INTERAGENCY COORDINATION EFFORTS CONCERNING
STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION:
WHO IS TAKING THE LEAD?

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
General Studies,

by

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Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
2009

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			*Form Approved* *OMB No. 0704-0188*
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. **PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.**			

1. REPORT DATE *(DD-MM-YYYY)* 12-06-2009	**2. REPORT TYPE** Master's Thesis	**3. DATES COVERED** *(From - To)* AUG 2008 – JUN 2009	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Interagency Coordination Efforts Concerning Stabilization and Reconstruction: Who is Taking the Lead?		**5a. CONTRACT NUMBER**	
		5b. GRANT NUMBER	
		5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) Lepak, John C., LCDR		**5d. PROJECT NUMBER**	
		5e. TASK NUMBER	
		5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army Command and General Staff College ATTN: ATZL-SWD-GD Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301		**8. PERFORMING ORG REPORT NUMBER**	
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)		**10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)**	
		11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited			
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES			

14. ABSTRACT

In May 2005, President Bush signed into effect National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 44, *Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization*, in an attempt to promote increased interagency coordination and planning. This policy directs the Department of State (DoS) to "coordinate and lead integrated United States Government efforts, involving all U.S. Departments and Agencies with relevant capabilities, to prepare, plan for, and conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities as lead agency for stabilization and reconstruction efforts." (Bush 2005)

While this directive is intended to promote coordination among United States Government (USG) Agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), it does not lay out an effective framework for interagency coordination. In the approximate four years since NSPD 44 was released, Congress has not fully funded DoS stabilization and reconstruction initiatives and subsequently continues to fund existing Department of Defense (DoD) programs. This thesis examines funding of stabilization and reconstruction programs within DoS and DoD, as well as the types of interagency missions conducted at USSOUTHCOM since the release of NSPD 44.

15. SUBJECT TERMS

Interagency Coordination, S/CRS, Civilian Response Corps, Haiti Stabilization Initiative, SOUTHCOM, NSPD 44

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			**17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT**	**18. NUMBER OF PAGES**	**19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON**
a. REPORT	**b. ABSTRACT**	**c. THIS PAGE**			**19b. PHONE NUMBER** *(include area code)*
(U)	(U)	(U)	(U)	77	

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39.18

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of Candidate: LCDR John C. Lepak

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Reconstruction: Who is Taking the Lead?

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not
necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or
any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing
statement.)

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ABSTRACT

INTERAGENCY COORDINATION EFFORTS CONCERNING STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION: WHO IS TAKING THE LEAD? by LCDR John C. Lepak,77 pages.

In May 2005, President Bush signed into effect National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 44, *Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization*, in an attempt to promote increased interagency coordination and planning. This policy directs the Department of State (DoS) to "coordinate and lead integrated United States Government efforts, involving all U.S. Departments and Agencies with relevant capabilities, to prepare, plan for, and conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities as lead agency for stabilization and reconstruction efforts." (Bush 2005)

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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ACRONYMS

AOR	Area of Responsibility
CIPA	Contributions for International Peacekeeping Activities
COCOM	Combatant Commander
CRSG	Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group
DGDP	Directorate of Graduate Degree Programs
DFA	Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance
DoD	Department of Defense
DoS	Department of State
FM	Field Manual
GAO	Government Accountability Office
IMS	Interagency Management System
HSI	Haiti Stabilization Initiative
ICAF	Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JFC	Joint Force Commander
MINUSTAH	United Nations Stabilization Mission Haiti
MOE	Measure of Effectiveness
MOP	Measure of Performance
NGO	Non Governmental Organization
NSC	National Security Council
NSC	National Security Strategy
NSPD 44	National Security Presidential Directive 44
PCC	Policy Coordination Committee

PNSR	Project on National Security Reform
S/CRS	Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization
SCG	Security Council Guidance
SGA	Small Group Advisor
TE3	Training, Education, Exercises, and Experimentation Sub PCC
UN	United Nations
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USG	United States Government
USSOUTHCOM	United States Southern Command

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The United States has a significant stake in enhancing the capacity to assist in stabilizing and reconstructing countries or regions, especially those at risk of, in, or in transition from conflict or civil strife, and to help them establish a sustainable path toward peaceful societies, democracies, and market economies. The United States should work with other countries and organizations to anticipate state failure, avoid it whenever possible, and respond quickly and effectively when necessary and appropriate to promote peace, security, development, democratic practices, market economies, and the rule of law. Such work should aim to enable governments abroad to exercise sovereignty over their own territories and to prevent those territories from being used as a base of operations or safe haven for extremists, terrorists, organized crime groups, or others who pose a threat to U.S. foreign policy, security, or economic interests.

— George W. Bush, NSPD 44

In December 2005, President Bush signed National Security Presidential

Directive (NSPD) 44, *Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction*

and Stabilization, in an attempt to promote increased interagency coordination and

planning. This policy directs the Department of State (DoS) to "Coordinate and lead

integrated United States Government (USG) efforts, involving all U.S. Departments and

Agencies with relevant capabilities, to prepare, plan for, and conduct stabilization and

reconstruction activities as lead agency for stabilization and reconstruction efforts" (Bush

2005). While this directive is intended to promote coordination issues among USG

organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), it does not lay out an

effective framework for interagency coordination. Also, given that the Department of

Defense (DoD) has a greater share of resources, in terms of budget and personnel, DoD

has the capacity to assume more responsibility for ongoing stabilization and

reconstruction efforts.

<center>Research Questions</center>

While the subject of interagency coordination is a broad and complex issue, this thesis will narrow the focus of research to the performance of DoS and its efforts to lead integrated USG efforts to prepare, plan for, and conduct reconstruction and stabilization activities. This thesis will also highlight DoD's role in reconstruction and stabilization efforts through a selected case study of U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM). The question this thesis attempts to answer is: Given the promulgation of NSPD 44 in December 2005, has the Secretary of State, through the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), taken the lead on interagency efforts concerning reconstruction and stabilization?

In order to answer this primary question, the answers to three secondary questions will be used to formulate the basis for the response. The first secondary question that will be answered is: What is the mission and organizational structure of S/CRS, and how is it related to the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance (DFA). The answer to this question will establish the relationship between two primary offices within DoS, and how resources are aligned with policy priorities. The second subordinate question is: What are the recent efforts of S/CRS to build civilian capacity under NSPD 44? The answer to this question forms the evaluation criteria against which the primary question is measured. Lastly, the answer to third question: How does USSOUTHCOM contribute to interagency efforts for reconstruction and stabilization? Will establish the context of DoD's role in interagency efforts for reconstruction and stabilization.

<u>Background</u>

As the United States Government is currently organized, the only meaningful way in which various federal departments and agencies come together is in the Executive Branch. In the Executive Branch, the National Security Council (NSC) is the primary body for deliberating national security policy issues requiring Presidential decision.

> The NSC shall advise and assist me in integrating all aspects of national security policy as it affects the United States - domestic, foreign, military, intelligence, and economics (in conjunction with the National Economic Council (NEC)). The National Security Council system is a process to coordinate executive departments and agencies in the effective development and implementation of those national security policies. (Bush, 2001)

The coordinating role of the NSC, at various times, meets with mixed results. Each president will choose to use his national security advisor and NSC differently. In addition, there is a lack of sufficient authority over the secretaries and control of resources to allow an integrated unity of effort. The most common method has been the "lead agency approach" in which it is recognized that various agencies have important contributions to make and one agency is designated to lead the others. More often than not, the lead agency is left with little ability to obtain the support and cooperation of the other agencies, therefore, a coordinated effort is never fully achieved.

Regardless of how an administration may choose to structure the NSC, the role of the interagency community in the day to day management of national security issues remains similar:

1. Identify policy issues and questions.

2. Formulate options.

3. Raise issues to the appropriate level for decision within the NSC structure.

4. Make decisions where appropriate.

5. Oversee the implementation of policy decisions (Project on National Seuruity Reform 2008, Executive Summary).

The national security policy process involves coordination within and among the agencies of the Executive Branch. The benefit of the process is that it is thorough and inclusive--each organization brings its own practices and skills. The drawback is that it can also be slow and cumbersome --each agency also brings its own culture, philosophy and bureaucratic interests. Critics argue that the very definition of national security must be revised. While it is recognized that specifying the scope of national security is necessary, it must also be acknowledged that this task cannot be definitively accomplished with one static definition of national security.

PNSR outlines four principal objectives of a refined definition of national security and its policy objectives:

> First, efforts to address current and future challenges must be as multidimensional as the challenges themselves. Addressing successfully the contingency of a terrorist detonation of a "dirty" bomb in a major city, for example entails a range of critical functions including deterrence, norm-building, prevention, defense, preparedness, and consequence management. Focusing on any single dimension or lesser subset of this spectrum of functions will sharply increase the likelihood of a major failure.

> Second, the national security system must integrate diverse skills and perspectives. The actors in U.S. national security policy today already include government departments that have not traditionally had front row seats, like Justice and Treasury. But departments such as Agriculture, Interior, and Transportation, agencies such as Centers for Disease Control and Prevention within the Department of Health and Human Services, and elements of state and local government and the private sector are playing increasingly greater roles as well. Creating ways to mobilize and integrate this diverse set of actors is essential to make effective and informed decisions in today's national security environment.

> Third, a new concept of national security demands recalibration of how we think about and manage national security resources and budgeting. Today's more complex challenges impose qualitatively more demanding resource allocation

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choices, even in good economic times. In developing and implementing national security policy, the rubber meets the road where money is spent, and we are unanimously agreed that the current system's gross inefficiencies risk collapse under the weight of the protracted budget pressures that likely lie ahead.

Fourth, the current environment virtually by definition puts a premium on foresight--the ability to anticipate unwelcome contingencies. While the ability to specifically predict the future will always elude us, foresight that enables anticipation and planning is the only means we have to increase response times in a world of rapid unpredictable change. (Project on National Security Reform 2008, Executive Summary)

A variety of factors, including areas of persistent conflict, exponential population growth, and globalization have increased the likelihood that each military operation will have stabilization goals. In the conduct of these missions, the military will increasingly encounter and often support civilian and non-governmental agencies. They may be representatives of GOs, United Nations (UN) agencies' representatives, and personnel from NGOs who have established their own operations independent of any military/civil operations.

As such, governmental organizations representing the diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments of national power are present in every operation. Like the military, government organizations employ their respective ends, ways, and means to resolve regional crises. Their inclusion into an operation brings unique capabilities and often-differing visions toward resolving conflict, and as a result, integrating these efforts into the interagency process often proves to be difficult.

