, the researcher found difficulty in following-up on interviews or obtaining documentary or archival information, once he returned to the US.

In this regard, the researcher found one of the greatest limitations of the study, was his inability to interview or obtain information from BG Alfonso was. The General commanded the Defence Force during the implementation of the first strategic plan, and therefore the researcher thought this former Chief of Defence Staff's evidence was important. However, despite the General's willingness to assist in the research study, the researcher found difficulty in synchronizing with his schedule. Nonetheless, the

researcher depended on the evidence of other former Chiefs of Defence Staff to fill this gap, especially Commodore Franklin who succeeded BG Alfonso.

Summary

This chapter proceeded with an examination of the background that leads to the research study. Secondly, it discussed Trinidad and Tobago's Prime Minister intent for greater integration within the Caribbean region, and the potential impact that this may have on the Defence Force's strategic development. Additionally, the chapter examined how a similar strategic issue-Public Sector Reform-in the 1990s, provided the Defence Force with an opportunity to change its strategic management approach. Next, using a case study approach, the researcher provided an historical overview of Force Development initiatives within the Defence Force from inception to the implementation of strategic planning.. The chapter then ended by posing the research questions, highlighting the significance of the study, assumptions, definitions, and limitations.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Strategy--“the art of the employment of battles as a means to gain the object of war”

Clausewitz, On War

Introduction

Restated Purpose

The Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force commenced strategic planning as its strategic management model in 1992. The decision by MG Ralph Brown, the Chief of Defence Staff, was more a strategic move rather than a technical innovation. The General, recognizing that the Government was introducing strategic planning as a mechanism to reform the Public Service, used this as leverage, to gain the Government’s commitment in establishing a proper Force Headquarters.⁷¹ This indirect approach the General found necessary, since attempts by former Chiefs of Defence Staff failed to gain previous Governments’ commitment for the initiative. Past Administrations while in principle agreeing with the concept, made no provisions for establishing the Headquarters, leaving an ad hoc arrangement to persist.⁷²

However, since officially implementing strategic planning in 1996, and despite two condensed iterations,⁷³ the Force has not assessed the effectiveness of its initial attempt. This study therefore aims to examine the level of effectiveness the Trinidad and

⁷¹ Major General Brown Ralph, Interview by author, Trinidad and Tobago, 6 April 2009.

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ Sandra Lynch, Acting Deputy Permanent Secretary, Interview by author, Trinidad and Tobago, 9 April 2009.

Tobago Defence Force achieved in its initial attempt at strategic planning, and if necessary, to recommend an improved model.

Overview

One of the main purposes guiding a literature review is to examine previous research in a particular area of study. Taking this into consideration and the maxim that all research builds upon previous research, initially, this literature review focused on researching previous studies in organization strategy conducted at the College. However, this proved no easy undertaking as the emphasis of previous research was mainly in the area of change management. In addition, the initial scan of the literature revealed the inconsistent use of key terms, necessary in understanding the field. For example, while the research problem's focus is on strategic planning, the literature review however revealed the interchangeable use of this term with strategic management, or, as a process within change management. In fact, as the more in-depth literature review revealed, strategic planning is but one of several models within the field of strategic management.

Furthermore, the field of strategic management is not without its complexity. Despite its recency (commencing in the 1960s), the literature on strategic management continues to grow apace and now comprises hundreds of theories, models, and methods. Neal probably best describes the state of the field when he noted, "strategic management is a relatively new subject and . . . academics have been busy in producing a wide literature that approaches the subject from different perspectives."⁷⁴

⁷⁴ Derrick Neal, *Strategic Management: Avoiding Analysis Paralysis in Managing Defence in a Democracy* (London: Routledge, 2006), 125

Considering the above statements, and the fact that this thesis is invariably about formulating and implementing organization strategy, this chapter commences with an ambitious, though necessary attempt to trace the evolution of strategic management. Simultaneously, the researcher will examine the works of some of the earliest contributors, who established the foundation of strategic management and whose contributions continue to shape the study and practice of the discipline today. Thus, by examining the works of some of the principal contributors, one will observe the symbiosis that exists between military strategy and the works of these theorists. In particular, the review will demonstrate how the fields of military strategy and organizational strategy shaped, and continue to shape each other. Additionally, this chapter will demonstrate the extensive contribution made by strategic management theorists, in shaping the development of the modern organization.

Strategic Management: Crafting Organization Strategy

According to David, “Strategic management is the art, science, and craft of formulating, implementing, and evaluating cross functional decisions that will enable an organization to achieve its long term objectives.”⁷⁵ Hence, as its name implies, the study is deeply rooted in the disciplines of strategy and management. However, as the literature review will later demonstrate, strategic management also owes its development to other disciplines such as economics, mathematics, public administration, psychology, and organizational theory and behavior. In addition, taking into consideration the central role of planning, the terms strategic management and strategic planning though often

⁷⁵ David Fred, *Strategic Management* (Merrill Publication Company, 1989).

used interchangeably, are not the same.⁷⁶ Strategic management is an all-embracing term, whereas strategic planning is an approach used in strategic management. Strategic planning is:

The systematic identification of opportunities and threats that lie in the future, which in combination with other relevant data provide the basis for a company's making better current decision to exploit the opportunities and avoid the threats. Planning means designing a better future and identifying ways to bring it about.⁷⁷

Given its evolutionary nature, it remains extremely difficult to trace the true origin of strategic management. Despite this however, the roots of strategic management can be traced back thousands of years to the military, and the use of the term "strategos."

Originating within Grecian society, the term literal translation is "general of the army" and described the generals of Greek tribal armies "who . . . were elected political leaders, [and] who left battlefield tactics to troop leaders, but ruled on policy issues as a group."⁷⁸

In addition to the Grecian contribution, overtime, strategic management benefitted from the ideas of history's greatest military strategists such as Sun Tzu's, *The Art of War*, Clausewitz's, *On War*, Jomini's, *Precis de l'Art de la Guerre*, and Mao Tse Tung's, *The Red Book*. Within the more contemporary period, the Allied use of strategic planning during the First and Second World Wars also played a great part in influencing the field of study. As evidence of this, the following passage taken from Matloff and Snell's

⁷⁶ George Steiner, *Strategic Planning: What Every Manager Must Know* (New York: The Free Press 1979), 4.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 14.

⁷⁸ Phillip Blackerly, GPRC Strategic planning: Start here – How to write a plan-to-plan in The Armed Forces Comptroller. Alexandria: 39, no. 2 (Spring 1994): 21-22. Available from ProQues.

Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-1942 provides an account of the stalemate between Great Britain (GB) and the US in December 1942:

The war between the two coalitions had reached a state of strategic equilibrium and, in a sense, both sides would be starting afresh and on more nearly equal terms. In the area of strategic planning, the two close allies, Great Britain and the United States, would also have to begin anew. . . All signs [therefore] pointed to the beginning of a new phase of global and coalition warfare for the strategic planners.⁷⁹

Alongside its military roots, strategic management also grew out of management's perpetual struggle to optimize corporate strategy, especially as firms grew from single businesses to multi-divisional structures. Sloan in *My Years with General Motors* speaks of his challenges in 1920, to deal with the "specific problems such as those created by the expansion of the corporation after World War I."⁸⁰

The Decade of the 1930s

Especially in its early years, the field also benefitted from the works of economists such as Ronald Coase. As one of the earliest recorded contributors, Coase in 1933, writing on *The Nature of the Firm*, argued for greater study to examine business performance and the role firms played within the economy.⁸¹ Recognizing that firms' contributions received very little attention; Coase contended that along with a market-focused approach to economics, a micro-economic perspective was also necessary. Thus,

⁷⁹ Maurice Matloff, Edwin M. Snell *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-1942, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II* (Government Printing Office: Washington, 1953), 1.

⁸⁰ Alfred Sloan, *My Years with General Motors* (New York, Doubleday 1936), 47.

⁸¹ Ronald Coase, *The Nature of the Firm*, in *Economica*, 4, 1937, cited in Peter McKiernan, *Historical Evolution of Strategic Management II* (Dartmouth Publishing Co. Ltd, 1996).

beginning in the early part of the 20th Century, Coase and other economists such as Joseph Schumpeter (1934), began to seek out alternative approaches to understanding economic activity. Accordingly, these economists were the pioneers in developing a ‘theory of the firm’ that took a revolutionary departure in economics, as it challenged the prevailing market-centric view of firms.⁸²

Unmistakably, Coase’s writings underpinned the need to analyze a firm’s performance based on its resources. While satisfying economic inquiry, Coase’s theory provided the impetus for more detailed analysis, on the inner workings of organizations.⁸³ Over time, this approach, also considered the inside-out view of the firm, gained recognition as one of the foundational writings on the Resource Based View (RBV) of the firm. Of similar importance, the rival Industrial Economics (I/O) View or outside-in approach, examined organizational performance from the perspective of the industry. These contrasting views dominated the field of strategic management for several years.⁸⁴

The Decade of the 1940s

World War II dominated the decade of the 1940s, and naturally, an event of this magnitude influenced organizational strategy. Given the military’s capability of moving millions of men and materiel across the globe, business looked to the military for lessons in managing strategy during periods of uncertainty. Two prominent economists, Von Neumann and Morgenstern, seemingly influenced by the military’s approach to warfare,

⁸² http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Resource-based_view. (accessed 28 August 2008).

⁸³ Ibid

⁸⁴ Ibid

introduced the concept of Game Theory in their article, *The Theory of Games and Economic Behavior*⁸⁵ According to these theorists, much like war-fighting, businesses needed to strategize if they were to outperform their competitors. Thus, business strategy they argued, consisted of a series of “move and counter-move, bluff and counter-bluff, between competing yet interdependent businesses.”⁸⁶

Considered a rational decision-making model, Von Neumann and Morgenstern’s theory faced criticisms from behaviorists such as Herbert Simon. Simon, a psychologist, argued that organizational strategy was invariably decision-making. Therefore, as human behavior influenced decision-making, organizational strategy could not be rational as game theorists claimed. Instead, Simon posited, organizations comprise “coalitions of individuals” who bring “their own personal objectives and cognitive biases to the organization.”⁸⁷ Consequently, while in principle individuals seek to make rational choices, in reality however, ‘bounded rationality’ affects individuals’ decision-making processes. Bounded rationality according to Simon, was the process of decision-making that affects one’s ability to make rational choices, due to the human factors of “insufficient information, limited cognitive capacity and weak willpower.”⁸⁸

Simon and other behaviorists therefore argued that successful organization strategy comes about less from planned activity and more from ‘emergent’ action as

⁸⁵ John Von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern, *Theory of Games and Economic Behavior* (NJ: Princeton University Press, 1944).

⁸⁶ Toby Harfield, *Strategic Management and Mike Porter: A Postmodern Reading* (1997) 3. http://www.mngt.waikato.ac.nz/ejrot/Vol4_1/harfield.pdf (accessed 30 March 2009).

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ Ibid

responses to an ever-changing environment. Consequently, Simon also argued, that because of ‘bounded rationality, strategy making occurs through a process of negotiation, which he called ‘satisficing.’ To Simon, satisficing is foregoing the optimum solution in preference for the most acceptable one. Thus, unlike the rational long-term view of the classical school, Simon contributed the ideas that strategy development is both a consensual and emergent activity. These ideas still hold firm today and within the context of the military, is reflected in doctrine that views strategy development as both a science and an art; the art perspective being consistent with Simon’s view of emergent strategy.

As a management practitioner and public administrator, Luther Gulick also contributed significantly, in better preparing organizations to respond to their competitive environments. Gulick, a renowned management thinker in the 1940s, refined Henri Fayol’s 14 Management Principles, along with Lyndall Urwick.⁸⁹ This team formed the famous acronym POSDCORB, representing planning, organizing, staffing, directing, controlling, reporting and budgeting. Known also as an energetic change agent within the US public sector, Gulick was in a firsthand position to witness the gains made by the Allies in World War II, using a strategic approach to planning. Impressed by the military’s use of mission statements, Gulick became a proponent for businesses incorporating these statements, as a mechanism toward improving their performance. In 1948, he wrote, “military administration taught us a real lesson. With minor exceptions, no activity was initiated by the military without clear definition, a definition cast in terms

⁸⁹ Luther Gulick, Lyndall Urwick, *Papers on the Science of Administration* (New York: Institute of Public Administration 1937), 13.

of purpose, timing, and resources; no organizational unit was set up without a statement of its mission.”⁹⁰ Gulick’s writings popularized mission statements, and even today, mission statements remain one of the foundational pillars of organization strategy.

The Decade of the 1950s

After the devastation caused by World War II, the 1950s was a period of rapid growth and reindustrialization for military and business organizations alike. Militarily, the threat of nuclear extinction between NATO and Warsaw Pact countries, saw demobilization strategies of the 1940s, replaced by growth in the 1950s. As such, among these Cold War alliances, one could discern very little differences between military strategy and the organization strategy they pursued. In general, both these strategies seemed to merge, centering on threat-based strategic planning, and the need to produce large, rapidly deployable forces.

While a Cold War existed in Europe, members of both alliances fought each other in “proxy” wars, throughout various regions the world. Probably the Korean and the French Indo-China Wars were among the most noteworthy. These large-scale skirmishes, along with wars for independence and territory, facilitated worldwide growth in military organizations.

In the business realm, companies’ success also depended on growth and their “ability to meet demand and to respond to changing market requirements.”⁹¹ During this

⁹⁰ Luther Gulick, *Administrative Reflections from World War II*, (New York: University of Alabama Press 1948), 77.

⁹¹ Richard Lochridge, *Strategy in the 1980s*, cited in *Perspectives on Strategy* (New York: John Wiley and Sons 1998), 56.

decade, the contributions of Philip Selznick and Edith Penrose significantly advanced the discipline. Building on Gulick's work, Selznick in *Leadership and Administration* recognized the important role played by leadership in the growth environment of the 1950s. As a strategic leadership thinker, Selznick contributed several novel ideas to the field, focusing on the positive correlation between developing the leader (CEO) as a strategist, and the resultant success of the organization.

Selznick's writings provided breakthrough ideas, one of which challenged the popular view of organizations being closed systems. Instead, he argued that organizational success depended on greater interaction between organizations and their environments. In this regard, the leader as the principal strategist played a pivotal role in aligning the organization to its environment. Hence, Selznick posited that as the senior executive transitioned from "administrative management to institutional leadership," creativity in aligning the organization to its environment became a more desired competency.⁹² Further, he argued that the leader was responsible for developing "strategic and tactical" plans after thoroughly "analyzing the [external] environment to determine how best to use the existing resources and capabilities of the organization."⁹³ While capability-based approaches seem most contemporary, since the 1950s, Selznick advanced this and other concepts such as "distinctive competence."

Selznick was also strong in his conviction that the chief executive needed to embody the organization's purpose, as he/she reflected the organization to the rest of the

⁹² Philip Selznick, *Leadership in Administration: A Sociological Interpretation* (Harper & Row Publishers 1957), 4.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, 149.

world. The senior executive he argued was the organization's mirror and therefore its "statesman."

As the second principal strategic thinker in the 1950s, Edith Penrose, an economist, noted in *The Theory of the Firm* "So far as I know, no economist has as yet attempted a general theory of the growth of the firm."⁹⁴ Given her bold statement, Penrose set out to developing an alternative approach at explaining how firms competed. Therefore, unlike the external approach preferred by many of her predecessors, Penrose postulated that the strategy a firm pursued was dependent on the resources it possessed. Closely following Coase's base ideas in *The Nature of the Firm* (1933), Penrose's writings served to return the discipline to the Resource Based View of the firm.

By the end of the 1950s, Japanese businesses, mostly recovered from World War II, began outperforming their US and European counterparts, through applying quality management approaches (later renamed Total Quality Management [TQM]).⁹⁵ Similar in focus to the Resource Based approach, TQM examined organizations' processes and management systems to find ways to improve its efficiency and effectiveness. Thus, worldwide, a slow quality revolution began taking shape as businesses looked towards Japan to discover best practices, which they could incorporate into their systems and processes. This building revolution would not realize its full potential until the 1980s and 1990s, when the movement exploded with the introduction of strategies such as Business

⁹⁴ Edith Penrose, *The theory of the Firm*, (New York: John Wiley and Sons 1959).

⁹⁵ Business Performance Improvement Resource. <http://bpir.com/total-quality-management-history-of-tqm-and-business-excellence-bpir.com.html> (accessed 30 March 2009).

Excellence, Performance Measurement, Benchmarking, Best Practices, and Quality Management among many others.

The Decade of the 1960s

Expectedly, during the 1960s, “increased competition and the internationalization of many industries made cost efficiency and market share critical determinants of success.”⁹⁶ In this environment, Alfred Chandler’s ideas of corporate strategy greatly influenced the development of the field. While Selznick’s approach was more leadership focused, Chandler’s views were broader in scope than Selznick or any other theorist who had gone before. Chandler argued convincingly that strategy occupied a central position in enabling organizational success. In his opinion, strategy was the “determination of the basic long term” goal of an organization, and “that a long-term coordinated strategy was necessary to give a company structure, direction, and focus.”⁹⁷ In fact, so forceful was Chandler in making his argument that memory of his famous quote, “structure follows strategy”⁹⁸ still resonates today, despite a forceful counter argument.

The 1960s also saw more businesses in the private sector applying strategic planning as a strategic management tool. During this era, very few persons in the field made any distinction between the two terms. As a model of organizational strategy, strategic planning eclipsed the internally focused long-range planning, which now became ill suited for the dynamic environment of the 1960s. According to Steiner in

⁹⁶ Richard Lochridge, *Strategy in the 1980s*, cited in *Perspectives on Strategy* (New York, John Wiley and Sons 1998), 56.

⁹⁷ Alfred Chandler, *Strategy and Structure: Chapters in the History of the Industrial Enterprise* (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press 1962), 14.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

Strategic Planning, strategic planning was more beneficial than long range planning for several reasons. Among these included the addressing of strategic issues, and the revelation and clarification of future opportunities and threats.

The discipline also benefitted from the studies of Igor Ansoff in the 1960s, who built upon Chandler's work. Considered as the "Father of Strategic Management" for his use of this term in his 1973 academic discourse, Ansoff was one of the editors of an interestingly named book, *From Strategic Planning to Strategic Management*. This book resulted from a conference that dealt with the challenges faced in implementing strategic planning. Prior to that book, Ansoff wrote his now famous book *Corporate Strategy*, one of the first books exclusively concerning the manner in which organizations competed. Ansoff developed several novel ideas including that of the "gap analysis" in which he argued that an organization "must understand the gap between where we are currently and where we would like to be."⁹⁹ Having determined this gap, Ansoff proposed that an organization's success then depended on the organization's ability to achieve appropriate "gap reducing actions."¹⁰⁰

The Decade of the 1970s

The 1973 oil crisis and the resulting worldwide recession, defined the decade of the 1970s, and set the tone for how organizations strategized during this period.

Lockridge in *Strategy in the 1980s* summarized the decade as one of "high inflation coupled with low growth, increased competition in traditional fields, added regulation,

⁹⁹ Igor Ansoff, *Corporate Strategy* (New York: McGraw Hill 1965).

¹⁰⁰ Ibid

and dramatic growth in international trade, which again changed the rules of the game.”¹⁰¹

Militarily, organization strategy and military strategy remained inextricably linked to threat-based planning, under the canopy of nuclear warfare, while heavily engaged in strategizing for ongoing “proxy” wars, wars of independence, and territorial wars. In addition, the development of new capabilities became a focal point for most militaries, resulting from the ongoing war in Vietnam, the Arab-Israeli Wars (1967,1973), and the need to develop special operations capabilities as a counter to the growing terrorist threat worldwide.

From a business perspective, Lockridge summed up the challenge facing businesses when he stated that, “The most successful companies achieved success by anticipating market evolution and creating unique and defensible advantage over their competitors in the new environment.”¹⁰² Thus, to assist organizations deal with the turbulence of the decade, academics and practitioners introduced or improved several worthwhile tools to assist businesses navigate the unpredictability of the era. Examples of these tools were the Learning/Experience Curve, Portfolio Management, and Growth Share Analysis.

Notwithstanding the value of these contributions, the work of Andrews in 1971 was arguably one of the principal offerings to the field of strategic management during this decade. Following an earlier study in the 1960s, Andrews hypothesized that there

¹⁰¹ Richard Lochridge, *Strategy in the 1980s*, cited in *Perspectives on Strategy* (New York: John Wiley and Sons 1998), 56.

¹⁰² Ibid.

was greater value in conducting both an internal and external analysis of an organization's environment. He contended that none of these analyses had ascendancy over the other. Thus, through conducting an internal analysis an organization's strengths and weaknesses were determinable. On the other hand, an external analysis revealed the organization's opportunities and threats. Known as SWOT analysis, Andrews' work derived its name from the use of the initial letter of each component of the framework.¹⁰³

The decade of the 1980s

Considered as one of the seminal works of strategic management, Michael Porter's writings in the 1980s further defined the field of strategic management. Probably influenced by the rising dominance of the transnational corporation, Porter popularized the Industrial Organization (IO) or industry-focused explanation of how firms strategize to defeat their competitors. As mentioned previously, this approach was at variance to the Resource Based View of the firm and alternately argued that external industry forces determined an organization's strategy.¹⁰⁴ Porter postulated that a firm's ability to outperform its competitors resulted from achieving a sustainable competitive advantage in its industry. Building on Andrews' model, Porter contended that to achieve such an advantage firms chose one approach from among three generic strategies; cost leadership, product differentiation, or market focus. Further, Porter postulated that firms critically analyzed 5 Forces within their industry influencing the organization. Porter ascertained that these forces were:

¹⁰³ Kenneth Andrews, *The Concept of Corporate Strategy* (Homewood: Irwin 1971).

¹⁰⁴ Michael Porter, *Competitive Strategy: Techniques for Analyzing Industries and Competitors* (New York: The Free Press 1980).

The intensity of rivalry among competitors;
Threats posed by new firms entering the market;
The threat of substitute products;
The bargaining power of suppliers; and
The bargaining power of customers¹⁰⁵

In 1985, Porter introduced the Value Chain Model influenced by, or in response to Wernerfelt's resource-based arguments below. The Value Chain approach complemented his 5 Forces model, but also provided organizations with a strategy tool, to analyze the organization's activities in relation to the industry's value chain. Based on this model, Porter demonstrated that an organization provided greater value to its customers, when it created synergies by combining the individual parts of its operations into a seamless whole. Accordingly, Porter inferred that by eliminating or outsourcing non-core processes/components, the organization created greater customer value.¹⁰⁶

Economist Birger Wernerfelt, mentioned above, was another significant theorist in the 1980s. Countering Porter's ideas in a 1984 article, Wernerfelt returned the field to the argument of the Resource-based View of the Firm. Wernerfelt contended, that the "idea of looking at firms as a broad set of resources . . . has received very little formal attention."¹⁰⁷ Rather, he found that by analyzing firms based on a wider resource

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Michael Porter, *Competitive Advantage: Creating and Sustaining Superior Performance* (New York: The Free Press 1985).

¹⁰⁷ Birger Wernerfelt, *A Resource-based View of the Firm*, *Strategic Management Journal*, vol. 5. New York: John Wiley and Sons 1984), 172

¹⁰⁷ Ibid

perspective, provided “different immediate insights than the traditional product perspective.”¹⁰⁸

Acknowledging the foundational studies of Penrose (1959) and Rubin (1973), Wernerfelt appropriately named his article, A Resource-Based View of the Firm, which officially established the name of the theory. Despite his difference in focus in explaining his theory, Wernerfelt used Porter’s 5 Forces as an analytical tool, while acknowledging that “these were originally intended as tools for analysis of products only.”¹⁰⁹

Based on his theory, Wernerfelt argued that a firm could achieve a competitive advantage leading to high profits, through developing certain attractive tangible and intangible resources the firm possesses.¹¹⁰ Wernerfelt further argued that because of their greater resources, “large firms could leverage their attractive resources to develop new resources or obtain these through acquisitions.”¹¹¹ Referring to Porter’s 5 Forces Model, Wernerfelt was careful to note that in achieving an advantage, a firm must be able to control its attractive resources which must not be substitutable, controlled by monopolies, or confined to be sold to monopolies.¹¹²

Organizations in the 1980s benefitted from the reintroduction of the idea of knowledge workers, and the importance of learning in organizations. In 1968, Drucker in

¹⁰⁸ Birger Wernerfelt, *A Resource-based View of the Firm*, Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 5 (New York: John Wiley and Sons 1984).

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² Ibid.

The Age of Discontinuity, wrote, “Today’s organization...is, however, a knowledge organization. It exists to make productive hundreds, sometimes thousands of specialized kinds of knowledge. . . . It is true of today’s business, of today’s government agency, and increasingly in today’s army.”

Probably motivated by Drucker’s ideas, Tilles in *Strategy and Learning*, reintroduced to the discipline, the importance of organizational learning in achieving competitive advantage.¹¹³ Tilles argued that for organizations to respond to the fast changing environment, a strategy of adaptation was vital. To Tilles, strategy and learning were synonymous, and organizations had to overcome four difficulties connecting learning and strategy.¹¹⁴ Tilles identified the first difficulty as the organization’s inability to release old beliefs. Old beliefs he explained, were assumptions of corporate behavior, built up from long years of experience in the industry. Thus, even when those old beliefs became irrelevant, organizations held fast to them, even though they were no longer successful. To overcome this behavior, Tilles proposed that leadership must recognize when the old belief system was no longer working, and appraise its continued utility.

The second difficulty Tilles observed was rigid relationships that did not facilitate learning. Effective organizational learning he noted was a joint activity, achievable only when “those who normally work together can contemplate joint exploratory activity.” Tilles therefore charged leadership with the responsibility for creating positive

¹¹³ Seymour Tilles, *Strategy and Learning*, cited in *Perspectives on Strategy* (New York, John Wiley and Sons 1998), 249-253.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 249.

relationships, and by extension, the organizational climate that would facilitate learning.¹¹⁵

Further, Tilles highlighted that organizations' inability to appreciate industry rates of change was another inhibitor to organizational learning and strategy. In his view, "One of the most severe tests of learning is whether something is so well understood that rates of change can be predicted."¹¹⁶ Despite the uncertainties of the future, executives he said must be in a position to forecast and develop strategies to respond to the environment.

The final difficulty Tilles identified was an organizations' failure to develop a systems perspective. Tilles argued:

Strategy is inherently a systemic issue. To deal with it effectively, people responsible for major components of the system have to learn how their activities mesh with those of others in the system to create an overall direction. Unless this perspective is learned, it will be difficult to create consistent behavior. Few things are as disruptive to the long-term interests of a large company as a strong function narrowly pursuing its own.¹¹⁷

To "promote systems learning," Tilles felt that it was necessary to require people to become knowledgeable about external events before they developed a joint strategic response.¹¹⁸ Tilles insightful study reignited the importance of learning as a competitive advantage, and set the stage for Peter Senge's highly acclaimed book on organizational learning, *The Fifth Discipline*.

¹¹⁵ Seymour Tilles, *Strategy and Learning*, cited in *Perspectives on Strategy*, (New York: John Wiley and Sons 1998), 250.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 251.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 252.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*

The Decade of the 1990s

The 1980s ended with the fall of the Berlin Wall. Far from the tranquility anticipated from this event, the 1990s witnessed an even more turbulent and fragmented world than the previous decade. Of great significance, this decade witnessed global events such as the end of the Cold War, the unification of Germany (1989), the spread of New Public Management and privatization, the formation of the World Trade Organization (WTO), globalization, trade liberalization, deregulation, the information communication and technological revolution, and ecommerce. In combination, these driving forces of change led to an explosion in world trade, an exponential increase in business organizations, and the fragmentation of traditional industries.¹¹⁹ Similar to the previous decade, this uncertain environment enabled the development of new approaches to strategic management as individuals attempted to make sense of the prevailing circumstances.

In such a dynamic environment, militaries could not expect to remain unscathed. Therefore, whether it was in response to the end of the Cold War, Government's New Public Management initiatives, or both of these events, these global forces affected military organizations worldwide. Thus, as was customary, both the military and business 'benchmarked' off of each other in order to identify "best practices," words now popular in the strategic management arena. On the military side, a noteworthy strategic contribution came from the United States Air Force's Colonel John Boyd who introduced the OODA (Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act) Loop. While viewed more as a decision-

¹¹⁹ Alonzo Strickland and Arthur Thompson, *Crafting and Executing Strategy* (New York: McGraw-Hill/Irwin 2001), 261-263.

making tool than that of a comprehensive strategic management model, the OODA Loop provided military and business decision makers alike, with a tool to enhance their efforts at strategy development.¹²⁰ The end of the Cold War era also provided militaries with another interesting development that influenced both their military strategy and organizational strategy. During the Cold War, NATO and Warsaw Pact countries existed in a state of perpetual readiness, each one anticipating an invasion from the other. However, with the specter of invasion no longer looming, militaries began to move away from the narrower threat-based approach to planning, while embracing instead, the more all encompassing capabilities-based approach. This was a natural progression as capabilities-based operations proved its effectiveness in 1991, when a US led Coalition Force expelled the invading Iraqi Army from Kuwait, in what popularly became known as the “100 Days War”.

To make sense of this dynamic environment, businesses once again turned to academics and practitioners, many of whom returned to the earlier ideas of the Resource Based View of the firm. Of these, three of the more defining works in the early period of the decade came from Prahalad and Hamel, Jay Barney, and Stalk, Evans, and Shulman.

Following their article on Strategic Intent and Strategic Architecture, Prahalad and Hamel in a complementary article, *The Core Competence of the Corporation*, returned the discipline to a reexamination of core competencies. In their groundbreaking article, these theorists argued that an organization’s strategy was dependent on the core competencies that they developed during the course of their existence. Based on these

¹²⁰ Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 6-0, *Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office), 6-19.

core competencies, a firm could introduce core products and services, with which the organization could distinguish itself in the minds of its customers.

In 1991, Jay Barney wrote an article in the *Journal of Management* titled, “Firm Resources and Sustainable Competitive Advantage,”¹²¹ a term previously used by Porter. This article complemented Prahalad and Hamel’s writings, and used arguments closely related to Wernerfelt’s 1984 study, that postulated firms could achieve a sustainable competitive advantage if they held resources that were valuable, rare, imitable, and non-substitutable.¹²²

In 1992, Stalk, Evans, and Shulman expanded on Selznick’s previous work on organization’s capabilities. In *Competing on Capabilities: The New Rules of Corporate Strategy*, they argued that “When the economy was relatively static, strategy could afford to be static...and competition was a “war of position.”¹²³ However, given the fast changing nature of the 1990s environment, they contended that strategy “has to become correspondingly more dynamic. Competition is now a “war of movement.”¹²⁴ Strategic success depended on the dynamism of an organization’s behavior, demonstrated by its ability to anticipate, respond quickly, and develop “the hard-to-imitate organizational

¹²¹ Organizations and Markets. <http://organizationsandmarkets.com/2008/03/14/jay-barney-to-become-honorary-doctor-at-cbs/> (accessed 1 June 2009).

