THE MOST EFFECTIVE SOUTH KOREA – U.S. COMBINED FORCES COMMAND STRUCTURE AFTER RETURNING WARTIME OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF THE SOUTH KOREAN MILITARY

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
General Studies

by

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### Abstract

The core of the 50-year South Korea-U.S. alliance, the Combined Forces Command (CFC), was established on November 7, 1978 to employ operational control of the South Korean military and U.S. forces in South Korea. The CFC has been effective in deterring war on the Korean peninsula. However, impetus for a new CFC has developed from the diverging U.S. and South Korean policy toward North Korea. With this U.S. strategy and different perceptions toward North Korea, the U.S. began working to transfer operational control of the South Korean military forces to the South Korean government. The CFC is projected to be dismantled during 2012 and wartime operational control of the South Korean military transferred to the South Korean government.

The South Korean government needs to focus on how to strengthen the military alliance between the U.S. and South Korea based on an agreement to contribute to the stability on the Korean peninsula and Northeast Asia. Therefore, this paper drew success criteria for an effective command structure from warfighting functions from three historic case studies on multinational command structure (the Korean War, the Vietnam War and the Gulf War) and applied those criteria to identify the most effective South Korea-U.S. combined forces command structure after returning the wartime operational control of the South Korean military to the South Korean government.

### Subject Terms

- unity of effort
- adaptive to emergent threats
- interoperability
- common operational picture
- CFC
- warfighting function
- Korean War
- Vietnam War
- Gulf War
- CORDS
- multinational operation
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
THE MOST EFFECTIVE SOUTH KOREA- U.S. COMBINED FORCES COMMAND STRUCTURE AFTER RETURNING WARTIME OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF THE SOUTH KOREAN MILITARY, by MAJ Jinbu Kim, 87 pages.

The core of the 50-year South Korea-U.S. alliance, the Combined Forces Command (CFC), was established on November 7, 1978 to employ operational control of the South Korean military and U.S. forces in South Korea with U.S. augmentation from the Pacific and the United States. The CFC has been effective in deterring war on the Korean peninsula. However, impetus for a new combined forces command developed from the diverging U.S. and South Korean perspectives and policies. The necessity for single unified command decreased and the way South Korean people think about North Korea and its alliance with the U.S. changed a lot.

With this US strategy and different perceptions toward North Korea, the U.S. began working to transfer operational control of the South Korean military forces to the South Korean government. In 1994, the CFC commander transferred peacetime operational control of the South Korean military to the South Korean government. The CFC is projected to be dismantled during 2012 and wartime operational control of the South Korean military transferred to the South Korean government.

The South Korean government needs to focus on how to strengthen the military alliance between the U.S. and South Korea based on an agreement to contribute to the stability on the Korean peninsula and Northeast Asia. The strong military alliance to maintain combat readiness for North Korea conventional threats comes down to CFC structure. Therefore, this paper drew success criteria for an effective command structure from warfighting functions from three historic case studies on multinational command structure (the Korean War, the Vietnam War and the Gulf War) and applied those criteria to identify the most effective South Korea-U.S. combined forces command structure after the wartime operational control of the South Korean military is returned to the South Korean government.
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Do as best as you can, then God will do the rest.

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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

The core of the 50-year South Korea-U.S. alliance has been the Combined Forces Command (CFC). The CFC was established on November 7, 1978 to employ operational control of the South Korean military and United States forces in South Korea with U.S. augmentation from the Pacific and the U.S. Its mission is to deter hostile acts of external aggression against South Korea by a combined military effort of the U.S. and South Korea; and in the event deterrence fails, defeat an external armed attack against South Korea. The CFC is commanded by a U.S. general officer who reports to the national command authorities of both countries.

The history of CFC goes back to the Korean War. The president of South Korea handed operational control of the South Korea military over to the United Nations Command (UNC) commander early during the Korean War. The president of South Korea acknowledged that the South Korean military could not defend South Korea against the communists alone and needed to place the South Korean military under the command of the UNC creating a unified chain of command for the 16 allied countries that made up UNC. Operational control was transferred to the CFC commander from the UNC commander after the CFC was established in 1978. Since then, the South Korean and U.S. CFC has been effective in deterring war on the Korean peninsula. However, impetus for a new combined forces command developed from the diverging U.S. and South Korean perspectives and policies.

There are several factors driving the effort to develop a new command structure in the South Korean military. First of all, the necessity for a single command is decreasing
from the U.S. point of view. A more versatile command structure is necessary to meet the
2006 U.S. national security strategy, especially such objectives as defeating global
terrorism and defusing regional conflicts.\(^2\) In this U.S. national security strategy, the
focus is to guard against a variety of potential threats and to respond swiftly to multiple
regional conflicts, because the present danger comes from asymmetrical threats and
transnational threats that are difficult to predict. This change in the nature of expected
threats led the U.S. to change diplomatic and military strategy. The new strategy is
focused on transformational diplomacy with the option of preemptive military attack to
draw a change of behavior within conflicted areas. This paradigm shifted U.S. focus from
military basing to mobility, strategic projection capability, and long-range precision
attack. U.S. forces needed more strategic flexibility in order to respond to unexpected
incidents. That is why the U.S. developed modular forces capable of deployment in
multiple conflicts while simultaneously creating the need to change the CFC structure.

Secondly, the way South Korean people think about North Korea and its alliance
with the U.S. changed a lot and those changes influenced changing the current CFC. The
different perceptions toward North Korea between South Korea and the U.S. diverge in
that South Korea and the U.S. alliance worked to deter military threats from North Korea,
even after the Cold-War. However, two North and South Korean summits in the last
decade, the first in 2000 and the second in 2007, and the continuous economic
cooperation in the Gaesong industrial complex, showed that North Korea had a different
perception toward their relationship with the U.S. and South Korea.\(^3\) The U.S. considers
North Korea as an axis of evil terrorist country. South Korea considers North Korea as a
threat, but also hopes to see it as a partner of cooperation over the long-term.\(^4\) The South
Korean public’s sense of external threat was reduced significantly after the Cold War produced a period of economic free-fall in North Korea. While the North Korea nuclear missile development program was in progress, it was still possible to travel by cruise ship. Another difference in perspective is how the South Korean people see the South Korea – U.S. alliance. They consider the alliance unequal and further insist that South Korea needs to be independent from the U.S. led defense operational plan. They tend to favor increasing South Korea’s self-defense capacity and reducing its dependence on the U.S. military.

With this U.S. strategy and different perceptions toward North Korea, the U.S. began working to transfer operational control of the South Korean military forces to the South Korean government. In 1991 after the Cold War ended, the U.S. wanted to withdraw U.S. forces from South Korea based on the East Asia Strategic Initiative (EASI) of 1990, which is a document that describes post-Cold War U.S. goals for the East Asia region, and prescribed a change in U.S. strategy toward East Asia. The East Asia Strategic Initiative (EASI) focused primarily on military security issues, with some reference to ideological concerns such as the expansion of democracy, human rights, and the promotion of other Western values. In 1994, the CFC commander transferred peacetime operational control of the South Korean military to the South Korean government, even though North Korea’s continuous efforts to develop a nuclear missile program hindered efforts to facilitate transferring operational control to South Korea. However, the CFC still maintained control of the South Korean military in time of war. Later on February 23, 2007, the U.S. and South Korea ministers of defense made an agreement for a monumental change of the CFC. In that agreement, the CFC is projected
to be dismantled during 2012 and operational control of the South Korean military
transferred to the South Korean government. This agreement was achieved during the
39th Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) for allied partnership ministerial--level talks
held on November 7, 2007. They further agreed to work on the details of the new South
Korea-U.S. combined forces structure. What does this mean to South Korea? Does South
Korea still need self-defense or help from the U.S. through a different form of combined
forces command?

There are many arguments for and against changing the system of command and
control structure in South Korea. Opponents argue that the agreement between the U.S.
and South Korea should be renegotiated, because dismantling the South Korea – U.S.
CFC could negatively impact the security of Northeast Asia by destabilizing the balance
of power in the region. They also argue that South Korea does not have sufficient
intelligence, surveillance assets, long-distance artillery, and target monitoring assets to
completely counter the North Korean threat. They insist that South Korea could not
handle an unexpected crisis on the Korean peninsula after dismantling the CFC. There is
still instability on the Korean peninsula due to the questionable intentions of North
Korea’s government. On February 10, 2005, North Korea announced the possession of a
nuclear weapon, and launched a long range missile test on October 16, 2006.7

Furthermore, conventional South Korea military forces could not compete with a North
Korean military backed by nuclear missiles.

Supporters of a change in command structure insist that South Korea has
developed sufficiently and has enough military capability to take over operational control
of its military. They insist that South Korea is an independent country and should have
operational control of its military. Rendering operational control to another country is a violation of South Korea’s sovereignty. They also argue that the U.S. reason for staying in South Korea is to further its own national interest in Northeast Asia--supporting South Korea as a counterweight to China. Which opinion is appropriate for the future of South Korea? The answer is somewhere in between. Countries can maintain their sovereignty if their national security is ensured. The South Korean government needs to focus on how to strengthen the military alliance between the U.S. and South Korea based on an agreement to contribute to the stability on the Korean peninsula and Northeast Asia. The answer could be an effective combined forces structure with South Korea in control, supported by U.S. military assets. In this context, the purpose of this research is to identify the most effective South Korea-U.S. combined forces structure after the wartime operational control of the South Korean military is returned to the South Korean government.

**Research Outline**

The introduction to this thesis sought to establish an understanding of the South Korea–U.S. combined forces command to find out what the driving factors were for the development of a new combined forces command.