While the President designated DoS as lead agency for stabilization and reconstruction efforts, many explanations attest to the difficulty integrating military and nonmilitary organizations in the interagency process. They include the lack of a formal coordination process, insufficient number of field personnel within various agencies,

limited budget resources, and the belief that organizational bias precludes fostering good working relations. Even so, without further developing the ability to integrate strategic level military and non-military efforts in the interagency process, the national instruments of power applied to a given crisis will lose some of their potential combined effectiveness.

In today's environment, the growing interaction of civilian and military efforts necessitates increased coordination to maximize each player's contribution and achieve unity of effort. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has been a major proponent of interagency reform:

> America's national security apparatus, military, and civilian needs to be more adept in operating along a continuum involving military, political, and economic skills…Bureaucratic barriers that hamper effective action should be rethought and reformed. The disparate strands of our national security apparatus, civilian and military, should be prepared ahead of time to deploy and operate together. (Gates 2007)

In order to address this necessity, the U.S. Army released an update to Field Manual (FM) 3-07 which presents overarching doctrinal guidance and direction for conducting stability operations, setting the foundation for developing other fundamentals and tactics, techniques, procedures, and provides operational guidance for commanders and trainers at all echelons. This doctrine, consistent and compatible with joint doctrine, also introduced a coordinated USG framework for interagency conflict assessment. This Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF) is "intended to develop a commonly held understanding across relevant USG departments and agencies of the dynamics driving and mitigating violent conflict in a country" (U.S. Army 2008, D-1). To this end, "Successful stability operations are predicated on identifying and reducing the causes of

instability and reestablishing or building community and state capacity to diminish, manage or prevent them from recurring in the future" (U.S. Army 2008, D-1).

Significance of the Study

While executing current and future operations, the military will continue to work with other USG agencies at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. The degree of integration between them will have a significant impact on success of each operation in terms of achieving unity of effort among the various agencies. The significance of this study is to provide an understanding of the factors that limit effectiveness in meeting those challenges demanding the integration of the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic elements of national power.

Assumptions

In order to facilitate research, the author made several assumptions about this subject. First, the civilian capacity of the federal government is insufficient to conduct reconstruction and stabilization operations. While the status quo is an option, the cost of "maintaining" is far too high when one considers the wasted efforts and resources of uncoordinated plans. Second, the current operational environment will necessitate the military to work closely with USG organizations and NGOs. Third, DoS, as it stands, does not have the personnel and budget resources to effectively carry out stabilization efforts on its own, therefore it will have to rely upon DoD to carry out reconstruction and stabilization missions.

Since the topic of interagency coordination is so broad this thesis will focus on analysis of interagency coordination primarily from a budgetary perspective, as well as case study of DoS involvement in the Haiti Stabilization Initiative (HSI). This thesis will focus on the analysis of DoS and DoD budgetary data from FY 2006 through the President's FY 2010 budget submission to Congress. This thesis will also analyze the USNS Comfort's 2007 four month humanitarian deployment to Central America. Finally, this thesis will establish a research cutoff date of 1 May 2009 for new information in order to facilitate timely analysis of information.

Delimitations

While there are many lessons to be learned from the reconstruction and stabilization operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, this thesis will mainly focus on the ability of S/CRS to lead efforts concerning stabilization and reconstruction within USSOUTHCOM's area of responsibility (AOR). This thesis will also not explore an in depth analysis of the NSC and its functions relating to Homeland Security.

This thesis adheres to the scientific methods of research. The process for this research includes defining the problem and formulating research questions; reviewing literature in the field of study and validating the research question; selecting a research approach; collecting evidence; analyzing and interpreting evidence; drawing conclusions; and making recommendations for further research.

Summary

Chapter 1 identified the background of interagency coordination from the National level perspective, and outlined the difficulty in coordinating between USG

agencies, as well as presented the significance of this study, specified the assumptions, limitations, and delimitations of this study. Chapter 2 will survey the extensive amount of literature written on interagency coordination from national strategic level, theater strategic level, and published reports. Chapter 3 will explain the methodology used to analyze the secondary research questions which, in turn, will form the basis for the answer to the primary research question. Chapter 4 will analyze the secondary research questions using the methodology outlined in Chapter 3 to formulate the answer to the primary research question. Finally, Chapter 5 will summarize the key points from Chapter 4, state the conclusion, and propose recommendations for future research.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

The previous chapter introduced the topic of interagency coordination and discussed a brief history of the topic, specified the significance of the study, listed assumptions, and set the limitations and delimitations of this thesis. Chapter 2 will outline the vast amount of literature covering differing aspects of interagency coordination by analyzing three categories of source information. The first category focuses on analysis of interagency coordination from a national strategic perspective, the second focuses on theater specific strategic perspective, and the third focuses on published reports on the subject of interagency coordination and reform.

The primary research question this thesis will answer is: Given the promulgation of NSPD 44 in December 2005, has the Secretary of State, through the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), taken the lead on interagency efforts concerning reconstruction and stabilization? Chapter 2 will help answer this question by defining the spectrum of interagency coordination from a "big picture" perspective and define what experts in the field of interagency coordination think about the subject.

> When the United States undertakes military operations, the Armed Forces of the United States are only one component of a national-level effort involving all instruments of national power. Instilling unity of effort at the national level is necessarily a cooperative endeavor involving a number of Federal departments and agencies. In certain operations, agencies of states, localities, or foreign countries may also be involved. The President establishes guidelines for civil-military integration and normally disseminates decisions and monitors execution through the NSC. (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2007, iv)

National Strategic Level

The following documents outline national level strategic policy, DoD and DoS strategy and directives, and serve as the basis of USG agencies approach to national security issues.

National Security Strategy of the United States

At the heart of U.S. foreign policy is the National Security Strategy (NSS). The requirement set forth in section 108 of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended (50 U.S.C. 404a), requires the President to transmit to Congress each year a comprehensive report on the national security strategy of the United States and shall include a comprehensive description of the following:

1. The worldwide interests, goals, and objectives of the U.S. are vital to the United States.

2. The foreign policy, worldwide commitments, and national defense capabilities of the United States necessary to deter aggression and to implement national security strategy of the United States.

3. The proposed short-term and long-term use of the political, economic, military, and other elements of the national power of the United States to protect or promote the interests and achieve the goals and objectives referred to in paragraph 1.

4. The adequacy of the capabilities of the United States to carry out the national security strategy of the United States, including an evaluation of the balance among the capabilities of the national power of the United States to support the implementation of the national security strategy.

5. Such other information as may be necessary to inform Congress on matters relating to the national security strategy of the United States (National Security Act of 1947, Sec. 404a).

The NSS of 2002, which was in effect when NSPD 44 was promulgated, lays out eight overarching objectives of U.S. foreign policy and serves as the foundation of USG agencies' strategy for national security. It essentially abandons concepts of deterrence -- which dominated defense policies during the Cold War years-- for a forward-reaching, pre-emptive strategy against hostile states and terrorist groups, while also expanding development assistance and free trade, promoting democracy, fighting disease, and transforming the U.S. military. "Defending the United States from its enemies is the first and most fundamental commitment to the American people," President Bush said in his introduction. He goes on to say that radical terrorists and rogue states are the primary threats to U.S. security and that defeating such threats requires the U.S. to use every tool in its arsenal including military power, better homeland defenses, law enforcement, intelligence, and efforts to hinder terrorist financing. The document also outlines a policy to work with other nations and international organizations to defuse regional conflicts; to prevent enemies from using weapons of mass destruction against the United States, it allies and friends; to support and promote a new era of global economic growth through free markets and free trade; to expand the development of open societies and build the infrastructure of democracy; to reduce the toll of HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases; and to transform the U.S. military to meet 21st century challenges.

National Security Presidential Directive 44

Overarching interagency policy direction for reconstruction and stabilization is set

forth in NSPD 44. Promulgated in December 2005, its purpose is to:

> Promote the security of the United States through improved coordination, planning, and implementation for reconstruction and stabilization assistance for foreign states and regions at risk of, in, or in transition from conflict or civil strife. (Bush 2005)

NSPD 44 also outlines responsibilities of the DoS to coordinate and lead integrated

efforts with DoD, and other USG agencies with relevant capabilities, to prepare, plan for,

and conduct reconstruction and stabilization operations. Key functions specified in NSPD

44 include:

1. Coordinate interagency processes to identify states at risk of instability, lead

interagency planning to prevent or mitigate conflict, and develop detailed contingency

plans for integrated United States Government reconstruction and stabilization efforts for

those states and regions and for widely applicable scenarios, which are integrated with

military contingency plans, where appropriate.

2. Provide United States Government decision makers with detailed options for an

integrated United States Government response in connection with specific reconstruction

and stabilization operations including to recommend when to establish a limited-time

PCC-level group to focus on a country or region facing major reconstruction and

stabilization challenges.

3. Coordinate United States Government responses for reconstruction and

stabilization with the Secretary of Defense to ensure harmonization with any planned or

ongoing U.S. military operations, including peacekeeping missions, at the planning and

implementation phases; develop guiding precepts and implementation procedures for

reconstruction and stabilization which, where appropriate, may be integrated with military contingency plans and doctrine. (Bush 2005)

NSPD 44 also calls for a Policy Coordination Committee (PCC) for Reconstruction and Stabilization Operations. It calls for this committee to be chaired by the DoS Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization and a designated member of the NSC staff. While the PCC is another means for interagency coordination, NSPD 44 goes so far as to specify that it will not affect the authority of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budget, administrative, or legislative proposals.

Furthermore, NSPD 44 establishes that the Secretary of State, supported by a Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, shall coordinate and lead integrated United States Government efforts, involving all U.S. Departments and agencies with relevant capabilities, to prepare, plan for, and conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities. When the U.S. military is involved, the Secretary of State is responsible for coordinating with the Secretary of Defense to ensure harmonization with any planned or ongoing U.S. military operations across the spectrum of conflict.

Critics of the National Security Council System (NSCS) suggest that the sheer size of the NSCS necessitates the critical need for the most effective and efficient processes.

Unfortunately, current processes are fragmented, ad hoc, personality and issue specific, and unable to harness the wide range of talent within the system, or to learn from failure or success. Without presidential intervention, the NSCS centralizes processes at the level of senior Cabinet officials. Processes are not coordinated or integrated across the system (Project on National Security Reform 2008, 254).

DoS/USAID Strategic Plan 2007-2012

The DoS and U.S. Agency for International Development's (USAID) joint *Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years 2007 to 2012*, revised in May 2007, supports the policy positions set forth by President Bush in the NSS, and presents how USAID will implement U.S. foreign policy and development. In the joint *Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years 2007 to 2012*, the Strategic Goals section defines the principal aims of U.S. foreign policy and development assistance, as well as the strategic priorities within each goal for the coming years, in addition, for each goal identified, it identifies key USG partners and external factors that could affect the performance of these goals. The Regional Priority section outlines the USAID priorities within each region of the world. The joint strategic goals cut across the regional priority chapters. These regional priorities show how the efforts described in the Strategic Goal chapters connect together in addressing specific regional issues.