¹²² 12 Manage. http://www.12manage.com/methods_barney_resource_based_view_firm.html (accessed 1 June 2009).

¹²³ George; Stalk, Philip Evans and Lawrence Shulman, *Competing on Capabilities: The New Rules of Corporate Strategy in Perspectives on Strategy* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1998), 87-88.

¹²⁴ Ibid.

capabilities that distinguish a company from its competitors in the eyes of its customers [stakeholder].”¹²⁵

According to these strategists, a capability is a set of collective cross-functional business processes, weaved together to deliver value in satisfying a customers’ real needs. Capabilities based competitors therefore relentlessly focus on satisfying customer needs, identify and invest heavily in key interconnected business processes, manage them centrally, while “looking for a long-term payback” on their investment.¹²⁶

As an example, the authors espouse the view that looking at new product development only from the sales point of view is too narrow of an approach. Rather, Stalk, Evans, and Shulman suggest that businesses need to see these opportunities as product realization, “a capability that includes the way a product is not only developed but also marketed and serviced.”¹²⁷ Consequently, capabilities-based competitors avoid stove piping since no one part of the organization can claim ownership of a capability since it is “everywhere and nowhere.”¹²⁸ Such organizations therefore integrate their operations vertically and “even when a company doesn’t actually own every link of the capability chain,” they develop strategic relationships that enable the company “to tie these parts into its own business systems.”¹²⁹ Thus, using these approaches, capabilities-

¹²⁵ George; Stalk, Philip Evans and Lawrence Shulman, *Competing on Capabilities: The New Rules of Corporate Strategy in Perspectives on Strategy* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1998), 87-88.

¹²⁶ Ibid.

¹²⁷ Ibid., 89.

¹²⁸ Ibid., 90.

¹²⁹ Ibid., 89.

based competitors strategically outperform their competitors on speed, consistency, acuity, agility, and innovativeness.

The First Decade of 2000

While the first decade of the 21st Century is still in progress, probably the defining moments of this decade have occurred already. This decade so far has witnessed several tumultuous events such as the 2001 terrorists attack on the World Trade Center and the subsequent US response. Additionally, the world is witnessing a resurging Russia as a military power; the transformation/modernization of many armed forces; the growth of China and India as economic powerhouses; and the failure of the US economy, which seems to have initiated an approaching world recession. Thus, despite the hope of a new millennium, the world seems no less turbulent than the decade of the 1990s.

Militarily, this decade is witnessing a greater number of militaries separating their military strategies from their management strategies. In fact, after much criticism from the US Government Accountability Office for its slow pace in implementing an overarching management plan,¹³⁰ the US Department of Defense recently published its first Strategic Management Plan.¹³¹ Thus, this decade is witnessing greater symbiosis between private sector management strategies and that of the military. Reflecting this symbiotic relationship is the use of terms such as learning organizations, lean six sigma,

¹³⁰ Government Accountability Office, Defense Business Transformation (2008).

¹³¹ Department of Defense: Deputy Chief Management Office.
<http://www.defenselink.mil/dcmo> (accessed 1 May 2009).

continuous process improvement, roadmaps and balanced scorecards, which now form part of the military management lexicon.¹³²

Noting that organizations “generally fail at implementing a strategy or managing operations because they lack an overarching management system to integrate and align these two vital processes,”¹³³ Kaplan and Norton in *The Execution Premium* (2008), proposed a Comprehensive and Integrated Management System. Building on their previous writings on *The Balanced Scorecard* (1992, 1996), they see the closed –loop management system as an end state “that enterprises can aspire to reach for connecting excellence in operational execution to strategic priorities and vision.”¹³⁴ Six stages comprise the system consisting of strategy development, strategy planning, organizational alignment, develop operational plans, monitor and learn, and test and adapt the strategy.

While enriching the world with its variety of tools, methods, and approaches, strategic management has also brought with it some degree of inconsistency. Kaplan and Norton in *The Execution Premium* probably best sum up this situation when they state:

In summary, strategy development and the links between strategy and operations remain ad hoc, varied and fragmented. Given the myriad strategy and operational management tools available, we believe that a company can benefit by taking a systems approach to link strategy to operations. Having a comprehensive and integrated management system can help companies overcome the difficulties and

¹³² Ibid., ix.

¹³³ Robert Kaplan, and David Norton, *The Execution Premium: Linking Strategy to Operations For Competitive Advantage* (Harvard Business Press, Boston. 2008), 1

¹³⁴ Ibid., ix.

frustration that most of them experience when attempting to implement their strategy-particularly new transformational strategies.¹³⁵

¹³⁵ Ibid., 7.

CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY

Introduction

Re-stated Purpose

The Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force commenced strategic planning as its strategic management model in 1992. The decision by MG Ralph Brown, the Chief of Defence Staff, was more a strategic move rather than a technical innovation. The General, recognizing that the Government was introducing strategic planning as a mechanism to reform the Public Service, used this as leverage, to gain the Government's commitment in establishing a proper Force Headquarters.¹³⁶ This indirect approach the General found necessary, since attempts by former Chiefs of Defence Staff failed to gain previous Governments' commitment for the initiative. Past Administrations while in principle agreeing with the concept, made no provisions for establishing the Headquarters, leaving an ad hoc arrangement to persist.¹³⁷

However, since officially implementing strategic planning in 1996, and despite two condensed iterations,¹³⁸ the Force has not assessed the effectiveness of its initial attempt. This study therefore aims to examine the level of effectiveness the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force achieved in its initial attempt at strategic planning, and if necessary, to recommend an improved model.

¹³⁶ Major General Ralph Brown, Interview by author, Trinidad and Tobago, 6 April 2009.

¹³⁷ Ibid.

¹³⁸ Sandra Lynch, Acting Deputy Permanent Secretary, Interview by author, Trinidad and Tobago, 9 April 2009.

The main purpose of this chapter is to provide an insight into the methodology used by the researcher in conducting this study. In this regard, the design of this chapter seeks to satisfy the needs of several audiences, whom one may consider as existing along a continuum. Located at one end of the spectrum are researchers for whom this chapter will provide a roadmap to repeat, refine, or further expand this study as appropriate. Conversely, at the other end of the spectrum are readers with a general interest in the topic, for whom this chapter will provide a framework guiding the evolution of the study.

This chapter proceeds by examining in some detail, the overarching research strategy, which takes a case study approach. Next, the researcher discusses the case study design, which includes the framing of the research question, and an overview of the approach used in conducting the literature review. This chapter will then conclude by examining the process of data collection and data reduction, before finally ending with a summary of the chapter.

Research Strategy

In conducting the research methodology, the researcher used a combination of approaches suggested by various theorists. However, as the investigator framed the research within the context of a case study, aspects of Yin's *Case Study Research: Design and Methods*, guided the research methodology.¹³⁹

According to Yin, a case study is a comprehensive research strategy “that allows investigators to retain the holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-life events-such as individual life cycles, organizational and managerial processes, neighborhood changes,

¹³⁹ Robert Yin, *Case Study Research: Design and Methods*, 3rd ed. (California, 2003).

international relations, and the maturation of industries.”¹⁴⁰ Also influencing this researcher’s decision was Yin’s recommendation that the case study is a preferred strategy when “how” or “why” questions are being posed, when the investigator has little control over events, and when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within some real-life context.¹⁴¹ This research topic matches all of these conditions. First, the study comprises “how” or “why” questions. Secondly, the Defence Force’s employment of strategic planning and strategic management qualify as contemporary phenomenon, as these are relatively new areas of study. Finally, the researcher definitely has had no control over how the strategic management of the Defence Force unfolded.

Case Study Design

A case study design or the case’s “blueprint”, “is the logical sequence that connects the empirical data to a study’s initial research question and, ultimately, to its conclusions.”¹⁴² Yin categorizes case study designs into two general categories; single case and multiple case designs. The researcher chose the former typology, as it best represented most of the characteristics of the research study. Single case study designs are “analogous to a single experiment and many of the conditions” are the same between these two.¹⁴³ This case study satisfied three of the conditions relevant to the single case design-critical testing of a significant theory, revelatory, and longitudinal in nature.

¹⁴⁰ Robert Yin, *Case Study Research: Design and Methods*, 3rd ed. (California, 2003), 2.

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 1.

¹⁴² *Ibid.*

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*, 39

First, by focusing on a proven theory, strategic management, the case meets the requirement of being a “critical test of a significant theory.” Secondly, the case is “revelatory” as no previous investigator has had the “opportunity to observe and analyze [this] phenomenon previously inaccessible to scientific investigation”¹⁴⁴ Finally, the research study is “longitudinal” as it examines the Defence Force implementation of Force planning over approximately four decades.

Framing the Study’s Question

This aspect of the research began with the arduous task of “converting a topic of interest” into primary and secondary questions.¹⁴⁵ Research is an evolutionary process and, probably just like many researchers before, this researcher discovered that the process of framing both the primary and secondary questions is a continuous and an iterative one. In this regard, there is a hidden lesson here for amateur researchers; that is they should not be alarmed if the first questions they frame, are not necessarily the final ones that are researched.

Research is also an exploratory process and in this regard, while undertaking the literature review, the researcher discovered that an important assumption made at the commencement of the study later proved inaccurate. This discovery led the author to reframe both the primary and secondary questions. Hence, when redrafting the questions, the researcher used a cyclical process of reading (literature review), reflecting, drafting,

¹⁴⁴ Robert Yin, *Case Study Research: Design and Methods*, 3rd ed. (California, 2003), 42.

¹⁴⁵ Martin Davies, *Doing a Successful Research Project: Using Qualitative or Quantitative Methods* (New York, Palgrave MacMillan, 2007).

and refining. This process led the researcher to coin the phrase “the RRDR process”, which the researcher believes provides a useful acronym to assist future researchers.

Regarding the reading aspect, the researcher found that in addition to reading published material, it was equally valuable to review previously written theses in the area of study. By doing this, the researcher was able to obtain a conceptual roadmap, while gaining a better understanding and appreciation for the requirements at end state.

However, there was also a downside to taking such an approach.

Since new research builds upon previous research, and past studies at the College focused almost exclusively on change management, initially, the study and by extension the questions, focused on this area of research. However, once the researcher expanded the literature review beyond the College’s database, it soon became apparent that the more appropriate area of research was in the discipline of strategic management, and not change management as originally thought. Thus, through undertaking the literature review, the researcher discovered that while strategic planning, change management, and strategic management are often thought to be synonymous, in reality, they are not all the same; the former two being subfields of the latter. Steiner states this quite succinctly; when speaking about strategic planning he says, “Strategic planning is a backbone support to strategic management. It is not, of course, the entirety of strategic management but it is a major process in the conduct of strategic management.”¹⁴⁶

In addition to this revelation, the researcher observed that by applying the RRDR approach to the specific areas of interest, over time, both the primary and secondary

¹⁴⁶ George Steiner, *Strategic Planning: What Every Manager Must Know* (New York: The Free Press, 1979), 4.

research questions emerged. Subsequently, using these questions as a guide, the search for “truth” commenced, leading to an even more comprehensive literature review.

Review of the Literature

Prior research studies at the College provided a valuable roadmap that assisted the author’s research. Notwithstanding, given the ambiguity in the lexicon, and the hundreds of various approaches comprising the field of strategic management, the researcher also found immense value by taking a chronological approach to conducting the literature review. Along with the greater clarity, this chronological approach provided the researcher with a “menu” of best practices, which played a significant role in informing the final recommendations made.

Additionally, to gain a better appreciation for the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force’s application of strategic planning within the wider framework of the discipline, the researcher reviewed the strategic and transformation plans of other military forces, plans of public and private sector organizations, journals, reports, articles, and internet sources. In this regard, the researcher examined areas such as Defense Transformation, New Public Management, Change Management, Strategic Planning, and Strategic Management. The literature review also assisted the researcher in deciding on the type, sources, and data collection methods that were appropriate to this study.

Data Collection

As a framework for data collection, the researcher first used Strategic Management theory and focused the questions into three categories of Strategic Management -historical considerations, strategic plan formulation, and strategic plan

implementation. Next, the researcher further subdivided these three categories into nine themes, which focused data collection efforts into the specific areas of concern.

Organized by categories these themes were:

1. Historical Considerations
 - The Force's Planning History
 - The Purpose for Strategic Planning
2. Strategic Plan Formulation
 - The Planning Process
 - Strategic Goals
 - Competitive Strategy
3. Strategic Plan Implementation
 - Plan's Acceptance
 - Benefits/Successes
 - Challenges/Failures

Having decided the categories and themes, the researcher then used data triangulation to guide the actual data collection process. This process, recommended by several authors including Yin, defines data triangulation as the process of using multiple collection methods for data verification.¹⁴⁷ In this regard, the researcher used five sources of data collection- Electronic and Hard-copy Documents, Archival Records, Interviews, and Questionnaires.

¹⁴⁷ Robert Yin, *Case Study Research: Design and Methods*, 3rd ed. (California, 2003), 2.

Archival Records

The researcher collected data from two principal sources of archival records. The first source consisted of the following official Government records:

1. Hansard from the Parliament of Trinidad and Tobago
2. The Initial Progress Report on the Implementation of Public Service Reform in Trinidad and Tobago (February 1992)
3. The Second Progress Report on the Implementation of Public Service Reform in Trinidad and Tobago (June 1992)
4. A Green Paper on the Policy Agenda for the Public Service of Trinidad and Tobago (October 1996)
5. A White Paper on the Policy Agenda for the Public Service of Trinidad and Tobago (May 1997)
6. Vision 2020 National Transformation Plan (2006)

The Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force provided the researcher with the second source of archival information from the following records:

1. The Strategic Plan of the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force (1992-2000)
2. A Proposal For the Revision of the Structure and Operations of the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force (August 1993)
3. Various Operational Orders, documents, and archival records from the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force

Documentation

During the spring of 2009, the researcher returned to Trinidad and Tobago and visited the Headquarters of the Defence Force and the Regiment. The purpose of this visit was to examine pertinent documents such as reports and letters. These documents provided a rich source of data, regarding the evolution of strategic planning within the Defence force.

Interviews

Interviews were the principal source of data collection. As suggested by Davies in *Doing a Successful Research Project*, the researcher first selected a small sample comprising a core strategic group of expert individuals to interview.¹⁴⁸ This group comprised the current Chief of Defence Staff of the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force, and five former Chiefs of Defence Staff, among whom; one later became a Minister of National Security. The group also included an Acting Deputy Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of National Security; who currently heads the Ministry's Defense Section, and who possesses almost two decades of experience in defense matters. The expert knowledge of these individuals formed from their several years of experience interacting within the domestic, regional, and global defense and security environments, was paramount in the decision to use them as a reliable source of data.

In an effort to ensure the accuracy of the interviews, the investigator used audio recording, which he later transcribed. In general, the questions asked of each individual were uniform in nature, though the focus of enquiry related more to the period when the

¹⁴⁸ Martin Davies, *Doing a Successful Research Project: Using Qualitative or Quantitative Methods* (New York, Palgrave MacMillan, 2007).

individual would have commanded the Force. In the case of the Acting Deputy Permanent Secretary, the questions focused on defense oversight and policy development. This group therefore provided the study with immeasurable value that no other group could replicate, based on their several years of experience, in shaping the strategic development of the Force. In addition, the project benefitted from the wealth of information each individual provided, based on their knowledge of decisions at the national strategic level, which determined certain courses of action taken by, and on behalf of the Defence Force.

Notwithstanding their valuable contributions, Davies cautioned against selecting a core group of individuals who may be too homogenous, as it may seem at first glance with these former Chiefs of Defence Staff.¹⁴⁹ To mitigate against this possibility, the investigator purposely included the Acting Deputy Permanent Secretary, who along with being the lone civilian, also contributed a female perspective to the discussions. Additionally, while a core group such as this one may appear to be homogenous; in reality however, this was not the case. Given that throughout their careers these individuals shared senior-subordinate relationships, the only real commonality that existed was that they all rose to the Office of Chief of Defence Staff. As an example of this reality, during the period 1995-2000 when BG Joseph Theodore became the Minister of National Security on retirement, three of his former colleagues served as Chiefs of Defence Staff under his guidance. This group therefore, provided unique duality, enriching the research with the perspectives of strategic decision-maker/enabler, as well as that of operational and tactical implementers.

¹⁴⁹ Martin Davies, *Doing a Successful Research Project*.

Questionnaire

The researcher also administered a questionnaire to obtain data from two former Chiefs of Defence Staff who at the time was unavailable to attend the interviews. The researcher regrets that up to the completion of the report, one of the Generals was unable to participate. The questions used for the questionnaire covered similar topics as that used for the interviews. In addition, as was the case with the interviewees, the researcher placed the emphasis of the questions, on the period during which the Chief of Defence Staff commanded.

Data Reduction

Data Reduction is the process of organizing the data by identifying patterns through the process of categorizing, coding and developing themes.¹⁵⁰ Using the categories and themes previously developed for data collection, the researcher first reviewed the answers to the questions. Next, using the process of pattern analysis, the researcher used in combination, a numerical and color-coding scheme, to match the data collected under the question themes. However, on occasions when a topical issue emerged that the questions did not address, the investigator was careful to develop a separate theme for analysis.

Summary

This chapter proceeded by examining the application of the case study methodology, as an overarching strategy to this research project. Next, the researcher

¹⁵⁰ Michael Patton, *Qualitative Evaluation and Research Methods* (California, SAGE Publications, 1990).

discussed the single case study design, the framing of the research question, and an overview on the approach used in conducting the literature review. Finally, the chapter concluded by examining the methods of data collection and data reduction, ending with the researcher preparing the data for analysis in the succeeding chapter.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Introduction Restated Purpose

The Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force commenced strategic planning as its strategic management model in 1992. The decision by MG Ralph Brown, the Chief of Defence Staff, was more a strategic move rather than a technical innovation. The General, recognizing that the Government was introducing strategic planning as a mechanism to reform the Public Service, used this as leverage, to gain the Government's commitment in establishing a proper Force Headquarters.¹⁵¹ This indirect approach the General found necessary, since attempts by former Chiefs of Defence Staff failed to gain previous Governments' commitment for the initiative. Past Administrations while in principle agreeing with the concept, made no provisions for establishing the Headquarters, leaving an ad hoc arrangement to persist.¹⁵²

However, since officially implementing strategic planning in 1996, and despite two condensed iterations,¹⁵³ the Force has not assessed the effectiveness of its initial attempt. This study therefore aims to examine the level of effectiveness the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force achieved in its initial attempt at strategic planning, and if necessary, to recommend an improved model.

¹⁵¹ Major General Ralph Brown, Interview by author, Trinidad and Tobago, 6 April 2009.

¹⁵² Ibid.

¹⁵³ Sandra Lynch, Acting Deputy Permanent Secretary, Interview by author, Trinidad and Tobago, 9 April 2009.

The principal purpose of this chapter is to analyze the data collected from the five data sources that the researcher identified in the previous chapter - Electronic and Hard copy Documents, Archival Records, Interviews, and Questionnaires. Similar to the previous chapter as well, to ensure congruency, the researcher will analyze these data within the framework of Strategic Management theory, using the following themes:

1. Historical Considerations
2. Strategic Plan Formulation
3. Strategic Plan Implementation

Analysis of Historical Considerations

In conducting the historical analysis, the researcher analyzed the data collected based on following questions:

1. How did the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force conduct Force Development planning, prior to the introduction of strategic planning?
2. Why did the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force implement strategic planning in 1992?

The researcher found that by first analyzing these questions, he obtained greater clarity and appreciation for the historical circumstances that led the Defence Force into introducing strategic planning in 1992. Accordingly, the researcher commenced data analysis by examining the data collected on the question, *How did the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force conduct Force Development planning, prior to the introduction of strategic planning?*

Based on the data from the various sources, the researcher learned that the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force's development is probably unique among military

institutions, since the Force's growth and development, occurred in the absence of a formal command and control Headquarters.¹⁵⁴

Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force's initial efforts at Force planning are traceable to the period just prior to the country's independence, while it was still a member of the West Indian Federation (1958-1962).¹⁵⁵ In its efforts to provide its West Indian colonies with greater autonomy, Great Britain, by the British Caribbean Federation Act of 1956, agreed to the formation of the West Indian Federation.¹⁵⁶ To provide for regional defense, the Federal Government formed the West India Regiment with the First Battalion stationed in Jamaica. To assist the Federal Government's efforts in planning for the Second Battalion, intended for Trinidad and Tobago, Britain provided the Federation with a three-man army advisory team.

Confronted with several problems, the Federation dissolved in 1962 and immediately following, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago seized the opportunity to seek their independence from Britain.¹⁵⁷ However, as a precondition for granting independence, the British, recognizing the increasing instability in many newly independent post-colonial states, insisted on the establishment of defense forces for internal defense.

¹⁵⁴ Brigadier General Joseph Theodore, Interview by author, Trinidad and Tobago, 7 April 2009.

¹⁵⁵ Major General Ralph Brown, Interview by author, Trinidad and Tobago, 6 April 2009.

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http://www.caricom.org/jsp/community/west_indies_federation.jsp?menu=community. (accessed on 16 May 2009).

¹⁵⁷ http://www.caricom.org/search_results.jsp?menu=search. (accessed on 16 May 2009).

To satisfy this requirement, the Trinidad and Tobago Government established a land force, the Regiment, and a maritime force, the Coast Guard. In planning for the Force, the Government used aspects of the British Army advisory team's "strategic plan" and similar plans from a Royal Navy planning team, to develop the structure and established strength for the Defence Force.¹⁵⁸ Cost consideration militated against the establishment of a Defence Force Headquarters.¹⁵⁹ Responsibility for these functions however fell to the Commanding Officer of the Regiment, LTC Peter Pearce Gould, who held seniority over his Royal Navy equivalent, Captain David Bloom, attached to the Coast Guard.¹⁶⁰

Despite the concept of a unified defense force, in reality, there was no overarching strategic development plan, doctrine, interoperability plans, or attention paid to achieving a joint force concept.¹⁶¹ On the contrary, similar to the British Armed Forces, both units trained, operated, and developed separately, only coming together when neither could independently deliver a capability required by the Government.

In 1964, on the return of LTC Peter Pearce Gould to Britain, the Government appointed Colonel Joffre Serrette as the first local Commanding Officer of the Regiment, and the Commander of the Defence Force.¹⁶² The Defence Force having been "imposed"

¹⁵⁸ Major General Ralph Brown, Interview by author, Trinidad and Tobago, 6 April 2009.

¹⁵⁹ Ivelaw Griffith, *Quest for Security in the Caribbean: Problems and Promises in Subordinate States* (New York, M.E. Sharpe, Inc, 1993), 1.

¹⁶⁰ Major General Ralph Brown, Interview by author, Trinidad and Tobago, 6 April 2009.

¹⁶¹ Brigadier General Theodore Joseph, Interview by author, Trinidad and Tobago, 7 April 2009.

¹⁶² Ibid.

on the Government, slowly the Administration disengaged from the Force. As an example of this disengagement, BG Brown recounted in his testimony, an occasion when at an Independence Parade, Colonel Serrette took the opportunity to approach the Prime Minister, Dr Eric Williams, for an item on behalf of the Regiment. The Prime Minister's response, BG Brown recounts, was to ask the Colonel rhetorically, "What does the Regiment produce?"

Accordingly, over time, the Administration seemingly retreated from its Defence Force, leaving Force development up to the Commanding Officers of the two units.¹⁶³ Consequently, success in implementing defense initiatives strongly depended on the persuasive power of individual unit commanding officers, to convince successive Ministers of Home Affairs (later National Security) and their influential teams of public service "experts."

Persuasive incompetence therefore meant that despite the soundness of initiatives, plans either came to a halt, or reduced Commanding Officers to political maneuvering. Later, unit development through political maneuvering became a Force development challenge. This occurred with BG Serrette's appointment as the independent Commander of the Defence Force; having to deal with a deeply ingrained culture, of direct transactions between politicians and unit commanding officers.¹⁶⁴

Ministers, once convinced however, took the Defence Force's recommendations either to the Defence Council, the National Security Council, or directly to the Cabinet.

¹⁶³ Major General Ralph Brown, Interview by author, Trinidad and Tobago, 6 April 2009.

¹⁶⁴ Brigadier General Theodore Joseph, Interview by author, Trinidad and Tobago, 7 April 2009

As the final decision-making authority of the Administration, once the Cabinet approved the recommendations, the responsibility then fell to the Minister to provide the Defence Force with the resources required for implementing the Cabinet's decision.

Notwithstanding, despite BG Serrette's efforts, the Force remained without a unified Headquarters. Recounting this period, MG Brown said:

Even at the time when they [the Government] separated the Commander of the Force from the Commanding Officer of the Regiment, they still did not accept the idea of a Defence Force Headquarters existing. Therefore, the Commander of the Defence Force Brigadier Serrette, as he then was, made his own internal arrangement to get such staff, limited though it may be, that he required, by taking them out of the units.¹⁶⁵

While in command of the Force, BG Serrette undertook initiatives to develop a closer relationship between the two units, even spearheading what eventually became a failed attempt at a unified "strategic document."¹⁶⁶ However, for the most part under BG Serrette's command, Force Development and Unit development were synonymous.

In 1976, Commodore Mervyn Williams of the Coast Guard succeeded BG Serrette. Under the Commodore's stewardship, the Ministry eventually "accepted, though not formally, but verbally, the concept of a Defence Force Headquarters."¹⁶⁷ This "acceptance" occurred in 1979, when an amendment to the Defence Act replaced the title Commander of the Defence Force, with that of Chief of Defence Staff.¹⁶⁸

¹⁶⁵ Major General Ralph Brown, Interview by author, Trinidad and Tobago, 6 April 2009.

¹⁶⁶ Brigadier General Joseph Theodore, Interview by author, Trinidad and Tobago, 7 April 2009

¹⁶⁷ Major General Ralph Brown, Interview by author, Trinidad and Tobago, 6 April 2009.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid; Commodore Anthony Franklin, Interview by author, Trinidad and Tobago, 9 April 2009; Ivelaw Griffith, *Quest for Security in the Caribbean: Problems and Promises in Subordinate States* (New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1993), 107.

BG Theodore succeeded Commodore Williams during a short period of command, and he too was not able to convince the political directorate of the need for a Joint Force Headquarters. This situation however began to change just prior to BG Theodore's retirement in 1991, when the Defence Force under his command, distinguished itself in putting down an attempted coup by the Jamaat-al-Muslimeen, a radical Muslim fundamentalist group. Because the operation was mainly land-based, the Regiment played the key role in forcing the surrender of the insurrectionists. For its distinguished service in "The Preservation of Democracy and Constitutional Government", the unit under the command of Colonel Ralph Brown received the Trinity Cross, the country's highest award.¹⁶⁹

Consequently, when newly promoted BG Brown replaced BG Theodore, he met an environment that was becoming somewhat more amenable to the concept of a Defence Force Headquarters. Another factor assisting BG Brown was the Defence Force adoption of strategic planning, during the Government's Public Sector Reform initiative. According to MG Brown, "it was only after the formal strategic plan was completed [accepted in 1996] which called for the establishment of a Defence Force Headquarters with proper staffing, proper staff officers and the like, that the idea was accepted. . . ."¹⁷⁰

Next, the researcher analyzed the data regarding the purpose for implementing strategic planning. As MG Brown was the Chief of Defence Staff and the convener of the initiative, the investigator asked MG Brown, "*Why did the Trinidad and Tobago*

¹⁶⁹ Trinidad and Tobago National Library and Information System Authority. http://www.nalis.gov.tt/NationalAwards-Emblems/Culture_TrinityCross.html. (accessed 1 May 2009).

¹⁷⁰ Major General Ralph Brown, Interview by author, Trinidad and Tobago, 6 April 2009.

Defence Force commence strategic planning in 1992? In response, MG Ralph Brown said:

If my memory serves me correctly it was after the attempted Coup in 1990 that the Defence Force under my leadership formally decided to work on a [strategic] document, the very first strategic plan document which we submitted to Government for acceptance. At the time, the Government was involved in strategic planning for the entire management of the Public Service and as a result I approached the then Minister of Public Administration, he is now deceased, Minister Gordon Draper, so that the Defence Force can “piggy back” on the exercise which the Government was endeavoring to put in place. He took my request to the National Security Council and I was asked to formally work on a strategic document. This was, as far as I am aware, the very first document and I think it’s very often referred to as “The Blue Book”.¹⁷¹

To corroborate MG Brown’s evidence, the researcher asked the Acting Deputy Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of National Security, Mrs. Sandra Lynch, to provide her perspective on the introduction of strategic planning within the Defence Force. Mrs. Lynch recounted:

Strategic development started, I would say, in 1992 with General Brown and his proposal to restructure the Defence Force and the Volunteers. He had his proposals which essentially focused on staffing and structuring the various Battalions and whatever and that would have been around 1992. Now, during that time, there was not much focus on strategic planning and on quality. It was more on having structure in place.

Strategic Plan Formulation

Prior to analyzing the data in respect to strategic plan formulation, the researcher first drafted questions that corresponded to the category and themes. These questions asked:

1. How did the Defence Force formulate the strategic plan?
2. What were the strategic goals of the plan?
3. What was the Defence Force’s competitive strategy?

¹⁷¹ Major General Ralph Brown, Interview by author, Trinidad and Tobago, 6 April 2009.

To obtain the information required to answer these questions, the researcher examined data collected from documents, archival records, and interviews. The researcher commenced the analysis by first reviewing documentary evidence and the strategic plan.

