NIMITZ AND GOLEMAN: STUDY OF A CIVILIAN LEADERSHIP MODEL

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
General Studies

by

Derrick A. Dudash, LCDR, USN
B.S., U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, MD, 1998

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
2009

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Within a couple of weeks after the attacks on Pearl Harbor in 1941, selected over 28 other senior admirals, Admiral Nimitz took command of the Pacific Fleet and held that command until the Allied Forces won the war in the Pacific almost four years later. He went on to hold the highest office in the U.S. Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations. Nimitz’s ability to lead effectively throughout his career proves that his style of leadership can be a model for any military officer. Even since 1941, the requirement to lead personnel in the Armed Forces has not changed. However, with the advent of information sharing on a global scale, today’s military officers are exposed to a wide range of leadership styles such as one presented by Dr. Daniel Goleman derived from the civilian sector. This study examines in detail Goleman’s leadership model and compares it to Fleet Admiral Nimitz’s style to see if it is feasible for use in the military environment.
Name of Candidate: LCDR Derrick A. Dudash, USN

Thesis Title: NIMITZ AND GOLEMAN: STUDY OF A CIVILIAN LEADERSHIP MODEL

Approved by:

_____________________________, Thesis Committee Chair
Eric F. McMillin, M.A.

_____________________________, Member
MAJ Jennifer L. Crawford, J.D., LL.M.

_____________________________, Member
John M. Persyn, Ph.D.

Accepted this 12th day of June 2009 by:

_____________________________, Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

NIMITZ AND GOLEMAN: STUDY OF A CIVILIAN LEADERSHIP MODEL, by LCDR Derrick A. Dudash, USN, 96 pages.

Within a couple of weeks after the attacks on Pearl Harbor in 1941, selected over 28 other senior admirals, Admiral Nimitz took command of the Pacific Fleet and held that command until the Allied Forces won the war in the Pacific almost four years later. He went on to hold the highest office in the U.S. Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations. Nimitz’s ability to lead effectively throughout his career proves that his style of leadership can be a model for any military officer. Even since 1941, the requirement to lead personnel in the Armed Forces has not changed. However, with the advent of information sharing on a global scale, today’s military officers are exposed to a wide range of leadership styles such as one presented by Dr. Daniel Goleman derived from the civilian sector. This study examines in detail Goleman’s leadership model and compares it to Fleet Admiral Nimitz’s style to see if it is feasible for use in the military environment.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Throughout this entire project, many people have lent their guidance, help and support to see it through to completion. I am honored to recognize here those who have freely given their time in support of this thesis.

I would first like to thank my thesis committee. As the thesis chairman, Mr. Eric McMillin provided the wisdom and guidance to help keep my thesis on track to its completion. Dr. John Persyn always ensured that I maintained the proper focus for the paper. Finally, Maj. Jennifer Crawford, Command and General Staff College 2009 Military Instructor of the Year, provided the intricate edits and help needed to complete this thesis. Without this wonderful team of professionals, I could not have accomplished one of the greatest milestones in my professional life. Thank you.

I would be remiss if I did not recognize those family and friends who unconditionally gave their support and encouragement on this endeavor. I would especially like to thank my parents, Terry and Judy, for their unwavering belief in my abilities. Both are outstanding parents and I cannot thank them enough for the opportunities they have given me. Finally, I would like to thank Erica Guthrie for her support and understanding throughout this entire project. I hope the work below is a true testament to the sacrifices made by those above.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE THESIS APPROVAL PAGE .......... iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT ....................................................................................................................... iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ....................................................................................................... v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLE OF CONTENTS ....................................................................................................... vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACRONYMS .................................................................................................................... viii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLES ............................................................................................................................ ix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................... 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Background ..................................................................................................................... 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Leader ..................................................................................................................... 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary and Secondary Research Questions .............................................................. 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Definitions .................................................................................................................... 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limitations .................................................................................................................. 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delimitations ............................................................................................................... 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assumptions ............................................................................................................... 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significance of Thesis ............................................................................................... 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW .................................................................................. 15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctrine ....................................................................................................................... 15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Books .......................................................................................................................... 17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Periodicals .................................................................................................................. 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Media ............................................................................................................... 22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY ...................................................................... 23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 4 ANALYSIS ................................................................................................... 36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coercive ....................................................................................................................... 36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authoritative ............................................................................................................... 41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affiliative ..................................................................................................................... 45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic ................................................................................................................... 52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacesetting ................................................................................................................ 58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coaching ..................................................................................................................... 65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adm.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGSC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCPAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gen.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLES

Table 1. Emotional Intelligence Capabilities and Supporting Competencies..................27
Table 2. Impact of Leadership Styles on Factors of Climate............................................33
Table 1. Goleman’s Styles versus Nimitz’s Leadership Style........................................74
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

This study examines Dr. Daniel Goleman’s civilian leadership model and compares it to the actions and exercise of leadership by Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz during his naval career. In today’s joint professional military education institutions, like the U.S. Army’s Command and General Staff College (CGSC), the students, who are military officers from all branches of the U.S. service and many international countries, explore a curriculum that introduces them to multiple leadership models. Leadership is a cornerstone of any military institution; the same holds true in the civilian sector. However, some military leaders are cautious about accepting a civilian leadership model for fear that its application will not succeed in military culture. This study examines a prominent civilian leadership model against a well-known World War II naval leader to see if a civilian model is appropriate in the military.

Background

Regardless of which branch of the U.S. military young men or women enter to become a military officer, immersion into service culture and tradition begins immediately. Along with their immersion comes their introduction to leadership styles and doctrine. Some services follow large, in-depth leadership manuals while others have smaller, generalized publications. For instance, the U.S. Army’s doctrinal Field Manual (FM) 6-22, Army Leadership is more than 115 pages long while the U.S. Air Force’s Doctrine Document (AFDD) 1-1 is also of comparable length at eighty-two pages. The U.S. Navy differs in that it only addresses the topic of leadership within its seventy pages
doctrinal publication titled Naval Doctrine Publication 6 (NDP-6): Naval Command and Control as part of the overarching idea of command and control. This paper is not an area for parochial discussion as to which service has better leadership doctrine. The Army’s and Air Force’s more in-depth manuals provide their officers a more focused approach to leadership, while the Navy’s manual may allow an officer more flexibility in learning and practicing leadership. Each service has its own particular way of handling day-to-day operations. However, as military officers reach field-grade rank and begin working more with other services, interagency, multinational, government, and non-government organizations, sticking rigidly to one’s own service leadership doctrine may or may not be a good idea.

Since this thesis compares Goleman’s leadership model to Nimitz, a closer look at today’s naval leadership doctrine, dated 1995, provides a baseline for analyzing Goleman and Nimitz. NDP-6, published by the U.S. Naval Doctrine Command, officially addresses the subject of leadership as it relates to U.S. Navy. In chapter 1, it discusses the elements of command and control, the principal element of which is command (Department of the Navy 1995, 7). It defines command as a “function of authority, responsibility and accountability . . . lawfully exercise[d] over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment” and confirms, “[l]eadership is the cornerstone of effective command” (Department of the Navy 1995, 7).

NDP-6 also discusses the important relationship between the commander’s functions of authority, responsibility and accountability. Commanding is an “intensely human activity” and “the element of personal leadership in a naval command should never be discounted” (Department of the Navy 1995, 8). Two sources give a commander
his power to exercise command: official and personal (Department of the Navy 1995, 8). Officially, a commander can derive his power from his lawful rank or position. Personally, a commander’s power comes from his “influence, charisma, experience, reputation, character and personal example” (Department of the Navy 1995, 8). In addition, “responsibility and accountability for results are natural corollaries of authority; where there is authority, there must also be responsibility and accountability” (Department of the Navy 1995, 8). Simply put, if an individual is responsible and accountable for results then that person must have the authority to execute action to obtain those results. Therefore, officers can delegate authority but not responsibility and accountability.

Another reference to leadership in the NDP-6 relates to the factors of uncertainty and time in combat operations. NDP-6 defines uncertainty as the difference between what a commander knows and does not know in the strategic, operational or tactical environment (Department of the Navy 1995, 12). Time is a crucial factor for commanders for three reasons: (1) gathered knowledge is perishable as time moves forward, (2) time affects each side of the fight equally, and (3) today’s high-tempo operations limit the commander’s time needed to reduce uncertainty (Department of the Navy 1995, 12). The more time a commander spends trying to reduce uncertainty, the slower the operational tempo, and thus, his assets become more vulnerable to the enemy (Department of the Navy 1995, 13). NDP-6 highlights even before combat operations begin, a commander has the power to “mitigate the factors of uncertainty and time through professional leadership, teamwork, realistic training, flexibility in organization and equipment and cohesive doctrine” (Department of the Navy 1995, 13). Overall,
NDP-6 gives the fundamentals a naval leader must possess. Any student of military leadership will find that NDP-6 does not proscribe a specific leadership style; whether such flexibility is an advantage or disadvantage for today’s naval leaders is a separate topic altogether. However, because the U.S. Navy does not specifically delineate a set leadership style, a naval leader is free to experiment with various leadership styles as long as the styles adhere to the NDP-6 fundamentals. Such independence allows U.S. Naval officers to choose from a panoply of leadership styles; the applicability of so-called civilian leadership models forms the basis for this thesis.

During the academic 2009 year, the U.S. Army CGSC’s leadership syllabus introduced students to a civilian leadership model developed by Goleman. Often, instructors referred back to Goleman’s model in the course, thus making it a de facto foundation for the course. As a reminder, the U.S. Army, who taught this course at a post-graduate level, already has a dedicated doctrinal leadership manual. Since the CGSC is a joint military school, it is important to highlight that officers from other services may also consider Goleman’s model for their own use. U.S. Army officers can simply compare their service’s leadership doctrine with Goleman’s model and form their own opinions. Other service officers can do the same, but for those with more flexible leadership doctrine, the model presented in the CGSC curriculum may look inviting. Less convinced officers may doubt the validity of applying a civilian model to the military. Such doubt welcomes examination and comparison between Goleman’s civilian leadership model and a well-known, highly-successful naval leader, in this study, Admiral (Adm.) Nimitz.
The Leader

Naval historians and leaders recognize Chester W. Nimitz for his tour as Commander-in-Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC) during World War II. How did Nimitz, without even a day of combat, joint, or inter-service experience, lead the U.S. Navy out from the pains of defeat after December 7, 1941? The answer lies in how he led. To understand how he developed his own leadership style a summary of his career is essential.

Nimitz’s military career began on September 7, 1901, when he entered the U.S. Naval Academy as a Naval Cadet; at that time, the rank of midshipman came with graduation (Driskill 1983, 55). In Nimitz’s case, graduation came early on January 30, 1905 (Driskill 1983, 64). Ranking seventh out of 114, promotion to the rank of Midshipman was automatic, and Nimitz began his career as a surface naval officer (Driskill 1983, 65). Of note, while stationed in the Far East the following summer, he met Adm. Heihachiro Togo, a famous Japanese commander in the Russo-Japanese war, at a party held by the Japanese Emperor honoring Togo and other famous Japanese leaders. Nimitz respected Adm. Togo deeply and in 1934 attended both his public and private funerals. In 1906, after completing the required two years at sea and then commissioned an Ensign, Nimitz, in rapid succession, took command of various small ships. His command of the United States Ship (USS) Decatur stood out among them. While sailing through the poorly charted waters of Batangas Harbor near Olongapo, Philippines, the Decatur ran aground on a mud bank. The night of the incident Nimitz slept peacefully having thought of what his grandfather, a former German merchant marine, said about life at sea: “Don’t worry about things over which you have no
control” (Driskill 1983, 78). The next day a small steam ship pulled the Decatur off the bank and an investigation began. The grounding of a ship is usually career-ending for any naval officer. A court-martial did convict Ensign Nimitz, but only sentenced him to receive a letter of reprimand for hazarding his ship. Nimitz survived his court-martial because of his impeccable service record, the poor accuracy of the charts, and because the ship sustained relatively no damage and Nimitz remained mindful of this experience for the rest of his life (Driskill 1983, 79). From that time on, Nimitz believed in honest mistakes and second chances.

In 1909, Nimitz transitioned to submarines despite his request for a battleship assignment (Potter 1966, 37). In the early days of the submarine, this new marvel of naval warfare operated on engines fueled by dangerous, highly flammable gasoline. Therefore, in early 1913, the U.S. Navy sent Nimitz to Germany and Belgium to learn about maritime diesel engines as an alternative; ultimately, he returned stateside to supervise the U.S. fleet’s first experimental diesel powered tanker (Driskill 1983, 90). At the start of World War I, Nimitz served on Adm. Samuel S. Robinson’s staff, Commander Submarine Force U.S. Atlantic Fleet, and later would become his chief of staff (Driskill 1983, 94). Following World War I, Nimitz worked as a senior member on the Board of Submarine Design and afterwards took command of the USS South Carolina and later the USS Chicago (Potter 1966, 37). Afterwards, he attended the Naval War College followed by his return to the staff of his mentor Adm. Robinson, now Commander Battle Fleet and later Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet (Potter 1966, 37).
In 1926, Commander Nimitz had mixed feelings about orders to implement a new recruiting concept at the University of California, Berkley—the Naval Reserve Officers’ Training Corps. This type of assignment did not typically advance a naval officer’s career, but it could attract a lot of attention if the new program was a success (Potter 1976, 143). Nimitz became the school’s first Professor of Naval Science and the program became a resounding success (Driskill 1983, 96). Following Berkley, he commanded Submarine Division 20 and then advanced to command the flagship of the Asiatic Fleet, the USS Augusta. Next, for shore duty, he assumed the duties as Assistant Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, which controlled placement for all naval personnel—today called the Bureau of Naval Personnel (Driskill 1983, 99). Nimitz excelled at this position because of his ability to accurately judge character and communicate clearly with all types of people. Plus, he possessed a great memory for recalling competencies of each officer he came to know (Potter 1966, 38). After serving at the Bureau, Captain Nimitz returned to sea duty as Commander Cruiser Division Two and then as Commander Battleship Division One, Battle Force (Driskill 1983, 101-102). In June 1939, Rear Adm. Nimitz returned to Washington again, this time as the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation; he remained in that position until the United States entered World War II on December 7, 1941 (Driskill 1983, 102).

After the Japanese Imperial Navy attacked Pearl Harbor, U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt had two serious issues with which to contend: (1) the decimation of America’s Pacific naval fleet left the west coast of the United States exposed to attack, and (2) according to Secretary of the Navy, Frank Knox, the naval leadership in the Pacific had to change. Roosevelt and Knox wanted a capable leader who embodied the
characteristics necessary to take on the enemy with a damaged, demoralized fleet. After a quick trip to Hawaii to survey the damage, Knox returned to Washington and, with Roosevelt’s approval, he appointed Nimitz as the new CINCPAC, a job that came with the rank of Admiral, a four-star billet (Driskill 1983, 107,109). A stunned Nimitz knew of twenty-eight other possible flag officers ahead of him for the job (Driskill 1983, 109). Nevertheless, Roosevelt and Knox wanted Nimitz to command the Pacific Fleet. For security reasons, Nimitz left Washington by train, in plain clothes, under the assumed name of Mr. Wainwright (Lewis 1945, 406). He took over the Pacific fleet on the last day of 1941 (Lewis 1945, 406). In answering a letter from his wife congratulating him on his recent promotion to CINCPAC, he stated that half of the fleet was on the bottom of the ocean (A&E Biography 1996). It was to be an arduous command tour. Nimitz became one of only three major U.S. theater campaign leaders in World War II, the other two being General (Gen.) Douglas MacArthur and Gen. Dwight Eisenhower. The biggest difference between Nimitz and the two Army generals was that Nimitz’s odds versus those of the Japanese, for much of the war, were at best less than those facing the ground commanders (A&E Biography 1996). Facing an enemy who clearly outnumbered his fleet, Nimitz embarked on one of the greatest naval campaigns ever recorded in history with, initially, a broken and devastated fleet. Nimitz’s command would soon encompass an area covering sixty-five million square miles and include two and half million men, and thousands of ships and planes (A&E Biography 1996). Nimitz did exactly what Roosevelt and the Navy wanted him to do. He and his subordinate commanders won back the Pacific from the Japanese through a campaign of fierce battles like Coral Sea, Midway, Eastern Solomons, Guadalcanal, Tarawa, Marianas, Philippine
Sea, Leyte Gulf, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa. In late December 1944, before the start of the
Iwo Jima operation, the U.S. Senate and President Franklin Roosevelt passed and
appointed, respectively, Nimitz to Fleet Admiral, a lifetime, five-star billet (Driskill 1983,
213).