The joint strategic goals define an integrated vision and are anchored in the 2006 NSS and its two pillars: Promoting freedom, justice, and human dignity; and confronting the challenges of our time by leading a growing community of democracies. The seven Strategic Goals outlined represent the core transformational diplomacy efforts. The first five of these goals correspond to the five objectives of the Foreign Assistance Framework listed in Appendix 1, and reflect the integrated nature of the work of the two organizations. These joint strategic goals are as follows:

1. Achieving Peace and Security.

2. Governing Justly and Democratically.

3. Investing in People.

4. Economic Growth.

5. Humanitarian Assistance (U.S. Department of State 2007, 10).

The joint *Strategic Plan* states that the seven strategic goals outlined constitute the strategic planning framework for both agencies. The joint *Strategic Plan*, and the Foreign Assistance Strategic Framework, serve as the basis for both organizations' annual performance plans at the Department, bureau, and mission levels. The annual plans focus on efforts to meet performance goals and contain specific indicators of performance. Success in meeting performance goals is an indicator of overall progress in achieving the mission and strategic goals outlined in the Strategic Plan (U.S. Department of State 2007, 10).

DoD Directive 3000.05

DOD Directive 3000.05, *Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations*, issued 28 November 2008, outlines how DoD will fulfill its role as defined under NSPD-44. Also, recognizing that stability, security, transition, and reconstruction operations are critical to the war on terrorism, DoD placed these types of operations on par with major combat operations. This directive notes that integrated civilian and military efforts are key to successful stability operations and charges DoD to work closely with USG departments and agencies, foreign governments, global and regional international organizations, non-governmental organizations, and the private sector. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD (P)), with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's (CJCS) support, is responsible for representing the Secretary in discussions on stability operations policy and strategy with other USG departments and

agencies, foreign governments, IGOs, NGOs, and the private sector. COCOMs are

responsible for engaging relevant partners in coordination with USD (P) and CJCS.

Joint Publication (JP) 5-0

JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*, published 26 December 2006, describes the

nature of Joint Strategic Planning with its three subsets: security cooperation planning,

joint operational planning, and force planning. It states that joint strategic planning occurs

mostly at the national and theater strategic levels of war to assist the President, Secretary

of Defense (SecDef), and members of the NSC to "formulate political-military

assessments, define political and military end states, develop strategic concepts and

options, and allocate resources" (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2006, 22). The Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), in consultation with other member of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff (JCS), performs joint strategic planning to:

1. Advise and assist the President and SecDef regarding the strategic direction for

the Armed Forces of the United States and the preparation of policy guidance.

2. Advise the SecDef on program recommendations and budget proposals to

conform to priorities in strategic plans.

3. Transmit the strategic guidance and direction of the President and Sec Def to

the combatant commands, military services, and combat support agencies (Joint Chiefs of

Staff 2006, I-2).

JP 5-0 defines security cooperation as the means by which DOD encourages and

enables countries and organizations to work with us to achieve strategic objectives. In

discussing the role of DOD's senior civilian and military leadership, JP 5-0 calls for

coordination with CCDRs, Service Chiefs, and support agencies to focus their activities

on achieving the objectives identified by SecDef. Security cooperation planning links these SecDef identified objectives with security cooperation activities grouped within the following six categories:

1. Military contacts, including senior official visits, port visits, counterpart visits, conferences, staff talks, and personnel and unit exchange programs

2. Nation assistance, including foreign internal defense, security assistance programs, and planned humanitarian and civic assistance activities.

3. Multinational training.

4. Multinational exercises, including those in support of the Partnership for Peace Program.

5. Multinational education for US personnel and personnel from other nations, both overseas and in the United States.

6. Arms control and treaty monitoring activities (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2006, I-3).

In response to direction in the DOD *Security Cooperation Guidance* (SCG), CCDRs, Service Chiefs, and combat support agencies' directors prepare security cooperation strategies in accordance with SCG objectives for CJCS review and SecDef approval, with the Geographic Combatant Commanders as the supported entities. These strategies form the basis for security cooperation, and important among them are the coordination efforts of all the USG agencies representing the diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments of national power.

Joint Publication (JP) 3-08

In March 2006, DoD revised its manual for interagency and multinational operations, *Interagency Intergovernmental Organizational, and Nongovernmental*

Organization Coordination During Joint Operations, Volumes I and II. Volume I discusses the interagency, IGO, and NGO environment and provides basic guidance to facilitate coordination between DoD, and other USG agencies, IGOs, NGOs, and regional organizations. Volume II describes key USG departments and agencies, IGOs and NGOs--their core competencies, basic organizational structures, and relationship, or potential relationship, with the Armed Forces of the United States.

JP 3-08 sets forth guidelines to govern the activities and performance of the Armed Forces in operations and provides the doctrinal basis for interagency coordination and for US military involvement in multinational operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFC) and prescribes joint doctrine for operations and training. It provides military guidance for the Armed Forces in preparing appropriate plans. JP 3-08 also goes so far as to say that it does not limit the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to establish unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall objective.

One difficulty, however of coordinating operations among US agencies is determining corresponding counterparts. Another significant difficulty is the determination of the lead federal agency for a given interagency activity. Organizational differences exist between the military hierarchy and other USG departments and agencies, particularly at the operational level where counterparts to the geographic combatant commander seldom exist. Further, overall lead authority in a CCO is likely to be exercised not by the geographic combatant commander, but by a US ambassador or

other senior civilian, who will provide policy and goals for all USG agencies and military organizations in the operation.

Decision making at the lowest levels is frequently offset because field coordinators may not be vested with the authority to speak for parent agencies, departments, or organizations. Figure 1 from JP 3-08, depicts comparative organizational structures using the three levels of planning.

COMPARISON OF UNITED STATES AGENCY ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE			
	ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES	EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS & AGENCIES	STATE & LOCAL GOVERNMENT
STRATEGIC	Secretary of Defense Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Chiefs of Staff Combatant Commander (1)	National Headquarters Department Secretaries Ambassador/Embassy (3)	Governor
OPERATIONAL	Combatant Commander Commander, Joint Task Force (CJTF) (2) Defense Coordinating Officer/Defense Coordinating Element	Ambassador/Embassy Liaisons (4) Federal Coordinating Officer or Principal Federal Official Regional Office	State Adjunct General State Coordinating Officer Office of Emergency Services Department/Agency
TACTICAL	CJTF Components Service Functional	Ambassador/Embassy Field Office US Agency for International Development (USAID)/ Office of Foreign Disaster Response Team (DART)/ Liaison (5) Response Team US Refugee Coordinator	National Guard County Commissioner Mayor/Manager County City (e.g., Police Department)

1. The combatant commander, within the context of unified action, may function at both the strategic and operational levels in coordinating the application of all instruments of national power with the actions of other military forces. United States Government (USG) agencies, nongovernmental agencies (NGOs), regional organizations, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and corporations toward theater strategic objectives.
2. The CJTF, within the context of unified action, functions at both the operational and tactical levels in coordinating the application of all instruments of national power with the actions of other military forces, USG agencies, NGOs, regional organizations, IGOs, and corporations toward theater operational objectives.
3. The Ambassador and Embassy (which includes the country team) function at the strategic operational, and tactical levels and may support joint operation planning conducted by the combatant commander or CJTF.
4. Liaisons at the operational level may include the Foreign Policy Advisor or Political Advisor assigned to the combatant commander by the Department of State, the Central Intelligence Agency liaison officer, or any other US agency representative assigned to the Joint Interagency Coordinating Group or otherwise assigned to the combatant commander's staff.
5. USAID's OFDA provides its rapidly deployable DART in response to international disasters. A DART provides specialists, trained in a variety of disaster relief skills, to assist U.S. embassies and USAID missions with the management of USG response to disasters.

Figure 1.   Organizational Structure
Source: Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Comparison of U.S. Agency Organizational Structure* (Washington, DC: GPO, 2006), vol 1, Ch III-9.

Nested with the strategic priorities listed in the NSS, the following document outlines U.S. Southern Command's strategy for addressing the challenges in countries within its AOR.

United States Southern Command Strategy 2018

In December 2008, Admiral James Stavridis, COMUSSOUTHCOM, promulgated *United States Southern Command Strategy 2018: Partnership for the Americas* (CS-2018). "*CS-2018* provides the vision for how we hope to become a more interagency oriented organization seeking to work with U.S. international partners to support security and stability in the Americas" (Stavridis 2008, 1).

CS-2018 provides the framework for achieving USSOUTHCOM's goals and objectives for 2018. The strategy discusses common linkages that apply through the command's area of responsibility. It then addresses common challenges that affect the security and stability of nations in the region. Finally, the strategy outlines the way ahead for turning these concepts into capabilities that will achieve the command's goals and objectives through 2018.

CS-2018 uses National Security Presidential Directive NSPD 32 as a source document for USSOUTHCOM's Western Hemisphere strategy. It states that "The Western Hemisphere is our home. By virtue of geography, history, culture, demography, and economics, the United States is linked to our Hemispheric partners in ways unmatched else ware in the world" (Stavridis 2008, 3). These linkages, as outlined by the president, provide the basis for addressing the common challenges that affect the security and stability of the region. For example, in countries such as Haiti, where crime in Cite

Solei, a volatile enclave of 300,000, located in metropolitan Port-au-Prince was completely lost to Haitian government control until the United Nations Stabilization Mission Haiti (MINUSTAH) reclaimed it through military operations at the beginning of 2007.

CS-2018 goes on to state that the hemisphere is tied together in ways far beyond geography; it is linked demographically, economically, socially, politically, culturally, linguistically, and militarily.

Published Reports

The following published reports, conducted by subject matter experts, serve as a sample of the vast body of research on the subject of interagency coordination.

Forging a New Shield

Section 1049 of the *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008* (Public Law 110-181) required a study of the national security interagency system by an independent, non-profit, non-partisan organization. This legislation authorized SecDef to contract with the Project on National Security Reform (PNSR) to conduct a study of the national security interagency process. In November 2008, PNSR published a 742 page report, *Forging a New Shield*, detailing problems inherent in the current system and proposing recommendations for an overhaul of the national security system.

Forging a New Shield is the culmination of two years of analysis by more than 300 national security experts from academia, government, Congress, federal agencies, and think tanks. The report was overseen by a bipartisan guiding coalition comprised of former senior officials and others with extensive national security experience. The report's underlying thesis is that the national security system can no longer help

American leaders formulate coherent national strategy, as well as integrate expertise and capabilities, and cannot resource those capabilities sufficiently to safeguard vital interests of the nation.