The plan addressed the following twelve areas:

1. The Threat Environment
2. The Mission
3. The Vision
4. Strengths and Weaknesses
5. Objectives
6. Restructuring and Relocation of units
7. Equipment
8. Communications
9. Operational Concepts and Systems
10. Administrative Reform
11. Training
12. Strategies For Implementation of Goals and Objectives¹⁷²

Next, the researcher analyzed the data collected from MG Brown's interview that asked, *How was the strategic plan formulated?* In response, the General said:

[T]he strategic plan was informed by the external situation that was in place at the time." "We had to think outside of the box and we had to adopt a whole new approach to plans for the Defence Force, its utilization, and how we were going to execute those plans." Further, the General said that along with the normal

¹⁷² Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force Strategic Plan 1992-2000, 1992.

military role, the Force was becoming involved in some of the youth social safety net programs, such as the Civilian Conservation Corps.¹⁷³

Regarding the actual formulation process, MG Brown said that he involved “the senior elements in the Defence Force, the Regiment and the Coast Guard at the time. It was much wider in scope and in the numbers of people that were involved in the exercise [than previous planning initiatives].”¹⁷⁴

However, commenting on this planning process, BG Dillon, who at the time was a senior major in the Force, felt that there was need for greater participation and input by a wider cross-section of the Force. As far as he recollected, the plan was only presented “to the wider body” after completion, resulting later in no “sense of buy-in” during implementation.¹⁷⁵

Commodore Anthony Franklin, who was the Commanding Officer of the Coast Guard when strategic planning commenced in 1992, corroborated BG Dillon’s view. The Commodore said, “Coincidentally, I was Commanding Officer of the Coast Guard at the time, and I am not sure how well it was known to [MG] Ralph Brown, but we were going through a learning process at the Coast Guard where we were doing our strategic plan. The approach was very different [from MG Brown’s approach] and I might have mentioned it [Coast Guard planning initiative] to him.”¹⁷⁶

¹⁷³ Major General Ralph Brown, Interview by author, Trinidad and Tobago, 6 April 2009.

¹⁷⁴ Major General Ralph Brown, Interview by author, Trinidad and Tobago, 6 April 2009.

¹⁷⁵ Brigadier General Edmund Dillon, Interview by author, Trinidad and Tobago, 12 October 2008.

¹⁷⁶ Commodore Anthony Franklin, Interview by author, Trinidad and Tobago, 9 April 2009.

The researcher enquired from Commodore Franklin if the Commanding Officer of the Coast Guard, *he made efforts to influence the Defence Force's strategic planning approach*. In response, Commodore Franklin said:

[R]emember in those days, it is not as it is now. We were two very separate bodies: the Regiment, Coast Guard and then Defence Headquarters was another place somewhere else, so we were just looking after ourselves but we let people know what we were doing.¹⁷⁷

Enquiring into the goals of the plan, the investigator asked MG Brown, alongside involving the Force in the Civilian Conservation Corps initiative, “*What were the strategic goals of the plan?*” Responding, the General said, “I think my main objective in doing the strategic plan was to finally get a formal acceptance from the Ministry, because even at that time there was no formal acceptance of the Defence Force structure.”¹⁷⁸ Continuing on, the former Chief of Defence Staff explained that his second goal was Force integration:

Because the units were going separate on a tangent and there was a lot of duplication; duplication in the procurement process for that matter. The Supply Officer in the Coast Guard procured separately for the Coast Guard and the Quartermaster procured for the Army. By combining the two and putting it under the Defence Force Headquarters economies of scale came in....The only thing that was separate was the operational arm but in all the other levels such as in management and administration, there were duplication. Therefore, we were able to combine all those things and bring them under the umbrella of the Defence Force Headquarters, which allowed Commanding Officers to concentrate primarily on their task, which was ...the operational command of their units.¹⁷⁹

Recognizing that in the changing environment at that time, the Force may have had to compete against other public agencies, the author asked MG Brown *whether*

¹⁷⁷ Ibid.

¹⁷⁸ Major General Ralph Brown, Interview by author, Trinidad and Tobago, 6 April 2009.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid.

during the planning process he considered a competitive strategy. In response, the General confirmed that while developing the plan, he considered the other competitors, and devised a competitive strategy that focused on resource acquisition. MG Brown explained, “[P]rior to the years of the “oil boom,” the Ministries in a way were competing with each other for whatever little financial resources the Government had, and the Defence Force was competing like any other Ministry.”¹⁸⁰ The former Chief of Defence Staff further explained that during this period, the Force was “starved” for resources. Consequently, during the strategic planning process:

I think we adopted an attitude of let us not think in terms of how much this is going to cost. In other words, look at what we are required to do as a Defence Force with all the changes that had taken place, because we certainly do a hell of a lot more now, than we even thought of when the Army [Defence Force] first started in 1962. So it is in that context that we said well at least let us complete the exercise and then let the politicians decide just how much of it they can accept.¹⁸¹

Taking cognizance of the fact that as the new Minister of National Security, BG Theodore became the principal stakeholder of the Defence Force, the researcher asked the General whether in implementing the plan, *the Defence Force strategized to become leaner, better, and more competitive, given the changing environment*. In response, BG Theodore said that from his observations:

[W]hat the Defence Force did . . . was to see themselves as still being somewhat left behind in the development process, because a lot of things the Army [Defence Force] got was years after they wanted it; they had a serious transportation problem; they had a manpower problem; they had a problem with the state of the camps and they spent that time trying, maybe with the same aim to become more efficient, more businesslike, of getting their camps fixed, getting their vehicles up to strength and maybe improving the overall condition of the Defence Force. This

¹⁸⁰ Ibid.

¹⁸¹ Major General Ralph Brown, Interview by author, Trinidad and Tobago, 6 April 2009.

is what they did. They didn't become leaner or any better. They simply tried to fill all the gaps that had had been existing over time and I think with the thrust to reform the Public Service they saw the benefit to them would be to make their camps and so on more habitable.¹⁸²

Strategic Plan Implementation

In examining plan implementation, the researcher analyzed the data collected based on the following interview questions:

1. Did the Government accept the strategic plan?
2. What were the principal successes Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force achieved through implementing strategic planning?

What were the principal challenges/failures the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force experienced through implementing strategic planning?

First, the investigator enquired from MG Brown, *whether the Government accepted the strategic plan*. Responding, the General said, “[A]t the political level I had absolutely no objection. In fact, I had encouragement from Minister Draper and the Prime Minister, Mr. Manning, to go full speed ahead. The objection came from the public servants [officers].”¹⁸³ However, MG Brown expressed concern that the laying of the strategic plan in the National Parliament never took place as he intended. According to the General, his intent for having the strategic plan laid in the Parliament was to ensure that every legislator knew that:

[T]his is the structure and the strategic plans for the Defence Force, for its administration, and its operations, and no subsequent Government can change that. Therefore, I'm still not aware whether the document is formally accepted. I

¹⁸² Brigadier General Joseph Theodore, Interview by author, Trinidad and Tobago, 7 April 2009.

¹⁸³ Major General Ralph Brown, Interview by author, Trinidad and Tobago, 6 April 2009.

know it was accepted in principle and in fact the ideas in it were applied to the Defence Force...but in a formal sense in writing and being laid in Parliament, I'm not quite sure of that.¹⁸⁴

The researcher examined other data sources to confirm whether the Government accepted BG Brown's proposal. The following evidence by BG Theodore is instructive:

[I]n 1993, the Ministry established a Committee to deal with the Strategic Plan proposal put forward by General Brown and it dealt with "*A Revision for the Structure and Operations of the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force.*" I chaired that Committee and those recommendations in fact gave the "meat to the bones" proposed by General Brown, because without a realistic structure, a lot of what he was proposing would have been difficult to achieve. This was submitted to the Minister in August 1993. General Brown's Strategic Plan was submitted in July 1992. Therefore, one year later, the Ministry considered dealing with the Strategic Plan and sought to find out what would be a revised structure that would facilitate this. The structure was based on the role of the two units and the need for a Defence Force Headquarters.¹⁸⁵

BG Theodore went on to explain further that after 1995 when he became the Minister of National Security (under a new political party), he recognized that the Ministry had not taken any action on either the strategic plan, or on the review that he conducted in 1993. Consequently, he took the review committee's recommendations to the Defence Council, which, the Council accepted. Following this, the General said, "We picked out certain things [from the plan and] then I took a note to Cabinet and Cabinet agreed."¹⁸⁶ The review addressed four principal areas:

1. Roles of the Defence Force
2. Proposed Structure

¹⁸⁴ Ibid.

¹⁸⁵ Brigadier General, Joseph Theodore, interview by author, Appendix 1, 6 April 2009.

¹⁸⁶ Brigadier General Joseph Theodore, interview by author, Appendix 1, 6 April 2009

3. Benefits of the Proposal

4. Draft Proposal for Youth Development Programs¹⁸⁷

Engaging further in plan implementation, the investigator asked, *What were the benefits of implementing the strategic plan?* In response, MG Brown comments were:

prior to the document, the acceptance of the Defence Force [Headquarters] was left to the whims and fancy of whoever the Minister was at the time, and if the Minister felt that it was convenient to deal separately with the Coast Guard, or separately with the Regiment, as indeed some of them did, that was the route he went. I think formalizing a strategic plan forced the civilian “powers that be,” to accept the notion of a Defence Force [Headquarters].¹⁸⁸

The author also asked BG Antoine a similar question concerning the benefits accruing to the Force. The General’s response was, “Strategic Planning brought about an awareness of the role of the Defence Force and how it could be shaped to deal with threats to the country in the future.”¹⁸⁹

The current Chief of Defence Staff, BG Dillon also responded to this question.

BG Dillon said:

One of the things that it presented to us; something that wasn’t there before was that we now had a document with which we could justify our resource requirements. This meant that we could now more easily approach the Ministry to justify requests for things which we had either developed, or wanted to expand upon. That to my mind was the significant change in the way we did business.¹⁹⁰

As the lone responder to the questionnaire, BG Sandy response was:

¹⁸⁷ A Proposal for the Revision of the Structure and Operations of the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force, 1993, 1.

¹⁸⁸ Major General Ralph Brown, Interview by author, Trinidad and Tobago, 6 April 2009.

¹⁸⁹ Brigadier General Ancil Antoine, Interview by author, Trinidad and Tobago, 2 January 2009.

¹⁹⁰ Brigadier General Edmund Dillon, Interview by author, Trinidad and Tobago, 12 October 2008.

Observable benefits included better career and succession planning; structured training and development to satisfy particular appointments, recruitment of expertise, charting a well articulated vision and understanding of the goal attainment modules, for example, alignment of processes.¹⁹¹

As a key stakeholder of the Defence Force, the researcher asked the Acting Deputy Permanent Secretary, Mrs. Sandra Lynch, whether there were any observable differences in the Defence Force's effectiveness resulting from implementing the strategic plan. Mrs. Lynch's response was:

Yes, there was because at least--and around that time too, I think even in the Plan, it had something like the changing role of the Force in terms of engineering and helping people build bridges and roads and whatever, and it was at that point and emanating from that Plan, that the Engineer Battalion was formed. So to answer your question, yes. The Defence Force now had something to look forward to; to work towards. They had a focus because of that plan.¹⁹²

The investigator also examined the challenges and failures experienced by the Defence Force while implementing strategic planning. More specifically, the researcher enquired from MG Brown whether he encountered any internal resistance to the new planning approach that he introduced. Responding, the General said:

Very much so, I met resistance at two or three levels but I would rather not get into personalities. However, there was in fact resistance at the very highest level at that, among some of the senior officers in the Force to any notion of strategic planning. I'm glad to see that the new officers, including you, don't think like that. However, yes, there was some resistance to it. Some of them I'm sure would have preferred for the status quo to remain for their own particular selfish reasons.¹⁹³

¹⁹¹ Brigadier General John Sandy, Internet questionnaire administered by author, January 2009.

¹⁹² Sandra Lynch, Acting Deputy Permanent Secretary, Interview by author, Trinidad and Tobago, 9 April 2009.

¹⁹³ Major General Ralph Brown, Interview by author, Trinidad and Tobago, 6 April 2009.

Further expanding on his comments, the former Chief of Defence said, “[I]t was the officers at the next level down who were the ones that I relied on. These officers were the future leaders of the Force and these were the people who thought strategically and looked to the future.”¹⁹⁴

In a similar context, the researcher asked BG Antoine “*What were some of the liabilities that resulted from strategic planning?*” In response, the General said, “One of the liabilities or fallouts of strategic planning is increased resistance within the Defence Force.” Further elaborating, BG Antoine said that in his opinion, “the resistance is more at the top”. Additionally, he said:

People seem not to want to give up certain perks, certain positions that [were] beneficial to the individual, but detrimental to the organization.” It is similar to the old Star Trek movie... the needs of the many outweigh the needs of the few. In our organization, the needs of the few [are] more important than the needs of the many. That has not changed.¹⁹⁵

Summary

The aim of this chapter was to analyze the data collected from the five data sources discussed in detail in the previous chapter. In achieving this goal, the researcher analyzed the data using a Strategic Management framework, which corresponded to framework the researcher employed during data collection.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁹⁵ Brigadier General Ancil Antoine, Interview by author, Trinidad and Tobago, 2 January 2001.

CHAPTER 5
RESULTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Introduction

Restated Purpose

The Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force commenced strategic planning as its strategic management model in 1992. The decision by MG Ralph Brown, the Chief of Defence Staff, was more a strategic move rather than a technical innovation. The General, recognizing that the Government was introducing strategic planning as a mechanism to reform the Public Service, used this as leverage, to gain the Government's commitment in establishing a proper Force Headquarters.¹⁹⁶ This indirect approach the General found necessary, since attempts by former Chiefs of Defence Staff failed to gain previous Governments' commitment for the initiative. Past Administrations while in principle agreeing with the concept, made no provisions for establishing the Headquarters, leaving an ad hoc arrangement to persist.¹⁹⁷

However, since officially implementing strategic planning in 1996, and despite two condensed iterations,¹⁹⁸ the Force has not assessed the effectiveness of its initial attempt. This study therefore aims to examine the level of effectiveness the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force achieved in its initial attempt at strategic planning, and if necessary, to recommend an improved model.

¹⁹⁶ Major General Ralph Brown, Interview by author, Trinidad and Tobago, 6 April 2009.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁹⁸ Sandra Lynch, Acting Deputy Permanent Secretary, Interview by author, Trinidad and Tobago, 9 April 2009.

Taking the above into consideration, the aim of this final chapter is to conclude the research project. In achieving this goal, the researcher will first present the findings of the study. Following this, the researcher will interpret and synthesize these findings, examining whether there are lessons of benefit to the Defence Force. Finally, the researcher will conclude the chapter by proposing some recommendations for action and for future study.

Findings

Historical Considerations

Recognizing that historical antecedents inform current and future decision-making, at first, the researcher enquired into the historical considerations that were responsible for shaping the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force's implementation of strategic planning. To obtain this information, the researcher asked in Question 1: *How did the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force conduct Force Development planning, prior to the introduction of strategic planning?*

The researcher learned that for most of its history, the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force's development occurred from individually generated unit plans, as there was no formal unifying Headquarters to undertake joint planning.¹⁹⁹ Invariably this meant that the Joint Force growth was not a preplanned activity, but motivated by the needs of the units. The researcher traced this development to the formation of the Defence Force just prior to the country's independence.²⁰⁰

¹⁹⁹ Brigadier General Joseph Theodore, Interview by author, Trinidad and Tobago, 7 April, 2009.

²⁰⁰ Major General Ralph Brown, Interview by author, Trinidad and Tobago, 6 April 2009.

Trinidad and Tobago attained its Independence from Britain on 31 August 1962, soon after the failure of the West Indian Federation (1958-1962).²⁰¹ As a defense force was a prerequisite for Independence, the Government used the “strategic plans” developed by a British Army advisory team, to form the Trinidad and Tobago Regiment.²⁰² Initially, these plans were for the establishment of the Federation’s Second Battalion of the West India Regiment, originally planned for Trinidad and Tobago. However, with the dissolution of the Federation, these plans became void though not useless. Similarly, Royal Navy advisors assisted in developing plans for the country’s Coast Guard, and in combination, these plans established the structure and strength for the Defence Force.²⁰³

Cost considerations mitigated against establishing a Defence Force Headquarters. However, responsibility for Force development fell to the Commanding Officer of the Regiment, whom, as the senior ranked officer, the Government also appointed as Commander of the Force. Notwithstanding, in this embryonic period of development, each unit conducted its affairs separately, resulting in the Defence Force’s development becoming a secondary priority to unit development.²⁰⁴

This separate approach to development began changing in 1970, when the Government delinked the command of the Defence Force from the command of the

²⁰¹ Trinidad and Tobago National Library Information Systems Authority. <http://library2.nalis.gov.tt/Default.aspx?PageContentID=277&tabid=178> (accessed 31 August 2008).

²⁰² Major General Ralph Brown, Interview by author, Trinidad and Tobago, 6 April 2009.

²⁰³ Ibid.

²⁰⁴ Ibid.

Regiment.²⁰⁵ This action came in the aftermath of an unsuccessful mutiny attempt by some members of the Regiment. In an effort to stabilize the situation, the Government appointed retired BG Joffre Serrette as the first independent Commander of the Force. However, despite the Government's trust in the General, the Administration did not "support the idea" of a Force Headquarters and BG Serrette had no staff headquarters to support his command. Instead, the Force Commander relied on his unit commanding officers to supply his staffing requirements.²⁰⁶ In these circumstances, force development remained in its infancy, as the Commander's focus lay in managing the daily affairs of the Force, and convincing the Government of the need to establish a proper Force Headquarters. Probably, the Force's failure to develop its first unified "strategic plan" during this period bears testimony to the lack of an adequate staff system. This situation persisted until 1992, when MG Brown, as the Chief of Defence Staff, received Government's approval to commence planning for the Force's first integrated strategic plan. Planning using this model persists in the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force today.²⁰⁷

Question 2 also dealt with the historical perspective and enquired, *Why did the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force implement strategic planning in 1992? The Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force implemented strategic planning in 1992, primarily, as a strategic move to gain its Government commitment for the official establishment of a Force Headquarters.* In response to this question, MG Brown said, "I think my main

²⁰⁵ Ibid.

²⁰⁶ Major General Ralph Brown, Interview by author, Trinidad and Tobago, 6 April 2009.

²⁰⁷ Ibid.

objective in doing the strategic plan was to finally get a formal acceptance from the Ministry...of the Defence Force [Headquarters] structure.”²⁰⁸ Additionally, the General indicated that his secondary goals were the achievement of Force integration, and the Government’s acceptance of the Force’s involvement in “the Civilian Conservation Corps Youth Development initiative.”²⁰⁹

Plan Formulation

Next, the researcher examined the process of plan formulation and queried, *How did the Defence Force formulate the strategic plan?* In response, MG Brown said that he formed a planning committee that involved “the senior elements in the Defence Force.”²¹⁰

However, in responding to this question, Commodore Franklin, who commanded the Force three years after plan implementation, and who was the Commanding Officer of the Coast Guard at that time, remembered his unit conducting separate planning from the “Defence Force Headquarters.”²¹¹ Similarly, the current Chief of Defence Staff, BG Dillon, expressed the view that the planning committee was not sufficiently broad-based. Consequently, in the words of BG Dillon, plan implementation suffered because of the lack of involvement of key persons in the planning process.²¹²

²⁰⁸ Ibid.

²⁰⁹ Major General Ralph Brown, Interview by author, Trinidad and Tobago, 6 April 2009.

²¹⁰ Ibid.

²¹¹ Commodore Anthony Franklin, Interview by author, Trinidad and Tobago, 9 April 2009.

²¹² Brigadier General Edmund Dillon, Interview by author, Trinidad and Tobago, 12 October, 2009.

Question 4 followed along similar lines and asked, *What were the strategic goals of the plan?* The researcher previously obtained the answer to this query at Question 2 above. However, to reiterate, the strategic goals articulated by MG Brown were to obtain a formal acceptance of the Defence Force [Headquarters] structure, the achievement of Force integration, and obtaining the Government's agreement for the Force's involvement in the Civilian Conservation Corps Youth Development program.

The final question related to plan formulation examined the Force's competitive strategy. Question 5 enquired, *What was the Defence Force's competitive strategy?* The researcher learned from MG Brown, that the Defence Force's competitive strategy was one of resource acquisition. The General decided to pursue this strategy since he recognized that at the time, the Force became "starved" for resources.²¹³

The researcher next examined plan implementation and first enquired, *Did the Government accept the strategic plan?* The researcher discovered that MG Brown received support from the Prime Minister, the Honorable Patrick Manning, and other senior Government ministers to develop the plan. On completion, the General dispatched the plan to the Minister of National Security, Senator, the Honorable Russell Huggins, on 8 July 1992. The General's intention was to have the plan laid in the Parliament.²¹⁴ However, according to the Acting Deputy Permanent Secretary, Mrs. Sandra Lynch, the Ministry took no immediate action on the plan. Eventually, on 22 March 1993, the

²¹³ Major General Ralph Brown, Interview by author, Trinidad and Tobago, 6 April 2009.

²¹⁴ Ibid.

Defence Council authorized the Minister of National Security to establish a committee to review the plan.²¹⁵

The Minister appointed former Chief of Defence Staff, BG Theodore, as the chairman of a joint Defence Force team of senior officers. The committee completed its review on 25 August 1993, and submitted its recommendations to the Minister.²¹⁶

Similar to MG Brown's proposal, the Ministry once again took no immediate action on the committee's recommendations. Finally, in 1996, on BG Theodore becoming the Minister of National Security, the General initiated action to implement the committee's recommendations. In his new portfolio, the General gained the support of the Defence Council and later the Cabinet, to implement "certain aspects" of his former committee's recommendations.²¹⁷

Additionally, the researcher discovered that during the four-year time lapse, necessity occasioned the implementation of some aspects of BG Brown's plan. For example, in April 1993, the Government formed the Second Infantry Battalion proposed by MG Brown in the strategic plan.²¹⁸ The researcher therefore concludes that in response to the question asked, the Government accepted aspects of both plans for implementation.

²¹⁵ Sandra Lynch, Acting Deputy Permanent Secretary, Interview by author, 9 April 2009.

²¹⁶ Brigadier General Joseph Theodore, Interview by author, Trinidad and Tobago, 7 April 2009.

²¹⁷ Brigadier General Joseph Theodore, Interview by author, Trinidad and Tobago, 7 April 2009.

²¹⁸ Various documents and archival records from the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force

The second question relating to plan implementation enquired, *What are the principal benefits/successes the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force achieved through implementing strategic planning?* Relying on the combined opinions of the interviewees, the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force achieved the following benefits/successes from implementing strategic planning:

- A formalized strategic plan with a well articulated vision
- Government acceptance of a Defence Force Headquarters concept
- Recognition of the Force's potential to deal with national threats
- The codification of the Defence Force's roles
- An improved mechanism for resource justification
- Better career and succession planning
- Better structuring of training and development

- The recruitment of professionals

- Provided greater alignment of systems and processes
- Provided the Force with greater focus

Conversely, the researcher examined, *What were the principal challenges/failures the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force experienced through implementing strategic planning?* In response to this question, the researcher found it interesting that a common challenge highlighted by the former Chiefs of Defence Staff was the resistance to change they encountered from among the senior officers of the Force. In addition, the Generals found the lack of support from ministerial officials was a second challenge.

The primary research question asked, *How effectively has the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force implemented strategic planning, as a strategic management model?* This question the researcher asked only to the former Chiefs of Defence Staff who served during the period of plan implementation. The researcher asked the Generals

to score their opinions on a scale from 1-10, with 10 being the highest value. The following table illustrates their answers.

Table 1. Effectiveness of Strategic Plan Implementation

Name	Score
Commodore Anthony Franklin	4.
BG John Sandy	6.5
BG Ancil Antoine	4.0
BG Edmund Dillon	4.5
Average	4.75

Source: Created by author.

This being the primary research question, the researcher decided to undertake a second level of analysis, independent of these scores. Therefore, taking precautions against bias, the author further analyzed the data, being careful to look for evidence contradicting the perceptions of the interviewees. In conducting this further level of analysis, the researcher examined the data collected against the criterion of Plan Formulation and Plan Implementation (note that the Historical Considerations theme was not as applicable). In this regard, the researcher took the interviewees comments about the benefits/successes of the plan, and balanced this against the following evidence:

- The limited involvement of key future leaders in plan formulation
- The four-year time span between plan formulation and plan implementation

- The length of time it took for the Defence Force to gain ministerial support for converting the plan into policy
- The length of time it took for the Force to gain its Government's acceptance of the policy
- The lack of “buy-in” during implementation
- The lack of aggressiveness (follow through) in obtaining resource requirements

Consequently, having critically examined the benefits of the plan versus the challenges, the researcher concurred with the former Chiefs of Staff and concluded that the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force did not effectively implement strategic planning as a strategic management model. Notwithstanding, the researcher is careful not to discount the gains achieved through implementing the strategic plan.

Finally, Question 9 asked, *Should the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force's implementation of strategic planning prove ineffective, is there a more effective model that the Force may employ to improve its effectiveness?* In response, and given the above confirmation that the Defence Force did not effectively implement strategic planning, the researcher's view is that a more comprehensive and integrated model will be more effective than the present approach to strategic planning. The researcher will elaborate on the proposed model under recommendations.

Interpretations

This section of the chapter places emphasis on synthesizing and interpreting the research findings. First, the researcher interpreted the research findings to examine the implications these hold for the future of the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force.

Interpretation, according to Patton, is the:

means attaching significance to what was found, offering explanations, drawing conclusions, extrapolating lessons, making inferences, building linkages, attaching meanings, imposing order, and dealing with rival explanations, disconfirming cases, and data irregularities as part of testing the viability of an interpretation.²¹⁹

Given this wide area that interpretation covers, the researcher will focus on the aspect of interpretation that deals with “attaching significance” to the findings. The researcher found that the study has strategic, operational, and tactical significance for Trinidad and Tobago and its Defence Force. First, at the strategic level, the immediate implications lies with the country’s Prime Minister’s stated intent of developing a more integrated Caribbean region.

At the commencement of this study, the researcher indicated that as recent as August 2008, the Prime Minister renewed his efforts at forging closer ties among Caribbean States. Since writing that statement, the Prime Minister moved closer to achieving his vision, signing a Memorandum of Understanding with the Prime Ministers of three Southern Caribbean States; Grenada, St Lucia, and St Vincent and the Grenadines. These are member countries of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS). After signing the MOU, the Prime Minister discussed with the nine member states, the possibility of Trinidad and Tobago joining their proposed economic union and political integration. More recently, in April 2009, the Prime Minister hosted the Summit of the Americas in Trinidad and Tobago, where he repeated his vision for the Caribbean.

In preparing for the Summit, the security forces anticipated the challenges they would face in providing adequate security for thirty-four Western Hemispheric leaders

²¹⁹ Michael Patton, *Qualitative Evaluation and Research Methods* (California, SAGE Publications, 1990).

and their delegations. As a result, the country formed a coalition among defense and regional law enforcement bodies, which successfully executed the mission. This coalition approach to regional security is an emerging model, which, if the researcher is correct, has its genesis in the US-CARICOM coalition that invaded Grenada in 1983. The region took a similar approach in 1994 to dealing with problems in Haiti, and later for the Cricket World Cup held in the Caribbean in 2007.

At the strategic level, the Defence Force, faced with the stated intent of its Prime Minister; the emerging model of greater defense and security cooperation among regional states; the expectations held for Trinidad and Tobago given its economic strength; and the fact that it possesses one of the more capable militaries within the region, there will be high expectations among Caribbean people, of the Force's role in defense and security within the region.

To meet these high expectations, it is imperative that Trinidad and Tobago enables its Defence Force to become an even higher performing military organization. However, relying on the lessons from this study, history indicates that similar to MG Brown's experience in 1992, the leadership must seize the initiative, if the Force is to maximize the fleeting opportunities presented in the strategic environment. Therefore, recognizing the past challenges posed by an internally driven defense decision-making model, the Force leadership must immediately act to influence a change to a more expansive, nationally generated, policy-driven model. Such an approach is vital to the Force's strategic development, as it will aid commanders and planners in achieving Trinidad and Tobago regional strategic goals and interests.

Similarly, moving toward a national policy-driven model also has implications for the Force at the operational and tactical levels. First, at the operational level, strategic guidance informed by policy, as suggested by Chandler and Andrews (see literature review), allows the Force to align its organizational architecture i.e. its strategy, structure, systems and processes (PS³), to the needs of its key stakeholders and the ever-evolving security environment. Likewise, at the tactical level, strategic guidance provides the Force with the direction necessary for utilizing its key enablers - doctrine, objectives, training, material, leadership, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF).²²⁰

Acquiring these Force generators is critical to enable the Force to build the competencies and create the dynamic capabilities, required to compete successfully in the future security environment. In speaking of the new role and challenges faced by this Force in the evolving environment, BG Theodore said:

So that is where we are now . . . all of these things are based on the expanding role and the regional responsibility which Trinidad and Tobago has accepted for itself for the security of the Caribbean and all this is fuelled by the increasing drug trade and movement of arms and drugs through Trinidad to the Americas and Europe. What has been said is that even if we were able to deal with the local situation, the people who are involved in the drug trade would simply move up the islands. Instead, we will be passing our worries onto other people. As you can see from the employment of the 360° radar, we are looking to cover quite a wide area of the Eastern Caribbean, which the Government feels is part of our mandate, because they are our senior trading partners. From an economic standpoint, we do accept some responsibility for their wellbeing, the Coast Guard already has a search and rescue responsibility extending well North of Trinidad and Tobago, and we have established as well, certain amount of joint patrolling with the Venezuelan Navy and the Venezuelan Coast Guard. So from the point of view of the role of the Defence Force it is not localized anymore it is more

²²⁰ The researcher changed the meaning of the letter “O” in the normal application of DOTMLPF acronym from Organizations to Objectives. Organizations is already accounted for under structures.

regional and as the threat for stabilizing the Caribbean increases, so too the Army and the Coast Guard would have to play a greater role.²²¹

Synthesis

Synthesis as Patton suggests, is the process of focusing “on what lessons could be learned” from the research findings.²²² The researcher found that there are several lessons from the study that could benefit the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force. While all these lessons are important, the researcher found the following were the most beneficial:

First, in order for the Defence Force to improve its effectiveness, the Force must realize its critical role in influencing change from the current bottom-up strategic planning approach, to a top-down policy driven approach. Currently, the Defence Force strategic plan drives the national defense planning agenda. However, given Trinidad and Tobago’s regional intent, this approach will not be sufficiently expansive to deal with the multitude of current and future regional issues. Therefore, much like Strategic Management’s corporate level guidance, the Force must develop the mechanisms to convince its Government of the value in establishing national ends, ways, and means to enable defense planning. Thus, by employing such an approach, the Defence Force’s plan will contribute to a wider defense and security portfolio. This portfolio will consist of other plans/strategies addressing, for example, domestic, regional, energy, food, and

²²¹ Brigadier General Joseph Theodore, Interview by author, Trinidad and Tobago, 7 April 2009.

²²² Michael Patton, *Qualitative Evaluation and Research Methods* (California, SAGE Publications, 1990), 425.

environmental security. This approach, as it pertains to the Defence Force, is represented graphically by the following slide:



Figure 1. Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force Strategy Development Model
Source: Created by author.

