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THESIS

ENHANCING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF AD HOC UNITS: A REVISED TRAINING MODEL

by

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June 2009

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13. **ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)**

To meet the personnel shortfalls resulting from the Global War on Terror, the United States Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command developed an integrated approach to strength management – use of the ad hoc unit. This came at a cost however, generally in terms of lost efficiency and decreased capabilities to conduct tactical and operational Civil Affairs Operations. This thesis encapsulates fifteen months studying eight United States Army Civil Affairs units who deployed to Iraq as part of OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM, Rotation 06 – 08. The research objective was to determine if the units were effective and what, if any, changes are needed to improve the training program prior to deployment. Analysis revealed cyclical patterns in teams' task progress, in their attention to outsiders and their mission, and in members' interpersonal work relations. Although different teams handled these issues differently, and moved through the cycles at different speeds, they showed striking convergence in the way they alternated between periods of continuity and periods of change. The research indicates there is a better method for preparing ad hoc units for deployment. By creating a collaborative approach to task management and linking social, cultural, and task cohesion, the Army can more effectively execute pre-deployment training plans for ad hoc units.

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ENHANCING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF AD HOC UNITS: A REVISED TRAINING MODEL

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ABSTRACT

To meet the personnel shortfalls resulting from the Global War on Terror, the United States Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command developed an integrated approach to strength management—use of the ad hoc unit. This came at a cost, however, generally in terms of lost efficiency and decreased capabilities to conduct tactical and operational Civil Affairs Operations.

This thesis encapsulates fifteen months studying eight United States Army Civil Affairs units who deployed to Iraq as part of OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM, Rotation 06 – 08. The research objective was to determine if the units were effective and what, if any, changes are needed to improve the training program prior to deployment.

The thesis presents a better method for preparing ad hoc units for deployment, and argues that overall unit effectiveness depends upon leveraging time management throughout training, validation, and deployment. By creating a collaborative approach to task management and linking social, cultural, and task cohesion, the Army can more effectively execute pre-deployment training plans for ad hoc units. The thesis also recommends that the Army adopt both a refined training model that augments the Army Training Management Cycle developed in Army Field Manual 7-0, Training the Force and revise the training management program to focus on integrating fulltime collaborative efforts into the training development and execution cycle.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

BTOE	Baseline Table of Organization and Equipment
CA	Civil Affairs
COL	Colonel
CPA	Coalition Provisional Authority (Iraq)
DOA	U.S. Department of Agriculture FYI changed all "US" to "U.S."
DoD	Department of Defense
DOJ	U.S. Department of Justice
DoS	Department of State
DUIC	Derivative Unit Identification Code
FBCB2	Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below
GWOT	Global War on Terror
HD/LD	High Density / Low Demand
HTT	Human Terrain Teams
JFCOM	Joint Forces Command
JFLCC	Joint Forces Land Component Commander
JSS	Joint Security Station
LTC	Lieutenant Colonel
MCAC	Mobilization Civil Affairs Course
METL	Mission Essential Task List
MTOE	Modified Table or Organization and Equipment
MTP	Mission Training Plan
NCT	National Coordination Team

OTOE	Objective Table of Organization and Equipment
PPG	Personnel Policy Guidance
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
PSYOP	Psychological Operations
RIP	Relief in Place
SO	Special Operations
TDA	Table of Distribution and Allowances
TOA	Transfer of Authority
TOE	Table of Organization and Equipment
TPU	Trained, Proficient, Untrained
UIC	Unit Identification Code
USACAPOC(A)	United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (Airborne)
USAID	United Stated Agency for International Development
USAR	United States Army Reserve
USC	United States Code
USG	United States Government

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Without their knowledge of the battlefield and the roles that Civil Affairs personnel play tactically, operationally, and strategically, I would have had a much more difficult time wrapping my arms around ad hoc units—their pluses and pitfalls. To the men and women assigned to Headquarters, Alpha, Bravo and Charlie Companies of the 414th and 402nd Civil Affairs Battalions, OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM 06 – 08, who spent hundreds of hours letting me interview them, I hope my thesis meets your needs for getting the truth out and making a difference for future rotations. Few will understand the almost insurmountable hurdles your joint units overcame. Composed of Army, Navy, and Air Force, you survived one year in combat and embody everything that is implied in the word "joint."

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I.   INTRODUCTION

Civil Affairs have played an important role in reconstruction in every major U.S. military operation since the Civil War. Today, the primary role of Civil Affairs in the United States Army Reserve is to "to plan, enable, shape, and manage stabilization and reconstruction and the enablement, reestablishment, and support of civil administration at the provincial level."[1] This role has increased dramatically as a result of the Global War on Terror (GWOT). By December 2005, the United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (Airborne), who oversees all Army Reserve Civil Affairs Soldiers, had mobilized and deployed over 98% of its assigned personnel to the GWOT.[2] The result of this extremely high operational deployment rate, coupled with the high demand worldwide for Civil Affairs Soldiers, meant the Department of Defense (DoD) could no longer provide theater commanders with previously trained and experienced Civil Affairs Soldiers. This problem was exacerbated by reserve component mobilization policies that limited the number of times and how often Reserve Soldiers are reused after their first deployments.

As a result, in 2005, the Army developed a novel sourcing strategy to meet its large Civil Affairs manpower needs in Iraq and Afghanistan. Instead of remobilizing experienced Soldiers, the DoD transferred Soldiers, Sailors and Airmen from their current assignments to Civil Affairs units. These personnel, who represented over 75% of the rotational force deployed for OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) Rotation 06-08, were provided basic training in both Army and Civil Affairs doctrine.[3] Once the training was completed and these newly constituted units validated, the units deployed to Iraq beginning in the spring of 2006 for a one-year tour.

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[1] Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Field Manual 3-05.40 (FM 41-10), Civil Affairs Operations*, September 2006, 2-18.

[2] United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (Airborne), weekly deployment briefing, January 4, 2005.

[3] Basic training included an overview of basic rifle marksmanship, Army procedures and regulations, basic Civil Affairs planning and shaping operations, and U.S. Central Command defined requirements (e.g., radio and medical evacuation procedures). Chapter II provides a more detailed breakout of training accomplished by the personnel assigned to the rotation.

The challenge of this new process was two-fold. First, these newly transferred personnel had only four to five weeks to train together as a unit prior to deployment. That left little time for personnel to become acquainted and to begin working in cohesive teams. Second, these units were expected to immediately assume the complex responsibilities of reconstruction operations in Iraq. Failure to adequately transition and gain credibility had the potential to marginalize the CA units with their supported unit commanders.

This thesis will look past the basic defined requirements for what units need to deploy and offer a new methodology to more quickly and efficiently organize training plans and prepare units for deployment. The intent is to streamline the process so that changes in the field will more readily be incorporated into training cycles for future rotations.

A.   THESIS PROBLEM AND SCOPE: CHAPTER SUMMARIES

Chapter I describes how the DoD sourcing decision, mobilization policies and training programs have created a complex problem that is decreasing the effectiveness of units during combat, stabilization and reconstruction activities.

Chapter II analyzes how the Army currently trains, validates and deploys ad hoc and Reserve units. As a result of the current strategic management structure, training of these units meets the minimum requirements for validating units for deployment, but overlooks many of the cultural and leadership details that contribute to cohesive units ready to assume the mission from the unit they are replacing. The first place this shortcoming is manifested occurs during the Relief in Place and Transition of Authority (RIP/TOA). Specifically, as units replace each other in theater, an efficiency gap develops as the outgoing unit hands off its operations to the incoming unit, thus reducing its influence on operations. Likewise, it takes time for incoming units to gain the same situational awareness acquired by their predecessors.

Chapter III looks at the efficiency loss developed during the RIP/TOA process and seeks to quantify how losses translate onto the battlefield. This chapter focuses on team dynamics and their use as an appropriate strategic tool for dealing with the

complexity of wartime training. The overarching goal is to overlay certain business models on strategic development and execution in order to pull lessons learned and expand the boundaries that currently limit collaborative training within the Army structure.

Chapter IV presents an alternative model for training ad hoc units prior to deployment. By achieving a more efficient and focused training plan, built on collaboration and active feedback loops, the goal is to reduce the efficiency losses that occur during RIP/TOA. Over time, the increased efficiency gains achieved through the refined training program should improve the ability of ad hoc units to achieve their mission objectives in the military, interagency and multi-national environment.

Chapter V summarizes the current challenges faced by the military when creating ad hoc units and offers recommendations for refining the training program.

Appendix A provides a case study on the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and presents an alternative methodology for how to prepare and conduct stability, security, transition and reconstruction. Appendix B summarizes the study protocols and presents a detailed summary of the four iterations of interviews and survey sessions conducted as part of this research effort. Appendix C offers a summary list of interviews conducted.

B.   BACKGROUND OF UNITED STATES MILITARY MOBILIZATION POLICY

On 14 September 2001, shortly after the devastating attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld issued the first policy memo on mobilization of military Reserve units to meet the new war on terrorism.[4] This policy laid the groundwork for the mobilization of all Reserve and National Guardsmen in support of the GWOT. The key component of this policy memo was that it defined eligibility to use the Reserves under the guidance of United States Code, Title 10, Section

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[4] "Partial Mobilization (World Trade Center and Pentagon Attacks) and Redelegation of Authority, *Under Title 10, United States Code, Section 123, 123a, 527, 12006, 12302, and 12305*," Secretary of Defense, September 14, 2001.

12302 (10 USC 12302), Partial Mobilization. Mobilization of the Reserves is based on a four level, graduated scale. The four categories are:

- Presidential Select Call-up (e.g., Bosnia and Kosovo prior to 2006),
- Partial Mobilization,
- Full Mobilization, and
- Total Mobilization.

Each level has specific personnel and mobilization duration ceilings, eventually leading to full use of the Reserves for an indefinite period and ultimately including implementation of the military draft.

Partial mobilization stipulates that up to 1,000,000 personnel may be called to active duty for a period not to exceed 24 months. Partial mobilization is also the last level before a civilian draft can be implemented. The challenge of partial mobilization is that 10 USC 12302 does not adequately define what the duration "24 months" means. Specifically, the wording allows the DoD to assume either 1) the duration is 24 months total per service member, with only one mobilization per operation (e.g., GWOT); or 2) the duration cannot exceed 24 months per individual service member per mobilization, but DoD has the authority to remobilize multiple times per operation (e.g., GWOT).

To lessen the impact on individual reservists, Under Secretary of Defense Dr. David Chu issued his first Personnel Policy Guidance [PPG] for the use of the Reserve on 20 September 2001.[5] Two key issues resulted from the initial PPG. First, "no member of the Reserve component called to involuntary active duty…shall serve on active duty in excess of 24 months." Second, "a service member, who has been released from active duty prior to completing 24 months, may again be involuntarily called to active duty as long as the combined periods of service…does not exceed 24 months." As a result of this initial policy and interpretation of 10 USC 12302, the DoD, for all practical purposes, decided to mobilize and deploy all its service members before seeking to involuntarily

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[5] Department of Defense, "*Mobilization/Demobilization Personnel and Pay Policy for Reserve Component Members Ordered to Active Duty in Response to the World Trade Center and Pentagon Attacks*," Under Secretary of Defense, September 20, 2001.

remobilize them. This remained the case until January 2007, when the new Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, changed the policy interpretation.

For the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR), three challenges of the DoD interpretation led to an eventual breakdown of the mobilization process. First, units considered High Demand / Low Density (HD/LD) quickly began to run out of cohesive units to deploy. The DoD defines HD/LD as "key military capacities that are much in demand but short in supply. These force elements consist of major platforms, weapons systems, units, and/or personnel that possess unique mission capabilities and are in continual high demand to support worldwide joint military operations."[6] In the case of Civil Affairs, requests for forces from all the Geographic Combatant Commanders eventually overwhelmed the ability of the Army to meet the sourcing needs using first time, mobilization eligible reservists.

Second, the USAR strained to maintain the assigned strength of its units. Prior to September 11, 2001, USACAPOC(A) maintained an authorized strength of about 5,600. Of these authorized positions, only 78% were continuously filled, and many of these filled positions did not have personnel who were fully qualified to deploy in their assigned job specialty.[7] Third, and most disastrous to unit cohesion, was the process of cross leveling personnel to meet requirements. At USACAPOC(A), the Command assigned certain units as donors and others as recipients. Donor units were stripped of all deployable personnel, and recipient units were filled to authorized strength. While the initial cross leveling satisfied 100% of personnel requirements, this number slowly decreased until 2005, when it was considered sufficient if a deploying unit was only at 80% of its authorized strength.[8]

Simultaneous to the breakdown of mobilization processes, the training process also began to show increasing cracks as Reserve units arrived at their mobilization

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[6] William S. Cohen, *Annual Report to the President and the Congress* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2000), 35.

[7] Personnel Status Report provided by the USACAPOC(A) Personnel Section to the USACAPOC G3 Mobilization Section, December 12, 2001.

[8] United States Forces Command deployment guidance to mobilization station, March 24, 2005.

platforms with little to no unit organization or equipment. As the GWOT expanded and the use of the Reserves and National Guard increased to levels not seen since World War II, the Army realized that the training of personnel defined by the Cold War period was no longer sufficient. Consequently, in 2004, General Peter J. Schoomaker, the Army Chief of Staff, and R.L. Brownlee, the Acting Secretary of the Army, issued new guidance for preparing and waging conflict. A cornerstone of their new guidance was:

> Trained, cohesive staffs are key to combat effectiveness. Today, because our tactical headquarters elements lack the necessary joint interfaces, we have to improvise these when operations begin. That must change. Major tactical headquarters must be capable of conducting Joint Force Land Component Command (JFLCC) operations."[9]

C.   DEPLOYMENT OF NEW BATTLEFIELD ORGANIZATIONS

One of the fundamental changes since the beginning of the GWOT is the movement from a defined organizational structure to a hybrid system that uses traditional units (e.g., Infantry Brigades and Army Divisions) augmented by ad hoc organizations, such as Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and Human Terrain Teams (HTTs). Prior to 2001, the Table of Organization and Equipment defined how the Army was designed and manned. The Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) is a document published by the Department of Defense which prescribes the organization, manning, and equipment of *types* of units from divisional size and down, but also including Corps and Army headquarters.

There are four basic TOEs: (1) the Base Table of Organization and Equipment (BTOE): this is an organizational design document based on current doctrine and available equipment. It shows the basics of a unit's structure and its wartime requirements (both for personnel and equipment). (2) The Objective Table of Organization and Equipment (OTOE): this is an updated form of the BTOE. It is a fully modern document and is up to date with current policies and initiatives. (3) The Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE): this is a document that modifies a Basic TOE (BTOE) in regard to a specific unit and is used when a unit's needs are substantially

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[9] United States Army, *Serving a Nation at War: A Campaign Quality Army with Joint and Expeditionary Capabilities,* Secretary of the Army (Arlington, VA: The Pentagon, October 2004), 11.

different from the BTOE. (4) The Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA): this is a type of temporary TOE that is applicable to a specific mission and is used in an instance when there is no applicable TOE.

