INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITY GAP WITHIN THE SBCT INFANTRY COMPANY

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
General Studies

by

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Intelligence Capability Gap Within the SBCT Infantry Company

This thesis compares the operational requirements of OIF with the SBCT infantry company MTOE design. The problem is determining why SBCT infantry company commanders are modifying their MTOE organization while deployed to OIF. To address the problem the thesis analyzed the OIF operational environment, what company commanders thought, and what additional or unique resources the infantry company requires. This thesis also analyzed the structure’s limitations in terms of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF). The combination of document research and primary source information provide justification that, despite the best efforts of some officers, there is a large intelligence capability gap within the SBCT infantry company structure.
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITY GAPS WITHIN THE SBCT INFANTRY COMPANY, by Kevin C. Saatkamp, 61 pages.

This thesis compares the operational requirements of OIF with the SBCT infantry company MTOE design. The problem is determining why SBCT infantry company commanders are modifying their MTOE organization while deployed to OIF. To address the problem the thesis analyzed the OIF operational environment, what company commanders thought, and what additional or unique resources the infantry company requires. This thesis also analyzed the structure’s limitations in terms of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF). The combination of document research and primary source information provide justification that, despite the best efforts of some officers, there is a large intelligence capability gap within the SBCT infantry company structure.
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<td>AAR</td>
<td>After Action Review</td>
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<tr>
<td>AO</td>
<td>Area of operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBRNE</td>
<td>Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, Explosive</td>
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<tr>
<td>COG</td>
<td>Center of gravity</td>
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<tr>
<td>COIN</td>
<td>Counterinsurgency</td>
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<td>COTS</td>
<td>Commercial off the shelf</td>
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<td>CTC</td>
<td>Combined Training Center</td>
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<td>DOTMLPF</td>
<td>Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership and Education, Personnel, and Facilities</td>
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<td>FSO</td>
<td>Full Spectrum Operations</td>
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<td>HCT</td>
<td>Human Collection Teams</td>
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<td>HQDA</td>
<td>Headquarters, Department of the Army</td>
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<td>HUMINT</td>
<td>Human Intelligence</td>
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<td>IMINT</td>
<td>Imagery Intelligence</td>
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<td>LTIOV</td>
<td>Latest time information is of value</td>
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<td>MEL</td>
<td>Military Education Level</td>
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<td>MNC-I</td>
<td>Multi-National Corps - Iraq</td>
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<td>MTOE</td>
<td>Modified Table of Organization and Equipment</td>
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<td>OPD</td>
<td>Officer Professional Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>PMESII-PT</td>
<td>Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, Infrastructure, Physical Environment, and Time</td>
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<tr>
<td>RSTA</td>
<td>Reconnaissance, Surveillance, Target Acquisition Squadron</td>
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<td>SBCT</td>
<td>Stryker Brigade Combat Team</td>
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<td>SIGINT</td>
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<tr>
<td>TCM</td>
<td>TRADOC Capabilities Command Manager</td>
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<td>TOC</td>
<td>Tactical Operations Center</td>
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<td>TRADOC</td>
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<td>UAV</td>
<td>Unmanned Aerial Vehicle</td>
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<td>TS-SCI</td>
<td>Top Secret - Secure Compartmentalized Information</td>
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<td>SSO</td>
<td>Security System Officer</td>
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

The Stryker brigade combat team (SBCT) infantry battalion is designed to be a full-spectrum, early-entry combat force. It has utility in all operational environments against all projected future threats. As part of the SBCT, the infantry battalion possesses significant utility for divisions and corps engaged in a major theater war; however, the SBCT is optimized to meet the challenges of smaller-scale contingencies. (US Army 2003)

The Stryker Brigade Combat Team is one of the most robust units in the Army today. It has an additional infantry battalion, organic reconnaissance assets, a military intelligence company, a brigade anti-tank company, and a brigade engineer company. This organization boasts a total strength of almost 4,000 soldiers. This type of unit has been tested several times in deployments to Operation Iraqi Freedom. Yet, is this the right organization for fighting an insurgency? SBCT Infantry Company commanders are being asked to do far more in this conflict than any other.

The purpose of this thesis is to determine if there are sufficient supporting intelligence collection, analysis, and command and control assets at the company level to meet the requirements currently levied on an infantry company commander in a SBCT. From an organizational point of view a company commander is the staff of the company. He has no staff, no help and no analysis capability to make sense out of truly complex situations except what he sees or his subordinates tell him. This thesis compared the requirements of the OIF operating environment using the DOTMLPF model. DOTMLPF is an acronym that stands for doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership and education, personnel and facilities (DOTMLPF). These seven domains were used to
determine if the company is inadequately resourced to meet the demands of intelligence collection, analysis, and command and control.

**Background**

The SBCT grew out of guidance from then Army Chief of Staff Eric Shinseki’s vision to modernize and equip the Army taking full advantage of commercial off the shelf (COTS) products. This new brigade would be robust in terms of personnel, equipment, and hence capabilities. Part of this concept included adding a third infantry battalion, a Mobile Gun System platoon for every company, and a sniper team. The complete structure is shown in figure 1.

![Stryker Brigade Combat Team Structure](image_url)

**Figure 1.** Stryker Brigade Combat Team Structure


Centralized planning and decentralized execution is firmly embedded into US Army doctrine. This is especially true of the SBCT which is optimized to fight
decentralized and cover a large area that only a few years ago would be under the control of a division-size force. However, battalion and brigade headquarters are requiring SBCT Infantry Company commanders to develop their own intelligence and command and control forces far beyond traditional span of control. Each SBCT (sans SBCT 1 (3/2 ID) in OIF II) that deployed to OIF has changed their MTOE for two reasons.

First, instead of utilizing the brigade as a quick reaction force senior leaders have chosen to give this technologically enhanced brigade, and its battalions and infantry companies, a set area of operations. In this situation companies are responsible for specific sections of terrain or neighborhoods in an urban environment. Mosul and Baghdad and other urban areas served as the backdrop of the majority of SBCT operations. At the brigade and battalion levels the respective staffs manage the tactical operations center (TOC) and the area of operations. The company is managed by the commander with the aid of the first sergeant and executive officer.

Secondly, intelligence drives operations. Intelligence assets are a premium in any organization. The brigade is organized with a military intelligence company and the reconnaissance, surveillance, targeting, and acquisition (RSTA) squadron. The battalion is organized with the staff intelligence section (S2), an unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) such as Raven, and has an organic scout platoon equipped with the reconnaissance variant of the Stryker vehicle. There is no such support, organizationally or technically, at the company level. The SBCT Infantry Company is shown in figure 2
Figure 2. SBCT Infantry Company


**Research Questions**

The primary research question of this thesis is: Are there sufficient supporting intelligence collection, analysis, and command and control assets at the company level to meet the requirements currently levied on an infantry company commander in a SBCT. This question is supported by several secondary research questions used to answer the main thesis question.