A second valuable lesson related to the external environment is the importance of involving key external stakeholders in the planning process. The research findings highlighted the disconnectedness that existed between the military and its key external stakeholders. As a public institution, a defense force’s effectiveness increases when it has the support of public officials. As the study revealed, acceptance of the plan and its implementation suffered, as public officials did not share ownership of the plan.

Another closely related lesson in this regard, especially regarding resource acquisition, is the importance of continuously engaging ministerial officials during the

implementation process. The researcher found instructive, the advice of Mrs. Sandra Lynch, the Acting Deputy Permanent Secretary who commented, “. . . the Defence Force needs to be more proactive. They need to be more aggressive to get what they want because remember, it is one Ministry dealing with competing agencies and interests.”²²³

Similarly, the Force must also recognize the importance of including as many people within the organization in the planning process. The study revealed that while MG Brown intended to involve the “senior elements of the Force,” in the planning process, in reality however, this seemed not to be the case.²²⁴ BG Dillon observed this anomaly in planning, and linked the lack of “buy-in” during implementation, directly to the absence of the key future leaders during the formulation of the plan.²²⁵

BG Dillon’s view is consistent with Strategic Management theorist, George Steiner, who in his writings on *Strategic Planning; What Every Manager Should Know* provides Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force with a vital lesson. Steiner states, “One of the outstanding characteristics of formal strategic planning is that as many people, line and staff, in an organization participate in the process.” “Generally speaking the greater the degree of participation of people in planning the easier will be the task of top management in developing and implementing plans.”²²⁶

²²³ Sandra Lynch, Acting Deputy Permanent Secretary, Interview by author, Trinidad and Tobago, 9 April 2009.

²²⁴ Major General Ralph Brown, Interview by author, Trinidad and Tobago, 6 April 2009.

²²⁵ Brigadier General Edmund Dillon, Interview by author, Trinidad and Tobago, 12 October 2008.

²²⁶ George Steiner, *Strategic Planning; What Every Manager Should Know* (New York, The Free Press, 1979), 73.

Recommendations

To ensure alignment with its Government's Vision 2020 Strategic Development Plan, the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force is currently in the process of reviewing its strategic direction. Therefore, this research study coming at this time provides the reviewers with a document that they may use in the planning process. In this regard, the researcher makes the following recommendations:

- Expand planning focus to include regional challenges and opportunities
- Gain commitment by involving key external stakeholders early, and throughout the planning process.
- Develop mechanisms to influence change in national defense planning, converting the process from a bottom-up strategic planning approach, to a top-down policy driven approach.
- Gain policy makers commitment for inclusion of Force's strategic plan into the national policy agenda
- Develop the Force into a strategy-focused organization
- Develop Strategic Engagement as a core competency
- Develop strategies to continuously engage political and ministerial officials
- Gain internal commitment by involving as many people within the Force
- Maintain internal momentum through continuous engagement
- Select an overarching competitive strategy that will motivate the Force and lead to competitive advantage
- Align Force's competitive strategy with its strategic goals
- Develop a performance driven culture of continuous change, learning, improvement and reward
- Understand that strategic management involves people and is a continuous iterative process of planning, engagement, experimentation, learning, change, communication, and commitment

- Engage former Chiefs of Defence Staff to form think-tanks to assist in the Force's development (Commodore Franklin)
- Establish an Office of Strategy Development (BG Dillon)

The researcher, having benefitted from the several “models, methods, and approaches to strategic management, further recommends the Defence Force adopts a more comprehensive and holistic approach to force development. As the findings demonstrated, the initial strategic plan and the subsequent review, focused primarily on force restructuring.

However, in making these recommendations, the researcher does not intend to add yet another model to the several models that are already in existence. Rather, the author wishes to recommend an adaptation of Kaplan and Norton's Comprehensive and Integrated Model.²²⁷ The researcher previously explained this model while conducting the literature review. The model is essentially a six-stage process that Kaplan and Norton described as being a “whole model.” In adapting the model, the researcher extended the six stages to a seventh stage as indicated below in Column 3 and 4 of Table 2.

²²⁷ Robert Kaplan and David Norton, *The Execution Premium. Linking Strategy to Operations for Competitive Advantage* (Boston, Harvard Business Press, 2008), 7.

Table 2. Continuous Strategic Change and Development (CSCD) Model

Stages	Kaplan And Norton ²²⁸	Proposed Model	Resulting Actions
1	Strategy Development	Commander's Visualization and Environmental Assessment	Commander prepares self for change Intent and Guidance prepares the Internal Environment for Change
2	Strategy Planning	Strategic Engagement	Commander prepares Leadership Teams through cascading Strategic Communication (issues Intent and Guidance)
3	Organizational Alignment	Emplace a Joint Change Team.	Select a Change Champion, Change Team and Consultant
4	Operational Plans	Conduct Joint Planning and Strategy Development to Realign the Force with Environment	Develop the Plan and Strategy maps - Environmental analysis and Risk Assessment; Realign vision, mission, strategy, structures, systems, processes, capabilities, people and culture (performance, change, and learning)
5	Monitor and Learn	Plan Experimentation, Monitoring, and Revision	Communicate the strategy and short wins, acquire/reassign resources; Learn from the experiment
6	Test and Adapt Strategy	Implement Strategy and Plans	Manage Knowledge – Monitor, Review and Measure Plan performance
7		Communicate, Scan, Review and Re-strategize	Recommence planning

Recommendations For Future Research

This pioneering research study focused primarily on two periods of the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force's strategic development. The first period covered a thirty-

²²⁸ Ibid.

year expanse, and examined the Defence Force's development from its formation in 1962, to the period just prior to the implementation of strategic planning in 1992. The second period built on the foundation of the first period and examined the formulation of the strategic plan, through to plan implementation. This research study has therefore laid a platform for the conduct of further research into the two iterations that followed the first strategic plan, under the commands of BG Sandy and BG Antoine.

Summary

The Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force commenced strategic planning as its strategic management model in 1992. However, since officially implementing strategic planning in 1996, and despite two condensed iterations,²²⁹ the Force has not assessed the effectiveness of its initial attempt. This study therefore aims to examine the level of effectiveness the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force achieved in its initial attempt at strategic planning, and if necessary, to recommend an improved model.

The paper therefore commenced with the background of the case study, the study significance, and presentation of the problems. Chapter 2 expanded on this foundation and conducted a comprehensive literature review of some of the principal studies in strategic management. Highlighting this here is important, as the researcher took the approach that strategic planning is a component of the wider discipline of strategic management. Next, in Chapter 3 the researcher articulated the research methodology used in the study, emphasizing areas such as data collection and data reduction. In

²²⁹ Sandra Lynch, Acting Deputy Permanent Secretary, Interview by author, Trinidad and Tobago, 9 April 2009.

Chapter 4, the researcher conducted an in-depth analysis of the research problem, which provided the basis for the results and recommendations made in Chapter 5.

APPENDIX A.

Interview with Brigadier General (BG) Joseph Theodore Conducted

by Lt. Colonel (LTC) Rodney Smart on 7 April 2009

LT. COLONEL SMART: Today is Tuesday 7 April 2009 and I am about to interview Brigadier Joseph Theodore, former Chief of Defence Staff of the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force. It is now approximately 1350 hours and this interview is being conducted from Trinidad and Tobago. Sir, before I start this interview if I may ask you to give your approval for this interview to be taped, and for students who afterwards may want to repeat the research, to have access to the tapes, please.

BRIGADIER THEODORE: Of course, I have no objection to your taping our interview and keeping the material for students from the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force to use it as a reference, when they are doing research.

LT. COLONEL SMART: Thank you very much Sir. If I may start by first asking you as one of the early Chiefs of Defence Staff, if you can give an overview of how the Defence Force did planning prior to the official commencement of strategic planning.

BRIGADIER THEODORE: The planning was done very much on an establishment basis. From the very beginning when the Regiment and the Coast Guard were formed, they were given an establishment to facilitate recruitment and budgetary matters. The basis for reviewing the establishment came about every two or three years based on the role, that was developed for the two units. The matter of strategic planning was not really an issue at that time. We were more concerned with the Regiment being expanded and growing.

As you know, when the Regiment was formed it comprised only of a Headquarter Company and one Rifle Company. Eventually that was extended to two Rifle Company and then three Rifle Company. Eventually, as the battalion grew, it became too large to be controlled by one Commanding Officer. Therefore, in 1981, the oversized battalion was divided into two, and a Regiment Headquarters was created. The two battalions were an Infantry Battalion and the Support and Services Battalion.

Similarly in the Coast Guard, they were ordering fast patrol boats and their structure had to be enlarged to cater for the larger vessels and their expanding roles. As you know, the Coast Guard started with vessels from the Police Marine Branch, which were small in-shore patrol vessels. So I would say for the first eight (8) years or so, all that commanded the attention of the Commanding Officers was the issue of the establishment, creating posts and creating suitable ranks for the growing Regiment and the Coast Guard.

That being the case, one found that in 1970 when we had the problem known as the Black Power Uprising, the Regiment and the Coast Guard were still operating virtually independent of each other and the Commander of the Defence Force at that time

was in fact the Commanding Officer of the Regiment. After the problem was dealt with and Brigadier Serrette was reinstated, he insisted that the Defence Force Headquarters be established to cater for the command of the land forces and the maritime forces. This was done but it was not really done officially. He was allowed to draw personnel from the Regiment and the Coast Guard to staff the Headquarters so the numbers in the Regiment and the Coast Guard, which were already small, were further depleted in the formation of this Headquarters and the two Commanding Officers at the time continued to operate somewhat independent of the Headquarters. This became obvious when talks were being held for pay and allowances and one would find, even after 1970 that discussions would be held with the Commanding Officer of the Regiment one way, and further discussions with the Commanding Officer of the Coast Guard another way. Both units claimed seniority over the other, the Regiment because of its numbers, and the Coast Guard, because in Britain, the senior service is the Navy. The Royal Navy has an historical right to that claim. Therefore, the Coast Guard, whose Officers were all British Navy trained, felt that they were senior.

This situation continued for several years until I would say around 1990 when there was the hostage situation. After the hostage situation was resolved, General Brown produced what I regard as the first Strategic Plan for the Defence Force Headquarters and in that Strategic Plan, one saw where there was a need for some sort of equity to exist between the Coast Guard and the Regiment. Up to that time, the Commanding Officer (CO) of the Regiment was senior in rank to the CO of the Coast Guard. It was always felt by the Coast Guard command, that as it was one Defence Force, whatever rank the Regiment Commander held, the CO of the Coast Guard should hold the same rank.

Fortunately, General Brown Strategic Plan did indicate that the Defence Force Headquarters was necessary and he laid out a plan of action as far as the further extension of the Regiment and Coast Guard. A lot of this was based on the role given to the Coast Guard and the Regiment by the Government.

Now, in 1993, the Ministry established a Committee to deal with the Strategic Plan proposal put forward by General Brown and it dealt with "*A Revision for the Structure and Operations of the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force.*" I chaired that Committee and those recommendations in fact gave the "meat to the bones" proposed by General Brown, because without a realistic structure, a lot of what he was proposing would have been difficult to achieve. This was submitted to the Minister in August 1993. General Brown's Strategic Plan was submitted in July 1992. Therefore, one year later, the Ministry considered dealing with the Strategic Plan and sought to find out what would be a revised structure that would facilitate this. The structure was based on the role of the two units and the need for a Defence Force Headquarters.

In order to balance out the value or the importance of the two units, while numbers [the strength of the Regiment] were taken to establish the rank of the CO of the Regiment, which at that time was a Colonel, the value of the equipment [monetary cost] and the role of the Coast Guard, was used to establish the rank of the CO of the maritime forces. The recommendation was that if the CO of the Regiment was a Colonel, then the CO of the Coast Guard should be a Captain. It was the first time that any effort was made to equate the Commanding Officers of the two units. And a structure was created for the Headquarters. These recommendations also catered for an increase in the senior

ranks because at the time, the ranks were fixed. However, having proposed the upgrading of CO of the Coast Guard to Captain, it meant that a certain amount of flexibility was introduced into the rank structure. I think it took maybe another year.

LT. COLONEL SMART: 1994? Because I was told, it was before he [MG Brown] went home, and he retired early in 1995, so he said he was told he had to complete it – the revision - before he went home in 1995.

BRIGADIER THEODORE: This is General Brown?

LT. COLONEL SMART: Yes.

BRIGADIER THEODORE: So a couple years later, you find that gradually these were implemented. There was one thing that Commodore Williams started and in fact it was incorporated in the new structure. His idea was that in order to further solidify the unity that was being forged between the Coast Guard and the Regiment, as a result of having a Defence Force Headquarters, Commodore Williams felt, the head of the Coast Guard and the head of the Regiment should have their offices at the Defence Force Headquarters. This happened while I was still CO of the Regiment and Commander Richard Kelshall, who was CO of the Coast Guard, and I, both relocated to Defence Force Headquarters.

Now, while theoretically it was a good idea, because we were close to the head of the Defence Force, it meant little problem with communication. However, the argument was that as the Regiment was maybe two miles away and the Coast Guard about the same distance, there was no reason why the Commanding Officers should not stay with their units where they primarily belonged. Therefore, you find today, the Commanding Officers are not at the Defence Force Headquarters but they are with their units. In fact, the recommendation as to the structure went so far, again based on Commodore Williams' proposal, to recommend that the Chief of Defence Staff move closer to the Ministry of National Security, where he would not only be the Advisor to the Minister, but also be in direct contact with the Minister and run his headquarters from that location. That never really came into being and again, practice over time has shown that the Chief of Defence Staff is better within his own Headquarters where he has staff, where he has personnel and where there are linkages between the Headquarters and the two units.

So if you look at the Defence Force today, you will find that there is a Chief of Defence Staff and what we did as well when I was Minister, I got most of these recommendations accepted by Cabinet, though they dealt primarily with rank structure not so much the location of people. We also separated the rank of Brigadier/Commodore from Chief of Defence Staff, because the only way you became a Brigadier or a Commodore was if you were appointed a Chief of Defence Staff. However, we figured, there were other officers who may be just as capable and just as eligible for promotion....

[Interruption]

LT. COLONEL SMART: We are now continuing after a short disturbance. Sir, please go ahead.

BRIGADIER THEODORE: What we also were able to do, was to promote other officers who were quite eligible for promotion, but who would have been denied the opportunity to gain the rank of Commodore or Brigadier, if they were not appointed as the Chief of Defence Staff. That action was taken and accepted. Sometime later, the Ministry accepted that the rank of Brigadier could be increased to that of Major General, and the rank of Commodore to Rear Admiral. This was consistent with the expansion plan and the broader role that the Regiment and the Coast Guard would play in the future. Therefore, should the time come when the size of the Force became such that it warranted a more senior rank, the provision was already put in place for that. So that is the position as far as the structure goes.

In addition, you need to look at the Regiment and the Coast Guard as it is today, because based on the number of vessels that have been ordered for the Coast Guard, their strength now is a far cry from what it was let's say forty years ago. One of the other things that the recommendations for the structure did was to give the Air Wing a certain degree of independence. We created an Air Division with its own Commanding Officer, as opposed to an Air Wing that the Commanding Officer of the Coast Guard commanded. That has since been implemented and we now have – not only implemented - but it has been improved upon, with the creation of an Air Guard which is actually separate from the Coast Guard. So we now have the Coast Guard, an Army and an Air Guard.

What was also changed over the last few years is the terminology. The land force is no longer regarded as a Regiment because the structure of a Regiment does have certain limitations; it is now known as the Army. There is also the Maritime Forces and the Air Guard. So that is where we are now and as I said, all of these things are based on the expanding role and the regional responsibility that Trinidad and Tobago has accepted for itself for the security of the Caribbean. The increasing drug trade and movement of arms and drugs through Trinidad to the Americas and Europe fuelled all of this. What has been said is that even if we are able to deal with the local situation, these people who are involved in the drug trade would simply move up the islands. Therefore, instead of passing our worries on to these other islands, employing the 360° radar, we are looking to cover quite a wide area of the Eastern Caribbean. This the Government feels is part of our mandate, because the Eastern Caribbean are our trading partners and from an economic standpoint, we do accept some responsibility for their wellbeing. In addition, the Coast Guard already has a search and rescue responsibility extending well North of Trinidad and Tobago, and we have established as well, a certain amount of joint patrolling with the Venezuelan Navy and the Venezuelan Coast Guard.

So from the point of view of the role of the Defence Force it is not localized anymore, it is more regional and as the threat for stabilizing the Caribbean increases, so too the Army and the Coast Guard would have to play a greater role. Right now, the role that the Army – while the Coast Guard is protecting our coast, looking after fisheries and trying to keep the drugs out - the Army is working in tandem with the Police Service in support of the legal authorities. It has now become almost a full-time job, as is the situation with a number of countries worldwide, where the Army is being employed to deal with the criminal elements, to increase the thrust against the drug barons, and try to assist in removing all the firearms. That in effect is about it.

LT. COLONEL SMART: Sir, please allow me to ask you a few questions? Do you recall who would have done the first structure for the Force and then when it was first revised?

BRIGADIER THEODORE: The first structure was done by Colonel Pearce Gould and that was to form the Regiment. He was actually stationed in Jamaica. In those days, a lot of potential West India Regiment Officers who were stationed in Jamaica and who were earmarked to come to Trinidad actually ended up in Trinidad when the Federation broke. Colonel Fairpoole, Eastwood and there was a third one. They created the structure. When Brigadier Serrette succeeded Colonel Pearce Gould, this would have been around 1964, he did some revision and this is where the Regiment went from a Headquarter Company and one rifle Company, to a Headquarter Company and two Rifle Companies. Subsequently, the Regiment expanded to a Headquarter Company and three Rifle Companies. A revision was done then, but the revision was fairly simple. It simply added one more company. We went from HQ and A to HQ, A and B to HQ A, B and C and that completed the First Battalion as far as things were concerned at that time. When I took command in 1978, by that time the Regiment had grown beyond three rifle companies and had in fact about five rifle companies and during my tenure in office in 1978, we recruited women into Regiment.

LT. COLONEL SMART: In 1980 we recruited the first batch of women, Sir.

BRIGADIER THEODORE: Yes, well I took over in '78.

LT. COLONEL SMART: I thought you said 1978, sure. Sorry.

BRIGADIER THEODORE: Okay, 1980 for accuracy the first batch of women were brought in. By the end of 1980, as I said earlier, the Battalion had become very unwieldy and in January 1981, the Battalion was divided in two and the Regiment Headquarters formed and I was promoted to full Colonel to command the Regiment. That's the position as far as that goes. Subsequently, other revisions were made within the Regiment. I can't speak much for the Coast Guard. I think the Coast Guard created their Special Naval Unit; the Regiment created their Special Forces and their Community Services Detachments and their Engineering Detachment. Let me just jump ahead here. That engineering detachment in 1996 or 1997 became the Engineering Battalion because while the focus was on more rifle companies, it seemed impractical at the time to be only having rifle companies and no units that could service the country, so the Engineering Battalion was formed and it's located at Cumuto Barracks.

LT. COLONEL SMART: In terms of planning for the other aspects of the Defence Force, how did that take place? And when I say so, for example, if it is we wanted to do infrastructure planning, was there any long-term planning for these things? I understand the structure part.

BRIGADIER THEODORE: Yes, the long-term planning as far as the infrastructure went, again, is contained in the Brown program.

LT. COLONEL SMART: But before him; in your period and before that. Was it on an annual basis, dependent on the money you received from Cabinet; from the budget?

BRIGADIER THEODORE: Well after 1970, it was found that having all the soldiers stationed in Teteron Barracks was impractical and coming out of that, a base was established in South [Trinidad] and another one was established in Camp Ogden. Camp Ogden up to that time was there only for the Volunteers. Part of Camp Ogden got burnt down in 1970 and the remaining buildings were taken over by the First Battalion. The Support and Services Battalion remained in Teteron which included the Headquarter Company. So the planning had to do with location. Similarly, the Coast Guard established bases at Galeota and Cedros, Hartscut and Staubles. So what came out of the 1970 effort was a decentralizing of the Regiment and the Coast Guard and the planning that went into that had to do with creating new barracks and providing additional transport to move the troops around. And that is what engaged our attention for the next few years.

LT. COLONEL SMART: And would this initiative have been driven internally from within the Defence Force, or external of the Defence Force?

BRIGADIER THEODORE: Oh yes, it came from within the Defence Force because after we did a debrief of the events, and it was painfully obvious that to get stuck in Teteron Barracks was not an option. The same way the Coast Guard was able to stop elements of the Regiment from getting past Staubles during this Black Power Uprising, other people doing the same thing could have confined the Regiment to Teteron. So that immediate action was taken to do that and this came about in the form of papers being put to the Ministry and recommendations being made for additional resources, most of which were accepted.

LT. COLONEL SMART: During your tenure as Chief of Defence Staff you would have observed the need to continue the integration of the Force. What challenges did you have in achieving that?

BRIGADIER THEODORE: Well it was purely a personality thing; I will give you an example. Whenever we had parades, like the Chief of Defence Staff Parades, they started becoming mixed so you would have detachments from the Regiment, Detachments from the Coast Guard and detachments from the Volunteers, and when the women came in you would have a small detachment of women. In some cases they may be mixed but generally they paraded separately and despite several hints; although the individual company commanders would say Units No. 1 stand at ease, No. 2 stand at ease, No. 3 stand at ease, you would hear Coast Guard stand at ease; they refused to accept they were part of anything other than the Coast Guard and that I think up to today is a problem

underlying the attitude of the Coast Guard towards the Defence Force and its relationship with the Regiment. To overcome that, what we tried to do was to have more soldiers go over to Staables to be on board ships and to be sort of almost like marines so we would see that the Special Naval Unit – and in fact while we were doing that with soldiers going aboard ships maybe to be landed on exercises, you find that the Special Naval Unit came about in Commander Richard Kelshall’s time which sort of said to the Army, “We don’t need you, we have our own people and they wore camouflage outfits and so on. General Brown didn’t take kindly to it because he felt that the camouflage uniform should be reserved for the Army. Of course today, everybody wears camouflage uniforms including the Police. So it’s attitude, that’s the major problem. In order to be realistic, if certain services were required at the Headquarters, let’s say a Chief Clerk, or a writer, or somebody else, it was resisted but eventually, when the time came people were transferred and got on with their duties. In fact, in the restructuring, support elements from the Regiment came from the Support and Service Battalion and support elements at the Headquarters from the Coast Guard were be attached to the Support and Service Battalion. So you don’t have two Commanders giving orders to people who work in the same service. That has always been a problem but it didn’t stop anything from happening, but it did give you cause to consider and have to try and rationalize and justify the transfer of certain people to the Headquarters.

LT. COLONEL SMART: Sir you would have done this revision of the first strategic plan in 1993 and I gathered from what you’ve said, that it wasn’t immediately implemented but it was implemented when you became Minister, is that correct?

BRIGADIER THEODORE: Yes, that is correct.

LT. COLONEL SMART: So when were you Minister?

BRIGADIER THEODORE: 1995 to 2000.

LT. COLONEL SMART: Any idea why it wasn’t immediately implemented?

BRIGADIER THEODORE: *Inaudible*

LT. COLONEL SMART: Okay Sir. So you are Minister of National Security. You recognize that the proposal had not been implemented and you moved to implement it.

BRIGADIER THEODORE: That’s right. I took it to the National Security Council.

LT. COLONEL SMART: National Security Council or the Defence Council?

BRIGADIER THEODORE: The Defence Council and they considered it, they said yes they accept. We picked out certain things then I took a note to Cabinet and Cabinet agreed. I went back to the Ministry and started to put certain measures in place to deal with the imbalance that existed between the Coast Guard and the Regiment which in

itself was a big obstacle to the integration of the Force, because it was also suggested that since the Regiment's Commanding Officer was always senior to the Coast Guard's Commanding Officer, when the Chief of Defence Staff is not available it would mean that only a Regiment Officer would be acting as Chief of Defence Staff because of the seniority. All of these things we tried to deal with, by making the ranks of the Cos similar between the two Units.

LT. COLONEL SMART: One of the things I observed is that in implementing this plan there would have been a new Chief of Defence Staff. This would have been proposed by General Brown and there would now be this new Chief of Defence Staff who is going to implement this plan. Was there any sort of resistance in terms of the revised plan you received from the Defence Force?

BRIGADIER THEODORE: I would have to think of my position as Minister and again I think that the first thing that they objected to, which Richard Kelshall and I didn't support, was having the CO stationed at the Defence Force Headquarters. That was proposed and the Commanding Officers were very adamant that they don't need to do this. I believed I had to go back to Cabinet to rescind that order so we went along with the opinion of the COs because they made a very strong case that they are more effective at their headquarters than be removed from the headquarters. So that was done. The other thing we tried to do was to get the Defence Force Commander – the Chief of Defence Staff closer to the Ministry. That didn't work either because to bring him to the Ministry by himself left him bare with no staff. It also meant that some other officer was in fact running the Defence Force. We tried it, it may have lasted a few weeks, and this was Brigadier Alfonso when he returned from a course. We saw him coming to the Ministry because he was coming up to retirement – we saw him coming there almost as a resettlement. We thought that we would fit him into a youth program. I am at fault because I didn't explain it carefully enough and he felt coming up to the Headquarters was a waste of time and I left it alone. It was my fault that I didn't prepare him for it and he would just come and sit down. So that didn't work and so what we are seeing in the Defence Force today is an effort to implement this with certain modifications based on the situation and it seems to be working very well. You see things when you read, they talking about the people stationed at the Ministry and so on. All those things were proposed, they were attempted and rejected. So what you have on the ground now is the accepted structure of the Defence Force.

LT. COLONEL SMART: One of the things that I observed from my research is the laying or the debating of strategic development plans, or even their revisions in the Parliament, in the case of Britain, or in Congress, as is the case of America's Quadrennial Defense Review. Did we ever think of doing that here or was it sufficient at the level of Cabinet to obtain the necessary approvals.

BRIGADIER THEODORE: Well you had the Defence Council, not Cabinet. The Defence Council does that. They are the ones that go through everything and you have both the Chief of Defence Staff there and advisors, the Minister, I think the Attorney

General...

LT. COLONEL SMART: And one other Minister.

BRIGADIER THEODORE: So they work things out and that has been found to be sufficient and if there is anything that needed some sort of authorization the Minister could then take a note to Cabinet. What goes to Parliament that is being revised right now is the Defence Act, and that is where Parliament comes in., but for the day to day running of the Force and minor adjustments like simply saying when the Chief of Defence Staff goes on leave, who acts, there is no need to have Parliament involved in those situations. But there was a problem even with that when Brigadier Serrette was there. Whenever he went on leave, I think Colonel Christopher acted as Chief of Defence Staff, and Captain Bloom was never allowed to act simply because there was this imbalance, but as far as I'm concerned the issue of succession planning is still very much something that is done by the Minister and the Defence Council and then it goes to the Prime Minister – I don't think Cabinet has anything to do with that.

The Prime Minister is then given a recommendation who should be the next Chief of Defence Staff. He approves or he disapproves because he has a veto. If he approves, it is then sent to the President and the appointment is made. Unfortunately, the timing doesn't always work out as the Ministry would like it to be. We [in the military] feel that if a vacancy is going to occur and we know that in six months officer X is retiring, you don't have to wait until he retires as is done in the Public Service and then have somebody act for another year before you appoint that person. That is still a problem that exists among politicians, so in fact I was one of the first officers that got promoted the day I took command, the same day, and Brigadier Serrette insisted; he said when Theodore takes over he must be a Lieutenant Colonel; he cannot be a Major and then act. However, they have still lapsed because I think when Commodore Franklin took over they had him acting for a long time. That was untenable at least from a military standpoint because this was the Prime Minister's call and he said he would have to wait; he would have to wait until the opportunity was suitable to the Prime Minister to promote him. It is unfortunate, but these things happen and the thing with the Army is that with the Minister in charge, although the President is the Commander in Chief, you know that is a nice sounding title, it would only be as in the case of the hostage situation that the Commander in Chief really takes command. The bottom line is that it is the Minister who "calls the shots", of course with the agreement or concurrence of the Prime Minister. So military appointments are still very much a political thing and the reason given is straightforward. You select the man you think that is most suitable to perform the job and the fellow could be five ranks junior to the person who has been acting; but the senior one would have been acting and he promotes the junior one. I jumped about five Majors to become a Lieutenant Colonel and it didn't go down very well with them and they gave me a rough time, but it went with the territory because I was found to be the one most suitable at the time to be the leader of the First Battalion. Because of that, once you cross the rank of Major, you can't assume that you will be the next Lieutenant Colonel.

LT. COLONEL SMART: Looking again at when you were Minister, the Government at the time was going through public service reform and one of the things the Public Service was being prepared for was to become more competitive because there was a view through the IMF initiatives, the Public Service needed to become smaller, leaner, etc. Did you find that the Defence Force was strategizing itself to be competitive or is it that they continued in the mould that they were accustomed to all the time?

BRIGADIER THEODORE: Well, the Public Servants were being encouraged to be more like private business, to be more businesslike, to be more efficient, and to be leaner and better. No the Army was never affected by that. I say it that way because they made no effort – what the Defence Force did funnily enough around that time was to see themselves as still being somewhat left behind in the development process. A lot of things that the Army [Defence Force] got was years after they wanted it; they had a serious transportation problem; they had a manpower problem; they had a problem with the state of the camps and they spent that time trying, maybe with the same aim to become more efficient, more businesslike of getting their camps fixed, getting their vehicles up to strength and maybe improving the overall condition of the Defence Force. This is what they did. They didn't become leaner or any better. They simply tried to fill all the gaps that had had been existing over time and I think with the thrust to reform the Public Service, they saw the benefit to them would be to make their camps and so on more habitable. That's what I think the Defence Force was all about.

LT. COLONEL SMART: Sir, one of the challenges you may have had as the Chief of Defence Staff may have been the absence of a National Security Policy to guide you as Chief of Defence Staff. As Minister, what efforts did you put in place to achieve that.

BRIGADIER THEODORE: Well, we looked at the role of the Defence Force and one of the things we recognized in the Ministry is that first of all, the role of the Defence Force had to be formalized, because there were a host of things the Coast Guard was doing that wasn't in any book [formalized]. Similarly, there were still no rules and regulations governing the Defence Force Headquarters. They were still very much an ad hoc gathering of people and all of that was discussed by the Defence Council and I think what came out of that was the whole issue of the review of the Defence Act being done. If this was not done, we would have ended up with a lot of ad hoc arrangements. Therefore, we thought, if we start with the Defence Act, everything should fall into place. This is about as much as I did when I was there.