While a TOE defines a specific unit type (e.g., Civil Affairs Battalion, Engineer Company, or Tactical Psychological Operations Company), this can still be too broad a designation to deploy. Consequently, the Army classifies units by Unit Identification Code (UIC). This UIC identifies for the Army operations and mobilization planners the specific unit (e.g., the 402nd Civil Affairs Battalion, Charlie Company/844th Engineer Battalion, or 345th Tactical PSYOP Company).

After September 11, 2001, the Army realized that in many cases, the type of unit composition it was looking for did not exist within the defined world of TOEs and UICs. For example, U.S. Central Command did not require the entire 352nd Civil Affairs Command (CACOM) on September 12, 2001, but it did need the 352nd CACOM's Civil Affairs Plans, Programs and Policy Team (CAP3T). The first hybrid units thus became subordinate units, called Derivative UICs (DUIC).

The benefit of the DUIC was this granted Army and DoD complete flexibility to define unit manning, equipment and training requirements. Rank structures were tailorable to missions, equipment could be added or deleted based on mission analysis and, most importantly, Commands such as USACAPOC(A) could select which units would provide the personnel. This had an immediate and positive effect on meeting the sourcing needs of the DoD as the GWOT expanded in late 2001 to early 2002. By the time OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM began in early 2003, the use of DUICs for HD/LD units was a normal procedure.[10]

The DUIC process foreshadowed the challenges that developed when ad hoc units, such as PRTs developed. The challenge with the DUIC and most ad hoc units is that the very flexibility they provide in the areas of manning and equipping the units is also what causes the units to have difficulty training and developing team cohesion. Whereas defined units with a predetermined TOE and UIC know their staffing and

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[10] Daily Briefing slides, USACAPOC G3 Mobilization from November 2001 through March 2003.

equipment, and can develop training plans based on using these to accomplish defined missions, the DUIC and ad hoc units have none of these basic building blocks. First, they may not have a clearly defined mission outside of the basic Army Operations Plan or Order. For instance, the mission may be to Perform Civil-Military Operations. Without training and knowledge of the civil affairs missions, it may be difficult to define the specific subordinate tasks needed (e.g., Provide Humanitarian Relief/Winterization versus Manage Dislocated Civilians).

Second, without a clearly defined mission, developing the manning and equipment lists becomes difficult. In early 2002, for example, the Task Force Horn of Africa requested a Special Operations (SO) Civil Affairs Company as a DUIC. Since these were DUICs and since the doctrine for this type of unit was changing, the actual manning request was based not on mission analysis, but on a six year old graphic from Field Manual 41-10 that described what a "typical" SO Company might look like.[11]

Third, when members of the ad hoc unit or DUIC meet at the Mobilization Station, they are now confronted with having to validate that they are mission ready. The role of the Mobilization Station is to ensure Soldiers are medically, financially, administratively, and individually ready to deploy to combat (e.g., qualified on their assigned weapon or know basic first aid). The Mobilization Station is responsible for ensuring the units are equipped, that the equipment is operational and that the personnel are trained in their missions and on operation of all equipment prior to deployment.

For a normal UIC this task is relatively simple, if not time-consuming. There are historical reference documents and Mission Training Plans (MTP) that define what a unit must accomplish to be certified in its specialty. The DUIC and ad hoc unit does not have these documents or plans and thus the challenge becomes how to work through the labyrinth of requirements dictated by the Mobilization Station so that the DoD can safely state it is deploying a properly manned, equipped and trained unit into combat.

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[11] U.S. Central Command, *Request for Forces to Support Task Force Horn of Africa*, by U.S. CENTCOM (Tampa, FL, April 2002)

D. A NEW PROBLEM EMERGES FOR PREPARING CIVIL AFFAIRS RESERVISTS FOR DEPLOYMENT

Beginning in October 2001, the United States Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC(A)) at Fort Bragg began mobilizing Soldiers under OPERATIONS NOBLE EAGLE and ENDURING FREEDOM. By April 2003, the number of reservists mobilized for those operations and OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM exceeded 2,800 soldiers. By April 2004, this number climbed to over 4,200. Finally, in April 2005, USACAPOC(A) reached a milestone when it crossed the 5,600 mark, effectively mobilizing the entire Reserve command to support the GWOT. From that moment onward cross leveling lost favor as the preferred method to meet unit deployment requirements. Instead, any new requests for Reserve units by the Geographic Combatant Commanders were met by creating ad hoc units, culling first the Command and then the military for anyone capable of meeting the diverse requirements needed in Civil Affairs.

Between 2002 and 2004, USACAPOC(A) met its requirements by transferring Soldiers from other Army Reserve units. When, in April 2005, the personnel deficiency grew so large USACAPOC(A) and the Army could not meet its requirements internally, the Joint Staff sought help from the Navy and Air Force to meet the projected shortfall of over 50% of the total request for OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM Rotation 06-08.[12] As a result, in August 2005, the Joint Staff directed the other services to loan the Army up to 525 personnel to fill out the Civil Affairs units in Iraq and Afghanistan.[13] These new Civil Affairs personnel were assigned to work at all levels of the war, from tactical combat patrols through operational headquarters at the Corps level. And while many of the slots were for functional specialists with little need for unit or even team cohesion, a large percentage of the personnel served in battalion and company headquarters.

Two of these battalions designated to rotate into Iraq in 2005 as part of the OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM 06-08 rotation were the 414th Civil Affairs Battalion

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[12] U.S. Army Special Operations Command, *Personnel and Unit Sourcing Strategy slide deck to the Joint Staff, J3 Special Operations Division,* by U.S. Army Special Operations Command (Fort Bragg, NC; May 2005).

[13] Ibid.

and the 402ⁿᵈ Civil Affairs Battalion. The units had both already deployed to Iraq in 2003 and 2004 and still had a small cadre of Army Civil Affairs Soldiers and leadership; however, now most personnel came from other services. Even at the core leadership level, the unit did not resemble the Army most people know. The Executive, Operations, and Intelligence Officers were Navy Lieutenant Commanders or Commanders, and the administration was staffed by Army Reservists from the Individual Ready Reserve. In both units, only the commander and his Command Sergeant Major were Civil Affairs trained.

As the personnel met for the first time in March 2006 at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, their primary concern was "what uniforms to wear, where was everyone living, and how to create a cohesive fighting force."[14] During the pre-deployment training program, each of these ad hoc units faced enormous administrative and logistics challenges. For example, unit personnel were physically living in barracks spread across over four square miles, and neither the units nor the mobilization station had effective means of transportation or communications for commanders to keep in touch with their personnel.

To summarize: in four years of wartime operations, the Civil Affairs community had developed from a small force of specialists typically working for a maneuver commander into a HD/LD unit so relevant to the fight that the Army no longer had any left to deploy. But this evolution was hardly linear and tremendous gaps in training the units prior to deployment appeared.

E.   NEED FOR THIS STUDY

It is likely the DoD will continue to create and use ad hoc units, especially joint ones. In fact, on March 17, 2005, Charles Abell, the Principal Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, testified to Congress that the DoD has employed innovative joint operations "to spread mission requirements across the force where

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[14] LTC William Mason, interview with author, March 4, 2006, Fort Bragg, NC.

possible in order to meet mission requirements."[15] He noted, for example, that Navy and Air Force members are supplementing Army and Marine ground forces in Iraq in such areas as Civil Affairs and Military Police.

To ensure successful integration of these joint service units (i.e., U.S. Army, Air Force, and Navy) the DoD needs to continue to improve and leverage the divergent skill sets in each Service. Though this study specifically concentrates on the issues with sourcing and deploying Civil Affairs units, the challenges addressed affect any ad hoc organization DoD creates. Ad hoc units are typically organized to meet a specific mission requirement and include personnel from disparate organizations and agencies, disciplines, levels of command, sectors of government, and can even include, non-government actors. Each of the participatory organizations has its own culture and brings to the table very different sets of expectations and approaches. Typical training of many ad hoc teams in the past seven years has focused on mission parameters and leaves the issues of team cohesion and effectiveness to the individual unit leaders.

A key component of this study was a field study conducted on eight Civil Affairs units over 15 months to determine how each approached and managed the function of training as a unit. By comparing the paths that each unit took to prepare for war and then execute operations in a combat zone, this thesis hopes to identify better ways to effectively utilize the limited time available prior to deployment to increase the training efficiency of ad hoc units.

Systems do not build bridges—people do via relationships. Problems primarily arise as a result of occupational cultural clashes, group decision-making dynamics, or jurisdictional disputes between equal partners. These problems may manifest themselves in any one of a number of ways: inability to understand or accomplish the primary missions of the organization, lack of collaborative skills, or as organizational and occupational cultural barriers between defined roles. Because the DoD presently focuses on the physical systems for validating units for deployment, human dynamics have

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[15] Testimony of Charles Abell, Principal Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to the Committee of the Armed Services Subcommittee on Total Force, *The Stress on Military Capability*, March 17, 2005.

largely been pushed to the unit level to deal with. This causes considerable problems for ad hoc units who already have less time available to spend working through their organization issues.

The existing body of literature for team effectiveness of ad hoc teams has primarily focused either on how civilian organizations build cohesion and collaborate or on the military actions of small units with very specific missions (e.g., strategic missile crews) or on prototypical units (e.g., 172nd Stryker Brigade Combat Team). This thesis draws on a number of academic studies on team effectiveness, how to make teams more effective, how to evaluate team effectiveness, and various frameworks for increasing team and group cohesion.[16]

Unfortunately, there is no comparable body of literature that focuses on the creation, training, and validation of larger ad hoc units to perform conventional combat, stabilization, and reconstruction missions in wartime. One of the most recent military studies was a study completed in 2003 by the Army Research Institute on Collective Efficacy in Multinational Teams. The study looked at how the Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia sought to overcome the cultural and leadership challenges of

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[16] Audrey M. Korsgaard, David M. Schweiger, and Harry J. Sapienza, "Building commitment, attachment, and trust in strategic decision-making teams: The role of procedural justice," <u>Academy of Management Journal</u>, 38 (1), 60-84.

Paul M. Nemiroff, Paul M., William, A. Pasmore and David L. Ford, Jr., "The Effects of Two Normative Structural Interventions on Established and Ad Hoc Groups: Implications for Improving Decision-Making Effectiveness," *Decision Sciences*, Vol. 7, 841-855.

Anne Gero, "Conflict Avoidance in Consensual Decision Processes." *Small Group Behavior*, Vol. 16, No. 4 (November 1985), 487-499.

C.C. Snow, S.C. Davison, S.C., S.A. Snell, and D.C. Hambrick, "Use transnational teams to blogalize your company." *Organizational Dynamics* (Spring 1996), pp. 50-67.

Connie Gersick, "Time and Transition in Work Teams: Toward a New Model of Group Development," *Academy of Management* Journal (1988), 9-41.

J. R. Hackman and C.G. Morris, "Group tasks, group interaction process, and group performance effectiveness: A review and proposed integration." In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology,* Vol. 8 (1975).

J.R. Hackman, K.R. Brousseau, and J.A. Weiss, J. A., "The interaction of task design and group performance strategies in determining group effectiveness," *Organizational Behavior and Human Performance*, 16 (1976), 350-365.

J.R. Hackman and R. Wageman, "When and how team leaders matter," *Research in Organizational Behavior*, 26 (2005), 39-76.

multinational units. But even this study noted that "literature is not complete and certainly when we try to understand the development of *collective* efficacy amongst cross-cultural teams, we find a lack of research and theory for measurement, for understanding its development and for understanding its influence on training."[17]

Yet, it is hard to imagine a more significant topic, given the need to cooperate and build consensus in these high stress, competitive environments. It is critical that a portion of the preparation for deployment be devoted to understanding team members' occupational culture, experience, and skill sets. As this thesis will contend the challenges to ad hoc unit effectiveness must be addressed and solved during the pre-deployment training and validation process, or they will surface once the units deploy with detrimental effects.

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[17] Angela I. Karrasch, "Technical Report 1137: Lessons Learned on Collective Efficacy in Multinational Teams," *U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences* (Alexandria, Virginia: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, April 2003), 1.

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II. THE CULTURE OF DEPLOYMENT TRAINING AND ITS CHALLENGES TRAINING MANAGEMENT

When building cohesive units, there are two characteristics of the training process that can be measured. First, there is the social cohesion that develops as team members develop social bonds and networks of friendship, caring, and closeness. Cohesive units generally exhibit high social unity with members liking and feeling emotionally close to one another. Second, there is task cohesion whereby a unit exhibits a shared commitment to reaching objectives. Highly cohesive units are motivated and are able to synthesize their efforts, leveraging individual skill sets to meet the common goals. In 1996, a study by Robert MacCoun on unit effectiveness determined that task cohesion must outweigh strong social cohesion for combat units to be effective. He found that "when social cohesion is too high, deleterious consequences can result, including excessive socializing, groupthink (the failure of a highly cohesive group to engage in effective decision making processes), and insubordination."[18]

The Civil Affairs units' pre-deployment training period lasted 60 days once the units were formed. During this period the units primarily conducted basic Army and deployment training skills. A example list of the core tasks completed during training included: basic administrative processing for pay, medical, dental, and legal; basic rifle shooting and crew served weapons familiarization (i.e., machine guns); cultural overview of the region; basic first aid and combat lifesaver; communications training on FM, HF and satellite radios; urban warfare training; training using the installations weapons simulation facilities; basic equipment maintenance and operation procedures; and limited battle staff and operational planning. Non-Civil Affairs trained personnel also attended professional school training prior to the units activating in order to learn about the mission of tactical Civil Affairs units.

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[18] R.J. MacCoun, "Sexual Orientation And Military Cohesion: A Critical Review Of The Evidence," In G. Herek, J. Jobe, and R. Carney (Eds.), *Out in Force: Sexual orientation and the military* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 162.

Cohesion and team building processes themselves were impeded by communications problems, lack of equipment to train on, and a continuing requirement to send personnel to receive miscellaneous training they had not received prior to the unit forming. Some examples of the unit level distracters included sending the both the 414th and 402nd CA Battalion's Executive Officers and many of the team leaders who came from the U.S. Navy to the Mobilization Civil Affairs Course (MCAC) for four of the final five weeks they were at Fort Bragg.[19] There was an almost continual need to send individuals to mission or equipment specific training (e.g., supply and communications systems),[20] and there was a lack of rental or military vehicles to ensure that units could meet and develop cohesive bonding outside of the required mobilization training day.[21]

One major challenge for the deploying units was that many of the service members who were transferred in from outside the Civil Affairs community did not attend familiarization training prior to March 2006. As a result, they were sent to school for up to nine weeks during the critical forming, storming and norming phases of unit development. In some cases, key leaders did not arrive back in their units until five days prior to the deployment date. As LTC Mason concluded on the day he deployed, "We [were] prepared primarily to survive on the battlefield, our Civil Affairs skills [though] could not be learned overnight…there were many things that we were not able to accomplish before deploying and at times it felt like we were playing with mittens versus boxing gloves."[22]

When a unit replaces another, there is a period of adjustment that occurs when the old unit departs and the new unit assumes the mission. Figure 1 defines this transition period and the qualitative effects on unit effectiveness. Analysis shows that two events occur simultaneously to prevent full mission accomplishment during periods of unit transition. First, the outgoing unit begins its transition home. This involves tasks such as

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[19] Lieutenant Commander Carlos Iglesias (United States Navy) and Commander Timothy Myers (United States Navy), interview with author, April 27, 2006, Fort Bragg, NC.