Chapter 2 is the literature review. There is extensive literature on command structure of coalition and alliance forces. The review will look at official documents that dealt with the historical evolution of the South Korea-U.S. CFC and the importance of command structure. U.S. doctrinal command structure documents and their application will be examined to help understand which command structure worked and failed with multinational forces command. The U.S. JP 3-16 is the good doctrinal publication
available for multinational command structure. South Korean scholarly views on CFC will also be examined. Scholars in Korea tend to address the command structure for CFC, while scholars in the U.S. are more likely to focus on historic case studies about multinational command structure.

Chapter 3 will discuss the research methodology. A comparative study will be conducted to identify success and failure criteria in multinational forces for a combined forces command. This chapter will provide the overarching framework for completing the research.

Chapter 4 will examine and compare historic case studies on multinational command structure to identify which command structures worked and which failed. Success and failure criteria drawn from historic case studies will be applied to develop a new command structure for a combined forces command.

Chapter 5 will conclude the study and propose an effective command structure for CFC to meet the needs of both South Korea and the U.S. government. Where appropriate, it is intended that the proposed command structure will impact discussion of the future role of Joint Chief of Staff in South Korea.

**Research Questions**

The primary question of this thesis is “what will be the most effective South Korea-U.S. military combined force structure after returning the wartime operational control of the South Korean military back to the South Korean government?” To answer this question, this research will examine these secondary questions as follows.

What historic examples have worked and failed with multinational force commands?
What are the success criteria withdrawn from warfighting functions that can be applied to develop the command structure of a combined forces command?

What are the components of the warfighting functions that meet the success criteria for the effective South Korea-U.S. combined command structure?

Is the role of CFC confined to defending against North Korean conventional threats?

Assumptions

In order to conduct this study, certain assumptions are required. First, U.S. forces in Korea will continue their military role in South Korea even after the dismantlement of CFC. Second, the U.S. and South Korea will choose a parallel command structure to meet both governments’ needs for a new combined forces command. Once the present integrated command structure of CFC is dismantled, the U.S. will not place its forces under the South Korean military. In JP 3-16 Multinational Operations, as Commander-in-Chief, the President always retains and cannot relinquish national command authority over U.S. forces. Likewise, the South Korean people also do not want to put its forces under the U.S. command authority.

Limitations and Delimitations

The analysis is subject to the national interest specified in the national strategy, and the political agreement between South Korea and the U.S. The thesis is limited to the scholastic research with a logical flow. It will not address political contexts and implications. This paper will not discuss the command structure that deals with a nuclear threat on the Korean peninsula, which is a political issue and a classified discussion.


The construction of the Gaeseong Industrial Complex is an economic cooperation project that will bring together the technologies of the South and the labor and rich resources of the North Korea for mutual benefit, and the construction of the Gaeseong complex is an essential part of a larger project that is aimed at developing an inter-Korean economic entity. This document is available online at: http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/rok/2003/rok-030709-korea-net04.htm


Levin, 25.


There were two exemptions in Afghanistan that U.S. troops were put under NATO and under Polish command. Donna Miles, “12,000 U.S. Troops in Afghanistan to Serve Under NATO,” *American Forces Press Service*, October 4, 2006, and U.S. troops in Afghanistan to Fall Under Polish Command, *Mideast Stars and Stripes*, May 9, 2007.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

A multinational force commander’s primary duty is to unify the efforts of the multinational force toward common objectives.

JP 3-16, *Multinational Operations*

General

There is sufficient literature to provide a good understanding of the basis for the South Korea- U.S. Combined Forces Command (CFC) structure. The literature can be broken into four categories: the historical evolution of the South Korea-U.S. combined forces structure in official documents, the purpose of the command structure in the coalition and alliance, doctrinal command structure documents and their application, and scholarly opinions on the issue.

The Historical Evolution of the South Korea-U.S. Combined Forces Structure in Official Documents

There are numerous historical agreements and memorandums that show the evolvement of the CFC in South Korea, dating as far back as 1953. Those are mutual defense agreements, terms of reference (TOR) for the military committee and South Korea-U.S. CFC, exchange of notes for the establishment of the ROK/U.S. combined forces command and security consultative meeting (SCM) joint communiqués.

The initial defense agreement between South Korea and the U.S. is the South Korea-U.S. mutual defense agreement signed in 1953 at the close of the Korean War. However, operational control was not mentioned in that agreement. Operational control of the South Korean military was mentioned in article 2 of the ‘agreed minutes and amendment thereto between the governments of the Republic of Korea and the United
States of America relating to continued cooperation in economic and military matters and amendment to the agreed minute of November 17, 1954’ as follows.

Retain Republic of Korea forces under the operational control of the United Nations command while that Command has responsibilities for the defense of the Republic of Korea, unless after consultation it is agreed that our mutual and individual interest would best be served by a change.¹

Operational control was defined in the mutual agreement between U.S. and South Korea as stated above; this meant that the range of authority was confined to military operations. The South Korea-U.S. mutual defense agreement, signed on October 1, 1953, prescribed the South Korea-U.S. security gathering, comprised of the SCM and military committee (MC). The U.S. president special envoy Cyrus R. Vance on Feb 1968, suggested using the SCM because of rising tension on the Korean peninsula following the USS Pueblo incident and force deployment to Vietnam in 1968.² The SCM is a system that assesses military threats and establishes the policy encompassing general security in Northeast Asia. The MC was established on July 27, 1978 under an agreement of the SCM to coordinate military affairs between South Korea and the U.S. after the establishment of CFC.³ The SCM gives strategic guidance to the MC. The MC has an oversight of the CFC and gives an operational guidance or strategic directive to the CFC. The MC issued a strategic directive No.1, which was the foundation for establishing the CFC on July 28, 1978.

The South Korea-U.S. CFC was established based on the terms of reference (TOR) for the military committee and the South Korea-U.S. CFC signed at the 9th SCM on July 27, 1978. The TOR prescribed the function and mission of the CFC, as well as the function of the CFC commander. Strategic Directive No. 1 from the MC prescribed the CFC units list and issued an order to the CFC commander, which is to defend South
Korea against North Korean threats with operational control of the South Korean military, excluding the Korea 2nd Army and Capital Defense Command. The CFC was established on November 7, 1978 and it has ground, navy, air component command, and combined marine forces command. The CFC is under the control of the higher South Korea-U.S. combined decision making gathering such as the MC and SCM, while UNC is under the control of U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, and United States Forces in Korea (USFK) is under the control of U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM). After the Nunn-Warner Amendment in 1989, which required the withdrawal of U.S. forces in northeast Asia, the operational control of South Korea's military during the armistice period was handed over to South Korea on December 1, 1994, which made South Korea more responsible for her own defense. Therefore, the chairman of the South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff has operational control over the South Korean military during the armistice period, while the CFC commander still has wartime operational control over the South Korean military.

The Purpose and Considerations of Command Structure in Coalition and Alliance

Maurer, in *Coalition Command and Control*, said that the purpose of forming a command structure between two or more forces is to achieve unity of effort and facilitate decision making process to aid in achieving common objectives. Unity of effort is considered to be important since time is a critical factor in responding hostile actions. Unity of effort makes the decision making process fast and effective during military operations. In JP 3-16, the multinational force commander exercises command authority over a military force composed of elements from two or more nations. His primary duty
is to unify efforts of the multinational forces toward common objectives. However, each country has different military capability and command and control system. These differences in a communication network and interoperable connectivity tend to cause frictions in establishing command structure that hurt unity of effort among alliance and coalition groups.

Military planners need to consider various issues to make alliance or coalition command structure function properly. Bowman called these first steps as friction points, which are common goals, logistics, capabilities, training, equipment, doctrines, intelligence, language, leadership, and cultural differences. Each member has its own unique culture, capability and doctrines. A different culture or language can be an obstacle in establishing an integrated command structure for a coalition operation. National pride could be a reason for planners to decide on a parallel command structure instead of an integrated command structure for a coalition operation like the first Gulf war, even though they have common objectives.

However, these common objectives have a tendency to lead those countries to form a coalition or an alliance to respond to common threats. A coalition is defined as “an ad hoc agreement between two or more sovereign nations for a command action.” An alliance is defined as “the result of formal agreements between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives that pursue further common interests of the members.” In effect, alliances are coalitions that have formalized their common goals into a long-term partnership. In formal alliances, national political objectives are addressed and generally subsumed within multinational objectives at the alliance treaty level. These definitions present two issues on command structure.
The first issue is whether or not the present command structure addresses common political objectives. The South Korea-U.S. combined force command structure is based on the mutual defense agreement of 1953. However, the present command structure of the South Korea – U.S. CFC fails to meet the changing national political objectives of the U.S. and South Korea after the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991.

The second issue is that the arguments mentioned above do not differentiate the coalition command structure and alliance command structure. The coalition command structure is based on an ad-hoc agreement that might be influenced by culture, logistics, capabilities, training, equipment, and doctrines. An alliance’s command structure is based on a long-term partnership and is likely to be more influenced by common objectives rather than the other elements. That was why the South Korea – U.S. chose an integrated command structure to respond to North Korean threats, even though they had a different culture, language and doctrine. The command structure of either coalition or alliance is a contentious issue because it contains friction points that reflect different culture, national pride, and also determines who has a command authority to employ forces.

Doctrinal Command Structure Documents and Their Application

Command structure is defined in JP 3-16, Multinational Operations and elaborated upon in some additional military literature. In JP 3-16, Multinational Operations, three command structures are defined: an integrated command structure, a lead nation command structure, and a parallel command structure. An integrated command structure has one designated commander, and has an integrated staff with representatives from the individual nations. Since this command structure has an
integrated staff, it is quick to respond to common threats and efficiently achieves unity of effort. However, Marshall, in *Problems and Solutions in Future Coalition Operations*, suggested that an integrated command structure for high intensity operations may be inappropriate, because of the amount of time it takes for members with differing backgrounds and levels of experience to develop into an efficient functional force. However, because it is such an efficient command structure, an integrated command is desirable when there is enough time to integrate and train together.