LT. COLONEL SMART: Sir, this is my final question. Is there anything else you wish to add...[*change of tape*] either as Chief of Defence Staff or as Minister, that I did not capture, regarding the strategic development of the Force.

BRIGADIER THEODORE: I think you captured most of what you wanted based on the historical situation within the Force. Having gotten to the present day, you must now look ahead and see because of the track record and the practices that were developed over time, what are the chances of the Defence Force improving. I would give you a case in

point. After the hostage crisis in 1990, not only did Government refuse to hold an inquiry but also the Defence Force refused to even have a study day to examine if what they did was right, and what they would do in future. I think that was a grave omission and one can't allow something as critical as that hostage crisis to have occurred where the first respondent was the Army and the Coast Guard or the Defence Force and where they performed their duties admirably to simply say, it's finished now, let's forget about it. I think that attitude, if it persists, will undermine the Defence Force. Already there are complaints that things are slipping. Former soldiers have come to me and have mentioned that things aren't where they are supposed to be. The Coast Guard is still having a problem with maintaining their boats. Imagine a boat that was put on standby for security duties sink at Galeota on the docks. Now, that's a slap in the face. What security are you going to provide if you can't even keep your vessel seaworthy? It seems as though the Defence Force is getting caught up with all the practical aspects of being out in the field. They seem to be over extended and unless they pull back, take an assessment of their current condition, and try to go back, as you are doing, and try to explain and understand what happened in 1990, I think they would be hard pressed should a similar event occur in the future. This is because they will not be as well prepared and the results may be worse. That is my view.

LT. COLONEL SMART: Sir, allow me to thank you very, very much for what you have contributed here today. This definitely is the first time we are trying to capture this information and I am certain that this is going to go a long way— in fact, I don't think you or I can imagine what this is going to contribute to the history of our Defence Force. Thank you very much once again Sir.

BRIGADIER THEODORE: Not at all, my pleasure.

APPENDIX B.

Interview with Major General Ralph Brown Conducted

by Lt. Colonel Rodney Smart on 6 April 2009

This interview is being conducted with Major General Ralph Brown, the former Chief of Defence Staff of the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force. It is being done in Trinidad and Tobago at approximately 1930 hrs, on the Monday 6 April 2009.

LT. COLONEL SMART: Sir, good evening.

GENERAL BROWN: Good evening Rodney.

LT. COLONEL SMART: Before I start the official interview, may I have your approval to sanction the taping of this interview, please?

GENERAL BROWN: Yes, you do have.

LT. COLONEL SMART: Thank you very much Sir. I also need to inform you that this tape is going to be made available to other researchers who may also have an interest in doing or in repeating the same research, I'm doing. Do you also give your approval for it, Sir?

GENERAL BROWN: Yes.

LT. COLONEL SMART: Thank you very much, Sir. If I may start by asking, can you please give a brief description of the history of strategic planning in the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force?

GENERAL BROWN: I would say that prior to the formation of the Defence Force, there were three English officers who ostensibly were here to help the Government set up the Second Battalion of the West India Regiment. On the collapse of the Federation, Colonel Eastwood, Major Herring and Lieutenant Colonel Pearce Gould, who eventually became the first Commanding Officer of the Regiment and first Commander of the Defence Force, were engaged in some form of strategic planning. I'm not aware that anything was formalized but they clearly were engaged in some form of strategic planning for the advent of Trinidad and Tobago's Independence. Arising out of that, the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force and the Defence Act were established, and formally became law in the law books of Trinidad and Tobago. I'm aware that subsequent to that, after the 1970 Black Power Revolution, another attempt was made, this time by the local officers spearheaded by Brigadier Joffre Serrette, at arriving at a strategic document. However, no formal strategic document was developed.

If my memory serves me correctly, it was after the attempted Coup in 1990 that the Defence Force under my leadership formally decided to work on a document, the very

first strategic plan document which we submitted to the Government for acceptance. This arose out of..... the Government at the time was involved in strategic planning for the entire management of the Public Service and as a result, I approached the then Minister of Public Administration, he is now deceased, Minister Gordon Draper, so that the Defence Force can “piggy back” [leverage] on the exercise which the Government was endeavoring to put in place. He verbally took my request to the National Security Council and I was asked to formally work on a strategic document. This was, as far as I am aware, the very first document and I think it’s very often referred to as “The Blue Book”. I think you yourself might have seen or participated in some of it and that was the very first time that a formal attempt was made to provide a strategy for the Defence Force.

LT. COLONEL SMART: Was consideration given at the time that you had done this to another approach in terms of a model or was it the strategic plan approach that you decided to use?

GENERAL BROWN: We decided on the strategic plan approach. However, it involved not simply one or two people but it involved the senior element in both the Defence Force, the Regiment and the Coast Guard at the time. It was much wider in scope and in the numbers of people that were involved in the exercise. We didn’t go beyond the officer level because my own view is at the time I didn’t think that the other rank structure, given the low requirement standard for entry at the time, had the capacity to engage in any meaningful way in the exercise.

LT. COLONEL SMART: When you look back at the start of that formal process, Sir, can you indicate what were some of the factors both in the external environment – outside of Trinidad and Tobago – that may have caused the Government now to take the approach that they took and because of that shaped how you went? Was there something in the environment in the 1990s? And probably if I could prompt and say I’m thinking now of the IMF and in those days when the Government was seemingly under some challenges in terms of being able to have cash flow to run some of its program.

GENERAL BROWN: Yes, I think you are quite correct in that in the late ‘80s and early ‘90s Trinidad was very much in the grip of the IMF and the IMF required the Government to be engaged in a lot of the social development program and it was felt at the time that the only Government agency that was geared to some of these program, the Civilian Conservation Corps, for example, would have been done under the auspices of the Defence Force. That caused us to think outside of the normal military role, which was internal security and military operations and we were now involved in some of the social safety net program. In addition, the Servol Program which initially was started by the Defence Force and the depressed areas of Laventille and surrounding areas – Beetham and those areas. So we had to think outside of the box and we had to adopt a whole new approach to plans for the Defence Force, its utilization and how we were going to execute those plans. I think it is in that context that the strategic plan was informed by the external situation that was in place at the time.

Internally, events of the 1990 Attempted Coup mandated that we took another look at how the Defence Force was to be structured and I think it is in that context that the whole idea of strategic planning was developed.

LT. COLONEL SMART: Sir, when I look at the timeline, I recognize that your strategic plan would have dealt from the period 1994 or thereabout to the year 2000 but it would have been the same time when you were going home in terms of retirement. Were you able to see this strategic plan approved and implemented within the Defence Force?

GENERAL BROWN: The short answer to that is yes, it was approved. It was a condition of my retirement – because I should have retired much earlier than I did – that I stay on and complete the exercise of the strategic plan which initially started in 1992, just about the time when the Government started its strategic plan for the administration of the Public Service and you will recall I mentioned we attempted to piggy back on that. And yes, I did submit an interim plan which gave me enough time because I had two years between 1992 and 1994 when my retirement was due, to develop the more formalized plan which is what we did and once that exercise was completed the official document was handed over to the National Security Council and it was then left for my successor to ensure the implementation of that document. It didn't quite meet with the approval of several people internally and externally because I think they weren't quite ready for it because as I said, the other two attempts at some kind of strategic planning were rather ad hoc in their implementation and this was a very formalized attempt. At the time I left the document was prepared and delivered and it was at that point I took my departure and it was for my successor to ensure the implementation of the plan. I think they have in a way implemented it but I am not sure whether they have formalized the implementation of it but I think most of what was in that document was actually implemented.

LT. COLONEL SMART: Sir, based on what you said there at the end, can you indicated what were some of the plusses, some of the positive things we got out of the strategic planning approach, this being our first attempt at strategic planning? I would also ask you if you can think about the liabilities as well.

GENERAL BROWN: Well in terms of what came out of it, prior to the document, the acceptance of the Defence Force [Headquarters] was left to the whims and fancy of whoever the Minister was at the time, and if the Minister felt that it was convenient to deal separately with the Coast Guard, or separately with the Regiment, as indeed some of them did, that was the route he went. I think formalizing a strategic plan forced the civilian “powers that be,” to accept the notion of a Defence Force [Headquarters]. Initially, the Defence Force comprised only two units: a unit of land forces and a Coast Guard.

LT. COLONEL SMART: So there was no headquarters?

GENERAL BROWN: There was no headquarters. Initially the Commanding Officer of the Regiment was the de facto Commander of the Defence Force. It was only subsequent, almost twenty years later that the concept of a Defence Force Headquarters was accepted. Even at the time when they separated the Commander of the Force from the Commanding Officer of the Regiment they still did not accept the idea of a Defence Force Headquarters existing so the Commander of the Defence Force Brigadier Serrette, as he then was, made his own internal arrangement to get such staff, limited though it may be, that he required by taking them out of the units; so the units in effect went short that number of people and it was only after Commodore Williams came into being that the Ministry accepted, though not formally but verbally, the concept of a Defence Force Headquarters. And then again it was only after the formal strategic plan was completed which called for the establishment of a Defence Force Headquarters with proper staffing, proper staff officers and the like, that the idea was accepted and I'm still not sure today whether that document has been formally accepted or laid in Parliament.

The intention was to lay it in Parliament so that everybody knows this is the structure and the strategic plans for the Defence Force, for its administration and its operations, and no subsequent Government can change that. Therefore, I'm still not aware whether the document is formally accepted. I know it was accepted in principle and in fact the ideas in it were applied to the Defence Force..... but in a formal sense in writing and being laid in Parliament, I'm not quite sure of that.

LT. COLONEL SMART: That brings me to another question, Sir. Who would have been the Minister of National Security during the period that you were in command and also what was that period when you commanded the Defence Force?

GENERAL BROWN: I commanded the Defence Force from 1991 to the 31st of December 1994 sometime I think it was November – in 1991 which was the date on which my predecessor retired. The acting was some months before that because he was on leave at the time but my substantive appointment was made from, I think it was the 19th of November, 1991 to the 31st of December, 1994 and it was during the period 1992 to 1994 that most of the work on the strategic plan was done together with the other officers in the Force at the time.

LT. COLONEL SMART: Sir, when you went to the Chair of the Chief of Defence Staff your previous job would have been most likely the Commanding Officer of the Regiment.

GENERAL BROWN: I was, yes.

LT. COLONEL SMART: What sort of planning did the senior level – and here I am talking about long-term planning – of the Force undertake during that period before you assumed command?

GENERAL BROWN: None to my knowledge.

LT. COLONEL SMART: So was this a challenge then when you came into the chair and decided to go this new route?

GENERAL BROWN: Very much so.

LT. COLONEL SMART: Did you meet a lot of resistance?

GENERAL BROWN: Very much so, I met resistance at two or three levels but I would rather not get into personalities. However, there was in fact resistance at the very highest level at that, among some of the senior officers in the Force to any notion of strategic planning. I'm glad to see that the new officers, including you, don't think like that. However, yes, there was some resistance to it. Some of them I'm sure would have preferred for the status quo to remain for their own particular selfish reasons.

LT. COLONEL SMART: Coming back now to present the question, would you then say that this would have been one of the liabilities in terms of strategic planning, people not embracing the approach, this approach which you think would have done well for us?

GENERAL BROWN: Yes, but you have to understand that the level that we got the resistance from though it was high, fortunately for us, their time in the Force was rather limited; they only had a couple months in one case and a couple years in another case and it was the officers at the next level down who were the ones that I relied on. These officers were the future leaders of the Force and these were the people who thought strategically and looked to the future. These are the people who have come to the fore now in the last couple of years in the Force so fortunately, as I said, the objectors were few in number but their remaining time in the force was short enough and the people that I really relied on to assist in developing this strategic plan – I don't want you to go away with the impression that it was a one-man show; far from it. There were a lot of bright officers at the time; a lot of them were going to university; a lot of whom had just left university and these were the officers that I relied on to push this to get this process going. I'm grateful to a lot of them.

LT. COLONEL SMART: Sir, what training did you have to prepare you to undertake this task?

GENERAL BROWN: In a formal sense, training in strategic planning, absolutely none but, having said that as you would know as a military officer I think much of the courses that officers are called upon to take after their initial courses – most of the advance courses at the level of staff officers course, junior and senior staff officers, does in fact have an element of strategic planning in it and so if you were to ask me if I had a formal training at the university level in strategic planning, the answer is no but I think the training I received as a staff officer in Canada, more particularly, did in fact have some basis in strategic planning and it is that I relied on to help me in starting off the process. And as I said, we had quite a number of young officers at the second level in terms of rank, majors who had been to the University of the West Indies and they had done some formal training in strategic planning, they must have done, and it is that together with the little knowledge I had that I acquired from my staff training that prepared us for the task. It was a herculean task. It took almost two years to get this thing done because we started from scratch; we had nothing. We didn't even have a document.

LT. COLONEL SMART: And how often did you meet?

GENERAL BROWN: We met once a week and we didn't even have a document that could have informed us so it was a work in progress as we went along developing it. It would have been easier like today where somebody could have sat down and drafted a document that we could have used as a working document. We didn't even have that luxury.

LT. COLONEL SMART: And I get the impression that the other military forces at the time weren't going in that direction as yet.

GENERAL BROWN: Certainly not in the Caribbean at the time.

LT. COLONEL SMART: Sir, I'm going to ask you a trick question here. As you were speaking it came into mind so please allow me. One of the things of the environment at the time as we spoke about the '90s and the IMF and that situation, there was this new approach to how Government wanted the Public Service to reform. In the English system they call it the New Public Management that the Public Service needed to become more competitive; they needed to be able to become more customer focused. One of the things of that environment was an expectation that there would be some measure of competition; the Public Service must be able to compete just like the private sector. Did you in any way think of the Defence Force as competing against other agencies within the Government for scarce resources and because of that thought about a strategy on how you were going to compete in the strategic plan?

GENERAL BROWN: The answer to that is yes because you will recall that prior to the oil boom years the Ministries in a way were competing with each other for whatever little financial resources the Government had and the Defence Force was competing like any other Ministry. As a matter of fact, Dr. Eric Williams once asked Brigadier Serrette when he had approached him, in my presence, for something, I can't recall what it was now – he approached him at an Independence Day parade for something for the Defence Force and the Prime Minister's comment was, "What do you produce?" Well, clearly Brigadier Serrette had no answer for that because the Defence Force in a way does not really produce any "product" but they do secure the country; but how do you quantify that? But it just goes to show you the way the Civil Servants and the politicians were thinking at the time with all these Ministries competing for these very scarce resources so in a way the military was starved and that in a way determined how they dealt with the military. Even within the Ministry now what was required was when you asked for certain things it is only when you got the little that you got, that determined how you planned. Now, how could you develop long-term strategic planning given what I just said? It was only after the oil boom years that I believe an opportunity was afforded to the Government to really think in terms of – well both in terms of the Public Service and the Defence Force as to how we were going to proceed. So in a way the short answer to your question is yes, a lot of what external environments existed at the time did determine

how much we could have put in the plan, even when we started to develop the plan. I think we had adopted an attitude of let us not think in terms of how much this is going to cost. In other words, look at what we are required to do as a Defence Force with all the changes that had taken place because we certainly do a hell of a lot; more now than we even thought of when the Army first started in 1962. So it is in that context that we said well at least let us complete the exercise and then let the politicians decide just how much of it they can accept.

Fortunately as I said the money was flowing then and we seemed to have gotten a lot out of it and I'm glad to see that not only have we gotten a lot at that first attempt at strategic planning but I'm glad to see the officers after I've left a couple years after, decided to continue the process of strategic planning and I think that's a good thing.

LT. COLONEL SMART: So if I'm to ask you to name your strategy, Sir, it would have been to develop this plan and try to see yourself getting as much as possible to achieve your objectives.

GENERAL BROWN: That is correct. To convince the powers that given what they were asking the Army to do at that time in terms of getting involved in government safety net, developing the Civilian Conservation Corps and all of those other things, assistance to civilians that we were required to do – Servol and the like – given that and given the fact if I am not mistaken it was a condition of the IMF that through the IADB the Defence Force had formal discussions with the Head of the IADB then on the establishment of the Civilian Conservation Corps.

LT. COLONEL SMART: So there was a one and one with the Bank.

GENERAL BROWN: Oh yes, myself and the Head of the IADB. I am trying to remember his name but it escapes me now but it will come to me in a short while. We actually had a very formal discussion and it was after our discussion because he was of the opinion that the Government may not have agreed, given the fact that the mutiny that took place in 1970 and impressing the young minds in looking beyond the sort of discipline we would give them and they were not quite sure it was a program, but through his efforts the Government then established the Civilian Conservation Corps and put it into the hands of the military to run and that is why in that document you see a whole separate section there that talks about the Civilian Conservation Corps.

LT. COLONEL SMART: Sir, are you saying that was another initiative of the Defence Force?

GENERAL BROWN: I was approached by the Head of the IADB. I was approached by him to see if the Defence Force would have used this as one of their projects – if we could have run the project because they were insisting that the project was going to be run by somebody else, another Ministry, the Ministry of Youth Development or something like that. But he felt that it needed to go beyond that.

LT. COLONEL SMART: A bit more robust.

GENERAL BROWN: That's right and he wanted to involve the Defence Force and it was for that reason that we spoke. I went to his office in St. Clair – I'm seeing it like if it was yesterday.

LT. COLONEL SMART: What were some of the principal strategic goals other than the CCC that you would have set for the force if you can think back that far?

GENERAL BROWN: I'm old you know. It's fifteen years you are asking me to think back, Rodney. I think my main objective in doing the strategic plan was to finally get a formal acceptance from the Ministry because even at that time, there was no formal acceptance of the Defence Force structure. They were still in the situation of divide and rule; dealing with the Coast Guard when they wanted, bypassing the Chief of Staff when they wanted to speak to somebody in the military and in a way this was sort of encouraged by the Ministry. Officers bypassed the Chief of Defence Staff and went directly to the Ministry to seek something for their own unit to the detriment, probably of the other unit or the Force and I think my main objective was to get a formal acceptance from the Government of the Defence Force as a unit.

LT. COLONEL SMART: And while you haven't said it as yet Sir, somewhere in the document I remember reading where you said "to develop an integrated Force"; it speaks to that as well.

GENERAL BROWN: Yes. Because the units were going separate on a tangent and there was a lot of duplication; duplication in the procurement process for that matter. The Supply Officer in the Coast Guard procured separately for the Coast Guard and the Quartermaster procured for the Army. By combining the two and putting it under the Defence Force Headquarters economies of scale come in, you buy larger quantities you get goods cheaper and everything that goes with that and it is not just that. Both units had separate financial accounting units; they had their own Paymasters. There was duplication at every level of the administrative element of the Force. The only thing that was separate was the operational arm but all the other levels: management and administration levels there was duplication. So we were able to combine all those things and bring them under the umbrella of the Defence Force Headquarters which allowed for the Commanding Officers to concentrate primarily on their tasks, which are to command the unit, the operational command of their units.

So I think that was my main achievement that came out of this, and acceptance by the Ministry. Because if at the level of the military some aspect of acceptance was there, you couldn't help but, especially in the case of Brigadier Serrette. He just had the kind of personality that people went to him but it should not be like that. Commodore Williams when he took over the Coast Guard, that only started when Commodore Williams took over because he, notwithstanding what transpired before, accepted in his own mind the idea of a Defence Force Headquarters having command both operationally and

administratively over the Force and it was only when he took over in 1978, and the Army was started in 1962, that he accepted that. But it ought not to be at the whim and fancy of the individual who accepted that because I can tell you his successor, who shall remain nameless at this point did not accept it so we reverted to status quo ante, as they say. I think the lawyers use that phrase. So you see, if anything good came out of this, it was an acceptance finally by all within the Force and the majority externally of the Defence Force as a unit.

LT. COLONEL SMART: In terms of your challenges – I understand challenges internally. In terms of your external challenges what challenges did you have to overcome in terms of selling this and how did you go about doing that?

GENERAL BROWN: There are two aspects to it. One is the political aspect and I had absolutely no problem with getting the politicians to accept the concept of a strategic plan. As I said, at the time Minister Gordon Draper was the man, he is deceased now. He was attempting to do a similar exercise in the Public Service. Of course you know there is always objection to change, especially where public servants are concerned, and I approached him with a view to having the Defence Force do a strategic plan and have it integrated in some way into a formal acceptance in his document. Needless to say, our document was produced much faster than the Public Service was moving at. I'm not even sure they have completed their task or whether their task in the Public Service was ever completed. So that when I presented him with our document he was able to show it to his public servants and say, "Look, this is the type of document that I'm expecting you to produce". And he told me this himself.

LT. COLONEL SMART: So the Defence Force's own was a model.

GENERAL BROWN: Yes. And he said, "This is the kind of thing that I want you to look at and this is the way I would anticipate that you approach the exercise". As I said, like everything else in the Public Service there is always objection to change and to some extent in the military also, initially at any rate and I think that basically is how that happened. Public Servants are in themselves lazy individuals and I make no apologies for saying that.

LT. COLONEL SMART: Lazy or maintaining the status quo?

GENERAL BROWN: Lazy! And they do not want to think outside of the box. So they stick by their Rules and Regulations and they try to hold you down to that. You ask anything and they will find a reason why they can't do what you ask them to do. They will look for something, some Cabinet Note in 1962 which said that they couldn't do this or you couldn't do that. And in fact that was the kind of relationship that we had with the Ministry, you know. Not at the political level but at the level of the public servants. They were either inept; military was new to them. It's not like the British or the Americans where you have – in any walk of life you will find a retired military person at whatever level both in the British and the American system. In our system, no way! It is

only now that we've gone a couple years and people like me and the others have left who have now been doing some work on the outside that people are beginning to understand what the military is all about. But before that, they had absolutely no knowledge of the military. In one case an AO 5 [Administrative Officer, Grade 5] - I wonder if I should say this as I'm being taped - who is just below the Permanent Secretary, responsible for finance in the Ministry, asked Commodore Williams whether a propeller was absolutely necessary for the operations of a boat, because when she saw the cost of it and we were purchasing a new one, she asked that question. And Commodore Williams' reaction to that was to get a crane, take the propeller and the shaft out of the boat, put it on a truck and drove it and parked it in the car park of the Ministry and asked her to come and see what it is. Now that's the extent of their lack of knowledge of things military and it was something as basic as that. So at the political level I had absolutely no objection. As a matter of fact, I had encouragement from Minister Draper and the Prime Minister, Mr. Manning, at the time to go full speed ahead. The objection came from the public servants.

LT. COLONEL SMART: Sir given what you've just said there, would you be one of the people who would recommend joint training between the public Service and the military in terms of getting that understanding?

GENERAL BROWN: Yes. Well an attempt was made at doing that by the Joint Services Staff College. I don't know if it's still in existence.

LT. COLONEL SMART: It is.

GENERAL BROWN: And I think that's where they pull people from the military, from Customs, public servants. It's a Diploma course, I think. That idea is there but then these people go back to where they come from and they crawl back into their old system.

LT. COLONEL SMART: Set in their ways. In terms of you doing this thing all over again if I can ask you for three things, three recommendations you will make to an incoming Chief of Defence Staff on how you will suggest he do this process, especially if he wants to copy the approach you took.

GENERAL BROWN: My first suggestion to him is don't use my approach; you come up with your own approach because times have changed. It's fifteen years since I have left. I think one of the things I would recommend to him is that he establishes a formal strategic planning unit a small unit - it doesn't have to be a large unwieldy unit - with one or two people in the Force; people who have been trained in strategic planning and set up a planning unit in the force itself, something which we never had really, not even when I was there. It is the existing people that we took from wherever they were. So I think you should organize planning as a formalized aspect as a unit, a separate component of the Defence Force Headquarters and put people from the three units which they now have because they have formed an Air Guard since I left. So from the Air Guard, the Army and the Coast Guard and have a formalized planning unit and that is

their duty; that is their task; to look at what exists, because the Army is evolving, the Army is changing every minute.

You look at what is happening now, the Summit of the Americas. This was unheard of in my time where a Summit of the Americas hosted by Trinidad is having units from all over the Caribbean taking part in an effective manner in providing security for that. Before now, the only occasions where we got together was when there were natural disasters, in a hurricane we would send a company of men; earthquake, in the volcano eruption in Montserrat. And outside of the two major units, which is Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, they didn't have the capacity to do any kind of planning for that. Another good thing that has come out of this and given that requirement now, CARICOM is now taking a more proactive approach to security. It took the World Cup 2007 to establish that link so we have established links in intelligence, we have established links in operations and logistics and Trinidad and Tobago has to play a major role and I gather is playing a major role insofar as the logistical aspects, in terms of the procurement of assets that will cater for that. But before the World Cup 2007, that would have been unthinkable. Yes I would establish a planning unit as a permanent thing and they would just keep reviewing the strategy.

LT. COLONEL SMART: Now you said that the first thing you would do is not recommend they take your approach. On a scale of one to ten how well you would say your plan was, the whole process, plan? You weren't able to implement it. I would have liked to score the implementation but you weren't here for the implementation.

GENERAL BROWN: Given that, I would say an eight. The acceptance of the plan was a major accomplishment. As I said, the public servants objected to it, to a man, but I had the political support and I think once that was there, so you are quite right....

LT. COLONEL SMART: In terms of the strategic development experiences of other militaries are you aware of any lessons Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force can learn from these other militaries?

GENERAL BROWN: Well I have never been exposed to such, as you in the research you are doing now. You are attending the...

LT. COLONEL SMART: Command and General Staff College.

GENERAL BROWN: I didn't attend any at that level, of course, so that I am not aware of any strategic plans that they would have made but given what I know of some of the, including some of the major forces, I think they too are grappling with a way of developing a strategy and to service strategy. I am aware of that fact. I am not aware of what their strategies were.

LT. COLONEL SMART: I have one final question I wish to ask you and this question, in our language, in our parlance is for you to "ramajay" [go beyond the ordinary], for you to tell me any additional information you will like to share from the interview here,

something I probably didn't ask that you would like to share, that you will like to leave us with.

GENERAL BROWN: I think that's a difficult question to answer off the bat; I need to put some thought to it but I think that the present administration of the Force is heading in the correct direction in terms of what I see happening. They are involving much more than I did and I think I tried to explain my reason for not involving the lower ranks at the time because I didn't think some of them had the capacity to do it but I think since then the Defence Force arrangement, and the Coast Guard, they have developed a whole range of courses that they send their young officers – you yourself are on one such course. And not simply officers; some of the other ranks and given the fact that the technology is being used now and the officers are being trained in the use of technology, a much more learned person is coming through both at the level of the other ranks, at the higher echelons of the other rank structure and in the officer corps. That's one of the things that I pioneered. I don't want to pat myself on the back but the first set of officers who was sent to do university training was sent during that period of time just prior to the time when I took over and my request to Brigadiers then was – and Major Hubert Williams is the first that went to the university at the time, the University of the West Indies, and his entire program, and this while he as a soldier, continued to get a salary.

LT. COLONEL SMART: So he went full time.

GENERAL BROWN: He went full time. I, without reference to the Ministry told the officers, any officer who can go to the university part time for two years I will give them the final year or two years, pay them and they will go, without reference to the Ministry.

LT. COLONEL SMART: I remember that.

GENERAL BROWN: And you had Kayam Mohammed, Colonel Williams, Peter Joseph. You had a whole host of officers – Colonel Spencer, Colonel Antoine all of them started.

APPENDIX C.

Interview with Commodore Anthony Franklin Conducted

by Lt. Colonel Rodney Smart on 9 April 2009

LT. COLONEL SMART: This interview is being conducted on Thursday 9 April 2009 at the Institute of Marine Affairs. It is now approximately 0950 hrs. Sir, for the purpose of this interview can you please state your name and your association with the Defence Force?

COMMODORE FRANKLIN: I'm Commodore (retired) Anthony Franklin, former Chief of Defence Staff. Prior to being at the Defence Force Headquarters, I was Commanding Officer, Coast Guard. I have retired since 2000.

LT. COLONEL SMART: Sir, during what period were you the Chief of Defence Staff?

COMMODORE FRANKLIN: 1999 to 2000.

LT. COLONEL SMART: Okay, thank you very much, Sir. To start us off, if I can ask you please to give a brief description of the history of strategic planning within the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force up to and even extending beyond your period of command, Sir, please.

COMMODORE FRANKLIN: Strategic planning started in 1992; I think it was when General Ralph Brown was Chief of Defence Staff. Now, that is all part of the whole Government's thrust. Gordon Draper was Minister when they mandated Government Departments to do their strategic plans. The way it was done, however, had many questions to be answered. I think Emru Millette – Ralph Brown and he did a lot of the work. Coincidentally, I was Commanding Officer of the Coast Guard at the time, and I am not sure how well it was known to [MG] Ralph Brown, but we were going through a learning process at the Coast Guard where we were doing our strategic plan. The approach was very different [from MG Brown's approach] and I might have mentioned it [Coast Guard planning initiative] to him.

When I began acting in Command of the Coast Guard In 1991, I started a program called Total Quality Management. We received a lot of assistance from Canada and we found out that the US Coast Guard had Total Quality Management working for their system. When their vessels visited, in fact, two vessels visited - that's the HQM vessels - we had the Captains come and lecture to us. From there, I picked up the Canadian Armed Forces model of continuous improvement. Trinidad and Tobago and Canada, through CIDA, had some arrangement.

LT. COLONEL SMART: CIDA?

COMMODORE FRANKLIN: Yes, Canadian International Development Agency where they provided maritime assistance to the Caribbean region. So there was a very close collaboration between Transport Canada and Trinidad and Tobago Coast Guard and it included Jamaica and Barbados but we were viewed as a leader. So out of that I got to hear about strategic planning and then I started making enquiries and hearing Minister Draper at the time so I made contact with him. So we had a team from the Ministry headed by Rita Portillo and the guy who eventually became PS of National Security. I can't remember his name.

LT. COLONEL SMART: Trevor Percival.

COMMODORE FRANKLIN: Right, correct. They came down to the Coast Guard and over about three weekends; when I say weekend, from Friday to Monday we did a training thing in team building leading right up to the development of a strategic plan. At the end of the day, I eventually sat down over 24 hours and wrote the plan but the fact is that I had all these inputs during the training and I submitted that to Ralph Brown who at the time had Emru Millette writing and working with him. So that was our input. That's what I know of the history of the first – in the Coast Guard we hadn't started that before 1990 and I don't think the Regiment had done anything like that before. But you know, within the military we have strategic plan built into our whole system. It's just that this "strategic planning" which was adopted and adapted from business and the Government had taken on and now we try as part of the Government state entity to try to do. It is just that it is now in a new framework but in military life, we would have done that; we have to do it when we are preparing for a battle. That's what I know of the first brush at it. Of course, there was a review when the Government changed and the Minister at the time, the Former Chief of Defence Staff – he succeeded General Brown. He was the Minister.

