IS THE UNITED STATES ARMY RESERVE AN OPERATIONAL FORCE, A STRATEGIC RESERVE, OR A MIX OF BOTH?

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MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
General Studies

by

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Is the Army Reserve an operational force, a strategic reserve or a mix of both?

14. ABSTRACT
The United States Army Reserve’s (USAR) role has changed multiple times throughout its history. It was founded as a medical reserve corps. In that role, it supplied individual replacements to the Army. The USAR continued to be developed into a Cold War force. It would then change again from the Cold War force to a modular force operating in the 21st century.

Since the attacks on the World Trade Center, the Army and its Reserve Components (RC) have faced new challenges. It has had to rethink and assess what role the USAR will play in the future. Department of Defense (DOD) Directive 1200.17 dated October 29, 2008 defines that role. It describes the role of the RCs as providing operational capabilities and strategic depth to meet all requirements across the full spectrum of conflict.

This thesis will review the roles described in the DOD directive. The thesis will establish how the United States reserve force was created and then the purpose of having a reserve force. It will then establish the strategic reserve role played by the USAR. This will be accomplished by an in depth historical perspective of the USAR. The historical perspective will include the creation of the USAR through the Gulf War.
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

IS THE ARMY RESERVE AN OPERATIONAL FORCE, STRATEGIC RESERVE OR A MIX OF BOTH, by Howard M. Keebler, 70 pages.

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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Is the United States Army Reserve (USAR) an operational force, a strategic reserve or a mix of both? In order to answer the question this thesis will provide a historical perspective on the implementation of the USAR. It will define and describe the strategic reserve, and the reserve as an operational force. It will examine if the USAR is both a strategic reserve and the reserve as an operational force. Finally this thesis will present the effects on a reservist’s civilian career when a USAR Soldier becomes part of the strategic reserve and the reserve as an operational force.

The USAR as an operational force is a fairly new concept. It came about due to two reasons: transformation and terrorism. In 1999 the Chief of Staff of the Army directed an overhaul of the U.S. Army by issuing The Transformation Campaign Plan. This document tasked a Cold War Army to transition into a lighter more responsive mode.\(^1\) The plan directed the Army to form modular brigades, decreased the size of the institutional Army, and established an interlocking dependence on the reserve component.\(^2\) The transformation included the Army National Guard (ARNG) and USAR.

The other reason the concept of the USAR as an operational force came about was due to America’s response to the September 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center. In order to respond to the terrorist threat, the Army called for additional forces, located in the USAR. The increased requirements along with the transformed force created a constant reliance on the USAR. The USAR created a cyclic process that manages units to support this operational tempo. This process is called Army Reserve
Expeditionary Forces (AREF). The need of the Army has placed citizen Soldiers alongside Active Component (AC) Soldiers. These two reasons created the need for a reserve as an operational force. Now that the conditions are set, what is the reserve as an operational force?

As with any new concept, the identity of the concept can change. The most current definition can be located in DoD Directive 1200.17 Managing the Reserve Component as an Operational Force, dated October 29, 2008, which states:

RCs as an operational force. The RCs provide operational capabilities and strategic depth to meet U.S. defense requirements across the full spectrum of conflict. In their operational roles, RCs participate in a full range of missions according to their Services’ force generation plans. Units and individuals participate in missions in an established cyclic or periodic manner that provides predictability for the combatant commands, the Services, Service members, their families, and employers. In their strategic roles, RC units and individuals train or are available for missions in accordance with the national defense strategy. As such, the RCs provide strategic depth and are available to transition to operational roles as needed.

As indicated in the statement above, the Reserve Component (RC) is a multidimensional force. The directive defines the RC as an operational force that provides operational capabilities and strategic depth to the U.S. across the full spectrum of conflict. This is accomplished through the two roles the RC performs. The two roles defined by the directive are strategic and operational.

The operational role consists of two elements. The primary element of the operational role is participating in a full range of missions. The secondary element is the force concurrently participating in a cyclic force generation plan that is directed by the Service. For example, today the USAR participates in Army Force Generation Plan (ARFORGEN) as directed by the Army.
The document states the strategic role directs units and individuals to train and be available for missions in accordance with the national defense strategy. The strategic role includes the capability to transition to the operational role. The strategic role and operational role are key according to the DoD in the definition of the USAR as an operational force.

The definition of the reserve is derived from DoD Directive 1200.17 and is signed by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates. It establishes the contemporary environment the USAR is operating in today. The document organized all branches of the RC including, the Army, Navy, USMC, and Air Force as an operational force. In order to accomplish this task, it directs policies and principles that support achieving that goal. Overall it contains nine principles required to achieve the end state of managing the RC as an operational force. The nine principles are: (1) Operational Capabilities and Strategic Depth, (2) Homeland Defense and Defense Support to Civil Authority, (3) Total Force Concept, (4) Connection to the American Public, (5) Continuum of Service, (6) Utilization Rules, (7) Voluntary Duty, (8) Readiness, and finally (9) Outreach.

The directive begins with ensuring the RC provides strategic depth and an operational capability that enables the full spectrum of operations. Then it directs the Active Component (AC) and RC are fully integrated creating a total force. It describes a unity of effort in Homeland Defense and Defense Support to Civil Authorities. It further reiterates that all RC’s provide a link to the American public in support and commitment.

It continues by addressing implementation of the force. It dictates the need to change a variety of laws to support the Army’s operational mission. The directive addresses the issue of continuum of service specifically creating additional flexible
service options. It acknowledges the need for individual voluntary duty by creating additional exception options for Soldiers. It also addresses the readiness requirements and operational force requires, and finally the need for outreach to support the RC which includes the USAR.

This thesis will explore and examine the strategic role and operational role as defined by DoD Directive 1200.17. It will analyze both roles and provide evidence that establishes the primary question: “Is the United States Army Reserve an operational force, a strategic reserve or a mix of both?” In order to answer the primary question a five phase methodology will be used. The first phase will establish resources in order to collect data related to the topic. It will then establish categories related to the primary question. The next step will identify key characteristics through analysis of the categories. Then it will report the analytical results in chapter four, and finally present recommendations based on the analysis

Background

According to the USAR’s official web site:

More than 190,000 Army Reserve Soldiers have mobilized since the terrorist attacks of September 11th. Ninety Eight percent of Army Reserve units have provided mobilized soldiers in Iraq, Afghanistan, and 18 other countries. . . . The global War On Terror has proven the Army Reserve is no longer a “strategic” force in reserve but an “operational ready” partner with the active Army. The majority of the USAR’s effort is devoted to deploying units and Soldiers in support of the Global War On Terror (GWOT) and serving as an operational force. These two are critical missions to execute. The transformation and force generation process are integral parts of these two tasks. They enable the AC Army force a full range of missions. The primary USAR mission is supporting the GWOT as it requires unique
capabilities that are not in the Active Component. For example, 93 percent of all Army civil affairs (CA) units reside in the USAR. In many instances, mission completion or mission failure depends upon successful execution of these unique capabilities. These capabilities have to be well maintained and resourced appropriately. Supporting the GWOT is only one aspect of the multitude of missions the USAR is executing.

The second mission identified in the Army Reserve 100th Anniversary statement asserts that the USAR is no longer a “strategic” force but an “operational ready” force. The strategic force was a reserve force called upon to supplement the Army in crisis times. The strategic reserve relied upon a period of time to prepare and train for deployment. The assumption underlying this model was the Army would not need the force until months after the initial hostilities occurred. This assumption held until after the Vietnam War.

A change in the reliance upon the USAR began after the Vietnam War. The Army Chief of Staff, General Creighton Abrams, directed the change through the “Total Force” policy. The policy dictated combat support and combat service support units move from the AC to the USAR. The Army would now have an earlier and greater dependence on the reserve. The Gulf War was a testament to this fact, as over 84,000 USAR Soldiers served in that conflict. This was not the only time the USAR would be called upon to support the Army, as operations in Kosovo would demonstrate.