On September 2, 1945, in Tokyo Bay on the deck of the battleship USS Missouri,
Fleet Adm. Nimitz signed for the United States after the Japanese signed the instrument
of surrender (Driskill 1983, 228). Shortly afterward, a grateful nation honored Nimitz in
Washington, D.C., on Nimitz Day, October 5, 1945. Less than two months later Nimitz
relinquished his command of the Pacific to Adm. Raymond Spruance and assumed the
duties of Chief of Naval Operations. For the next two years, Nimitz worked to
demobilize the forces, and develop the Department of Defense and the National Military
Establishment (Driskill 1983, 263). Finally, after over forty years of service in December
1947, Nimitz retired to become the Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy in the
Western Sea Frontier, a position he held for the remainder of his life (Potter 1966, 53).
He continued to influence the U.S. Navy but only when queried directly. For example,
when asked by Congress in 1948, he gave his opinion on the U.S. Air Force’s B-36
bomber and United States aircraft carrier debate (Potter 1966, 53). Nimitz was content
with his retired life, but always refused to write an autobiography or memoirs about his
experiences even though many asked him to do so. He did not want to seem self-serving
to others nor did he inadvertently want to hurt those with whom he served.

Nimitz briefly worked for the United Nations (UN) when the UN Secretary Gen.
Trygve Lie nominated him to administer a plebiscite for India and Pakistan in regards to
the Kashmir region (Potter 1966, 53). When the two nations reached a stalemate, Nimitz
requested to be relieved of his duties vowing to return if India and Pakistan agreed to come to terms (Driskill 1983, 274). He continued to work for the UN as a good-will ambassador (Driskill 1983, 276). After working for the UN, Nimitz bought a home near Berkeley, California because of fond memories from his previous tour as a Naval Reserve Officers’ Training Corps professor (Potter 1966, 54). While living near Berkeley, he consulted for history books for authors from around the nation. As the years passed and his health began to fail Nimitz decided to leave Berkeley and move to Naval Station Treasure Island in San Francisco, California where he resided until his death on February 20, 1966 from complications from a stroke. “At his request he was buried without the pomp of a state funeral at Golden Gate National Cemetery beside the Pacific, among thousands of men who had served with him” (Potter 1966, 55).

**Primary and Secondary Research Questions**

How well does a civilian leadership model as Goleman’s apply to the military, using the historic military career of Nimitz as a case study? Secondary questions are:

1. How do Goleman’s six leadership styles relate to the six climate factors of flexibility, responsibility, standards, rewards, clarity, and commitment?

2. What examples from Nimitz’s career correspond to Goleman’s civilian leadership model? How close are the leadership characteristics? How do Goleman’s model and Nimitz’s actions deviate?

3. Did Nimitz use any styles or approaches not addressed by Goleman’s leadership model? Why?
4. After comparing the Goleman model with Nimitz and taking into account current military leadership doctrine, is further exploration into civilian leadership models warranted? Why?

Definitions

The following compilation of terms provides definitions for the doctrinal and military terminology used in this thesis.

Operational level of war. “The level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to achieve strategic objectives within theaters or other operational areas” (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2009, 406).

Strategic level of war. “The level of war at which a nation, often as a member of a group of nations, determines national or multinational (alliance or coalition) strategic security objectives and guidance, and develops and uses national resources to achieve these objectives” (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2009, 532).

Tactical level of war. “The level of war at which battles and engagements are planned and executed to achieve military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces” (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2009, 547).

Limitations

This study has three limitations. First, this thesis remains unclassified. Second, analysis is limited to Nimitz and the Goleman civilian leadership model. Any mention of other leaders, their respective leadership traits, or any other leadership models is only to emphasize a specific point or to make a relevant comparison. Ranging from the tactical
to the strategic level of warfare, vignettes from Nimitz’s professional life illustrate how Goleman’s model compares to Nimitz’s personal leadership style.

**Delimitations**

This thesis compares Goleman’s civilian leadership model to Nimitz’s military leadership style. Although history often studies leaders and the effect they have on the outcome of battles, campaigns, and wars, such analysis is not the focus of this thesis. Again, mostly noted for his command in the Pacific theater during World War II, the vignettes used in this thesis cover the entirety of Nimitz’s military career. Finally, this is not a history paper. This paper focuses on how Nimitz’s leadership affected those around him throughout his professional life and how the Goleman leadership model compares to those leadership approaches used by Nimitz to become a successful military leader.

**Assumptions**

Two main assumptions frame this study. The first is that Nimitz was an accomplished naval leader. After four decades of naval service, he quietly left active duty on his own terms; neither the U.S. Navy nor the U.S. government forced Nimitz to retire (Potter 1966, 52). Second, though there are vastly different technologies at work between the times when Nimitz was alive and when the Goleman model first appeared in print in 2000, the critical importance of leadership, both in business and in the military, has remained constant. As Commandant of the Marine Corps, Gen. Lemuel Shepard once wrote, “leadership is held to be the management of men by inspiration and persuasion rather than by direct or implied threat of force” (Montor 1998, 1). Gen. Shepard’s does not mention technology or its implied presence in the role of leadership.
Technology may assist leaders, but without it, man can still lead. In addition, this statement assumes that technology and even command structure will change over the course of time, but leadership always will be a requirement for society, especially in military matters. In the beginning era of unmanned vehicles, human operators still control these machines, even if by remote control, and these operators still need other humans to lead them. More than fifty years separate Goleman and Nimitz, but the comparison is appropriate because of the unwavering truth that Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Marines need leadership despite technological advancements.

**Significance of Thesis**

In the recent past, military leaders enlisted the help of civilian leadership experts or used civilian leadership models to enhance military effectiveness; introducing staff college students to these elements is nothing new. However, with the still rapid and global expansion of information sharing, an officer or non-commissioned officer exposed to various civilian leadership models may find one he wants to use, but may wonder if it is appropriate to employ in the military. Traditionally, services have relied upon their service academies, officer candidate schools, staff colleges, war colleges and other military post-graduate or career schools to train these officers and non-commissioned officers in the art of leadership. Usually that training stems from historical, military case studies or relevant doctrinal field manuals. Often students discuss inside and outside the classroom the validity of using a civilian leadership model for military applications. For example, due to similarities between military administration and logistics and traditional civilian business practices, many military leaders might concede that it makes sense to use a civilian model in that domain, but then wonder if it is also appropriate to use the
same methods on the battlefield directing combat operations. Some students support the use of civilian leadership practices; other students adamantly oppose it. This examination of a civilian leadership model compared to a historic, well-known naval leader will further that discussion. More importantly, this study provides analysis for whether a civilian leadership model can work in the profession of combat arms.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

This study examined three main types of literature: doctrine, historical references and courseware. First, a look at military doctrine addressing the art of leadership and command helps to show the reader how the military places emphasis on leadership. The second method for literary research comes from historical books, articles and other media documenting Nimitz’s life and career. The last source is the courseware used by the CGSC to teach leadership classes to field-grade officers and senior ranking Chief Warrant Officers. Finally, after a brief overview of each source used in this thesis, this chapter summarizes the research material to identify any bias or gaps in the available information.

**Doctrine**

In the profession of arms, the U.S. government uses doctrine to guide its armed forces. Doctrine is a generic template, a starting point, for most situations in which the military may find itself. According to the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, doctrine is the “[f]undamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application” (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2009, 178). By definition, doctrine guides behavior while allowing leaders to deviate from it when necessary. Many individual services have their own leadership doctrine. This paper briefly examines the U.S. Navy’s and Army’s leadership doctrine.
The U.S. Navy addresses leadership in *Naval Doctrinal Publication 6 (NDP-6)*, *Naval Command and Control*. *NDP-6* “explains how naval commanders exercise command and control over assigned forces and outlines broad guidance for the command and control of Navy and Marine Corps operations” (Department of the Navy 1995, i).

This document, first published in 1995, addresses the nature of naval command and control (C2), the process of C2, the naval C2 system, and how to build effective C2. In the introduction, the U.S. Navy defines command as “the authoritative act of making decisions and ordering action [while] control is the act of monitoring and influencing this action” (Department of the Navy 1995, ii). The U.S. Navy’s C2 is based upon a foundation of constant principles: “professional leadership, competence born of a high level of training, flexibility in organization and equipment, and cohesive doctrine” (Department of the Navy 1995, ii). The introduction concludes with statements stressing that C2 governs all areas of naval warfare and that the U.S. Navy requires its commanders to have a thorough understanding of naval leadership among the other aspects pertaining to the nature and conduct of war and the supporting information systems (Department of the Navy 1995, ii). *NDP-6* focuses on the C2 process and how leadership enhances that process within operational command. Finally, it states the key component of what naval leadership is and how it applies to the U.S. Navy and its operations in the maritime and joint environments.

The U.S. Army dedicates an entire field manual to the subject of leadership, *Field Manual (FM) 6-22: Army Leadership*. Much like *NDP-6*, *FM 6-22* defines what leadership is as it relates to working within the Army. *FM 6-22* goes further, in its greater than 110 page length, to describe the basics of leadership: a leader’s character,
presence and intellect; his or her competency based-leadership for direct through strategic support; and leading at the organizational and strategic levels (Army 2006, i-ii). In all, *FM 6-22* details what it means to be a military leader in the U.S. Army; it is easy to see that, if not all, leadership attributes outlined apply to any military leader regardless of service branch.

While each form of doctrine defines what leadership is and how it relates to its service, they do vary in length and detail. The U.S. Navy manual tends to identify leadership broadly, preferring to use it in context with C2. The U.S. Army favors giving a more descriptive account of leadership. Neither method demonstrates better leadership in practice; it is just different for different service mindsets. To illustrate this point, in order for the U.S. Navy to turn five hundred people in one direction the captain of a ship orders a heading change and all five hundred now move in that direction. In order for the U.S. Army to move five hundred people in the same direction it takes a bit more leadership and coordination. Although this example is a bit tongue-in-cheek, the point is leadership from service doctrine is culture focused and the reader should be mindful of that.

### Books

The bulk of the research for this thesis resides in books and historical texts like biographies, autobiographies, or expert texts on the subject of leadership. The primary books used for research are grouped below by author.

Published in 1976, E. B. Potter’s biography, *Nimitz*, is truly the authoritative work on the Fleet Admiral to date. After Nimitz’s death in 1966, Potter was the logical choice to write Nimitz’s biography. Potter, as a naval reserve officer, first met Nimitz in 1943 at
Pearl Harbor; first spoke with him in 1955 at Nimitz’s fiftieth class reunion; and worked with him in 1957 at Nimitz’s home in Berkeley, California on writing *Sea Power: A Naval History* (Potter 1976, xii). In an interview in 1969, three years after Nimitz’s death, Mrs. Catherine Nimitz stated she requested Potter to write the biography. “Professor Potter worked with him and he has been a guest in our home” (Potter 1976, xii). Mrs. Nimitz was equally comfortable with Potter as her late husband highly regarded Potter’s writing skills. No other work, covers his life, as Potter’s book on Nimitz so completely.

Frank Driskill and Dede Casad’s book, *Chester W. Nimitz: Admiral of the Hills*, is a short, concise biography. Driskill and Casad’s work offers the reader a slightly more Paul Harvey-esque look at Nimitz’s life. It captures, in a shorter read, more of Nimitz’s character without the intense detail of every turn of his military career.

Dr. Daniel Goleman wrote the leadership model used in comparison with Nimitz. Although Goleman wrote many books, the two books applicable for this thesis follow. The first one, titled *Working with Emotional Intelligence*, provides background for his leadership model. This book emphasizes that understanding emotional intelligence is more important to business leaders than advanced degrees or specific expertise, especially the higher one moves up in a business leadership structure. Released in 1998, this book is the precursor to Goleman’s next book, *Primal Leadership: Realizing the Power of Emotional Intelligence*, released in 2002, notably two years after the article “Leadership That Gets Results” ran in *Harvard Business Review*. In *Primal Leadership*, the leadership model presented in the *Harvard Business Review* article appears, but with a few minor name changes to two of the six leadership styles. However, the basis for
each leadership style remains the same in both the article and the book. In 2004, Goleman released a paperback version of this book with a slight variation to the title, *Primal Leadership: Learning to Lead with Emotional Intelligence*.

Goleman’s research comes from civilian leadership, this next book focuses on the U.S. Navy’s leadership. *American Admiralship: The Art of Naval Command* written by Edgar F. Puryear Jr., provided a forty-year compilation of naval leadership attributes and competencies derived from over 125 four-star flag officers and more than one thousand one-star and above flag officers (Puryear 2005, ix). It details the eight attributes needed to become a great naval officer. They are: possessing selflessness, seeking jobs requiring the ability to make tough decisions, honing a “sixth sense” to make those decisions, avoiding “yes men,” conducting professional reading, providing mentorship, delegation, and finally demonstrating true character (Puryear 2005, x).

It is the objective of this volume to focus the insights and thoughts of these senior naval leaders on why they personally believe they were successful leaders and how they analyze the success of other senior naval officers. How, in other words, does one lead successfully in the American military, and what role does character play in that success? (Puryear 2005, ix)

The book is filled with examples of Nimitz’s leadership, but more importantly, it contains reflections about his leadership from different points of view by the author and by those with whom he served.

Before Nimitz’s death, in the years after he left the U.S. Navy, ambitious authors attempted to tell Nimitz’s career story. *Famous American Naval Officers* by Charles Lee Lewis provides a career-specific look at many naval leaders. However, the portion of the book addressing Nimitz is incomplete, but does provide some basic details about his career. Such sacristy of biographical texts written before Nimitz’s death is a testament to
his resolve to keep his biography and personal thoughts effectively out of public sight at least until after his death.

Vice Adm. E. P. Forrestel, United States Navy (ret.) wrote Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, USN: A Study in Command. Forrestel’s book gives Spruance’s feelings about, reactions to, and opinions on Nimitz’s leadership and decisions. Great weight should be given to these positions because Spruance and Nimitz worked closely together in the Pacific during World War II. There is even a forward at the beginning of the book written by Adm. Nimitz applauding Spruance’s achievements (Forrestel 1966, v). In addition, Spruance’s biography, the Quiet Warrior: A Biography of Admiral Raymond A. Spruance written by Thomas B. Buell also reflects upon Nimitz’s decisions and leadership style.

Eric Larrabee wrote Commander in Chief: Franklin Delano Roosevelt, His Lieutenants, and their War, a book that provides Roosevelt’s view of Nimitz. This perspective offers the reader a look at how Nimitz’s civilian superiors felt about him, his leadership style, and the decisions he made. “This book is concerned with Franklin Roosevelt as a war leader and with the subordinates through whom he exercised command” (Larrabee 1987, 1).