> These national security challenges require effective whole-of-government integration, but remain dominated by outmoded, inward-looking vertically oriented, competitive, stove-piped bureaucracies. (Locher 2009)

The report also analyzes problems that limit the performance of the national security system, identifies the most appropriate means of solving them, and attempts to persuade national leaders to take corrective action.

PNSR presents the argument that without thoroughly examining the structures and processes of the current legacy national security system--including its human and physical capital and management dimensions, as well as its executive-legislative branch dynamics--we have isolated the system's essential problems. The report also contends that unless these essential, underlying problems are rectified, system failures will occur with increasing frequency. The five interwoven problems, which the report details at length, are key:

1. The system is grossly imbalanced and supports strong departmental capabilities at the expense of integrating mechanisms.

2. Resources allocated to departments and agencies are shaped by their narrowly defined core mandates rather than broader national missions.

3. The need for presidential integration to compensate for the systemic inability to adequately integrate or resource missions overly centralizes issue management and overburdens the White House.

4. A burdened White House cannot manage the national security system as a whole to be agile and collaborative at any time, but it is particularly vulnerable to breakdown during the protracted transition periods between administrations.

5. Congress provides resources and conducts oversight in ways that reinforce the first four problems and make improving performance extremely difficult (Project on National Security Reform 2008, Executive Summary).

One key issue with the national security system previously noted is that the system's design emphasizes core capabilities over mission integration. This is largely a structural problem. "A system's structure should serve its strategy, which in turn should aim to achieve and organization's objectives in the most efficient manner possible given the organization's environment" (Chandler 1990). While structure is subordinate to strategy, PNSR notes that it is important to understand because a properly functioning structure is indispensible to achieving an organization's objectives.

> The "legacy" mode of organization of the executive branch is vertical. This form of organization significantly impedes the ability of government to deal with complex problems. Authority to act requires detailed supervision from the top, mediated by large bureaucracies. Information about real-world conditions does not travel easily between field-level components of institutions and the policymaking levels. It flows even less readily between executive institutions. (Project on National Security Reform 2008, 176)

The report asserts that effects of the system's institutional and managerial limitations are most apparent when a discreet issue or mission is undertaken. If the issue is, for the most part, under the management of a single agency or department, it is much more likely to be executed well. If the issue requires an integrated effort across multiple agencies and departments, problems arise all along the national security issue management chain from policy to strategy, to plans, to implementation and assessment.

The process of issue management, according to PNSR, starts and ends with assessment. The basic function of assessment is to provide policymakers with a context for understanding the international environment and the issues at hand. The NSS's ability to provide integrated assessments is constrained because information is resident institutional "stovepipes" and only unevenly shared, producing skewed and sometimes inaccurate picture of the security situation facing the policymaker. Knowledge management across the system is hampered by cultural factors and technical misalignments, which sometimes leads a failure to share information. Individuals across departments and agencies do not trust sufficiently in the accountability and likely reciprocity of those with whom they ideally should be sharing knowledge. In addition, different departments and agencies have non-interoperable information management systems. Critical decisions are therefore delayed while information sources are identified and integrated, sometimes at the moment for action slips away. Ultimately, effective assessment requires effective decision support.

"The tendency of interagency decision mechanisms to stalemate over policy issues delay policy decisions, making the system slower and less nimble than desired" (Project on National Security Reform 2008, 176). While discussing the make-up of interagency groups, the report notes that individuals and agencies tend to view themselves as being in competition for power, influence, and resources. Interagency groups are also characterized by conflicting agency positions, which produce creative tensions--ones which cannot be effectively solved. Representatives of agencies meet and express their respective agencies' views and suggestions, but rarely do representatives step outside of their assigned positions and discuss issues in a joint, coordinated,

interagency rather than agency-centric way. Furthermore, the interagency process is so

onerous that policy is developed slowly, often in response to crisis or external forcing

functions. "Key leaders are consequently 'in-box' driven, crisis-by-crisis, and little time

for longer range policy or system wide national security management" (Project on

National Security Reform 2008, 177). In the current NSS, it is difficult to generate and

objectively evaluate alternative strategic courses of action to obtain desired results.

Opponents of a chosen course of action may leak their preference, opening up political

liabilities for the administration. Poor decision support and the tendency toward

consensus building obscure the links between objectives and the alternative activities,

programs, and resources required to achieve them. As a result, 'strategy' tends to be

expressed in terms of desirable objectives rather than specific courses of action with

strengths and liabilities that must be mitigated. Critics have noted:

> The NSC spends most of its time readying papers that mean all things to
> all men. An NSC paper is commonly so ambiguous and so general that the issues
> must all be renegotiated when the situation to which it was supposed to apply
> actually arises. By that time it is too late to take anything but emergency action.
> (Locher 2008, 178)

The lack of a clear strategy sends mixed signals to external players, including U.S. allies

and adversaries, about the intent of American action which is often misconstrued to the

detriment of the nation's long term national security.

National security organizations do not have a strong history of routinely

collaborating on plans. A key reason for this is the great cultural differences regarding the

importance of planning. These differences are apparent between DoD and DoS, as well as

between the functional and regional national security divisions within these and other

departments and agencies. The Goldwater Nichols Act, (10 USC 113(g) (2)), requires

that SecDef prepare contingency planning guidance, which is drafted by DoD, approved by the President, and returned to DoD for execution. Other departments or agencies need not be involved in these plans. Neither are they required to perform their own planning, even though they have begun doing so. Even DoS, through its functional bureaus involves planning more than used to be the case. However, personnel shortages, the lack of personnel trained in planning, and the reluctance of many non-DoD organizations to embrace planning complicate efforts to improve interagency coordination.

> [W]e found that DoD and non DoD organizations do not fully understand each other's planning processes, and non-DoD organizations have limited capacity to participate in DoD's full range of planning activities…State does not have a large pool of planners who can deploy to DoD's combatant commands. DoD officials noted that their efforts were stymied by the limited number of personnel those agencies can offer…both DoD and State staff doubted that civilian capacity and resources would ever match the levels desired. (GAO Report to Congress 2007, 5)

The report outlines three immediate impediments to effective implementation of interagency national security missions. First, command and control functions are contested and confused in interagency operations, with multiple chains of command operating between Washington-based headquarters and their representatives in the field. Command and control is also complicated by the fact that departments and agencies delineate regions differently, so that a single area of operation can span numerous regional offices and organizational elements that involve support to interagency operations.

Second, resource allocation is subject to the same issues previously identified that make it difficult to link resources with policies, strategies, and plans. Since the departments and agencies give priority to their core missions, capabilities required for executing nontraditional missions are frequently lacking or inadequate. Third, personnel

system incentives reward agency-centric behaviors, consistent with strong authorities, cultures, and career paths of the independent agencies and departments.

Post-implementation assessment suffers from the same knowledge management impediments that limit issue assessment prior to policy development. In addition, the system cannot constantly and objectively assess performance, as doing so both exceeds available resources and opens up political liabilities. Finally, for any given issue, lessons learned concerning performance are often lost during political transitions as key leaders depart.

In addition to analyzing problems with the national security system, the report also recommends adoption of new approaches to the national security system design focused on national missions and outcomes, emphasizing integrated effort, collaboration and agility.

Managing for Results: Barriers to Interagency Coordination

In Managing for Results: Barriers to Interagency Coordination, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) points out that a coordinated effort of two or more agencies is required for the federal government to get the results that it hopes to achieve. "This shared responsibility is the result of various factors, including the piecemeal development of federal programs and the complexity of public needs" (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2000, 9). GAO's work demonstrates that mission fragmentation and overlap are widespread in the government and that crosscutting program efforts are poorly coordinated. Without coordination scarce funds are wasted and effectiveness of federal programs is undermined. This report

1. Discusses barriers to interagency coordination, such as missions that are not mutually reinforcing or that may even conflict.

2. Summarizes potential strategies for improving the effectiveness and efficiency of crosscutting programs (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2000, 9).

The report also notes that in addition to structural barriers interagency coordination, it is often hindered by incompatible procedures, processes, and data. In addition, interagency coordination difficulties are compounded, according to the GAO, in the absence of clear lines of responsibility and accountability for crosscutting program efforts. The report further suggests that the lack of clear lines of authority, coupled with disparate missions, adds to the difficulty agencies have in developing a coordinated approach to public problems. GAO suggests that without clearly defined roles and responsibilities, it can be difficult to determine which entity should lead federal efforts with respect to a particular mission.

Summary

This chapter has discussed the vast amount of literature covering differing aspects of interagency coordination by analysis of three categories of source information. The first category focused on analysis of interagency coordination from a national strategic perspective, the second focused on theater strategic perspective, and the third focused on published reports on the subject of interagency coordination and reform. The next chapter, Chapter 2, will discuss the research methodology used to answer the primary and secondary research questions.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

In the previous chapter, the author summarized key documents in the vast amount of literature covering different aspects of interagency coordination by analysis of three categories of source information. The first category focused on analysis of interagency coordination from a national strategic perspective, the second focused on theater strategic perspective, and the third focused on published reports on the subject of interagency coordination and reform. The purpose of this chapter is to outline the research methodology the author will use to answer the primary and secondary research questions by using a mixed method of quantitative and qualitative data analysis. In order to answer the primary research question, the secondary questions must be answered first.

The primary research question this thesis will answer is: Given the promulgation of NSPD 44 in December 2005, has the Secretary of State, through the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), taken the lead on interagency efforts concerning reconstruction and stabilization?

The secondary research questions are (1). What is the mission and organizational structure of S/CRS, and how is it related to the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance (DFA)? (2). What are the recent efforts of S/CRS to build civilian capacity under NSPD 44? (3). How does USSOUTHCOM contribute to interagency coordination efforts for reconstruction and stabilization?

The steps in the methodology the author will use are:

1. Conduct a comparative analysis of S/CRS's mission statement with that of the responsibilities delegated to DoS listed in NSPD 44.

2. Compare S/CRS's mission statement to that of DFA.

3. Analyze three key efforts of S/CRS, which include the IMS structure approved by the NSC in 2007, the Planning Framework for Reconstruction and Stabilization, and the development of the Civilian Response Corps.

a. Conduct Case Study of Haiti Stabilization Initiative.

4. Conduct a quantitative analysis of the numbers and types of missions conducted in the USSOUTHCOM AOR.

a. Conduct a representative case study of USSOUTHCOM using USNS Comfort's 2007 four month deployment to Central America to exemplify a whole of government approach to stabilization and reconstruction operations.