The reliance upon the strategic reserve began early in the 20th century. Congress created the USAR in 1908. The newly constituted force consisted of medical professionals and became a medical reserve corps. In 1912 the USAR was expanded to include additional occupations.
I (WWI). The purpose was to fill individual medical requirements in the AC. The newly mobilized Soldiers used their professional medical civilian credentials and background to support American forces during WWI.\textsuperscript{12} The reliance on the civilian certifications was necessitated by the fact that the USAR often did not have adequate funding to provide training. The lack of training due to inadequate funding would be a trend through the early 1950s.\textsuperscript{13}

The Korean War caused the Army to call upon complete units with the assigned Soldiers.\textsuperscript{14} Many issues would surface from the mobilization to include the first occasion of double-tapped Soldiers.\textsuperscript{15} Double-tapped Soldiers were soldiers who served in WWII and re-mobilized for Korea. Some soldiers openly complained about the situation. These complaints did not stop deployments or valiant efforts on the battlefields.\textsuperscript{16}

The 1960s provided an interesting environment that both parallels aspects of today’s events and presented challenging opportunities for the USAR. The Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, restructuring the Department of Defense. The purpose of the restructuring was to create a more flexible Army. He specifically targeted the USAR for rebuilding.\textsuperscript{17} This is similar to the restructuring called for in the 1999 \textit{Transformation Campaign Plan}. He saw excessive force structure and created what would become the Army Reserve Commands (ARCOM). For the first time, USAR units were linked to contingency operations.\textsuperscript{18} During this period the Berlin crisis occurred resulting in the immediate mobilization of multiple USAR units. During the mid 1960s and early 1970s, the USAR would play a small role in the Vietnam War.\textsuperscript{19} The marginalization of the Reserve Components during the Vietnam War created another impetus for change which General Creighton Abrams would direct with his “Total Force” policy.
From the creation of the USAR through the “Total Force” policy of the early 1970s, the USAR was considered a strategic reserve. It was composed of civilian Soldiers that required time to mobilize equip and train. The composition of the force began with medical officers and grew to include a variety of units. The force today still retains the basic structure that can be traced to its inception as the USAR. The uniqueness of today’s USAR differs from the past is the development and implementation of a cyclic force generation model. This model provides deployable units as operational forces for the U.S. Army.

**Primary Research Questions**

Is the United States Army Reserve an operational force, a strategic reserve or a mix of both?

**Secondary Research Questions**

What is the reserve as an operational force?

What is the strategic reserve?

How can the USAR man, equip and train for the different roles?

Does the Army need the USAR as a strategic reserve?

How does the type of USAR force impact employer relationships?

**Significance**

The transition of the USAR from a strategic reserve to a reserve as an operational force is not a new subject. The USAR has transitioned between these many times through its 100 year history. The transition began with the creation of a medical reserve corps; then it moved to a strategic reserve that attended once a month drills and two
weeks annual training each year. Now it is an integral part of the Army’s operational force with deployments projected every five years. Today's GWOT requirements dictate that the USAR serves as an operational force past the end of current hostilities. The ability to maintain a reserve as an operational force is unchartered.

Assumptions

This paper assumes that the future role of the USAR remains undetermined. The USAR has undergone significant changes over the last ten years and will continue to do so. A primary assumption is the USAR was a strategic reserve from inception through the Gulf War. The reserve as an operational force has developed over the last six years.

Definitions

For the purpose of this thesis, USAR is defined as a Federal Reserve. Federal Reserve forces are Title 10 forces consisting primarily of combat service and combat service support units in the USAR.

The term transformation has a variety of meanings and uses. It can be defined as a change in characteristics or traits. The Transformation Campaign Plan refers to the change of force structure.

Limitations

This paper will address the transition from a strategic reserve to operational force from the view of the USAR. The previous historical role of the USAR through September 10, 2001, will define strategic reserve. The USAR as an operational force will be considered from September 11, 2001, to present. This thesis will discuss the similarities and differences in the strategic reserve and the reserve as an operational force.
Delimitations

This thesis will not address the impact or role the Army National Guard plays in the subject. Homeland defense and defense support to civil authorities is one of the nine principles established by DOD Directive 1200.17. It is a very important role the RC must address, but this issue is not addressed in this thesis. The view of this paper will be from within the USAR community.

Summary and Conclusion

The future force size and force development of the Army is currently under review by the Obama Administration. The USAR is not exempt from this review. The current demands on the USAR are extreme. As conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan conclude, the operational tempo will change to a prewar pace. Will the ready units still deploy? Is there a need for a strategic reserve? A review of previous changes to the USAR is warranted. A closer review of today's literature on the topic necessitates the study of “what next.”

This chapter established the primary question “Is the United States Army Reserve an operational force, strategic reserve or mix of both?” It defined the USAR as an operational force per DoD Directive 1200.17. It briefly identified the methodology used through the research process. It provided a background in order to establish the next chapter. The next chapter will discuss and review the related literature to the primary question. It offers a description of DoD Directive 1200.17 and other relevant sources including articles, books, and testimony.

2 Ibid., 32.


6 Stultz, 144.

7 Ibid., 140.

8 Ibid., 142.


10 Ibid.


12 Currie, 30.

13 Ibid., 38.

14 Ibid., 96.

15 Ibid., 97.

16 Ibid.

17 Ibid., 133.

18 Ibid., 134.

19 100 Years of Service Timeline, USAR, April 2008.
CHAPTER 2

REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE AND DATA

The previous chapter discussed the primary question, which is, the Army Reserve: an operational force, a strategic reserve or a mix of both? It also described why the question is important. This chapter provides a focused view related to the directed change of the USAR from a strategic to operational force via various resources. There is a fair amount of literature concerning the process for changing to a reserve as an operational force including reports, thesis, papers, articles, and briefings.

The reserve in an operational role has breadth in research. There is a substantial amount of written material relating to the reserve as an operational force, but there is also a lack of depth in sources concerning the ability to sustain an operational force after a war has ended. There is little written on maintaining the USAR as an operational force during non war years and the lack of a discussion of the strategic reserve.

The primary source for defining today’s role of the USAR is taken from a DoD directive. DoD Directive 1200.17 states, “the RC serves in two roles that enable the Army to operate in a full spectrum of operations.”¹ The two roles are strategic and operational. It further explains the primary difference between the RC serving in a strategic role versus the operational role is the reserve force in an operational role participates in force generation plans. The issue with the definition as it currently stands is the USAR has all units participating in force generation plans.² The directive is further supported by a white paper that was published in October 2008.

The white paper, Managing the Reserve Components as an Operational force, was published by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs.
The paper takes the nine key areas from the directive and further addresses the importance of each one. The key areas are translated into nine principles. The purpose of the white paper is to streamline the approach of managing the RC as an operational force. It further wants to enhance Active and Reserve integration throughout the Services, consolidate use of resources, and enhance training efficiencies.³

In addition to the purposes put forth, there is a goal the paper wants to achieve: to provide a standardized baseline framework that enables all DOD services to manage its RC as an operational force. It generates nine principles of managing the reserve as an operational force as a foundation for institutional knowledge that will enhance managing the reserve as an operational force. The nine principles also provide a baseline for future development of policy. The paper organizes the nine principles into three categories.⁴ (See Figure 1)
DOD DIRECTIVE 1200.17
9 Principles

• Roles of the Reserve Components
  – Operational Capabilities and Strategic Depth
  – Homeland Defense and Defense Support to Civil Authority

• Underlying Philosophy
  – Total Force Concept
  – Connection to the American Public

• Management Principles
  – Continuum of Service
  – Utilization Rules
  – Voluntary Duty
  – Readiness
  – Outreach

Figure 1. Categories and Principles of Managing the RC as an Operational Force
Source: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs

The first category is “Roles of the Reserve Components.” This addresses the primary question. It contains the principle of operational capabilities and strategic depth. It begins with discussing the strategic and operational roles of the RC. It establishes the characteristics of the operational role which include participation in a full range of missions, force generation plans, and operational requirements. It further expands the characteristics of the reserve as an operational force to include a force that is ready. The importance of a trained and equipped force in a cyclic planned generation cycle is a key for the reserve as an operational force.

The second piece of the category discussed is the strategic role. The strategic role for the USAR is described as well trained, equipped and staffed. It also must accomplish missions as directed by the national defense strategy. The key characteristic described in
this role is the ability to transition to an operational role as required. The paper recognizes the importance and value of the USAR as a limited resource for the Army. The paper acknowledges the USAR is a community based force serving in multiple roles supporting the Army worldwide.

The second category, “Underlying Philosophy,” contains the principle of a total force concept. This section discusses integration of the AC and RC components. It begins by reviewing total force policy signed in 1970 by Melvin Laird, then Secretary of Defense. It first directed an increased reliance upon the RC. It also required the AC and RC to be considered together including the areas of budgeting, planning, and programming.