Periodicals

The idea for this thesis came from two likely areas of study: discussions in the classroom and from the readings to facilitate the class. The latter obviously initiated the discussions and the two articles referenced below were among the first investigated to form the basis for this thesis. Goleman’s article is part of the CGSC’s leadership readings for follow-on classroom learning and discussion. These heavily opinionated
discussions intrigued this author and drew him into the research process. The second article, while not part of the CGSC’s curriculum during the 2008 and 2009 academic years, is an excellent article describing Nimitz to which any military leader can relate.

Goleman’s article titled “Leadership That Gets Results” printed in the March-April 2000 Harvard Business Review, two years before the release of Goleman’s Primal Leadership, applies his concept of emotional intelligence to leadership. The article is based on data he and his colleagues collected from business leaders all over the world and then condensed that into six distinct leadership styles based on emotional intelligence. While the article touches on what emotional intelligence means and how it connects to the six leadership styles, it is the six leadership styles that truly stand-out in the article. The relationship of how the six leadership styles effect the six climate factors of an organization is used extensively throughout this thesis.

The second article intrigues the reader about Nimitz’s life, his character, and his leadership style. In July 1966, just five months after Nimitz’s death, Naval Institute Proceedings published an article written by E. B. Potter which detailed Nimitz’s life and career. Another ten years would pass before Potter finished the definitive biography on Nimitz, but this article gives the reader a quick overview of Nimitz’s life, personality, and many accomplishments. It was Nimitz’s wish not to have his biography written until after his death; “he made every effort to protect the feelings and reputations of his subordinates, even when they failed to measure up” (Potter 1976, xi). This article is a good one-sitting, quick-read and a precursor to Potter’s more lengthy biography on Nimitz.
Other Media

In 1996, A&E Television Networks produced a video titled *Admiral Chester Nimitz: Thunder of the Pacific* for their programming on the *Biography Channel*. The fifty-minute episode contains many anecdotal insights to Nimitz’s life and offers interviews from not only analysts and historians, but also his friends and family.

In summary, historians have written or produced much about Nimitz’s life. Even though E. B. Potter is the authoritative writer about Nimitz, there are many other authors and even television producers who catalogued his life and his accomplishments. Most viewpoints about Nimitz are in agreement, but having researched his peer, subordinate, and superior officers gives credible and alternative viewpoints on Nimitz’s decisions and leadership style for this work. There are no gaps in the coverage of his life, but no author or producer of work ever stated what was Nimitz’s actual leadership style. However, there are many vignettes and many opinions based on the decisions he made which can provide insight into what his actual leadership style might have been. The abundance of research material commented on here and in the reference list is crucial for providing many points of view of Nimitz’s leadership style. Only with these points of view can the comparison between Goleman’s model and Nimitz take place. In the next chapter, some of these research materials, especially the ones written by Goleman and his associates, form the research model to compare Goleman’s leadership model to that of Nimitz.
Nimitz’s career was in some ways similar to many military officers of today. Until World War II, Nimitz had no combat experience. He never saw combat action in World War I or during the inter-war period until World War II. Nimitz devoted a large portion of his career to advancing technology for naval use and to developing new tactics, skill-sets that mirror careers of many naval officers today. Nimitz often went on sea deployments, which are characteristically good for a naval officer’s career. Yet despite his lack of combat experience, his nation called on him to lead the United States into a world war and Nimitz was ready. Any military officer can learn much from studying Nimitz. Besides reflecting on his career, studying his leadership effectiveness can possibly provide a role model for today and tomorrow’s military leaders.

At first, validating Nimitz’s leadership style by using current naval doctrine and then comparing that to a civilian leadership model might seem logical. However, this approach places naval doctrine as an extraneous filter between Nimitz and Goleman’s model. It also does not answer the question of whether or not a civilian leadership model can work within the military environment. Therefore, the best way to analyze Nimitz’s leadership style is to compare it directly with Goleman’s model. Ultimately, chapter 5 will provide conclusions and recommendations as to how this analysis might apply to military leadership and doctrine.

The method for analysis comprises of the six leadership styles from Goleman’s model and how they affect Goleman’s six climate factors. In order to provide some background into how Goleman arrived at his leadership model, a look into what
emotional intelligence is and how it relates to the leadership styles is useful. Then, in chapter 4, a look at each of the six leadership styles themselves using the method for comparison will provide the analysis for follow conclusions.

Goleman’s model rests on the theory that individuals have different emotional intelligence capabilities (Goleman 2000, 78). Emotional intelligence is “the ability to manage ourselves and our relationships effectively [and it] consists of four fundamental capabilities: self-awareness, self-management, social awareness and social skill” (Goleman 2000, 80). He has written extensively about emotional intelligence in two books: *Emotional Intelligence* (1995), and *Working with Emotional Intelligence* (1998). He claims research links emotional intelligence to the six leadership styles. In his book *Primal Leadership*, Goleman keeps the four fundamental capabilities the same except he replaces the term social skill with relationship management; their underlying meanings remain the same. These four fundamental emotional intelligence capabilities are comprised of many emotional intelligence competencies.

In “Leadership That Gets Results,” Goleman outlines a civilian leadership model based upon scientific data. Goleman collaborated with a consulting firm, Hay/McBer, in which they randomly selected 3,871 worldwide business executives out of a possible twenty thousand for analysis of those executives’ particular leadership traits (Goleman 2000, 78). The resulting model came from an assortment of civilian businesses and quantifiable data rather than from the “inference, experience and instinct” of some leadership experts (Goleman 2000, 78). The use of this data shows that Goleman and his associates built a model with as little bias as possible and formed the six distinct leadership styles discussed later on in this chapter (Goleman 2000, 78). The article also
shows how previous scientific analysis conducted by David McClelland, a Harvard University psychologist, illustrates “that leaders with strengths in a critical mass of six or more emotional intelligence competencies were far more effective than peers who lacked such strengths” (Goleman 2000, 80). Goleman set out to show how emotional intelligence, in the form of competencies and capabilities, when linked to leadership, affects an organization’s climate and performance (Goleman 2000, 81). He collaborated with a team of McClelland’s colleagues headed by the Hay/McBer firm when they discovered which “emotional intelligence capabilities [and their corresponding competencies] [drove] the six leadership styles” (Goleman 2000, 81).

Before defining the six leadership styles, a brief understanding of how the emotional intelligence competencies relate to the four fundamental capabilities is required. To begin, the first two emotional capabilities, self-awareness and self-management, each introspectively looks at the leader’s own emotional perception while the second two capabilities, social awareness and social skills, are a look as to how the leader deals with those around him in the organization. A self-aware leader is one who has the capability to read his emotions, understand them, and realize their impact on the organization, work relationships, and work performance (Goleman, Boyatzis and McKee 2004, 253). A self-aware leader also has a strong sense of his own strengths and limitations and has a positive sense of self-confidence (Goleman, Boyatzis and McKee 2004, 253-254). Second, a leader with self-management possesses strong self-control which, when recognized by others, translates into trustworthiness, honesty, and integrity (Goleman 1998, 82). Anyone working with this type of individual would find him to be conscientious and adaptable to change within the organization (Goleman 1998, 26). This
leader would recognize opportunities to seize the initiative in an effort to achieve goals (Goleman 1998, 82). Next, a socially aware leader displays empathy for others within the organization; empathy is the ability to read others’ emotions, take an interest in them and understand their perspective (Goleman 1998, 137-138). As a leader of a large organization and beyond reading individuals, the socially aware leader can read an organization’s collective current of emotions and navigate the politics with an eye on serving the needs of the organization and those who benefit from its existence (Goleman 1998, 160-61).

Finally, the fourth emotional capability is social skill. The competencies needed to be successful at social skill include “farsighted leadership that is inspiring and influential” (Goleman 1998, 168). Persuading and developing others through the use of feedback and guidance are essential to cultivate members of an organization to perform up to their collective or individual potential, or both (Goleman 1998, 170-74). As in personal relationships, communication is just as important at an organizational level because it allows leaders to listen openly and send clear, convincing messages (Goleman 1998, 174). At times, a leader will have to be the catalyst for change and then confidently lead people in a new direction (Goleman 1998, 193). During times of conflict, the leader will have to step in, de-escalate the dispute and help lead the organization to a resolution (Goleman 1998, 178). Lastly, a socially skillful leader will be proficient at building relationships, sharing the vision, and leading by example those around him or her, ultimately promoting cooperation and teamwork (Goleman 1998, 183-192). To close, these four major emotional intelligence capabilities are important when examining the six distinct leadership styles because it is from these capabilities on which
each style of leadership is based. The following table shows a concise relationship between the four emotional capabilities and their associated competencies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Emotional Intelligence Capabilities</th>
<th>Self-Awareness</th>
<th>Self-Management</th>
<th>Social Awareness</th>
<th>Relationship Management</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Emotional Intelligence Competencies</td>
<td>- Emotional self-awareness</td>
<td>- Self control</td>
<td>- Empathy</td>
<td>- Inspiration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Accurate self-assessment</td>
<td>- Transparency</td>
<td>- Organizational awareness</td>
<td>- Influence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Self-confidence</td>
<td>- Adaptability</td>
<td>- Service</td>
<td>- Developing others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Achievement</td>
<td></td>
<td>- Change catalyst</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Initiative</td>
<td></td>
<td>- Conflict management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Optimism</td>
<td></td>
<td>- Teamwork and collaboration</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


With a background understanding of emotional intelligence, one may freely investigate Goleman’s six leadership styles: visionary, coaching, affiliative, democratic, pacesetting, and commanding (Goleman, Boyatzis and McKee 2002, 55). Goleman’s article, in the March-April 2000 *Harvard Business Review*, lists the same six leadership styles but substitutes the term coercive for commanding and authoritative for visionary (Goleman 2000, 80). Since the CGSC used the 2000 *Harvard Business Review* article in its leadership textbook, this author chose to use Goleman’s earlier leadership style names from the article. However, each style remains the same between the *Harvard Business Review* article and the book, *Primal Leadership*.

For each leadership style, separate examinations will illustrate the style’s uniqueness, which emotional intelligence capabilities resonant within it, when does the
style work best, and how does it effect the overall organizational climate. The coercive leadership style stems from the emotional intelligence capability of self-management. The leader’s mentality is rooted in the phrase “do as I say” which demands immediate compliance (Goleman 2000, 82). Goleman even states that this style of leadership is characteristic of the military on the battlefield, but concedes that today’s military uses other styles to build unit cohesion and teamwork (Goleman, Boyatzis and McKee 2004, 77). Although Goleman does not overtly state that today’s military mainly uses coercive style in its leadership, he does imply this. The coercive style works best when a crisis presents itself, when people must be stunned into breaking bad professional practices, or when trying to quickly rectify a problem situation (Goleman, Boyatzis and McKee 2004, 78). While its initial use can bring immediate change, it quickly will become ineffective if relied upon too heavily (Goleman 2000, 82). Sooner rather than later, it tends to erode the subordinate’s sense of self-worth, pride, job satisfaction, and his view of how his role plays into the organization’s larger vision (Goleman, Boyatzis and McKee 2004, 77). Overall, it has the greatest negative impact on the organization’s climate if not used sparingly (Goleman 2000, 82).

In contrast, authoritative leadership style derives its power mainly from three emotional intelligence capabilities: self-awareness, social awareness and social skill (Goleman 2000, 82). A phrase that summarizes this style of leadership is “come with me,” meaning a leader would employ this style when he wants or needs his subordinates to move towards a common organizational vision (Goleman 2000, 82). Authoritative leadership has the strongest positive impact on an organization’s climate; a leader using this style articulates a vision for the organization, but does not specifically tell the
subordinates how to achieve that vision (Goleman, Boyatzis and McKee 2004, 57). It establishes the benchmarks for feedback and it provides clarity on how everyones’ job fits into the big picture because their work, no matter how small, matters (Goleman, Boyatzis and McKee 2004, 57). Inspiration, transparency, and empathy are the three main competencies that drive visionary leaders (Goleman, Boyatzis and McKee 2004, 58-59). Visionaries can sense how other people feel, understand their points of view and then motivate them firmly towards a vision (Goleman, Boyatzis and McKee 2004, 58-59). As positive as this style is, it can produce cynicism in an organization or it can make the leader appear overbearing when used in the company of experts or vastly experienced peers (Goleman, Boyatzis and McKee 2004, 59). In most circumstances though, a leader can rarely go wrong with using the authoritative style of leadership which is why most business schools emphasize it (Goleman, Boyatzis and McKee 2004, 57, 59).

The affiliative style has the second most positive impact on an organization (Goleman 2000, 83). To put this style into a phrase: “people come first” (Goleman 2000, 83). It draws its power from a leader’s emotional capabilities of social awareness and social skill (Goleman 2000, 83). This style is based upon sharing emotions or placing less emphasis on results and more emphasis on a subordinate’s emotional needs (Goleman, Boyatzis and McKee 2004, 64). Use of this style tends to breed loyalty, increase harmony, improve morale and communications, and restore the broken bonds of trust within an organization (Goleman, Boyatzis and McKee 2004, 64). Affiliative leadership underscores the competencies of collaboration, empathy, and conflict management (Goleman, Boyatzis and McKee 2004, 64-66). Affiliative leaders care about their employees’ happiness and remain focused on ensuring harmony and a friendly
atmosphere exist, while working to resolve conflicts especially between fellow employees. Leaders should be cautious not to use this style alone because it does not stress the importance of feedback and employees can be led to believe that mediocrity is acceptable (Goleman, Boyatzis and McKee 2004, 66). In order to overcome these shortfalls, it is best to use this style in conjunction with the authoritative style (Goleman, Boyatzis and McKee 2004, 66). Combine the clear vision and standards of the authoritative style with the caring aspects of the affiliative style “and you have a potent combination” (Goleman, Boyatzis and McKee 2004, 66).

The next style, the democratic style, also positively affects an organization’s climate (Goleman 2000, 83). This style takes into account inputs from as many involved persons as possible; the catch phrase for this style is “what do you think?” (Goleman 2000, 83). Leaders use it when they are unsure about direction or are in need of ideas (Goleman, Boyatzis and McKee 2004, 67). The competencies of collaboration, conflict management, and influence form the base for this style (Goleman, Boyatzis and McKee 2004, 69). By teaming with subordinates, a leader can create synergy to resolve strife or fix broken bonds within an organization (Goleman, Boyatzis and McKee 2004, 69). Also, democratic leaders must listen to both the good and bad news; chastising someone for truthful but bad news will likely alienate that person from the leader (Goleman, Boyatzis and McKee 2004, 68). The amount of time it takes to use the democratic style is its biggest drawback in application. Using it during a time of crisis is inappropriate. Relying on endless meetings when a consensus remains elusive produces confusion and expensive delays. Overall, its use can help a leader show that his or her employees’ input
matters; he can use their recommendations, and it shows the employees they have a say in the direction of the organization.

The last style to impact climate positively is the coaching style. The phrase “try this” describes what the style is all about (Goleman 2000, 83). Coaching leaders delegate and assign tasks which challenge employees who demonstrate initiative and seek professional development. But coaching leaders must also tolerate short-term failures to allow employees to grow (Goleman, Boyatzis and McKee 2004, 61). Developing others, self-awareness, and empathy are the three competencies that power the coaching style (Goleman, Boyatzis and McKee 2004, 62). The leader must show genuine interest in his or her employees by listening to them before offering advice (Goleman, Boyatzis and McKee 2004, 62). If a leader poorly executes this style, employees perceive it as micromanagement (Goleman, Boyatzis and McKee 2004, 61). Finally, the reason for its large positive impact on the climate stems from rapport the leader personally builds with the employees (Goleman, Boyatzis and McKee 2004, 62).