The first question is; Is the inherent technology associated with the SBCT incorporated at the lowest levels being used effectively? In the decentralized world of the company commander, where the terms ‘bottom-up intelligence’ or ‘bottom up feedback’ are constants, is he able to leverage his force structure to meet his requirements from the battalion? Furthermore, does the commander have the right tools in the company to help
him analyze his area of operations (AO), rapidly provide updates to the battalion, and leverage his systems to capitalize on real-time intelligence?

Secondly, OIF/OEF presents the US military a unique set of circumstances. The most modern and robust units in the Army’s inventory, the SBCT, are designed around common chassis and technology. Yet with all of this information, how does a company commander manage it? Does the SBCT Infantry Company commander have the right capabilities to effectively utilize the information he receives?

Third, what are the information requirements for the SBCT Infantry Company commander? This line of questioning attempts to truly answer the designer’s problem as to answering the requirement. Does the SBCT infantry company commander need analyze his area of operation in combat beyond the effects of terrain and enemy.

Finally, what recommendations can be made to correct any gaps found? This question addresses the personnel and equipment requirements generated from the DOTMLPF analysis. This question also identifies the training requirements for managing such an increase in end strength.

Assumptions

Several assumptions must be made to continue this research. First and foremost the opinions of the soldiers interviewed reflect the general opinion of their specialty areas. Secondly, the experiences of sources build upon one another. Third, people and documents consulted across the DOTMLPF domains do not have an ulterior motive that would otherwise sway their point of view. Fourth, the modified table of organization used is 1-25 SBCT (SBCT 2) for the infantry company.
Definitions

This thesis considered the Stryker Infantry Company across the domains of DOTMLPF. This term refers to the domains of Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership Development, Personnel, and Facilities. These domains are used by the US Army to analyze solutions to capability gaps as they are identified. Doctrine refers to the body of written works that pertain to the type of unit and the base requirements against which the unit was designed to meet. These are the policies which govern or guide the way the military operates. (Joint Forces Command 2006) Organization is the manner in which the unit is arranged or physically structured in order to accomplish its mission.

Training is the process by which a military unit prepares for combat. Field Manual 7-0, Training the Force, defines training as “the process that melds human and materiel resources into [these] required capabilities” (Department of the Army 2007) Material resources pertain to the actual equipment that is procured through the army system in order address a capability gap. These include the Stryker vehicle, its components, as well as the fuel and ammunition consumed in its operation.

Leadership and education is rolled into one category for the purposes of DOTMLPF analysis. FM 6-22, Army Leadership, defines leadership as “the process of influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation while operating to accomplish the mission and improving the organization” (Department of the Army 2006). The US Army divides education into five separate levels (Military Education Levels 1-5) which are taught over the course of an officer’s or non-commissioned officer’s career.
Personnel are those humans comprising the military, to include their knowledge, skills, abilities, and competencies. (Joint Forces Command 2006) Facilities define those things that support the military structure as a whole. This includes real property such as buildings, roads, and support structures.

Change is achieved through a continuous cycle of adaptive innovation, experimentation, and experience. Changes deliberately executed across DOTMLPF domains enable the Army to improve its capabilities to provide dominant land power to the joint force.

Limitations

The scope of this paper does not address the technical aspects of intelligence gathering of the Infantry Company in SBCTs. Such analysis would quickly move this paper into the classified realm.

Due to the limited scope of this paper, a bill-payer is not identified to “fill” the capability gap due to a fundamental lack of understanding of the larger Army personnel requirements. However, a broad recommendation, if any, should be produced as a result of this analysis.

Methodology

The methodology of this paper is a gap analysis. This methodology will attempt to define differences between what the actual combat requirements of a SBCT Infantry Company, and those upon which it was originally designed. This methodology will look across the domains of doctrine, organization, training, materials, leadership and education, personnel and facilities.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

The purpose of a literature review is to establish what literature is available and analyze what information, if any, addresses the capability gaps within this thesis. This literature review summarizes research on the company intelligence requirements and command and control at the company level within a SBCT Infantry Company. This literature review is divided into three categories: primary sources, secondary sources, and other sources.

Primary Sources

Primary sources are first-hand accounts of events or information. Primary sources are the thoughts of an individual alone and have not undergone scrutiny from another person. The primary sources used for this study include personal experience of the author, after action reviews (AARs), and interviews conducted by the author.

As a SBCT Infantry Company commander I was challenged in Iraq to provide intelligence and command and control intelligence assets. I provided command and control to multiple assets without the requisite staff or analysis capability to leverage these assets properly.

G-3/7 Force Management, Combined Arms Directorate (CAD), and USAFMSA also provided key AAR comments in the form of force structure changes to SBCTs. These elements provided a background on doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facility (DOTMLPF) domains and requirements for a SBCT Infantry Company. This document included a wide ranging discussion from
multiple domain perspectives about how to fill this capability gap within the SBCT Infantry Company. This AAR informed a larger force structure analysis and outlined the performance of SBCT Infantry Companies in combat.

Interviews were also a valuable primary sources used in the research process. They provided a staff perspective from both a brigade and battalion level on the conduct of intelligence gathering requirements and operations in combat. It also served to provide insight into intelligence analysis methodology and asset allocation to answer information requirements of the commander. This was beneficial in filling gaps within intelligence collection, analysis, and use. This also focused on the functionality of brigade and battalion systems, rather than actual performance in a combat environment.

Secondary Sources

Secondary sources are sources of information that have gone through some form of interpretation by the author. Secondary sources usually describe a topic in order to convey a certain message or persuade the reader into thinking a certain way. Secondary sources for this thesis include articles, scholarly publications, and military doctrine.

Most publications dealing with either transformation or the employment of SBCTs are immature from a historical point of view. A literature review provides a means to identify and analyze literature on the company intelligence team and company command post within a SBCT Infantry Company in order to find gaps and answer questions regarding the topic. This literature review categorizes sources into primary, secondary, and other.

Primary sources provide firsthand testimony or direct evidence concerning a topic under investigation. They are characterized by their content, regardless of their format
and serve as the basis for commentary within secondary sources. Primary sources have also been created at the time being studied, by an authoritative source, usually one with direct personal knowledge of the events being described. The primary sources used for this study include after action reviews (AARs).

After action reviews (AARs) provided a critical link in determining what requirements were placed on a SBCT infantry company. They provide a direct insight to daily operations and the performance of different units over time. 3/2 SBCT’s AAR provided detailed information on what worked for the unit in combat. This document served as a starting point for recommended changes within the DOTMLPF framework for SBCTs. It also illustrated the capability gap within infantry companies for intelligence sections and recommended to HQDA to formalize the structure the unit developed in combat.

4/2 SBCT’s AAR provided additional information on what worked for the unit in combat and how they successfully built upon the 3-2 SBCT model and changed it over time. It also highlighted the changing nature of the area of operations, task organization and missions. The BDE S2 portion of this document is extremely informative for human intelligence (HUMINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT), and employment of HUMINT collection teams (HCTs). It also highlights his approach to training intelligence analysts and the gap in training received through Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) schools for the COIN environment. This document also illustrates how the brigade developed company level intelligence fusion teams to address an intelligence gap between battalion and companies. The Brigade S3 portion of this document is also informative on incorporation of detailed company level intelligence reports to brigade
and division level planning of ISR assets. The document also provides recommendations across the DOTMLPF domains in order to better inform the institutional army on changes.