The third category is “Management Principles.” This contains the remaining five principles as described by DOD Directive 1200.17. The subsection utilization rules address the importance of maintaining the USAR by managing its implementation. It discusses force generation as necessary to provide stability and predictability to families as well as employers. It further explains activation of a member is no longer a once-in-a-career event. The next principle relating to the primary question is readiness. This section communicates the requirement to adequately resource the RC. It discusses the desired process used to ensure resources are placed where they are required. It discusses the train, mobilize, and deploy model that is supported by force generation plans. It details the need for a proper mixture of fulltime staff including Active Guard Reserve (AGR), military technicians (MILTECH) and other federal employees. The subsection recognizes the need to maintain medical, dental and legal readiness and how readiness can affect the train mobilize and deploy model. The final principle is outreach. It
recognizes a bond between the RC and employers needs to be maintained and strengthened. The performance of the RC is related directly to the support the civilian sector provides to its employees who are serving as citizen warriors.

The DoD Directive 1200.17, in concert with the white paper, attempts to manage the USAR as an operational force. It provides nine principles that support the goal. They define what the USAR as an operational force is today. The definition, along with the roles and characteristics described by the directive, will be the baseline description of the USAR for this thesis. They are the only sources that define the USAR as an operational force.

Literature on the historical role flows from numerous sources. The first source is secondary sources. There are very few books written about the topic. The book *Twice the Citizen, a History of the United States Army Reserve*, written by Richard Crossland and James T. Currie provides an in depth and detailed picture of the historical development of the USAR. The book was commissioned as a tribute to the 75th year anniversary celebration of the USAR. It contains information gathered from a multitude of sources including the national archives. It provides a detailed historical account of the USAR as a strategic reserve. The book’s limitation is that it ends in 1983: however, it provides a comprehensive historical perspective of the USAR.

Another relevant book is *Twenty - First Century: a Federal Army and a Militia* by Dr. Charles E. Heller published by the Strategic Studies Institute U.S. Army War College. The author divides his work into two categories: the institutional history of the USAR and the proposed direction of the USAR. The institutional history begins at the inception of the reserve through the Gulf War. In the second part of the book, Heller
proposes a new force structure. The structure contains two pieces. The first piece is the AC and the USAR together. They would begin the initial fight. This would allow time for the second piece, the Army Reserve National Guard (ARNG) to prepare for deployment. The second piece is the ARNG, which would deploy additional combat power to support the AC. Unfortunately, Dr. Heller’s proposed revisions would not work in today’s GWOT environment that depends on the mobilization of the USAR. Waiting for a lengthy generation of a reserve force is unlikely.

The next source for gathering current information is from articles written in professional publications. Current trends and philosophies are found in these sources; hence I will use these to gather current information. Many senior leaders use these publications to provide their thoughts and direction. There are articles specifically related to the topic of the USAR as an operational force.

For example, the featured article in the October 2007 ARMY Magazine was “The Army Reserve: No longer a Strategic Reserve,” by LTG Jack C. Stultz. Stultz gives a command view of the USAR transition from a strategic to an operational reserve force. He presents an update on USAR operations and a map of future operations. This article provides a foundation on which to build the concept of the USAR as an operational force. The USAR as an operational force is a topic that appears often in these publications. Almost always when the topic of an operational reserve is written, the authors support the idea of an operational reserve. They discuss the reliance of the Army upon the USAR due to the inability of the Army to self-sustain. At times the articles lack depth of detail related to the definition of the USAR as an operational force and may only discuss current command philosophy. Additionally, the authors generally have an agenda. The
Another article that presents issues related to the operational reserve is published in the June 2007 edition of *The Officer* magazine. “The Operational Reserve,” by COL (Ret.) David A. Smith. Smith proposes two issues that arise from an operational reserve. The first is the need to rethink personnel policies and the second is reorganizing the USAR. He acknowledges the legal requirements such as Title 10 that restrict the use of the USAR. He suggests a splitting of the USAR force into an operational and strategic reserve. Volunteers recognizing the higher operational tempo requirements, which require the legal changes, would mean the operational reserve. He ends the article by proposing the need for a strategic reserve. The author describes using the USAR as an operational force as being too demanding and not in line with Soldiers civilian careers. He states the requirements of an operational force may interfere with the development of civilian careers. In order to pacify the civilian career issue, he suggests a strategic reserve will enable Soldiers to enhance their civilian careers.

Another type of professional publications includes reports researched and written by strategic studies groups, including the Center for Strategic Leadership (CSL) and the Center for Strategic International Studies (CSIS). Both produce in-depth reports written about the transformation of the Army. In particular CSIS produced “The Future of the National Guard and Reserves Beyond the Goldwater - Nichols Phase III Report,” co-written by Christine Wurmmuth, Michele Flornoy, Patrick T. Henry, and Clark A. Murdock. The report’s third chapter discusses the challenges of employing the USAR as an operational force. This chapter discusses the equipment shortfalls of the USAR, the
ARFORGEN process, required time for deployment training, and finally manning the force. The report recommends that in order for the USAR to serve as an operational force, the Army must resource, plan, create policy, and recognize the USAR as a partner with the AC. This report establishes areas that will be used to compare the strategic reserve to the reserve as an operational force.

Reports to Congressional Committees provide the next source of information. The foremost congressional reports used are from the United States Government Accountability Office (GAO). There are several key reports produced from this office including topics such as improving defense logistics, Future Combat Systems (FCS), and a report on readiness challenges of the USAR for the 21st century. These topics are not the only ones cited in this report. Another report to Congress cited in this paper is the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves “Transforming the National Guard and Reserves into a 21st-Century Operational Force.” This report recommends reforming the operational reserve.\(^{10}\) The report covers six areas of concern. Three relating to this thesis are: (1) creating an operational reserve, (2) developing the operational reserve and (3) reforming the institutions that support an operational reserve. The report was the first formal review of the reserves since WWII.

The GAO report “Reserve Forces Army National Guard and Army Reserve Readiness for 21st century challenges” focuses on the equipment shortages for the AR and ARNG. This report's primary focus is on the lack of equipment and the effects it will have on the future force. Equipping an operational vice a Strategic force is fraught with complexity. From the years 2001 through 2005 the USAR had to transfer over 205,000 pieces of equipment to fill shortages of the USAR’s deploying units.\(^{11}\) As late as fiscal
year 2007 the USAR reported 78 percent equipment required, and further estimates 44 percent needs servicing. An operational reserve must equip the force at a much higher rate; the operational force does not have the luxury of a six month build time as called for in the strategic reserve. The underlying issue in equipping either force is the cost. The cost is identified as a requirement in the GAO report.

Next are the additional directives the Department of the Army published. The USAR as an operational force is addressed in great detail in the 2006 Army Game Plan, the 2008 National Military Strategy, and the 2008 Army Reserve Vision statement. These three documents establish what the USAR is doing today and what it is supposed to do in the future. The 2006 Army Game Plan is relevant due to the fact it directs the USAR to “operationalize.” These documents will enhance the baseline for current USAR operations.

Another source of information is official briefings. The Army Reserve Posture Statement is one such briefing. This briefing states the purpose of the USAR, priorities and the reasoning why the USAR is headed the way it is. It discusses the top priorities which include establishing the USAR as an operation force, and the importance of employer support. The limitation to official briefings often is the agenda they are espousing. The Army Reserve Posture Statements agenda relates to keeping Soldiers and transforming the reserve as an operational force.

Additionally, there is a plethora of information related to this topic written as graduate theses papers. The United States Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC), School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), and the Army War College provide a multitude of papers on this topic. A key monograph related to this topic,
“Untested Waters Challenge facing an Operational Army Reserve” was written by LTC Tracy Thompson. This research project from the U.S. Army War College addresses the impact of an operational reserve on the civilian careers of Soldiers. The paper proposes the reserve as an operational force may be too demanding and distracts from a Soldier’s civilian career. This refers directly to the thesis question and provides another insight into the complexity of this topic. These resources provide current thought and guidance.

The internet provides a variety of resources. The Defense Strategy review page, sponsored by the Project on Defense Alternatives (PDA), formally the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) maintains a variety of resources. The Defense Strategy page provides copies of the QDR’s, and Official Strategy papers, along with Posture statements and the Commission Documents. It also furnishes unofficial commissions, task force findings, SecDef Annual Reports, and the Reserve Component Employment Study. The RC Employment Study from 2005 reviews the role of the reserve in three areas. The first is Homeland Defense, Smaller-Scale Contingencies, and Major Theater Wars. The report makes recommendations on maximizing the use of the reserve forces in Homeland Defense, Smaller-Scale Contingencies, and Major Theaters of War.