The final style of leadership, pacesetting, has an overall negative impact on climate but still has its place in the work environment (Goleman 2000, 83). The “do as I do, now” style emphasizes the emotional competency of self-management (Goleman 2000, 83). More often than not, self-management along with collaboration, communication, and empathy are competencies lacking in a leader who primarily relies on the pacesetting style (Goleman, Boyatzis and McKee 2004, 74). Results matter the most to pacesetting leaders and morale considerably suffers if relied upon too much (Goleman, Boyatzis and McKee 2004, 72). If used under appropriate conditions some pressure can achieve great results while too much pressure will cause the employees’
efforts to collapse (Goleman, Boyatzis and McKee 2004, 73). However, if a leader is mindful of self-management, pacesetting used in conjunction with the affiliative and authoritative styles can produce quick results amongst teams of highly-motivated personnel (Goleman, Boyatzis and McKee 2004, 74).

Goleman uses the analogy of golf clubs in a golf bag to explain the use of these six styles of leadership (Goleman 2000, 80). Used in various combinations, each is essential to reach a maximum potential. Also, each style of leadership emphasizes certain emotional capabilities and competencies over others. As in golf, the use of an individual club will not win the entire game; the same holds true for leadership styles and a successful career (Goleman 2000, 80). Again, Goleman makes a point: the greater the use and combination of styles, the greater the success.

The final part of the this model is how each leadership style effects the six key factors in an organization’s climate. The factors are flexibility, responsibility, standards, rewards, clarity and commitment (Goleman 2000, 81).

Table 2 depicts how each key climate factor relates to each style of leadership. The corresponding number is either a positive or a negative. The further away the number is from zero the stronger the effect in that direction. For instance, if a leader uses a coercive leadership style, the most negatively affected factor is responsibility. This result makes sense because the leader assumes most, if not all, of the responsibility for the actions of
his or her employees leaving them little or no sense of responsibility. Notice, too, under the coercive style, the factor of standards remains close to zero. This figure indicates that employees revert to baseline standards when subjected to the coercive style. Compare the coercive style to the coaching style and the reader can see an increase in the standards factor encouraging the subordinate to create better output. Under the pacesetting style, the correlation for the standards factor moves in the opposite direction from the coaching style. A forced change upon subordinates causes the standards factor to suffer severely.

It is important to note the overall impact the style has on the climate down at the bottom of table 2. Four of the six styles have positive influences on the climate: authoritative, affiliative, democratic, and coaching. The coercive and pacesetting styles have negative influences on the climate.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Coercive</th>
<th>Authoritative</th>
<th>Affiliative</th>
<th>Democratic</th>
<th>Pacesetting</th>
<th>Coaching</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Flexibility</td>
<td>-.28</td>
<td>.32</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td>.28</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsibility</td>
<td>-.37</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standards</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>.38</td>
<td>.31</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>-.27</td>
<td>.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rewards</td>
<td>-.18</td>
<td>.54</td>
<td>.48</td>
<td>.42</td>
<td>-.29</td>
<td>.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clarity</td>
<td>-.11</td>
<td>.44</td>
<td>.37</td>
<td>.35</td>
<td>-.28</td>
<td>.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commitment</td>
<td>-.13</td>
<td>.35</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td>.26</td>
<td>-.20</td>
<td>.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall impact</td>
<td>-.26</td>
<td>.54</td>
<td>.46</td>
<td>.43</td>
<td>-.25</td>
<td>.42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Goleman and his colleagues found that leaders who used as many positive styles as possible had better-performing organizations and climates than those leaders who did not (Goleman 2000, 81). This does not mean that coercive and pacesetting styles are always inappropriate. At certain times and in certain circumstances, crises or the need for
quick results arise and these two styles adequately meet those needs. Goleman’s research indicates that climate accounts for almost a third of a business’s environment with present economic conditions and peer competition making up the other two-thirds (Goleman 2000, 82). This means that of the three influences in the business environment, climate is the only one affected by leaders and, “that’s simply too much too ignore” (Goleman 2000, 82). Military competitors in times of peace and war is the enemy. Economic conditions during World War II strained most people all around the world. Given two of the three influences remained stable for all military leaders, Nimitz’s prioritized strategic and operational campaigns over economics. Therefore, in Nimitz’s case, climate would account for more than a third in the military environment and his leadership style would have a greater impact than it would in business. Although a greater than fifty year gap exists between Nimitz and Goleman’s leadership model, the model is applicable for two reasons: (1) human nature has not changed very much over the course of history and (2) like the business environment that is constantly changing so is the military (Goleman 2000, 90). Leadership is not an exact science, but it does not have to remain a mystery either (Goleman 2000, 90).

The following method to compare Goleman’s model to Nimitz’s leadership ability uses a quantitative and qualitative approach. An overall match exists if Goleman’s description of four or more of the climate factors given for each leadership style matches Nimitz’s leadership effect on his organization’s climate factors. The evaluation criteria mentioned above accounts for overlap or areas of ambiguity in the employment of leadership styles. The criteria of using four of six climate factors accounts for a greater than fifty percent chance that Goleman’s model does match Nimitz’s style. However,
this criterion also allows room, less than fifty percent, for the possibility, that Nimitz’s style might overlap with one or more of Goleman’s styles. The author examined Nimitz’s entire military career, focusing on his leadership style, searching for vignettes that illustrate possible elements of Goleman’s model. The vignettes chosen display the most characteristics, based on Goleman’s climate factor description of each leadership style, of a single Goleman leadership style for analysis.
CHAPTER 4
ANALYSIS

This thesis examines Goleman’s leadership model compared to a known historical military leader. Again, in this study Nimitz’s leadership traits are the control while the civilian leadership model is the variable. As a brief review, the six leadership styles of the Goleman model are coercive, authoritative, affiliative, democratic, pacesetting and coaching. Comparing biographical vignettes show whether Nimitz demonstrated the same leadership traits in his professional life that Goleman describes in his leadership model and if Nimitz moved freely between styles depending on the circumstances. The first step is essential to answering the primary research question: how well does Goleman’s leadership model compare throughout the military career of a historic military leader such as Nimitz? Adhering to the chapter 3 descriptions established for each style of leadership, the author will also answer the secondary questions. The purpose of the analysis is not to fit the vignettes from Nimitz’s professional life neatly into Goleman’s model. If the examples found do not meet the description of the climate factors outlined by Goleman of each leadership style, an explanation accompanies the deviation. Finally, the end of the chapter gives a summary of the analysis.

Coercive

Goleman’s coercive leadership style is one that “demands immediate compliance” (Goleman 2000, 82). While the overall impact of the coercive style is negative, there are times when it is useful; Goleman recommends caution when exercising this style. Addressing the positive aspects first, in business, for example, it is best to use this style
when a looming hostile takeover or turnaround is imminent (Goleman 2000, 83). When a
natural disaster or a physically damaging event, such as a fire, takes place, coercive
leadership is useful to regain control of subordinates and to prevent the situation from
going out of control (Goleman 2000, 83). For any given positive use of the coercive
style, larger negative side effects are: its effect on the subordinate’s flexibility and on an
organization’s rewards system (Goleman 2000, 82). Flexibility is compromised because
the worker’s sense of responsibility wanes considerably shortly after being subjected to
top-down decision making from a superior (Goleman 2000, 82). Workers “feel little
accountability for their performance” because any ideas or help they may be able to offer
will knowingly be rejected (Goleman 2000, 82). The second most negative aspect to this
style of leadership is the lack of motivation resulting from no positive feedback for work
completed (Goleman 2000, 82). Many times subordinates are “motivated by more than
money” (Goleman 2000, 82); highly competent people are often motivated by individual
pride for job satisfaction. Using coercive leadership too long after correcting a chaotic,
stressful situation, the coercive leader will find his employees are less likely to see how
their roles fit into the overarching mission leaving them feeling alienated (Goleman 2000,
82).

Nimitz demonstrated coercive leadership only on a few recorded occasions. One
such instance concerns the relief of Vice Adm. Robert Ghormley, the Commander of the
South Pacific (COMSOPAC). When Nimitz visited the little south Pacific island of
Nouméa on September 29, 1942, he found a chaotic harbor.

There were eighty cargo vessels tied up, all desperately needed for Operation
Torch, the invasion of North Africa. The ships had been improperly loaded—for
example, with guns in one ship and ammunition in another—but could not be
unloaded because the port lacked the necessary piers, cranes, barges, trucks, and workers. (Puryear 2005, 11)

Nimitz’s evaluation of the situation in Nouméa and of Vice Adm. Ghormley’s reaction to several urgent incoming messages requiring Ghormley’s guidance deeply concerned him (Puryear 2005, 11). One reaction occurred during a meeting between Nimitz and Ghormley when the latter stated out loud, “My God, what are we going to do about this?” (Puryear 2005, 11). Nimitz’s growing lack of confidence in Ghormley to properly handle the situation prompted him to look into the matter more closely.

For Nimitz, the situation approached the point of a crisis, if not already a crisis. While the Pacific theater fight had been ongoing for the past nine months, the fight on the other side of the world in the Mediterranean area had not yet begun. Operation Torch started the North African campaign and was the stepping stone for the later operations on the European continent. The supplies stuck in the chaos of Nouméa were essential for Operation Torch. Neither Nimitz nor Adm. King in Washington could afford to let these supplies languish in the throes of Ghormley’s inefficient management.

Nimitz, with the advice from his senior flag officers and the approval of his superior, Adm. King, decided it was best to relieve Ghormley as COMSOPAC and sent a dispatch to Ghormley with the order (Puryear 2005, 12). “It could not have been an easy decision” (Puryear 2005, 12). After all, Nimitz and Ghormley had a friendship that dated back to when they were naval cadets together at the Naval Academy. Afterward, Nimitz wrote to his wife of his fondness for Ghormley and his hope that he had not made a life-long enemy, but the situation was serious enough for the nation’s interests to “transcend private matters” (Puryear 2005, 13).
While the concept of coercive leadership may evoke a mental image of a Hollywood war movie with a lot of shouting and profanity during a stressful, chaotic or crisis situation, the Ghormley situation was actually at a much higher level and created significant stress for both Ghormley and Nimitz. Nimitz had vital supplies backed up in his theater of operations which Ghormley, appearing “haggard with fatigue and anxiety” controlled with mounting frustration (Puryear 2005, 11). This was indeed a crisis and, as such, Nimitz needed “to kick start a turnaround” (Goleman 2000, 82) with a “problem employee” (Puryear 2005, 82). Beginning with flexibility, Nimitz’s observations of Ghormley’s tired appearance, his frustration with operational details, and pessimistic attitude combined with the dispatch from Nimitz relieving him from the COMSOPAC role, indicates Ghormley’s significant reduction in flexibility and adaptiveness. Also, Ghormley’s sense of responsibility was severely diminished, even though Nimitz’s relief dispatch ordered Ghormley “to report to Halsey for the time being, as I believe he will need your thorough knowledge of the situation and your loyal help” (Puryear 2005, 12).

The standards factor of the climate remains neutral in Goleman’s model as it does in this vignette. Both Nimitz and Ghormley understood that supplies needed to move from the Pacific to the Mediterranean theater; they understood that the standard was not met.

The next climate factor of reward was also strongly affected. High-performing workers are motivated by more than just money; they are motivated by the satisfaction of a job well done and the superior’s approval of their performance. Obviously, Ghormley’s performance was not pleasing to Nimitz or King, hence the issuance of relief orders. In Goleman’s discussion of coercive leadership, he combined the final two factors of clarity and commitment stating that employees exposed to coercive leadership end up feeling
alienated and are left wondering “[h]ow does any of this matter” (Goleman 2000)? In the
gHormley and Nimitz scenario, however, these factors are best addressed separately.
While G hormley’s clarity of the situation may have been affected, his commitment to the
cause was not. One can only speculate that after G hormley received his relief orders, his
clarity of the situation, in particular his own reflection upon his ability to command in
that role became muddled. However, as a military officer, especially a high ranking one,
G hormley knew and could see the larger picture of what Nimitz was trying to
accomplish. This is evident in his response to Nimitz’s question when they met in person
after Nimitz issued the relief orders. Nimitz’s stated: “Bob, I had to pick from the whole
Navy the man best fitted to handle that situation. Were you that man?” (Puryear 2005,
13). G hormley’s response: “No. If you put it that way, I guess I wasn’t” (Puryear 2005,
13). For all of G hormley’s faults and the sheer disappointment he must have felt as a
result, he could still see and recognize the larger task at hand for the Navy and the nation.
So while G hormley’s commitment may have diminished slightly, he knew mission
accomplishment was important and would not succumb to emotions and admit defeat as
Goleman suggests an employee might do in the face of coercive leadership. Admitting
defeat may occur in the junior officer or junior enlisted ranks, but flag level officers
would seldom lose their commitment in the face of coercive leadership.

In summary, this vignette is the Nimitz leadership example that most closely
resembles Goleman’s coercive leadership model. This scenario clearly shows how all six
factors of climate were affected surrounding G hormley and how Nimitz needed to use
this type of leadership style to advance not only his agenda but the larger agenda of the
U.S. Navy and the nation. While the overall effect of coercive leadership is negative due
to its nature of immediate compliance, there is a usefulness for it in business and the military. The only difference in the application of the coercive style in business and military environments is how an individual responds to the idea of commitment, especially in the case of higher ranking officers and non-commissioned officers.

**Authoritative**

According to Goleman, the authoritative leadership style is one of the most effective due to its hallmark enthusiasm and vision brought to an organization (Goleman 2000, 83). This style’s impact on clarity is essential because it makes a clear statement to subordinates that their work, their careers and their efforts are important in sustaining a vision for the organization (Goleman 2000, 83). The authoritative leader defines the vision and then provides the required feedback to his workers (Goleman 2000, 84). By stating the ends to which an organization is working a leader allows workers enough leeway to freely innovate and achieve that endstate (Goleman 2000, 84). This type of leadership style “works well in almost any type of business situation” and works best when the leader determines that an organization has no clear vision or mission statement (Goleman 2000, 84). As well-suited as this leadership approach is to most situations, it should not be the only style used. When a leader works with a group of experts, he may appear “pompous or out-of-touch” with the workers (Goleman 2000, 84). In the end, authoritative leaders lead from the front while moving towards the ultimate achievement stated clearly and understood by the workers; confidently and accurately set the standards needed to achieve the organizations goals; and finally, allow the needed space for subordinates to freely use their own judgment and methods to achieve the vision.
Nimitz demonstrated the authoritative style of leadership when he alone introduced a new fleet formation that would change the way battle groups maneuvered at sea. In 1922, this circular formation design arose while Nimitz studied at the Naval War College with Commander Roscoe MacFall on how to tackle the “increasingly unwieldy formations” of larger battle groups (Potter 1976, 138). MacFall figured out that placing “cruisers and destroyers in concentric circles around battleships” allowed concentration of antiaircraft fire, the direction of the “formation could be changed by a simple turn signal,” and it was far easier for ship skippers to deploy into a column formation from the new circular formation rather than from the old rectangular formation (Potter 1976, 138).