[20] LTC William Mason, interview with author, April 29, 2006, Fort Bragg, NC.

[21] Command Sergeant Major Robert Zglenski, interview with author, April 25, 2006, Fort Bragg, NC.

[22] LTC William Mason, interview with author, April 29, 2006, Fort Bragg, NC.

creating continuity books, coordinating rearward movement, and reducing visibility and risk associated with conducting convoys. Each of these events reduces the unit's ability to operate effectively.

Figure 1.   Standard Unit Transition vs. Effectiveness Curve.

Alternately, incoming units, especially ad hoc units, face a daunting learning curve. Not only are they still developing their task cohesion, but in many cases their social cohesion has not matured. Figure 1 depicts how the outgoing unit efficiency curve and the incoming unit efficiency curve cross during the transition period. Once this transition occurs, the incoming unit assumes the mission but still must fully acclimate to its environment, learn the region and culture, and become comfortable in conducting operations in a combat zone. Interviews with over 20 different Civil Affairs Company

and Battalion Commanders indicate that units achieved a level of effectiveness and cohesiveness after spending 60 to 90 days in theater working their assigned missions.[23]

The learning curve itself is continuous process whereby units slowly increase their ability to accomplish their assigned missions over time. While specific metrics are achieved at each stage of the transition process (e.g., comfort ability driving in a convoy or conducting security operations at a meeting), there are specific time-defined metrics that describe when a unit meets a given percentage of effectiveness.[24] Based on interviews in March 2006 with the 402nd Civil Affairs Battalion, members of the unit predicted they might not achieve full mission readiness until 90 to 120 days into their rotation.[25] When matched against with the 30 to 60 days of reduced effectiveness created by the outgoing units, the potential exists for a reduced overall mission effectiveness of up to six months out of every year long rotation period.[26]

By seeking to improve unit effectiveness prior to deployment, units can potentially reduce the effectiveness gap of the incoming unit (identified in red shading, Figure 1) to 60 days from a normal of 90 to 120 days. Over time, the potential results from revising training methods and programs would be threefold: increased unit

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[23] One challenge for this study was developing a consistent definition of unit effectiveness. This was made difficult given the limited training in Civil Affairs Operations received by the ad hoc units prior to deployment, coupled with the overall operational requirements of the supported unit commanders who dictated the doctrine of Civil Affairs Operations regardless of its grounding in *Field Manual 3-05.40, Civil Affairs Operations*. Overall unit effectiveness was defined by the units and personnel as the quantifiable ability to accomplish the assigned tasks of the maneuver commander within the time allocated and with the personnel and equipment resources available to the unit. Effectiveness was not gauged or quantified on the ability to build or sustain systems (e.g., Rule of Law or Education) since each unit had a different set of doctrinal training, templates and guidance from higher command to follow.

[24] Refer to Appendix B and Appendix C for specific information on the surveys and personnel interviewed. These interviews and e-mail responses were accumulated over a 15 month period from November 2005 through January 2007. The majority of the commanders were reservists who served in either Iraq or Afghanistan between 2002 and 2006. Each commander was asked (1) "How long did it take your unit to become fully integrated into the battle rhythm of the unit you were supporting?" and (2) "How long did it take for the unit to become effective in security and in accomplishing its assigned Civil Affairs mission?"

[25] This assessment is based on ten interviews conducted at Fort Bragg in 2006. Nine of the interviews were with small groups of officers, NCOs or enlisted service members. During each interview session, the group was asked how long they expected the transition to occur once the transition of authority was completed. The tenth interview was with LTC William Mason, Commander, 402nd Civil Affairs Battalion, and occurred at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, on March 14, 2006.

[26] Further aggravating this inefficiency are internal unit movements, realignments of operational boundaries, and the compounding effect of every unit in theater going through the same process.

effectiveness prior to deployment, more efficient transitions between rotating units, and quicker transference of military stability operations to either Department of State or host nation government oversight.

A. THE TRAINING PROCESS

The challenge for units, especially ad hoc units, is the limited time available for training and cohesion. The normal training process for the Army is based on the Field Manual 7-0: Training the Force (October 2002). In this document the underlying premise is that training development and execution comprise a two pronged approach. First, training guidance and directives are passed down from higher headquarters to the units and second, the units develop training plans based on this guidance and then pass the plans upward for approval prior to execution. As paragraph 1-19 states:

> Training is a team effort and the entire Army—Department of the Army, major Army commands (MACOMs), the institutional training base, units, the combat training centers (CTC), each individual soldier and the civilian work force—has a role that contributes to force readiness. Department of the Army and MACOMs are responsible for resourcing the Army to train…Units, leaders, and individuals train to standard on their assigned missions, first as an organic unit and then as an integrated component of a team.[27]

Figure 2 describes the foundation of the training management process—the Army Training Management Cycle. For the process to be successful, units develop their core Mission Essential Task List (METL). The METL is an unconstrain*e*d statement of the tasks required to accomplish wartime missions. The METL is based on training and operational guidance provided by higher headquarters staffs. A significant facet of the METL development process is that units only identify four to six primary tasks. Each company size element and above must create a METL. Typical examples of METL tasks are (1) Perform Mobilization Operations, (2) Execute Family Readiness Operations, (3) Conduct Civil Military Operations, and (4) Support Security, Stability, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR).

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[27] U.S. Department of the Army, *Field Manual 7-0: Training the Force* (Washington,D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, October 2002), 18.

Figure 2.   Army Training Management Cycle. (From: Field Manual 7-0: Training the Force)

Once the subordinate units create their METLs, it then becomes their responsibility to develop the long-term, short-term, and near-term training plans to utilize effectively available resources to train for proficiency on METL tasks. After training plans are developed, units then execute by preparing, conducting, and recovering from training. The process continues with training evaluations that provide bottom-up input to organizational assessment.

The METL system is further defined at the battalion and below level through an evaluative process known as Trained, Proficient, or Untrained (TPU).   In the TPU process, each unit is asked to rate proficiency at the individual level and then collectively for the team and unit.   During the pre-mobilization and mobilization phases of deployment, these assessments become the backbone of the training plan for each company and battalion. The intent of each unit commander is to ensure that the unit and each individual are prepared to at least a Proficient (P) level of execution. For example, the unit may be responsible for a collective task: Conduct a Convoy. Within this task,

there are dozens of individual and team tasks (e.g., Perform Troop Leading Procedures, Conduct a Pre-Convoy Briefing, Check Weapons, Operate a Military Vehicle) that must be met for the unit to receive a "P." Each subtask is evaluated separately, but it is the aggregate task that determines the level of competence of a unit to perform its mission.

The challenge for an ad hoc unit is that the process of rating and evaluating tasks must be done without months and years of prior training. During a normal work-up for deployment, a unit may have months or years to prepare. And for basic Army tasks, it is likely the Soldiers have spent many years performing the same tasks; they have become routine (e.g., Perform Troop Leading Procedures or Operate a Military Vehicle). The ad hoc unit generally does not have this advantage. Even if the unit is organic to a single Service such as the Army, many of the advanced tasks (e.g., Perform a Civil Assessment of a Water Distribution System) are not standard to most units.

The result is that the learning curve becomes steeper each time a new task is added to a unit's list, particularly if this is a task the unit has not studied, trained or worked on previously. These complicating factors work against the very intent of mobilization which is to validate current training competency, conduct new training as needed, and move the units downrange quickly. More importantly, the social science side of training, which is to build unit cohesion through team building, is marginalized since these types of tasks are not listed in the doctrinal training manuals as tasks, conditions, or standards for deployment.

In summary, ad hoc unit leaders are constrained in two ways. First, for METL tasks that are predefined (e.g., Operate a Military Vehicle), ad hoc units usually have time to meet minimum proficiency goals. However, the time for the ad hoc unit to achieve a high level of proficiency is not available. Second, as the task complexity increases (e.g., Perform a Civil Assessment of a Water Distribution System), many times the METL development will lag as the ad hoc unit attempts to build a strong foundation before attempting to become proficient at advanced tasks.

B. AN ALTERNATIVE VIEW

A second way to view the development process of unit training plans is to picture the training model as an hourglass with the neck of the bottle serving as the approved unit training plan. As Figure 3 (left side) indicates, training guidance and direction are generally provided by higher headquarters while units take this guidance and direction, develop the METL , and once this is approved, generate their near-, short-, and long-term training plans.

While acceptable in peacetime, the Army Training Management Cycle fails to address the challenges that occur when units have compressed time frames in which to develop and execute training prior to deployment. During wartime, when ad hoc units are created (e.g., unique units, joint task forces, provincial reconstruction teams), the timeline for units to assess, resource, and develop a training plan is compressed (Figure 3, right side). Further, often the personnel in these units are transferred from other units (i.e., cross leveled) or other Services (i.e., Individual Augmentee) and may have minimal knowledge and experience in how to conduct unit operations. When this occurs, the bottom half of the hourglass is compressed to the point that the units do not have the capability to adequately define their METL or develop appropriate training plans at the individual, team and unit levels.

Instead, the leadership in higher headquarters takes on the added responsibility for the actions the units themselves are not able to achieve. Over time, the ad hoc unit will become familiar with its mission and unit cohesion will increase. When this occurs the unit will be able to assume responsibility for the training plan development being managed by other organizations. The goal for all the involved players should be to set the initial priorities and work patterns so the ad hoc units are able to focus on internal team dynamics and work their way through the virtual web (which can be more like a tangle) of interdependent work relationships.

Normal Training Process

Headquarters provides
Operational Plans
Guidance
Policies

Approved Unit Training Plan

Unit develops
METL
Training Calendar

Unit executes
Training Plan

Compressed Training Process

Headquarters provides
Operational Plans
Guidance
Policies
plus
Training Calendar
METL

Approved Unit Training Plan

Unit executes
Training Plan

Unit revises
Near/short term training plans

Figure 3.   Alternative View of Army Training Management Cycle.

C.   CONCLUSION: CHANGING   THE   INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE

Chapter II introduced the concept that training management is about developing effective plans which provide units the tools necessary to prepare for deployment. Using the example of the RIP/TOA and how all units suffer from an efficiency loss during the process, the chapter laid out the foundation for one of the more complex problems facing units during the pre-deployment training, especially units that are ad hoc, have limited time to train prior to deployment, or are augmented by outside personnel in critical leadership positions. The end result demonstrates that the current process the Army uses to manage training—The Army Training Management Cycle—does not address what to do when things are not "normal."

Recognition of this concept requires a cultural shift that addresses the functional differences that exist for units that do not fit in the standard molds defined by the

military. In the case of unit training for combat, the critical goals are to have a complete training plan which encompasses the technical skills necessary to accomplish the mission and the soft skills of team dynamics, cultural awareness, and consensus. A critical assumption of this thesis is that both of these skill sets are identifiable and transferable, and that the skills do not necessarily occur naturally but can be trained and developed in almost any specified group. The remaining chapters of the thesis serve as a forum to address the differences. While actual training curriculum recommendations are beyond the scope of what should be included in the training program, the functional differences discussed here can provide a basis for what should be included in a training program for ad hoc, specialty type units, and temporary task forces.

III. THE EFFICACY OF THE TRAINING DEVELOPMENT PROCESS TO MEET MISSION REQUIREMENTS

In Chapter I, we pointed out that one of the most fundamental changes made during the GWOT was the change in organizational design from a baseline Table of Organization and Equipment type of structure to a hybrid system that uses ad hoc units to meet specific personnel or operational needs on the battlefield. This chapter focuses on team dynamics and their use as an appropriate strategic tool for dealing with the complexity of wartime training. The overarching goal is to overlay certain business models on strategic development and execution in order to pull lessons learned and expand the boundaries that currently limit collaborative training within the Army structure. The discussion of collaborative strategy is relevant to the topic of military training as a basis for understanding the importance of joint preparation and devising better responses to the constantly changing training requirements. It is pertinent for understanding what a successful training plan accomplishes in a complex environment.

A. ELEMENTS OF A COMPLX ENVIRONMENT

Prior to September 11, joint planning and the sharing of a common, consistent management system between various commands and organizations within the DoD were largely dependent on the level of local initiative. During peacetime this process, though inefficient, was acceptable. After the initial combat deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq, it became apparent that the normal system of training and doctrine development was inadequate to keep pace with the exigencies of the unconventional type of warfare facing troops. As a result, numerous training and information initiatives have been stood up to compensate. These systems, some new (e.g., Company Commander Online or Joint Knowledge Online) and some overhauled (e.g., Center for Army Lessons Learned), are now used to augment the doctrinal training requirements set forth by the military.

Nonetheless, if the training plans themselves are to be successful, a more refined training program is needed which includes all agencies, remains up-to-date, and looks past the historic boundaries set for training development. What is needed is a collective

strategy for execution expressed as involving a truly interdisciplinary network of planners and executers at all levels of the training process. The following sections outline core principles of strategic management drawn from business, and links these applications and principles to the challenges of preparing units for deployment into combat.

B. INTER-ORGANIZATONAL COOPERATION

N. Venkatraman and John Camillus define strategy as "a stream of decisions taken to achieve the most favorable match or alignment between the external environment and the organization's structure and process."[28] In practice, strategy is more art than theory and serves as a balancing act among various components within the system that must be tailored to the individual goals and visions of the organization. Most importantly, successful strategic development must be executed within the context of its environment.[29] In its most basic form, strategic execution views the organizational requirements through a simple diagram (Figure 4).

Inputs ⟶ Throughputs ⟶ Outputs

Figure 4.   Diagram of Process Specialization

Based on this figure, it is possible to argue, first, that organizations can be structured around throughputs—the processes or resources (the "ways and means") employed in converting inputs into outputs (the "ends"). The term "process specialization" can be used to emphasize this focus on throughputs or the common processes employed to generate organizational outputs.[30]

In the case of ad hoc units, a severe challenge is in the definition of the throughputs themselves. While the general output—a trained Civil Affairs team—is

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[28] N. Venkatraman and John Camillus, "Exploring the Concept of "Fit" in Strategic Management," *Academy of Management Review*, Vol. 9, No. 3 (July 1984), 514.

[29] Lawrence G. Hrebiniak, *Making Strategy Work* (University of Pennsylvania: The Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania, Wharton School Publishing, 2005), 12.