The literature collected fits into two categories. The first is the historical perspective of the employment of the strategic reserve. The documents begin with the founding of the reserve through the Gulf War. It includes issues associated with the strategic reserve such as the Total Force Policy changes. The historical perspective includes a large array of resources that create the foundation of a strategic reserve.

The second literary category is the current operation and direction of the USAR. This includes articles and briefings that are mostly supporting the idea of the reserve as
an operational force. This category contains documents that are critical to the foundation of this thesis. There are vast amounts of research studies, white papers, professional articles, GAO reports, reports to congress and command direction. They provide insight, diverse thoughts, and opinions on the reserve as a strategic force. The two categories indirectly and directly address the majority of the secondary research questions.

This chapter reviewed the resources used and the relationship to the thesis. The next chapter will explain the methodology used for analysis of the data. The next chapter will associate the key issues related to the primary and secondary questions, and apply them against the resources brought forth in this chapter. Chapter Three will present the methodology used to collect, evaluate and present the findings of the primary question “Is the United States Army Reserve an operational force, strategic reserve or a mix of both?”


2Stultz, 140.


4Ibid., 6.

5Currie, 269.


7Stultz, 140.

8David A Smith, "The Operational Reserve." The Officer (June 2007): 37.


CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY

The primary research question “Is the United States Army Reserve an operational force, a strategic reserve or a mix of both?” The previous chapter summarized and analyzed the literature and resources used in order to develop the foundation of this thesis. This chapter will explain the techniques used to gather the data and how the data relates to the primary and secondary questions. This chapter will provide the method used to identify, define, and describe the characteristics of the reserve as an operational force, strategic reserve and a mix of both a strategic reserve and an operational force. It will present the method used to describe and discuss the impact of each type of reserve force upon civilian employment. Finally it will also present the historical implementation of the USAR in order to develop a predictive future use of the USAR.

To answer the primary question of “Is the United States Army Reserve an operational force, strategic reserve or a mix of both,” the following methodology was used to generate the related data. The process is best described in five phases: gathering the information, categorizing, analyzing, reporting the findings and finally recommendations (See Figure 2)
Five Phase Method

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Five Categories established within Phases Two- Five

1. The reserve as an operational force
   Developed after September 2001
   Increased unit and personnel readiness
   One deployment every five years
   Mobilization cycle is train, alert deploy
   force generation model support current operations

2. The strategic reserve
   1908 through August 2001
   Mid-level readiness of units
   Mobilization cycle of alert, train and deploy
   Strategic reserve tied to contingency plans
   Once in a twenty year career mobilization

3. A mix of both
   Developed from DOD Directive 1200.17
   Contains both strategic and operational roles
   Strategic role
   - Availability of force
   - Ability to transition to operational role
   Operational role
   - Force generation
   - Full range missions
   - Increased readiness

4. Historical perspective
   1908 through August 2001
   Creation and development of the USAR
   Implementation of the USAR
   Force Structure Changes

5. Employer support
   Maintaining positive employer support
   Provide predictable patterns to employer
   The days away from the civilian career
   Recognition of Employer Support

Figure 2. Methodology

Phase One

The “gathering information” phase came from traditional and nontraditional sources. This was specifically done to in order to gain a wide variety of views and opinions related to the primary question. The traditional sources were generated from institutional research. These sources originated from library research. They included books, articles, theses and dissertations. The foundation of the historical implementation of the USAR along with current guidance was developed from this research.

The second source for gathering information was derived from the internet. The internet searches produced additional resources including websites related to the primary question. The websites generated a variety of related documents including contemporary articles that applied to the USAR Today. The final source used to gather information was
from within the Ft Leavenworth community. The staff and instructors of CGSC provided keen insight and more importantly additional subject areas to research. The various libraries, internet, and instructors from CGSC provided the resources collected during phase one gathering information. The research produced a key resource DoD Directive 1200.17. This document defines the reserve as an operational force. The definition assisted in establishing the next phase which is categorizing the collected data.

**Phase Two**

Phase two, “Categorizing the Data,” began with establishing areas related to the primary research question. The initial step was creating an operational force category, strategic reserve category, and a mix of both categories. Two additional categories were created from the secondary research questions. The secondary questions are a historical perspective and employer support. The categories all contain additional steps.

The first category is the reserve as an operational force. The operational force category was developed from contemporary articles written by key leaders. The first step is defining the reserve as an Operational force by referencing the 2006 vision provided by LTG Jack C. Stultz Chief, Army Reserve.\(^1\) It states we are no longer a once-a-month, two weeks a year reserve, we are an operational force. The characteristics of the reserve in an operational role are gathered from a variety of reports.

These reports include the United States Army War College (USAWC) report “An Operational Army Reserve: Implications for Organizational Health” by Colonel Jonathan A. Dahms. It provides a foundation of the transition from a strategic to what he describes as an operational reserve.\(^2\) It also defines both a strategic and operational reserve, along with characteristics that affect Soldiers and civilian employment. An additional article
from LTG Stutlz is titled “The Army Reserve: No longer a Strategic Reserve”. This article serves as a bridging point. In it LTG Stutz describes the characteristics of an operational force and a strategic reserve.

The second category established is “the strategic reserve.” The concept of the USAR as a strategic reserve is developed through a variety of resources. They include articles, statements and historical references. For example the deputy chief of staff for personnel, G-1, LTG Michael Rochelle stated in October 2008 that prior to 2001, the USAR and ARNG were considered strategic reserves. The expectation was a unit would be called upon for duration of war plus six months. The issue of a strategic reserve is further defined by current articles such as “The Army Reserve: No longer a Strategic Reserve” written by LTG Stultz. These are just a few of the resources used to establish a strategic reserve. The article also provides a view of the reserve as an operational force.

The third category taken from the primary question is titled “a mix of both.” This section contains two references. The first is DOD Directive 1200.17. The second reference is the white paper that further supports the directive. These references are placed into the mix of both categories due to the definition provided. The directive defines the RC as operational reserve as both in a strategic role and an operational role. The white paper details the reason for placing both the operational and strategic roles under the operational force. The definition also requires a cyclic force generation process. Defining the generation process along with addressing the second and third order effects will be presented in this section. The effects from the force generation process include three areas of readiness, manning, training and equipping. The white paper addresses the requirements of readiness. The ARFORGEN process as developed by the
Army will be presented as the force generation model. This category will contain the operational role, strategic role, and the ARFORGEN process. They will be used to develop the mix of both categories.

The fourth category is the “historical perspective.” This category includes the historical implementation of the USAR as well as the historical indication of force size. In order to provide a historical perspective, it will consist of the creation of the Army Reserve, the role of the AR in WWI, WWII, Korea, Vietnam, and Desert Storm. The book *Twice the Citizen, a History of the Army Reserve*, is a key resource of this phase. The historical use of the Army Reserve will be analyzed in order to identify common trends in the application of the Army Reserve as a strategic force from the wars of WWI through Desert Storm.

The fifth category developed to answer the primary question is impact on “employer support.” The USAR consists of citizen Soldiers and the affects from the different types of reserve force upon employers must be addressed. Employer support is an important aspect to the reserve Soldiers. It is also an initiative from the Chief of the Army Reserve. He has developed an employer recognition plan in order to reinforce the positives of employer support. The heart of the issue is how many days a Soldier will be way from the employer. This topic is one of the most important as the reserve relies primarily on citizens to fill its ranks. Without positive support citizens may not want to risk their primary source of income in order to serve the country. This will assist in developing characteristics of the two types of reserves along with answering the primary question.
Phase Three

The third phase of the methodology is the analysis. This phase takes the research data sorted into each of the five categories and develops definitions and characteristics. The definition and characteristics create the frames of each category. Each category shares common traits as well as unique characteristics. The framework of analysis for each category follows. The first category is the reserve as an operational force. This is defined primarily through articles and papers written on the USAR from the time period of the attacks on the World Trade Center to the present. The common characteristics of the reserve as an operational force developed from the research are as follows: need for the reserve as an operational force surfaced after the attacks on the World Trade Center, increased unit and personnel readiness, Army has a greater reliance upon the USAR to fulfill missions, expected mobilizations of three to four times during a twenty year career, the mobilization cycle is train alert deploy, and development of a force generation model support current operations. These are the key characteristics of the reserve as an operational force.