Another primary source for this thesis is interviews. Interviews with both battalion and brigade level intelligence officers (S2) were conducted. They provided a unique look into the level of detailed information required in a counter insurgency. They also provided different perspectives about cavalry squadron S2 and infantry battalion S2 requirements. Each unit also provided feedback about the different types of intelligence.

Another primary source used for this thesis are the personal observations of the author. They provided additional information about the challenges faced by company commanders in a SBCT. They also aided in formulating questions for the interviews.

Secondary Sources

A secondary source is a document or recording that relates or discusses information originally presented elsewhere. A secondary source involves generalization, analysis, synthesis, interpretation, or evaluation of the original information. Secondary sources for this thesis include doctrine, professional journals, and concept papers.

Most doctrinal manuals assume that Reconnaissance, Surveillance, Target Acquisition (RSTA) squadrons are the eyes and ears of a brigade. Likewise, scout platoons perform this function for battalions. This is no longer the case in OIF/OEF. This is a profound contrast to the requirements of the company. FM 3-0 Operations, a seminal work in changing the Army, articulates the difference between lines of operation and lines of effort. This is not an easy concept to push down to the company, nor is the concept of multiple phases of operations maturing and occurring simultaneously.
FM 3-24 *Counterinsurgency*, December 2006 provided the overall framework for what a counterinsurgency is and how the Army intends to fight one. This document, a seminal work for the Army, outlined some requirements for both command and control as well as intelligence requirements.

ST 2-22.7 (FM 34-7-1) *Tactical HUMINT and CI Operations*, April 2002 provided a detailed analysis of the benefits of human intelligence and its role within both COIN and a high intensity conflict at the tactical level. This document also outlined the requirement for taking advantage of information in such as manner. This is codified in doctrine as latest time information is of value (LTIOV).

FM 2-91.4 *Intelligence support to operations in urban environment*, Aug 2005 and FM 2-91.6 *Small unit support to intelligence*, Mar 2004 provided a doctrinal basis for conducting intelligence operations within a typical urban environment. It also highlighted the requirements for multiple sensors in the complex terrain, both human and physical.

Professional journals, such as the *Infantry Bugler* highlight the need to change with the fight, being flexible and agile. MG Wojdakowski, former CG, US Army Infantry Center presents a unique picture of command relationships that are hampered due to inexperience. Soldiers are being overwhelmed with information with no discernable means to interpret it and communicate its significance to higher.

Another professional journal the Fort Benning / Maneuver Center of Excellence *Infantry Senior Leader Newsletter* posted in January 2009 outlined TRADOC’s initiatives to conduct a holistic review of brigade combat teams within a “no growth” requirement. This review, although not an AAR, provided detailed information on post combat surveys.
with 2nd Stryker Cavalry Regiment (2SCR). These surveys focused on improving
TRADOC provided resources along the DOTMLPF domains to the SBCTs.

Another secondary source used for this thesis is books, however, the information
they provided was limited to specific combat actions and the personalities of those
involved. TRADOC Capabilities Command Manager (TCM) SBCT provided an excellent
source for general information pertaining to the organizational structure changes to the
SBCT in the SBCT Smart Book. This handy reference provided a clear picture of what
the SBCT looks like as an organization and a detailed view of the Stryker vehicle variants
that comprise the brigade.

Imbedded author, Michael Yon, in 1-25 SBCT offers a unique perspective of the
inner workings and day to day operations. His book, Moment of Truth in Iraq, followed a
SBCT battalion throughout its entire twelve month tour in Iraq. He highlighted the
challenges faced by both battalion and company commanders when faced with an elusive
enemy. Due to the relatively new nature of SBCTs, few books have been written about
their specific challenges and requirements in combat.

Another secondary source for information is the internet. The Stryker NET;
https://strykernet.army.mil yielded a wealth of information on tactics, techniques and
procedures, as well as training, leader books, and collective training for infantry
companies. TRADOC Capabilities Manager (TCM) SBCT also provided an insight into
its support of specific SBCT reset operations with Mobile Training Team courses.

Other Sources

Government documents comprised a portion of the secondary sources used in this
study. The Center for Army Lessons Learned has collected data and presented a
company command post standard operating procedures (SOP) through Stryker Net. This document although not nearly as detailed as required for a specific target area, firmly establishes a set of procedures for any cavalry, infantry, or battery commander to start and organize command post operations. Included in this SOP is the incorporation of an intelligence section into the command post.

The final group of secondary sources used was briefing documents from outside the SBCT community. Joint Forces Command’s (JFCOM) “Leaveraging DOTMLPF” publication outlined the domains and their role in DOTMLPF analysis. This publication explained how the military developed and uses this methodology to change the services and the impact of a change in one domain on the others.

4/2 SBCT produced an officer professional development briefing for 5/2 SBCT. This briefing “5/2 SBCT OPD” provided an update about their specific area and served at the time to inform and help prepare 5/2 SBCT for their future deployment. The briefing also highlighted through specific examples the need for intelligence driven objectives with limited duration clearance operations. It also highlighted the use of air and ground assets acting on time sensitive targets. This briefing is highly informative for any officers going to a SBCT and officers in general who want to learn more about SBCTs in combat.

2-25 SBCT developed a concept briefing for the G2 of the Army outlining the need for a “Company Exploitation Cell.” This briefing done in September 2007 highlights the need for intelligence at the lowest levels of the SBCT and the need to take advantage of recently collected intelligence for immediate action. Although this document is dated by SBCT standards, it provides both a technical and structural solution
to a perceived capability gap. It also highlights the requirements for training, biometrics, increased bandwidth, and remote video terminals associated with its solution.

The review of literature discussed in this chapter highlights many of the significant sources currently available on the subject of company command posts and company intelligence sections used in military operations. The methodology used to analyze these sources is discussed in chapter 3.
CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY

The purpose of this thesis is to determine if sufficient supporting intelligence collection, analysis, and command and control assets at the company level to meet the requirements currently levied on an infantry company commander in a SBCT. The research includes an analysis of the current doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership, and personnel domains under which the unit operates. This research will also address the unique challenges that face a Stryker Brigade Combat Team in a counterinsurgency (COIN) environment.

The purpose of this chapter is to identify and link the data collected to the conclusions through a methodology of analysis. In short, this chapter outlines how information was scrutinized for this thesis. This methodology will answer the primary, secondary and tertiary research questions found in chapter one. This chapter also highlights advantages and disadvantages of using this methodology in this thesis.

Method of Evaluation

The method of evaluation used for this thesis is a qualitative analysis. Qualitative analysis is a means of interpreting information through intuition, classification, coding, thinking aids or display methods. Qualitative analysis compared the SBCT infantry company in OIF, across the DOTMLPF domains using as many detailed sources as possible. Data was obtained and thoroughly analyzed in an effort to establish its value in answering the primary and secondary research questions. The research led to conclusions which ultimately must be viewed in the context of OIF. As a result, this research
qualitatively describes the environment of OIF and the role of the SBCT infantry company within a counterinsurgency in order to establish a firm context for this research.