[30] Hrebiniak, *Making Strategy Work,* 110.

known, and the inputs are readily definable, the actual definition of what a "trained" Civil Affairs team means remains nebulous. For example, is training defined as meeting the minimum combat skills to survive on the battlefield? Is it being competent in the specific skills needed to conduct the Civil Affairs mission? Or is it something in between, what are the tasks, conditions, and standards to judge what becomes acceptable? Without these basic guidelines, ad hoc Civil Affairs units have a difficult time just defining their basic boundaries.

All organizations, regardless of size or focus, operate within a social environment bounded by certain parameters. Organizations must continuously monitor and adjust to this environment to remain viable. This is typically done by "…sustaining need recognition and responsiveness at high levels, both internally and externally," and by adjusting business strategies routinely in response to the environment.[31] The need for action and the amount of change required to execute operations grows with the volume or intensity of what the organization needs to accomplish. However, only when the need to change rises to a sustained level of importance does the leadership usually initiate change within the business structure and its core development strategy. "The responsiveness to perceived needs takes shape as the organization determines its prerogatives…. The type of action thought to be useful moves the organization from avoidance to compromise or collaboration, depending on how the leader[ship] responds to the pressure for action."[32]

In 1995, Paul Nutt and Robert Bakoff developed a "mutualist" strategy for those who operate in turbulent environments with a need for high responsiveness and action (CA teams in combat, for example). Collaboration was deemed the most important feature of this strategy. Nutt and Backoff go on to list six basic characteristics of successful organizations employing the mutualist strategy:

- Key people set the tone by subordinating personal and organizational interests.
- The organization develops an issue-centered focus of effort.

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[31] P.C. Nutt and R.W. Backoff, "Strategy for Public and Third-Sector Organizations," *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, Vol 5, No, 3 (April 1995), 262.

[32] Ibid., 197.

- The organization establishes a consortium that draws key stakeholders into a body seeking to address emergent needs.

- The organization uses the consortium to create or shape a vision to meet needs.

- The organization seeks "win – win" arrangements for all affected parties.

- The organization promotes trust so that stakeholders will cooperate in meeting needs and shepherding the consortium toward higher levels of cooperation.[33]

C.   ORGANIZATIONAL COLLABORATION

A continuous threat which may go unnoticed during strategy planning is how complex it can be to consolidate requirements and manage the interdependencies, especially those that incorporate a broader environment. While individual organizations typically focus on the task environment (sourcing, logistics, regulations, mandated training requirements), complexity in the overall environment (operational and strategic requirements defined outside the organization's main focus) can make decision-making about viable courses of action difficult.   When organizations operate independently, or expend little on thinking about the strategic implications of their actions, the organization may suffer from being unable to conceptualize effective strategies or react efficiently to change. According to Graham Astley and Charles Fombrun, organizations can overcome potential constraints and the ineffectiveness of independent actions through "…the creation of shared domains in which organizations can collectively, but not independently, maintain control of their own destinies."[34]

In the case of the ad hoc Civil Affairs units, where the units were composed of individuals from various military Services, a number of explanations fit the complexity challenges that must be overcome as outlined by Astley and Fombrun. First, the absence of team-functioning skills training in the formal training plans could have resulted from the assumption that team members were expected to bring skill sets with them or develop

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[33] Nutt and Backoff, "Strategy for Public and Third-Sector Organizations," 205.

[34] W.G. Astley and C.J. Fombrun, "Collective Strategy: Social Ecology of Organizational Environments," *Academy of Management Review*, Vol 8, No. 4 (October 1983), 580.

them outside of the training program. Another possible explanation was that the desired skills were expected to form naturally as unit cohesion built. And a third possibility was that those overseeing and managing the sourcing of personnel to the units were unable to ensure the member had the requisite skills prior to assignment to the team.

D.   TRAINING EXECUTION AS A COLLECTIVE STRATEGY

As laid out above, the need for collaboration is paramount to achieving a concerted effort within the training program to ensure all involved agencies and organizations are involved in the flow of resources and information. In the case of training and validating ad hoc units or units with limited training time prior to deployment, the nature and flow of resources within the collectivity becomes more important than the structural arrangement. Resource flows become the defining criteria by which the growth, adaptation, and dissolution of the training plan may be measured. Resource flows cross staff, agency, and organizational boundaries and include money, personnel, facilities and materials, and most importantly, information.   They are measured in terms their direction, intensity, and variability. Three reasons account for the importance of resource and information flows within the training development process. First, they are the basic elements of activity in organized forms of behavior. Second, task and sustainment of proficiency are essential to successful training and are manifest in resource flows. Third, resource flows, if assessed, reveal process dynamics through which the strategic importance of members may be evaluated.[35]

With this in mind, the ultimate question about training development for ad hoc units becomes "what are the relevant factors that contribute to the need for a redefined training methodology?"   In answering this question, four resource areas must be addressed.

First, information that drives ad hoc unit training encompasses the entire spectrum of knowledge from doctrine through organizational capabilities to detailed regional or country-specific data. For ad hoc units, especially units where the personnel come from

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[35] Andrew Van de Ven, "On the Nature, Formation, and Maintenance of Relations Among Organizations," *The Academy of Management Review*, Vol I, No. 4 (October 1976), 28.

different organizations, developing a common doctrinal picture becomes critical. Doctrine is the standards, guidelines, and policies that define how and why organizations act. A challenge for refining the training methodology is how to rapidly decipher the large quantity of data, needs, and requirements and to incorporate the resultant information into a new doctrinal design. Critical to this doctrinal review and update is the requirement to ensure that changes are relevant across the whole spectrum of operations and do not address only a single specific action or threat. Information must be easily explainable and expandable to meet the worldwide mission requirements.

Second, resources are driven by the organizational capabilities of the personnel assigned to the ad hoc units. If personnel from the unit do not all come from the same type organization (e.g., Army Reserve, National Guard, DoS), each must then assimilate their disparate organizational experience and culture into the unit. It is important to characterize what the key tasks, conditions and standards are that each organization must contribute.

Third, defining the facilities and materials needed to execute training and education is crucial to success. In the case of ad hoc units, this area cannot be under emphasized. Normal operations are dictated by a needs analysis and detailed long-term planning. Ad hoc unit, by definition, are not usually considered in the long-term development process. Thus, when needed, there may be few facilities and materials readily available to train and educate the units prior to their deployment.

Finally, it is necessary to ensure funding is adequate. While in time of conflict, military funding may increase dramatically; this is not necessarily the case for other U.S. Government nor other non-governmental agencies and organizations. Even within the military, the focus on the fight many times precludes focus on developing a robust training plan. For long-term, viable education and training to occur, funding should be prioritized across all government agencies so that the military is not left carrying the primary weight during all phases of operations.

E.   CONCLUSION

As one might expect a literature review on strategic training, development and execution suggests, the "first step in changing the culture of training is communication and information sharing. The reasons and logic underlying the need for change must be complete, unambiguous, and compelling."[36] Many times training still tends to focus on core tasks as defined and validated by a limited number of individuals. Soft skills are not necessarily ignored – in fact units train on dozens of tasks prior to deployment—but these need to be expanded. As future rotations demand more ad hoc teams, cross functional training and revisions to training based on the needs of the unit will become increasingly important. The notion that developing standardized training programs can be developed that are relevant for most units should be relooked to determine the best methods to ensure that ad hoc units also receive the most relevant and up-to-date training tailored specifically for their unique constituencies. Critical within this planning system must be a review and incorporation of unit cohesion, collaboration and team building.

The next chapter will outline how to achieve this goal—the development of a comprehensive program that leverages collaboration, consensus building, and distributed training development to better train units prior to deployment into combat.

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[36] Lawrence G. Hrebiniak, *Making Strategy Work* (University of Pennsylvania: The Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania, Wharton School Publishing, 2005), 271.

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IV.   CHANGING THE TRAINING DEVELOPMENT PLAN

Chapter II outlined reasons for efficiency losses during the RIP/TOA process. Chapter III made the case for a more refined collective and collaborative training development and execution system as a basis to begin to redress these problems. In this chapter, the overall training environment and the need for a nexus between downrange operational requirements and development of comprehensive training plans are further described.

A.   BOUNDING THE PROBLEM

As Chapter II indicated, operations such as the GWOT and its subset campaigns in Afghanistan, Iraq and the Horn of Africa are all ill-defined and constantly in flux. Ad hoc training programs with centrally focused, unilateral training may meet the end state goals in the end, but will not ensure units are as well prepared to deploy as they could be.

In the case of training ad hoc and Reserve units for deployment the overall training requirements are constituted from many directly and diversely interested organizations. When a unit then reports to the mobilization station, it is given a long list of requirements it must meet in order to validate and deploy. It does so at the mobilization station which should be the repository of the latest, most relevant guidance and requirements for deployment. While regular Reserve units may have their own research and training repositories, it must be remembered that the ad hoc unit usually arrives with limited to no resources to prepare itself for deployment. Using the mobilization station as the repository makes it a central point to which units can turn to as they prepare to deploy. Other units and organizations that influence training – whether providing inputs, resources or supporting outputs – likewise become dependent on the core mobilization station personnel to keep the training regime focused.

When looking at the mobilization and deployment process, there are two units/teams teams that must work together to ensure the deploying unit is adequately prepared. The first is the deploying unit itself. The second is the mobilization team. The mobilization team can be comprised of many different elements, including the training

brigade, weapons range personnel, medical staff, and transportation experts. Each of these organizations brings diverse occupational and skill-sets. While these experts can all provide important information to support the deploying unit, this can be a double-edged sword, however, since diversity can also present certain challenges. Therefore, it is important for the mobilization team to realize that though they may be comprised of different organizations and units, when supporting the deploying unit, they are first and foremost a team, subject to all the dynamics of interpersonal relations.

This becomes especially relevant as the stress levels increase within both the mobilization and deploying units. For both units, decisions must be made quickly and accurately to ensure that all the training tasks are incorporated. What often happens is that the mobilization unit staff becomes overworked with many participants involved in the process, but most of the decision-making occurs within a small vacuum of knowledgeable personnel. Commanders frequently end up specifying or approving strategies and training that represent compromises between the training necessary for war and the time available to train the service members.

Ultimately, how do you accomplish training and time management within the limitations directed by the various players tasked with oversight of training for deploying units?

B. DEVELOPMENT OF WORK TEAMS

The concept of work teams is used in both the public and private sector. They are especially valuable when the problem is considered wicked – where there is a basic problem, with no developed solutions or obvious endpoint; where each problem is unique and each solution may lead to other problems; and where each problem has many available alternative solutions. The characteristics exemplified by the problem makes it inherently ambiguous and well suited for a collaborative process. In the case of unit training for combat, the critical goals are to have a complete training plan which encompasses the technical skills necessary to accomplish the mission and the soft skills of team dynamics, cultural awareness, and consensus. A critical assumption of this thesis

is that both of these skill sets are identifiable and transferable, and that the skills do not necessarily occur naturally but can be trained and developed in almost any specified group.

The concept of a work team is further expanded by developing a formal definition of "team." Richard Guzza defines a team as a group of individuals who see themselves and are seen by others as a social entity, which is interdependent because of the tasks performed as members of a group. The key to work teams is that they are interdependent, and this is the major factor that distinguishes a "team" from a "group."[37] Further, in order for work teams to succeed, the leadership must empower them to make important decisions. The leadership must support the work team, establish boundaries for it, and train the team members so they have the skills and knowledge to accomplish their task. Ultimately, the work team is held accountable for the success or failure of the project.[38] For the purposes of this thesis we will consider the mobilization unit tasked with training ad hoc units for deployment and labeled the "training unit," as the basic work team.

In the case of training units tasked with training and validating ad hoc units prior to combat, this last criterion regarding accountability for success or failure is important. For most training units, the standard metrics of success are whether the unit deploying meets the minimum administrative, operational, and logistical proficiency levels to survive on the battlefield. These standards are provided from a variety of sources (e.g., Army guidance, DoD guidance, regulations, doctrine, deployment messages, etc.). There are rarely consequences for poorly preparing units for deployment, failure to ensure units attain a minimum level of cohesion, and neglecting to collaborate with external agencies and organizations to ensure that proper collective training has occurred.

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[37] R.A. Guzzo, "Group Decision Making and Group Effectiveness," ed. P.S. Goodman , *Designing Effective Work Groups* (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 1986), 42.

[38] Eric Molleman and Jannes Slomp, "The impact of team and work characteristics on team functioning," *Human Factors and Ergonomics in Manufacturing* (Department of Management & Organization: University of Groningen, The Netherlands), Vol 16, Issue 1 (12 December 2005), 1-15.

C. FOCUS ON COLLABORATION AND CONSENSUS

For ad hoc units to become effective they must receive comprehensive guidance, direction, and oversight throughout their pre-deployment training period. For the unit conducting and overseeing the training, the best way to achieve these goals is to develop an internal collaborative and decentralized training management process across its staff and leadership and with that of the ad hoc unit. And while the ad hoc units must understand collaboration and team building, it is more important for the training units to execute an integrated, collaborative approach to training, and validating the ad hoc units for deployment.

Collaboration requires that participants have highly developed interpersonal skills. Collaboration reduced to its simplest definition means "to work together." In *Collaborative Leadership*, David Chrislip and Carl Larson offer a slightly different but also useful definition. "[Collaboration] is a mutually beneficial relationship between two or more parties who work toward common goals by sharing responsibility, authority, and accountability for achieving results."[39]

How can the working team best train the ad hoc unit and turn it into a cohesive unit capable of performing its assigned missions? Group dynamics research began in the 1940s with a focus on psychosocial and emotional aspects of group life. But it was not until 1965, when Bruce Tuckman developed a unitary sequence to describe group dynamics, that the field really developed. The sequence which Tuckman described is the same for every group, consisting of forming, storming, norming, and performing.[40] Tuckman postulates that as the team develops maturity and capability, relationships are established and the leaders change their leadership style. They begin with a directing style, move through coaching, then participating, and finish by delegating. At that point they are detached. Only after experiencing these stages will a team be capable of producing a successor leader so that the previous leader can move on to develop a new team. Tuckman and Mary Ann Jensen further amended the Tuckman's concept in 1977

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[39] Scott London, "Collaboration and Community," prepared for the *Pew Partnership for Civic Change* (November 1995), http://www.scottlondon.com/reports/ppcc.html.

[40] Bruce W. Tuckman, "Developmental sequence in small groups," *Psychological Bulletin* (1965), 3.

to add a new final stage—adjoining.[41] In the adjoining stage, the team, finished with its project, disperses with members heading to other teams and projects.

A second line of study in the field of group dynamics concerns phases in group problem solving. The classic reference point is Robert Bales and Fred Strodtbeck's unitary sequence model which defines three phases in a group's movement toward its goals: orientation, evaluation, and control.

What both schools of thought have in common, and what makes them important for military training organizations, is that they both regard group development as predictable, sequential progression. The implication is that if concepts and processes emanating from outside the group are ignored, the overall training development process will become stunted. The time spent during pre-deployment training will lead to successful development of certain skills, but group effectiveness will be diminished since the unit will not have reached a point of equilibrium where it realizes its limitations and seeks to address them.