After attending War College, Nimitz worked for Adm. Samuel Robinson, Commander in Chief Battle Fleet, the second most senior operational command in the Navy (Potter 1976, 138). While serving with Robinson, Nimitz proposed using the circular formation but he met much resistance from senior captains and from Adm. Robinson (Potter 1976, 139). Nimitz never gave up; he knew Robinson was, “an eager student and a born experimenter” and eventually won his support for the formation (Potter 1976, 139). Soon, Robinson ordered Nimitz and other ship captains to try the formation. The formation worked well in the daytime, but at night it proved more difficult to maintain position within the formation, until the invention of radar (Potter 1976, 140). After mastering the formation, Nimitz took the circular formation a step further and introduced the idea that a single aircraft carrier should be placed at the center of the circular formation rather than alone, by itself, outside of the formation (Potter 1976, 141). This change allowed the carrier to turn into the wind as needed to launch and recover aircraft while still having the protection of the surrounding vessels in the form of antiaircraft fire,
antisubmarine depth charges, and if an aviator were to land in the water, a nearby vessel could quickly pick him up (Potter 1976, 141). The credit of combining naval aviation with the rest of the fleet belongs to Nimitz, but this idea fell into disuse due to either bureaucratic inertia or unrecognized merit after the Navy assigned him and Robinson to shore duty (Potter 1976, 141). It was not until after the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor that Nimitz reintroduced the carrier-centric circular formation, thus replacing the battleship with the aircraft carrier as the new capital ship of the U.S. Navy. By the end of World War II, many navies incorporated this formation and later it became standard practice for North Atlantic Treaty Organization naval forces and remains in use today (Potter 1976, 141-142).

Nimitz’s implementation of carrier-centric formations addresses all six organization climate factors. Even though Nimitz did not personally invent the formation, as a visionary, he recognized the improvement in the ability to control the formations and saw it as the new standard to handle ever increasing and complex threats coming from above, on, or below the sea’s surface. From 1922 until October 1925, Nimitz, with Robinson’s support, introduced the circular formation through multiple exercises and battle problems and tried to show its clear value. Nimitz’s authoritative leadership address apparently did not register well in the factor of clarity; he failed to impress upon the fleet how the use of formation would help further the Navy as an organization. Only after the Japanese raided Pearl Harbor did the fleet realize it had to rely on the carrier-centric circular formation. Even though some naval airmen felt that Nimitz rushed the fleet and the carrier together too soon, to the detriment to naval aviation, some naval aviators took positive notice (Potter 1976, 141). One such aviator,
Lieutenant Commander Forrest Sherman exercised flexibility by advocating the use of these carrier-centric circular task-force formations. Sherman’s commitment to the new tactic was not lost on the powerful Nimitz; it is no surprise that later during World War II, Sherman attained flag rank and worked for Nimitz as one of his subordinate commanders. After the Japanese attacks on Pearl Harbor, with only the carriers remaining unscathed, Nimitz emphasized that carriers using the carrier-centric circular formation, was the United States’ only formidable offensive weapon in the Pacific. He laid the responsibility to use this new visionary tactic in the hands of his trusted subordinate commanders. Finally, Nimitz constantly offered feedback during the 1922 through 1925 exercises in efforts to share his vision for the new formation and the way ahead as a form of reward.

Aside from not clearly sharing the importance of the new formation, which, in Nimitz’s defense, was extremely difficult to do before Pearl Harbor, his leadership in this vignette did positively impact the five other climate factors associated with the authoritative style. Although, Battle Group reformation is one of Nimitz’s most lasting contributions to the Navy, he did not often use the authoritative style that spurred the change. He did use the style when he introduced the tactic and again when working with senior fleet commanders for the three years following its introduction. Even though it fell out of use after he went on shore duty, he again used the style when effective use and protection of the carriers were America’s only hope in the Pacific. It was his decision to strike back offensively against Japan using his visionary tactic of carrier-centric task-force formations and he did it with the support of his subordinate commanders.
Affiliative

This particular type of leadership style concerns the people in an organization; “its proponents value individuals and their emotions more than tasks and goals” (Goleman 2000, 84). The defining characteristic of the affiliative leader is his ability to keep workers “happy and create harmony among them” (Goleman 2000, 84). The by-product of this effort is shared ideas and inspiration among the workers which increases flexibility, innovation, and the desire to take calculated risks (Goleman 2000, 84). For the purposes of recognizing and rewarding subordinates, the affiliative leader will provide a lot of positive individual feedback to bring about the organization’s cohesiveness, translating into an environment conducive to building relationships (Goleman 2000, 84). The affiliative leader displays emotions freely and openly with those whom he leads or works (Goleman 2000, 84). Like the authoritative style, the affiliative style is suitable as an all-around style, but it is particularly effective “when trying to build team harmony, increase morale, improve communication, or repair broken trust” (Goleman 2000, 84). This style, too, has drawbacks. For one, mediocrity can develop when a leader gives his subordinates too much positive praise for doing the minimum required of them (Goleman 2000, 84). Another drawback, a constant flow of solely positive feedback fails to give a worker the required constructive criticism he needs to continually improve (Goleman 2000, 84). Thus, the leader ultimately relies on the worker to self-develop and possibly leaves the less motivated employees directionless (Goleman 2000, 85). Interestingly, this style of leadership is used in “close conjunction with the authoritative style” (Goleman 2000, 85), but the main characteristic for this type
of leadership is putting people first to create harmony in an organization and develop organizational loyalty.

Nimitz learned about the affiliative style of leadership very early in his career as a naval cadet at the U.S. Naval Academy. One day, Nimitz violated a rule by purchasing beer when he noticed that a man dressed in civilian clothes was observing him (Puryear 2005, 234). The following Monday, that man, now in uniform, was Lieutenant Commander Levi Bertolette, his instructor in class; Nimitz thought he would be put on report and his short naval career would be over (Puryear 2005, 234). “Bertolette either did not recognize him or chose to ignore it, but whatever the case, Nimitz learned a lesson about sensitivity and consideration for others” (Puryear 2005, 234). This stayed with Nimitz for the rest of his life. Nimitz said of the incident, “[i]t taught me to look with lenient and tolerant eyes on first offenders when in later years they appeared before me as a commanding officer holding mast” (Puryear 2005, 234). This incident taught Nimitz leniency for not only those unfortunate sailors facing him during captain’s mast, but also for those developing new skills. Case in point, Ensign Odale Waters, under Nimitz’s command aboard the USS Augusta was conning the ship to its anchorage site when the young officer did not recognize the need to reduce the ship’s speed (Potter 1976, 156).

As a result he had to back the ship full power and lay out 90 fathoms of chain before he got her stopped, then had to heave back to 60 fathoms. Captain Nimitz remained silent until the ship was secure. Then he said, “Waters, you know what you did wrong, don’t you?” “Yes, sir, I certainly do,” replied Waters. “I came in too fast.” “That’s fine,” said Nimitz, and that was the end of that. (Potter 1976, 156)

These lessons learned or attributes displayed by Nimitz would have the widest impact later on in his career.
In particular, one vignette from Nimitz’s life, taking place just weeks after the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, captures the essence of Goleman’s affiliative leadership style. While enroute from Washington, D.C. to Hawaii, to assume command of CINCPAC after his old friend Adm. Husband Kimmel’s unfortunate relief, the U.S. Navy staff gave Nimitz a report on the attack. Nimitz found the report “shocking, but it tended to confirm his growing conviction that [Frank] Knox [then Secretary of the Navy] was wrong in blaming Kimmel and the other comander’s in Hawaii” (Potter 1976, 13). Upon arriving in Hawaii, Nimitz did not look down upon the leaders in charge of the Pacific Fleet forces. His mindset, and more importantly, the deep understanding of the circumstances under which Kimmel, his staff and the other commanders in Hawaii were working, allowed Nimitz to display great compassion for these men. Upon seeing Kimmel for the first time in Pearl Harbor, Nimitz shook his hand and said “My friend, it could have happened to any of us” (Driskill 1983, 137).

Nimitz’s compassion for his fellow shipmate did not stop there. All those who worked for Kimmel suspected they were next to be relieved (Driskill 1983, 138). Nimitz knew he had to reaffirm quickly the worth of all those officers, Sailors, Soliders and Airmen who felt dejected after such a terrible attack. These personnel and their emotions, the two most important aspects of the affiliative style, were valuable to him and were critical to the Pacific Fleet’s expedient recovery. In order to begin immediately rebuilding the morale, trust, and harmony among those beneath him he called for a conference of Kimmel’s, now his, and other senior command staff officers.

Nimitz promptly dropped a bombshell, but not the sort the assembled officers were expecting. He said that he had complete and unlimited confidence in every one of them and that he did not blame them for what had happened at Pearl
Harbor. Moreover, he continued, as former Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, he knew that it was because of their competence that they had been sent to the Pacific Fleet. Now he wanted them to stay on with him to provide continuity through their familiarity with their duties. If there were any who wanted to leave he would listen to them individually, discuss their futures, and do what he could to get them the assignments they wanted. “But,” he concluded, “certain key members of the staff I insist I want to keep.” Somehow, in that simple short speech, Admiral Nimitz lifted an incubus off the spirits at Pearl Harbor. (Potter 1976, 21)

The shocked staff did not foresee this type of reaction from Nimitz. In a few brief words, he endeared himself to them, the U.S. Navy and the nation’s cause. However, Nimitz did not give this speech simply to motivate the staff he just inherited from Kimmel. Worth noting is that he trusted the staff’s abilities prior to assigning them to the Pacific Fleet while he was the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation (today called the Bureau of Personnel). Nimitz could have ordered anybody from the entire U.S. Navy to work for him on his staff. He did not do that because he believed the commanders and staff officers were victims of circumstance. In an interview for an A&E Biography episode on his father, Chester Nimitz, Jr. recalls his father told him prior to the attacks on Pearl Harbor “it is my guess that the Japanese are going to attack us in a surprise attack” (A&E Biography 1996). His son’s recall continued, “there will be a revolution in the country against all those in command at sea and they will be replaced by people in positions of prominence ashore and I want to be ashore and not at sea when that happens” (A&E Biography 1996). Nimitz instinctively knew the Japanese would attack Pearl Harbor. He drew upon his education at the Naval War College where he participated in exercises labeling the Japanese as enemy; his discussions with senior naval leaders, and his observation of steady Japanese conquests throughtout the Pacific formed his hypothesis. Regardless of how he came to that realization, Nimitz was considerably understanding of
Adm. Kimmel and his staff’s feelings and emotions when the attack did happen. The staff saw the potential threat of relief from duty by Nimitz as removed completely and they were, therefore, humbled, grateful, and highly-motivated to work for their new commander.

Examining the six factors of climate in relation to Nimitz’s example of affiliative leadership, the rewards factor is the greatest and most positively affected factor. Even though Pearl Harbor was a devastating attack on American soil, Nimitz still rewarded the staff’s hard work up to that point by retaining all of them. Nimitz’s act of compassion not only helped foster harmony and rebuilt morale, but it sent a message that he still believed in all of them, but for Nimitz it gained him their loyalty (Goleman 2000, 84). Loyalty can be synonymous with commitment; therefore, Nimitz’s speech also earned the staff’s commitment another factor of climate in the workplace. Responsibility for one’s actions grew under Nimitz’s command especially after the speech because no one wanted to let down Nimitz after he relayed his confidence in them. For Goleman, standards and clarity can quickly become negative factors if a leader relies too much on the affiliative style (Goleman 2000, 85). Nimitz instinctively does not rely on the affiliative model for long. For example, in the climate factor of standards, Nimitz believed a naval officer should always maintain his good performance, holding special contempt for those who were sloppy. For such performance violators, Nimitz “could fix the culprit with steely grey eyes and make even the strongest of men wince with his measured words” (Potter 1966, 38). Those who worked alongside Nimitz also agreed that he “quickly displayed a remarkable aptitude for choosing the officers best qualified for particular duties and commands” (Lewis 1945, 407). Goleman cautions that standards will suffer because of
constant positive feedback with little to no constructive criticism (Goleman 2000, 38).
Nimitz’s style never allowed for this to happen. Had Nimitz been aware of Goleman’s style, he would have realized that his style benefitted from the combined use of more than one of Goleman’s leadership styles to counteract any drawbacks.

Additionally, Goleman suggests leaders who use the affiliative style lack clarity, but this was not the case for Nimitz. Rear Adm. William Drake gave a firsthand testament to such clarity shortly after Nimitz arrived in Pearl Harbor on Christmas morning 1941.

As to the fleet staff, he said, there were going to be no changes. “I know most of you here, and I have complete confidence in your ability and your judgment. We’ve taken a whale of a wallop, but I have no doubt of the ultimate outcome.” Admiral Nimitz in the first few weeks of his command made every effort to convince his staff and his force commanders that an offensive strategy was the only way to win in the Pacific, despite our huge shortage of weapons and the vast distances to the enemy’s strongholds. (Puryear 2005, 234)

His subordinate commanders and staff officers knew his vision for victory in the Pacific theater dispelling Goleman’s suggestion that affiliative leaders are typically unclear.

Finally, flexibility is enhanced by the affiliative leader and Nimitz truly empowered his people to do just that. His subordinates shared ideas and inspiration, increasing the trust and the innovation amongst each other (Goleman 2000, 84). Almost a direct reflection of the confidence Nimitz instilled in his staff came when Commander Edwin Layton, the fleet intelligence officer, and Lieutenant Commander Joseph Rochefort, officer in charge of the Fourteenth Naval District’s Combat Intelligence Unit, devised a plan to confirm if the Japanese were targeting Midway Island (Driskill 1983, 155). The U.S. Navy had broken the Japanese naval code, but Nimitz and other commanders involved wanted convincing evidence of Japanese Adm. Isoroku Yamamoto’s target which Layton and
Rochefort speculated were the letters “AF” in the deciphered enemy messages. With limited assets and trying to execute an offensive plan against the Japanese, Nimitz and his commanders could not take chances as to where the enemy might strike next; they needed certainty.

Layton suggested to Admiral Nimitz that he order Midway to send out a fake radio message stating that their distillation plant had broken down, a serious matter since the atoll had no other source of fresh water. Nimitz agreed, and directions were sent by way of the cable. Midway made the report in the clear; two days later Hypo decrypted a Japanese intercept reporting that AF had a shortage of fresh water. (Potter 1976, 79)

This illustrates the capability, ingenuity and flexibility of Nimitz’s staff. In return for this flexibility, the staff produced the results that Nimitz and his commanders needed to execute their plans.

In summary, Nimitz used the affiliative style when it mattered the most to his staff to bolster their morale and increase their self-confidence. According to Goleman this powerful style of leadership can heal and turnaround a struggling organization, but if over-used subordinates may become visionless and could make medicroity the standard. Nimitz’s own nature, that of a considerate, tolerant, understanding man sensitive to needs of those around him, helped him avoid these dangers (Puryear 2005, 234). Nimitz discovered these attributes early in his career when he was still a naval cadet at the Naval Academy and examples of his leniency can be found throughout Nimitz’s career. He displayed great amounts of sensitivity, calm, and understanding to all situations for those trying to learn a new skill. Nimitz’s incredible sense of consideration endeared him to his closest confidants but it was his intellect and his ability to draw his own conclusions and opinions that allowed him to employ the affiliative style of leadership at precisely the right time when his subordinates needed it the most.
Democratic

The democratic style of leadership emphasizes a leader’s ability to achieve a consensus on a decision collectively (Goleman 2000, 85). The leader listens to subordinates’ ideas and concerns, and encourages them to voice their opinions (Goleman 2000, 85). Like the authoritative and affiliative styles of leadership, the democratic style increases flexibility and responsibility among the organization’s members (Goleman 2000, 85). When people have a say in how an organization is run, they feel responsible for setting the standard and they tend to be very realistic about their own performance (Goleman 2000, 85). Some of the drawbacks associated with this style include the monotony of endless meetings in efforts to reach a consensus and if leaders using this style procrastinate on critical decisions, the workers can sense this and are apt to feel leaderless (Goleman 2000, 85). Also, the absolute wrong time to exercise democratic leadership is when an organization has reached a crisis or when there is an overall lack of competency among the subordinates (Goleman 2000, 85). The ideal time to use the democratic style is when a leader is lost for ideas on how to handle a situation or when a fresh idea is needed to solve the same reoccurring problem (Goleman 2000, 85). In summary, the democratic style focuses on building a consensus within a group or an organization to generate ideas or to reach a collective decision.