A lead nation command structure exists when all member nations place their forces under the control of one nation. JP 3-16 specifies that this command structure may be characterized by an integrated staff with multinational subordinate forces. The perspective gained from using an integrated staff helps the commander understand the situation, and allows the commander to draw upon expertise of allied or coalition partners in areas in which the lead nation may have less experience. Participating nations may take charge of subordinate component command.

Under a parallel command structure, no single force commander is designated. Each participating country maintains its sovereignty and native command structure. Therefore, JP 3-16 recommends the use of coordination centers to achieve unity of effort in a parallel command structure, and also recommends that the use of a parallel command structure should be avoided if at all possible because of the absence of unified command. Structural enhancements that can improve the coordination of multinational forces in a parallel command structure are needed to mitigate disadvantages—including a coordination center and liaison network. In JP 3-16, a coordination center is described as the focal point for support issues such as force sustainment and host nation support.
A coordination center’s function is to coordinate activities among headquarters and staff elements that represent each coalition member such as the C3IC did in the Gulf War. Likewise, the absence of a coordination center between multinational headquarters during the Vietnam War might have inhibited the coalition’s unity of effort and contributed to the defeat of the South Vietnamese government to the communist regime of North Vietnam. The role of coordination should be expanded to include coordination of command activities.

JP 3-16 specifies a difference between an alliance command structure and a coalition command structure—including periods of time, political sensitivity and the degree of stability of the command structure. Allied countries have a tendency to make an agreement to a certain command structure prior to the development of conflict based on a mutual agreement. Therefore, an alliance command structure has been well-developed over extended periods of time and has a high degree of stability. In JP 3-16, this alliance command structure often reflects either an integrated command structure or a lead nation command structure for strong unity of effort. However, people in an allied country tend to look for a nation’s sovereignty to reflect public opinions and the political sensitivities associated with actual operations might impact command relationships in an alliance command structure more than in a coalition command structure.

A coalition command structure has not been developed over long periods of time and has a low degree of stability, because coalitions are developed based on an ad-hoc agreement. This command structure usually does not have enough time to organize well. Coalitions are most often characterized by one of two basic structures—lead nation or parallel. One good example of a coalition command relationship is in Operation Desert
Shield / Storm in 1991, which used a lead nation and parallel command structure as its command relationship model. Political sensitivity is less likely to impact command relationships in a coalition command structure than in an alliance command structure, because of the imminent threats they face. A coalition command structure does not allow multinational forces enough time to form an integrated organization by training an international staff, or achieve a level of experience based on an ad-hoc agreement.

There are various historical case studies that either worked or failed pertinent to a command structure. Col Lescoutre, in *Command Structure for Coalition Operations*, analyzed the coalition command structure of the Korean War, the Vietnam War and the Gulf War after the World War II.¹⁶

Col Lescoutre said that the U.S. chose to seek the cooperation of other United Nations members and enter into a coalition operation during the Korean War. South Korea recognized the lead role of the U.S. by placing the South Korean military force under the U.S. command authority after the UN resolution was passed in July 7, 1950, which gave the U.S. the lead of a coalition operation. He insisted that the lead nation command structure was well-suited for this coalition operation, and the driving factors for the lead nation command structure were speed to respond and military effectiveness, instead of political necessity.
As figure 1 shows, multinational air, ground and naval forces were under the U.S. military force. During an integration process, the UNC had to carefully train and reorient almost all of non-American troops to ensure compatibility with the U.S. doctrine. The U.S. attempted to turn UN units into homogeneous bodies in combat including attaining organizational uniformity through restructuring UN units to fit U.S. infantry battalion tables of organization and equipment. The U.S. also simplified command control by attaching small allied units to larger U.S. units, standardized equipment by providing
U.S. weapons and equipment, obtaining qualitative uniformity through familiarization training offered by the UN reception center (UNRC) and U.S. units, and facilitated inter-allied communication by liaison lines, one from U.S. organizations to UN units, the other from UN units to U.S. signal corps teams. In the end, the lead nation command structure, in support of the common objective for defending South Korea against communist countries, worked successfully in the Korean War.

Col Lescoutre analyzed the Vietnam War, and said that the U.S. chose a parallel command structure during the Vietnam War, because the South Vietnamese were sensitive to placing troops under the U.S. command. He wrote that the South Vietnamese did not want to be seen as puppets of the U.S. by the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong. South Korea, who joined the Vietnam War, also wanted to have a parallel command structure, because the leadership wanted to keep casualties down. The U.S. recommended an integrated command that was neither favored nor employed. There was not any military coordination center to coordinate activities between coalition members. Only in the area of intelligence was there a combined or integrated effort between U.S. and Vietnamese forces. Variables to influence the forming of a parallel command structure were a combination of political necessity, cultural tolerances and national traditions. Palmer, in 25-Year War: America’s Military Role in Vietnam, insisted that this parallel command structure did not generate the coalition’s best combined efforts.
From the U.S. point of view, coordination and cooperation could be maintained effectively only if the U.S. Joint Forces Command like its Vietnamese counterpart, the Joint General Staff, had full operational control of ground forces, and the liaison between the two commanders was as close as possible.\textsuperscript{21}

The U.S. in \textit{Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress} adopted a parallel and lead nation command structure in the Gulf War, because of cultural diversity and political dimensions. Saudi Arabia demanded that the Americans not be seen as an occupying force, and the unity of effort be achieved through the cooperation and mutual support of two multinational headquarters, the U.S. (Western) and Arab (Islam) coalition
headquarters, which assured Saudi Arabia the retention of its sovereignty as well as its religion, culture and traditions.22

Figure 3. Coalition Command Relationships for Operation Desert Storm

As figure 3 shows, the British and French forces were under the tactical control (TACON) of U.S. forces, and Arab forces under operational control (OPCON) of the Saudi Arabia lead joint task force. The command structure during the Gulf War was like a hybrid command structure - U.S. lead western countries and Saudi Arabia lead Arab countries and a parallel command structure was set up between lead nations. However, an
important challenge to the U.S. and Saudi Arabia was to forge a unified effort among coalition ground forces without the benefits of a unified command, and there was no single commander to coordinate multinational activities.\textsuperscript{23} Therefore, a military coordination center (MCC) was established to coordinate activities between coalition forces for unity of effort. The MCC was a 24-hour center that exercised no command authority, and its tasks included the coordination of boundary changes, movement of the fire support coordination line (FSCL), the focal point for the exchange of intelligence between the Saudis and U.S. forces, and it also provided briefings and updates daily on the Iraqi and allied situation to senior officers from all coalition countries.\textsuperscript{24} The MCC played an important role in the success of Operation Desert Storm. Another challenge the U.S. and Saudi Arabia faced was to control air assets. Initially each coalition force separated and controlled air assets. Later, all air assets of Arab nations and each service were TACON to U.S. lead coalition forces unlike the Vietnam War. This operation was called one of the most successful coalitions of modern times.\textsuperscript{25}

**Scholarly Opinions on Forming Command Structure for the South Korea – U.S. CFC**

There are three main scholarly opinions on the South Korea – U.S. Combined Forces Command structure. Kyung-young Chung in his master’s thesis in the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC) in 1989 focused on the inconsistency between the peacekeeping mission of the United Nations Command (UNC) and the CFC’s war-fighting tasks. He pointed out that the CFC commander did not have a structured way to improve the interoperability of the South Korean units that were under his operational control.
Dae-sung Song in *Road Map for South Korea- U.S. Alliance* wrote about the conditions, objectives and capabilities of a new CFC, which should meet the common interests of the U.S. and South Korea.\(^{26}\) He discusses three conditions to form the new CFC: sharing common values, contribution to national interests for each country, and the will of the population. Common values to share are free democracy, free market economy, and human rights. Once one of common values is threatened, the CFC needs to defend that value. The national interest of the U.S. on the Korean peninsula is not the same as that of South Korea. Therefore, if the new CFC does not meet the U.S. national-interests, but contributes only to South Korea’s national interests, then military leaders will definitely negotiate a new CFC structure. The objectives of the new CFC are to maintain peace and stability in the Korean peninsula and secure common values and national interests for each country. The military capabilities for the new CFC that Song recommends are to have an early warning system, a preemptive strike capability, and the capability to deter the initial North Korean attack of South Korea. The critical threats to South Korea from North Korea could be ballistic missiles, mechanized units, special forces, chemical / nuclear weapons, which all need 24-hour monitoring. The new CFC should have the capability of preemptive attack if any symptoms of threats have been deterred. If a preemptive attack fails, the CFC needs to deter the war: in other words, defeat the North Korean initial attack. He described the direction development for the new CFC capability and ideal CFC as the command that meets all the conditions discussed above. However, he just discussed the big picture, but did not discuss the specific details, as well as some ways to overcome the inconsistency of perceived threats between the U.S. and South Korea. The U.S. pays attention to strategic flexibility, which
means that North Korea is not the only threat in Northeast Asia. He is focusing on North Korea, but overlooked China and transnational threats.

Young-sun Ha in *Korean-American Alliance: A Vision and A Roadmap* insists that the new CFC structure should consider a complex operational environment, and not stick to a parallel or integrated command structure, and avoid analyzing a command structure from the point of view of the Cold War or after the Cold War.\(^\text{27}\) He said that the CFC was formed as a U.S. lead integrated command structure to defend South Korea against North Korea during the Cold War, which was its only purpose. As the characteristics of U.S. forces in South Korea was changing, South Korea was insisting on giving the operational control of the South Korean Army back to the South Korean government, and have a parallel command structure independent from the U.S. military for self-defense. The U.S. forces in South Korea are flexible in that they could be deployed to conflicted areas off the Korean peninsula, and more U.S. forces could come to South Korea. That the parallel command structure of U.S.-Japan and U.S.-Australia is applicable to a new CFC in South Korea is questionable, because those command structures were never exercised in their territories such as Vietnam or Iraq. If South Korea is under attack from North Korea, and U.S. forces are reinforcing South Korea, the effectiveness of parallel command structure in the CFC is questionable.