Collaboration plays a twofold role for ad hoc units. First, research undertaken by Connie Gersick shows that the teams she studied "used widely diverse behaviors to do their work; however, the timing of when groups formed, maintained, and changed the way they worked was highly congruent."[42] Further, Gersick found that all groups change over time, but that each group displayed a distinct approach to becoming effective. There was an underlying pattern where, at some point in the transition and "in a concentrated burst of changes, groups dropped old patterns, reengaged with outside supervisors, adopted new perspectives on their work, and made dramatic progress."[43]

Within the training system recognition of this should play an important role in training plan development. Knowing that there are temporal milestones and that groups

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[41] Bruce W. Tuckman, "Developmental sequence in small groups," *Current Concerns* (1964).

[42] Connie Gersick, "Time and Transition in Work Teams: Toward a New Model in Group Development," *The Academy of Management Journal*, Vol. 31, No. 1 (Mar 1988), 16.

[43] Ibid., 17.

set at different points, it is important for leaders in both the working mobilization team and the ad hoc unit to recognize this. Ideally, these milestones should be reached during pre-deployment training.

D.   MILESTONES

Two key milestones are 1) the first moments when a unit forms and begins defining itself, and 2) near the midpoint of the training cycle. During these periods, it is imperative that the external training units and organizations provide clear direction about what is required. As LTC Woods, Commander of the 414th Civil Affairs Battalion stated during the first set of interviews for this project: "The first few days set the tone for our training and unit. We did not know who was assigned to us, we did not know where everyone lived, and we did not know what the training plan entailed. We only knew that we were deploying in April [2006]." [44] While this reaction is not unusual for someone in a newly formed organization or team, for units preparing to go into combat, this "bad start" has the potential to slow the learning curve for the unit as it strives to figure out which unique issues it feels should preoccupy its time versus what the unit *should have been* accomplishing during the first days after unit formation. Additionally, after spending several days together, any attempt by outsiders aimed at "fundamentally altering a group … may be unsuccessful because [of] members' resistance to perceiving truly different approaches."[45]

A second central milestone comes at the midpoint in the training cycle. Most organizations and individuals recognize the midpoint as signifying they are halfway to the end. At this critical point, it becomes imperative that everyone involved reengage the training design process to take advantage of the unit's increased information and abilities to revise their training goals, and to adjust their training plans to the resources, timelines and requirements needed to ensure the unit is prepared for deployment. If done

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[44] Lieutenant Colonel William Woods, interview with author, March 12, Fort Bragg, NC.

[45] Connie Gersick, "Time and Transition in Work Teams: Toward a New Model in Group Development," *The Academy of Management Journal*, Vol. 31, No. 1 (Mar 1988), 38.

constructively, the collaborative process exercise can help streamline the ad hoc unit's ability to perform as defined in FM 7-0, Training the Force, as shown in Figure 2.

E. REFINING THE ARMY TRAINING MANAGEMENT CYCLE

The Army Training Management Cycle described in Chapter II is the core concept defining how the Army trains its force. As Chapters III and IV have shown, this model is most effective when the timelines are sufficiently long enough and when the unit has the internal capabilities to plan and execute its own training regime. For ad hoc units, neither of these criteria usually hold true.

1. Reaching the Desired End State: A Validated Training Plan

For units to succeed, they must have a validated training plan that ensures that correct tasks are selected and trained prior to a unit deploying. This means units confront questions like whether to place most of their emphasis on force protection, cultural awareness, communications, or collaboration and consensus building skills? Depending on the unit and its mission, all of these are valid choices. So how do the trainers and headquarters choose what to prioritize? Fortunately, many tasks are interconnected and may directly or indirectly support a METL task.

Figure 5 proposes a different way to look at the input side of the training cycle that units face when developing their METL and training plans. Rather than catalog hundreds of tasks and then try to synchronize them, a different approach would be to categorize the tasks as Critical, Essential or Enhancing. Adopted from a model used by the Army Special Operations Command for prioritizing logistical requirements, these terms make it easier to begin the process of de-conflicting and prioritizing the various tasks lists that units must complete prior to deployment. Each of these task designators is described below:

Critical Tasks: Tasks a unit must be proficient in in order to accomplish its primary missions. If these tasks are not trained, a unit will either (1) be unable to accomplish its defined operational missions, or (2) only be able to accomplish the missions at a high risk of casualties, loss of equipment, or severe operational inefficiency.

Figure 5.   Training Plan Matrix

Essential Tasks: Tasks a unit must be proficient in but which will not prevent the unit from accomplishing its primary missions. If essential tasks are not trained there is an increased risk of mission failure but not significantly an increase risk of casualties or loss of equipment.

Enhancing Tasks: Tasks a unit must accomplish but that have little to no impact on the ability of the unit to perform its primary missions. Inability to train enhancing tasks carries little to no risk of mission failure and should not result in casualties or loss of equipment.

The idea is not to replace the current system of developing a METL with its associated unit evaluations for task proficiency of Trained, Proficient, Untrained (TPU) for collective, unit and individual tasks. Rather, the system proposed here builds on the current system espoused in FM 7-0 by expanding the organizational structure of the tasks so they are ranked based on operational necessity and risk. For example, is performing dismounted land navigation a mission essential task for a unit that only conducts mounted patrols, or only drives within the confines of a Forward Operating Base?

2. Inputs to the Training Plan

a. *Operational Requirements*

When developing the training plan for a unit, two overlapping phases guide the planning process: the Operational Requirements phase and the Training and Sourcing phase. Incorporation of each of these is crucial to ensuring that training plans for ad hoc units are comprehensive and address the minimum critical tasks required once the unit deploys. The first phase in the training process is identification of the missions and requesting personnel or units to accomplish the tasks. As part of this process, the most important step is the accurate communication of operational requirements from those defining the mission to those who are tasked to prepare units to complete the mission. During the pre-deployment training, the operational requirements serve as a basis for determining the operational effectiveness and suitability of the unit to deploy.

b. *Training and Sourcing*

Once the operational requirements are defined, the second phase determines the training and sourcing needed to meet them. In Iraq, for example, one critical operational requirement is for functional specialists to support the Embedded Provincial Reconstruction Teams (E-PRT) in Baghdad (e.g., city planner or agronomist). These positions were specifically created to meet a specialized stabilization and reconstruction requirement. The linkage between the operational requirements phase and the training and sourcing phase occurs as the planners conduct a capabilities analysis to

determine where the specific resources exist within the military, where the requirements should be outsourced, or where ad hoc units are required to meet the operational requirements.

c. Capabilities Analysis

To achieve an integrated training plan requires capabilities analysis. The overall goal of the capability analysis is to avoid deployment of a unit in which individuals or the unit either fails as whole to meet the down-range commander's needs or fails to understand their overall operational objectives. By evaluating the capabilities request in relation to the problem and the overall operational environment, the working team can tailor training to meet the downrange commander's requirements. It is here that there is a decided need for close collaboration among the working mobilization team and with the ad hoc unit.

The benefits of linking the development of operational requirements with training and sourcing are threefold. First, the commander in theater can be assured that the capabilities requested will be likely to arrive. Second, realistic timelines for training and deployment can be developed. Third, everyone will be on the same sheet of music/page from the outset. For the working mobilization team meanwhile, the real benefit is that it can focus its training plans to make the best possible use of a limited amount of time.

d. Collaboration Loop

The final component of the Training Development Plan is creation of a dynamic collaboration loop. Typically, after the initial training plans are validated, and initial lessons learned and checklists incorporated, there is minimal update of the training matrix to incorporate ongoing changes in theater. This collaboration loop is different from the feedback loop that is defined in FM 7-0 (see Figure 1). The goal of the feedback loop described in FM 7-0 is to produce internally derived information to assist a unit improve its own proficiency. In the model described in Figure 5, feedback looks to gather all organizations involved in setting operational requirements, developing and validating training plans, executing training, and validating units for deployment.

The goal should be to not only improve the capabilities of the ad hoc unit preparing to deploy, but to incorporate real time issues and requirements. What makes the collaboration loop unique is that it ensures the latest lessons are incorporated into training.

An example of how the collaboration process could work is to look at the training task of how a unit provides security when a convoy stops and dismounts (at a non-traffic control point). Initially, when the task list is first being developed this task might be classified as essential since the unit can still accomplish its overall missions without perfecting security procedures. But what if, as the unit trains, it is determined in theater that complex attacks are increasing and the task of security should be elevated from essential to critical. By creating a dynamic collaboration loop into the training analysis and development process, the working mobilization team would be able to incorporate this change into the ad hoc unit's training.

Though such a concept is not new and many units conduct collaboration informally, the overarching goal should be to formalize feedback processes and incorporate collaborative actions into the training *development* system. The collaboration process does not stop after the final training plan is signed. Up until the day the ad hoc unit deploys, the staff and operations section should continue to update the process specialization diagram, reprioritizing and making changes as required.

F.   A REFINED TRAINING DEVELOPMENT PLAN

With the training matrix defined, Figure 6 illustrates how a refined training program can be executed. Having identified that a unit requires training prior to deployment, the initial steps (Steps 1 and 2) follow the standard system currently in place within the Army. This entails consolidating the myriad of reference sources and training requirements (input sources) for the operations section of the unit tasked with conducting training (i.e., the working team at the mobilization station).

After the initial tasks are mapped, the operations section then begins the process of distributing management for the individual processes across the staff sections within the working team (Step 3). Unlike most conventional training programs, the key here is

to ensure that tasks are not only parsed out to the most appropriate individual or group within the working team, but that once responsibility is transferred, the individual or group retains responsibility for the tasks throughout all phases.

Figure 6.   Training Development Plan

In Step 4, the tasked individuals and groups (staff sections) review the tasks list and validate or reassess the tasks as enhancing, essential, or critical by comparing the tasks against their own experiences and background, established policies and standards, benchmarks, lessons learned and operational updates from the field. The goal is to refine the operational training plan to ensure training tasks are prioritized correctly. Once this is

accomplished, the individuals and groups present their revisions for concurrence. Appropriate changes are then made prior to execution (Step 5).

Step 6 is less a phase than a process which needs to be continual. The collaboration loop provides for constant feedback and reassessment as new information is gained. The operations section is responsible for providing oversight of this looping process while specific individuals retain responsibility for tracking the tasks assigned to them.[46]

In this way, by standardizing the methodology and enforcing a collaborative approach to training management, the work team should be able to 1) maintain a more up-to-date and relevant picture of the operating environment where the ad hoc unit will be deploying and 2) maximize its ability to manage scarce time and allocated resources.

Lack of time, availability of resources, or a work team staff not trained to operate in a collaborative environment will pose challenges. In each of these cases, it will be up to the work team unit commander to overcome them as best he/she can. The overall intent of this proposed process is not to fix the mobilization and deployment process. The intent is instead to streamline the process so that ad hoc units are more capable when they leave the mobilization station and deploy to combat. If this occurs, the learning and transition curves for the ad hoc units in theater will shrink and the units will be able to more quickly achieve optimum efficiency at an earlier point in the their rotation. No amount of knowledge will eliminate the gap in efficiency that occurs when unit's transition in theater; but this proposed concept does provide a means to lessen the impact of the transition and more evenly balance the operational rate in theater. Figure 7 illustrates the likely results.

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[46] A good example of how the collaboration loop can work is to study the initial training program for the FBCB2 computerized battlefield tracking system. When the systems were first fielded, many units classified training on the system as critical to achieving mission success. However, over time evidence indicated that the time required for training on this task was better spent on other tasks. Thus, the task was downgraded from critical to essential and eventually enhancing for most units, especially those in the Army Reserve and National Guard. Today, given the small number of systems available within the U.S., FBCB2 training is barely covered during pre-deployment training in favor of conducting familiarization once a unit arrives in theater and begins operating on convoys and in vehicles with mounted systems.

Figure 7.   Revised Unit Transition vs. Effectiveness Curve

G.   FINAL STEPS

Once the draft training plan is approved (Step 7, Figure 6), the ad hoc unit executes training in preparation for deployment (Step 8).   While the ad hoc unit is training for deployment, it is important that collaboration training occurs during the process.   When collaboration and team cohesion training is incorporated, the working unit is able to ensure that any deficiencies caused by creation of the ad hoc unit are overcome.[47]

The final step occurs after the unit deploys and is arguably the most difficult step for the training unit – obtaining feedback from a deployed unit (Step 9).   If the working team is able to obtain a record of the experiences of the ad hoc unit after it deploys, these lessons learned can be easily assimilated into future training plans for other units.   The

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[47] See Chapter III.C provides a full description of possible team functioning skills that may be deficient when the ad hoc unit first forms.

difficulty with this is maintaining physical contact when both the training unit and the ad hoc unit are engrossed in their missions, with little time to think about the recent past or the distant future.

H.   CONCLUSION

Ultimately, a unit's effectiveness is a function of time management, social and task cohesion, and use of an effective methodology to prepare the unit for deployment. It is easy to redraw line and block organization charts. It is even easier to misunderstand the unit's mission and fail to accomplish the assigned specified tasks.   For real transformation to occur, units must be made more effective not only so they can accomplish their assigned tasks downrange, but so they can develop detailed plans to train and manage the limited time they may have to do so.

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V.   CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The ad hoc unit will remain an important tool in the Department of Defense's arsenal. As this thesis has shown, while ad hoc units may be considered proficient, they have not received the level of training and education required to ensure their success when deployed. As these units proliferate, they require training beyond the basic technical skills of surviving on the battlefield and accomplishing the minimum skills of their specialty. Team members must be able to quickly assemble, develop cohesive bonds and learn to properly manage the limited training time available to develop the team dynamics and social capital needed to be successful. The current system of training within the Army meets the first criterion of preparing units to deploy; however, it does not satisfactorily address how to prioritize or manage the ever increasing list of needs and requirements that compete for time, resources and space on the training calendar.

As noted by Lieutenant Colonel William Woods, the 414th Civil Affairs Battalion Commander, unified teamwork begins on "Day One; it is about understanding human nature and applying the correct pressure so that individuals mold to the needs of the team."[48] This thesis has drawn a direct correlation between the "soft skills" - the technical and doctrinal skills required by ad hoc units - and their usefulness within the context of deployment. It is critical for ad hoc units and the units that are responsible for their pre-deployment training to understand how these skills operate in parallel. Until this occurs, it will be difficult for ad hoc units to receive the proper training they need. Thus, it is incumbent on the training units to not only identify the correct training, but to ensure that all training is correctly prioritized, executed, and revised when appropriate.

A.   SUMMARY QUESTIONS AND ARGUMENTS

1.   What is the largest training impact on ad hoc units during mobilization?

Research conducted for this thesis indicates that the largest impact on successful training of ad hoc units remains the limited time the units are together prior to

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[48] Lieutenant Colonel William Woods, interview with author, February 9, 2007.

deployment. While technical difficulties still remain such as availability of firing ranges, synchronization of individual and unit training requirements, and equipment resourcing during mobilization, the preponderance of problems stem from taking a disparate group of individuals, and in a period of weeks to a few months, transitioning them into a cohesive fighting unit. Chapter I and II were dedicated to discussing the organizational and occupational challenges faced by ad hoc units.