**Qualitative Methods**

The first method used in this thesis is observations. Observational techniques are methods by which an individual gathers firsthand data on the programs being studied. (Joy Frechtling and Laure Sharp-Westat 1997) The author of this thesis used personal observations while serving as a SBCT infantry company commander prior to and during a deployment in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Observations were gathered while on multiple training and combat operations. An advantage of observations is fully understanding and appreciating the context in which an organization is operating. Another advantage of observation is they are inherently natural and unstructured. A disadvantage of the observation method is personal bias. The perception of the observer may or may not distort the data that is collected. This observer was able to mitigate these disadvantages by remaining objective and experience the same set of obstacles as other commanders.

The next method used was interviews. Interviews conducted in support of this thesis were structured interviews and in-depth interviews. The key difference between structured and in-depth interviews is the manner in which they are conducted. The structured interview in this thesis was a series of questions posited to battalion S2’s (intelligence officers) either currently serving in or having served in a Stryker Brigade in that position. This was useful in seeing a perspective from battalion versus company level. The in-depth interview conducted for this thesis was less structured and focused on leading questions in order to facilitate an open dialogue. These individuals possessed
firsthand knowledge of the difficulties in obtaining intelligence, the means to collect intelligence, and the various processes used to analyze intelligence. An advantage of in-depth interviews is the ability to clarify questions or reword a question in order to elicit a more useful response. A disadvantage to this approach is the possibility of recall error or selective perceptions. (Joy Frechtling and Laure Sharp-Westat 1997)

The next method used in this thesis was document study. The document study included identifying, analyzing and evaluating primary sources such as AARs. The AARs as discussed in chapter two provided a wealth of information pertaining to this thesis. One key point in the AARs is the different structures between deploying SBCTs. While the overall SBCT structure is intact, there exists a significant variation in capabilities between a unit equipped with Project Warrior and other sub-systems fielded by the Army to brigade combat teams.

The final method used was the key informant. A key informant is a person who has unique skills or professional background related to the issue being evaluated, knowledgeable about the participants, or has access to other information of interest to the author. (Joy Frechtling and Laure Sharp-Westat 1997) Key informants used in this analysis were members of the US Army Infantry Center - Brigade Combat Board (BCB), Senior Review Directorate (SRD) and members of the Battle Command Training Program (BCTP). Key informants were critical to filling holes between the AARs mentioned above. They also provided clarity and continuity by highlighting old or outdated material and the emerging requirements from the field. They also tended to be biased by advocating an increase in end strength for SBCTs while guidance from the Army G3 is zero growth.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Secondary Question</th>
<th>Data Collection Method</th>
<th>Data Source</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Is the inherent technology associated with the SBCT incorporated at the lowest levels being used effectively?</td>
<td>Observations, interviews, document study, key informants</td>
<td>Personal observations, AARs, publications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does the SBCT Infantry Company commander have the correct right capabilities to effectively utilize the information he receives?</td>
<td>Observations, interviews, document study</td>
<td>Personal observations, AARs, publications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What are the information requirements for the SBCT Infantry Company commander?</td>
<td>Observations, interviews, document study</td>
<td>Personal observations, AARs, interviews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What recommendations can be made to fix any gaps found</td>
<td>Document study, key informant, AARs, publications</td>
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CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

The purpose of this thesis is to determine if sufficient supporting intelligence collection, analysis, and command and control assets at the company level to meet the requirements currently levied on an infantry company commander in a SBCT. The research must include an analysis of the current doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership, and personnel domains under which the unit operates. This research must also address the unique challenges that face a Stryker Brigade Combat Team in a counterinsurgency (COIN) environment.

The purpose of this chapter is to integrate the information provided in chapters two and three in order to answer the primary research question: is there a capability gap within the force structure of the SBCT infantry company? This chapter will answer secondary and tertiary research questions at the end of each domain of DOTMLPF. This chapter opens with a discussion of the COIN environment using David Galula’s work as a theoretical basis and provides contextual updates where it applies to OIF.

In his seminal work, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*, David Galula outlines a series of laws which history has demonstrated are consistent with various examples of revolutionary war. Chief among Galula’s laws is the center of gravity for a revolutionary war – the population. This center of gravity upon which all operations revolve or are aimed at is the population. “If the insurgent manages to dissociate the population from the counterinsurgent, to control it physically, to get its active support, he will win the war because, in the final analysis, the exercise of political
power depends on the tacit or explicit agreement of the population or at worst on its submissiveness” (Galula 2005).

An overview of Joint Publication 3-0 defines center of gravity “as the source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act” (Joint Forces Command 2008). A center of gravity (COG) is fed by critical capabilities needed in order to achieve an overall influence on the population. These critical capabilities, in turn, are made up of critical requirements needed to achieve a specific capability. These critical requirements are typically tangible elements which can be targeted and are defined as critical vulnerabilities. For an extended discussion on this please see JP 3-0 and Galula’s model for combating an insurgency.

As the scope of this thesis only covers a counterinsurgency it is important to illustrate the relationship between the strategic and operational levels of war. This relationship is divided into political, military, economic, social, information and infrastructure categories as a means to look at an insurgency. The diagram found in Joint Publication 3-0 below illustrates this concept (Joint Forces Command 2008):
This concept is further detailed as the acronym PMESII-PT in the Army Field Manual 3-0 Operations. PMESII-PT is defined as “the operational environment: political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, time (operational variables)” (Headquarters, US Army 2008). This is useful in understanding the spider web of interrelated threads both Galula and JP 3-0 describe. An action in the political arena will have a ripple effect in the other areas such as information or economic. This is a critical concept to keep in mind as these strategic and operational concepts are executed at the tactical level by junior leaders. In short, the everyday
actions, words and deeds, of junior leaders and units have either a positive or negative operational and sometimes strategic impacts. As Galula states, “every action must constantly be directed at securing the trust of a local population where any set back could have a dramatic impact on the conduct or success of a counterinsurgency campaign” (Galula 2005).

This is the operational environment in which the current company grade officer is working. On October 10, 1997, General Krulak articulated his vision of the three-block war in a speech before the National Press Club. He predicted:

In one moment in time, our service members will be feeding and clothing displaced refugees, providing humanitarian assistance. In the next moment, they will be holding two warring tribes apart - conducting peacekeeping operations - and, finally, they will be fighting a highly lethal mid-intensity battle - all on the same day . . . all within three city blocks. (C. C. Krulak 1997, 139-142)

The crux of General Krulak’s argument is the question: does the company commander have the right DOTMLPF structure at his disposal to adequately meet tactical requirements General Krulak outlines? Research shows that the SBCT infantry company “is…the missing link” to provide higher echelons information instead of just data, to develop a clear understanding of their area through PMESII-PT, and develop courses of action for future operations (Clausen 2008).