The next category is the second part of the primary question the strategic reserve. The strategic reserve characteristics gleaned from the research data rely upon both current articles written by key USAR leaders as well as historical information. There are five key characteristics that will be used to develop the strategic reserve: The time period established from the research begins at the inception of the USAR through the Gulf War. The readiness levels were maintained at a mid-level. The deployment cycle was alert train and deploy. The strategic reserve was tied to contingency plans developed by the Army. The mobilization process was not expected but once in a twenty year career.
The next category is taken from the primary question a mix of both. The mix of both categories is developed from DoD Directive 1200.17. The directive defines the reserve as an operational force as providing strategic depth and operational capabilities across the full spectrum of conflict. In order to accomplish that mission the definition describes the RC in two roles: an operational and strategic. Each role is defined by the DoD Directive and described by the white paper managing the RC as an operational force. The key operational role framework established is as follows: cyclic force generation, increased readiness, and participation in full range of missions. The key strategic role framework as defined by the directive includes availability of the force and to ability to transition to the operational role. The mix of both contains strategic and operational capability.

The next category is the historical perspective. The historical perspective was developed from the data collected in phase two categorize. There are four key pillars developed from the research data. The first pillar developed is a timeline from creation of the USAR through the Gulf War. It also contains how the concept of the reserve was developed and created. The third pillar that establishes the framework of the historical perspective is the implementation of the USAR during conflict. The final pillar in the framework is key changes in force structure. The final category developed from the categorization phase is employer support.

There are four key pillars that establish the employer support developed from phase two categorization. The first pillar is maintaining positive employer support of the USAR. The second is the number of days away from the civilian career. Next is providing predictable patterns of USAR requirements to the employer. Finally
recognition of employer support as directed by the Chief, Army Reserve. The five categories created during phase two now have a framework developed to enable phase three analysis. Once phase three analysis is complete the next phase reporting will begin.

Phase Four

Phase four is reporting and is recorded in Chapter four. Each of the five categories presents the analysis results from phase three. The categories will contain the framework established through analysis. The first category reported is the reserve as an operational force. There are five key points that are addressed. The first key point is the need for the reserve as an operational force developed from the attacks on the World Trade Center. The second is the increased reliance upon the USAR from the Army. Next, unit and personnel readiness rates are increased due to availability requirements. The concept of mobilization is now train, alert, and deploy. The final is the expiation of three to four deployments per a twenty year career.

The next category is the strategic reserve. The strategic reserve is reported with four key points. The first is an expectation of a required train up time. The next key point reported in within the strategic reserve is the mid level of readiness. This compliments the required train up time through the need of building readiness. The mobilization cycle is train, alert and deploy. The final key point is the expectation of one deployment in a twenty year career.

The next category is titled a mix of both. The mix of both category reports both the strategic and operational roles as defined by DOD Directive 1200.17. It begins with the operational role which contains three key points. The first is a cyclic force generation process. The next is an increase in unit and personnel readiness. The third is
participation in a full range of missions. The first section is the operational role and the second section contains the strategic role. The strategic role defined by DOD Directive 1200.17 identifies two key points. The strategic role includes availability of the force and the ability to transition into the operational role. The next category to be reported is the historical perspective.

The historical perspective is reported with the framework established from the third phase analysis. There are four key points. The first is the development of the RC. The second is the establishment of the USAR timeline. The third is the implementation of the USAR during conflicts. The final key reported in the historical perspective is major changes in the USAR force structure. The historical perspective is followed by employer support.

The final category reported is employer support. Employer support is reported with four key elements. The first is positive employer support. The second key is days away from the civilian job due to participation in the USAR. The third is the ability to provide predictability of USAR requirements to employers. The final is recognition of employer support of the USAR. Phase four reporting contains the five categories along with the framework developed from phase three in order to gain an understanding of what is reported, along with key major topics within the categories. The last phase is recommendations.

Phase Five

The recommendation phase is located in chapter five of the thesis. The recommendations are developed from the five categories of reserve as an operational force, strategic reserve, a mix of both, a historical perspective and employer support. The
recommendations will be presented from within the categories. They will address the differences among the five categories, as well as the impact of the differences. Ultimately the recommendations will answer the primary question “Is the Army Reserve an operational force, strategic reserve or a mix of both?” The recommendations will include future areas to explore and examine.

This chapter presented the methodology used to gather the data for use in the next chapter analysis. It developed a five phase process. It began by discussing the resources used to collect relevant data. It highlighted traditional institutional searches as well as contemporary methods. It highlighted in its second phase the creation of five categories related to the primary question. The categories are historical perspective, the reserve as an operational force, the strategic reserve, a mix of both operational and strategic roles, and lastly employer support. The chapter in its third phase analysis presented the five categories and key issues identified within the categories. The next phase of methodology presented is reporting. This phase demonstrated how the findings are report. They are reported by each category including the key developments within the category. The final phase of the methodology phase five is titled recommendations. This phase presents the differences among the five categories and the impacts of the differences. It developed recommendations for future study. The next chapter will present the information collected and categorized in order to answer the primary question of “Is the Army Reserve an operational force, strategic reserve or a mix of both?”


3Stultz, 2007, 142.


5Currie, v.


Chapter 3 reviewed the five phase methodology used to collect the information to answer the primary question, “Is the United States Army Reserve an operational force, a strategic reserve or a mix of both?” This chapter will define and describe, the five categories developed in the previous chapter. The categories, analyzed sequentially in this chapter, are as follows: historical perspective, the reserve as an operational force, strategic reserve, a mix of both the operational and strategic force, and finally employer support. The first step is to establish the historical perspective.

**Historical Perspective**

The historical perspective begins with the purpose and development of a reserve force. The chapter then establishes the creation of the USAR. It provides a historical timeline of development and implementation of the USAR. It further includes major force structure changes within the USAR.

The composition of the Army has been debated and discussed throughout the history of the United States. Mostly volunteers and non-military professionals fought for independence during the American Revolution. Standing armies were not always viewed in the former colonies as a positive attribute. Thomas Jefferson, Patrick Henry and George Mason were opposed to a professional army.¹ Mason viewed a standing army as a threat to liberty. On the opposite side of this view, Alexander Hamilton relied on the Army to defeat the Whiskey and Shay’s rebellions.² George Washington wanted a small professional army supported by militia.³ In order to balance the two demands, military
clauses were added to the constitution. The clauses delineated power between the President and Congress.

The debate would continue as George Washington suggested creating a force of regulars by having them sign a three-year enlistment tour. The force then would become the trainers to a larger force. The answer to the force prior to 1812 was a combination of state militias and a federal force. The War of 1812 would be a catalyst for change. Learning from mistakes and tactical issues that occurred during the War of 1812, John Calhoun would suggest creating a regular army as leadership cadre that could be supplemented by volunteers. Calhoun was the first proponent of an expandable force.

The Civil War saw the North and South resort to conscription to fill its ranks. The military organizations were often born from state militias and filled by state residents. A Civil War division commander turned military theorist, Emory Upton, stated congress allowed an untrained army to fight. He further claimed because of the lack of Soldier training the Civil War was a bloodbath. Upton would publish writings that recommended leadership training, a federalized draft, and expanded enlistments beyond the three-year minimum.

The Spanish-American War call-up caused many problems. The mobilization demonstrated the inability of some state militias to deploy overseas. This would cause Elihu Root, Secretary of War, to reform the Army. He would use Upton’s ideas and professionalize the schooling and staff structure of the Army. Root’s improvements would lead to the Dick Act of 1903. The Dick Act established the National Guard as a supplement to the Regular Army. Several years later, the USAR was established as a medical reserve corps in 1908. World War I established the federally supervised draft
and the principles of an expansive Army. The theorist John Palmer recommended a reliance on the citizen soldier. His ideas would be worked into the 1920 National Defense Act. It established that when war began, the US should create new divisions to add to those deployed.

The First World War would call upon the USAR. The requirement was to replace individuals within the medical corps. The Army identified the unique medical skills and background of individual Soldiers and capitalized on the skills. The Second World War would expose a similar situation. The Army called the USAR as a source for individual replacements. The replacements would not be just medical, as they would serve in every division and every command level in the Army.