What is difficult for personnel assigned to these ad hoc units to themselves appreciate is the criticality that each member plays within the team. It is not until this realization occurs and not until each member recognizes what others bring to the ad hoc unit and fight that the team will gel and be able to move forward. This is especially true when the ad hoc unit is joint. To counteract the potentially disruptive effects of combining inter-service cultures, I propose that training development plans for ad hoc units include material highlighting the importance of collaboration, consensus decision-making, and team building, along with what these require, in their curriculum and training plans. If incorporated early into the training plan, before barriers to change are erected by individuals, there is a greater opportunity to decrease natural skepticism and distrust and promote better appreciation for each other's backgrounds and experiences.

2. **To what extent is the body of literature pertaining to team effectiveness applicable to the training and validation ad hoc units for deployment?**

Over the past forty years, dozens of research studies and articles have been written on team effectiveness and cohesion. Chapters I, II, and III drew on a considerable body of literature that links leadership and team cohesion to effectiveness. Much of this research is based on specific case studies of companies, organizations, and events where collaboration and efficiency were measured and metrics of success defined. But there has been little effort to standardize measurable variables of team effectiveness. Additionally, the means to evaluate the individuals' influences on team effectiveness has not been documented in relation to the overall effectiveness of the team.

In the case of military deployments, this lack of research is compounded by the absolute speed at which operations move in relation to the speed at which doctrinal

development can keep pace in today's combat environment. A clear example of this can be found in the field of Civil Affairs itself. Prior to issuance of Field Manual 3-05.40, Civil Affairs Operations, in September 2006, the last Field Manual published was 41-10 in February 2000. Between these two publication dates, the entire Civil Affairs community in the Army and Marine Corps deployed to war and the force structure became so strained that the DoD deployed non-Civil Affairs personnel as augmentees.

The challenge with such a high rate of deployments is that forces deploy and tactics change so frequently that lessons learned are not easily captured. More importantly, entire units deploy and conduct operations based on limited doctrine and maximum personal experience. This was evident in every unit studied for this thesis. Ironically, responding to the environment is a key concept in Civil Affairs, as is collaborating with partners and understanding the nature of psychological and sociological responses to diverse challenges. This now needs to be applied by Civil Affairs and the broader community to the ad hoc units we field.

B.   RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the results of this study, the following recommendations suggest themselves:

1. The DoD should relook at training programs for ad hoc units and treat the cognitive requirements for team development on a par with meeting technical training requirements.

2. Both ad hoc unit training and units tasked with training ad hoc units should include concepts and skills related to collaboration, consensus decision-making, and team building in their curricula and training plans.

3. Ad hoc units should receive additional special attention in the realm of building cohesion; there is a need to speed up the process of building mutual professional and social respect.

4. A revised training matrix should be developed that prioritizes tasks according to a system of Critical, Essential and Enhancing tasks.

5. A new Training Development Plan (as described in Figure 6, page 60) should be implemented by units tasked to train ad hoc or any other deploying unit.

6. Incorporation of a collaboration loop should be added to the Training Management Plan to speed timely review of requirements against the most recent information.

7. Training units should expand their knowledge base to incorporate the immediate and short-range feedback from deployed units.

8. The Army Research Institute should commission future studies to see if the unit transition period can be further shrunk as illustrated in Figure 7, reproduced here.

9. The Army Research Institute should commission further studies to focus not only on the training process and unit effectiveness when deployed; they should also look at the effects of post-deployment adjoining after the unit has completed its assigned mission.

Finally, in the uncertain and complex environment that currently exists for training and validating units, especially, ad hoc units, for deployment, a more collective strategy is needed to maximize the effectiveness of the limited time available to train units. Further research on effective performance of units during periods of transition in the context of relief in place and when unit boundaries are changed when units are deployed should be performed. Answers to survey questions varied widely regarding the loss of time and overall operational efficiency during these two types of events.

APPENDIX A: CASE STUDY: PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS IN IRAQ[49]

A.   OVERVIEW

The latest model in stabilization and reconstruction is the use of the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) to coordinate and oversee the transition and reconstruction programs in a post-conflict environment. A major program created jointly by the Department of Defense (DoD) and Department of State (DoS), these interagency teams seek to improve reconstruction efforts by combining a variety of disciplines to form working teams to study and implement policies that foster long-term growth. In Iraq, specifically, the United States Government (USG) has used the PRT to spearhead its reconstruction efforts. While there exists a growing body of literature and much "wisdom of practice" on the use of interagency teams to manage reconstruction, there remains limited scientific understanding of how group dynamics and organization drives cohesive teamwork and hastens the transition to host nation capacity. To advance scientific knowledge about interagency collaboration and the development of cohesive teams, this study analyzes the case of Army Civil Affairs units supporting the PRTs in Iraq. The analysis is intended to help understand and ultimately design and implement new ways to facilitate collaborative processes that influence the quality and efficiency of reconstruction programs.

1.   Overview of Provincial Reconstruction Teams

The concept of the PRT was first incorporated into operations in Afghanistan in 2002 and expanded into Iraq in October 2005. The PRTs were created to expand the capacity of the Government of Iraq (GOI) to deliver not only essential services but also to help establish a permanent mid-level bureaucracy that is able to meet the short- and long-term needs of the Iraqi population. The PRT process is bottom-up driven with oversight

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[49] The data used to generate this case study was gathered during the period October 2006 to March 2007.

provided by a combined DoD and DoS team located within the U.S. embassy in Baghdad. Figure 8 shows the location of the current and future PRTs in Iraq.

Figure 8.   Location of Iraq PRTs. (From: Department of State, January 2007)

As Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice put it in January 2007, PRTs help local and provincial governments "manage the day to day problems of the people where the people live."[50]. PRT funds are focused on training and coordination versus the typical reconstruction role of building physical infrastructure. The mission of the PRTs in Iraq is to:

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[50] Stephen Kaufman, "Provincial Reconstruction Teams Building Local Iraqi Leadership," http://www.america.gov/st/washfile-english/2007/January/20070117180624esnamfuak0.9784815.html (Accessed January 17, 2007).

(1) Have stabilized, transparent processes for identifying redevelopment needs throughout the assigned provinces, and a solid program to address redevelopment.

(2) Have regularized mechanisms for citizen participation in the governmental decision-making processes.

(3) Have increased core competencies in the areas of public administration, finance and budgeting, and urban/municipal planning and accountability.

(4) Have enhanced reporting and assessment on political and economic development at the local level, and advocacy of coalition political and economic policy goals.

(5) Foster stability and security throughout their provinces.[51]

As part of President Bush's plans to expand operations in Iraq, the number of PRTs was expanded in 2007 from 10 to 19 and eventually 21.

2. Organizational Development

PRTs are designed to strengthen the capacity of local Iraqi leaders to build an economically viable, politically moderate government. By leveraging the Iraqi business community, local leadership, and elected officials, the PRTs target assistance versus overall nation building. Some examples of PRT programs include leadership and business training seminars and short courses, micro-loan and micro-grant programs, and bureaucratic mentoring programs.

To accomplish these tasks, PRTs are composed of American and coalition Foreign Service officers, military specialists and security teams, U.S. interagency experts from the Departments of Agriculture, Justice and State, U.S. Aid for International Development (USAID), and functional specialists in areas like agriculture, municipal planning, accounting, and rule of law. While some organizations in Iraq manage reconstruction projects and funding, PRTs are instead organized to use their limited

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[51] U.S. Department of State Cable 04045, *Action Plan to Build Capacity and Sustainability within Iraq's Provincial Governments*, U.S. Mission Baghdad and Multinational Forces – Iraq (2005), 3-4.

funding mechanisms to build Iraqi capacity versus complete physical projects. Both by design and execution, PRTs are ad hoc organizations composed of individuals brought together only for the specific mission of supporting the PRT. As such, building and executing operations as a team is difficult at best.

3. An Integrated Theory on Teamwork

Teamwork begins, and each participant brings to the team a network of ideas, representing the individual's prior knowledge relevant to the groups' task. Each individual brings with him/her thought patterns and knowledge that are characteristic of the organization, culture and community to which that member belongs. Because some individuals have common backgrounds (including their broader institutional context), they share ideas to some degree with other members. These overlapping ideas constitute the group's task-relevant shared knowledge. Also, each individual possesses task-relevant private knowledge that is not known by other members and that may or may not be shared with others in the organization.

As the team becomes more cohesive, members of the group share and discuss some of their ideas about the mission and develop a coordinated vision. During team development, group members attempt to develop compatible mental models pertaining to the team and their tasks. Since there are multiple agencies represented within each PRT, building shared task and team models requires each individual to negotiate language, definitions, and procedures to ensure an amicable working environment. Even terms held in common, such as reconstruction, and short- and long-term reconstruction, must be clarified and redefined. For example, USAID and the DoS believe long-term development is a five to seven year process while the DoD views long-term development as a nine to twelve month process.

One critical challenge to PRT formation is when one organization becomes a dominant force behind policy making; this could be when DoD has to take the active lead because DoS and USAID are unable to fill their billets or when DoS pushes DoD aside because it feels the area is permissive and DoD is hindering reconstruction activities. In the worst case, this may lead to creation of in-group/out-group splits. To overcome these

challenges, teams should train ahead of time and learn about the various attributes of the cultures represented on the team. It is important for teams to recognize the key external actors that will impact team operations, and information about them should be incorporated into any training. Understanding these challenges leads to a more compatible understanding of the overall mission and how the team can most effectively work together while retaining the unique disciplinary knowledge each brings to the table.

Ultimately, as units begin to coalesce into a team, they will go through multiple developmental phases that are characterized by the use of different means of communication. What is important is for the leadership forming the PRTs to recognize the divergent skill sets and belief systems that each organization brings to the overall organization and then develop training plans to ensure they address not only the common areas but also the differences in culture and belief.

B. DATA SOURCE, CONTEXT, AND ANALYSIS

1. Contextual History

During OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM ROATION 06-08 (2006 to 2007), three Army Civil Affairs units were tasked to provide tactical support to four PRTs in Iraq. During the first two months together, the unit members spent most of their time becoming acquainted and struggling to define a systematic plan for supporting the PRT effort in Iraq. Unit members with more experience in the systemic functions of Civil Affairs provided some mentoring but a constant turnover of personnel and a fragmented training plan meant that as the units deployed from the United States to Iraq they still had no clear vision or plan for support. After transitioning with the units rotating out, the three companies assumed their role as augmentations to the PRTs.

Forty days into the rotation in Iraq, the units had developed basic mission plans and were integrating into the daily rhythm of the PRTs. Sixty days into the rotation the Civil Affairs units were accomplishing their security mission, but the majority still had difficulty defining the primary PRT missions. Even at four months after the initial deployment of the units, most unit members continued to express a need for further information and material about overall requirements and initiatives needed to make the

PRTs successful. In short, this initial four month period could be characterized as an apprenticeship phase of team development.

This matches the basic concept presented in the main thesis that incoming units face a learning curve of several months before they are able to achieve the efficiency of the previous rotation.

2.   Transforming Ideas into Action

The challenge for the PRTs is that the majority of their capability is mental not capital output. Therefore, in order for the team to have greater effectiveness with the Iraqi government, the team must develop ways to transfer its knowledge on reconstruction to the GOI. There are multiple ways this can occur. First, as the PRTs currently operate, they can hold meetings and training sessions with the GOI, directing them on how to build sustainability and then use follow-up meetings to emphasize the importance of executing certain tasks. For example, the PRT might arrange for an agriculture seminar and later leverage the information gained to force the district governor to implement needed farm reform programs. Alternatively, the PRT might accumulate information from various sources within the province and present an overall package to the GOI for implementation. For example, the PRT might conduct weekly meetings with local farm groups and agriculture interests and capture the results of this into a single action plan. Once this action plan is completed it would be presented to the local district manager for approval and implementation.

Observation of the three PRTs found that both techniques were widely used to develop and convey programs to the Iraqis. Observation over the length of the deployment showed that units which seemed most effective were able to track the incoming data and develop a key list of tasks to perform. From there, they were then able to take this content, develop a product for the Iraqis, and based on the Iraqi response; influence the direction in which the reconstruction program was headed. A significant negative for all the units was that the military Civil Affairs component of the PRT had not trained with its civilian counterparts. As a result, the time it took to develop cohesion within the overall PRT was extended.

Two examples of how transforming ideas into products worked are the Ninewa and Baquba PRTs. At the Ninewa PRT outside Mosul, the PRT was very effective at achieving a team approach to reconstruction. By using intermediary products and analyzing accumulated data from three previous years of stabilization efforts, the team leader and assistant positively influenced the direction and facilitated the work of the team. The Baquba PRT appeared effective, but staff shortages and over-zealous team members led to the PRT bogging down in its overall efforts. While the Baquba PRT was able to focus heavily on economics and microfinance it was unable to create a viable political structure over the first years of the PRTs existence.

3.   The Action-Item List: A Product of Distributed Processing

Recent research in the civilian world on groups has highlighted the importance of role definitions as a catalyst for increased unit productivity. Issues associated with defining the roles of team members can also affect group morale. Given the importance of this issue, it was curious to note that team composition and role discussion primarily occurred only during the formative time frame in the first two months after the units were created back in the United States. Though unit reorganization did occur during the deployment, an overarching review of team cohesion and staffing was never made after the units fell in on their PRTs.

The first organizational meetings for the Civil Affairs support to the PRTs occurred in March 2006 when the units were thrown together at Fort Bragg. Unit manning rosters were initially determined based on alphabetical lists regardless of skill sets or past civilian or military experiences.[52]   In each case, the senior battalion commander interviewed each officer and made a leadership decision. In three cases, the decision was made to place an average officer in the leadership role despite evidence that there might be problems once the units deployed.[53]

As a result of the unit organizational method, there was continued concern throughout the entire training cycle into the first thirty days of the rotation in Iraq

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[52] Command Sergeant Major Robert Zglenski, interview with author, March 14, 2006.

[53] Lieutenant Colonel William Woods, interview with author, March 13, 2006.

regarding teams' roles. However, once the units deployed, the speed of activity on the ground led to a decision not to make wholesale changes in organization. During interviews with units in June 2006, the units appeared to remain concerned and in some cases confused about their roles supporting the PRTs. Given the importance of defining roles for team members, one has to wonder why this was not considered an item for further action.

4.   Challenges Faced by the PRT

a.   *Reconstruction or Transition?*

The overall efforts of the PRTs were consistently hampered by a failure at all levels of command, both within the military and civilian worlds. The initial cause for this failure developed prior to the PRT concept being imported to Iraq from Afghanistan. Specifically, the lead problem for the PRTs begins with their name. The word "provincial" is appropriate given that most nations divide their internal boundaries by province. However, the way that the words "reconstruction" and "team" were defined has consistently led to a misapplication and worse, a misunderstanding, of the capabilities and mission as defined by the DoS and DoD.