Young-sun Ha focuses on the flexibility of the command structure for the new CFC. He suggests two areas of operation (AO) in South Korea. One AO is for South Korean lead forces and the other AO is for the U.S. lead forces. The new CFC can choose either the integrated or the lead nation command structure during war time to maximize
effectiveness of combined operations, while it maintains a parallel command structure during peace time.

Summary

The relevant literature review reveals the historical evolution of South Korea-U.S. CFC, purpose and considerations of command structures, doctrinal command structures and their applications, and scholarly opinions on the forming of a command structure for the South Korea-U.S. CFC. There are three points that need highlighting. First, there is not much difference between a coalition command structure and an alliance command structure except for a period of time, political sensitivity, and level of stability of a command structure. A command structure has shown similar forms of structure for common interests. Second, a parallel command structure was not recommended and it led to an operational failure when it lacks a military coordination center. Lastly, there are some criteria for success and failure that can withdraw an effective command structure for a coalition or alliance forces command. Chapter 3 will discuss the methodology to analyze the historic examples and draw upon criteria that best determine an effective coalition or alliance command structure. It will apply the criteria to the South Korea-U.S. combined forces command in chapter 4.

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1 East Asia Institute (EAI) task force, Korea-US Security Partnership: Institutional Transformation and Renovation (Seoul: East Asia Institute, February 2008), 128-129.


3 Ibid., 210.

4 Ibid.
5 Ibid., 216-218.


9 Ibid., 1-9.

10 Lescoure, 8.


13 Lescoure, 21-22.

14 Ibid., 18.


16 Lescoure, 32.


18 Ibid., 45.


21 Eckhardt, 63.


24 Ibid., K-25.


26 Dae-Sung Song, *Road Map for South Korea – U.S. Alliance* (Seoul: The Sejong Institute, 2008), 72-94.

CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

General

The literature review in chapter 2 did not attempt to address all historic cases addressing command structure options, but simply attempted to highlight the command structure reflected in doctrine as well as present relevant scholarly suggestions proposed for a South Korea-U.S. CFC structure. The review showed that a reasonable and appropriate command structure had critical success criteria that ensured a sound command relationship. These criteria should be considered in developing a coalition or alliance command structure. This chapter outlines the methodology utilized in establishing success criteria from historic case studies, and how they will be applied in determining the best South Korea-U.S. CFC structure going forward.

How to Draw Success Criteria for a Command Structure?

Success criteria for a command structure might not exist. It would be difficult to say that the failure or success of an operation could be attributed completely to a wrongly selected command structure. However, historic case studies use criteria that suggest success criteria for an effective command structure.

Three historic case studies that used a coalition or alliance command structure after World War II were chosen to analyze success criteria. A coalition is not different from an alliance in the architecture of command structure, except for periods of time that a command structure was developed, its political sensitivity, and the level of stability in a command structure, which is mentioned in chapter 2. The architecture of a coaliational
command structure is almost the same as that of an alliance command structure. Three coalition command structure case studies have something in common to share with South Korea, which was that host nations were invaded by neighboring countries or wars among the same ethnic peoples with different ideologies. This relates to the threat of a North Korean invasion of South Korea, in which neighboring countries and the same ethnic peoples live with a different ideology. Therefore, I selected the Korean War, the Vietnam War and the Gulf War as historic case studies to analyze how the success criteria for an effective command structure work for the CFC in South Korea.

To analyze and draw criteria for a command structure, I will look at the above mentioned historical case studies using six joint warfighting functions: intelligence, movement, fire, command & control, combat service support and protection. The Following are the sub questions to select success criteria from historic case studies for the effective South Korea – U.S. command structure.

What are the most vital components of each warfighting function to ensure military success on the battlefield in a coalition operation?

How did a command structure among a coalition operation affect warfighting functions on the battlefield?

How to apply withdrawn success and failure criteria for a new South Korea – U.S. CFC?

There are three command levels in an alliance or coalition command structure: strategic, operational and tactical. A strategic level of command is supposed to issue guidance to the operational level of command. There are already security consultative meetings (SCM) in South Korea that ally partnership ministerial–level talks and military
committee meetings (MCM) between the U.S. and South Korea. This strategic level of command should exist in South Korea even after dismantling of the CFC. An operational level of command is like a joint task force (JTF), which employs each military component force. Tactical levels of commands are component commands under their national commands. In a parallel command structure, each component command is under its respective national command. In this paper, the focus is an operational level of command.

Therefore, success criteria drawn from historic examples for an effective command structure will be applied to an operational level of command for a new South Korea-U.S. CFC. The success criteria will determine the necessary organizations or cells for an effective command structure between the U.S. and South Korea against the North Korean threat and unanticipated threats for the future.
Figure 4. Analysis Diagram

*Source:* Created by author.
CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

General

The success criteria for an effective alliance command structure in historic case studies are seemingly difficult to find. Chapter 3 described the framework of how success criteria are to be determined and how they will be applied to the new South Korea – U.S. CFC structure (i.e., drawn from applying the warfighting functions to the three historic case studies). Detailed conclusions and recommendations for an effective CFC structure are presented in Chapter 5.

Movement and Maneuver

In a combined command structure with allied countries such as seen in the Korean War, movement and maneuver, one of warfighting functions, is under the control of one unified commander. This lessens the possibility of delaying the decision making process for a coordinated operation. However, movement and maneuver with a command structure other than a parallel command structure might cause disagreements or frictions on planning and executing operations among coalition forces due to a lack of coordination with each other. It may also result in unpreparedness for all phasing operations based on flawed assumptions.

Planning and execution for a coalition operation should be made by one leading nation within a geographical area of responsibility based on the capability of coalition forces. In an article, “Coalition Warfare: Preparing the U.S. Commander for the Future,” the author recommends that the responsibility for planning and execution of a coalition
operation should not be separated from one another.\textsuperscript{1} There should be unity of command in each assigned area of responsibility among all coalition forces and service components to facilitate effective operations. What that means is that coalition forces assume the responsibility of an assigned area, such as a defense or provide fire support for ground operations, based on their capability.

During the Korean War, the UN units that came to help South Korea were battalion-sized and were attached to the U.S troops under U.S. command authority. Most UN units provided infantry forces to help South Korea except a New Zealand artillery regiment for fire support.\textsuperscript{2} Foreign air forces including one Australian squadron, one South Africa fighter squadron and, Australia/Canada/Greece/Thailand air transport units, served in the Korean War as an attachment to the U.S. units.\textsuperscript{3} The South Korean military troops were only partially trained, and the general officers’ command experience stopped at the tactical level. Therefore, the South Korean military troops were either operationally controlled by, or attached to, U.S. troops.
As shown in figure 5 above, the U.S. and South Korea had assigned areas of responsibility to plan and execute their mission, under a lead nation command structure. This avoided confusion and delay in the decision making process.

During the Vietnam War, the areas of operation were divided into four areas called corps tactical zones (CTZ). Each South Vietnam corps assumed the responsibility of each CTZ. Coalition units that participated in the South Vietnam War included 1st Battalion, Royal Australian regiment, a 105mm howitzer battery of the Royal New Zealand artillery, operated in the 3rd CTZ under operational control (OPCON) to U.S. 173rd Airborne Brigade, and the South Korean troops deployed to the 2nd CTZ.¹
However, U.S. headquarters co-located U.S. and coalition units with Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) in the same area of operation under its respective command authority. To exercise command and control over U.S. forces in the field, the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) commander established U.S. field forces commands in each CTZ. The U.S. III Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF) was co-located in Da Nang, 1st CTZ with RVNAF I Corps. The U.S. I Field Forces Command, Vietnam (IFFV) co-located in Nha Trang, 2nd CTZ with RVNAF II Corps.
The U.S. II Field Force Command, Vietnam (IIFFV) was co-located in Bien Hoa, 3rd CTZ with RVNAF III Corps. There was no U.S. field forces command in the 4th CTZ. Being co-located with coalition forces in the same area of operation could cause confusion, and moreover the mission of each U.S. and RVNAF was almost the same. The following lists common missions:

1. To establish and protect major bases
2. To defend governmental centers and to protect national resources
3. To open and secure major lines of communications, railways and waterways
4. To conduct long duration ground and air operations against enemy forces
5. To neutralize the enemy strategy
6. To provide security for the expansion of government control
7. To interdict land and sea infiltration routes
8. To provide tactical air and logistic support

The U.S. field forces command and RVNAF had no choice but to cooperate with each other for a same tactical mission. Being physically co-located with no distinctive division of tasks did not seem to be an effective use of forces. Therefore, U.S. and RVNAF developed combined operations to bridge the gap within 1st, 2nd, and 3rd CTZ. This was unique and worked well to some extent, even with a parallel command structure. However, it took time to mitigate the risk of being co-located with each other in the same area of operation and made a compromise such as combined operations for combat effectiveness. U.S. forces and RVNAF did not have a daily meeting to coordinate and it was vague whether the U.S. was responsible for each CTZ or not.
The Gulf War reflected “a lead nation” command structure. Joint Forces Command (JFC), a coalition force, was composed of nine Arab countries under Saudi Arabian command authority. The 1st UK Armored Division and 6th France Armored Division were tactical control (TACON) to the U.S. forces. For the ground operation, five major formations within the Gulf area of operation (AO) were arrayed from west to east: U.S. XVIII Airborne Corps, U.S. VII Corps, JFC-North, U.S. 1st Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), and JFC-East. JFC-N and JFC-E under the Saudi Arabia command authority got each area of responsibility. The U.S. and Saudi Arabia were responsible for a planning and execution within each assigned area of operation.