LT. COLONEL SMART: Who are you speaking about Sir, for the purpose of the interview?

COMMODORE FRANKLIN: Joe Theodore. He had a review done of it. To be honest, I can't remember very much of what he said of the review. However, the fact is that something was put down and it was the first block in the foundation. During my time, based on the review, I tried to expand a little bit on certain areas and I know that my successor, who was John Sandy, continued and I'm really happy to hear under Eddie Dillion, so far it has been done. But it's a living thing and there will be several alterations to it.

LT. COLONEL SMART: Sir, prior to the formalization of strategic planning within the Force what method was used for planning, either in the Coast Guard or the Military Force?

COMMODORE FRANKLIN: I can tell you a lot from the Coast Guard. The Commanding Officer at the time, who had a very strong personality in Commanding Officers, well, the eighth Commanding Officer, which is Mervyn Williams.

LT. COLONEL SMART: And he went on to be Chief of Defence Staff.

COMMODORE FRANKLIN: Yes. We had an experience gap. We had certain people who had a certain amount of administrative experience and experience in the history of the country and you must recall too that we were talking about development of the country at the same time and so development of the Headquarters and the way the Force started where we had expats in both the Army and the Coast Guard and I think they stayed much longer in the Coast Guard because I think it was after 1970 those in the Army left but we still had them in the Coast Guard for sometime thereafter. So you had the nationalism thing going on, so planning was very much an individual – the people in charge, the top people: Commanding Officer, the Executive Officer or we would have staff meetings where some general discussions take place but a lot of the planning went on with the Heads, the top people. I can't say what happened in the Regiment. I believe it might have been that way because remember the military is a top down organization.

LT. COLONEL SMART: Very hierarchical.

COMMODORE FRANKLIN: It is a top down organization so a lot of the planning goes on up there. In today's world I think it has flattened out; management has flattened out a lot.

LT. COLONEL SMART: More all inclusive sort of arrangement.

COMMODORE FRANKLIN: And that's an interesting point because I remember when I was Chief of Defence Staff and I tried to improve senior NCOs into the thinking, people couldn't understand that; they themselves couldn't understand that. I attempted – Warrant Officer who went to the States on a Warrant Officers' Course; he and his wife did the course – Scantbury. When I did my staff course in the States one of the things that I observed, now this is Naval Staff...

LT. COLONEL SMART: Which part you did that Sir?

COMMODORE FRANKLIN: Newport. I observed that the Chief Warrant Officer, I think he was called; his office was right next to the Head of the Navy. He had a very, very high position and so it was with the Army; they were big people; top senior NCOs and their views were sought after at the time and I attempted to do that here but I found a lot of – there were a lot of issues with it.

LT. COLONEL SMART: From senior officers or senior NCOs?

COMMODORE FRANKLIN: From both sides, but the thing has changed. I think the idea has seeped in and I'm seeing we have – what is it called now?

LT. COLONEL SMART: The Force Chief or the Force Sergeant Major.

COMMODORE FRANKLIN: Yes.

LT. COLONEL SMART: So you saw that as a model that we could have used to improve the Force?

COMMODORE FRANKLIN: Sure, particularly in terms of looking after the troops because these people are supposed to have their feet on the ground.

LT. COLONEL SMART: And one of the ideas when I asked a question of one of the former Chiefs of Defence Staff was that – he said that he would not have brought in the senior NCOs during that period, because he did not find that they had that capacity that was needed to carry the plan forward in the early days. Do you share that view?

COMMODORE FRANKLIN: You are right. They did not have the capacity because I had asked around and so on, different people, and that's why I thought that sending Scantbury to that course would have given him some tools and people would have seen that if you arm yourself in a certain way.....The start will always be difficult. But you are right. You know it's not only in that area. When you talk to people outside – retirees, senior NCOs and so on and ask them what they are doing and you reflect on it, people would have spent twenty-five years in the Force and you wonder, how did they arm themselves while they were in the Force and knowing how they entered; what capacity, academic.....and what did they leave with. They left with the ability to order men around; they left with the ability to shout at men. I could give you a good example. The Head of Royal Bank Securityhe was responsible for not just the guards but the total security, kind of thing. He hired one of our retired senior NCOs. I was very pleasedand I saw him six months later and I asked him, "How is the guy going?" And he said, "I had to let him go because all he could do is shout at people." Now, that was quite instructive. You see that set the tone outside in civilian life to the quality of our people coming out. So the question of capacity really is a real one and I can understand that; and it's an evolution. Where we are today is far better than where we were back in the nineties and far better than where we were in the 1970s and so on.

LT. COLONEL SMART: Sir, you mentioned the use of TQM in the Coast Guard which may have played a part in influencing the Defence Force plan because you looked at TQM and then you went to your strategic planning viz a viz the model being used in the Public Sector. What would have spurred the need within the Coast Guard to decide to use that approach as opposed to a next approach? What were the internal drivers?

COMMODORE FRANKLIN: The internal drivers really was to try to get efficiency within the – you know on a ship – a ship is a system; it is an integrated system and we

used that as the model to run the whole Coast Guard; we used the Coast Guard as a model ship. So it's an integrated system and you had to beef up each department so to get this working together I thought the TQM model was really....and it worked. Of course you had to have people to drive it, especially in the beginning and I had a few officers and senior NCOs who caught on to it and drove it and we ran all the senior.....courses – live in courses at the Caribbean Fisheries Training Development Institute. They had accommodation and so on. So we took them off base for a week and.....TQM and a number of other things to build the image of the organization and to get the organization working more efficiently.

LT. COLONEL SMART: Interestingly Sir, this would have been happening in the Coast Guard that you recognized that you could build this capacity, but at the Defence Force level, was that happening at the same time?

COMMODORE FRANKLIN: No.

LT. COLONEL SMART: And how did you try to influence that, seeing that this input from the top?

COMMODORE FRANKLIN: It couldn't. I don't think I would have been able. I knew General Brown; we had a very good relationship which went back to school days. So I let him know what I was doing but I don't think he would have been interested in that because he wasn't exposed to it. And remember in those days, it is not as it is now. We were two very separate bodies: the Regiment, Coast Guard and then Defence Headquarters was another place somewhere else, so we were just looking after ourselves but we let people know what we were doing. I think the word got around because you know these officers exchanged – the word got around what we were doing and people started asking questions. When I went to Defence Force Headquarters I think perhaps it might have been expected of me to try to do that throughout the Force but it was difficult to do because one, at that time my focus was more on making sure that my officers get properly trained because I had a lot of officers away.

LT. COLONEL SMART: When you went to DFHQ, what position did you occupy, Sir?

COMMODORE FRANKLIN: Vice-Chief of Defence Staff; Vice Chief Admin. When I went there the Government introduced the two Vice Chief positions: one Operations and one Admin and then Operations left me and went to the States.

LT. COLONEL SMART: And who was Operations at the time, Sir?

COMMODORE FRANKLIN: John Sandy.

LT. COLONEL SMART: So you became both.

COMMODORE FRANKLIN: No, we tried to put, I think it was Antoine to...

LT. COLONEL SMART:do Operations.

COMMODORE FRANKLIN: That model didn't work. I'm glad we got out of it anyhow. The other bad thing about that model – I say it now, it was a bad thing – it was. We didn't have a CO Regiment at that time. We tried to treat with the most senior person as the CO Regiment but.....

LT. COLONEL SMART: Most senior Battalion Commander.

COMMODORE FRANKLIN: Yes, you are correct. But my focus then was making sure officers were trained.

LT. COLONEL SMART: After a short interruption the tape is rolling again.

COMMODORE FRANKLIN: Yes I was saying that training was my focus and also trying to encourage people to get into academics; the academic side of their development. My focus was really onbecause

LT. COLONEL SMART: But Sir you had done something I remember that Dr. Armstrong there was something you were doing in terms of development, mission. Do you recall that?

COMMODORE FRANKLIN: Yes. Coming out of the total strategic plan we developed our Mission, our Vision and so on and I thought that would have been important to bring in.....then I brought in Aubrey Armstrong to do a team-building exercise, one, because I thought we had to get this “joint-ness” in our exercise. I remember that's when we started with the J designation at the Force

LT. COLONEL SMART: That would have been what year, Sir?

COMMODORE FRANKLIN: 2000. And if you recognize the Mission Statement of the Force had words from the Coast Guard; the whole thing about.....and then....The Mission Statement is perhaps exactly the same thing as that developed in the Coast Guard with a few changes. So the team-building exercise was an important one, because we had a lot of separateness and then two, for my own sake. A Coast Guard Officer now taking over as Chief of Defence Staff after a long history of Army Officers. We would have approached things differently, so I needed to build a team of all officers. I remember at one meeting telling the officers what I wanted in terms of vision and this was just a part of the vision. I wanted to develop a Force that the public perception would be when they see of a soldier walking down the road they take a gasp and say, “That represents us.” The fellow, he looks good; he looks well outfitted; he looks healthy, he looks strong, he looks proud so that the public say, “That represents us” and therefore we had a responsibility to represent them properly and behave in a manner not like some of the

things I'm reading about in the press today – with seven point six two. That is what I was trying to convey to the officers, so that they could....

LT. COLONEL SMART: But do you remember starting that when you were Vice Chief Admin? I think Brigadier Alfonso was the CDS at the time.

COMMODORE FRANKLIN: I remember having something down in Teteron.

LT. COLONEL SMART: Yes, when you brought down Dr. Armstrong. So you continued it when you....

COMMODORE FRANKLIN: A little bit. I had other things on my plate. But the whole objective was to introduce this kind of thinking into the Force, which I don't think was there; I'm not sure it was there. You start and you plant your seeds and hope that people carry on and to some extent I think it bore fruit. You never expect these things to bear fruit instantly. You plant some seeds and....

LT. COLONEL SMART: ...some will grow and some will not. What we recognize is that strategic planning is taking us into the future; planning into the future. Prior to this Sir, how was planning done, let's say in the Coast Guard or in the Defence Force? Short-term tenure plans; what happened?

COMMODORE FRANKLIN: I would more say short and medium term. The reason for it being short term was; it was a day to day struggle; we are a reactive type of organization. In terms of the medium- term development because acquisition of the vessels, equipment takes a while so the planning process there takes quite a while. That is just to acquire the equipment. In order to do that, now you have to plan for the manpower, training people, you have to plan for the maintenance and so it's a longish process. I can't say that there was very much long-term planning in the Coast Guard and I don't know – remember we had gone through a period of evolution, post '70. So I worked a little bit with Brigadier Serrette; just a little bit. I was up at the HQ....I'm not so sure that there was a whole lot of long-term planning. There was a lot of reactive development and so on going on. Ralph Brown could tell you a lot about that because he was Serrette man.

LT. COLONEL SMART: He mentioned it, Sir. If you look at the Coast Guard's own development process which would have eventually influenced the Defence Force own at some point, is it that the Coast Guard would have gone into two and three-year plans because of the acquisition processes?

COMMODORE FRANKLIN: Yes, we were driven a lot by the acquisition; not so much by the operations – more by the acquisition. Operations at that time The other thing that affected in terms of our operations was the whole Law of the Sea question which would have given us a greater range of responsibility. Remember we moved from a two-mile limit to a 12-mile limit....economic zone so it put our surface responsibility

further away. So we were driven a lot in the medium term in terms of equipment for that kind of responsibility but the day to day operations was short term.

LT. COLONEL SMART: And in terms of budgeting, if you have to acquire a vessel over five years, let's say, how did that go? This is the Government capital budget as opposed to recurrent.

COMMODORE FRANKLIN: It was capital; but the experience again, was reactive. We acquired equipment although we had been putting up our cases; the decision to acquire had been reactive. Our first set of boats we acquired in 1965. Our next acquisition was in 1972 and guess what? That was as a result of 1970. Our next acquisition was 1980. There was the whole fishing thing with Venezuela which started getting rough and Venezuela acquired a set of vessels and politically or internationally, Trinidad and Tobago during Eric Williams' time and continued under Chambers, developed close relationship with Brazil. The philosophy at the time was get friendly with your neighbor down the road so that you could keep your neighbor's next door to you in check; balanced. And as a result, I was sent down on goodwill missions to Brazil. I went and spent time down there and then started sending people for training in Brazil. So again, reactive. That 1980 acquisition, it was Venezuela plus.....because we had to be going further out. Remember we signed the Treaty and then the.....plan to acquire.....The whole drug thing. There is a certain amount of regional – I don't want to say hegemony. There is a certain amount of regional concerns.

LT. COLONEL SMART: Sir, prior to you taking over command of the Force, what training did you receive to prepare you to lead the Force in strategic planning; in strategic development?

COMMODORE FRANKLIN: On the military side, I think the only one is Naval Staff Course and in that Staff course we had a certain amount of – We did a course called National Security decision making and inside there is built in a number of tools and things about strategic planning; about how you take your course and how you build your kind of material; how you make a decision to acquire material and so on and how you make decisions for alliances and all that. So inside there, during that course we also had a lot of exposure to the American thinking. It's American but the politics of it. Now, at a regional level, it was more or less exposure. We were seeing what the Government wanted. You know they had these short courses. Government had a number of short programs that those of us who went to them, went to them out of our own interest because we weren't sent by the Ministry or the Force. We saw them and said, "This is something I would want to go on." The people at the time allowed – Mervyn Williams. Mervyn Williams was a guy who saw these things. It is the same way I went to university to do my first degree. So people allowed the time. There were things that I would see occurring on courses, and I thought somebody should attend.

LT. COLONEL SMART: But were we invited as well to send people?

COMMODORE FRANKLIN: Not so much. I am not sure that we got a lot of invitations from the Ministry of Public Admin.

LT. COLONEL SMART: Do you think we should develop a closer relationship, especially with the Ministry of Public Admin?

COMMODORE FRANKLIN: Oh yes, definitely. Listen, I had a basic philosophy and I still have it, that the Defence Force is important for the development of the country. I have said it several times and I've said it to the point where, when I said it in a workshop – there was a workshop that Ralph Brown had arranged once assisted by the Canadians and he had a lot of senior officers – I was a Lieutenant Commander at the time and I said something that has made the circle several, several times – that we weren't allowed to develop as an alternative. I think you might have heard me say that

LT. COLONEL SMART: Yes, sure, sure. Yes

COMMODORE FRANKLIN: And a country must develop its alternative and in a small-island state like ours let's look at the military and when I say an alternative, the example I should bring in is that one day a hurricane might hit this country. You know now it's becoming more and more real with global warming; things are changing, patterns are changing – a hurricane hits this country all the public servants, senior public service, a lot of the people in the private sector; it is a freeze; people might get killed and so on. They are going to freeze. Who should be able to carry on and bring stability to this whole thing? Your Defence Force should be the one to do that and in order to do that, you have to prepare them a certain way; you have to give them the resources, you have to do certain things; you have to build barracks that would withstand the thing so that when it coming they honker down; they have the behaviors, they honker down, they have the tools and when it pass, they hit the road, they clearing, they doing things but you must have people at certain levels while somebody come and help take charge of the power distribution. Recently I told Maundy that UTT has an MSC course in Environmental Management and he should send your officers to that course because if a major environmental disaster happens here, you all going to be called out. The Officer who is in charge of the Operations should understand what he is dealing with. So, from the basic philosophy of being important for the development, we should parallel the development. I'm not saying that we have to have entrepreneurs in our Force but how the country is run and these are things that other countries do. Their senior officers, there is a certain kind of staff – and this is a comment I've always made about this Joint Staff College here. The whole concept when that came up about Staff College.....

LT. COLONEL SMART: You want to say something about that, Sir because nobody has spoken about it.

COMMODORE FRANKLIN: Well, I can't speak totally about the College but my understanding of the concept was that you have this – it is a Joint Staff College where the forces; your personnel at a certain level, senior level come together. It was supposed to

be a developing program. Somehow, it got watered down where – because when we first sent, we sent Lieutenants; we sent officers to the thing but then they started sending senior NCOs. I don't know if it is because other organizations sent these senior NCOs. I made a comment that they now need to put another layer on top of that. You need to have another layer on top of that and I even up to a few months ago I raised it again in the context of senior leadership development; that we need in this country a forum by which our senior – our Chief of Defence, people just below him, Commissioner of Police, Permanent Secretaries, people in banking, people in enterprise come together to discuss the way forward in this country; the development of this country. I think in the United States you have the National Defence College. In the UK you have the – where Brigadier Alfonso – and now there is a University associated with it.

LT. COLONEL SMART: Kings' College

COMMODORE FRANKLIN: African countries have it and Latin American countries have it. We need to develop that kind of thing to help our development.

LT. COLONEL SMART: Do you see the Defence Force pushing that? Seeing that it is not happening.

COMMODORE FRANKLIN: The Defence Force needs to push it. I kept mentioning the idea. I put it to Theodore at the time about it. People have a fear and I tell you, my comment keeps coming back to me. When I made that comment first, I was a Lieutenant Commander in the Coast Guard. When I became CO, Coast Guard, we were having a joint exhibition with IMA called "Our Nation's Youth", and this is something I conceptualized and I think Lennox Ballah was here at the time; I had a good relationship with him and I discussed the idea with him and I said, "Let's do this together." The idea was to.....a lot of opportunities.....We went looking for sponsorships. We went to McAl and Naimool, he used to be our Ambassador.....He said, but I heard you said so and so. I was shocked. I mean, that was about four years ago before so I said to him.....

LT. COLONEL SMART: Was he attending the Conference or he heard it from someone?

COMMODORE FRANKLIN: No, he heard it; he heard about it. Somebody took it out of the room because when I said it, men bolted. Deceased Basil Thompson ran out the room. Ralph Brown who was sitting there said, "Boy, Tony what you saying boy?" Men say, "Boy what you talking about?" And I gave them the example about the hurricane and I really believe and I still do believe that the Defence Force is important for the development and the Government must put certain kind of resources and build the Force in a certain kind of way. *[Phone rings]*

LT. COLONEL SMART: After a short interruption, the interview continues.

COMMODORE FRANKLIN: So I was saying about the Force being an important instrument in the development of a country. I'm not talking about taking over governance/government. I'm not talking that at all. I'm talking about being one of the leading drivers of development. Our engineering: Look at the amount of civil engineering work that is required around the country. The Ministry of Works can't handle it all and they don't handle it properly because an engineer is supposed to do quality work and rather than just emergency, I'm talking about developmental work. Our community development: one of the things I tried, we did it and there were some successes, is in terms of communities: using the band to go into some communities, play music but before the band went in there, we publicized it. Ourpeople would be in; band come in and played; band goes out and our.....people stayed back and get a fee....Two things I am looking at and this is how I....that, one, it is about progress succession of the Force and two; it is about intelligence of what is going on the ground. And there were some successes.

LT. COLONEL SMART: In terms of – and I'll just bring us back to the training: your own training. Would you say that the training you received was adequate enough to assist you in the development of the Force strategically, Sir?

COMMODORE FRANKLIN: No, I wouldn't say so.

LT. COLONEL SMART: What else would you have done differently or for a future Chief of Defence Staff or the present one?

COMMODORE FRANKLIN: At the higher level, I would say Staff courses. Our Chiefs of Defence Staff, I think, courses such as the one done at the NCBS or the US Defence College. They need to do that kind of thing because courses, especially in a place like the Caribbean, we are not insular and we are not isolated.....

LT. COLONEL SMART: Sir, would that, you think, give them the strategic planning long term focus?

COMMODORE FRANKLIN: Yes, it would because you have to look at the influences from outside Forces. Remember globalization affects not only economies; it affects people's day to day lives and the Force is here to assist in the protection and the defense of the country so you have to understand the whole picture, not so much to go in depth globally but certainly regionally to understand what the geopolitics is because you are a military unit within that whole sphere you must understand that. In terms of the management styles I think what is happening globally is we are getting this merging now of military and.....

LT. COLONEL SMART: Management Sciences?

COMMODORE FRANKLIN: Yes. Business Management Sciences.

LT. COLONEL SMART: So it's not strategic planning/strategic management.

COMMODORE FRANKLIN: Yes, there is cross-pollination now, one borrowing from each other. So perhaps the officers need a little more of the management training. I believe that very senior officers must have a master's degree; but I just don't want to say a master's degree. It must be a degree that has a significant element of management; some element of politics in it and not stick to a science. Now military science has all of that so perhaps that is to ensure that people do like what you are doing, so it gives you that broad overview. There's also the need for people up at that level - the people I am talking about are people just below him; somebody who is likely to succeed him - to have an in-depth knowledge about the government of the country. However, it's how it's done. If you have to mount separate courses for that at UWI or UTT...or if he has to go and monitor the political...he should do that. So that gives him the kind of all round...running the Force. Because running the Force is not just looking down the road, looking behind you. Running the Force is positioning the Force within the context of the country; within the context of the region because the country is positioning itself within the region.

LT. COLONEL SMART: You would have taken over from Brigadier Alfonso, Brigadier Alfonso would have taken over from General Brown; he would have presented a Strategic Plan, what we call the Blue Book. Where did you take strategic planning from when you took over command? What was the duty in terms of the direction of the Force?

COMMODORE FRANKLIN: Well, I was hoping you wouldn't ask that question because.....

LT. COLONEL SMART: I had to ask it Sir.

COMMODORE FRANKLIN: I didn't get much of a - there were issues. We had issues.

LT. COLONEL SMART: Sir would it be correct to say that the Force wasn't on a strategic development path during that period?

COMMODORE FRANKLIN: Perhaps we might have been on a developmental path in certain areas. I don't know if you could describe it as strategic. We were dealing with the now. We had a lot of shortages and I think the focus was on trying to fill certain gaps and getting certain administrative things in the now, not strategically. I can't say that we were looking at further development as a strategic thing. Remember too under the UNC.....

LT. COLONEL SMART: UNC being what, Sir?

COMMODORE FRANKLIN: United National Congress. Under the government of the day, which was the UNC, they were not looking very much at strategic development. I can't say that they were of anybody so the impetus of strategic development fell.

LT. COLONEL SMART: Is it that they saw it as a People's National Movement initiative?

COMMODORE FRANKLIN: Perhaps, because if you would recall, people like Rita Portillo and so on, fell out of grace badly and she had to leave and go to Guyana. So a lot of the driving force behind the strategic development

LT. COLONEL SMART: Looking inwards at us now, on a scale of one to ten, what would you say has been our success at strategic planning up to when you were in command?

COMMODORE FRANKLIN: Well, I did write something. In the '90s, I put down a four. I think we were just beginning to turn, the wheel was just beginning to turn and it had its difficulty in that people had to understand and accept the concept and at that time, people were still thinking that that is a civilian thing and not seeing what was happening globally where there was a marriage taking place of military management concepts and business practices. But of course, the whole plan for strategic management was **[End of side A]** very....People like Nieves Beckles out of the – what was the organization – MDC or something like that.

LT. COLONEL SMART: Management Development Centre.

COMMODORE FRANKLIN: That was the first time I heard about strategic planning. I remember asking, I think it was Mervyn Williams at the time, yes – I see this and I want to go, it wouldn't cost us anything and he afforded me two days to go. But you know, later on in life, especially when I became Chief of Defence Staff, I didn't think so much about strategic management; I thought about leadership about where you wanted to take the Force and how you take them there and so on. These management tools afforded you how to move from here to there.

LT. COLONEL SMART: So you placed the emphasis on leadership which would have brought all those other things.

COMMODORE FRANKLIN: Correct. That's why I did the Aubrey...

LT. COLONEL SMART: Aubrey Armstrong team building and all of that. Sir, in terms of your own strategic development thrust and you've just mentioned the leadership part of it, what were some of those programs you would have passed on to the Chief of Defence Staff, your successor?

COMMODORE FRANKLIN: One of the things – as I just turned the page I saw it here – I could feel proud about which evolved out of the strategic thinking was CAMP. I didn't have to work too hard.

LT. COLONEL SMART: And what is CAMP, Sir?

COMMODORE FRANKLIN: I can't remember the acronym. It's the welfare program. The acronym is something Assistance for Military Personnel. I can't remember what the C is for. I didn't have to work too hard to get a champion. You know you always have to get a champion, who is now our Minister of Public Administration, Kennedy Swartsingh and I had two real champions in that: Swaratsingh and Derrick Herbert. He was a university man at the time but he had done his degree and then there were others. There was a Corporal who was studying.

LT. COLONEL SMART: Stewart?

COMMODORE FRANKLIN: No, not Stewart. He was a Reverend. He was a Sergeant.

LT. COLONEL SMART: I'm trying to remember his name; he was a Staff Sergeant.

COMMODORE FRANKLIN: Yes. The ideas came out of the strategic campaign and so CAMP developed. The other thing was development of IT at the headquarters which I thought was an important tool. The whole idea would have been to get all the units interconnected but I had to start somewhere so IHeadquarters because it was a pleasure knowing we were getting an IT.....

LT. COLONEL SMART: A backbone?

COMMODORE FRANKLIN: No, it wasn't a backbone at the time. It was just getting a unit and starting building a database; set up databases and so on.

LT. COLONEL SMART: So the unit started under your command?

COMMODORE FRANKLIN: Yes, with Able Seaman Lewis and Private London at the time and these were the guys who assisted. So I didn't have to go too far, searching for the champions who were part of the exercise. I found the guys, I put them there and told them, "This is the objective." There were computers around but people weren't thinking in terms of integrating. Remember, Coast Guard had an integrated system, had a whole network – this was given by the Canadians until a bolt of lightning burnt it, fried it. I also have here a thing about acquisition of resources – vehicles. Just before I left the vehicles came.....that was a fight with the Ministry; we were able to get that. I had put them on the fast track...

LT. COLONEL SMART: I think that was one of the largest acquisitions of vehicles we had ever received.

COMMODORE FRANKLIN: My champion on the outside there was Sonny Franklin and, as I said, finding the people to champion the thing because.....

LT. COLONEL SMART: So an important part of this process, as you say, is finding the champions.

COMMODORE FRANKLIN: Yes. *[Phone rings]*

LT. COLONEL SMART: After a short interruption we are starting off again.

COMMODORE FRANKLIN: And training and education encouraging people to educate themselves and so on. I was reminded recently about something, I feel good about that. My driver and a security I used to tell them: "Listen to me, when I go to a meeting anywhere I don't want you all to sit down in the car and listen to music. You must go to Foreign Affairs, they have a library." I say: "All you go inside there and read something and when I am finished the meeting I know where to send and get you all. I go to these places, you all go and learn something; don't sit down in the car and listen to music." That has caused these guys to go on and do things and study and get certificate and diploma in different things. One of them, Trevor, is a big mas band leader and the management, he learnt that at Labour College because he went off to Cipriani Labour College. Kern Fraser, well you know where he is now? Atlantic. I said to him: "You not just working for me learn something; keep learning something." I used to encourage people like Small! Small.....just the other day....."This is where I reach you know." I feel good about that. Encourage people around. Even down in Staubles fellas like Beharry and those fellas....And that is where I start. I start with the people who I could influence. So, in the Force I always kept talking about education. You have the time between Captain and Major, between Lieutenant and Commander, educate yourself and I was always willing to help a man with the time. So these are some of the things. Perhaps there are things I don't remember.

LT. COLONEL SMART: Sir, in all change initiatives, there is some level of resistance, where did you encounter resistance to the changes you proposed into this and how did you manage this resistance?

COMMODORE FRANKLIN: Some of the senior personnel, some of them, couldn't take in the apparent civilian approaches. So it required a lot of talking and bringing people to talk. The other part is in the Ministry there was an attempt to try to control the resources of the Force in the Ministry by the PS. I wouldn't call her name now but there was a significant attempt to control: telling us what kind of vehicle we should buy, or even ordering a particular kind of.....So that is some of the difficulties. In terms of.....the difficulty we had then was what really was taking precedence. Operations were really taking precedence. We were short on officers; we were short on

senior officers because promotions weren't taking place or hadn't taken place for a while. We were short on senior officers. They had to go here abroad and we had the drug problem where we sent a larger and larger operation. We were getting into more and more drug busts with the police and so on. So we had to focus more on operations. I couldn't spend a whole lot of time on change management.

LT. COLONEL SMART: But you brought the Force – I'm now thinking about it – from the old century into the new century. Just thinking about it.

COMMODORE FRANKLIN: Well, I tried to put the ideas out there. It would have been difficult to try to change it but you have to put the ideas out there; find people who would buy into it right away and to get it done. Again, military being top down, and you legally have to get the top people to buy in.

LT. COLONEL SMART: Was it a challenge at the time Sir, to your formation Commanders?

COMMODORE FRANKLIN: Well, I'll tell you. I thought that Commanders at the time were very much interested in learning development, in personal development rather than... the Force. Yes, they would say Force but it is really...I found that was really the issue and that prevented us from moving as fast and this was not only during my time.

LT. COLONEL SMART: It's a historical thing.

COMMODORE FRANKLIN: Yes, I found so and I hear that it might be worse now, I don't know if it is true.

LT. COLONEL SMART: Well, probably with the formalization of education in that now that you have these program developed, people will go because....

COMMODORE FRANKLIN: It is now part of the system.

LT. COLONEL SMART: Yes, so then you don't feel threatened you wouldn't be going. At some point in time you will go as part of your development.

COMMODORE FRANKLIN: You know that is another thing, tertiary education....It is a natural development.

LT. COLONEL SMART: Sir, if you were to do this all over again, what would you have done differently?

COMMODORE FRANKLIN: From where?

LT. COLONEL SMART: As the Chief of Defence Staff, in terms of the development of the Force, what would you have done differently?

COMMODORE FRANKLIN: Perhaps from the outset I would let the Minister know exactly what I wanted to do, giving him, rather than – put another way, we all in the Force thought that we have a Minister who is the Former Chief of Defence Staff so we easy and we kind of let things go for granted. I think I might be guilty for that.

LT. COLONEL SMART: He must know!

COMMODORE FRANKLIN: I had to go and push that head. You know what I mean, which is not the case. You found that you had to work much harder. I would have started from even before I took over, pushing that. I think that one, in terms of within the Force.....the formation, making sure that we get a Regiment in place and so on because we went through a very nebulous period there, in not having unit Commanders and so on and it made management tough.

LT. COLONEL SMART: When I think back, when I reflect on that period, I wonder because I remember even in your own appointment there wasn't the easy flow into that. Did that in some way affect how you would have want to run.....?

COMMODORE FRANKLIN: Yes, of course, it did.