The word "reconstruction" signifies first and foremost that a country has viable physical infrastructure and capital that can be rebuilt. In Iraq this is not the case. Ten years of sanctions and over thirty years of dictatorial rule had left much of Iraq unprepared for Iraqis to assume the political and economic responsibilities of overseeing reconstruction in 2003. So, when the subject of reconstruction arose, especially in the United States, the initial assumption was that the country was in a minor downturn, but not destitute. A better suited title would be "transition." Transition signifies a continual process of transferring control and program management. More importantly, "transition" denotes a process or means to achieve a desired end state such as reconstruction.

The third word, "team," was also a misnomer. When the PRTs were first created in Afghanistan, the concept was to centralize reconstruction efforts around a core group of military members and augment them with functional specialists from other U.S. Government agencies. In Iraq, the same concept was floated, but with the civilian

interagency running the PRT and the military filling a support role. What was missing from both PRT concepts was the host-nation participation. If the overall end state is to transition political and economic development programs to the GOI, then it is critical to involve the Iraq bureaucracy in the transition team. So, for "team" to mean what is should, more GOI involvement in the PRT is required.

b. Doctrine and Training

A challenge with ad hoc teams such as PRTs is developing basic organization doctrine about how to operate. This can be as simple as a standardized operations and training manual. But the difficulty in translating doctrine to daily operations involves more. In *Trust*, Piotr Sztompka demonstrates that how a team translates levels of trust is critical to the projected success of the team. Doctrine, therefore, must look past the lists of training tasks and study the structural context of not only how the team is organized and operates but also how the team operates, within the context of the Iraqi society. "Understanding stability, transparency and accountability of institutions is a critical mediating process," Sztompka writes. "In addition collective capital (human and social) of the members of a [team] provides potential resources for taking risks."[54]

For doctrine to succeed in reconstruction and within the PRTs, it must recognize/acknowledge that there is a reciprocal relationship between trust and democracy. For example, studies have shown that when there is an underlying fear of moving backward in a newly democratic country this is usually directly related to distrust of the stability of new institutions.

Historically, there has been little "doctrine" for PRTs. Since each is an ad hoc organization, both the DoS and DoD have left it to each PRT commander to determine the best methodology to reconstruct his or her piece of Iraq. According to LTC Joseph Staton at the National Coordination Team (NCT), "this has been one of the problems to overcome – giving the PRT commanders too much latitude in designing,

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[54] Piotr Sztompka, *Trust* (London: Cambridge Press, 1999), 34.

staffing and executing their missions." [55]   So, how might the PRTs develop "swift trust" in an environment where teams are created at the last minute and individual team members do not know each other until the day the team is created? Two methods suggest themselves.

First, the PRTs must develop a common goal or vision, starting small to demonstrate organizational trust and establish both internal and external credibility and capability. By setting a sense of urgency defined by detailed boundary conditions (e.g., political and economic indicators of success), the team can then begin finding common ground among members and with their projected Iraqi counterparts. Most importantly, the team must act and be professional; as the old adage goes: first impressions are lasting impressions. By learning how to balance individual vs. team requirements and by demonstrating a competency and willingness to work, teams have a greater chance of success. Further, PRTs that are able to meet these objectives are more likely to react to change (e..g, mission, personnel) better than those that are rigid and individually focused.

Second, PRTs should adopt a holistic approach to the reconstruction effort. A good template for success is the model for post-conflict reconstruction developed by Sultan Barakat of the University of York. Barakat defines seven basic components required for long-term sustainable development. Barakat has empirically shown that when these components, listed below, are executed with a participating indigenous population's participation and targeted at economic, social, political and psychological systems, the probability for sustaining reconstruction success increases.[56]

- Vision: synthesizing the views of multiple organizations and groups, including local nationals, on essential *medium* term goals.
- Participation: ensuring the internal, in addition to external, resources are leveraged. It is critical psychologically that the local population becomes a vested partner in the development of social policies and

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[55] Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Stanton, interview with author, February 22, 2007.

[56] Sultan Barakat, *After the Conflict: Reconstruction, and Redevelopment in the Aftermath of War* (London: IB Taurus, 2005), Chapter 14.

political policies that are sustainable within their culture versus what is thought sustainable by external actors.

- Security: providing for a secure environment through policing with focus not on protecting foreign personnel but on restoring conditions of general security that allow the local population to work and carry on lives without fear of peril.

- Reconciliation and Justice: establishing trust in the national and provincial governments by creating a system based on the rule of law based on a commitment of righting wrongs and achieving an acceptable level of social justice and accountability.

- Equity: creating an economic and political development plan that addresses not only the equity between various secular groups in Iraq but also the impacts that reconstruction economic policy will have on the country as a whole (e.g., supporting date production through micro-loans while failing to provide external markets at the macro level).

- Reconstruction and Development: understanding that reconstruction is different from development only due to complexity of the process, such as added emotion, reconciliation, and solving ingrained differences

- Capacity: knowing how to use the survival abilities of the Iraqis because the methods used, often informal and collaborative structures, are potentially capable of supporting of the development of local institutions vital to rebuilding.[57]

The overarching tenet of Barakat's *After the Conflict* is that the development process should carry more weight than should the physical execution, especially in the early stages of a post-conflict operation. Further, though the international community is generally honorable, many times reconstruction is initiated by inappropriately pouring large sums of money into incorrectly identified infrastructure

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[57] Barakat, *After the Conflict*, 249-270.

rebuilding, corrupt institutions, and large expatriate salaries. Instead of focusing efforts on the purely technical aspect of rebuilding the physical environment, a clearer vision is required which "helps the population recover – economically, socially, politically, and psychologically."[58] In over four years of post-invasion reconstruction in Iraq, these basic concepts remain unfulfilled. Even the fifteen months of PRTs in Iraq have produced little realistic proof that current reconstruction efforts are providing for a better Iraq.

Most detrimental to efforts in Iraq has been that little attention is still paid to relating reconstruction to how the government of Iraq and the Iraqi people want to develop their society. As espoused by Barakat, the challenge for the coalition in Iraq is to get past the physical destruction and apparent lack of formal organization and realize that Iraqi reconstruction is as political as the war itself, and that reconstruction, especially when dealing with social and political engineering, is fraught with risk. [59]

c.   *Organizational Design and Sourcing*

A major challenge of the PRTs is balancing the military and civil capacity. Currently, the primary role of the military is to provide (1) force protection support and (2) augment the reconstruction efforts by providing Civil Affairs personnel. The reality is that the military Civil Affairs personnel have taken on much of the reconstruction workload in areas that were semi- and non-permissive due to a lack of interagency personnel willing to accept the high risk environment.

This has led to a non-standardized list of capabilities as each PRT has capitalized on the individual civilian skill sets the civil affair personnel serendipitously bring to the table. For example, in Baquba, four of the PRT members were stock brokers or work in the finance industry in civilian life. As a result, the Baquba PRT and Diyala Province had the highest record of approved micro-finance loans in Iraq.[60] In Ninewa

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[58] Barakat, *After the Conflict,* 74.

[59] Ibid., 149.

[60] Mr. Reed Whitlock, interview with author, February 4, 2007.

the civilian expertise was focused on justice and public safety, and in Salah ad Din Province, the focus has been on infrastructure enhancements in Samarra and Tikrit.[61]

The cause of the mismatch in unit capabilities is traceable to the process of sourcing personnel to fill the Civil Affairs or other similar ad hoc units. Unlike individual augmentees, the Civil Affairs teams are autonomous units. When the Army ran out of organic personnel to staff its units, these units reverted to joint control for sourcing of personnel. As a result, each service is now required to provide a percentage of unit fill as directed by Joint Forces Command. And since the sourcing documents only list rank and basic job description requirements, it is left to each service to determine who to place in each unit vacancy.

A second sourcing challenge is that the new embedded PRTs required over 129 civilians to manage the functional specialist positions.[62] These positions were initially filled with military reservists mobilized for up to one year, with the positions eventually filled with USG or private contractors. The main problem with this approach was twofold. First, it took on average six to seven months to become a respected and accepted member in the Iraqi business culture. Since the military stopgap was only scheduled to last for eight to nine months, there was a strong possibility that the military specialists would not be effective at reaching out and gaining acceptance by the GOI. Second, contractors, though potentially cost effective, were driven by corporate balance sheets and not diplomacy. As a result, an additional stovepipe for command and control (i.e., the contractor internal business organization) had to be placed on top of an already overly bureaucratic PRT structure.[63]

Finally, the current organizational design of the PRTs was stifling progress as a result of the decision to create overlapping requirements and responsibilities for each of the interagency partnerships. Each interagency functional specialist had two reporting chains of command. First, functional specialists reported to the PRT lead from

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[61] Mr. Joe Shroader, interview with author, February 5, 2007.

[62] Ibid.

[63] Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Stanton, interview with author, February 22, 2007.

the DoS. However, since they are only attached to the PRT from the embassy, each specialist also retained a secondary chain of command to his/her normal agency lead in-theater. The result of this decentralized and multi-dimensional reporting structure was increased inefficiencies when the actions of the PRT conflicted with those of the senior representatives in Baghdad.

d. Operations Stand Alone PRTs

Operationally, the PRTs are designed to help rebuild a provincial area by providing technical assistance to the Government of Iraq (GOI). In reality, the PRTs are limited to work in the ten major cities in Iraq and do not impact the surrounding provincial areas except through the provincial councils. The causes of this are four-fold. First, the security situation in most of the PRT locations remains semi- to non-permissive. Therefore, the PRT specialists and team members cannot easily get to areas other than the primary cities. Second, the PRT remain under the ultimate direction of the embassy in Baghdad whose primary focus is the ten city economic development plan implemented in June 2006. The goal of this program is to channel the majority of the reconstruction efforts into the primary population centers vice spreading the capacity throughout the entire country. Third, the PRTs do not use their assigned Civil Affairs capabilities to their fullest capacity. Fourth, the Civil Affairs teams assigned to the PRT overlap responsibilities with the civil affair units assigned to the combat brigades located in the same regions.[64]

The Civil Affairs personnel assigned to the PRTs were divided into two groups. The first group, the functional specialists, provided a stopgap in areas such as municipal planning, economics, and governance until the interagency players were able to staff their requirements. The second and more controversial group was the Civil Affairs tactical company assigned to each PRT. Like the functional specialists, these personnel were usually thrown into specialist roles. For example, in Diyala Province, because of the civilian jobs of some of the Civil Affairs personnel, they became

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[64] Lieutenant Colonel Otto Busher, interview with author, June 9, 2006.

instrumental in the micro-loan program in the region.[65]   More importantly, the Civil Affairs personnel were usually used for force protection and support to the main PRT efforts in the cities and did not use the skill sets on which they were trained.

A glaring operational gap within the PRTs was that the Civil Affairs teams were not used to perform the role of civil reconnaissance. As discussed before, since the PRTs main focus is on the central cities of Iraq, the surrounding areas in the provinces generally received little reconstruction assistance. A better alternative would have been to use the Civil Affairs units to assist at this local level and leave the functional specialists assigned to the PRTs to manage the provincial issues, along with USAID and DoS personnel.[66]   The chief benefit of this mission change would be to get the Civil Affairs units back into their primary tactical role.

Tactical Civil Affairs do not have the overall capacity to rebuild structural systems at the provincial level in semi-developed and developed countries like Iraq. Instead, they should work at the local level gathering data and making rudimentary analyses of the effectiveness of the reconstruction efforts outside of the main cities. The chief benefits of this are that 1) the Civil Affairs units become more visible and effective when working with both the Iraqis and the military units in the region, and 2) the PRT is able to extend its reach past the city-centers.[67]

Additionally, re-orienting the Civil Affairs mission would alleviate some of the friction that occurs between the Civil Affairs units assigned to the PRTs and the combat maneuver brigades. With the exception of Mosul, which has a permissive security situation, the majority of the Civil Affairs units assigned to PRTs did not work well with the maneuver Civil Affair units.[68] The failure mainly resulted from turf battles, different mission directives, and leadership conflicts. By taking the PRT Civil Affairs units and turning their mission into a primarily civil reconnaissance role, they would be forced to work more closely with the maneuver brigade Civil Affairs assets for security

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[65] Major Hanhauser and Major Foster, interview with author, June16, 2006.

[66] Lieutenant Commander Carlos Iglesias, interview with author, February 3, 2007.

[67] Ibid.

[68] Enlisted and NCOs Salah ad Din PRT, interview with author, February 5, 2006 and officers, Kirkuk PRT, interview with author, February 6, 2006.

and information. This, in turn, could increase the collaboration between the PRTs and the combat forces in a province, thus providing a clearer vision to the reconstruction effort.

e.   Embedded PRTs

In Baghdad the newly embedded PRTs faced an additional set of challenges. The basic concept of the embedded PRTs is illustrated in Figure 9. Baghdad was initially divided into ten brigade sectors and within each sector was a series of Joint Security Stations (JSS).[69] Each JSS served as the equivalent of local policing and was manned by American, Iraqi Police and Iraqi Army personnel who lived and worked in the sector. Concurrent with the stand-up of the JSS, six embedded PRTs were created to assist the brigades with the reconstruction mission.

Figure 9.   Embedded PRT and Joint Security Station Concept.

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[69] Ambassador Joseph Saloom, interview with author, January 27, 2007. As the program developed the number of JSS per BCT sector increased.

The key to the embedded PRTs was that the leadership was integrated into the brigade staff functions and served as a key component of the staff planning and execution process. Four issues helped define whether the embedded PRTs were successful when implemented between April and December 2007.

First, the original embedded PRT concept was predicated on only six brigades in Baghdad. When the number of brigades increased to ten, there was not a realignment of the PRTs to create an additional four. The result is that some embedded PRTs provided coverage to two brigades, making it more difficult to be relevant in the daily operational plan. During interviews in February 2007, the National Coordination Team agreed that this was a challenge, but the NCT and MNCI C9 did not have plans to alter the implementation concept.[70] Ultimately the Brigade Commanders made the situation work, but not without much trial and effort.

Second, the staffing of the embedded PRTs was truly ad hoc. The core leadership first reported to Baghdad by 31 March 2007. This included the senior PRT team leader from the DoS, the senior USAID, senior Civil Affairs planner, and an Iraqi who was part of the bilingual, bicultural advisor group. They linked with the brigade(s) they were supporting and began an assessment process of all activities done since March 2003. Their goal was to develop a reconstruction plan ready for implementation when the second phase of the deployment occurred in mid-summer. The second phase included 129 military functional specialists drawn from across the entire Army Reserve, but not necessarily with any Civil Affairs or stability and reconstruction experience. Like the stand alone PRTs, the military functional specialist's role was to be an interim fill until fiscal year 2008 when the DoS budgeted money to support the embedded PRTs.[71] The challenge for the embedded PRTs was that the leadership, which received very limited training by DoS, and the main team members were never given a chance to build a

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[70] Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Stanton, interview with author, February 22, 2007.