Though rarely used by Nimitz, history provides three examples of when he displayed this democratic leadership style. In the fall of 1943, prior to the attack of the Gilbert Islands, planning for the Marshall Islands invasion was already underway (Buell 1987, 198). Preliminary planning called for three simultaneous attacks on the islands of Maloelap and Wotje, the two atolls closest to Pearl Harbor, and an attack on Kwajalein,
the center atoll of the Marshall archipelago where the Japanese located their headquarters (Buell 1987, 198). However, this preliminary plan would change after the devastating toll paid by U.S. Marines in the battle for Tarawa Island in the Gilberts (Driskill 1983, 191). Gen. Holland Smith, the Fifth Amphibiuous Corps commander, “recommended that the Marshalls plan be reconsidered, contending that not enough troops and support were available to capture three major bases at the same time” (Potter, 1960, 331). Adm. Raymond Spruance, commander of the U.S. Fifth Fleet, and Adm. Kelly Turner, commander of the Fifth Amphibious Force, agreed with him (Buell 1987, 231). Instead, the three commanders proposed a two-step operation. They wanted to capture Maloelap and Wotje first, reconstitute forces, and then assault Kwajalein (Buell 1987, 231). Surprisingly, Nimitz offered a counterplan of bypassing Maloelap and Wotje and attacking the Kwajalein atoll first.

Nimitz’s reasoning orginated from ideas presented in a paper by Adm. Turner titled “Lessons Learned at Tarawa” dated November 30, 1943 (Potter 1976, 262). After reading the paper, Nimitz had pillboxes and other fortification built on a Hawaiian practice range to the same specifications outlined in the paper. Once built, Nimitz’s men subjected these fortifications to naval surface fire and aircraft bombardment and found after testing they were hardly damaged, if at all (Potter 1976, 262). Also, once the U.S. Navy released the Tarawa casuality reports to the press, Nimitz suffered sharp criticism from grieving relatives and the public (Potter 1976, 264). Even though the U.S. Navy learned valuable lessons about amphibious operations at Tarawa, Nimitz could not afford another battle with more costly casualities. Nimitz’s staff and Spruance, Turner, and Smith were all cautious after Tarawa but for a slightly different reason: they did not have
the troops and support needed for a simultaneous three island campaign (Buell 1987, 231). Finally, Nimitz’s “decision was confirmed by new radio intelligence showing that the Japanese were strengthening their outer islands at the expense of Kwajalein” (Potter 1976, 265). Spruance, Turner and Smith tried to convince Nimitz that bypassing heavily fortified islands to the east of Kwajalein would allow the enemy to attack U.S. supply lines from Pearl Harbor with impunity. The idea first to attack Kwajalein came from consultation with Rear Admirals Charles McMorris, Forrest Sherman, and those aircraft carrier commanders and their respective air wing commanders. This larger majority of junior flag officers’ and captains’ plan ran counter to the orginal plan of their boss, Adm. Spruance (Potter 1976, 265). These aircraft carrier commanders assured Nimitz that U.S. naval air power could prevent enemy air or naval surface power stationed at Maloelap and Wotje from interfering with U.S. supply lines from Pearl Harbor (Potter 1976, 265).

On December 14, 1943, Nimitz called a final meeting regarding the Marshall Islands invasion plan (Buell 1987, 232). Again, Spruance, Turner, and Smith stated they each wanted to attack the outer islands first (Buell 1987, 232). Quietly Nimitz said, “Well, gentlemen, our next objective will be Kwajalein” (Potter 1976, 265).

When the meeting was adjourned, Turner and Spruance stayed behind to argue some more. Turner insisted to Nimitz that the decision to go straight in to Kwajalein was dangerous and reckless. He argued and argued. He raised his voice. Spruance asserted that Kelly was right.

When Ray and Kelly had exhausted their arguments, Nimitz said calmly, “This is it. If you don’t want to do it, the Department will find someone else to do it. Do you want to do it or not?”

Kelly Turner frowned for a moment, then relaxed his knitted brows and smiled: “Sure I want to do it.” (Potter 1976, 265)
History shows that Nimitz was correct. The invasion was vastly successful with limited casualties on both sides due to hard lessons learned at Tarawa, air and sea supremacy, and bad Japanese tactics (Buell 1987, 247). Also, the island defenses were relatively light in comparison to Tarawa (Buell 1987, 247). It was a tremendous victory for Nimitz and the Allies.

After the Gilbert campaign and the battle for Tarawa, Nimitz knew that the simultaneous three-island campaign was not feasible and looked to his staff and commanders for solutions. Nimitz relied on their sense of flexibility to generate new ideas and new solutions for the upcoming operation in the Marshall Islands. Spruance, Turner, and Smith generated their new idea of a two-step approach to securing the Marshall Islands. Though this is just one example of Nimitz conferring with his subordinate commanders, throughout his career, he often did so looking for alternative solutions to problems and imbuing his followers with responsibility for often times it was their ideas he would use. The fact that Nimitz listened to his junior subordinates ideas, and sometimes used them, was critical to Nimitz earning his officers’ commitment even if, in the end, it was not their course of action he went with. However, as demonstrated in the Kwajalein example, Nimitz elected to bypass Spruance’s, Turner’s, and Smith’s plan and use his junior flag officers’ recommendations. Nimitz trusted in his junior flag officers ability to keep Japanese air power on the surrounding atolls “pounded down” (Potter 1976, 265). His subordinates felt they could freely communicate any idea to Nimitz, discuss it with him and no matter how he decided, they would execute properly those orders because, at the very least, their opinions were heard and they felt they had a part in the direction of the organization. This is the key element in Goleman’s
democratic style of leadership: allowing people to voice their own opinions and participate in the growth or progress of an organization. Also, Nimitz’s commanders had a say in what the measure of success would be for the Marshall Islands invasion; they realistically knew they could not support a three-island campaign and were not afraid to voice that concern rather than blindly follow the original plan. While, the democratic approach to leadership has its positives, the one main drawback is the possibility of endless meetings to discuss an issue in search of a perfect solution. Like the example above, Nimitz mitigates the potential drawback by making the final decision after getting input from everyone, and by decisively giving his order. Altogether, Nimitz used the democratic style thoughtfully by discussing and weighing the opinions, facts, assumptions, positions, and ideas of his subordinates appropriately to arrive at the best course of action. In the next example, Nimitz supports his subordinates’ consensus in the face of Adm. King, Chief of Naval Operations.

Nimitz was not a “yes man” and he certainly did not value this attitude in his subordinates (Puryear 2005, 88). “One of the most important decisions made during the Pacific campaign was whether to invade Formosa or the Phillipines” (Puryear 2005, 89). Adm. Spruance refused to be a yes man and go along with Adm. King’s plan of attacking Formosa; instead, he surprised Nimitz by stating, “I would prefer taking Iwo Jima and Okinawa” (Puryear 2005, 89). Nimitz, knowing King’s original order, organized a meeting on Spruance’s behalf to discuss the attacks of Iwo Jima and Okinawa (Puryear 2005, 89). At the meeting in San Francisco, California included King; Nimitz; Spruance; Gen. Millard Harmon, commander of the Army Air Forces in the Central Pacific; and Gen. Simon Buckner, commander of the Tenth Army (Puryear 2005, 90). All were in
agreement with Spruance except for King and when the meeting came to order Nimitz and Adm. Sherman did most of the talking in supporting Spruance’s plan (Puryear 2005, 90). Towards the end of the meeting Nimitz called upon Gen. Harmon and Gen. Buckner who gave their opinions opposing Formosa (Puryear 2005, 90). Buckner’s argument finally brought King around to their side; he stated it would require at least nine divisions to conquer Formosa and estimated civilian casualties could be as high as fifty thousand persons (Puryear 2005, 91). King forwarded his recomendation to the Joint Chiefs for the invasion of Iwo Jima and Okinawa not Formosa.

Once again, Nimitz’s leadership closely resembled that of Goleman’s democratic style. Spruance felt free to express his view that Iwo Jima and Okinawa were part of a larger plan to use air power to reach many of the main cities on the Japanese mainland (Puryear 2005, 89). Obviously, Spruance felt responsible for the direction of his forces, but he felt an even greater responsibility to voice his idea and to establish the standard with which to further the campaign: gain advantagous territory (Iwo Jima and Okinawa) with as few casualities as possible in an effort to prepare for a follow-on mainland Japan invasion. The reward for Spruance and his staff’s hard work on this plan was approval from King himself and finally its execution.

In summary, Goleman’s model aligns with Nimitz’s style except for the factor of clarity. No one that worked with or for Nimitz was ever lost as to the goals he established for the U.S. Navy in the Pacific campaign. The first example demonstrates Nimitz’s ability to receive his subordinates recommendations and then make a command decision, even though he bypassed his immediate subordinate commanders recommendation and instead used his more junior flag officers’ plan. In the second
example, Nimitz supported his subordinates recommendations inspite of what his boss, Adm. King, wanted. Either way, Nimitz welcomed the flexibility and the many ideas that comes with it from those that worked for him. Nimitz’s calm resolve created an atmosphere around his presence in which subordinates could share their ideas and feel content they helped their commander succeed in the collective mission. As stated earlier, receiving input from subordinates breeds commitment because they, without fear of reprisal, feel comfortable delivering ideas to their superior who is genuinely interested. For the subordinate, the reward lies in the superior’s ability to consider his subordinate’s idea or opinion. Finally, Nimitz did not have too many meetings to decide a course of action. He took all the knowledge he gained on a subject, then made a decision, and everyone followed. Nimitz as a successful military leader found great use of the democratic approach at times when critical decisions had to be made.

**Pacesetting**

Goleman suggests using pacesetting the least often and is the second of only two styles of leadership, coercive being the first, that overall impacts the organization’s climate negatively (Goleman 2000, 86). Initially, the style seems appropriate for many organizations; the leader sets high standards and ultimately leads by adhering to the same (Goleman 2000, 86). The leader demands that execution of tasks and work move faster and is quick to point out the faults in his workers when they do not meet those high standards (Goleman 2000, 86). Realistically, they are only a few occasions where this type of leadership is appropriate. In general, pacesetting destroys an organization’s climate because the workers feel overwhelmed, their guidelines are not stated clearly, and they begin to “second-guess what the leader wants” (Goleman 2000, 86). The pacesetter
gives no feedback to the employees and if their work is not progressing as the leader envisions, he tends to overtake the situation himself to make corrections (Goleman 2000, 86). Then, if the leader abruptly leaves for whatever reason, the subordinates are left feeling leaderless and confused as to their sense of purpose or belonging with in the organization (Goleman 2000, 86). However, they are times when this style of leadership is appropriate, such as when working with a group of highly-skilled, motivated professionals who need very little direction to execute their jobs (Goleman 2000, 86). Talented teams comprised of highly skilled, self-motivated people who can work together effectively with only the leader’s established standards accept this style of leadership gracefully and will routinely accomplish those tasks on time or ahead of schedule (Goleman 2000, 86).

Of all six of Goleman’s leadership styles, pacesetting is the one style that is least reflected in Nimitz’s style. The closest example found in his career is really just an interesting footnote of the Pacific campaign. During the Battle of the Coral Sea, the USS Yorktown, part of Adm. Fletcher’s Task Force Seventeen, sustained serious damage, but still able to maneuver, returned to Pearl Harbor (Warner 1976, 194). Towards the end of the Battle of the Coral Sea, Nimitz’s intelligence staff was decoding messages indicating a possible offensive push from the Japanese into the central Pacific, namely in the region of Hawaii again or Midway Island. At a meeting on May 24, 1942, Commander Rochefort, advised Nimitz and his staff that the Japanese were planning to attack the Aleutian islands on June 3 and Midway on June 4 (Potter 1976, 77). Commander Layton went further and provided Nimitz a report detailing the direction, distance, and time the Japanese fleet might attack Midway: from the northwest along a bearing of 325 degrees
from Midway; the Japanese fleet would be sighted at approximately 175 nautical miles; and their striking aircraft would arrive over head Midway at five o’clock in the morning to commence their attacks on June 4 (Driskill 1983, 159-161). “This was a good deal more precision than Nimitz had counted on, but he knew that Layton would not have gone into such detail unless he had very good support for each fact and figure that he reported” (Potter 1976, 87). Three days later, on May 27, Fletcher’s Task Force Seventeen with a damaged USS Yorktown arrived in Pearl Harbor.

With a major battle looming on the horizon with the bulk of the Japanese fleet, including four big deck carriers, Nimitz’s fleet needed every single carrier possible for the battle. With the loss of the Lexington and a damaged Yorktown, this left Nimitz with just the Enterprise and Hornet to counter the Japanese. Nimitz needed more carriers, but the USS Saratoga, just repaired, was enroute to San Diego to form a new task force; the USS Wasp inbound for the Pacific was still on the far side of the Atlantic; and the British Admiralty refused to loan a carrier to Nimitz out of fear that the Japanese might drive into their area of operations in the Indian Ocean (Potter 1976, 80). This left the Americans with only two and a half carriers. When the Yorktown arrived she was ordered straight into dry dock and before the water was completely drained, Nimitz donned long boots and “led an inspection party in a slooshing examination of the Yorktown’s hull” (Potter 1976, 85). An early estimate to repair the ship back to a new condition required more than a few weeks, but the repair technicians had only two days (Gailey 1995, 155). The ships propulsion plants and aircraft elevators worked and the wooden flight deck already had been repaired; only the hull needed to be patched up “enough to keep fish out for a few more days” (Potter 1976, 85).
Speaking quietly but emphatically, Nimitz told the men in his inspection party, “We must have this ship back in three days.” The men glanced at one another. Then, after a pause, Lieutenant Commander Herbert J. Pfingstad, the hull-repair expert, answered for all, “Yes, sir!” Within an hour welding equipment, steel plates, and other materials were being assembled at the dock and the repairs were begun which would continue around the clock until the job was done. (Potter 1976, 85)

On May 30, 1942, the Yorktown was underway to rendezvous with the Enterprise and Hornet 350 miles northeast of Midway for the upcoming battle.

For Goleman, the pacesetting leader is “obsessive about doing things better and faster” (Goleman 2000, 86). “He quickly pinpoints poor performers and demands more from them” (Goleman 2000, 86). “If they don’t rise to the occasion, he replaces them with people who can” (Goleman 2000, 86). Upon reading these first few lines of Goleman’s description of the pacesetter’s style, it appears that this falls in line with Nimitz’s leadership, but Goleman continues. He states that subordinates working for a pacesetter “feel overwhelmed by the pacesetter’s demands for excellence, and their morale drops” (Goleman 2000, 86). Also, the pacesetter may have clear guidelines in his head, but fails to articulate them properly to his followers; people begin doubting what exactly the leader wants and feel they can not be trusted to take their own initiative (Goleman 2000, 86). Finally, the pacesetter gives no feedback, positive or negative, and often takes over projects feeling he or she can do a better job (Goleman 2000, 86). In the Yorktown vignette above, Nimitz only set the fast pace to repair the damaged carrier quickly because of an impending battle, not because he used the pacesetting style. This vignette illustrates that despite the fast paced nature of events, they do not necessarily reflect the pacesetting leadership style.
The only decent example of pacesetting in Nimitz’s career refers back to the Marshall Islands a few months before the invasion took place. Adm. Baldy Pownall took two carrier groups to raid and photograph Wotje and Kwajalein Atolls in the Marshalls shortly after the Gilbert operation (Potter 1976, 264). The plan was to launch two raids and bring the pictures back for future planning of the invasion, but after the first raid, the pictures that Pownall saw indicated there were a large number of Japanese long-range bombers untouched by the raids on Kwajalein (Potter 1976, 266). Pownall canceled the second raid and decided to run “away from the Marshalls--as if ships could outrun planes” (Potter 1976, 266). That evening, in the moonlight, the Japanese enemy bombers caught up with the fleeing fleet and one plane put a torpedo into the stern of the new carrier *Lexington*, which limped to Pearl Harbor (Potter 1976, 266). Pownall’s subordinates, including Captain Clark the commanding officer of the *Yorktown*, prepared a white paper criticizing Pownall for his lack of aggressiveness in these raids and forwarded it onto Nimitz. Nimitz reviewed their concerns, consulted with his senior carrier advisors and also spoke with Pownall’s superior, Adm. Spruance. Then, after a conference meeting, Nimitz asked Pownall, Spruance, Towers, McMorris, Sherman and Vice Adm. John H. Newton, Deputy CINCPAC, to stay behind” (Potter 1976, 266).