**Doctrine**

“Doctrine is the concise expression of how Army forces contribute to unified action in campaigns, major operations, battles, and engagements. Army doctrine is authoritative but not prescriptive. It is rooted in time-tested principles but is forward-looking and adaptable to changing technologies, threats, and missions” (Headquarters, US Army 2008).
Doctrine provides the base for Army operations and likewise a common language across a large organization. Doctrine also provides the requirements for the company grade officer. FM 3-0 codifies this as Full Spectrum Operations (FSO) or conducting operations that consist of offense, defense, and stability simultaneously. This is especially true in a counterinsurgency where all three types of operations could be present in one day or even in a single patrol.

A casual review may take this concept as *prepare for everything, yet be good at nothing* (italics used for emphasis only). This is a debate that is beyond the scope of this paper; however it does have a very real effect on the company commander’s job. How then do units focus the broad concept of FSO to actions on the ground?

An analysis of both 3/2 SBCT and 4/2 SBCT AARs reveals that each brigade chose to define their missions as “conducts Full Spectrum Operations* in order to control the XXXXX Province and prevents disruption of the MNC-I decisive effort in Baghdad” (the actual province named is beyond the classification of this thesis). From their most recent deployments to OIF, SBCTs are interpreting FSO doctrine as a guide to follow with certain local or district unique points of view. This is indicated by the asterisk found in the mission statement above. The prevailing trend appears to be summed up in one triangle (see figure 4):
Figure 4. Full Spectrum Operations Interpretation


Army Field Manual 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, highlights the operational and tactical requirements to focus the broad concept of FSO on the local population.

“Tactical actions thus must be linked not only to strategic and operational military objectives but also to the host nation’s essential political goals. Without those connections, lives and resources may be wasted for no real gain” (US Army 2006). It seems clear that there is a distinct and purposeful linkage between tactical practices of junior leaders and the operational and strategic aims as evidenced by Table 2 from FM 3-24 (US Army 2006).
Table 2. Successful and Unsuccessful Practices in COIN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Successful practices</th>
<th>Unsuccessful practices</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Emphasize intelligence.</td>
<td>• Overemphasize killing and capturing the enemy rather than securing and engaging the populace.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Focus on the population, its needs, and its security.</td>
<td>• Conduct large-scale operations as the norm.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Establish and expand secure areas.</td>
<td>• Concentrate military forces in large bases for protection.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Isolate insurgents from the populace (population control).</td>
<td>• Focus special forces primarily on raiding.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Conduct effective, pervasive, and continuous information operations.</td>
<td>• Place low priority on assigning quality advisors to host-nation forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Provide amnesty and rehabilitation for those willing to support the new government.</td>
<td>• Build and train host-nation security forces in the U.S. military’s image.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Place host-nation police in the lead with military support as soon as the security situation permits.</td>
<td>• Ignore peacetime government processes, including legal procedures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Expand and diversify the host-nation police force.</td>
<td>• Allow open borders, airspace, and coastlines.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Train military forces to conduct counterinsurgency operations.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Embed quality advisors and special forces with host-nation forces.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Deny sanctuary to insurgents.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Encourage strong political and military cooperation and information sharing.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Secure host-nation borders.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Protect key infrastructure.</td>
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Another point of emphasis in FM 3-24 is the absolute requirement for intelligence. In fact, it is so important that an entire chapter is dedicated to the subject. Perhaps the strongest point made is that “intelligence in COIN is about people” (US Army 2006). Moreover, “All Soldiers and Marines collect information whenever they interact with the populace. Operations should therefore always include intelligence collection requirements” (US Army 2006). The desired effect of multiple collection assets is a bottom up flow of intelligence. By way of clarification, intelligence discipline is defined by FM 3-24 as “a[n] . . . area of intelligence collection, processing,
exploitation, and reporting using a specific category of technical or human resources. There are seven major disciplines: human intelligence, imagery intelligence, measurement and signature intelligence, signals intelligence, open-source intelligence, technical intelligence, and counterintelligence” (US Army 2006).

As a result, the doctrinal evidence clearly places the onus on the company commander, and indeed every Soldier and Marine, to provide “bottom up” intelligence. As doctrine forms the base and design of how the Army intends to fight there should be a corresponding linkage between the DOTMLPF domains.

**Organization**

As discussed above, doctrine provides the basis for Army organizational requirements. The U.S. Army Force Management Support Agency designs organizations. The scope of this thesis is outside the realm of describing how TOEs and MTOEs are built; however, understanding the current SBCT organization is of critical importance. Of particular interest is the structure of the SBCT infantry company.

The current SBCT structure is described below. Of note is the location of intelligence collection and analysis nodes within the Brigade, Battalion, and company. The Military Intelligence Company is a brigade level asset. Furthermore, the Reconnaissance and Surveillance Troop with its ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) platforms which consist of UAV (unmanned aerial vehicles) and signals intelligence capabilities is also controlled at a brigade level through the RSTA squadron commander. The effect is an organizational structure whose intelligence gathering platforms are centrally controlled at the brigade and battalion level. The effects of material quantities and capabilities will be discussed further under the material domain.
Figure 5. SBCT Organization

Figure 6. Brigade Staff Structure
The brigade staff also has intelligence capability resident in the S2 and S2X (HUMINT) shops. These sections are designed to paint a picture for the brigade commander across the battalions. There is a clear interface and staff alignment between brigade and battalion S2 channels, personnel, and processes. Yet within these two brigade level sections there are three intelligence analysts to cover down on an entire brigade area of operation. If doctrine puts intelligence at a premium in a COIN environment there is an implied reliance on battalion level analysis.

Since there is a reliance on the battalion to provide and often augment the brigade fight one would expect a robust S2 (Intelligence) section at the battalion level. Indeed each infantry battalion is organized with an organic S2 or Intelligence section. By MTOE this is the primary section for analysis of data provided by the SBCT infantry companies. Analysis for this thesis shows that this section quickly gets overwhelmed with the magnitude of data from numerous daily patrols. Furthermore, this section cannot possibly replicate or analyze the level of detail required in a COIN environment to help the SBCT infantry company commanders in their areas of operations. As a result many units have taken to “fighting the enemy and not the MTOE” (Clausen 2008).

Research indicates that SBCT infantry company commanders are consistently recapitalizing their MTOE to meet the COIN fight and the intelligence needs generated by it. Research also indicates that there are two problems with the infantry company MTOE. The first issue is a lack of an organized command post on the MTOE and the second is a lack of an intelligence capability on the MTOE.

The first issue is truly one of monitoring and maintaining situational awareness within the area of operations. All battalion and brigade structures have battle captains or
other shift type positions to maintain twenty-four hour coverage in the tactical operations center. This structure is nonexistent at the company level. It therefore falls to the company commanders to improvise a structure by reorganizing personnel from other sections within their commands. Research indicates these soldiers are reassigned from maneuver platoons, the NBC NCO or adding non-doctrinal requirements to the company executive officer or fire support officer (FSO) positions.