Figure 7. Operation Desert Storm
This structure turned out to be effective during the Desert Storm operation. The decision making process was fast and effective in overcoming unforeseen challenges. For example, the 1st UK Armored Division was supposed to pass through the breach quickly created by the U.S. 1st Infantry Division and attack the Iraqi armored division in its zone under the U.S. VII Corps command authority. However, the 1st UK Armored Division could not clear the breach after U.S. 1st Infantry Division had breached about 50 percent of the enemy’s obstacle’s belt and forward defense. Then, the U.S. VII Corps cleared the enemy breach through in-depth artillery fire not to interrupt the passage of 1st UK Armored Division and to facilitate the passage of the corps combat service support assets. Therefore, the 1st UK Armored Division could attack the Iraqi tactical reserves to prevent them from moving into the flank of advancing VII Corps.\textsuperscript{9}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1. Analysis in Planning and Execution</th>
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<tr>
<td>Lead country</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean War</td>
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<td>Vietnam War</td>
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| Gulf War      | U.S. and Saudi                             | Yes                         | 1. Fast decision making process  
|               |                                            |                             | 2. Unity of effort           |

Source: Created by author.

In summary, coalition forces were stationed in a same area of responsibility with no distinctive mission in South Vietnam, while all UN units were attached to U.S. forces under the U.S. command authority during the Korean War. During the Gulf War,
coalition forces were divided into two groups--Islamic groups under the lead of Saudi Arabia forces and western groups under the lead of U.S. forces. In a same area of responsibility, there was unity of command either the U.S. lead or the Saudi lead to make fast decision making process with a unity of effort.

Coalition forces should have a plan for stability operations of an operation combined with civil agencies for full spectrum operations before engaging in a major conflict. Military leaders have a tendency to focus on phase III (major conflict for a military success). However, as Conrad C. Crane writes in Military Review, May 2005, a war tactically and operationally won can still lead to a strategic defeat if transition operations are poorly planned or executed. The end of conventional warfare does not mean the end of war. There might be an insurgency before, during and after a major operation to deal with. U.S. FM 1, The Army states: “Stability Operations employ military capabilities to reconstruct or establish services and support civilian agencies and may occur before, during, and after offensive and defensive operations.”

Stability operations is not a separate one from an offensive or defensive one, but waging a war with an offensive and defensive operation simultaneously as full spectrum operations according to U.S. FM 3-07 Stability Operations.

The mission determines the relative weight of effort among the components

**Figure 8. Full Spectrum Operations**

U.S. FM-1 states that the essential tasks for stability operations are to establish civil security, establish civil control, restore essential services, support to governance, and support to economic / infrastructure development with civil and military effort.\textsuperscript{12}

During the Korean War U.S. forces had little time to plan for waging war in the Korean peninsula because they deployed right after the establishment of UN Security Council Resolution 83 which called for urgent military measures to stop hostilities by North Korea.\textsuperscript{13} There was no plan for stability operations either. In 1950, U.S. Eighth Army established a special staff section to address civil assistance in addition to U.S. civil affairs units. It was later reconstituted as the UN Civil Assistance Command, Korea (UNCACK) and dealt with civil affairs including refugee problems.\textsuperscript{14} UNCACK realized that coalition forces could not win the war if there were unrests in the rear area. Its mission was to prevent disease, starvation and unrest among the civilian population in rear areas, South Korea to support the frontline of battle. It was composed of over 700 people including military and civilian specialists in the fields of economics, agriculture, industry, commerce, natural resources, finance, information and education.\textsuperscript{15} However, UNCACK failed to integrate military and civilian efforts. UNCACK and U.S. civil affairs units could not exercise the control to get back the law and order in Pyongyang, North Korea during the brief UNC occupation. What they did was just to sit and watch the appalling civilian atrocities that the South Korean military and police did other than getting the people back to farming areas and evacuating hundreds of thousands of Korean civilian refugees.\textsuperscript{16} That chaos and disorder might cause other challenges such as an insurgency on top of conventional threats, which could definitely lead to a prolonged war. The U.S. and South Korean military were not ready to wage stability operations before,
during and after a major conflict. For example, General Gay, Commanding General of the U.S. First Cavalry, was responsible for the internal security and order of Pyongyang after its capture, appointed Colonel Crombez civil assistance officer because of his knowledge of the country and its people after seizing Pyongyang.\(^\text{17}\) While following coalition units up to North Korea, the UNCAK should have participated in restoring law and order in North Korea and getting the stability back for long term policy.

U.S. troops initially focused on major operations and did not place much value on other phases during the Vietnam War. The U.S. knew that it had to face both an insurgency and conventional Army at the same time. When the U.S. intervened in South Vietnam, it lacked the forces to wage both a war of attrition and one of pacification, the civil operation program.\(^\text{18}\) Pacification operations in South Vietnam belonged to stability operations, because U.S. FM 3-24 stated that “Pacification was the process by which the government asserted its influence and control in an area beset by insurgents through local security efforts, food and medical supplies distribution program, and lasting reforms.”\(^\text{19}\) The U.S. made the assumption that defeating North Vietnamese army would bring security and stability to South Vietnam.\(^\text{20}\) However, the U.S. still recognized the necessity of pacification operations in South Vietnam. The Office of Civil Operations (OCO) was formed in November 1966, but failed to bring the military into it.\(^\text{21}\) The Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) program was established later on May 9, 1967, based on U.S. National Security Action Memorandum 362.\(^\text{22}\) That program dealt with stability operations including insurgencies, reconstruction and other matters. It was the first integrated program of civilian and military efforts. The deputy of the CORDS program for stability operations in South Vietnam was Robert Komer, a civilian.
As shown in figure 5, there was a CORDS element at every province in South Vietnam and all pacification operations came under the CORDS program including the Phoenix program which was designed to identify and neutralize the civilian infrastructure supporting the Viet Cong. The CORDS program was considered a successful achievement and included the revival of a functioning rural administration, health and human services functions, and rebuilding of infrastructure which military forces had ignored during the early years of the war.
The CORDS program integrated civil and military efforts critical to ensure a military success, while the overall war effort was ultimately unsuccessful.\textsuperscript{25} The CORDS program could not prevent the defeat of South Vietnam, despite the best efforts of the U.S. on the battlefield. If the CORDS program had begun earlier, the success of North Vietnam would have been minimized. The South Vietnam government ultimately was unable to defend itself from Hanoi once the U.S. withdrew all military and financial support.

During the Gulf War, U.S. did not expect civil affairs operations, also a component of stability operations in Kuwait during Operations Desert Shield / Desert Storm. The U.S. third Army was not prepared for phase IV in the first Gulf War nor did it have training exercises for phase IV. This resulted in a lack of hospital beds, overriding prisoners, and refugees.\textsuperscript{26} The U.S. Army’s 96th Civil Affair (CA) battalion was the only active unit to get involved in civil affairs other than the U.S. Army reserve and U.S. Marine Corps reserve.\textsuperscript{27} Operations Desert Shield / Storm was a unique case and it seemed that there might be no stability operations after the combat phase of Operations Desert Storm, once coalition forces expelled Iraqi forces out of Kuwait. However, the Kuwait government requested U.S. government help to plan emergency services and a recovery program after Kuwait was liberated. The U.S. subsequently formed the Kuwait Task Force in early December 1990 which worked with ministerial representatives of the Kuwait government in exile on the post-combat phase of operations.\textsuperscript{28} Desert Shield / Desert Storm showed that Stability Operations was necessary in the midst of full spectrum operations and coalition forces should be prepared in advance to be deployed.
Table 2.  Analysis in Phasing Operation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Organization for Phase IV, stability Operations</th>
<th>Effects on the battlefield</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Korean War</td>
<td>None -&gt; The UN Civil Assistance Command, Korea (UNCAK)</td>
<td>Possibility of raising insurgency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam War</td>
<td>OCO-&gt; The Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS)</td>
<td>Effective in Keeping the insurgency down</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gulf War</td>
<td>Small sized Civil Affair units</td>
<td>No effective in dealing with stability operations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source*: Created by author.

In summary, coalition forces during the Korean and Gulf war were not prepared for stability operations. They focused only on conventional threats. Coalition forces ignored the possible rising insurgency and even disorder in an occupied territory. However, during the Vietnam War, the CORDS program was initiated and effective in keeping a rising insurgency down to some extent. Coalition forces neglected to develop stability operations, which showed that they were not adaptive to unexpected emergent threats.

**Fires**

Military forces limit fire support to its respective Area of Operation (AO) to prevent fratricide. If coalition forces want to receive fire support from other coalition forces out of its AOR, it needs coordination in advance. This kind of fire support coordination can be applied to both ground and air operations. A U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) report on fratricide during operations pointed out that 45 percent of fratricides were caused by coordination problems in the major conflicts of the 20th century. The coordination between ground forces and air operation forces might be
much worse, not only because of common doctrine, but also communications tailored to different command structures. Airspace, a three dimensional area, is a unique battlefield and hard to draw control measures for subordinate units and their component forces. Therefore, airspace control and combined airpower will be addressed for fire support.

The Coordinated airpower, including centralized airspace control, should be utilized to contribute to unity of effort. Aircraft supporting their allies accidentally caused many casualties due to weaknesses in air command and control and airspace management. Air superiority will be achieved through integrated airpower with a centralized airspace control.

During the Korean War, under the U.S. commander in the Far East, there were three component commands: Far East Air Forces, Naval Forces Far East, and Army Forces Far East. Both the Fifth Air Force under Far East Air Forces and the Seventh fleet under Naval Forces Far East were stationed in Japan. The Far East Air Forces commander, General George Stratemeyer, wanted to have operational control over all naval land-based and carrier-based aviation operations from Japan or over Korea, but Naval Forces Far East refused to accept that. The Coalition’s airpower was attached to U.S. forces to ensure unity of effort during the Korean War. Australia’s 77th Fighter Squadron was attached to the 35th U.S. Fighter Group, and South Africa’s 2nd Fighter squadron was attached to the U.S. 18th Fighter Group. Australia, Canada, Greece and Thailand provided air transportation units to UNC.