The USAR would be called upon frequently during the latter half of the twentieth century, beginning with the Korean War. The Army used the USAR differently in the Korean War. The call for individual replacements would come, but also entire units were mobilized and deployed. The USAR supporting the Berlin Crisis would follow in 1961. In this role the USAR provided individual replacements and units. The next time the USAR played a role would be to support Vietnam. The use was limited, as only a select amount of units would be ordered to active duty. The Gulf War provided another opportunity for the USAR. The USAR would mobilize and deploy units to support the Army during this conflict. From the Gulf War forward to today the USAR has provided forces at an almost continuous rate. Today’s military operations are dependent upon the USAR. The presence of the USAR can be seen worldwide. The demands from the operational tempo have dictated a change in force structure.
A change in the reserve force structure would be implemented in the early 1970s. The GEN Abram’s doctrine, known as Total Force doctrine was a large change to the strategic reserve. It placed a greater reliance on the reserve force for war fighting and full spectrum operations. Total Force policy placed major pieces of combat service and combat service support units in the USAR. It also placed the budgeting, planning, and programming for AC and RC forces together. The effects of this policy would show during the Gulf War.

The Total Force doctrine policy would place the USAR into an active partnership with the Active Army. That policy coupled with the Transformation Campaign Plan of 1999, which directed an overhaul of the force structure creating modular brigades, affects today’s USAR. The historical perspective provided the background and the development of the USAR, key implementations of the force, and finally discussed the policy that has impacted the force today. Today’s USAR has been called an operational force.

The USAR as an Operational Force

The second category related to the primary question is the USAR as an operational force. This section will include how the concept evolved, the greater reliance from the Army, increase in unit and personnel readiness, and the change in mobilization. The operational force can be traced to 2004.

The USAR has undergone significant changes during the last nine years. These changes include a change in terminology. Then Chief, Army Reserve, LTG James Helmly, first broached the concept of an operational force. During his 2004 campaign for culture change, he addressed the need for all Soldiers to be prepared for an “active duty operational assignment.” LTG Helmly recognized the need for a new culture within the
USAR. He created the idea of an operational assignment almost as an information operation campaign.

The following year, the term operational reserve surfaced in the 2005 congressional testimony of Thomas Hall, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve affairs. He states in that testimony "They are an operational reserve that supports day-to-day defense." This is the first official use of the term. In 2006 the reserve as an operational force would be discussed in greater detail.

The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) states, “the reserve component must be operationalized.” The statement further describes a reserve force more ready and accessible. In his 2006 Commander’s Vision and intent the newly appointed Chief, Army Reserve, LTG Jack Stutlz, describes his expectations from an operational force. During the same year, the Army Game Plan was published. It called the USAR an integral part of our operational force.

Later in 2007, GEN George Casey spoke to the Association of the United States Army. In his speech, he called the USAR an operational force. In this same year the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (OSDA RA) published “A Total Force Policy for the Operational Reserve”. The policy attempts to define an Operational Reserve. It states the reserve is both strategic and operational due to the fact it meets daily requirements and is capable of expanding the force.

The 2008 USAR Posture Statement reflects this change in terminology. It describes the reserve as a force that is playing a large part in the Army’s missions. It describes the reserve force as an operational force. Today’s USAR seems to have an identity crisis. It’s been called a variety of names from an operational reserve, which
according to the Department of Defense dictionary is “a tactical reserve on a battlefield designated for a specific mission.” The number one factor is the Army relies upon the reserve to operate in the GWOT. Because of this need the reserve force or at least a portion must always be available.

Availability also requires manning, training, and equipping. The USAR addressed this through AREF. This is supposed to enable a larger portion of the reserve force accessibility to the Army. This is a dramatic change in the culture as LTG Helmly spoke about in 2004. The USAR is participating in the force generation model. The model is called Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN). It synchronizes and manages units throughout a variety of readiness levels. It plans personnel, training, and readiness levels. ARFORGEN begins with unit readiness at low levels. Personnel, training, and equipment describe readiness. In each case, the unit will not have enough of the three in order to be mission capable. By the end of the process the unit is fully capable in the three areas and is ready for deployment.

The training piece to support the ARFORGEN process is quite different than in the past. The dynamic of mobilize, train, and deploy is out of vogue. In order to support the new ARFORGEN process, the cycle is now train, mobilize and deploy. The key being training is now accomplished at Home Station (HS). The manning and equipping of the operational role are similar in technique.

The manning in ARFORGEN begins with limited numbers of Soldiers. Individual Soldiers are expected to attend development courses during the beginning stages of ARFORGEN. By doing so they achieve an end state of a fully qualified Soldier that enables their performance during deployment. The equipping of the unit begins in
the same way. The equipment is loaned out to deploying units or it is being sent to refurbishment.\textsuperscript{23} By the end of ARFORGEN the unit has all required equipment that is fully functional and enables the unit to achieve a successful deployment. ARFORGEN brings every unit to a level of deployment readiness. The increased reliance upon the USAR along with the force generation plan changes the implementation of the force.

The current model of force generation ARFORGEN used, projects a USAR unit to be available for deployment once every five years.\textsuperscript{24} It is now an expectation that a twenty year career will include availability for deployment three to four times. This is a new expectation derived from the Army’s need. The increased availability has consequences, as it impacts employers and causes Soldiers to adjust their deployment expectations. The reserve as an operational force is a force the Army greatly relies upon demands accessibility to, manages by a force generation model, and expects to deploy every five years.

The Strategic Reserve

The strategic reserve consists of four key areas. The first is the required time to train for a deployment mission. The next area is the level of readiness required to sustain the strategic reserve. The third key area is the mobilization cycle required to support the strategic reserve. Lastly is the deployment cycle required to support the strategic reserve.

The DOD dictionary does not include a definition of a strategic reserve. It provides a definition of a reserve as “a portion of a force being held to support the decisive movement.”\textsuperscript{25} It also defines the strategic concept as the accepted course of action resulting from an estimate.\textsuperscript{26} The combination of the two could read as an accepted course of action held to support the decisive movement. This definition does
not meet the requirement necessary in this thesis. Another avenue will create the definition. A look at what topics senior USAR leaders are discussing is in order.

The first example is from the G1, Chief of Staff. LTG Michael Rochelle defined the strategic reserve as being called up for major operations for the duration of the war plus six months after the war. The next example is from LTG Jack Stultz, Chief, Army Reserve. His 2008 Posture Statement defines the strategic reserve. It states the USAR as a once-a-month, two-weeks-a-year strategic reserve ended in 2001. LTG Stultz also addressed this topic in his 2007 article discussing the USAR as an operational force. He describes the strategic reserve as the once-a-month, two-weeks-a-year reserve. A third senior leader LTG James J. Lovelace, Deputy Chief of Staff, G3 detailed the strategic reserve in his statement before the Commission on National Guard and Reserves.

He describes the strategic reserve as a Cold War force that extended through the 1990s. He further details equipping and mobilization policies were designed with an acknowledged risk. The assumed risk was the AC was large enough to sustain the initial fight. This would allow sufficient time for the RC to mobilize and equip its force. The AC would self-sustain until the RC was committed to support the fight.

The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs defines the final example of the strategic reserve when it published a directive and a white paper on the reserve as an operational force. The paper describes the reserve’s mission during the Cold War years as providing strategic depth to the Army. It states the expected drill model of once-a-month, two-weeks-a-year. If war occurred, it would resemble WWII mobilization, taking months to deploy due to not being fully equipped, manned, or
The consistent theme described by senior leaders address availability, readiness, and the mobilization cycle.

The purpose of the strategic reserve is to serve as an expandable force in order to support the Cold War Army. According to LTG Lovelace, the AC was to begin the fight without the aid of the RC. The USAR was an expansive force to supplement the Army. It was called upon after combat operations began, needed months to train, equip, and man the force.

Due to the understood lead time required for readiness, the Cold War USAR was limited in availability to the Army. DoD policies constrained the Army on the use of the reserves. Title 10 U.S. Codes spell this out in detail. It limits who can call reservists to active duty, how long they can serve, the number of reservists that can be called-up, and the conditions under which the force can be used. The restrictive requirements needed to call upon the reserve dovetailed well within the civilian community.

The senior leaders noted earlier address the readiness area of the strategic reserve. The Deputy Chief of Staff, G3, addressed the risk in mid-level readiness. He acknowledges the Army did not fully equip the strategic reserve. It provided minimal equipment to train the reserve force. It would not fully equip the reserve force and thereby save additional equipping costs. It accepted the risk of not fully equipping the force, with the understanding the equipment would come during the units’ train-up prior to deployment. It was further understood a call-up was an infrequent occurrence and a period of time would allow the reserve into the fight.