The second half of this problem is intelligence collection. Doctrine clearly states the value and necessity of intelligence within the COIN environment. A few secondary questions are how do you collect intelligence, how do you manage the information, and how do you analyze it in a timely manner? Research indicates that SBCT infantry company commanders are building intelligence fusion cells in order to analyze patrol data prior to sending it to the battalion S2 shop. This serves two purposes. One, as mentioned previously, the battalion S2 shop cannot handle three companies worth of raw data. It simply does not have the analytical staff to handle twenty-four patrol debriefs every day. Two, the company commander is seeking a larger perspective from the battalion S2. He is seeking answers as to why something is happening in his area or how his area affects the broader battalion area.

This begs the question, what section or position within the SBCT infantry company MTOE is designed to analyze patrol data and provide the “so what this means is” to battalion and higher? Research shows there is no one qualified or coded by MTOE to perform this mission. There are no analysts within the MTOE at the company level. Research shows that battalion S2 sections have to supplement these ad hoc structures from within.
Research also revealed an additional MTOE problem in the form of security clearances. Each position on the MTOE is coded for a specific clearance for Top Secret - Secure Compartmentalized Information (TS-SCI,) or Secret, or FOUO. These are managed at the brigade level by the Security System Officer (SSO). An SSO, at this time, cannot authorize a company commander to view or have access to TS-SCI information because the billet is not coded for it. This makes it impossible for a SBCT company commander to have a complete understanding of the capabilities, limitations, and employment of SIGINT or other TS classified systems. This only serves to rob the commander of another collection asset that he will invariably have to escort in this type of environment. Research shows that several SBCTs are now using dedicated platoons to escort specific TS platforms (Isenhower 2009). In addition, commanders are seeking an exception to policies in order to provide clearances at the lowest levels.

As a side note, research also revealed an unexpected need for adding a company command post to the SBCT infantry company MTOE. Companies now have a span of control problem. Each company has four maneuver platoons, a FIST section, a mortar section, and a sniper team to command and control. This is already approaching the critical stage for a company commander at six elements to command and control. Any additional assets that would come to the company such as Tactical Human Intelligence Teams (THT), UAS support, and signal assets must come with additional resources for command and control.

There clearly is a large gap between COIN requirements and intelligence gathering the SBCT is required to do. There is no structure to provide twenty-four hour coverage of the company command post. In addition, there is a large gap between the
information requirements of the COIN environment and those that are resident in the company structure. Research plainly shows a gap between the emphasis on intelligence gathering and MTOE structure to execute it.

Training

Based on the SBCT organization shortfall described above, is there training being done to mitigate the shortfall? Research for this thesis indicates this is a systemic problem throughout the army. Several branches of the Army have published concerns about their eroding core competencies. However, for the purposes of this thesis it is necessary to confine the scope to the training of the SBCT infantry company and three distinct challenges. The three challenges within the scope of this thesis are individual, unit, and culminating with the collective training found at the combined training centers (CTC).

The first challenge, the individual, is perhaps the best source of intelligence information to be found for the unit. The individual soldier possesses an innate ability to adapt to his surroundings and perform in ways that surprise even the most seasoned leader. Major General Rodriguez explained to 1-25 SBCT, “there is a new MOS in town…it is called get the job done.” He is best suited to discern the minutest signs of enemy activity. He is constantly in the area and learns over time what normal looks like for the neighborhood. No machine can replace a soldier’s insight, instincts, or ability to see into a situation and react accordingly. Yet, there is very little in the way of training that can prepare a soldier for such a unique, diverse, and complex environment. It is left to the company commander and NCOs to train these individual soldiers. However, the
The company commander still needs to collect and analyze what the individual sees and notices and push the information vertically and horizontally from the company level.

The ability of an NCO to step into a void and fill it such as NCOIC of the company command post is truly a testament to the strength of the NCO corps. Research shows that CBRNE NCOs are being tasked with manning the company command post. Rather than using this sergeant or staff sergeant in some other capacity, unit commanders are typically putting this NCO in charge without a great deal of training and limited resources.

As previously mentioned, the FSO and XO are not trained by the institutional Army to conduct this type of operation. As a result, they lack the cultural, religious, targeting, and operations training in order to provide the commander the information he needs to make an informed decision. In an environment where second and third order effects must be taken into account, how does a young lieutenant with only 2-4 years in service manage this? Having said that, how does a company commander train an ad hoc company command post or intelligence fusion cell?

Research indicates that a critical piece to developing these improvised capabilities is finding the right person with the right skills or personality for the positions. This is hardly uniform across any unit for a depth of talent. Furthermore, 1SGs, platoon leaders and their platoon sergeants are very reluctant to provide quality personnel to the company headquarters for on the job training. At first this appears to be an issue of luck versus training. However, units are now recognizing this gap and “developing the bench” by providing centralized training with brigade and battalion intelligence sections (Clausen 2008). The goal of this training is to develop and maintain situational awareness, provide
some predictive analysis, recommend both lethal and non-lethal COAs, develop information requirements all at the company level. So far, analysis shows this training is paying off in OIF with increased numbers of detainees and increased understanding of terrorist cells and their networks.

The institutional Army is also helping to alleviate this training deficit, but only on an as needed basis. The Military Intelligence school house at Fort Huachuca, AZ is providing training for CBRNE NCOs. These NCOs are learning general analysis, link diagrams, significant actions, and the company’s ISR synchronization matrix (Tunnel, et al. 2009).

The garrison is also helping to solve some of these problems in regard to language and cultural training, however, this is specific to Fort Lewis, the home of three out of seven SBCTs in the Army inventory. Language Enabled Soldiers (LES) are soldiers who have attended a 10-month Arabic language and Iraqi culture course taught at Fort Lewis Language Center (Tunnel, et al. 2009). The intent of this program is “to have at least five LES per company” prior to deployment of the unit (Tunnel, et al. 2009).

At the CTC level research shows that units are not getting the training they need on specific systems used for intelligence collection or the training to analyze the information they collect. “CTCs currently do not train company commanders to build company level fusion teams that will facilitate company level targeting and planning” (Clausen 2008). Generally speaking the CTCs have been one of the best opportunities for training its BCTs. They provide the least restrictive live fire exercises, the most detailed situational training exercises all with the benefit of a world class opposition force that is not internally resourced as is the case at home station (Leffers 2009). By not
training this critical command and control node, the army is effectively ignoring the
execution level of combat operations. It also overwhelms staffs that are unprepared to
handle the sheer magnitude of reports and data. Furthermore, enemy combatants are not
confined to a company, battalion or even brigade boundaries. Tracking targets through
multiple areas or across boundaries will happen. By not preparing for this eventuality it
is far more likely to lose or worse burn (alert the enemy to your tracking mechanisms) the
target. “CTCs should publish equipping and training TTPs for fusion cells that are
simple and easily replicated by units that have little time to train together prior to
deployment” (Clausen 2008).