In early July 1950, the Joint operation center (JOC) was established to provide unity of airpower among all services and coalition forces, and to get rid of frictions over command authority of air power and different doctrines. Since then, the U.S. Navy
seemed to coordinate its air operations through the JOC, and it worked well such as the B-29 raid on the port of Rashin in the far northeastern corner of Korea on August 25, 1950.\textsuperscript{33} Even though it was of an ad-hoc joint plan, and there were problems with joint operations doctrine, it was considered a worthwhile effort to achieve a unity of effort.

During the Vietnam War, the Second Air Division used to command air power in Southeast Asia was deactivated, and Seventh Air Force replaced the deactivated the Second Air Division in March 1966. However, Seventh Air Force was not the air component commander because it did not have authority to control Marine, Navy and Army aviation.\textsuperscript{34} U.S. Army and Air Force operations in South Vietnam were ultimately coordinated through the combined Air Operation Center (AOC) between the U.S. Air Force (USAF) and Vietnamese air force (VNAF).\textsuperscript{35} Even though the Vietnamese air force coordinated air operations through a combined USAF-VNAF AOC, the authority of MACV to control air assets was confined in South Vietnam, having no naval and marine air assets. The major naval force in Southeast Asia was Task Force 77. TF 77 was under the authority of Admiral U.S. Grant Sharp, commander in Chief Pacific. He controlled all the naval air forces when the bombing of North Vietnam began in February 1965.\textsuperscript{36} Therefore, air space management was not organized, which led to air congestion and ineffective use of air power such as the lack of aircraft at critical times.\textsuperscript{37}

As if the command and control (C2) for Navy and USMC was not bad enough, additionally there were USAF strategic air command (SAC) assets outside AOC control as well. Air operations such as target approval and air operation execution were not effective because the U.S., having most of its air assets such as strategic bombers, and needed to get an approval through various chains of command. Ground commanders and
the Seventh Air Force in South Vietnam nominated targets to MACV; MACV had to take several steps to have nominated targets approved through CINCPAC, JCS, the secretary of defense (SECDEF) and the secretary of state.\textsuperscript{38} This was no way to run an air war.

During the Gulf War, CINCCENT (Commander in Chief, Central Command) designated CENTAF (Air Forces Component, Central command) as the JFACC (Joint Force Air Component Commander), and held it responsible for coordinating all coalition air forces to ensure unity of effort in the air campaign for Operation Desert Storm.\textsuperscript{39} The JFACC had the responsibility for managing airspace control in theater using the Air Tasking Order (ATO), and a daily Master Attack Plan (MAP).\textsuperscript{40} The MAP is the JFACC’s internal planning document that includes intent. The ATO is a detailed message that executes the MAP.\textsuperscript{41} Several national representatives and component service members were working on, and integrated into the JFACC for unity of airpower and airspace management.

In the report of \textit{Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final report to the congress}, it cautioned that if coalition air forces did not stick to the ATO, they might risk to air-to-air and surface-to-air fratricide, inadequate fighter and suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) support, or inadequate tanker support to reach the target and return safely.\textsuperscript{42} In actuality, failures in airspace management resulted in 11 of the U.S. military’s 35 ‘friendly fire’ casualties, which equated to 7.5 percent of total combat deaths during the Gulf War.\textsuperscript{43} Therefore, only well effectively planned and harmonized air operation, either via coordinated measures or centralized control, will ensure the unity of effort for fewer friendly fire incidents and effective use of airpower.
Table 3. Analysis in Airpower and Airspace Management

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Combined / Coordinated airpower</th>
<th>Airspace control</th>
<th>Effects on the battlefield</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Korean War</td>
<td>Joint Operation Center (JOC)</td>
<td>Centralized</td>
<td>1. Unity of airpower</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2. Need a joint air doctrine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam War</td>
<td>Combined AOC except U.S. Navy and Marine air assets</td>
<td>Not centralized</td>
<td>1. Caused air congestion and ineffective use of air power such as the lack of aircraft at critical times</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2. Multiple chains of command for target acquisition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gulf War</td>
<td>The JFACC coordinated coalition air assets</td>
<td>Centralized</td>
<td>Unity of effort</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Created by author.

In summary, the coalition forces failure to combine / coordinate airpower caused ineffective use of airpower, as seen in the Vietnam War. Parallel command structure without combined / coordinated airpower proved to be ineffective for a ground support operation and a target acquisition process. Combined airpower and centralized airspace control through joint air doctrine and JFACC during the Gulf War was effective in supporting ground operation at critical times and in preventing fratricide for unity of effort and interoperability.

Intelligence

An integrated intelligence center or coordinated intelligence agency needs to be established to collect, assess, and share information to ensure operational success. Intelligence is definitely one of critical factors to ensure a victory in the battlefield, especially in multinational operations. It might affect all warfighting functions, because
the effectiveness of all operations, such as movement plans and air attacks, depends on accuracy in intelligence to some extent.

In the Korean War, integrating intelligence to ensure a common operational picture across the theater was considered important. This leveraged the capabilities of both the U.S. and South Korea intelligence apparatus. Most of the UN ground units were lower than regiment level; Canada, Turkey and UK sent infantry brigades, and New Zealand sent 1 artillery regiment. Therefore, U.S. intelligence personnel dominated most of intelligence and often controlled release of intelligence to UN units for combined operations. Under U.S. policy, all necessary classified information to carry out given missions was released to UN units.

During the Vietnam War, U.S. and Vietnam forces tried to establish a combined and integrated effort to share information for an effective operation even though they were under separate lines of national authority. Both U.S. and Vietnam realized that military success could not be achieved without sharing information. They finally formed the Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam which had four functions--prisoner interrogation, exploitation of captured enemy material, exploitation of captured documents and the preparation of intelligence reports both for U.S. and Vietnamese commands. As U.S. forces grew and captured documents increased in volume, access became limited to certain officers from the U.S. and South Vietnam. This was the only truly combined effort between U.S. and Vietnamese forces under the parallel command structure.

In the ‘Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final report to Congress’, the coalition forces’ victory against Iraqi forces was due to precise intelligence given to decision
makers at the national and theater level.\textsuperscript{48} Intelligence officers of Coalition forces were fully integrated into Joint Intelligence Center (JIC) in Central Command, which included some allied countries. These allied countries also provided intelligence to JIC under the U.S. Central Command. A Coalition Coordination and Communication and Intelligence Center were created to circulate intelligence among coalition forces.\textsuperscript{49} For example, Saudi aerial reconnaissance planes flown along the border with Kuwait and Iraq took pictures of areas of interest. However, there were also some shortcomings to U.S. commanders on the tactical level even though some units had their own organic intelligence collecting assets and systems: problems included a lack of available assets and difficulties in disseminating intelligence, a lack of information on the exact locations of chemical, nuclear facilities, and a community-wide shortage of Arabic linguists.\textsuperscript{50}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Integrated / combined intelligence agency</th>
<th>Effects on the battlefield</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Korean War</td>
<td>Integrated Intelligence center</td>
<td>Well coordinated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam War</td>
<td>Combined Intelligence Center</td>
<td>U.S. and Vietnam realized that military success could not be achieved without sharing information.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gulf War</td>
<td>Joint Intelligence Center (JIC)</td>
<td>Victory against Iraqi forces was owing to precise intelligence.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Created by author.

In summary, coalition forces recognized the importance of intelligence during the Korean, Vietnam and Gulf War. Managing intelligence could ensure military success, and was the starting point to further any operational plan. That was why coalition forces
established an integrated / combined intelligence center even under a parallel command structure in South Vietnam, as seen in table 4. Coalition forces have to be integrated in collecting information through all available assets, assessing and sharing information among coalition forces.

**Sustainment**

The responsibility of providing supply varies with the command relationship. The supported units have to take care of providing supplies for the supporting units under the command relationship of attachment, while the supporting units have to take care of themselves under the command relationship of OPCON or TACON. However, in a coalition operation, logistic supply does not seem to matter with a command structure, because each country is supposed to be responsible for their supply either under the lead nation / integrated command structure or under the parallel command structure. Logistic support and sustainment might have a critical impact on the success of the operation to ensure operational reach.

Economy of effort for combat service support, leading to synergy, should be ensured through either an integrated logistical command or cooperation with coalition forces. Coalition staffs under either an integrated command or their respective national command need to coordinate with each coalition force for combat service support. Coalition forces need host nation support such as ports, airports, supply route and fuel to project their forces for reception, staging, onward movement and integration (RSOI). They can get economy of effort through common logistic doctrine, services, host nation support coordination, and standard of support in case of a coalition operation against common threats. U.S. FM 4-0 *Combat Service Support*, dealing with combined logistics,
also stresses economy of efforts by either an integrated command or a coordinated organization, which might obtain and distribute common supplies such as petroleum, water, food, medical supplies, repair parts, and major end items for common equipment for a coalition operation.\textsuperscript{51}

During the Korean War, South Korea was undeveloped and lacked support infrastructure. Therefore, the U.S. assumed responsibility of providing combat service support to coalition forces through standardized combat service support. The U.S. provided most transportation vehicles, food, and supply resources to coalition forces. For example, the U.S. provided the Turkish brigade with U.S. trucks because they brought obsolete trucks which became a traffic hazard when they broke down.\textsuperscript{52} Coalition countries also had a variety of combat service support problems such as food, clothing, and ordnance support, even with unity of command. However, most problems that they had were addressed under the one command authority as the operation progressed as follows:\textsuperscript{53} Food supply rations were modified to meet the different food tastes of coalition partners. Each coalition force had a different eating habits and preferences based on their cultural backgrounds.