The readiness level affected the mobilization cycle. The mobilization cycle of the strategic reserve is to alert train and deploy. This method was used during World War II
when a unit was alerted, expected to train up to fifteen months, and then deployed. This method fit into the Cold War mentality. The mentality was we knew our opponents, where they would strike, along with when they would strike. The alert train and deploy mobilization method, along with the Cold War mentality, allowed an environment of thought. The thought within the USAR was reservists would only be needed in an emergency. That thought enabled “the deploy once in a twenty year career” mentality. The strategic reserve required the AC to begin the fight without them. That allowed time to alert, train, and deploy the USAR force. The lack of an immediate need for the USAR enabled the force to maintain midlevel readiness. This also created the expectation of minimal deployments.

**A Mix of Both**

The mix of both is based on DoD Directive 1200.17 and the white paper written to support the concept of managing the reserve as an operational force. The DoD directive defines the RC which includes the USAR as both in an operational and strategic role. The directive further defines each of the roles.

The DoD directive begins with the operational role. The operational role as defined by the directive has three characteristics. The first is the RC participates in a full range of missions. The second is that units participate in cyclic force generation process. The final characteristic described in the white paper is the force is ready. The USAR is currently participating in a full range of missions. They are deployed across the world including Iraq and Afghanistan. The USAR is participating in the ARFORGEN process. The force generation cycle is a five year cycle with the fifth year ending in the fully mission capable unit fully deploying to support an operation. Finally as the white paper
titled managing the RC as an operational force discusses is ready. Ready is discussed in terms of deployability which is a byproduct of the ARFORGEN cycle. The USAR is accomplishing all of those goals as the 2009 Army Reserve Posture Statement indicates.  

DoD Directive 1200.17 also directs the USAR to serve in a strategic role. There are two characteristics described by the document. It describes the strategic role as the availability of the force. The availability is detailed as maintaining readiness. It further explains the ability to transition to the operational role as the other aspect of the strategic role. There is not a clear distinction between the operational and strategic roles as stated in DoD Directive 1200.17. The USAR is accomplishing both roles simultaneously.

For example, the USAR meets the readiness requirement which is related directly to the force generation process called ARFORGEN. The USAR is directed to participate in ARFORGEN as verified by the 2007 article in the *ARMY Magazine* “The USAR is No Longer a Strategic Reserve” by LTG Stutlz. USAR units are cycled through the five year ready process called ARFORGEN. ARFORGEN culminates in the fifth year with a ready unit deploying to support an Army operation. A USAR unit in the fourth year must meet readiness levels. Once those levels are accomplished, the unit moves to the available year which is year five in the ARFORGEN cycle. The USAR is accomplishing every task as described in both the strategic and operational roles.

The “mix of both” contains strategic and operational roles. Those roles are characterized, defined and described by DoD Directive 1200.17. The document attempts to define the USAR as performing in both roles. It fails to acknowledge the USAR manages the force, as does the Army, through a force generation process. The directive appears to be a compromise definition. DoD Directive 1200.17 addresses the issue of
identifying the USAR as an operational force or strategic reserve, but fails to delineate a clear difference between the two roles.

**Employer Support**

The final category is employer support. The USAR is a voluntary force that relies on citizens to fill its ranks. LTG Stultz recognizes the importance and included it in the recent 2009 Army Reserve posture statement published March 20, 2009. It identifies the USAR as a community-based force dependent upon families and employers. It describes four USAR priorities. The fourth priority includes providing for the well being of Soldiers and employers. The posture statement further addresses the issue of employer support by creating a new Employer Partnership initiative. The need is to establish a partnership with industry to build a prosperous economy and a skilled experienced Army. It describes the program as leveraging the skill set of volunteers, industry and the human development capability of the Army.33

The posture statement explains the importance of employer partnerships. It discusses the need to develop a shared workforce. The civilian career and military career will augment each other by providing skills developed independently and applied jointly. The Employer Partnership initiative addresses the issue of increased absence from the civilian workforce due to the USAR’s elevated operational tempo by identifying it and working with civilian employers who understand the requirements. Signing corporations on to work with the USAR on developing skills ensures the employer understands all aspects of employing a Citizen Soldier. The USAR also reinforces supporting employers through a reward program called “Is Your Boss a Patriot Award.” This award recognizes outstanding employer support. It is another tool to reinforce positive employer
relationships. The existence of these programs is an indication of the importance of maintaining a positive employer relationship. These programs were created due to many reasons. One reason is the impact on employers when an employee is absent from work due to a USAR requirement. The USAR as a strategic reserve required once-a-month and two weeks-a-year absences. The USAR as an operational force requires the same as a strategic reserve, plus one year of absence from the civilian employer every five years as the ARFORGEN process requires.

This chapter presented the analysis resulting from the methodology created and reviewed in chapter three. It produced analysis of the five categories developed which were a historical perspective, the reserve as an operational force, the strategic reserve, a mix of both, and employer support. It developed definitions as well as characteristics of each category. It presented the findings in order to facilitate the next chapter’s recommendations.


2Ibid.

3Ibid., 3.

4Ibid., 4.

5Ibid., 6.

6Ibid., 7.

7Ibid., 9.

8Currie, 30.

9Ibid., 71.

10Ibid., 96.
11 Ibid., 136.

12 Ibid., 194.


14 Ibid.


22 Stultz, 2007, 140.

23 Ibid., 146.

24 Ibid., 140.


26 Ibid.

27 Collins, l.

28 Stultz, 2007, 139.


31 Lovelace, 3.


33 Ibid.
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The last chapter presented the analysis developed from the five phase methodology in order to answer the primary question “Is the United States Army Reserve an operational force, a strategic reserve or a mix of both?” The last chapter presented analysis of the five categories established in chapter three. The five categories are a historical perspective, the reserve as an operational force, the strategic reserve, a mix of both, and finally employer support. The analysis developed key characteristics of each category.

The historical perspective presented how the reserve and the USAR developed, the implementation of the USAR, and discussed two major force structure changes. The reserve as an operational force had four key characteristics. It discussed the increased reliance upon the USAR due to the terrorist attacks. It addressed the change in the concept of mobilization. The new mobilization concept is train, alert and deploy the force. In order to manage the force a generation model was developed. The ARFORGEN process is a five year process. It begins in the first year with very little readiness and ends with the fifth year as available for deployment. Finally, the reserve as an operational force presented the requirement of increased readiness.

The third category discussed the strategic reserve. The analysis presented in chapter four established the characteristics of a strategic reserve. It requires a length of time to prepare for deployment. It maintains a mid-level of readiness with the dependence of time built into the readiness level. The mobilization cycle for the strategic reserve follows in the same thought, which is alert, train, and deploy. The final
characteristic of the strategic reserve was the expectation of a minimal number of deployments.

Chapter four presented the analysis of the mix of both categories. The mix of both categories was developed from DoD Directive 1200.17. The directive establishes the RC which includes the USAR, as performing in two roles. The two roles are operational and strategic. The directive defines the operational role as units participating in a full range of missions, a cyclic force generation program, and finally increased readiness of the force. The directive defines the strategic role as being available and having the capability to transition into the operational role as required.

The final category of analysis is employer support. Employer support characteristics include recognition, providing predictability, time away from the civilian job and finally providing support to the employer. Now that the key characteristics are developed the final phase of the methodology is presenting the recommendations.

The USAR is a malleable force. Being such, the Army has placed a greater reliance upon it. The USAR began as a medical officer reserve and now is performing according to DoD Directive 1200.17 in multiple roles. Senior USAR leaders from 2003 through the present have published numerous articles promoting the USAR as an operational force in lieu of its traditional role as a strategic reserve.

The strategic reserve as characterized by the chapter 4 analyses is a slow-to-mobilize force. Readiness levels are not set to accomplish immediate deployments. The USAR’s ability to man, equip and training depended upon the AC, as LTG Lovelace stated in his April 12, 2007, testimony, to self-sustain through the initial fight. He described the Cold War as enabling the slow mobilization process. The slow
mobilization process brought with it a mentality of complacency towards deployments. A twenty year career could possibly bring only one deployment. The strategic reserve would be mobilized for the duration of the conflict plus six months as the Deputy, Chief of Staff, G1, stated in 2008. The terrorist attacks changed the requirements of the Army. The Army now must use the USAR constantly. If the USAR is a strategic reserve it is no longer defined by the traditional characteristics. Then what is the USAR? The first part of the primary question asks, “Is the USAR an operational force”?