An additional benefit to this training would be exposing junior leaders at a much
earlier time in their careers to intelligence gathering and its linkage to targeting.
Unfortunately, combat operations, not training, dictate that junior leaders enter this world
far sooner than expected. Yet, with this knowledge, the Army is inadvertently growing
better and more informed well rounded officers for company command. These officers
are more attuned to cultural, religious, intelligence collection methods, and successful
targeting practices than their peers only a few year groups ahead of them. Research also
indicates that a program of instruction is required to address the following subjects:

1. Conventional and unconventional intelligence-collection and processing

2. Geographic information systems, or GIS;

3. Link analysis

4. The intelligence cycle

5. Training in analytical skills and emerging analytic techniques
6. Intelligence preparation of the environment, or IPE (conventional and asymmetrical)

7. Interagency operations

8. Intelligence architecture

9. Digital intelligence systems

10. Biometric identification systems; fingerprinting; photography

11. Threat and vulnerability assessments, or TVA

12. Evasion and recovery

13. Target analysis; and a targeting and asymmetric-targeting exercise with product brief backs

Material

The material solutions required to answer capability gaps addressed in this thesis must be constrained by the classification of this thesis. In accordance with chapter one’s limitations the only material solutions are classified as open source. Research indicates that there are three major gaps in the MTOE of the infantry company in the areas of intelligence product production, updating the company IPB, and contributing to the targeting process that are being addressed by a material solution. The non-MTOE systems currently being used include, but are not limited to, biometrics, analysts’ notebook, and TIGR (Tactical Ground Reporting System).

Biometrics is a series of devices that collects and “organizes iris images, fingerprints, and face photos into a multi-modal database” (West Virginia High Technology Consortium Foundation 2006). This database is currently being linked into national level assets such as the DoD’s Automated Biometric Identification System
(ABIS) and the FBI’s Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS) (West Virginia High Technology Consortium Foundation 2006). This system is proving very effective in dealing with positive identification (PID) of enemy combatants within Iraq. Similar programs are used in the United States law enforcement agencies. This system is currently being fielded outside of the army’s POM process and is not a program of record. Yet it is directly responsible for a significant contribution to the targeting process.

Analysts’ Notebook is a software application that organizes data from multiple sources. The largest value of this system is its ability to construct link diagrams which is particularly helpful in defining a network of interrelated individuals. Ironically, the overall goal of this system at the company level is to place the knowledge and power of intelligence-analysis tools in the hands of the operator. The result is a more precise interpretation and analysis of information, producing a more realistic assessment of the battlefield situation (Spencer 2009).

An emerging technology that is also outside of the normal army POM process is called TIGR or the Tactical Ground Reporting System. This particular system is endorsed by the current Vice Chief of Staff, Army, General Peter W. Chiarelli. According to General Chiarelli, “[TIGR is best described as] a virtual notebook, with significant events, pictures, video, census data, infrastructure, personal observations. Connected and geospatial in nature where fellow patrol leaders can tap into the virtual notebooks of their peers to draw their own conclusions, building context, building awareness. I would go so far as to say the empowering quality of systems like TIGR is allowing us to move beyond the mantra that ‘every soldier is a scout’. Now every soldier
is an intelligence asset uniquely empowered by the connective tissue of the network to conduct their own Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield” (Chiarelli 2008).

A critical point must be made at this junction. A single system will never be able to provide the leader with all of the information he needs to make a decision on the battlefield. However, TIGR fills a gap between the soldier collecting the information and disseminating the information throughout the organization rapidly and efficiently. “Currently fifteen BCTs are using TIGR in theater and [it] is still not a program of record” (Chiarelli 2008). This is certainly a condemnation of a cumbersome and overly bureaucratic acquisition system that is unable to keep pace with battlefield requirements.

**Leadership and Education**

Changing the position requirements of NCOs and officers within an organization will challenge leadership and education required to produce the desired results. This can best be addressed by the school house. Within the scope of this thesis, research shows a large gap between the educational system and the current OIF environment.

Specifically, the infantry school and the intelligence school need to come to some type of collaboration for a synchronized approach in teaching junior leaders intelligence collection and targeting. This directly relates to the instruction of MDMP (military decision making process) and ISR and targeting blocks of instruction at the CCC and CGSC. Currently the instruction at both courses focus on high intensity threats. However, as previously explained, the COIN environment at the company level is much more subtle in prosecution than at higher ends of the FSO model. This begs the question; is the institutional Army able to educate their leaders on dealing with a thinking enemy without a doctrinal manual he follows?
Research shows the answer to this question is yes and no. The institutional army is caught between the current fight and the future fight. Part of this dilemma is the instructors who have served faithfully in a different era than the officers who are being educated. This is not a critique for they cannot possibly replicate an entire year of combat experience. Furthermore, the requirement to introduce a wide area of subjects at CGSC limits the ability of the faculty to address intelligence gather and targeting to required level. This is perhaps the best the school can do given the varying backgrounds of the student body that attends annually.

Furthermore, as more and more combat experienced soldiers move through the institutional Army’s education system it becomes much harder to keep the curriculum up to date and relevant. It is unrealistic to think training institutions can replicate a year’s worth of combat experience. By creating an ad hoc structure such as a company intelligence cell or fusion cell, company commanders are being exposed to and are leveraging assets at a much lower level than in previous conflicts. This puts a tremendous burden on the institutional Army to expose the students to systems and processes that cannot possibly be taught given the time constraints of the course itself. "If company commanders are going to manage company intelligence cells, then they need to be familiar with assets capabilities and limitations. In addition, they need to know how analysis is conducted, capabilities and limitations of analysts and what they can realistically provide" (Clausen 2008). In effect, MAJ Clausen is arguing for a combined course between intelligence and maneuver in order to bring the institutional army in line with what is occurring in OIF. However, based on the doctrinal analysis,
research shows that this is in concert with current doctrine and only needs to change the focus of the curriculum by adding a COIN perspective (US Army 2006).

A key change for the Infantry Captain’s Career Course is “how to integrate intelligence-related automated data processing to properly support company operations” (Clausen 2008). A company commander is the primary staff officer for the company. He is responsible for collecting, analyzing, and sending up information that he gathers. In addition, his PIRs must be nested from BDE to PLT.

Furthermore, Captains attending CCC do not possess the requisite security classifications (nor do the instructors in some cases) to access and learn how to employ TS-level assets. As OIF requirements become more centric on man hunting, assets will continue to be pushed to the lowest level. Yet the officers and NCOs responsible for using these assets will not have the clearance required to know how to best employ the system.

**Personnel**

“Company-level intelligence sections need to be formalized, with intelligence soldiers as the nucleus” (Clausen 2008). At the end of a long and detailed process it is about getting the right person with the right MOS and skill set in the unit at the right time to meet mission requirements. Perhaps by getting the organization right the Army can solve the personnel problem. This begs the question, what skill sets are required within the SBCT infantry company like to improve its ability to gather, analyze, and utilize available intelligence?

Research shows that most stakeholders recommend adding at least one intelligence analyst either 35F20 or 35F10 at the company level. Units such as 4/2 ID
have taken this one step further to include both an analysts. LTC Spencer, 1-25 SBCT
BDE S2, also commented on the value of these analysts at the company level. “Due to
multiple personnel gathering the information and a lack of a filtering authority, much of
[the intelligence gathered] was confusing to the maneuver unit” (Spencer 2009). These
military intelligence soldiers would serve as managers and data filters.