Clothing supply was furnished through U.S. channels, because there was not enough time for UN units to prepare for a deployment. The Dutch had their own supply system, but as the operation progressed they tried to standardize them with the U.S. system for efficiency.

The lack of ordnance units in UN units presented ordnance logistic problems which U.S. ordnance units had to deal with. For example, the Greeks needed
maintenance training and supervision because they were not used to the ordinance handling vehicles.

Communication problems were raised such as cryptographic means, security and standardization of communication equipment. Some UN units brought communication equipment incompatible with U.S. equipment and there was no procedure to make communication compatible. Moreover, aircraft communication procedures and equipment needed to be standardized to provide uniform communication in UN aircraft.

Later after the Korean War was over, coalition forces reimbursed the U.S. for the supplies they had gotten from the U.S. based on an agreement between them. With one command authority, it was much easier to achieve economy of effort. Otherwise, each country had to bring its combat service support to South Korea. It might waste too much time and effort to react to a hostile attack on time.

Under a parallel command structure such as the Vietnam War, there was neither an integrated logistical command nor higher logistical command beyond each national logistic command. Each nation had to take care of their combat service support, because coalition forces were under the separate national authority. Like South Korea, Vietnam was also an undeveloped country, lacking infrastructure such as ports, airfields and highways. The U.S. had to tackle logistical issues for South Vietnam and coalition forces even with a parallel command structure. U.S. increases of over 16,000 troops were added to provide logistical support to Vietnamese and coalition partners by the end of 1967. Civilian contractors were hired to make airfields in South Vietnam, and ammunition for Vietnamese forces was processed through Military Assistance channels. The U.S. Army had an army support area for each CTZ. MACV needed a central logistical organization
in South Vietnam and later the 1st logistical command was deployed to support all U.S. and free world forces south of Chu Lai in 1st CTZ in 1965, while north of Chu Lai was a navy responsibility. The 1st logistical command was authorized full-strength. Coalition forces could expedite the flow of supply support through 1st logistical command, which enabled them to achieve economy of effort.

Under a lead nation command structure such as during the Gulf War, Saudi Arabia as a host nation had significant logistic capabilities to support coalition forces. The U.S. initially lacked of supplies to support the deployment of combat units to Saudi Arabia. Then Saudi Arabia agreed to provide all food, fuel, purified water, and facilities, which enabled more expeditious support for coalition forces. It was called the Saudi Arabia Host Nation Support Implementation Plan agreeing to support U.S. forces, which did three things as follows.

- It provided U.S. forces with government controlled / owned assets.
- It contracted to obtain assets to be provided to U.S. forces.
- It reimbursed the U.S. for contracts the U.S. led to provide for U.S. forces’ needs.

Saudi Arabia’s support plan enabled U.S. forces to gain economy of effort and unity of effort. Title 10 of U.S. Code, Chapter 138, authorizes exchanging support between U.S. services and those of other countries, which allow Department of Defense to acquire support from host nations including food, billeting, petroleum, oils, transportation, communications services, medical services, ammunition, storage, spare parts, maintenance services, and training by payment or replacement-in-kind, without establishing a cross-servicing agreement.
Table 5. Analysis in Combat Service Support

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Integrated logistical command /a logistical cooperation</th>
<th>Economy of effort</th>
<th>Effects on the battlefield</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Korean War</td>
<td>Integrated logistical command</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Ensured the persistence for coalition forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam War</td>
<td>1. No integrated logistical system</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Partially effective in supplying coalition forces on time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. A logistical cooperation between U.S. and coalition forces</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gulf War</td>
<td>A cooperation of host nation support</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Enabled more expeditious support for coalition forces</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source:* Created by author.

The purpose of Sustainment is to preserve and generate combat strength to support a concept of operation that ensures military success.\(^{59}\) Once incidents happened in certain countries, supporting units are supposed to be deployed there by ship, airplane or land transportation. The above three case studies showed that they deployed to conflicted areas by sea and airlift. Those coalition forces had transportation and supply problems like many other case studies. In those areas, not only were sustainment doctrines, weapons system, transportation and supply system interoperable, they also lacked a system to accommodate a surge of forces. Coalition forces deployed to conflicted areas, needed to set up integrated logistical command or close cooperation agreements to prevent the lack of sustainment from causing military failure. All that preparation is to ensure economy of effort and persistence for coalition forces, leads to unity of effort.

**Command and Control**

Coalition forces need to establish an integrated command structure or a military coordination center to achieve a unity of effort for operational success either through an
integrated command structure or a parallel command structure with a military coordination center in addition to a uniform communication.

During the Korean War, problems that U.S. forces faced were that UN units had different weapons systems, doctrine and training levels. U.S. forces wanted to achieve a unity of command by attaching UN units to U.S. units, which could address the above presented problems. Therefore, all UN units were attached to U.S. commands as soon as UN units arrived in South Korea. Since UN units were tactical units from battalion to regiment size, UN units agreed to be integrated into U.S. command structure. Some UN units brought communication equipments that were incompatible with U.S. equipments. To solve those problems, U.S. forces implemented common signaling procedures and maneuvering instruction for the coalition partners and adopted standard map sizes that each force could reproduce for a uniform communication.

In the Vietnam War, South Vietnam wanted their forces to be under their respective national command authority unlike during the Korean War. Initially, two command structures were considered--a single combined command with allied countries or a separate unified command among U.S. forces. As seen in figure 5, a single combined command was not accepted, because South Korea and Vietnam wanted a parallel command structure. South Vietnam did not want to look like a puppet for U.S. forces. Even though U.S. MACV was concerned over coordination with allied countries, any type of coordination center never crystallized into a feasible project during the Vietnam War. Instead, U.S. forces tried to accomplish a combined operation with Vietnam forces on the basis of cooperation and coordination in each CTZ.
A U.S. unified command structure separated from the U.S. pacific command was not accepted for the command structure in South Vietnam, because the Vietnam War was not considered isolated hostilities from neighboring countries. The U.S. needed to develop a comprehensive approach to address the Vietnam issue and considered ground operations in Vietnam War as one of many operations in Asia. The U.S. needed to develop contingency plans for unexpected conflicts around South Vietnam, once incident occurred in somewhere in Asia. Therefore, air operations against North Vietnam were controlled by the Pacific commander in chief through the commander of the Pacific Air Forces.

Communications systems in South Vietnam were also too underdeveloped to perform tasks for MACV. A consolidation of communications-electronics functions was required at the MACV level. Therefore, the 1st signal brigade was deployed and established to improve coordination and management of communications-electronics assets among coalition forces in South Vietnam in April 1966.

During the Gulf War, Saudi Arabia with most Arab countries did not want to be integrated into the U.S. command structure. Instead of integrating into the U.S. command structure, most Arab countries wanted to be under the Saudi Arabia command authority, while western countries were under U.S. command authority. That was more like a mixed lead nation command structure with a parallel command structure. However, the combined operations center was necessary to facilitate the combined planning process without a unified commander. They finally agreed to adopt the Coalition Coordination, Communication, and Integration center (C3IC) to facilitate cooperation among coalition
forces under a mixed command structure of lead nation and parallel command structure. That command structure worked well.

The C3IC initially played as a link to coordinate activities between U.S. led forces and Saudi led forces during Operation Desert Shield / Storm. The C3IC had no command authority. The role of C3IC were to coordinate training areas, firing ranges, logistic arrangements, frequency management, and planning activities like boundary changes and movement of fire support coordination line through presentation and update briefings. That C3IC composed of Ground, Air Forces, Naval, Air Defense, Special Operations, Logistics, and intelligence sections.  

Different communication equipments among coalition forces and several generations of equipment among U.S. forces were obstacles for coalition forces to tackle in the Gulf War. The Saudi communication service was limited and not enough to augment coalition forces. Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: A final report to congress said “a sophisticated network of multimedia communications capability had to be built from the ground up to tie the coalition forces together so that timely command and control could become a reality.” Therefore, U.S. forces ensured that radio communication nets were free of any hindrance among coalition forces through early deployment of the Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE) before Operation Desert Shield / Storm started. U.S. forces also tried to establish combined command and control communications by providing encryption systems to secure radios and telephones and implementing a communication infrastructure for Saudi and Arab countries. For an interoperable communication, the U.S. made a doctrinal exception to allow selected coalition forces to use U.S. communication systems.
Gold water-Nichols established very, very clear lines of command authority and responsibilities over subordinate commanders, and that meant a much more effective fighting force in the Gulf. The lines of authority were clear, the lines of responsibility were clear, and we just did not have any problem in that area--none whatsoever.  

Table 6. Analysis in Command and Control

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Integrated command structure/ A military coordination center</th>
<th>A uniform communication</th>
<th>Effects on the battlefield</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Korean War</td>
<td>Integrated command</td>
<td>Yes after conflict began</td>
<td>1. Ensure unity of effort</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>: Quick reaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2. Ensured interoperability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam War</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes after conflict began</td>
<td>1. No unity of effort</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2. Ensured interoperability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gulf War</td>
<td>A military coordination center</td>
<td>Yes before conflict began</td>
<td>1. Facilitate cooperation among coalition forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2. Ensured interoperability</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Created by author.

In summary, certain types of command structures for coalition operations have been selected based primarily upon political considerations and public opinion. However, an integrated command structure is desirable to ensure unity of effort. Senior military leadership should ensure uniformed command and control in a parallel command structure like during the Vietnam War through a supporting mechanism. During the Gulf War, the commanders were concerned about how a parallel command structure got fixed. Through the establishment of C3IC, the leadership attempted to fix this structure by establishing a military coordination center to make sure unity of effort was achieved. Additionally this was one of the big challenges in Operation Desert Shield / Storm.
Protection

Protection ends with an integrated or coordinated protection plan to ensure military success since its major function is supposed to protect critical military facilities. A protection plan, such as a missile defense system to defend key military facilities would be included in a combined airpower or an airspace control. During the Korean War and Vietnam War, there were not enough military assets to defend against air and missile attack except for the U.S. missile defense system.