In a kindly but serious voice, he told Pownall that he was being criticized by his subordinates as being too cautious and, without revealing its source, he referred to the white paper that Clark had had a hand in preparing. Nimitz said he was disappointed with the results of the Kwajalein raid. In operating with carriers, he pointed out, one often had to take calculated risks in order to inflict maximum damage on the enemy. Pownall was so obviously distressed and dumbfounded that Nimitz softened his criticism by mentioning that Spruance had praised his performance in Operation Galvanic. Pownall attempted to defend his hasty departure from Kwajalein but without much success. (Potter 1976, 267)
As in the coercive style, once again Nimitz demands that his people perform their duties well. Interestingly, Nimitz’s followers were demanding the same level of competency from their subordinates and their superiors in the same fashion as Nimitz demanded. If someone failed to meet that competency, Nimitz’s officers were not afraid to voice their concerns to him.

The emphasis of the pacesetting setting style is doing things better and faster; inherent in that endeavor is the element of time. Whether in business or the military, time is always a factor. Arguably, Nimitz pushed the shipyard to repair the Yorktown quickly because time was a critical factor. Any officer at the time knew how important these new capital ships of the line were to the prosecution of the war in the Pacific. If Nimitz was pushing people to do their best it was not just to make them a better officer, but because it put constant pressure against the enemy. The quicker Nimitz’s forces could cause the enemy to capitulate, the quicker the war would be over and thus more lives spared on both sides. With this in mind, Nimitz still trusted in his staff officers and subordinate commanders. In situations, like Pownall’s, Nimitz did not take over anyone’s command himself. Nimitz realized he had to rectify the problem, but only after timely consideration and consultation with those involved. In all cases, he offered feedback, both positive and negative. In Pownall’s case, Nimitz offered both negative and positive feedback. There were even times when Washington denied Nimitz the ability to award medals or promote his subordinate commanders as a form of positive feedback. Nimitz wanted to reward Rear Adm. Fletcher for his Coral Sea actions with a promotion to Vice Admiral and award him the Distinguished Service Medal (Potter 1976, 77). King, less
impressed, thought Fletcher could have used his destroyers better to prosecute night
attacks against the enemy (Potter 1976, 77).

Nimitz pointed out that Fletcher had had barely enough destroyers for screening
duty, that, lacking radar, they had little chance of finding fast carriers in the
darkness, that the difficulty of fueling at night did not permit high-speed night
operations, and that, had the destroyers done distant night cruising, they would
not have been able to get back to their own force by dawn. (Potter 1976, 77)

King still denied Nimitz’s request (Potter 1976, 77). However, this proves Nimitz
had established standards and worked diligently to provide both negative and positive
feedback because it was important for his subordinates to know how their were
performing to either improve or sustain their performance.

Reflecting back on Nimitz’s leadership style, only when time was a major
contributing factor, as the *Yorktown* case points illustrates, did he literally set the pace to
complete the task at hand, but he did not use the pacesetting style as described by
Goleman. The Pownall vignette is Nimitz’s closest example to pacesetting style in his
career. Nimitz’s leadership style does not fit Goleman’s description of pacesetting
because he once again offset its major drawbacks with other leadership attributes. In the
Pownall example, the only climate factor similar to both Goleman and Nimitz is Nimitz’s
high standard of maintaining constant pressure against the enemy. All other Goleman
climate factors do not match Nimitz. Goleman details that the best environment to use
pacesetting is when a leader surrounds himself with highly-skilled and motivated
professionals then a leader may be successful. Nimitz surrounded himself with the
nation’s best naval officers of the time and his style never mirrored that of Goleman’s
pacesetting style either in characteristic description or climate factors.
Coaching

In all of Goleman’s six leadership styles, he states that coaching is the one least often used in the business world; however, its impact on an organization’s climate is remarkably positive (Goleman 2000, 87). The leader employing this style helps the worker identify his or her own strengths and weaknesses (Goleman 2000, 87). The leader and the worker make agreements as to what the role and responsibilities of the worker should be. In return, the superior provides constant feedback (Goleman 2000, 87). The emphasis has more to do with a subordinate’s personal development rather than with his direct relation to any business related action (Goleman 2000, 87). The discipline lies in establishing an initial assessment of the employee and then allowing him the flexibility to experiment with his efforts (Goleman 2000, 87). The leader’s contact back to the employee is a constant flow of feedback so that learning can take place almost immediately (Goleman 2000, 87). To the subordinate receiving this guidance, the leader shows faith in his abilities and demands the best output that the subordinate can muster (Goleman 2000, 87). In order for this to work, the employee must be willing to accept the help from the leader; otherwise, the coaching efforts are futile (Goleman 2000, 87). Finally, this style only makes sense if the leader himself is competent enough to assume the role of a mentor. Overall, the coaching style of leadership lends itself well in developing a business’s long range production by investing in its people and giving them the space needed to develop. Results may not appear as fast as with other forms of leadership, but in the long run employers will get those sought-after results or establish a guarantee into the foreseeable future for continued success.
Before Nimitz had fully developed his own coaching leadership style, he was exposed to it and learned how to become a mentor himself. On August 10, 1917, Lieutenant Commander Nimitz worked on the USS *Maumee* as the engineering aide to then Captain Samuel S. Robinson, Commander, Sumarine Force, Atlantic Fleet (Puryear 2005, 195).

The new billet proved in some respects the most fortunate of Nimitz’s career, for in Robinson he acquired a sage adviser, an influential patron, and a lifelong friend. Through the older man’s influence, Nimitz shifted the direction of his career away from engineering, which could prove a dead end, and set his feet on the rungs of the ladder to high command. From this point on, he was concerned less with machinery than with people, less with construction and maintenance than with organization, and thus he found his true vocation. (Potter 1976, 129-130)

Robinson, now an admiral and recently selected as the commander-in-chief of the Battle Fleet in 1923, called on Nimitz to be his aide, assistant chief of staff, and tactical officer. Nimitz remained at his side when Robinson took command as Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet the most senior operational command in the U.S. Navy (Puryear 2005, 195-6). Nimitz took his discussions with Robinson about the future of the U.S. Navy; the lessons learned while he worked for Robinson; and his observations of Robinson, who had risen to the highest ranks of the naval service, and used them to further develop his own leadership style and mentorship skills. In 1926, Nimitz got his first taste of true mentorship when the Bureau of Navigation picked him to start up the Naval Reserve Officers’ Training Corps program at the University of California, Berkeley (Driskill 1983, 96). Here, working with young college students, Nimitz got valuable experience at handling personnel which “was becoming one of his chief professional interests, and here was for him a new and challenging means of dealing with people” (Potter 1976, 143). This tour of duty “imbued in him a deep and abiding interest in education” (Potter 1976,
This interest would serve him well into his next command and further on in his career.

No better tangible example of Goleman’s coaching leadership style exists within Nimitz’s career than his time as the commanding officer of the USS Augusta beginning in 1933 (Driskill 1983, 99). At the time, Captain Nimitz transformed the ship into the one of the best in the fleet due mostly to the crew that Nimitz continuously honed allowing them to achieve their best. Towards that end, Nimitz never hesitated to replace a crew member “who did not measure up” to the task; he demanded excellence (Potter 1976, 155). Delegating responsibility was a huge part of Nimitz’s development program for junior officers; “he could give them responsibilities their immediate seniors were exercising and thus push the latter into higher responsibilities until, at last, he himself could confine his activities to those broad areas of command, administration, and ceremony that only he, as captain, could carry out” (Potter 1976, 156). In the learning environment, Nimitz’s patience and calm attitude were welcomed attributes for the junior officer who made a considerable mistake; he would calmly suggest how he would have handled the situation and then move on (Potter 1976, 156). Recall the previous vignette used under the affiliative style of Ensign Waters approaching an anchorage point with too much speed; that example is directly applicable to this coaching style of leadership as well. In addition, the Augusta won the gunnery trophy for 1934 because Nimitz insisted that his ship be tactically proficient not only during the day but also at night (Potter 1976, 157). Tremendous pride builds among a crew when their unit wins competitions such as this and that extends to activities outside of the command. Nimitz believed in physical fitness not only for himself, but also for his crew and ensured that his crew organized into
teams for various sports (Potter 1976, 157). His crew even beat the British at their own game of rugby and would also win the Iron Man in athletics for cruisers (Potter 1976, 157). At this point in Nimitz’s career, his form of mentorship or coaching style was hands on or direct and it was effective. Nimitz looked fondly upon his time aboard the Augusta. The experience under Robinson’s mentorship, followed by the Navy’s new program for recruitment, the Naval Reserve Officers’ Training Corps program at the University of California, where as an instructor he first developed his own teaching or coaching style that would later be perfected onboard the Augusta.

Examining Goleman’s six climate factors we can see Nimitz style closely follows description of how a coaching leader operates. The coaching leader is one who identifies their worker’s strengths and weaknesses and provides “plentiful instruction and feedback” (Goleman 2000, 87). In addition, coaching leaders excel at delegation; they challenge their employees to work beyond their comfort zone and take on more responsibility; more than they think they can handle (Goleman 2000, 87). This was Nimitz’s modus operandi. Not only in the tangible examples above prior to World War II, but also when he was CINCPAC during the war. “He reserved his energies for those activities of decision-making and ceremonial and social obligations that were appropriate only to the commander in chief” (Potter 1976, 228). As Goleman relates in his article, the “impact on climate and performance are markedly positive” from a leader who employs the coaching style and that was certainly true of Nimitz’s effect on the midshipmen he instructed at the University of California, but also upon the crew of the Augusta. In both cases, the focus was largely on personal development in an environment that was amenable to experimentation due to Nimitz’s command climate
(Goleman 2000, 87). Obviously, the style only works if people are open to receiving such guidance; Nimitz quickly replaced those who were not with others willing to learn and grow (Goleman 2000, 87). This style also adequately expands the subordinates sense of responsibility and clarity because, as in the case of those that worked under Nimitz’s tutelage, they could see the reasons why they must perform. Those who know the responsibilities and standards of performance of those above or below them are more apt to respond better in a crisis situation. When the subordinates of a command see that their leader cares to teach them, that is where the commitment from subordinates returns for the leader. The payoff for the subordinate is recognition, personal achievement, and advancement. Goleman argues the coaching style of leadership does not produce immediate results and therefore is the least likely used style (Goleman 2000, 87).

However, in the military environment it is an appropriate style for many leaders to use in training personnel because of the very nature of the military’s business. Almost all facets of the military have a training curriculum, training pipeline, school, camp, or other medium for qualifications leading to advancement at all levels; there are times when some military training is less formal than others, but it still remains and is crucial to maintaining a high level of readiness. Those less formal times come under the guise of observing a superior’s conduct and character. The lessons or mentorship that are left unsaid are just as important as the tangible ones. Like a flight instructor teaching a new naval aviator how to land aboard an aircraft carrier for the first time.

Spruance’s observation of Nimitz is an example of the unsaid type of mentorship during the thirteen months when he served as Nimitz’s chief of staff (Puryear 2005, 566). In a letter to his wife he wrote of Nimitz: “an inspiration . . . and I hope watching him
has taught me more patience and tolerance. He is one of the finest and human characters I have ever met, yet has all the energy, courage, determination, and optimism that is needed in a great military leader” (Puryear 2005, 566). Whether Nimitz knew it or not, and he probably did, people above him, next to him, and below him scrutinized him all the time. Nimitz worked hard to maintain his composure and often instilled confidence in those within his presence. An example of this is found at CINCPAC staff prior to the Battle of Midway.

Staff officers continued to brood over the CinCPac plotting board and its steadily advancing colored lines. Their growing tension spread into the lower echelons where junior officers and enlisted men could only guess what was impending. To them, the appearance of the commander in chief, moving about, head erect, apparently calm and collected, was a source of reassurance. A young naval reservist and public relations officer on the CinCPac staff, Lieutenant (j.g.) James Bassett, long afterward recalled the comforting presence of what for him, as for others, had become a father figure. “This,” he remarked, “was a very unflappable man.” (Potter 1976, 90)

Nimitz was a pillar of strength to support the weight of the situation at the time, but more importantly he led by example, teaching, demonstrating in an unspoken fashion how future naval leaders should handle future high pressure situations and his lessons were not lost on those who observed him.

There is one final example taken from Douglas Southall Freeman’s perspective who knew of both Nimitz and Spruance. Nimitz himself was a fan of his work titled *Lee’s Lieutenants*. In fact, Freeman’s work proved to be very popular among many other World War II leaders like Adm. King, Generals Marshall, Eisenhower, MacArthur, and Bradley (Smith 1993, 9). Freeman even had the opportunity to meet Nimitz after the war (Smith 1993, 9). In the following excerpt from a lecture Freeman gave on the May 13,
1948, the reader can see through Freeman’s description the pinnacle of mentorship at the highest levels of rank within the military.

Command means cooperation. Read the story of two attacks on Fort Fisher and see how in the one instance the lack of cooperation on the part of a political, stupid general denied the Federals the victory which was won easily in the renewed attack because there was cooperation. And it means cooperation with your next in command. How many beautiful stories come to mind as I admonish you to think of the man next below you not as someone who is going to outstrip you but as someone to whom you have an obligation, someone to whom in the true spirit of comradeship you may extend the greatest cooperation. I’ve seen it. I’ve seen it at Pearl Harbor. I’ve seen Nimitz when, knowing that his days as commander in chief of the Pacific were ended and that ahead of him was the high office of chief of naval operations, he called to Pearl Harbor the man of all men whom he trusted, the man all men whom he wanted to be his successor; and there on hill looking down on the scene of that great tragedy of December 1941, there on the hill at his headquarters, Nimitz took him in. I was at the house next door, and there wasn’t a morning when they did not sit down together at the mess table and walk out together; and never was there a more beautiful example of comradeship and mutual confidence, those essentials of command, than was displayed there. As I looked to them, I said to myself, “Ah, the comradeship of David and Jonathan, which is the most beautiful of all the brotherly stories of Holy Writ, is replaced in the relationship of Nimitz and Spruance. (Smith 1993, 201)

In summary, Nimitz’s style greatly indicates a concurrence with Goleman’s coaching style. Whether tangible or intangible, said or unsaid, Nimitz led by example, delegated responsibility to foster the growth of his subordinates, and demanded excellence while allowing room to learn. He drew upon his own experiences under Robinson’s guidance, developed his own coaching style as an instructor at the University of California, and then continued to use it throughout the remainder of his career in the U.S. Navy.