The term developed to describe this need by the Army is the reserve as an operational force. It describes availability through cyclic force generation models. With the force generation model comes a need for readiness. LTG Lovelace testified to this fact. The increased requirement directed by the Army now demands a USAR unit every five years. The demand upon the Soldiers and their employers for the reserve as an operational force is the main issue. This is untested waters, as Citizen Soldiers place their civilian careers on hold once every five years at a minimum. Take the five year deployment and apply that model to a twenty year career and the Soldier is not available to civilian employment for four of the twenty years. The Soldiers understand the risk and rewards from deployments. The employers are faced with the same dilemma.

Take two examples that have occurred since 2001. The first is a very successful medical doctor. He receives notification his medical unit is deploying. His patients all say they support him and will be there for him when he returns. He serves admirably, and returns to his civilian occupation. He finds his patients have been visiting other doctors; they have developed medical issues during the deployment and wish to stay with the current doctor that is treating them. The formerly deployed doctor understands and
begins to see a trend. Within the next year he gains back less than half of his patients. Luckily, he is a successful professional and ends up joining a top medical practice located in another city.

The second example is a business owner. He purchases a million dollar business. He is notified to deploy. Immediately, he emplaces a temporary support structure to operate his business during his absence. He returns to his business and finds business increased due to the fact of his deployment. The community learned of service and was out in force supporting him. His second deployment wasn’t quite the same. He hired a temporary work force structure, and broke even. Both Soldiers mentioned have retired from the USAR. These are just two examples of the effects the operational role of the USAR can have on Soldiers.

The USAR is attempting to strengthen the employer bonds. This is a must as the issue of Soldier absence from employment will not vanish while the USAR serves as an operational force. The USAR has established a program that integrates civilian employers with Soldiers that share the same skills. For example, a civilian trucking firm hires a Citizen Soldier that serves in a USAR transportation company. The mutual benefits are the driver develops greater skills and improved leadership. What the USAR is failing to address is the self-employment aspect. If the USAR is going to continue to operate in an operational role then a support structure for self employed is a must. This is not an easy undertaking as self-employment can be a variety of things. It ranges all fields of employment from landscape to medical. The reserve as an operational force creates additional requirements that are not far from what the USAR did in its historical context.
It deployed to support the Army in Korea as well as the Gulf War. Then if not an operational force the next logical place in the primary question is “a mix of both?”

The mix of both categories is defined by DoD Directive 1200.17. It defines the USAR in two roles: operational and strategic. It is the sole DoD definition of the reserve as an operational force. The DoD Directive attempts to clarify the operational versus strategic role. It fails to delineate a clear line of separation from the operational role to the strategic role. The directive states one difference is the strategic role is able to transition to the operational role. The USAR has transitioned from a strategic role to an operational role from its creation. The terms aren’t the same but when the Army identified a requirement the USAR would fulfill it. For instance in World War II, the requirement was for infantry divisions. The divisions were alerted, mobilized, and deployed. The average train-up period was over one year. The need for a divisional force was identified and the reserve unit was called upon to deploy. This is not much different than the operational role for the USAR in today’s environment. The AC identifies a need and creates the requirement. The USAR resources the requirement which ends with the requirement fulfilled.

Defining or labeling the role the USAR plays in today’s environment is quite difficult. The USAR enables the Army to achieve its goals. The strategic or operational tags on the force only add a layer of confusion. The USAR has played a role in the GWOT since the hostilities began. It is the author’s view the operational role is a mindset that can be traced back to retired LTG James Helmly’s year of the Citizen Warrior where he states Soldiers must be prepared for an operational assignment. The operational role appears to be a battle cry to gain support for constant use of the USAR.
The old once-a-month, two-weeks-a-year mantra had to be shattered. The constant structure downsizing forced an inescapable reliance on the USAR. The initial fear was the USAR was not capable of supporting the heavy reliance upon it. The secretive nature of not discussing deployment timelines with the unit Soldiers, combined with the stop loss and involuntary mobilization orders implied as much. A need developed from the high tempo deployment cycles. In order to maintain the deployment tempo The USAR needed to keep employers on the positive side of the Soldier.

The USAR operates in a much freer atmosphere. Units know where they are at in the deployment cycles and train to the goals. The stop-loss is gone as well as the 15 day involuntary mobilization orders. The voluntary USAR is forging ahead. The USAR is still an expansion force meeting all requirements, just has its done the past 100 years; therefore the strategic reserve is alive and well.

This topic will not disappear anytime soon. The operationalization of the RC as called for by the 2006 QDR is still ongoing. Future studies can explore how politics impact force structure in the USAR compared to the ARNG. The total force concept is another avenue related to this topic. It affects the type of units are in the USAR and explore whether the unit type is a good match. The question of what is an operational reserve is still not complete as it means different thing to different key leaders. Future research conducted on this topic could reflect all five of the categories. The historical perspective could examine just the use of the USAR immediately after hostilities. The reserve as an operational force could examine the roles as defined by DOD directive as well as the impact of the roles upon employer support of the USAR. Another topic to be
examined is what happens after the GWOT is over? What type of force will the USAR serve as?

This thesis developed and used a five phase process in order to answer the question of “Is the Army Reserve an operational force, a strategic reserve or a mix of both?” Each phase built upon the next. It began with identifying relevant resources, categorizing them into five subjects, creating characteristics of those five areas through analysis, reporting the findings and finally recommendations. The USAR as an operational force is a current topic. In its stages of development, it has changed and will continue to change. By presenting this thesis, it is the author’s intent to continue to spur discussion on the topic of “Is the United States Army Reserve an operational force, a strategic reserve or a mix of both?”

The research produced the following results. The historical perspective of the USAR indicates the USAR is an expansion force. In this capacity, it has accepted, met, and accomplished every challenge the Army has presented to the USAR. It started as individual replacement source for the AC. It provided the required individual skills and evolved to providing intact units to many of our nation’s wars. The USAR performed those feats as the strategic reserve.

The reserve as an operational force was officially defined in DoD Directive 1200.17 in October 2008. It states the USAR performs in both a strategic and operational roles. The document appears to hedge on the two roles definition. The USAR is accomplishing every task stated for both roles simultaneously. The term “the reserve as an operational force” is often confused with an operational reserve. The operational reserve is a force held on the battlefield. The “reserve as an operational force” is used to
describe the RC’s, which includes the USAR. This only adds complexity as key leaders have stated the USAR is an operational reserve. The USAR is officially an operational force according to the 2009 Posture Statement.

It is the author’s position derived from this research the USAR is a strategic reserve and must remain a strategic reserve. The USAR is a federal force as described by Title 10. Title 10 mandates use restrictions as well as call-up force size. Therefore the USAR has limits to its use. Although limited in use, the USAR has been a successful expansion force serving the Army since 1908. The Army identifies a requirement and the USAR as a strategic reserve has met all requirements.

The DoD Directive 1200.17 states the USAR is an operational force. The Chief, Army Reserve, reinforces the point. A review of the definition uncovers a lack of clarity. The USAR is doing everything the definition states all at the same time. The reserve as an operational force is more of a mindset. Gone are the days where being a part of the strategic reserve meant very little risk of seeing combat. That is no longer the case. The USAR is in high demand. The Army can’t function without it. USAR Soldiers must be prepared for this simple fact. Deployments abound, and combat missions await. Mindsets had to be changed.

The USAR as a strategic reserve is no stranger to combat. History demonstrates ordinary men doing extraordinary things. Today’s USAR is managed by ARFORGEN. Gone are the strategic reserve requirements of war plus six months which could last for multiple years. ARFORGEN enables units to take one year tours and allows Citizen Warriors to return to the civilian employment.
The high demand of the USAR has caused friction within the civilian sector. The
USAR is attempting to reinforce the positive aspects of employing Soldiers. It is
providing avenues that address the impact of a soldier deployed away from the civilian
employer. The USAR as a strategic reserve provides the employer a stable, predictable
environment for the employer. Once hostilities subside, history demonstrates the USAR
will again provide the employer with a stable work force.

The USAR as a strategic reserve has existed the last 100 years. Many changes
have occurred to the USAR during that time. Many changes will occur in the future.
One fact remains: the USAR will be there when America calls.


Smith, David A. "The Operational Reserve." The Officer (June 2007): 36-38.


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