During the Gulf War, as air operations shifted to interdiction and CAS, Saudi led JFC-E received fire support from the USS Missouri and USS Wisconsin owing to integrated air power. The U.S. Navy supported coalition ground forces and the ground campaign through navy fire support in the eastern area of operation.71

Summary

Following figure shows how the success criteria of combined command structure were withdrawn from warfighting functions of three case studies.
Figure 10. The Success Criteria from Warfighting Functions

Source: Created by author.


5Ibid., 47-49.
6Ibid., 54-56.

7Ibid., 57-58.


12Ibid., 4-10.


16Sandler, 198-199.


21Dale and Willbanks, 13.

22Ibid., 14.
23 Ibid., 15.


26 Crane, 27.


28 Ibid.

29 Ibid., M-1.


31 Ibid., 42.


33 Winnefeld, 45.


35 Eckhardt, 51.

36 Winnefeld, 66-67.

37 Ibid., 70.

38 Mrozek, 41.


40 Ibid., K-12,


Paul L. Legere, “Joint and Multinational Command and Control Architecture in the Korean Theater of Operations: How Did We Get Here and Where are We Going?” (Rhode Island, Naval War College, 2007), 12.


Eckhardt, 59.

Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress vol 2, C-17.

Ibid., C10.

Ibid., C13-18.


Danzik, 15.


Eckhardt, 60.

Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress vol 2, F-4 – F-5.

Ibid., F-12.

FM 4-0, 2-10.


Fox, 51.

Danzik, 19.
62 Eckhardt, 61-63.

63 Ibid., 61-62.

64 Ibid., 60-61.


66 Ibid., K24 – K25.


68 Ibid., K-30.

69 Ibid., K-45.

70 General H. Norman Schwarzkopf.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

General

North Korea outnumbers South Korea in the number of military forces, heavy equipment and in the area of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). South Korea needs to strengthen the CFC structure more in order to prepare for unexpected incidents on the Korean peninsula and to be ready for open conflict against North Korea. There must be various command structures for the new CFC after dismantling the present CFC. However, if the new CFC structure developed is based on the critical assessment of defense posture rather than the byproduct of political affairs, South Korea might better leverage the U.S. presence in South Korea. For a defense posture, there are several ways to measure military capability. However, the warfighting functions as listed in U.S. joint and Army service doctrine are useful tools to measure the effectiveness of command structures. In particular, the monograph has shown how commanders conceptualized military capabilities in terms of combat power using the six warfighting functions.¹

In this research, success criteria were identified by comparing and analyzing the warfighting functions of three major operations to generate maximum combat strength for a recognized CFC. These criteria are: adaptive to emergent threats, interoperability, unity of effort, and common operational pictures. Each criterion has several components to meet conditions for military success. Those criteria will be applied to develop the new South Korea – U.S. CFC structure.

The military objective remains the Kim Jong-II regime and the North Korean military leadership. Nevertheless, the North Korean population has been exposed to a
They have been educated in a communist culture for more than 50 years and also indoctrinated with the view that western countries are to blame for dividing the Korean peninsula. We cannot be sure if the North Korean people are friendly to UN units or not. Therefore, South Korea, especially the military, should consider these factors in their planning vis-à-vis North Korea.

The Most Effective Course of Action Under a Parallel Command Structure

The most effective course of action is listed as figure 11.

Figure 11. The Most Effective South Korea-U.S. CFC structure

Source: Created by author.
To meet the first success criterion of being adaptive to emergent threats, military forces combined with civilian agencies under the control of Joint Chiefs of Staff will facilitate stability operations at any phase, and develop a coordinated synergy effect to prevent insurgencies from rising. Civilian agencies should be under the control of Joint Chiefs of Staff. That will make it easy for military operations to address with or without any insurgent hostilities at any phase of military operation.

The second success criterion, interoperability for military operation is defined as “the ability of systems, units, or forces to provide services to and accept services from other systems, units, or forces and to use the services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together.”

It includes interoperable hardware and software system. It was essential for U.S. forces to recognize differences of multinational forces and modify them to operate effectively in the battlefield for a multinational operation. U.S. JP 3-0 recommends that interoperability can be achieved through the exchange of systems, units and forces, which leads to a cooperation and coordination with allied forces.

To meet the criterion, interoperability, a combined logistical command must be established to allow coalition forces easy access to infrastructures such as ports, supplies and fuel. A combined logistical command will ensure economy of effort and timely supplies for deployed forces from a host nation since most of UN units are supposed to be deployed to conflicted areas. In case South Korea and the U.S. fail to agree on a combined logistical command, a formal agreement that allows coalition forces easy access to supplies, fuel, storage and infrastructure between countries can replace a combined logistical command. However, that agreement should be made prior to any conflict. Then, coalition forces can avoid any delay of reception, staging, onward
Another criterion for interoperability is to set up the system of centralized airpower to prevent fratricide. Air support for a ground operation might cause unexpected drastic casualties of allied forces unless a system of centralized air power is not in place including centralized airspace control measures and communication system indentifying friend or foe.

The third success criterion, unity of effort, is defined in FM 6-0 as coordination and cooperation among all forces toward a commonly recognized objective, even though the multinational forces are not in the same command structure. For unity of effort, command relationships down at tactical level, even under a parallel command structure, will maintain unity of command within the assigned area of operation. Then South Korea can take charge of leading embedded UN units on either eastern or western fronts to maximize combat strength, while the U.S. takes charge of allied forces in certain rear or flank areas to prevent confusion. Specific assignments will be decided on the capability of each force.

A combined intelligence agency for unity of effort needs to be activated before incidents happen on the Korean peninsula. Intelligence is a basic requirement for effective military operations, since it identifies and analyzes the enemy center of gravity. Coalition forces need to coordinate all intelligence activities and assess all the information they need to prevent any unexpected conflicts. South Korea, in particular, is short on intelligence gathering and analyzing assets to monitor North Korea in depth. Therefore, a new command structure should also make sure that all coalition forces be
involved in information collecting operations, either directly or indirectly, through a combined intelligence agency.

A combined air operation command for unity of effort is necessary in advance for effective fire support, which also ensures a centralized airspace control. South Korea and the U.S. will have a joint forces air component command (JFACC) to control all air assets under their respective command and control. Each JFACC will be under the control of combined air operation command. Combined air operation will include an integrated protection plan for timely fire support and key military assets defense. It will enhance the protection of key military assets and critical civilian facilities relating to military operation.

Supplementary mechanisms like a coalition coordination center (CCC) to ensure a flow command and control is also necessary for unity of effort if South Korea insists on a parallel command structure. The CCC should have staffs more like operational headquarters representing each country. The CCC should have coordination meetings to ensure common operational picture and flow of communication. Agreement and decisions made at CCC should be passed to all coalition subordinate units for execution.

An integrated command & control system and the combined intelligence agency will provide the common operational picture, the last success criterion. Unless coalition forces make it to an integrated command structure, then a coalition coordination center should replace an integrated command structure for a common operational picture.

Recommendations

South Korea wanted to get wartime operational control back from the U.S. and have a parallel command structure. Therefore, as figure 11 shows, military committee
(MC) has a command authority over combined organizations such as a combined intelligence agency, logistical command and combined air operations command (CAOC). The U.S. and South Korea agreed already on establishing combined air command for the new South Korea - U.S. CFC structure on February 11, 2009. The new CFC structure agreed between the U.S. and South Korea is a parallel command structure that has combined air command and other command coordination centers such as a combined intelligence center to mitigate the weakness that parallel command structure has in general.

![Diagram of CFC structure]

Figure 12. The CFC structure undergoing between the U.S. and South Korea

The course of action presented in figure 11 is quite similar to new undergoing CFC structure in terms of a combined air command, combined intelligence and coordination center. New undergoing CFC structure will also have an interoperable C4I system by 2011. However, the argument is who is in charge of MC representing the U.S. Korea command and South Korea Joint Chiefs of Staff if U.S. interests conflict with South Korea’s interest. Some military officers argue that new CFC would not have any command issues once combined air command is under operational control to South Korea’s joint chiefs of staff during wartime. If it does, U.S. Korea Command does not have command authority over the combined air operation center and air component command. The differences between the command structure in Figure 11 and new CFC structure underway between the U.S. and South Korea are as follows.

1. Military committee (MC) in figure 11 has command authority over combined air operations command. The combined air operations command is not under operational control to South Korea’s joint chiefs of staff.

2. The course of action in figure 11 presents command structure for Phase IV and full spectrum operations.

3. The course of action in figure 11 is a parallel command structure at operational level, but a hybrid command structure (integrated / lead nation command structure) at a tactical level by area of operation.

I cannot say that the aforementioned recommendation is a panacea for success. The above command structure in figure 11 also might have risks that both the U.S. and South Korea have to face. However, it must try to seek the most effective command structure for both U.S. and South Korea after 2012. There still are many areas that need
to be developed and case studies worth researching and analyzing. Military officers need to research each warfighting function in depth and relate the analysis to the possible command structure. The multinational operations that U.S. forces fought have many lessons to take away within the area of warfighting functions--U.S. forces had precedence in the combined air operation center (CAOC) structure, as seen in Bosnia and Kosovo. Therefore, I recommend military officers study each warfighting function to further examine multinational command structures.


6There was a case that the U.S. Patton tanks of 6th tank battalion were released from the U.S. 24th division and attached to the South Korea 1st division temporarily during capturing Pyongyang, the capital city of North Korea, in 1950. Clay Blair, The Forgotten War: America in Korea, 1950-1953 (New York: Times Books, 1987), 357.
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