Qualitative and Quantitative Analysis

Qualitative data analysis provides methods of examining, comparing and contrasting, and interpreting meaningful patterns or themes. These meaningful patterns can be determined by the particular goals and objectives of the research project. The matching data can be analyzed from various angles depending on the specific research or evaluation questions being addressed. In quantitative analysis, numbers and what they stand for are analyzed. By contrast, qualitative analysis deals in words and is guided by fewer general rules and standardized procedures than statistical analysis. By contrast, qualitative analysis deals in words and is guided by fewer universal rules and standardized procedures than statistical analysis.

Measures of Performance and Measures of Effectiveness

Another way to look at data analysis, according to Dr. Jack Kem, is through measures of performance (MOP) and measures of effectiveness (MOE). "It is important

to note that MOPs relate to the task being performed with the question 'are we doing things right?' MOEs relate to the effects and objectives with the question 'are we doing the right things?'" (Kem 2009, 118). JP 5-0 states that MOPs are closely associated with task accomplishment whereas MOEs measure the attainment of an endstate, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect; they do not measure task performance (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2006, Ch.III, 60-61). The relationship between MOP and MOE is demonstrated in figure 2, and again in Table 1.


Figure 2.   Assessment levels and measures
Source: Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operations Planning* (Washington, DC: GPO, 2006), Ch.III 60.

Table 1.	MOP and MOE Assessment	
	MOP	MOE
Relationship-to-Task and Purpose	Relates directly to Task	Relates directly to Purpose
Quantitative vs. Qualitative Measures	Primarily Quantitative	Primarily Qualitative
Internal vs. External Focus	Internal Focus (Task at hand)	External Focus (Impact of Actions)
Primary Question	Are we doing things right? (Are we accomplishing the task to standard?)	Are we doing the right things? (Are the things we are doing getting us to the end state we want?)

Source: Jack Kem, *Campaign Planning: Tools of the Trade* (Ft. Leavenworth: GPO, 2009), 121.

In order to answer the first of the secondary research questions, the author will conduct a comparative analysis of S/CRS's mission statement with that of the responsibilities delegated to DoS listed in NSPD 44. Ideally, an organization's mission statement guides its actions in the form of task and purpose to meet its objectives. In this case, the author will compare the two to see if S/CRS's mission statement is nested in the objectives stated in NSPD 44.

Once S/CRS's mission statement is validated, the next step will be to compare it to that of the mission statement of DFA to determine the relationship between the two offices, and to determine how overall resources are aligned with policy priorities.

The second secondary question is: What are the recent efforts of S/CRS to build civilian capacity under NSPD 44? In order to answer this question, the author will analyze three key efforts of S/CRS, which include the IMS structure approved by the NSC in 2007, the Planning Framework for Reconstruction and Stabilization, and the development of the Civilian Response Corps. Analysis of the IMS will include its

composition, and a case study of the HSI, which was one of the first attempts by S/CRS

to implement the Country Reconstruction Stabilization Group (CRSG).

The author will outline the complexities of HSI through analysis of mission

reports, news articles, DoS performance reports and budget data. Subject data will then

be used to determine if resources allocated under 1207 funds were sufficient, as well as to

determine what other resources contributed to achievement of mission goals. The author

will perform a quantitative analysis of DoS budget requests, Congressional justifications,

and Congressional authorizations from FY 2006 through FY 2009 to indicate the

performance of the Civilian Response Corps.

The third secondary question is: How does DoD contribute to interagency efforts

concerning reconstruction and stabilization? In order to answer this question, the author

will conduct a quantitative analysis of the numbers and types of missions conducted in

the USSOUTHCOM Area of Responsibility, and conduct a representative case study of

USSOUTHCOM using the USNS Comfort's 2007 four month deployment to Central

America to exemplify a whole of government approach to stabilization and

reconstruction operations. The analysis of material for the USNS Comfort deployment

consisted of mission blogs, press releases, after action reports, and DoD budget data.

<center>Summary</center>

This chapter outlined the research methodology that will be used to answer the

primary and secondary research questions by using a mixed method of quantitative and

qualitative data analysis. The next chapter, Chapter 4, will provide the analysis of the

secondary research questions which will be used to answer the primary research question.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

The previous chapter outlined the methodology necessary to formulate the conclusions and recommendations about the subject of this thesis. Chapter 4 will provide the analysis of the secondary research questions which will then be used to answer the primary research question.

The primary research question this thesis will answer is: Given the promulgation of NSPD 44 in December 2005, has the Secretary of State, through the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), taken the lead on interagency efforts concerning reconstruction and stabilization? In order to answer this primary question, the answers to the secondary questions will be analyzed first.

The secondary research questions are (1). What is the mission and organizational structure of S/CRS, and how is it related to the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance (DFA)? (2).What are the recent efforts of S/CRS to build civilian capacity under NSPD 44? (3). How does USSOUTHCOM contribute to interagency coordination efforts for reconstruction and stabilization?

Secondary Research Questions

What is the mission and organizational structure of S/CRS, and how is it related to the
Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance (DFA)?

As established first by the Secretary of State, and later under section 408 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2005 (P.L. 108-447), S/CRS has the authority to "catalog and monitor non-military resources and capabilities of Executive agencies, assess crises, plan for responses to countries or regions that are in, or are in transition

from conflict or civil strife, as well as coordinate the training of civilian personnel for

effective reconstruction and stabilization activities" (U.S. Congress 2005). According to

S/CRS, its mission is to:

> Lead, coordinate and institutionalize U.S. Government civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations, and to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife, so they can reach a sustainable path toward peace, democracy and a market economy. (U.S. Department of State S/CRS 2009)

S/CRS is the first USG entity specifically created to address stability operations,

and as such, there is no baseline to compare its structure to that of an organization with

the same mission. S/CRS's organizational structure is listed in figure 3.

Figure 3.   S/CRS Organization
Source: U.S. Department of State S/CRS (Washington, DC: GPO, 2009).

Figure 4 depicts the organizational structure of the DoS, and shows the

relationship between DFA and S/CRS. DFA is charged by the Secretary of State with

directing transformation of the USG approach to foreign assistance. The Director holds

equivalent rank to Deputy Secretary and also serves as USAID Administrator, ensuring

the effective use of foreign assistance to meet overarching foreign policy objectives. To

that end, DFA's mission is:

1. Provide leadership, coordination and strategic direction within the U.S.
    Government and with external stakeholders to enhance foreign assistance
    effectiveness and integrate foreign assistance planning and resource
    management across State and USAID.

2. Lead strategic, operational, and performance planning of U.S. foreign
    assistance with a focus on aligning resources with policy priorities.

3. Develop and defend foreign assistance budget requests and allocate State
    and USAID foreign assistance funding to meet urgent needs and new
    opportunities and to ensure long-term sustainable investments.

4. Promote good stewardship of foreign assistance funds by strengthening
    oversight, accountability, and transparency (Department of State Office of
    the Director of Foreign Assistance 2009).

Figure 4.   DoS Organization

Source: U.S. Department of State, *Organizational Structure* (Washington, DC: GPO, 2009).

Due to the close relationship between the work of S/CRS and the DFA, the

Secretary of State aligned S/CRS with the office of the Director of Foreign Assistance by

dual-hatting the Coordinator S/CRS as the Deputy Director of Foreign Assistance.

According to GAO, this action "assists S/CRS to coordinate the integration of diplomatic,

defense, development, intelligence, and economic tools of the USG in countries at risk of,

in, or in transition from conflict and stability" (U.S. Department of State 2007, 6).

What are the Recent Efforts on the Part o DOS to Build
Civilian Capacity Under NSPD 44?

Three key efforts of S/CRS to develop civilian capacity under NSPD 44 are the

Interagency Management System (IMS), development of the Civilian Response Corps,

and the planning framework for reconstruction and stabilization.

Interagency Management System

The IMS, approved by the NSC in March 2007, is a management structure

designed to assist policy makers, chiefs of mission, and military commanders who

manage complex reconstruction and stabilization activities. It consists of three elements:

1. Country reconstruction and stabilization group (CRSG). Which is a

Washington based decision making body equivalent to a PCC with a planning and

operations staff.

2. Integration planning cell (IPC). A civilian planning cell deployed to the

relevant geographic COCOM or multinational headquarters designed to integrate and

synchronize civilian and military planning.

3. Advance civilian team (ACT). A team consisting of one or more subordinate

interagency management and coordination field advance civilian teams that deploy to

support the chief of mission (U.S. Army 2008, 14).

Together the CRSG, IPC, and ACT are designed to be a scalable flexible tool for

S/CRS to incorporate a whole of government approach to reconstruction and stabilization

operations. S/CRS's first attempt to coordinate interagency planning met with mixed

results. In 2005, S/CRS set up a CRSG to address the evolving crisis in Sudan, which was

essentially equivalent to a PCC. A RAND study concluded that the results were counter

to the DoS's regional bureau and the Africa PCC, which had been meeting for months to address the Sudan issues (Nora Bensahel 2009, 8).

Haiti Stabilization Initiative

S/CRS's second attempt to coordinate interagency planning met with improved results, in part, by working with the DoS's relevant regional bureau. In 2006 S/CRS helped the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs establish a one year strategic plan in Haiti, which led to the Haiti Stabilization Initiative (HSI). HSI was established in 2007 by the U.S. Ambassador to Haiti, Ambassador Sanderson, and consists of three initiatives. First, the initiative serves to augment efforts of the MINUSTAH to re-establish a dedicated police presence in Cite Soleil. "Activities focus on building police infrastructure, as well as training and equipping Haitian National Police officers to staff new police stations" (U.S. Department of State, S/CRS Around the World, Western Hemisphere, Haiti n.d.). Second, HSI supports development projects that involve the residents of Cite Soleil as they rebuild lives beyond violence and poverty. This component consists of three parts:

1. Community-building activities focused on small infrastructure and social activities that generate employment over the short-term and improve the quality of life in Cite Soleil.

2. A public works and productive infrastructure effort to strengthen government presence and local institutions while providing economic opportunity.

3. A rule of law program that will support the Ministry of Justice to establish a permanent judicial presence in Cite Soleil. Under the program, justice officials and community leaders will receive training and equipment to better serve the

local community (U.S. Department of State, S/CRS Around the World, Western

Hemisphere, Haiti n.d.).

Third, as a part of the Government of Haiti's efforts to enhance the standard of living for

Cite Soleil's residents, HSI uses communications and outreach to raise public awareness

and the effectiveness of this initiative. HSI supports ongoing joint efforts of the Haitian

Government, MINUSTAH, and the private community to create conditions for sound

governance and economic growth in Cite Soleil. It also supports other USG efforts to

change conditions for long term assistance projects and private investment.(U.S.

Department of State, S/CRS Around the World, Western Hemisphere, Haiti n.d.). DoD

funding has been crucial to this effort.

HSI is funded through a transfer authority from the Department of Defense.