This chapter expressed in detail how Goleman’s leadership model compared to that of Nimitz’s leadership style. To summarize, all but one of Goleman’s leadership models differed from Nimitz’s style; the one that matched Nimitz in all six climate
factors was the coaching style. Admittedly, much of this comparison is qualitative in nature with some quantitative analysis, but leadership assessment, in the author’s opinion, is not a scientific process. The author gives an explanation of each leadership style and how it relates to each of the six climate factors. Next, comparing each leadership style to a vignette from Nimitz’s life using Goleman’s definitions for the six climate factors presents the reader with an objective argument for whether or not the style of leadership matches that of Nimitz’s. Finally, the author provides quantifiable data for each style by establishing that if four out of the six climate factors matched for a particular style then it matches Nimitz’s style. This chapter provides the analysis between the Goleman’s leadership model and the Nimitz’s own leadership style. Next, chapter 5 examines what the analysis means for those who work in leadership positions in the military and recommendations for the future.
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The conclusions and recommendations sections essentially divide this chapter in two major parts. The conclusions section answers the primary and secondary research questions based on the collected data and analysis. Next, the recommendations section offers ideas for further leadership application, study and doctrinal advancement. Finally, a closing summary at the end readdresses the significance of this thesis.

Conclusions

Before answering the primary research question, the requirement to first answer the secondary questions is necessary. The first set of secondary research questions asked what are Goleman’s six leadership styles and how do they relate to the six climate factors. Chapter 3 answers this question in detail, but as a review, there are six different leadership styles emphasizing certain climate factors more than others do. Worth noting, the leadership styles, with an overall positive climate, affect the rewards factor the greatest. In contrast, the two leadership styles with an overall negative climate, differ in which climate factors they affect the most. The coercive style affects responsibility the most while pacesetting affects rewards the most. Thus, the strongest affected climate factor is rewards for five out of the six leadership styles. In practice, subordinates typically look for some kind of recognition or validation for their work. Rewards come in many forms like feedback, monetary compensation, or promotions to name a few. The key conclusion about Goleman’s leadership model is that if a leader remains cognizant of the rewards factor, his subordinates will respond better to him.
Table 1 below illustrates how Goleman’s leadership model compares to Nimitz’s leadership style. The letter “X” indicates a match between Goleman’s model and Nimitz’s style; if no match exists, the box is blank. At the bottom of the chart, in bold text, indicates an overall match between Goleman and Nimitz. An overall match exists if the Goleman description of four or more climate factors given for each individual leadership style matches Nimitz’s leadership effect on his organization’s climate factors.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Coercive</th>
<th>Authoritative</th>
<th>Affiliative</th>
<th>Democratic</th>
<th>Pacesetting</th>
<th>Coaching</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Flexibility</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsibility</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standards</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rewards</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clarity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commitment</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Overall Match?</strong></td>
<td><strong>Yes</strong></td>
<td><strong>Yes</strong></td>
<td><strong>Yes</strong></td>
<td><strong>Yes</strong></td>
<td><strong>No</strong></td>
<td><strong>Yes</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The next set of secondary research questions asks which of Goleman’s styles correlate with those used by Nimitz’s, which styles of leadership seem to appear most often in Nimitz’s exercise of leadership, and which styles were not present or appeared least frequently. Chapter 4 provided detailed examples from Nimitz’s life for comparison with Goleman’s model. Five of the six styles generally apply to Nimitz’s actions; one did not. The five are the authoritative (or visionary), affiliative, democratic, coaching and coercive (or commanding) styles. Of these five, the coaching style matched Nimitz in all six climate factors while the other styles matched Nimitz’s behavior in at least four of the six climate factors. Conversely, the pacesetting style only matched Nimitz’s behavior in two of the six climate factors and, therefore, did not align with Goleman’s model.
Although Nimitz’s style did not resemble Goleman’s pacesetting style according to Goleman’s description of the climate factors, the differences between the Nimitz and Goleman’s model where positive differences. In fact, Nimitz’s style offsets most of the drawbacks in each of Goleman’s styles, which clearly shows that Nimitz’s style overlaps the best characteristics from two or more Goleman styles. This overlapping method amplifies a primary style by using the positive effects of other styles to counter the drawbacks of the primary style. For example, Goleman’s affiliative leader does not emphasize standards and clarity suffers. Nimitz positively offsets these drawbacks by possibly using the benefits of the authoritative style to clearly define standards and provide an organizational vision for his staff and command. Even the pacesetting style, which this thesis argues Nimitz did not use, Nimitz offsets with possibly using Goleman’s coaching and authoritative styles. In this example, Nimitz used the positive attributes of the coaching style to provide Pownall the flexibility to exercise his own tactics and gave him sole responsibility to execute the raids. Nimitz then used the positive attributes of the authoritative style to provide Pownall clearly defined standards and immediate feedback of his performance. Worth noting, Goleman described each leadership style separately, but he stated that all effective leaders use more than one style at a time (Goleman 2000, 87). Nimitz, too, combined them as Goleman suggested to counter the negative drawbacks of any one particular style. Goleman asserts that an effective leader embodies at least four of the six outlined leadership styles (Goleman 2000, 87). By frequently using five of Goleman’s six styles, Nimitz moved freely from one style to another, or combined them, as dictated by the situation. Therefore, by Goleman’s definition, Nimitz was an effective leader.
The third set of secondary research questions asked if there are any aspects or styles of Nimitz’s leadership not addressed using Goleman’s leadership model. Only one aspect of Nimitz’s leadership style is not addressed by Goleman’s model. Author Edgar Puryear describes this aspect as a “sixth sense,” dediacting an entire chapter of *American Admiralship* to this essential quality for military decision-makers and leaders (Puryear 2005, 51). Using Adm. Nimitz and other leaders from all branches of the U.S. military as examples, Puryear conveys that a military leader must routinely seek ways to interact with his subordinates, ensure his subordinates see him, and that he maintains a feel for his troops (Puryear 2005, 83). This feel comes from the leader delegating tactical responsibility, not interfering with subordinate commanders, and maintaining a close personal approach with those under his command (Puryear 2005, 83). Interaction initiated by commanders promotes approachability by subordinates. Nimitz used formal and informal techniques to achieve this interaction: inspecting fortifications, awarding medals, or by offering a Sailor a ride in his vehicle. Every day he held a thirty-minute group interview with various officers passing through Pearl Harbor to maintain the feel of the climate within his command. No matter by what means he engaged the men, Nimitz always asked them what he could do for them or what they might need (Puryear 2005, 83). Consequently, “some of the best help and advice I’ve had comes from junior officers and enlisted men,” said Nimitz (Puryear 2005, 83).

As far as leadership styles, Goleman’s model did cover all those leadership styles used by Nimitz. However, this third set of secondary question asks if there are any aspects, which contributed to Nimitz’s success, not covered by Goleman’s model. Aspects are traits or conditions critical to lead; in Goleman’s model, these are the
leadership capabilities or competencies for emotional intelligence (Goleman, Boyatzis and McKee, 253-255). While aspects are important in understanding Goleman’s six leadership styles, neither the capabilities nor the competencies clearly encompass the importance of Puryear’s “sixth sense.” Nimitz worked diligently to cultivate and maintain his own personal sixth sense.

The final secondary question asks whether civilian leadership models warrant further investigation as templates from which the military can build. In short, the answer is yes. The influx of contract civilians into the battlespace, the close interagency relationships, and joint experiences the military continues to face supports closer integration among many different agencies. Yet each service has its own interpretation of leadership doctrine focused on itself. As a service member grows in a joint, interagency environment, exposure to other leadership models could prove beneficial to his or her personal leadership style and his or her joint interactions. This examination of Goleman’s civilian leadership model demonstrates not only that it could work in military environment, but it also suggests that a large overlap exists between successful leadership in the civilian sector and the military sector. In other words, the principles of good leadership in either environment are essentially the same.

The answers to the secondary questions lead to the primary research question: how well does Goleman’s model compare with a historic military leader like Nimitz. Goleman’s leadership styles, although not an exact match, closely resembled how Nimitz led. Five out of six Goleman styles appear in Nimitz’s exercise of leadership. Debates have arisen in leadership classes at joint professional military education colleges as to the validity of Goleman’s model used within the confines of the military environment.
Nearly one hundred years prior to Goleman’s release of *Primal Leadership*, in which he outlines his six leadership styles, Nimitz began what would be almost forty years of development and implementation of his own career leadership style. The length of time between the use of these styles and Goleman’s naming of the techniques is significant for two reasons. First, the obvious requirement to lead people and fulfill their thirst for reward comes from their interaction with leaders and remains constant regardless of the type of business. Second, the interesting fact of how to lead people has not changed. It does not matter in what type of career field a leader uses Goleman’s styles, that leader just needs to know how to use the applicable style, or combination of styles, for the situation at hand. Goleman’s presentation of the styles makes it easier for a leader to read and study leadership and easily adapt it for any profession, maybe even the military.

**Recommendations**

After researching, analyzing and deriving conclusions from the gathered information, three recommendations for further study emerge. First, military leaders should continually develop their own personal leadership methods, which include incorporation of civilian leadership models. Second, application of Goleman’s model to other military leaders or the application of another model to Nimitz’s leadership may validate styles already in use in the military. Finally, a contrast between civilian leadership models and current military leadership doctrine may provide areas for doctrinal improvement. The first recommendation appeals to the military leader reading this thesis to keep an open mind and honestly try to find value in any civilian leadership model. The second and third recommendations help advance the study of military leadership in an increasingly interagency and joint environment. Together, these three
recommendations will help today’s military leader excel in an increasingly complex environment.

Service members are proud of their service. Military leaders enjoy embracing their service’s teachings, culture and history. In the past, a military leader’s career path emphasized service-specific leadership approaches. However, today’s career officers serve in joint billets where flexibility and incorporation of other views of leadership doctrine and practices may be necessary. Military leaders should continue to study leadership, review other service doctrine on the subject, and search civilian leadership styles like Goleman’s model especially when working in the joint, interagency arena. At a minimum, a military student of leadership should keep an open mind when exposed to different leadership styles. By reviewing, discussing, and studying leadership, all leaders can improve upon their service culture’s original leadership instruction and further develop their own leadership style for the expanding joint, interagency environment.

The second recommendation has two parts to it. The application of Goleman’s model to Nimitz in this thesis answers adequately the primary research question: how well does Goleman’s model compare with a historic military leader like Nimitz. This study accomplished this by applying each Goleman style separately to a different Nimitz vignette. Clearly, Nimitz, the effective leader he was, did not use one style at a time. He combined them as Goleman suggested as all great, effective leaders do to counter the negative drawbacks of any one particular style. Therefore, a study into the affects of combining Goleman’s styles using Nimitz vignettes would provide an intricate analysis of Goleman’s leadership model and of Nimitz’s leadership abilities. A method for further investigation is to compare each of the six vignettes with all six of Goleman’s styles.
This more expansive examination could provide detailed attributes about Nimitz’s style, which may be useful for leadership doctrinal development. The second part compares another civilian leadership model to that of Nimitz’s style or Goleman’s model to another historic leader can provide more support to the argument that leadership models are not military or civilian specific.

Finally, all military doctrine at some point undergoes a reviewing process to enhance its efficiency based on the near future. The U.S. Navy has such an example of service leadership doctrine that could use refinement. Recall from chapter 1, *Naval Doctrinal Publication Six (NDP-6)* only mentions leadership as it pertains to authority, responsibility, accountability and the factors of uncertainty and time. While *NDP-6* adequately focuses on naval C2, it also barely approaches the topic of leadership for the U.S. Navy compared to the Army’s *FM 6-22* or the Air Force’s *AFDD1-1*. As of this thesis’s publishing date, the U.S. Navy did not have a doctrinal manual that focused solely on leadership. *The Division Officer’s Guide*, published by the Naval Institute Press, is not naval doctrine, but it does focus new naval officers at the tactical level. The book dedicates a chapter to the subject of leadership, but even it admits “there [are] seemingly . . . few specific rules and guidelines concerning your role as a Navy leader” (Stavridis 1995, 13). Later, it suggests that a young naval officer should “consider the ideas presented here, listen and observe those who have been on board the ship or in the squadron longer than you--whether fellow officer, chief, or petty officer--and gradually develop your own personal approach to leadership” (Stavridis 1995, 13). This advice is great for fledgling naval officers, but the book offers little guidance for the operational or strategic levels at which most joint officers work. While the U.S. Navy’s strongest
attribute for the joint environment is its extreme flexibility to new situations, it also causes constant change and explains why the U.S. Navy has far less doctrine than the Army and Air Force. In the service, military members consider doctrine a service-wide publication addressing a particular issue. Due to the U.S. Navy’s flexibility, it prefers to operate mostly on unit to fleet level standard operating procedures; tactics, techniques and procedures, standing orders, and other frequently updated documents. The U.S. naval officer is very proud of this tradition. However, if there was one area in the U.S. Navy that could benefit from a doctrinal manual it is leadership. In the past, the U.S. Navy has even gone to the civilian sector in search for leadership models. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, U.S. naval leadership encouraged its leaders to study Stephen R. Covey’s *The 7 Habits of Highly Effective People*. For the U.S. Navy’s entire rich, traditional heritage, for it not to have a doctrinal manual on leadership addressing all three levels of warfare is surprising. As one of the United States’s oldest organizations that thrives on leadership, further investigation into a leadership-centric doctrine manual for the U.S. Navy would prove immensely beneficial to career naval officers. At the very least, the U.S. Navy needs to review and update *NDP-6* to meet the changing needs of today’s operational force.

**Summary**

A leader who can adapt to the changing times of the organization and use the right tools at just the right time is an effective leader. Although this statement is broad, for leadership purposes the important message lies within. The message is the importance of leadership flexibility and the importance of continually assessing one’s organization. The assessing part comes from an understanding of emotional intelligence as Goleman
described or a sixth sense as Puryear expressed. If assessing an organization is important, then the styles of leadership needed to lead an organization effectively are the required tools to get the job done. The ability to use the correct leadership style selectively and apply it in a timely fashion makes for great leaders like Nimitz. His methods of leadership developed through study, observation, and experience stand up to scrutiny by modern leadership teachers such as Goleman. Military leaders should not disregard civilian formed leadership models for that reason alone. They should feel free to experiment or employ all, or part, of selected civilian leadership models. How a leader leads his people to get results is important. Whether it is easier for a leader to use Goleman’s model over another does not matter. What matters the most is the leader should constantly study various models, experiment with them, and at least have more than three styles to choose from when leading people.

The United States asks much from its warriors. The country does not tolerate mediocrity in performance or attitude. It expects its service members to master all their skill-sets. The warrior must know how to employ his weapon system in the conventional fight, but must also know how to operate in a humanitarian crisis or disaster relief scenario. If the nation demands this breadth of full-spectrum operations from its service members, then it certainly requires flexibility in the military’s leadership, which is the leader’s weapon system. The military leader must always study leadership from all corners of life and develop his leadership model comprised of various styles. When the leader uses them, he gains practical experience, continues to refine his model, and builds effectiveness. The process of learning, studying and applying leadership never ends. The
more the process takes place the more effective the leader becomes ensuring the United States has the finest, most professionally led military in the world.
REFERENCE LIST


**Periodical Articles**


**Government Documents**


**Other Sources**

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

Combined Arms Research Library
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
250 Gibbon Ave.
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2314

Defense Technical Information Center/OCA
825 John J. Kingman Rd., Suite 944
Fort Belvoir, VA 22060-6218

Mr. Eric F. McMillin
Department of Joint, Interagency, and Multinational Operations
USACGSC
100 Stimson Ave.
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027

MAJ Jennifer L. Crawford
Department of Command and Leadership
USACGSC
100 Stimson Ave.
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027

Dr. John M. Persyn
Faculty Development
USACGSC
100 Stimson Ave.
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027