LT. COLONEL SMART: Sir, in terms of the future now, what would your recommendations be in terms of appointing this Chief of Defence Staff to ensure that how you would not have been able to give your full spirit at the time, at the start, what would your recommendations be? Because it seemed to have an impact on the strategic development of the Force.

COMMODORE FRANKLIN: No country or government....but they must have a cadre of people....and they must be prepared a certain way and the people must know that at this level, we are all contributing to a certain development and buy into that. Yes, when you become Chief, you may have.....but you are all buying into something that will last a number of years and our responsibility is to keep it going; bring it up to date; put our own spin on it which would be keeping it up to date. So we have to put something – we meaning the government. We have to put something in there that ensures that your next generation is of a certain quality, a certain caliber and the next generation knows that it is going to be a political choice. It is not something that reflects on your competence; it is a political choice and that they will make their choice and I will have options. So people must have options and once we put that kind of comfort inside there, I think people will work to the common goal. That is what I would recommend. Now how do you get that? It has to be driven from inside; the people and the current administration have to drive this kind of head.

LT. COLONEL SMART: Did you find that having the former Chief of Defence Staff – did it enable some of the processes even though as you said you took for granted that he was – did it enable some of the processes?

COMMODORE FRANKLIN: I got to learn later that he was constrained. In some way yes, but I learnt that he was seriously constrained. There is something that needs to be done which I thought about and never did and I don't think Eddie Dillion did. The former Chiefs, some kind of.....not foundation, some kind of control - develop a think tank. Now, it presupposes that the former Chiefs are in a position outside there to bring to bear and influence.

LT. COLONEL SMART: In saying that Sir, do you see – now historically we have done things like that based on those senior offices but you brought in a new dimension, the dimension of the Chief Warrant Officers; the....Chief position. Do you see that matching taking place all the way through in that the think tank should always be the senior officers and the senior warrants?

COMMODORE FRANKLIN: Yes, now that you bring it up. This should be done. Again, they must have the capacity so once you – I suppose that people at that level are have certain qualification and they would bring a perspective to your discussions that wouldn't normally.....

LT. COLONEL SMART: So the idea now of training the senior NCOs alongside the officers, the same level of training, for example in the Master-level training, you see that as matching what you are thinking of in terms of building that capacity.

COMMODORE FRANKLIN: They would move at a different pace. It is a little bit difficult for me to answer because coming from the juncture where I was – we came from this British trained....

LT. COLONEL SMART: Class system.

COMMODORE FRANKLIN: Class system, yes. I still have a little bit of that in me. We have that but we are talking about developing all our human resources so there is perhaps the need for that development as a start because coming from a different level.....at a different pace and the officers develop in a different way. Somebody who joined the Force as a Private he would move at a different pace. Now, if he has ambition, he would make that leap. Now, obviously....he is making leaps; he is making leaps within his career and so on and at some stage he will jump in and get into....he is moving but not at the same pace as somebody who came in as a Cadet but the fact is you would be developing your human resource and not only for the Force because at age fifty and you walk outside there, it continues.

LT. COLONEL SMART:with a resource there.

COMMODORE FRANKLIN: Yes

LT. COLONEL SMART: Sir, we are down to the last few questions. In looking at the influences that would have impacted on you, both internal and external, what advice

would you give to a Chief of Defence Staff who is interested in using the approach you took?

COMMODORE FRANKLIN: Well I don't know whether in today's – I mean, giving advice is about today and the future and I don't know the situation is the same; it's not the same so the approach I think we perhaps have gone past that kind of approach. The train has already gone so it's now to really get it up to speed, fine tune it and so on. So I really can't answer it. My own anecdote – well not so much an anecdote – my own view is this: somebody asked me about if I was the Chief of Defence Staff and I said, "I was never the Chief of Defence Staff in 2009." It's completely different. It's very different.
Check Tape

LT. COLONEL SMART: The environment has changed.

COMMODORE FRANKLIN: I tell Eddie this; the environment has significantly changed. When I look at the Coast Guard, when I was CO, Coast Guard, it was different from when I was NCO, Coast Guard. When I was NCO Coast Guard, the Coast Guard was a real nice thing. When I became CSO it was tough; you didn't have resources and the drugs started to come in. When I was Squadron Commander, it was whiskey, it was fun. It was fun running down people – contraband – but when the drugs came it became serious.

LT. COLONEL SMART: It came with arms and everything.

COMMODORE FRANKLIN: Exactly. It started to get serious and then your money getting tight and you can't maintain your control and you getting fellas coming into the Coast Guard who on the wrong side. So today, it's different because you now – to be a Chief of Defence Staff today you really have to.....the challenges now are different.

LT. COLONEL SMART: Sir, if one is to pick one thing that a Chief of Defence Staff must be able to acquire to assist him in dealing with all that changing environment, what would you say that thing is? What must the Force make sure he is trained in?

COMMODORE FRANKLIN: Strategic leadership because that involves a whole lot of things and to avoid the pitfalls because there are tough calls to make. It's a tough question.....

LT. COLONEL SMART: No, no, no. That was a question which just came up. It just popped up there.

COMMODORE FRANKLIN: I see you asked a question about scenario planning.

LT. COLONEL SMART: Yes Sir, was there an alternative model?

COMMODORE FRANKLIN: No.

LT. COLONEL SMART: I realized from what you were saying so that's why I didn't ask it but the model you preferred was the strategic planning taking into account all the other things.

Now you mentioned the TQM, Sir. TQM influenced how you developed the Coast Guard. Are you aware of other lessons that other military would have learnt that could be of benefit: naval lessons, army lessons that could be of benefit to the Force?

COMMODORE FRANKLIN: The Canadians had a model of continuous improvement which in a sense is a step up on TQM and I thought that was a useful model; put the path on TQM: continuous improvement and now everybody constantly aware of whatever you do today. Now we from normal military operations, we always review after an operation and writing report and so on and we look at lessons learnt but we do that with a view to correcting and not so much taking forward, developing new initiatives. So this is what I am talking about, developing new initiatives, given the nature of the thing. One of the things I mentioned to officers is about research; research and development. We have to do research on how we do things; how we do operations. I don't know how much is being done in terms of – because you have to develop types of operations that suit our needs.....

LT. COLONEL SMART:and responses. Just off the top, I know before I left we were making plans for a research unit which was supposed to help drive that, shaping the future sort of thing. So hopefully that will.....

COMMODORE FRANKLIN: That's an important tool the Chief of Defence needs to have and the other tool is to ensure that all the officers and the senior NCOs know about strategic leadership. Why I stop at senior NCOs is because the other NCOs have to think about how to do things.

LT. COLONEL SMART: The operations.

COMMODORE FRANKLIN: Yes, how to do things.

LT. COLONEL SMART: How to implement it, yes. Sir, there was one that you just threw there at me. Would you say that the Defence Force in terms of their strategic alignment with society understand what was coming to them and how they decide to re-strategize? Would you say we actually re-strategized? Did we place ourselves on a footing to compete knowing that we now have to compete for resources because of the environment that has changed?

COMMODORE FRANKLIN: When are you talking about, today?

LT. COLONEL SMART: No, no, no. During your period and before.

COMMODORE FRANKLIN: No, we did not and the way it was dealt with, it was based on lessons learnt from former people, like for example, the old Eric Williams. He

understood that; he understood about how to compete for resources by building networks within the Public Service and so on. So I learnt that lesson from him because seeing him doing it and the way he did it. He would take a senior public servant out for – we going on a patrol, “Come, take a boat ride,” and sit down and talk matters. That is how people like Greaves and so on; some of the people in Finance, especially. These are the people. We built networks. Certainly I didn’t see that before my time so much and when I was there I had to start rebuilding networks and a lot of the people had moved on. So starting to build those networks was a challenge.

LT. COLONEL SMART: The final one. Is there anything else you would want to say that I would have missed asking you and from your own experiences, you would like to share with us, for your book?

COMMODORE FRANKLIN: There is need for – and I don’t know how much it is allowed – initiative. I wanted to see the.....in officers wanting to do things, wanting to develop in a certain way.....but initiative in terms of development. But that could only come from accepting a philosophy that the Force is important for development. So I can’t say that my view, my personal philosophy about the Force is the right one. I felt at the time it was necessary but I don’t know and I can’t tell a successor that this is the philosophy. It’s what I believe in; I still believe in it and if I had the opportunity to be Minister or the PM this is what I would want the Force to do.

LT. COLONEL SMART: Sir, in a nutshell – and just guide me and let me know if I am correct – what I’m hearing you say is that you would like to see the Force on a footing of continuous improvement.

COMMODORE FRANKLIN: Absolutely, I mean, that is the nature of why we are here. We are here to serve but we are here to serve at the best of our abilities and we are here to be always performing at optimum; we are here to show the country what is quality, what is the kind of young man we are turning out when he joins the Force – Trinidad and Tobago, not USA. Yes, so we should always be on a continuous improvement within the Force so that we are impacting on people’s lives.

LT. COLONEL SMART: Sir, let me say thank you very much for sharing.....

COMMODORE FRANKLIN: I don’t know if I answered...

LT. COLONEL SMART: I think you did, unless of course you want to add more to it but I think you surely did, especially that last piece because you have defined to me how this strategic development process should proceed in the future. It is really one of trying to make the Defence Force more – the term I use is operational excellence – getting us to that point of always continuously improving what you are doing. Sir, if I can say thank you...

COMMODORE FRANKLIN: One more thing about the perception of the, not only the public in general but the decision makers about the Force. Decision makers, meaning the public and private. When they think they need a type of human resource one of the first places they should think about is the Defence Force. I'm not saying he has to be a petroleum engineer but we are talking about a leader. That's what we are talking about, a certain type of leader. One of the first places they should think about, "I wonder who they have in the Defence Force who could take on this role?" That is what I feel should be an objective, that the Executive, particularly and the public and private sectors should think of. We need a leader in "so and so"; let me call the Chief of Defence Staff. "Who you have retiring in so and so? Or, could you spare somebody for three years to do so and so and so?"

LT. COLONEL SMART: A secondment or something like that.

COMMODORE FRANKLIN: We need somebody, even in diplomacy and representing the country. So that is the kind of position because listen, shooting the rifle, doing patrols, I call that mechanical; you learn that you train to do that and so on but you reach a stage within your career in the Force that you have to think big. Like I told a Colonel, I don't need to know how to drive the new interceptor we get. I don't need to know that. There are people trained to do that. I need to know how to acquire it for them, how to convince the Government how to get it, X, Y and Z. Even the latest rifle – we need a weapon to do so and so. So that kind of resource you are looking at so that you translate that resource now to outside and the private sector has a problem, they need somebody to – they need a leader; they look at the Force: "Could we get Colonel Smart on loan for six months?" And Colonel Smart will now come and read about it and say, "I need a geo-technical so and so; I need an electrical engineer. You are not an electrical engineer but you could cut through the thing and see the big picture."

LT. COLONEL SMART: And you bring us back to leadership; your emphasis on leadership.

COMMODORE FRANKLIN: I look at my own position here. I'm not a scientist but I could converse with them. You know how I came here?

LT. COLONEL SMART: Sir, let me thank you very much for this interview and assure you that it will definitely go a long way in terms of the research. One thing I forgot to ask you and I'll ask you now, if the tape could be used by other researchers who may want to do a similar sort of project.

COMMODORE FRANKLIN: Yes.

LT. COLONEL SMART: Thank you very much, Sir.

APPENDIX D.

Answers to Questionnaire--Brigadier John Sandy

Prior to the use of strategic planning, what method was used for long range planning within the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force (TTDF)?

When I became senior enough to be exposed to the planning processes in the TTDF (**Trinidad and Tobago Regiment (TTR) in particular**) there was an absence of strategic planning as we know it today. What existed then was the institution of five year development plans in accordance with government policy, in which were included elements of strategic planning.

When was the use of strategic planning first introduced into the Defence Force?

I am not too sure when the use of strategic planning was introduced into the Force. Some will argue that it was during the late eighties with the introduction of the five-year development plans in the Divisions of the Ministry of National Security. Prior to the drafting and promulgation of the five year development plans, there were annual administration and training policies published by the CDS and reproduced by Unit COs as appropriate.

What were the internal factors within the Defence Force or external factors within the society, that were responsible for strategic planning being selected as the methodology for force development?

Internal factors included organizational growth, modernization, equipment transition, introduction of females, changing missions and vision statements, experiences gained during exercises with counterparts in the Caribbean, for example, Exercise Tradewinds and the annual deployment of troops to Martinique. External factors included threat assessments, technological advancement and government's five year development programs that impacted on the administration of the Force.

Was consideration given to the use of other methodologies, for example, scenario planning?

Scenario Planning was entertained in short – term applications, so were the administrative and training policies published by the CDS and reproduced as appropriate by Unit COs.

Please provide a brief description of the history of strategic planning within the Force, up to the period when you were in command.

Together with what has been stated above, up to the point of my deployment to DC in 1997, elements of strategic planning were contained in the five year development programs. Upon my return in 2000, the Force was being assisted by external experts in the drafting and implementation schedules of strategic plans.

What were some of the observable benefits that came about from the introduction of strategic planning within the Defence Force?

Observable benefits included better career and succession planning; structured training and development to satisfy particular appointments, recruitment of expertise, charting a well articulated vision and understanding of the goal attainment modules, for example, alignment of processes.

What were some of the liabilities that came about from the introduction of strategic planning within the Defence Force?

Initially there was a shortage of skilled personnel to satisfy appointments residing with strategic programs. There were gap analyses which showed considerable disparity as to where we were versus where we wanted to be and the extent of work required to fill respective gaps. The absence of specialists in the administrative chain caused infantry officers to be thrust into administrative roles that required specialists training.

On a scale of 1-10, 10 being the most successful and 1 being the least successful, what was the level of success achieved during the 1990s, through the implementation of strategic planning within the Defence Force?

6.5

When you became the Chief of Defence Staff, what was the state of strategic planning within the Defence Force at that time?

We were still being guided by external experts, but understanding of the principles and adjustments required, were clearer

Prior to taking over command, what training did you undergo to prepare you to lead the Force in strategic planning/change?

My first degree at UWI provided initial exposure to elements of strategic planning and organizational change during my management courses. It was from that exposure that I was able to contribute to the gap analysis exercise.

What changes did you make to the process/content of strategic planning during your period of command?

My changes were similar to what I attempted to inject before my deployment to DC. Apart from the gap analysis exercises, which provide optimum feedback, I was able to introduce process management concepts as some senior officers still did not understand the subtleties difference between strategic planning and organizational planning. I liked the idea of the strategic maps introduced by the external experts, but they carried some degree of challenges in military applications.

It is said that in all change initiatives there is some level of resistance. Where did you encounter resistance to the changes you proposed/introduced and how did you manage this resistance?

Opposition from Ministerial officials in some areas particularly as they did not understand the uniqueness of some military applications. *I ignored them as cleverly as I could.* Interference from a senior TTDF officer who at the time was not in the Force's chain of command. *I advised him (not quietly) that any instructions he wished to give to any of the Unit COs must be done so through the office of the CDS.* Lack of alignment by senior officers in the Force who appeared not to understand the thrust and maintained personal agendas; *tactful nurturing.*

What would you consider to be your greatest successes and greatest setbacks from your efforts to place the Force on a strategic development track?

Successes: **Introduction of the National Security Policy**, the committee of which was launched at the Crown Plaza by the Prime Minister. This formally stipulated processes and roles of the TTDF and Protective Services during periods of national unrest and disaster. **Introduction of the TTDF Community Caravan** which took the troops into rural communities and assisted villagers in community structural improvements and socialized with them. This was designed to win hearts and minds and encourage residents to share information that could contribute to military intelligence. **Introduction of the TTDF Family Support Group** that brought families of serving members together to share common interests, socialize and initiate program for the betterment of all service families. This was born from my experience in Haiti when we had limited access to communication with our families and I recognized that a Family Support Group would allow families back home to come together in a common situation. Once the soldier in the field knows that his family is comfortable back home he will perform better.

If you were to do it all over again, what three things would you do differently?

Follow up on initial inputs while posted as Defence Attaché. Ignore senseless enquiries from ministerial officials much earlier than I did. Involve more junior officers in the

initial process since information is distorted as it travels through the chain.

Considering that you had to influence both the internal and external environments, what advice will you give to a Chief of Defence Staff who was interested in using the approach you took?

Internal: Maintain checks and balances. Some unit commanders tell you what they think you want to hear.

Concentrate more on Force building innovations and activity.

Do not allow standards to deteriorate and nurture subordinates to maintain alignment.

External: With certain decisions do not seek ministerial concurrence.

Make extreme efforts to stay abreast of technology.

In terms of the strategic development of the militaries of the United States of America, Britain, and Canada, are you aware of lessons they may have learned that can be applicable to the strategic development of micro militaries such as the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force?

Career path planning and the encouragement offered to serving members to improve capabilities through education to qualify for expertise. Development of unit loyalties that generate perseverance in completing long term projects. The effects of Family Support Groups on successful implementation of strategic programs.

Is there any additional information that this questionnaire did not address which you will like to share?

What about lessons from smaller countries like Lebanon, Singapore and New Zealand. When I was doing research for my National Security Policy document, I was assisted by attaches from these countries.

APPENDIX E.

Interview with Brigadier General (BG) Ancil Antoine Conducted

by Lt. Colonel (LTC) Rodney Smart on 2 January 2009

LTC SMART: Today is Friday 2nd January, 2009 and this interview is being conducted at Bethesda, Maryland, in the United States. Sir, good afternoon. This interview fulfills a part of the requirement for the Masters in Military Arts and Sciences (MMAS) at the Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth. Sir, may I first ask you to give your approval to conduct this interview?

BG ANTOINE: Approval is given.

LTC SMART: Sir, for the purpose of the official record, please state your name, your position and your association with the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force.

BG ANTOINE: I am BG Ancil Antoine. My present position is that of Director General of the Inter American Defence Board. I took up this assignment in August of 2006 for a 1 year term as part of a transition team to develop the Inter American Board as an entity of the Organization of American States (OAS). Prior to 2006, the Inter American Defence Board operated independently and was not an entity of the OAS. I went up for re-election in 2007 for a 2-year term and in 2008, I was re-elected for another term, giving me a 5-year term as Director General of the Inter American Defence Board.

LTC SMART: Prior to this Sir, what position did you hold?

BG ANTOINE: Prior to Director General of the Inter American Defence Board, I was the Chief of Defence Staff of the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force from 2002 to 2006.

LTC SMART: What method was used for long range planning prior to the use of strategic planning within the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force?

BG ANTOINE: To that question, I have to say, I don't know. Strategic Planning was introduced to the Defence Force when I was a junior officer. Prior to that, I would not know if any strategic planning was done and who did it or what method was used. So, prior to my introduction to Strategic Planning in the Defence Force, I am not aware of what method was used.

LTC SMART: Sir you mentioned when you were a junior officer. To what period are you referring?

BG ANTOINE: That would be the 1980's. There was a plethora of management consultants and management studies being done; MBO, Management By Objectives – all sorts of management things being done as well as management consultants being involved in the public service and, as such, we became involved in Organizational Behavior, Organizational Theory, Strategic Management, Management by Objectives etc. It would have been introduced at a period of time by one of the consultants that would have come to the Defence Force.

LTC SMART: What period of the 1980s?

BG ANTOINE: The early 1980's; maybe before 1985, but in the early 1980's.

LTC SMART: Was it internal or external factors that drove strategic planning within the Defence Force?

BG ANTOINE: Both internal and external factors. The 1980s I guess would have been a period when a whole lot of consultants were coming out of Wall Street, Washington, and the Inter American Development Bank in the Caribbean. All sorts of theories; all sorts of ideas. So there was, I guess, in the 1980's, there would have been the big challenge that was taking place from the adoption of Reaganism and Thatcherism, where small governments had a big hand on the economy and all these attempts were to take the government's hold off on the economy. Therefore, the external factors came from the government and the society.

The internal factors came about with a need to transform the Defence Force from a ceremonial military, which in the 1960s we were organized into, to an operational military in the 1970s and 1980s. It would have seen the introduction of females into the Defence Force. It would also have seen the expansion of the Regiment from just 1 infantry battalion up to 1980, to the creation of 2 battalions. So there was a need to see beyond just infantrymen but in terms of logistics – other aspects of the military. So it was a time of change taking place, both in the society and the Defence Force.

LT. COLONEL SMART: Regarding the expansion of the battalions, was this part of a strategic planning effort or some other system?

BG ANTOINE: I don't think it was part of a Strategic Planning system. I don't know what other system it was. I think after that a fair attempt was made in the 1980s to solidify strategic planning and in the Defence Force, a "Blue Book"[strategic plan] was created. I think it was the Chief of Defence Staff at the time who would have instituted changes brought about by the increasing role of the Defence Force from strictly ceremonial and disaster management, into other areas. It was necessary to expand both the Army and the Coast Guard at the time into larger units and once you began to expand the army from a composite battalion, it was then necessary to have different branches of the military. What I can tell you is that consultation took place within the Regiment whereby officers added inputs and we broke down into different groups. The final structure adopted was nothing compared to what the groups came up with. The head of the Regiment imposed the eventual structure at the time. I therefore don't know what process took place to arrive at that structure.

LTC SMART: Would you say that Management by Objectives was the approach used to develop the Defence Force?

BG ANTOINE: Again, I can't say. As a junior officer, I was not brought into the decision-making process at that time. I know for a fact that when the decision was being taken to create 2 battalions all of the sub-committees made up of the officers came up with two equal battalions. The eventual structure developed was a Support and Service Battalion and an Infantry Battalion, which was not the recommendation of any of the groupings. That's why I said that it was imposed from above. I do not know what was the final planning process that came up with that structure. I wasn't privy to it and it was never explained to us why that was the structure adopted. At the end of the exercise, we knew that a decision was taken to form an Infantry Battalion and a Support and Service Battalion.

LTC SMART: Ok, I understand that the final structure was an imposition, however, what was the final structure that the groupings recommended?

BG ANTOINE: The groupings recommended two identical battalions that would comprise a headquarters and their own support and logistics elements, as well as an infantry component.

LTC SMART: Why was strategic planning chosen as the model for development and not, for example, scenario planning?

BG ANTOINE: That was because the task given was to create a first world military. To be part of a first world nation by 2020. So it had to be a strategic process because you were not dealing with the present-day structure, of the military but you were looking at a future structure for the military and the road that you would take to get to that future structure.

LTC SMART: Ok Sir, however, before that period you are referring to, why was strategic planning chosen in the 1980s?

BG ANTOINE: I don't know. I was a junior officer at the time and at those times junior officers were not privy to the decisions of the senior officers and the hierarchy of the Defence Force.

LTC SMART: Prior research indicates that within the wider society, individuals such as Gordon Draper etc. were involved in strategic planning. Was there a relationship between those initiatives and strategic planning within the Defence Force?

BG ANTOINE: Well, from the government perspective, I think it was Earl Nesbitt. I can't remember which government department he belonged to, whether it was from Planning and Development, but at the same time that the Defence Force was introducing management consultants to the Defence Force like Grace Talma, Ian [Roland] Baptiste, Aubrey Armstrong and other management consultants, the government was sending Earl Nesbitt as a management consultant as well. So there was a double action taking place. So, apart from the Defence Force using management consultants to assist in planning the future, the government was also running seminars with the Defence Force, conducted by government personnel under the authority of Gordon Draper, for the planning and future of the Defence Force.

LTC SMART: From what you can recall, how many iterations of strategic planning took place up to the period when you were in command?

BG ANTOINE: I can't give an exact figure but there would have been several interactions. In the 1980's there was the introduction, as I said, of management consultants. In the 1980's it would have been Mervyn Williams and then Brigadier Joe Theodore. Other introductions would have been made in terms of management consultants. I know Aubrey Armstrong would have been one at a time. I know Grace Talma and Roland Baptiste. If I am not mistaken, another Sealey (is it Patrick Sealey? I am not too sure). There were knee jerks. For instance, in the 1980's, the Regiment went from one battalion to two battalions – with a Support and Service Battalion and an Infantry Battalion. That went up until 1990 when there was the coup d'état by the Jamaat al Muslimeen. After 1980, it was realized that there was not enough maneuver elements, meaning infantry. There was only one infantry battalion, so therefore there was a decision made to create a second infantry battalion. So then, there were two maneuver elements in case of any insurrection, where one can be defense and the other one can be

offensive, along with the Support and Service. So they went to three battalions then and, as a result of that, there were planning processes taking place at the strategic level as to where the Defence Force would go after that. So that brought a whole range of other consultants - again, Watkins, I hope I'm getting the names right - and Gwendolyn Williams. In the 1990's the Regiment went through a process where the head of the Regiment was removed and the Battalions reported directly to the Chief of Defence Staff. I happened to be the Senior Battalion Commanding Officer at the time. I went through a Strategic Planning process where we went down to the rank and file to come up with mission statements for each department - each unit of the Defence Force - to come up with Core Values, Core Competencies, etc. It was being done in the Regiment at the time, but a subsequent exercise took place in the Coast Guard as well. That was done without the introduction of outside consultants because it was felt that the officers at the time had enough training at the military level to undertake the process down to the sub-unit level. After I left as Commanding Officer of the Regiment to go to Fort Leavenworth, my successor then called in a consultant - Gwendolyn Williams - who then put together all the work being done by the various units/sub-units into a strategic plan for the Regiment so that was another iteration that took place.

LTC SMART: What were some of the observable benefits that came about from the introduction of strategic planning within the Defence Force?

BG ANTOINE: The benefits of planning at the strategic level, in terms of looking forward, as to what type of organization you wanted. In 1962, when the Regiment was formed, they didn't even have a Defence Force Headquarters. They had a Regiment and a Coast Guard that were both ceremonial mainly - although the Coast Guard was given certain police tasks, being on the sea. That lasted until 1970 when there was a mutiny in the Regiment and, after that, there was appointed a Commander of the Defence Force, when the second Commander, Mervyn Williams, became the first Chief of Defence Staff. So Mervyn Williams became the first Chief of Defence Staff of the Defence Force. Joffre Serrette was never Chief of Defence Staff but Commander of the Defence Force. And so, Strategic Management allowed us to look ahead and to try and shape the Defence Force into an operational organization from a ceremonial organization. Again, there were stops and starts created by the environment or activities like the mutiny in 1970 caused the creation of the Commander of the Defence Force. In 1990, the attempted coup of the Jamaat al Muslimeen caused the expansion of the Army to two maneuver units so that we can best defend the country from internal as well as external threats, as the case may be. So, in the process, strategic planning brought about an awareness of the role of the Defence Force and how it could be shaped to deal with threats to the country in the future.

LTC SMART: Did this long-range approach to planning filter throughout the Force, or did it remain only at the level of the Defence Force?

BG ANTOINE: It never filtered throughout the Defence Force. There was resistance to change; the Army in particular. The Army has a history of conservatism; the Army doesn't like to change and any idea of change resulted in resistance by Army officers. From my experience, the Coast Guard officers seem more amenable to change than the

Army officers do. Once change is envisioned, you have resistance from the Army officers. Therefore, one of the liabilities or fallouts of strategic planning is increased resistance within the Defence Force

LTC SMART: I understand conservatism was one of the challenges. Are there any other challenges you can identify?

BG ANTOINE: Conservatism was not one; it remains one of the challenges today. Another challenge is the laws of image if you want to put it that way. People seem not to want to give up certain perks, certain positions that [were] beneficial to the individual, but detrimental to the organization.” It is similar to the old Star Trek movie... the needs of the many outweigh the needs of the few. In our organization, the needs of the few [are] more important than the needs of the many. That has not changed.

LTC SMART: Is it to be assumed that this resistance is more from persons in influential positions, as they are more able to influence the Force’s direction?

BG ANTOINE: The resistance is more at the top. If I may go back to my sociology learning about the Prismatic Society and the Salaman Society, everyone in the Defence Force aspires to become a Salaman; to rise to the top of the organization, or to the top of their area. It matters not whether you are a Chief of Defence Staff or you are the head of the Regiment, head of the motor pool, or head of the war dogs. Once you are in charge; you are in charge, that is the Salaman mentality, and that has not changed.

LTC SMART: Would it be correct then to say that the organization is not driven by a united policy, for example a strategic plan, but by individualism?

BG ANTOINE: Correct, it is driven by individualism and what people can benefit from, by being close to the individual who is in charge.

LTC SMART: That in mind, if I ask you to measure the success of strategic planning on a scale of 1-10, 10 being the highest, what score will you give?

BG ANTOINE: I would score it at 3.5 in the 1980s. In the 1990s there appeared to be more buy-in, so I would score it at 4.5. But certainly during my period in the 2000s, I will lower the score to 4.

LTC SMART: Sir, what were your greatest challenges or setbacks in moving the process forward from 4.5?

BG ANTOINE: Education! In the 1980s, the majority of the officers were not staff trained. As a result, in the 60s and 70s the emphasis was on command; similar to what I said earlier about the Salaman [Society]. However, in the 1980s when people began going on staff courses to Canada and England, the importance of staff officers became secondary to command. That has not changed, and that is the major problem with the Defence Force. Officers throughout their careers see themselves solely being in command positions and not wanting to spend the majority of their careers in staff positions and training, with short periods spent in command. During these short periods in command, officers should then apply what they learned as a staff officer and at the training schools, to bring changes to the organization. Officers do not see staff positions as part of their jobs. They don’t see themselves as being good staff officers, loyal to a senior person who will provide him with the tools necessary to do a good job. Therefore, when that staff officer goes back into command, he or she can then rely on their staff officers to help them make correct decisions. It reminds me of a statement made by our first Prime Minister, “When I sing, no damn dog bark.”

LTC SMART: Why were you unable to change this as the Chief of Defence Staff?

BG ANTOINE: Because of politics. The Defence Force's history is one where Formation Commanders have direct access to politicians and as such, the authority and role of the Chief of Defence Staff is undermined. That is the main reason why the Chief of Defence Staff is not as effective in implementing change within the Defence Force.

LTC SMART: What would you consider your major successes?

BG ANTOINE: I have to admit that I had very little success, as the strategic development that I attempted was not continued by my successor.

LTC SMART: But while you were the Chief of Defence Staff, were you able to achieve any major successes?

BG ANTOINE: I think my greatest success was Trinidad and Tobago's response to assisting Grenada after Hurricane Ivan, where we employed the concept of an air, land, sea, and reserve Task Force, whereby the Defence Force was able to project force outside its territory. At short notice, the Force was able to project assets to another island, sustain itself, achieve its mission of bringing stability to a volatile situation, and on instruction of the Government of Trinidad and Tobago, to recover to the country in a short space of time-mission accomplished.