Section 1207 of the 2006 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) allows the

transfer of funds to the DoS for reconstruction and stabilization activities. Section 1207

provides authority for DOD to transfer to the State Department up to $100 million in

defense articles, services, training or other support in FY 2006 and again in FY2007 to

use for reconstruction, stabilization, and security activities in foreign countries. This

authority was extended through FY 2008 by Section 1210 of the FY 2008. NDAA (P.L.

110-181) and through FY 2009 by the Section 1207 of the FY 2009 Duncan Hunter

NDAA (P.L. 110-417).

Of the $99m in FY 2007, DoD transferred $20m to DoS to combine community

policing with small scale employment and infrastructure projects to improve security and

stability and extend central government authority in Cite Soleil, the largest slum in Port

au Prince. There was zero funding provided under the 1207 program for HSI in FY 2006

or FY 2008, however, the author did find that an additional total of $224, 862.00 was funded in 2007 for Haiti under the following programs controlled by DoS/USAID listed in table 2.

Table 2.   DoS/USAID Funded Programs for Haiti (Other than 1207) FY 2007

Program	Amount in Dollars
CSH	19,800,000
DA	29,700,000
ESF	49,500,000
GHAI	77,265,000
INCLE	14,850,000
FMF	990,000
IMET	215,000
PL 480	32,522,000
Total	224,862,000

Source: U.S. Department of State, *Congressional Budget Justification Errata* (Washington, DC: GPO, 2009), 11.

These figures do not include funds in the Contributions for International Peacekeeping Activities (CIPA) account, which directly support DoS's strategic goal of attaining peace and security consistent with U.S. goals and adoption of UN Security Council resolutions. Successful peacekeeping operations help end violent conflicts, protect vulnerable civilians, nurture new democracies, lower the global tide of refugees, reduce the likelihood of unsanctioned interventions, and prevent small conflicts from growing into larger wars. UN peacekeeping operations directly serve U.S. interests in critical countries at much lower costs than direct U.S. military engagement. UN peacekeeping operations in regions where U.S. military involvement is neither appropriate nor necessary ensure that the burden of providing for international peace and

security is shared as broadly as possible. According to DoS, of the 8504 personnel

assigned to MINSTUAH, 49 were U.S. (Department of State Congressional Budget

Justification 2009). Also, the degree to which MINSTUAH achieved UN Security

Council Resolution which mandated UN Peacekeeping Operations with the goal of re-

establishing peace and security for FY 2006 through 2008 were rated Above Average.

(Department of State Congressional Budget Justification 2009).

Table 3. MINUSTAH Funding	
Amount in Dollars	
FY 2006 (Actual)	93,680,000
FY 2007 (Actual)	86,530,000
FY 2008 (Estimate)	145,822,000
FY 2009 (Request)	114,400,000

Source: U.S. Department of State, *Congressional Budget Justification* (Washington, DC:
GPO, 2009).

S/CRS is organized to build civilian capacity through training, planning

development, and establishment of the DoS's Civilian Response Corps (CRC). S/CRS's

training strategy highlights the scope of coordinated interagency training for operations

under NSPPD 44, and is intended for CRC personnel as well as other relevant USG

civilian and military personnel working to support USG reconstruction and stabilization

operations, including the Interagency Management System (IMS), when activated. The

members of the CRC include the Active Response Corps (CRC-A), the Standby

Response Corps (CRC-S), and the Civilian Reserve Corps (CRC-R).

CSI builds on three years of interagency development, exercises, and pilot efforts to create a robust Civilian Response Corps, the need for which has been consistently highlighted by both the Bush and Obama Administrations. The Reconstruction and Stabilization Civilian Management Act of 2008 (Title XVI of Public Law 110-447) charged the DoS with leading the interagency effort to significantly improve the ability of the United States to respond to conflict and create a civilian counterpart to the U.S. military ready and capable to stabilize countries in the transition from war to peace. This initiative establishes, in law, a permanent interagency civilian reconstruction and stabilization response capacity. This capacity is an essential part of first the Bush, and now the Obama Administration's strategy to enhance the tools of soft power projection and to permit DoD to focus on its core military mission responsibilities. The requested resources in the FY 2010 budget submission will provide funding to build, train, equip, and deploy a 4,250-member interagency Civilian Response Corps managed by S/CRS, if it is funded properly.

The Civilian Response Corps consists of three components:

1. CRC-A officers are full-time Government employees whose specific job is to train for, prepare, and staff reconstruction, stabilization and conflict prevention efforts. They are able to deploy within 48 hours and focus on critical initial interagency functions such as assessment, planning, management, administrative, logistical, and resource mobilization.

2. CRC-S officers are full-time employees of their departments who have specialized expertise useful in reconstruction and stabilization operations and are

available to deploy within 30 days in the event of a reconstruction and/or stabilization operation.

3. CRC-R officers are U.S. citizens who have committed to be available within 45-60 days of call-up to serve as U.S. Government temporary employees in support of overseas reconstruction and stabilization operations. Reserve officers are critical to efforts to bring "normalcy" to countries by filling capabilities career U.S. Government employees simply cannot match in expertise or in number (U.S. Department of State S/CRS 2009).

Beginning in late FY 2008, the ramp-up of the first 100 active responders was funded with $ 75 million ($50 million to DoS, $25 million to USAID) through the FY 2008 supplemental funding appropriated separately to Department of State and USAID. In FY 2009, DoS requested $248 million, and of that $45 million was appropriated to DoS and $30 million through the FY 2009 Omnibus Appropriations Act, provided that $23,014,000 may be made available to provide administrative expenses for S/CRS. In the FY 2010 DoS budget submission, DoS requested $323.3 million for the CSI.

The number of deployments, and increase in capacity build up is an effective indicator of readiness and build up of surge capacity of civilian response and is listed in table 4.

Table 4.	DoS Strategic Goal: Achieving Peace and Security Performance Indicators
Indicator: Sufficient numbers of interagency Active and Standby Response Corps (ARC/SRC) are trained, equipped, and deployable within 7 days (ARC) or 30-60 days (SRC) to support reconstruction operations.	
TARGETS	
FY 2010	Target to be set with FY 2010 budget request.
FY 2009	ARC will have 250 interagency personnel identified. Approximately 22 will be managed directly by S/CRS, while others will be managed by participating agencies. The new interagency ARC will complete core readiness and appropriate force protection courses, as well as attending specialized courses and civil-military exercises focused on Interagency Management Systems (IMS) operations. A total of 1,250 interagency SRC personnel will be identified at State, USAID, DOC, DOJ, USDA, DHS, HHS, and Treasury, and at least 750 interagency civilian members will be trained in R&S core courses. As required, mission-specific and force protection training will be provided for IMS-related operations
FY 2008	ARC will have 12 officers on board with four full time equivalent (FTE) employees all of whom have completed core readiness and appropriate force protection courses and attended specialized courses and civil-military exercises. ARC members respond to multiple requests by support Embassies in the field, and set up forward U.S. expeditionary presence. One hundred SRC complete core training.
FY 2008 Results	Rating Improved over prior year, but not met. Target not met because enabling FTE and funding was not provided. By the end of FY 2008, 13 CRC-A personnel were abroad on details (no FTE provided except for the 3 GS FTE bought). All CRC-A members completed Reconstruction and Stabilization training. CRC-A members deployed to Kosovo, Darfur, Afghanistan, Nepal, and AFRICOM. Over 350 serving DoS employees retained on the Standby component roster, which includes 250 retirees enrolled through the DoS's Retirement Network (RNet). Of the 350 CRC-S registered, more than 50 participated in S/CRS sponsored training. 2 CRC-S deployed to Afghanistan and 1 in Iraq under DoD mission. Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) were better prepared and interests were increasing.
FY 2007	Target not met because enabling FTE and funding was not provided. By the end of FY 2007, 12 ARC personnel were abroad on detail (No FTE provided). All ARC members completed reconstruction and stabilization training. ARC members deployed to Darfur, Haiti, Iraq, Liberia, and AFRICOM. Over 90 serving DoS employees retained on the SRC roster, along with over 250 retirees enrolled through the Department's retirement network. Two SRC members deployed to Sudan and Chad. SOPs worked through participating bureaus to release SRC members.
FY 2006	By end of FY 2006, 12 ARC personnel were aboard on detail (no FTE provided) and fully trained. Six had deployed to Darfur and Chad. Over 90 DoS employees selected and placed on SRC roster, along with over 250 retirees enrolled through RNet. Training and exercise requirements identified.

Source: U.S, Department of State, FY *2008 Performance Report* (Washington, DC: GPO, 2008), 56.

S/CRS's training strategy addresses training needs anticipated over the next five years as USG develops a broad capacity to respond to countries at risk of, in, or emerging from crisis (U.S. Department of State, S/CRS 2008). The training strategy was formulated by the Training, Education, Exercises, and Experimentation Sub PCC (TE3), which functions as a cross-cutting and supporting body to the Reconstruction and Stabilization PCC and its sub groups with the aim of improving USG readiness to conduct Reconstruction and Stabilization operations by maximizing the benefit of participation in training, education, exercises, and experimentation (Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute 2008).

The TE3 consists of members from the Departments of Treasury, Commerce, Homeland Security, Justice, Agriculture, Personnel Management, Health and Human Services, Defense, State, as well as the US Institute for Peace, and USAID. While this training framework was approved by the Reconstruction and Stabilization PCC in June 2008, its implementation has been slowed due to the lack of funding.

Planning Framework for Reconstruction and Stabilization

While the *Planning Framework for Reconstruction and Stabilization* was drafted in December 2005, with much assistance from DoD, a much more scaled down version was only recently approved by the Reconstruction and Stabilization PCC in May 2008 (United States Joint Forces Command J7 Pamphlet 2005). Its purpose is to provide a guide for how the USG should develop civilian plans for reconstruction and stabilization operations. It addresses two activities, crisis response planning, and long term scenario based planning for reconstruction and stabilization crisis-response planning addresses an imminent or existing crisis. Long-term, scenario-based planning addresses potential

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future crises, usually years in advance. In this respect, long-term planning is similar to the military's contingency or deliberate planning.

The framework also outlines a planning process consisting of four steps: (1) situation analysis, (2) policy formulation, (3) strategy development, and (4) interagency implementation planning. (U.S. Department of State, S/CRS 2008) Situation analysis is most useful for analyzing an imminent or existing crisis to gather information and building an accurate picture of conditions and developments. The goal of the policy-formulation step is to get planning guidance, including the overall goal of the operation and any critical planning assumptions or considerations that need to be factored into the plan, from senior leaders in the Deputies Committee or Principals Committee. Strategy development and interagency implementation planning are the two phases of plan development. Development of the strategic plan occurs in Washington at the PCC level, and development of the implementation plan occurs within the country team.