“At the company level there was a lack of vertical (company to higher) and
horizontal (Co to Co) coordination that would have expanded overall knowledge of the
OE and more coordinated operations” (4/2 ID 2008). The 35F MOS series appears to be
the right fit for this gap. By placing analysts at the company level would generate greater
discussion about relevant trends and gathering techniques that in turn would present a
greater picture of the area to the battalion. This is exactly the type of information that
document espouses to require in the COIN environment.

Perhaps the greatest cry for help comes from the company commander that
requires the information and analysis about a target. This intelligence can come in many
forms (HUMINT, SIGINT, IMINT) which he and his organization are not prepared to
handle. For example, on any given mission a company could capture documents (written
in Arabic), cell phones, weapons, radios, video tapes or propaganda. The company does
not have the resources to know what is important and how it fits into the battalion
commanders PIR. By assigning an analyst to the company there is a categorization,
filtering, and step by step exploitation of each item. Information can then be pushed up
to battalion rapidly (since the analyst works with the S2) and provide immediate feedback
to the company commander. The requirement for additional personnel to meet the
capability gap at the company level must address the bill payer. After all, where you add
to an organization you must simultaneously take away from another organization. This is beyond the scope of this thesis as it would be impossible to research the entire SBCT structure for personnel (grade, MOS, and rank) that would address this gap.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusion

People say it is a squad-level and platoon-level war and use that as a basis for saying we should push more assets down to the company-level. It is true that this war is being fought at that level, but the enemy – AQI, JAM and the rest aren’t tied to geographic boundaries like land-owning units. Consequently, you need to be able to look across compan[ies]. (Davis, Captain 2008)

Captain Davis’ comments are a perfect example of why the Army needs to fill the intelligence capability gap within the SBCT infantry company structure. The current design does not allow for a vertical or horizontal flow of intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination. Nor does it allow the company commander to truly analyze all aspects of his complex area of operations.

Research conducted for this paper clearly shows that doctrine outlines the need for bottom up intelligence. FM 3-24 COIN specifically highlights the value of bottom up intelligence. Yet, this doctrine is virtually ignored at the company level because of resource constraints or a flawed vision of what the OIF environment demands of the Army’s junior leaders. Organizationally the very tenets that FM 3-24 COIN espouses are being missed wholesale in the OIF environment. There must be a robust company command post structure that incorporates a company intelligence fusion cell in order take full advantage of the every soldier a sensor concept.

The institutional Army must establish clear tasks and standards for the use of this cell. In addition, the Army must eliminate restrictive security protocols that prevent unit leaders from knowing how to employ the specific intelligence systems resident in the SBCT and above. Eliminating restrictive protocols must be done without robbing the
higher headquarters of Top Secret positions. Intelligence information must flow up and down the chain of command.

The infantry and intelligence schools must establish a single, low-bandwidth computer system that operates on either the SIPR or NIPRNET (for training purposes) and utilizes commercial off the shelf laptop computers for the processing of combat information and intelligence. This is the best way the company will be empowered to produce meaningful and relevant products for itself and higher headquarters.

Furthermore, the infantry and intelligence schools must overhaul their education and leader development systems to teach tactics, reporting requirements, and systems necessary to collect information, and disseminate intelligence to the company and higher headquarters. This cannot be a locally driven program. It must be implemented for all officers and NCOs to know, understand, and execute.

From an organizational standpoint, research in this study shows that the personnel capable of providing this link can no longer be provided by the unit. The right soldier with the right skill set for the unit should not come from within the unit on an ad hoc basis. The right soldier must be a military intelligence school trained soldier with a specialty in analysis without degrading robbing the other elements within the battalion or brigade structures. There must be at least one analyst at the company level and a robust intelligence fusion cell capable of targeting and providing usable data both up and down the chain of command.

In conclusion, the majority of evidence gathered through this thesis points to an intelligence information capability gap within the infantry company in the SBCT. This
capability gap is most apparent in intelligence and command and control. Analysis, using the DOTMLPF model, clearly demonstrates how this capability gap can be resolved.

**Recommendations**

Doctrinally the infantry and intelligence centers of excellence must establish a collaborative effort to create a single doctrine for company level intelligence fusion teams that standardize operations across the force. It is apparent that operational level doctrine emphasizes tactical level intelligence collection as well as horizontal and vertical dissemination particularly in a COIN environment. Bringing the two centers of excellence within TRADOC together and providing the Army a cohesive doctrine is the best way to synchronize maneuver force commanders and intelligence analysts. The effect of this doctrine should be a perpetuating cycle of intelligence-driven operations as described in the operational level doctrine.

This doctrine should be codified in structure. There must be a robust company command post structure that incorporates a company intelligence fusion cell in order take full advantage of the every soldier a sensor concept. By drawing on the current SBCT infantry battalion and company MTOEs, the author extrapolated a recommended structure (see Figure 7).

The first section of this recommended structure is the intelligence fusion cell. This cell emphasizes not only intelligence collection, but also intelligence analysis. The 96B Intelligence Analyst brings a host of talents and skills to this structure. The analyst is the first filter for information to battalion. The analyst is trained to turn raw data into intelligence information. It is this information transmitted vertically and horizontally that provides the best source of real actionable intelligence to the companies and battalion.
The 97E Human Intelligence collector is the perfect fit for a company commander tasked with generating bottom up intelligence. This soldier is trained to run sources and pay assets. In addition, the collector is trained to identify and use individual character traits during negotiations which are becoming a large part of the company commander’s battlefield. Furthermore, this structure possesses an embedded collection management knowledge base that is helpful in requesting additional assets from higher headquarters. This cell also provides a few of the required TS-SCI clearances required at the company level fully utilize capabilities of specific systems. Intelligence is of little value to the company commander if it does not feed into a targeting cycle. Figure 7 also supports incorporating company level intelligence into the targeting process by placing the fire support NCO in charge of the intelligence fusion cell. The fire support NCO is already trained in the targeting process.
The second section of this recommended structure is the company command post. At the heart of this structure are the three infantry NCOs meeting the daily information and reporting requirements of the battalion. These NCOs should be battle staff trained and aid in the planning of future operations as well as supporting the intelligence fusion cell. Typically the NBC NCO at a 30 skill level possesses the right rank and level of maturity to supervise this structure. The role of the first sergeant in protecting the credibility and authority of the TOC NCOIC is critical. Furthermore, this structure serves as a training base for the battalion TOC as soldiers progress through the ranks. Again, by getting the structure right, the training and materiel will follow.
In conclusion the research conducted for this thesis indicates there is a large capability gap within the SBCT infantry company structure. The current structure does not support the company commander in answering battalion priority information requirements. Nor does this structure help the commander understand or provide command and control within such a complex (COIN) environment. The recommended solution to fill this capability gap is one way to mitigate this shortfall.
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