LTC SMART: Would you therefore say that you strategically developed your Force to operate as a Joint Force?

BG ANTOINE: Yes, we were operating under the strategic doctrine of simultaneous engagement at that time. Being able to engage in another island as well as continue engaging, for instance, in our anti-crime efforts with the law and order and security forces in Trinidad and Tobago. The idea of strategic engagement and the Joint Task Force concept meant that under one commander, appointed by the Chief of Defence Staff, Trinidad and Tobago was able to put air, land, sea, reserve, and even civilians, because it also incorporated certain government agencies, into a foreign country and achieve the mission.

LTC SMART: What was the state of strategic planning when you became the Chief of Defence Staff?

BG ANTOINE: When I became the Chief of Defence Staff there was a document, so at best, strategic planning was dormant. I was tasked by the Government to come up with a first world military for a first world country by 2020.

LTC SMART: Did this play any part in the Government's Vision 2020 plan?

BG ANTOINE: Yes, it was part of Government's Vision 2020 plan.

LTC SMART: Prior to taking over command, what training did you undergo to prepare you to lead the Force in strategic planning/strategic change?

BG ANTOINE: My training involved the diploma I did at Fort Leavenworth and the Masters program. I also attended several seminars in strategic planning. I also did some strategic planning as an aspect of my first Degree at the University of the West Indies under Roland Baptiste and several other management consultants.

LTC SMART: Would you say that the exposure an officer receives prior to becoming Chief of Defence Staff sufficiently prepares the individual to undertake strategic planning?

BG ANTOINE: I would say yes. In my particular case, I have a Certificate in Public Administration in which I would have done strategic planning. I also did my Masters

Degree and I would have done strategic planning/strategic management as part of my Junior and Senior Staff Courses at Toronto and Kingston [in Canada] respectively. Yes, a Chief of Defence Staff would have a working knowledge of strategic planning, enough for him to initiate a planning process, and then pass it on to the people with more expertise.

LTC SMART: Would you recommend the use of external consultants?

BG ANTOINE: I would recommend the use of external consultants who have a military background. I am totally against the use of civilian consultants in the strategic planning process of the military. Civilian consultants tend to go off into too many non-military issues and processes. Therefore, I do not have a problem with strategic management consultants but they should have a military background.

LTC SMART: Given that they bring a broad range of knowledge from industry, would you not say that there is some benefit to gain in that respect?

BG ANTOINE: I don't have a problem with them being part of a team, but in the team you need to have an expert with a military background.

LTC SMART: Given that you were given the mandate to transform the Force by the Government, what changes did you make to the process/content of strategic planning during your period of command?

BG ANTOINE: I felt that I had instituted a bottom-up approach to strategic planning rather than a top-down approach. When I was the senior battalion commander in the Regiment [a period when the Regiment Headquarters was suspended] I did a top-down approach. We started at the battalions and we went down in the process to the other ranks to develop mission statements, core competencies, and core values. When I became the Chief of Defence Staff, I took it from the cellar position and brought it back up to the strategic level. I therefore felt that I introduced a bottom-up approach to strategic planning in the Defence Force.

That was done through consultation with the rank and file. I went to each battalion, each Unit, and spoke with the most junior soldiers. I spoke with the junior NCOs [Non Commissioned Officers] at the unit level, and I consulted with the senior NCOs and officers at the Formation level. I believed that I introduced and championed a bottom-up approach to the structure and strategic planning process in the Defence Force.

LTC SMART: Was the Air Guard one of the strategic outcomes of your command?

BG ANTOINE: Yes, prior to my command, the Air Guard was part of the Coast Guard. During the planning process for Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force to become a first world military by 2020, it was felt that the country couldn't afford to have separate air assets in the Army and the Coast Guard. As such, it was felt that it was necessary to create an Air Guard that could be utilized by both the land and sea forces in case of emergencies and in case of operations.

LTC SMART: Then, would you consider the Air Guard to be one of your successes as well?

BG ANTOINE: Yes, I think the Air Guard and the Reserves would be successes in terms of the structure of the Defence Force. Prior to me assuming the position of Chief of Defence Staff, we had Volunteers, which in my opinion was a misnomer [for Reserves] since we are all volunteers, since in the military there is a difference between volunteers and conscripts. For example, I am a volunteer because I volunteered my

service. I therefore changed that misnomer and created Reserves. What we needed to have was air, land and sea Reserves. The creation of the Reserves of the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force was another one of the successes.

LTC SMART: If you were to command the Force once again, what three things would you do differently?

BG ANTOINE: I would pay more attention to the character of the officers. I think that was my biggest failure. Any future leader of the Force should be someone who is patriotic, someone who is looking at the good of the many – what is best for the nation, rather than what is good for his or her career. Yes, I would pay more attention to the character of the officers who assume command.

LTC SMART: You have spoken of character and patriotism, would you care to suggest a third one?

BG ANTOINE: I would also look for officers with vision; officers who are able to see beyond their immediate surroundings and be able to envisage how the organization should look next 10-15 years from now. If you cannot envision how the organization would look next 10-15 years from now, you have no reason to be in command.

LTC SMART: Considering that you had to influence both the internal and external environments, what advice will you give to a Chief of Defence Staff who is interested in using your approach?

BG ANTOINE: You have to be able to “bite the bullet”. You have to be able to fight the external detractors who do not understand the military; here I am speaking of some politicians and public servants. You also have to deal with the internal people who do not share your vision, your perspective, and your views. My advice is that it is not a popularity contest, “bite the bullet” and do what is required.

LTC SMART: In terms of the strategic development of the militaries of the United States of America, Britain, and Canada, are you aware of lessons they may have learned that can be applicable to the strategic development of micro militaries such as the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force?

BG ANTOINE: I think one lesson you can learn from all the major militaries of the world is that staff is important, not command. Command is a roll of the dice. Everyone knows of General Schwarzkopf and this was only because General Schwarzkopf was the CINC [Commander in Chief] Central Commander, European Commander at the time of the Gulf War; that’s why he became famous. If there were no Gulf War, General Schwarzkopf would go into the sunset like everyone else. So command, but staff training; the ability to support somebody else’s goal, somebody else’s mission based on training you received. That is the most important factor because that speaks of patriotism and putting your country first. We can learn that one thing from the major militaries-the importance of staff officers. I think that came from the Prussian military and later the German military in World War 2, as well as going back to Clausewitz and Jomini.

LTC SMART: This being the final question, is there any additional information that this interview did not address which you will like to share?

BG ANTOINE: Yes, each military must develop its own doctrine regardless of their size. As a result, I return to education, and staff training must be the more important aspect. Commanders will come to the front when there is a crisis, providing that they have the education and training to do the job. It is not important to be in command, it is

more important to be well trained. When the crisis comes, the commander will take charge. Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force must therefore develop its own doctrine; it must have its own staff school. Regardless of what, it must have its own system, its own institutions that provide its own doctrine.

LTC SMART: Sir, thank you very much for this wealth of information that you provided. Let me assure you once again that this information is going to be used for the MMAS to examine the strategic development of the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force.

APPENDIX F.

Interview with Brigadier Edmund Dillon Conducted

by Lt. Colonel Rodney Smart on 12 October 2009

This interview is being conducted on Sunday 12 October 2008 at approximately 2000 hrs with the Chief of Defence Staff of the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force, Brigadier General Edmund Dillon, at St James, Trinidad and Tobago.

LT. COLONEL SMART: Sir, please provide a brief description of the history of strategic planning/strategic development in the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force.

BRIGADIER DILLON: The history of strategic planning in the Defence Force is very short relative to the existence of the Force. Strategic planning in the Defence Force started somewhere in the mid 1990s, although there may have been some attempts in 1981 or 1982 in the land forces; the Regiment, when we were looking at expanding the organization. On this occasion there was some attempt at strategic planning, in which we formed what was then the Support and Service Battalion, coming out of a basic infantry battalion. There was also an attempt to involve the mid level officers and obtain their views on how they thought the battalion would look. While however this was not presented as a strategic planning exercise, in hindsight, when you look at it, it was a form of strategic planning in terms of obtaining consensus, direction and so on. This may be traceable to as far back as the mid 1980s.

During the 1990s there was an improved attempt at the higher level; the Defence Force Headquarters level, with the intent being to expand the organization, and putting a greater sense of structure to the organization. This had to do with the manner in which the Defence Force evolved, as we evolved along what I will call parallel structures; the land forces evolving separately to that of the maritime forces or the Coast Guard. The Defence Force Headquarters was then superimposed above these two sub units. Consequently, there wasn't a strategic plan for doing that; the plan therefore emerged at the tail end of the structure. I think this was followed in the mid 1990s by an attempt to restructure that initiative. That therefore represented another attempt at strategic planning, although again, it was not sold as a strategic planning exercise. In hindsight however, it was another attempt at strategic planning, this time focusing on the direction of the Force.

LT. COLONEL SMART: Was it internal or external factors in the society that made the Defence Force go in that direction?

BRIGADIER DILLON: What period are you speaking about? Are you speaking about the same mid 1990s period?

LT. COLONEL SMART: Yes I would say the mid 90s period that you identified as the genesis of strategic planning.

BRIGADIER DILLON: I think there was a combination of factors. However, more internal factors rather than external ones influenced the early attempts at strategic planning. It really had to do with the organization's own expansion as there was a need to really put things in place.

At the time, there was also an attempt by the Government of the day, to do what was called Public Sector Reform. This was done under the direction of then Public Administration Minister, Dr Gordon Draper. So there was some attempt at the governmental level to conduct some sort of national planning in terms of Public Administration and that also had some influence on the direction that we took. Therefore, it was a combination of both the internal and external factors that informed us that we needed to look at our organization differently.

LT. COLONEL SMART: Sir, will you please elaborate a bit on the internal factors? What internally would have caused those stresses, to cause those changes to happen?

BRIGADIER DILLON: Well I think we suddenly realized that we needed to have subunit headquarters and so we now had to have a headquarters under the land forces which was not existent before. On the land forces expanding to two battalions, and then later to three battalions, there was no headquarters element coordinating the activities of the land forces. That to my mind was one of the factors that made us realize that we needed to structure these two sub units differently, and their reporting relationships to the higher headquarters. Those were some of the factors that I think drove the Chief of Defence Staff at the time to realize that the structures were not working; and the lines of communications were not clear. He therefore set out first of all to establish the Defence Force Headquarters, followed by the subunit headquarters. I think those are the factors that drove us to look at a strategic direction.

LT. COLONEL SMART: What was the experience like after that first attempt at strategic planning?

BRIGADIER DILLON: Well there were several changes that were initiated based on that first attempt at strategic planning. These changes were however not done in a holistic manner. As the way forward was developed by a committee and then presented to the wider body, to a large extent, there was not a sense of buy-in nor wasn't there a sense of interpreting and understanding the document that was presented. As a result, one had to go back to the originators of the document to get a sense of what was meant by certain things. That I think was one of the failures of the process.

LT. COLONEL SMART: Sir, you mentioned that the process was not a holistic one. Did it negatively impact on implementation as well?

BRIGADIER DILLON: Yes it did because the implementation happened in a sort of piece meal manner. When one examined the document, it did not have an end in mind. It was just a series of organization charts which were not linked to an end state. That is what strategic planning is all about, knowing where you are hoping to get to, at the end of

the day. Knowing where you are heading; and to what you are aligning with. That however was not there. Therefore, while the document was a comprehensive one, it did not provide the ease of interpretation that was required for the implementers who had to make it work.

LT. COLONEL SMART: On a scale of 1-10, what would you say was the level of success achieved in implementation?

BRIGADIER DILLON: Ten being the most successful and one being the least successful?

LT. COLONEL SMART: That's correct Sir.

BRIGADIER DILLON: I would put it somewhere around a 4.5.

LT. COLONEL SMART: What were some of the observable benefits that came out of that experience?

BRIGADIER DILLON: One of the things that it presented to us; something that wasn't there before was that we now had a document. This meant that we could now more easily approach the Ministry to justify requests for things which we had either developed, or wanted to expand. That to my mind was the significant change in the way we did business.

LT. COLONEL SMART: When you said "to justify requests", are you speaking now of the development of the Force; the financial part of it?

BRIGADIER DILLON: Both the financial and the human resource aspects of it; we now could align our requests to some form of documentation

LT. COLONEL SMART: In the past the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force has assisted other organizations with their developmental processes. Are you aware if any of these organizations have applied the developmental model used by the Defence Force?

BRIGADIER DILLON: I cannot say, however I know that the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force has had a lot of influence in shaping the Barbados Defence Force. This was when it moved from a part time all volunteer force to a regular force. In fact, some of our officers who were involved in our organizational development transferred their skills and experiences to the Barbados Defence Force. We also had similar intervention in Antigua and Barbuda too. So I would say that there were some skills and experiences that were transferred from us to other militaries in the Caribbean, namely Barbados, Antigua and Barbuda, and St Kitts to a lesser extent. In terms of our own organizations here, there may be some but none comes to mind immediately.

LT. COLONEL SMART: Sir when you became the Chief of Defence Staff, what was

the state of strategic planning in the Defence Force at that time?

BRIGADIER DILLON: There was a strategic review of the Force prior to my coming on board. Again, it did not treat with the main stakeholders within the Force. Coming into an environment that at the time was being shaped by Government's Vision 2020 Plan, I felt that the Force needed to stop and review its strategic direction. We needed to examine where we were at this point in time; whether we were aligned to Government's Vision 2020 Plan; as well as the changing security environment? So, we needed to see whether we were in alignment with the changing security environment; Government's 2020 Vision, and of course, the expectations of the people of Trinidad and Tobago. I therefore thought it was important at that juncture to do a strategic review to really align the Force and chart the direction of the Force.

LT. COLONEL SMART: Can you please elaborate some more on the Government's Vision 2020 Plan?

BRIGADIER DILLON: Government's Vision 2020 is a strategic direction for the entire country of Trinidad and Tobago. It is the Government's efforts at positioning Trinidad and Tobago to what they have articulated as developed country status on or before 2020. And to do that, they have looked at using several pillars to position Trinidad and Tobago at achieving developed nation status. It is what I consider to be a holistic strategic plan that touches almost every sector of society, for example, human resource, infrastructure, safety and security. I think it is a very broad document so that almost every sector of society can find something in that document that pertains to it.

LT. COLONEL SMART: You mentioned that the Government's Plan influenced your decision to change the direction in which the Force was going. Can you speak to some of the principal changes of the new approach you have taken?

BRIGADIER DILLON: One of the differences in this approach that is different to previous approaches was the involvement of the entire Force in the process. It involved persons at the top to the bottom of the organization, both horizontal and lateral in the organization; and I think that made the difference. It therefore wasn't a top down approach in so far as the development of the vision, the mission, and the core values etc. Although it was a top down suggestion, it was an all-inclusive, buy-in process, based on feedback, adjustments amendments, and so on. I think that is the significant difference between this approach and previous approaches in strategic planning. Therefore, the person at the lowest rank within the Force had an opportunity to contribute to the development of the strategic direction of the Force. He or she had an opportunity to hear an analysis of the environment, an analysis of Government's 2020 Vision, so now I can say that most people in the Force have an understanding of what this Vision 2020 is all about. Similarly, they can envisage how the Defence Force fits into this 2020 Vision and by doing so, they are able to contribute significantly to the direction that the Force is going, and feel part and parcel of it. I feel that is the significant difference.

LT. COLONEL SMART: You mentioned that people would have had buy-in. This need to achieve buy-in, was it reminiscent of something that didn't occur in past strategic implementation plans?

BRIGADIER DILLON: Yes I think so. That was one of the lessons learnt from the previous approaches. If the ideas are not sold properly, then people would not be able to implement them. As they are part and parcel of the process, as you go along, understanding and interpretation is made a lot easier at the implementation stage. I therefore think in terms of the approach, it was important to ensure that as much people as possible in the Force, were involved in the process and procedures.

LT. COLONEL SMART: I observed that you went through a process of strategic communication where you called your Force together and spoke to them. Can you please expand on that as well?

BRIGADIER DILLON: Sure, as the Chief of Defence Staff, I thought it was important for the Force to hear from me, about the strategic review of the Force. They couldn't get that from a second hand source. That couldn't be delegated to one of the Formation Commanders or one of the platoon commanders or squadron leaders. I think it was important for them to hear, discuss, and have dialogue with the Chief of Defence Staff, because, at the end of the day, it is the Chief of Defence Staff who really articulates the vision of the Force. As I previously mentioned, the approach was not a top down one that announced "this is the vision." For while it is the Chief of Defence Staff who really articulates the vision and the mission of the Force, it was important for everyone, as much as possible, to say this is good, but we needed this, we needed that. If you look at it from the juniors stand point or the mid level leaders point of view, because it is important to them, at the end of the day you get a much broader vision and mission, and of course your core values.

LT. COLONEL SMART: So far, have there been any challenges to this new approach? I heard you speak to the benefits, but have there been any challenges thus far?

BRIGADIER DILLON: I have not had any real negative remarks about the approach so far. I suppose one of the things that will be in the back of one's mind is that people will say that we are going through this process again but what is the outcome. Therefore, implementation is important so that people get a sense that it wasn't a waste of time or effort. Hence, while it is a work in progress, people need to see some quick wins, some short victories that will tell them that this process is really going to bear fruit. This is therefore something that is really important to the process.

LT. COLONEL SMART: Regarding the strategic development of other militaries, and when I say other militaries I am speaking of the ones that your Defence Force is closely associated with, i.e. the United States, Britain and Canada, are you able to identify any lessons that they learned that may be applicable to your Force?

BRIGADIER DILLON: In doing the strategic review, I looked at the transformation initiatives of the US, Canada, and to a lesser extent, the British. Across the board, the thing that kept cropping up was the question of implementation. That to me is the significant challenge. You see, you can go ahead and strategize, you can go ahead and plan; however, unless you have a vibrant and really dedicated implementation crew, your strategic plan becomes meaningless. That I picked up that from all three countries when I looked across the board, it was implementation, implementation, implementation.

LT. COLONEL SMART: Sir, my final question, if you are to do this all over again, what would you change; and what would you say to Chiefs of Defence Staff like yourself, who may wish to copy the approach you took? Let us say three things that you have experienced, that you may wish to highlight.

BRIGADIER DILLON: First and foremost you have to begin with the end in mind and in so doing, you have to literally hand pick people with the kind of capacity that is required to move this process forward, because as Chief of Defence Staff you cannot do it by yourself. No Chief of Defence Staff can conduct strategic planning by himself. There must be a selected team; and it must be a team, it cannot be one or two individuals, it must be a team that is dedicated; to the extent that that's their job, it has to be their job to move that process forward. Without that team, it is going to falter. That is one message that I could send, you must select your team.

Another aspect in the strategic review process is knowledge of the capabilities of your consultants. Whoever is conducting your process internally, you may wish to supplement with an external consultant. There are some organizations which feel that they can do it in-house. I would say do not do it in-house. I think you should use someone who brings an outsider point of view to the process. This is important as persons within the organization will have a number of influencing experiences, for want of a better word, "baggage", and so, somebody who is not of the organization will bring a different perspective. Such an individual will be able to see things that we in the organization will not see, and be able to bring that to the organization's attention. So I will go for the use of a consultant. However, you have to choose your consultant wisely, as not all consultants are truly consultants.

LT. COLONEL SMART: Sir, thank you very much.

APPENDIX G.

Interview with Mrs Sandra Lynch Conducted by

Lt. Colonel Rodney Smart on April 9, 2009

LT. COLONEL SMART: Ma'am can I first please ask you to give me your name and your association with the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force.

MRS. SANDRA LYNCH: My name is Sandra Lynch. I am in charge of the Defence Section of the Ministry of National Security which is the Secretariat and Oversight body for matters relating to the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force. My position right now, I am the Acting Deputy Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of National Secretary.

LT. COLONEL SMART: Thank you very much Ma'am. And if I can ask you to give your approval for this interview today taped and the intent is for it to be used to assist me in doing my research into the strategic development of the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force and any other student who may need to copy or refer to my research. Can you please give your approval?

MRS. LYNCH: While I do not like to be taped, seeing that it is you Colonel Smart I...

LT. COLONEL SMART: Thank you very much Ma'am, much appreciated. The first question I would like to ask. I'm trying to trace the history of strategic planning within the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force. From the perspective of the Ministry, can you tell me your view, what our history has been? From the Ministry's perspective.

MRS. LYNCH: I would really have liked to have the question before so that I could have looked and be able to give you a better answer; a more informed answer with details. But I have not had that opportunity so I would have to rely on memory.

LT. COLONEL SMART: But what I was just thinking, if you wish as well, when you have time I can also send you back the question and if there is anything you would like to add...

MRS. LYNCH: You could e-mail.

LT. COLONEL SMART: Sure.

MRS. LYNCH: That would be good. Strategic development started, I would say, in 1992 with General Brown and his proposal to restructure the Defence Force and the Volunteer. He had his proposals which essentially focused on staffing and structuring the various Battalions and whatever and that would have been around 1992. Now, during that time, there was not much focus on strategic and on quality. It was more on having

structure in place. Policy and strategic development, those terms would have emerged around....

LT. COLONEL SMART: After a short interruption the interview is continuing. Go ahead please, Ma'am. You were speaking about policy.

MRS. LYNCH: What I said before is that the policy document developed by General Brown in 1992 or thereabouts was not regarded by the Ministry specifically as a policy or as a strategic direction for the Defence Force as such. It was viewed as a projection for the Force on a short-term basis. However, that document was in fact used to develop a strategic policy about two to three years thereafter. That should answer it. Not really recalling the chronology of the events but I recall that a Committee was established with persons like Brigadier Theodore, who at the time had retired; Commander Kia Mohammed of the Trinidad and Tobago Coast Guard. I think he was CO at the time. You were on it?

LT. COLONEL SMART: No, no, I was not there. Colonel Williams, I think as well...

MRS. LYNCH: Brigadier Sandy?

LT. COLONEL SMART: He may have been a Major at the time, Colonel Sandy at the time and Commander Franklin.

MRS. LYNCH: Yes, yes, those were the persons who were placed on that Committee essentially to review General Brown's submission as well as and to add to it and to dare to develop a policy. And a document was in fact developed which I cannot recall exactly what it contained but I know it had focused on the Coast Guard and that document was in 1994/1995; it was presented to the Defence Council and it was accepted by the Council as the strategic way forward for the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force. It was accepted and implementation of certain of the proposals was effected.

LT. COLONEL SMART: Why only certain of the proposals if it was accepted by the Defence Council?

MRS. LYNCH: You see what I would have to do and I think I would be able to place my hands on the document so you will leave the e-mail address and I would expand on that for you because I have the documents to support it. I will give you the Defence Council's decision and the follow up. I know that we have it here. That will be e-mailed to you.

LT. COLONEL SMART: All right Ma'am, the review having taken place, Brigadier Theodore having retired and then coming to the Ministry as the Minister, what impact did that have?

MRS. LYNCH: To me, his stint as Minister really helped the Defence Force because he knew what he was about and he really tried to let the Defence Force achieve some tangible things. For example, the TTF Nelson as much as they might bash it now, it was really good at the time. He tried to strengthen command to do promotions that would have been worthwhile to the Force and things like that, especially acquisition of arms and ammunition and all that. He tried to equip the Force and put some direction and focus.

LT. COLONEL SMART: When the strategic plan first arrived, what was happening in the rest of the Ministry? Was there planning going on in the Ministry? Was there planning in the Police? What was happening?

MRS. LYNCH: Not really, you know. The Defence Force was leading the way in terms of strategic development. The Ministry came with a Strategic Plan still under the UNC's time but it might have been more around 97/98. Police came long after in 2000 and the Ministry's Plan was placed in the context of the general Public Service so it focused on human resource development, establishing Human Resource Units in the different Ministries and how we were going to structure the human resource and things like that; strengthening the financial sector in the Ministries, introduce computers, IT programs and those types of things. That is how our focus was.

LT. COLONEL SMART: Would you say it gave strategic direction?

MRS. LYNCH: No, not particularly because the argument was always that strategic direction couldn't really hold fast in the Public Service because of the dynamism; things change every Monday morning; people move very, very regularly so it was very difficult to deem it strategic.

LT. COLONEL SMART: The Strategic Plan therefore was developed without an overarching plan from the Ministry. [After a slight interruption, the interview continues]. Yes Ma'am, I was saying that the Strategic Plan was developed without an overarching document from the Ministry.

MRS. LYNCH: Yes.

LT. COLONEL SMART: When it first arrived here, that's the blue book, how was it viewed at the Ministry?

MRS. LYNCH: Truthfully, it wasn't viewed with any degree of seriousness. In other words, it wasn't sent for approval like how we did the other one; presented it to the Defence Council, approved it and whatever. It wasn't dealt with.

LT. COLONEL SMART: So, was it seen as being caused a bit of turmoil because this thing just popped out of the blue?

MRS. LYNCH: I don't know; it was just not dealt with. I really wasn't in charge at the time or anything, so it was only after when I got a little senior in the section I recognized that it had this blue book and how important the book was and how many issues. So we just chose certain things out of it and processed it.

LT. COLONEL SMART: And that selection would have been you at the Ministry here or the Ministry/Defence Force.

MRS. LYNCH: That would have been Mr. Cuffie, the AOV Defence at the time.

LT. COLONEL SMART: I am advancing now to Brigadier Theodore's time and the chance to put the Strategic Plan into focus. Was there any observable difference in terms of the Defence Force effectiveness from Strategic Planning that you observed?

MRS. LYNCH: Yes, there was because at least – and around that time too, I think even in the Plan, it had something like the changing role of the Force in terms of engineering and helping people build bridges and roads and whatever and it was at that point and emanating from that Plan that the Engineer Battalion was formed. So to answer your question, yes. The Defence Force now had something to look forward to; to work towards. They had a focus because of that plan.

LT. COLONEL SMART: One of the points I have been hearing throughout is the need to resource the Plan. The Plan has always been challenged in terms of resources. Can you speak to that Ma'am?

MRS. LYNCH: Well, I could speak to it in terms of my own view. My view is that the people in authority in the Defence Force need to be more proactive. They need to be more aggressive to get what they want because remember, it is a whole Ministry dealing with competing agencies and interests and it is....

LT. COLONEL SMART: [After a short interruption, the interview continues]. Ma'am, you were speaking about the aggressiveness of the Defence Force.

MRS. LYNCH: Well, your question was how the Strategic Plan.....

LT. COLONEL SMART: In terms of the resources – one of the challenges has been it hasn't been resourced and you were speaking about the need to be more effective.

MRS. LYNCH: Yes, that's what they need to do. Once they do that we would have no choice but to sit down and do it, which is what happens whenever they get something, it is because they pushed through it.

LT. COLONEL SMART: And you raised here two issues – well you raised one issue coming out of two things you've said. One is, you have mentioned aggressiveness and two, you spoke about the Plan that was reviewed by Brigadier Theodore. One of the

suggestions I observed in that plan was for the office of the Chief of Defence Staff to move to the Ministry. I know we attempted it with Brigadier Alfonso.

MRS. LYNCH: Yes, and it never did work.

LT. COLONEL SMART: Yes, it never did work and there have been suggestions that that should be the way to go in order for the Defence Section and the Defence Force to work closely. What is your view on that, Ma'am?

MRS. LYNCH: I shared that earlier with you. My personal view on that is that it will never work and it is not really suited for a democracy like ours. Simply because while it is argued that they have this system in Canada, in England, whatever, my fundamental argument is that in those countries they would have the protection in law for the civilian authority somewhere along the line. We don't have it; we don't have any antecedents and there is a danger in it because it places the civilian authority at risk, because we have not developed to the point where we could work along together. And the Defence Force will always see us as a stumbling block.

LT. COLONEL SMART: So to help in a situation like that Ma'am, do you think there should be cross training; have a sort of Joint Staff College where we....?

MRS. LYNCH: Yes, they would have to develop some kind of policy document; it would have to be approved by Cabinet in the absence of legislation – that is how I see it – in order for it to be smooth; in order to make sure that we have the protection that we need.

LT. COLONEL SMART: And do you see therefore, professional Defence Section people from the Public Service? In other words, you can't take anybody from across the Public Service but you develop these people as professionals. Do you see that?

MRS. LYNCH: Yes, yes; that is how we always had the Section closed; you don't just bring in anybody.

LT. COLONEL SMART: Ma'am, this is my final question. I have asked you structured questions and some unstructured, is there anything else you would like to share that I did not ask that you feel is important in terms of how the course is going to develop in the future, based on our history?

MRS. LYNCH: What I would say is that Strategic Plan that we spoke of, there have been about three (3) subsequent ones and the Defence Force has always...

LT. COLONEL SMART: If I could just stop you there. We just spoke about the General Brown one so if you could just speak about the others.

LT. COLONEL SMART: Brigadier Sandy had developed a Strategic Plan also which was not pushed through properly. Even Brigadier Dillon, he has had a very good one lately but he is not bringing it to the Ministry and making it happen, which is my problem. So there have been three (3) after that actually and they just lie there like wasted paper and they have been developed in conjunction with human resource experts – you know that, as a result of retreats and whatever and where are they?

LT. COLONEL SMART: Well, in terms of that last one, I know for a fact that the Minister was approached in terms of a presentation being done to the Ministry. I don't know where it is right now but I know that approach was made. So you see that as being something that is necessary, the presentation of the plan?

MRS. LYNCH: Yes. Well, from my experience, I would prefer that if even we do a presentation we follow it up: we send it to the Ministry; we send it to the Section; we make sure that it gets on the correct agenda. You insist that it be placed before the – you know, you make things happen. It is just like me, if I sit down and I do this file, I am not going to say that I take all my precious time and do this and just leave it by the PS. You will see me run in there making sure she signs off on it, standing up by the Minister's door and making sure he approves it because I'm not wasting my time to do this work and it sits down on nobody's desk. That is my view. They do work and they leave it.

LT. COLONEL SMART: And the conduit when it comes here is the Defence Section as the sponsor.

MRS. LYNCH: Yes, and we don't even see it. So they are of this view that when they sit down and they give a presentation to the Minister, something is going to happen. Trust me, nothing happens.

LT. COLONEL SMART: Ma'am let me say thank you very much

MRS. LYNCH: What I will undertake to do for you is to give you how we dealt with that Strategic Plan and to show you the other plans subsequent to that and that nothing really was done. That will probably put some real focus into it.

LT. COLONEL SMART: The parting word I am taking is that plans are being done but they are not being followed through.

MRS. LYNCH: Exactly, that is the crucial thing and that is where the Defence Force is falling down.

LT. COLONEL SMART: I am so happy I've interviewed you. Thank you very much.

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