One of the primary challenges in reaching interagency agreement on the framework lay in the difficulties of reconciling military and civilian planning cultures. It is commonly understood that DoD and DoS have different approaches to planning, in large part because of their different missions. S/CRS initially shared the DoS's planning culture, which focuses on programmatic planning for the next fiscal year and not on planning for unforeseen contingencies. Over time, however, the office's specific mission led it to adopt more contingency planning approaches in support of its long term, scenario based planning. The planning framework has been used to help develop plans for ongoing operations in Haiti, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. It has not yet been used to develop a contingency plan that could be integrated with existing military contingency plans.

How Does USSOUTHCOM Contribute to Interagency
Eforts for Reconstruction and Stabilization?

>An interagency oriented organization seeking to support security and
stability in the Americas

>USSOUTHCOM Vision Statement, 26 January, 2009

As one of six geographic combatant commands, USSOUTHCOM serves as a role model for DoD interagency coordination by its efforts to ensure security, enhance stability, and enable partnerships. It is a joint command comprised of more than 1,200 military and civilian personnel representing the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, and several other federal agencies. "The services provide SOUTHCOM with component commands which, along with the Joint Special Operations component, two Joint Task Forces, one Joint Interagency Task Force, and Security Assistance Offices, perform SOUTHCOM missions and security cooperation activities" (USSOUTHCOM 2009).

The number of joint operations in SOUTHCOM's AOR with participating countries in the Western Hemisphere is listed in Table 5 and is used by DoS as a measure of performance for its strategic goal of achieving peace and security.

Table 5.	Number of Joint Operations and Exercises with Participating Countries in the Western Hemisphere.							
	FY 2005 Results	FY 2006 Results	FY 2007 Results	FY 2008 Target	FY 2008 Results	FY 2008 Rating	FY 2009 Target	FY 2010
	150	156	233	160	211	Above Average	175	Pending Budget Request
Indicator Rationale	This indicator measures the willingness of regional partners to work with the U.S. in meeting common security objectives. Participation above 140 joint operations/exercises every year since 2003 indicates a high degree of regional cooperation.							
Impact	Joint military-to-military interactions bolster regional cooperation, and strengthen partner nations' operational capabilities to anticipate and respond to maritime threats, emergencies, and natural disasters.							
Data Source and Quality	The USSOUTHCOM provides operational and exercise data. The indicator measures the willingness of regional partners to work with the U.S. in meeting common security objectives. Note: A new methodology for counting exercises was used starting in FY 2007. FY 2007 and out-year targets have been revised accordingly.							

Source: U.S. Department of State, FY 2008 Performance Report (Washington, DC: GPO, 2009), 53-4.

USNS Comfort Mission 2007

> *USNS COMFORT.* A very visible and successful recent initiative was the deployment of the hospital ship *COMFORT* to the Caribbean, Central America, and South America. For four months . . . this unique ship--with its specially tailored joint, interagency, international, and private sector crew--traveled to 12 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean to bring modern medical care to almost 100,000 men, women, and children through nearly 400,000 patient encounters is symbol of goodwill brought renewed hope to those who might have given up on a healthy future and to those who might have previously been sympathetic to anti-U.S. rhetoric. One deployment alone directly changed the lives of many and indirectly touched the lives of several hundred thousand throughout the region.

<div align="right">Admiral James Stavridis</div>

On March 5, 2007, President Bush announced that he would send the USNS Comfort, a Navy medical ship, to Latin America and the Caribbean. "The Comfort will make port calls in Belize, Guatemala, Panama, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, Haiti, Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana, and Suriname. Its doctors, nurses, and healthcare professionals expect to treat 85,000 patients and conduct up to 1,500 surgeries. The Comfort will also partner with the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services on a new initiative to provide oral care to the region's poor" (The White House, President George W. Bush 2007).

The Comfort deployed on a four month humanitarian mission to Central America and the Caribbean with over 740 personnel. Of that number, more than 500 were made up the medical crew comprised of sailors, coastguardsmen, airmen, soldiers, Canadian troops, and U.S. Public Health Service health care professionals along with representatives from NGOs like Project Hope, and Operation Smile. Comfort was operated and navigated by a crew of 68 civil service mariners (CIVMARS) from the Military Sealift Command (MSC). Mission MOPs are listed in table 6.

This deployment is truly a joint civil-military team. We have more than 200 different organizations represented on COMFORT to include the Navy, Army, Air Force, Coast Guard, the U.S. Public Health Service, Canadians, and volunteers from Project Hope. We have had donations of medical equipment and medicines from all over the United States. A hospital system in Green Bay, Wisconsin, donated medical equipment for us to give away, and the Lions Club of America donated 30,000 pairs of glasses. These are just a few examples of the spirit of community involvement and volunteerism that is one of the trademarks of the United States of America. (Kapcio 2007)

Table 6.	USNS Comfort Mission Measures of Performance (MOP)		
Location	Patients Treated	Patient Encounters	Seabee-led Construction Projects
Belize (June 20-26)	1,281	3,372	Refurbished two rural schools.
Guatemala (June 26-July2)	5,365	23,065	Renovated Puerto Barrios Children's Hospital.
Panama (July 4-10)	8,690	29,028	Improved Patricia Duncan Clinic.
Nicaragua (July 18-25)	8,355	28,345	Renovated Julio Health Care Center.
El Salvador (July 25-Aug. 1)	12,554	47,876	Renovated several work sites.
Peru (Aug. 6-13)	9,360	46,441	Renovated 3 schools, built a theater stage and 10 soccer goals.
Ecuador (Aug. 15-21)	12,060	51,028	Renovated 5 sites (schools & clinics).
Colombia (Aug. 22-28)	6,597	27,131	Built medical facility in La Sierpe.
Haiti (Sept. 1-8)	11,833	39,533	Renovated the Centre de Sante health training center.
Trinidad & Tobago (Sept. 16-22)	8,744	30,560	Renovated the South East Port-of-Spain Secondary School.
Guyana (Sept. 23-Oct. 1)	10,081	44,608	Renovated a school and health center.
Suriname (Oct. 1-8)	3,738	15,222	Renovated Zanderij Clinic.

Summary

DFA is charged, by the Secretary of State, to lead strategic, operational, and performance planning of U.S. foreign assistance with a focus on aligning resources with policy priorities. One way in which DoS improved its organizational structure was by dual-hatting the Coordinator S/CRS as the Deputy Director of Foreign Assistance. GAO noted that this measure assists S/CRS to coordinate the integration of diplomatic, defense, development, and economic tools of the USG in countries in risk of, in, or in transition from conflict or civil strife. The importance of this relationship with S/CRS is evidenced

in the case study of the HSI, which underscored the myriad sources of funding, and the need for a funded civilian response corps.

The analysis of the IMS revealed that while it is a flexible tool for S/CRS to incorporate a whole of government approach to reconstruction and stabilization operations, not much progress has been made on its full implementation due to the lack of funding. Much work has been done to develop the Interagency Management System, but more remains. S/CRS is using parts of the system and deploying small proto-type civilian teams in real country engagements.

Analysis of the Civilian Response Corps revealed that in the nearly four years since NSPD 44, the civilian capacity for reconstruction and stabilization operations has improved over prior years, however, as of the end of FY2008, only 13 members of the Active Response Corps were deployed overseas, and 2 members of the Standby Response Corps were deployed to Afghanistan, and 1 to Iraq. Improvements included the training of over 250 Active Response Corps members in early 2009, however, a comparison of the FY 2009 DoS budget request and the FY 2009 Omnibus Appropriations Act revealed that only approximately 30% of the original request was appropriated.

Analysis of the planning framework for stabilization and reconstruction revealed that it has been used to help develop plans for ongoing operations in Haiti, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. It has not yet been used to develop a contingency plan that could be integrated with existing military plans.

Finally, an analysis of USSOUTHCOM revealed that DoD's regional combatant commands lead the effort on reconstruction and stabilization efforts because of the vast resources at its disposal. Also, missions such as the USNS Comfort deployment to

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Central America demonstrate how DoD can integrate the instruments of national power to meet overall strategic goals.

The purpose of this chapter was to provide the analysis of the secondary research questions which will be used to answer the primary research question.

The primary research question this thesis will answer is: Given the promulgation of NSPD 44 in December 2005, has the Secretary of State, through the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), taken the lead on interagency efforts concerning reconstruction and stabilization?

The secondary research questions that were analyzed are: (1). What is the mission and organizational structure of S/CRS, and how is it related to the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance (DFA)? (2).What are the recent efforts of S/CRS to build civilian capacity under NSPD 44? (3). How does USSOUTHCOM contribute to interagency coordination efforts for reconstruction and stabilization?

Based on the analysis of the secondary research questions, the author concluded that the answer to the primary research question is: No, the Secretary of State, through the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) has not taken the lead on interagency efforts concerning reconstruction and stabilization. The next chapter, Chapter 5 will provide a brief summary of the findings from Chapter 4, outline the conclusions, and will provide recommendations for future research.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The previous chapter provided the analysis of the secondary research questions which were used to answer the primary research question of this thesis. The primary research question is: Given the promulgation of NSPD 44 in December 2005, has the Secretary of State, through the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), taken the lead on interagency efforts concerning reconstruction and stabilization?

Chapter 5 will first provide a brief summary of the findings from Chapter 4, second, it will interpret those findings in the conclusions, and third it will provide recommendation for further study.

Summary

DFA is charged, by the Secretary of State, to lead strategic, operational, and performance planning of U.S. foreign assistance with a focus on aligning resources with policy priorities. One way in which DoS improved its organizational structure was by dual-hatting the Coordinator S/CRS as the Deputy Director of Foreign Assistance. GAO noted that this measure assists S/CRS to coordinate the integration of diplomatic, defense, development, and economic tools of the USG in countries in risk of, in, or in transition from conflict or civil strife. The importance of this relationship with S/CRS is evidenced in the case study of the HSI, which underscored the myriad sources of funding, and the need for a funded civilian response corps.

The analysis of the IMS revealed that while it is a flexible tool for S/CRS to incorporate a whole of government approach to reconstruction and stabilization

operations, not much progress has been made on its full implementation due to the lack of funding. Much work has been done to develop the Interagency Management System, but more remains. S/CRS is using parts of the system and deploying small proto-type civilian teams in real country engagements.

Analysis of the Civilian Response Corps revealed that in the nearly four years since NSPD 44, the civilian capacity for reconstruction and stabilization operations has improved over prior years, however, as of the end of FY 2008, only 13 members of the Active Response Corps were deployed overseas, and 2 members of the Standby Response Corps were deployed to Afghanistan, and 1 to Iraq. Improvements included the training of over 250 Active Response Corps members in early 2009, however, a comparison of the FY 2009 DoS budget request and the FY 2009 Omnibus Appropriations Act revealed that only approximately 30% of the original request was appropriated for the CSI.

Analysis of the planning framework for stabilization and reconstruction revealed it has been used to help develop plans for ongoing operations in Haiti, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. As of the time of this writing, it has not yet been used to develop a contingency plan that could be integrated with existing military plans.

Finally, an analysis of USSOUTHCOM revealed that DoD's regional combatant commands lead the effort on reconstruction and stabilization efforts because of the vast resources at its disposal. Also, missions such as the USNS Comfort deployment to Central America demonstrate how DoD can integrate the instruments of national power to meet overall strategic goals.

<u>Conclusions</u>

We must improve the responsiveness of our government to help nations emerging from tyranny and war…and that means our government must be able to move quickly to provide needed assistance

President George W. Bush, 17 May 2005

In December 2005, President Bush signed into effect NSPD 44, *Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization*, in an attempt to promote increased interagency coordination and planning. This policy directed the DoS to "coordinate and lead integrated United States Government efforts, involving all U.S. Departments and Agencies with relevant capabilities, to prepare, plan for, and conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities as lead agency for stabilization and reconstruction efforts" (Bush 2005). While this directive is intended to promote coordination issues among United States GOs and NGOs, it does not lay out an effective framework for interagency coordination. Also, given that DoD has a greater share of resources, in terms of budget and personnel, DoD has the capacity, and continues to assume more responsibility for ongoing stabilization and reconstruction efforts.

Careful review of NSPD 44 and DoD Directive 3000.05 alludes to the potential hazards of an increased civilian capacity without commensurate authority over budget resources. NSPD 44 established S/CRS as a focal point to coordinate the multiple entities of the USG to achieve maximum results in efforts concerning reconstruction and stabilization, however, the directive fails to provide the Coordinator S/CRS with clear authority over other governmental organizations, and does not provide the budgetary resources necessary to implement the concept. While some progress has been made by DoS to increase the civilian capacity for reconstruction and stabilization efforts, attempts

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remain largely unsuccessful to obtain the requisite authorities and appropriations from Congress nearly four years after the promulgation of NSPD 44.

In November 2005, the Secretary of Defense approved DoD Directive 3000.05, *Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations.* For the first time, this directive established stability operations as a core mission on par with combat operations. This directive acknowledges that stability operations are best performed by indigenous, foreign, or U.S. civilian professionals, however, it also requires the military to be prepared to accomplish these tasks when civilians cannot. As such, two separate departments are attempting to build the capacity to conduct stability operations, DoS as the US government's main effort and DoD as a second temporary option. Given the slow progress of NSPD 44, and the ability of DoD to respond to this mission there is a chance that the civilian capability will never fully materialize, and by default, DoD will continue to lead interagency efforts.

Authority of the Secretary of State to manage foreign assistance provides the foundation for a coordinated interagency response to stabilization and reconstruction activities, however, based on the analysis of the secondary research questions, the author concluded that the answer to the primary research question is: No, the Secretary of State, through the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization has not taken the lead on interagency efforts concerning reconstruction and stabilization.

Recommendations

Based on the outcome of this research, the author determined that while funding for USG civilian capacity for reconstruction and stabilization efforts has increased slightly in recent years, it still is nowhere near the level required to stand up, equip, and

train members of the civilian response corps. Since DoD will continue to play a vital role in carrying out reconstruction and stabilization operations, it is the author's view that further research is required to come up with new ideas in areas where DoD can use its vast resources to integrate USG agencies and NGOs, much the same way as the USNS Comfort mission, to positively affect civilian populations around the world.

> New institutions are needed for the 21st century, new organizations with a 21st century mindset.

> ― Defense Secretary Robert Gates

GLOSSARY

COCOM (command authority): Non-transferrable command authority established by title 10 (Armed Forces), *U.S. Code*, Section 164, exercised only by commanders of unified or specified combatant commands unless otherwise directed by the President of Secretary of Defense. COCOM (command authority) cannot be delegated and is the authority of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. COCOM authority should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through the subordinate joint force commanders and service and/or component commanders. COCOM authority provides full authority to organize and employ commands and forces as the combatant commander considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control is inherent in COCOM authority. (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2001)

Interagency conflict assessment framework (ICAF): A tool that enables an interagency team to assess conflict situations systemically and collaboratively; it supports USG interagency planning for conflict prevention, mitigation, and stabilization. (U.S. Army 2008)

Interagency coordination: Within the context of Department of Defense involvement, the coordination that occurs between elements of Department of Defense, and engaged US Government agencies for the purpose of achieving an objective. (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2001)

Measures of effectiveness: A criterion used to assess changes in system behavior, capability, or operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect. Also called MOE. (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2001)

Measure of performance: A criterion used to assess friendly action that is tied to measuring task accomplishment. Also called MOP. (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2001)

Mission Statement: A short sentence or paragraph that describes the organization's essential task (or tasks) and purpose—a clear statement of the action to be taken and the reason for doing so. The mission statement contains the elements of who, what, when, where, and why, but seldom specifies how. (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2001)

Non Governmental Organization: A private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict

resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society. (U.S. Army 2008)

Operational level of war: The level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to achieve strategic objectives within theaters or other operational areas. Activities at this level link tactics and strategy by establishing operational objectives needed to achieve the strategic objectives, sequencing events to achieve the operational objectives, initiating actions, and applying resources to bring about and sustain these events. (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2001)

Stability operations: An overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitairan relief. (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2001)

Strategic level of war: The level of war at which a nation, often as a member of a group of nations, determines national or multinational (alliance or coalition) strategic security objectives and guidance, and develops and uses national resources to achieve these objectives. Activities at this level establish national and multinational military objectives; sequence initiatives; define limits and assess risks for the use of military and other instruments of national power; develop global plans or theater war plans to achieve those objectives; and provide military forces and other capabilities in accordance with strategic plans. (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2001)

Tactical level of war: The level of war at which battles and engagements are planned and executed to achieve military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces.Activities at this level focus on the ordered arrangement and maneuver of combat elements in relation to each other and to the enemy to achieve combat objectives. (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2001)

APPENDIX A

FOREIGN ASSISTANCE FRAMEWORK

FOREIGN ASSISTANCE FRAMEWORK

AS OF JANUARY 29, 2007

Goal: "To help build and sustain democratic, well-governed states that respond to the needs of their people, reduce widespread poverty and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system."

Objectives	Peace and Security	Governing Justly and Democratically	Investing in People	Economic Growth	Humanitarian Assistance	End Goal of US Foreign Assistance	Graduation Trajectory
Accounts within State/USAID	FMF, TI, IMET, ESF, INCLE, NADR, PKO, ACI, FSA, SEED	DA, TI, SEED, FSA, DF, ESF, INCLE, IO&P, ACI	DA, CSH, ESF, IDFA, IO&P, FSA, SEED, GHAI, ACI, Title II	DA, ESF, SEED, FSA, IO&P, ACI, Title II	IDFA, MRA, ERMA, ACI, Title II		
			Other USG Agency Contributions				
Foreign Assistance Program Areas	> Counter Terrorism > Combating WMD > Stabilization Operations and Defense Reform > Counternarcotics > Transnational Crime > Conflict Mitigation and Response	> Rule of Law and Human Rights > Good Governance > Political Competition and Consensus-Building > Civil Society	> Health > Education > Social Services and Protection for Vulnerable Populations	> Macroeconomic Foundation for Growth > Trade and Investment > Financial Sector > Infrastructure > Agriculture > Private Sector Competitiveness > Economic Opportunity > Environment	> Protection, Assistance and Solutions > Disaster Readiness > Migration Management		
Category Definition							
Rebuilding Countries States in or emerging from and rebuilding after internal or external conflict.	Prevent or mitigate state failure and/or violent conflict.	Assist in creating and/or stabilizing a legitimate and democratic government and a supportive environment for civil society and media.	Start or restart the delivery of critical social services, including health and educational facilities, and begin building or rebuilding institutional capacity.	Assist in the construction or reconstruction of key internal infrastructure and market mechanisms to stabilize the economy.	Address immediate needs of refugees, displaced, and other affected groups.	Stable environment for good governance. Increased availability of essential social services, and initial progress to create policies and institutions upon which future progress will rest.	Advance to the Developing or Transforming Category.
Developing Countries States with low or lower-middle income, not yet meeting MCC performance criteria, and the criterion related to political rights.	Address key remaining challenges to security and law enforcement.	Support policies and programs that accelerate and strengthen public institutions and the creation of a more vibrant local government, civil society and media.	Encourage social policies that deepen the ability of institutions to establish appropriate roles for the public and private sector in service delivery.	Encourage economic policies and strengthen institutional capacity to promote broad-based growth.	Encourage reduced need for future HA by introducing prevention and mitigation strategies, while continuing to address emergency needs.	Continued progress in expanding and deepening democracy; strengthening public and private institutions, and supporting policies that promote economic growth and poverty reduction.	Advance to the Transforming Category.
Transforming Countries States with low or lower-middle income, meeting MCC performance criteria and the criterion related to political rights.	Nurture progress toward partnerships on security and law enforcement.	Provide limited resources and technical assistance to reinforce democratic institutions.	Provide financial resources and limited technical assistance to sustain improved livelihoods.	Provide financial resources and technical assistance to promote broad-based growth.	Address emergency needs on a short-term basis, as necessary.	Government, civil society and private-sector institutions capable of sustaining development progress.	Advance to the Sustaining Partnership Category or graduate from foreign assistance.
Sustaining Partnership Countries States with upper-middle income or greater for which U.S. support is provided to sustain partnerships, progress, and peace.	Support strategic partnerships addressing security, CT, WMD, and counter-narcotics.	Address issues of mutual interest.	Address issues of mutual interest.	Create and promote sustained partnerships on trade and investment.	Address emergency needs on a short-term basis, as necessary.	Continued partnership strategically appropriate where U.S. support is necessary to maintain progress and peace.	Continue partnership or graduate from foreign assistance.
Restrictive Countries States of concern where there are significant governance issues.	Prevent the acquisition/proliferation of WMD, support CT and counter narcotics.	Foster effective democracy and responsible sovereignty. Create local capacity for fortification of civil society and path to democratic governance.	Address humanitarian needs.	Promote a market-based economy.	Address emergency needs on a short-term basis, as necessary.	Civil society empowered to demand more effective democracies and states respectful of human dignity, accountable to their citizens, and responsible towards their neighbors.	Advance to other relevant foreign assistance category.
Global or Regional	Activities that advance the five objectives, transcend a single country's borders, and are addressed outside a country strategy.					Achievement of foreign assistance goal and objectives.	Determined based on criteria specific to the global or regional objective.

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