[71] Ambassador Joseph Saloom, interview with author, January 27, 2007.

cohesive unit prior to deploying. While this concept eventually worked, it continued the debate started in 2003 concerning the value and ability of individuals to guide reconstruction versus team efforts.[72]

Third, the embedded PRTs derived most of their funding through the Commander's Emergency Relief Program (CERP) program. Designed to be a rapid reaction program, CERP has turned into the primary means for brigade commanders to influence the security posture within their sectors. A challenge for the embedded PRTs was overcoming the institutional bias of the military to focus monies on programs supporting force protection and realign them against reconstruction. This leads to the fourth and most complex challenge: mindset.

The embedded PRT concept was rife with stovepipes and individual command and control challenges. For example, while the PRT team chief was overtly responsible for all members of his/her team, the reality is that each interagency player and the military had their own directives that may or may not have conflicted with those of the team chief. This stovepipe system was a carryover of the creation of the CPA from 2003 when neither the embassy nor the military were given ultimate control of reconstruction activities. As a result, the priorities set by each agency (e.g., DoS, DOJ, USAID, Department of Agriculture (DoA)) could trump the individual plans of the PRT chief.[73]

Additionally, the military and interagency players applied different definitions to short-, medium-, and long-term. To the military, short- to long-term occurs within a year—the time the unit is on the ground in Iraq. To the interagency contingent, short-term programs end at one year, and long-term stretches to seven to ten years. For the embedded PRTs to succeed, the two groups had to spend inordinate amounts of time to reach a consensus across all of Baghdad.

Ultimately, the embedded PRTs achieved the desired results. However, the lack of pre-deployment planning and focus on team development placed large hurdles in

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[72] Ibid.

[73] Lieutenant Colonel Otto Busher, interview with author, June 9, 2006.

the path to success. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), as the primary source provider for the PRTs, should take a more active role in developing accurate requirements and consolidated training. While new training units put in place since 2006 exist for PRT personnel prior to deployment, it remains imperative that the senior DoS and DoD leadership in Iraq spends more time coordinating the implementation of reconstruction activities at the tactical level.

f.   Deployment Timelines

Historically, the deployment timelines for the PRTs were not synchronized to either the interagency timelines or, in the case of the new embedded PRTs, to the combat maneuver unit the PRT was supporting. The failure to link the stabilization and reconstruction efforts to the main fight resulted in a lack of detailed coordination between the PRTs and the maneuver commanders who "own the territory."[74] For PRTs to become successful, they must train and deploy not only as complete units themselves, but also as internal assets of the supported maneuver commander. Until this happens, there will continue to be opportunities for disconnects between the military commander and the civilian PRT lead.

In the case of the new embedded PRTs this problem was exacerbated because the main "surge" operations occurred over seven weeks before the first of the PRT leadership arrived in the maneuver brigade headquarters to set up reconstruction operations. Additionally, the main body of the new PRTs, the functional specialists, did not arrive until June 2007, almost four months into the new surge. Though it can be argued that the situation must be more permissive for the functional specialists to be effective, they still required time to acclimate and become familiar with operations on the ground. As a result, the new embedded PRTs were not fully operational until almost six months into the surge.

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[74] Major Menzemer, interview with author, February 6, 2007.

C. A MATRIX FOR STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION

One mechanism to reduce the number of challenges facing the PRTs is to review how the PRTs are integrated into military operations. From the outset, planning development should focus on using the PRTs as one facet of the overall reconstruction effort. Figure 3 illustrates a proposed methodology for using PRTs in future combat operations. As indicated in the figure, the role of the PRT changes from reconstruction and capacity building to transitioning between civilian-military run operations to assumption of core bureaucratic functions by the host nation. Since the mission is no longer restricted to reconstruction operations and focuses instead on transition, the most important change is to rename the PRTs to Provincial Transition Teams (PTT). By accomplishing this, the linkage between reconstruction operations in Afghanistan and Iraq becomes more visible, and more importantly, the linkage to the Department of Defense Directive 3000.05, Security, Stability, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) is solidified.

Military Phase	Phase III	Phase IV (A)	Phase IV (B)	Phase IV (C)	Phase V
Environment	Non-Permissive	Semi-Permissive	Semi-Permissive	Permissive	Permissive
Goal	Secure	Stabilize	Transition	Reconstruction	Handoff
Organization	CMOC	CMOC	PTT	PTT	HN Government
Organization Design					
•Military	100%	70%	50%	20%	5%
•Interagency	0%	20%	30%	30%	15%
•Host Nation	0%	10%	20%	50%	80%
Leadership/C2	Military	Military	DOS	DOS	HN
Focus Priority					
• Civil Recon	High	High	Moderate	Moderate	N/A
• PRC/DC	High	Moderate to Low	Low (as needed)	Low (as needed)	N/A
• Essential Services	High	Moderate	Low	Low	N/A
• Projects (CERP)	Moderate	High	Moderate	Low (as needed)	N/A
• Projects (DOS)	Low	Low	Moderate	High	Moderate
• SCA: Govern/RoL	Low	Low	Moderate	High to Moderate	Moderate to Low
• SCA: Econ Dev	Low	Low	Moderate	High to Moderate	Moderate to Low
• SCA: Munic Plan	Low	Low	Moderate	High to Moderate	Moderate to Low
• HA	Low (conv force)	Low (conv force)	Low (conv force)	N/A	N/A
• MCA (if applicable)	N/A	Low	Low to Moderate	Low	N/A

Note: PTT – Provincial Transition Team. The PTT replaces Provincial Reconstruction Teams since the focus of the team is to transition from military through interagency to host nation.

Figure 10. Core Transition Program from Military through Civilian to Host Nation Control.

The overall concept for the proposed PTT is to use the core principles defined in earlier of this thesis (doctrine and training) to create a thorough development plan which integrates a central vision with a strong host nation presence in the reconstruction effort. Three critical components of this process are (1) integration of host nation personnel directly into the PTT, (2) eventual handoff of the PTT to the host nation once reconstruction operations are complete, and (3) realignment of tactical Civil Affairs teams' priorities during each operational phase.

Currently, no PRTs integrate host nation personnel into the daily operations. Instead, the PRT members travel from their base camp to meetings with the host nation, hold training courses with the host nation for the host nation personnel, and issue directives and provide international linkages to assist host nation personnel with reconstruction activities. Under the new concept this would change. The basic premise is that the provincial leadership requires trained bureaucrats and the best way to create them is through a process of formal education, on-the-job training, and mentoring. To achieve this, the new PTT would begin integrating host nation personnel into the teams once the environment moves from combat operations to stabilization.

There are three primary benefits with this integration process. First, the host nation personnel receive daily contact with the functional experts of the PTT; they are able to learn through mentoring. Second, the PTT is able to gage the effectiveness of the newly minted host nation bureaucrats against set metrics. By working with these personnel daily, the PTTs ability to accurately assess the status of SSTR efforts is increased. Third, the host nation is better able to convey the cultural nuances about Iraqi society that are lost when the military and civilian members return to their base camps each day, after only a couple hours of perfunctory meetings.

The second advantage of the redesign is that there is a defined end-state when the host nation is capable of assuming political and economic control of its province. This currently does not exist within the PRT structure. Instead, there are individual metrics derived by the NCT for each PRT and briefed monthly. Status is measured by achieving standardized levels of reconstruction as defined by Baghdad. For provincial reconstruction to succeed, this process must transition to the provincial level (unless a

centralized government is the ultimate intent). By adding the host nation handoff, the local population visibly sees the train when it enters the tunnel and knows exactly where the end of the tunnel is. The process becomes a closed loop system that requires host nation collaboration and feedback.

The third attribute of the PTT is that Civil Affairs tactical and operational units receive clearer guidance on what their mission entails prior to arriving in theater. Historically, the units have arrived with little knowledge of where the reconstruction process stood. By clearly defining the expected operations the units will face, it becomes easier to develop detailed training plans to validate units prior to deployment. When successful, the process eliminates the hundreds of extraneous training tasks and focuses efforts on exactly what is required. Further, refining the mission tasks gives the supported unit commander or PTT team leader a better understanding of what to expect from his/her Civil Affairs support. PTT leaders are then able to project gaps in their reconstruction plans and more efficiently use the resources available.

Regardless of nomenclature, the design of the PRT must change to reflect the long-term vision of reconstruction. Allowing sourcing decisions and internal bickering to determine how to source, fund, and execute operations has meant the current PRTs are not able to adequately meet the goals that are defined in their overall mission statement. Only after a full review of the PRT structure from bottom to top occurs will the PRTs become effective and meet the overall intent to "have stabilized, transparent processes for identifying redevelopment needs throughout the assigned provinces, and a solid program to address redevelopment issues."[75]

The PRT concept is now seven years old and has survived initial contact in both Afghanistan and Iraq. However, there remains a mindset across the USG that PRTs are inherently different in Afghanistan and Iraq. The reality is that they are more similar than different as long as the central goal of each is to transition from military-civilian control of reconstruction to host nation control of the government. But also, as long as this

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[75] Major Johnny Spruiel, interview with author, February 9, 2007.

assumption of difference exists, the lessons learned in both places cannot be incorporated into a standardized plan of action regarding reconstruction and development in post-conflict environments.

D.   CONCLUSION

In summary, there are six areas the USG must concentrate on for successful implementation of the PRT concept. They are not listed in order of precedence, but each is critical to understanding and implementing reconstruction efficiently and effectively:

- Understanding cultural issues above the basics of dos and don'ts.
- Creating and implementing a central versus distributed vision.
- Integrating indigenous personnel as integral members of a PRT.
- Placing the PRT into the bigger operational picture versus implementing PRTs in parallel to military and other reconstruction efforts (e.g., USAID programs).
- Defining solutions holistically versus as city-centric.
- Standardizing training, doctrine, and operations in the joint, interagency, and multinational environment.

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APPENDIX B: SURVEY SUMMARY

A. SAMPLE DESIGN

The research for this thesis was conducted over a 14 month period from March 2006 through May 2007. During that time, four discrete interview series were conducted with eight Civil Affairs units deploying to Iraq in support of OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM, Rotation 06 – 08. The units included six, 32-member tactical Civil Affairs companies and two, 47-member battalion headquarters companies for a total sample size of approximately 298.

The units were pre-selected in November 2005 prior to decisions by the United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command on unit composition or deployment location. Each discrete interview series was a combination of three types of interviews: individual, group and survey.

The interview schedule and number of participants for each company in the study group are included in Tables B-1 through B-4 below. Overall, over 200 hours of taped interviews, 70 group interviews, 159 individual interviews, and 667 questionnaires (1 declined to participate in the survey) were completed during the effort. Additional interviews were conducted throughout the period with personnel who worked with, trained, or influenced operations of the eight units in the study group. A list of personnel interviewed is included in Appendix C.

Table 1. **Initial Interview Series, 3–14 Mar 2006, Fort Bragg, North Carolina.**

Unit	Location	Number of Interviewees		
		Group	**Individual**	**Survey**
Headquarters, 414th Civil Affairs Battalion	Ft Bragg, NC	3	11	14
A Company, 414th Civil Affairs Battalion		3	3	14
B Company, 414th Civil Affairs Battalion		3	2	14
C Company, 414th Civil Affairs Battalion		3	5	18
Headquarters, 402nd Civil Affairs Battalion		2	4	29
A Company, 402nd Civil Affairs Battalion		3	3	14
B Company, 402nd Civil Affairs Battalion		3	3	14
C Company, 402nd Civil Affairs Battalion		2	2	25
Total		23	33	142

Table 2. **Second Interview Series, 30 Mar–7 Apr 2006, Fort Bragg, North Carolina.**

Unit	Location	Number of Interviewees		
		Group	**Individual**	**Survey**
Headquarters, 414th Civil Affairs Battalion	Ft Bragg, NC	2	7	34
A Company, 414th Civil Affairs Battalion		2	4	22
B Company, 414th Civil Affairs Battalion		2	2	19
C Company, 414th Civil Affairs Battalion		3	3	22
Headquarters, 402nd Civil Affairs Battalion		2	8	2
A Company, 402nd Civil Affairs Battalion		1	3	29
B Company, 402nd Civil Affairs Battalion		1	2	22
C Company, 402nd Civil Affairs Battalion		2	2	27
Total		15	31	177

Table 3. **Third Interview Series, 1 Jun–19 Jun 2006, Iraq (Various Locations).**

Unit	Location	Number of Interviewees		
		Group	**Individual**	**Survey**
Headquarters, 414th Civil Affairs Battalion	Iraq	3	8	23
A Company, 414th Civil Affairs Battalion		1	3	14
B Company, 414th Civil Affairs Battalion		2	2	17
C Company, 414th Civil Affairs Battalion		2	5	23
Headquarters, 402nd Civil Affairs Battalion		5	9	31
A Company, 402nd Civil Affairs Battalion		0	2	1
B Company, 402nd Civil Affairs Battalion		2	3	25
C Company, 402nd Civil Affairs Battalion		2	2	16
Total		17	34	150

Table 4.   Fourth Interview Series, 24 Feb–13 Mar 2007, Iraq (Various Locations).

Unit	Location	Number of Interviewees		
		Group	Individual	Survey
Headquarters, 414th Civil Affairs Battalion	Iraq	2	13	35
A Company, 414th Civil Affairs Battalion		1	5	18
B Company, 414th Civil Affairs Battalion		2	6	21
C Company, 414th Civil Affairs Battalion		2	6	25
Headquarters, 402nd Civil Affairs Battalion		3	17	32
A Company, 402nd Civil Affairs Battalion		2	2	19
B Company, 402nd Civil Affairs Battalion		2	8	25
C Company, 402nd Civil Affairs Battalion		1	4	22
Total		15	61	197

B.   SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS

Demographic characteristics of the sample, like personnel strength in each unit, varied over time as personnel rotated in and out of the units. Table B-3 summarizes the characteristics during the period in which the surveys were taken and do not necessarily represent the composition of the unit in the weeks before or after the survey. The data are based on personnel who completed the physical survey and are presented on an "unbalanced" basis.

Table 5.   Demographic Characteristics of the Sample.

Category	Number			
	Survey 1	**Survey 2**	**Survey 3**	**Survey 4**
Potential Sample Size	238	298	296	287
Actual Sample Size	142	177	150	197
Gender				
Male	126	161	124	174
Female	16	16	26	23
Age				
18 – 24	28	36	21	10
25 – 30	30	30	34	60
31 – 40	54	59	70	82
41 – 65	30	52	25	45
Billet				
Civil Affairs	41	43	28	39
Non-CA	101	134	122	158
Rank				
E1 to E4	38	43	32	48
E5 to E7	59	73	55	81
E8 to E9	2	6	12	7
O1 to O3	25	32	32	36
O4	1	19	14	21
O5 to O6	2	4	5	4
Married				
Yes	69	104	82	135
No	73	73	68	62
Dependent/Children				
Yes	72	95	79	132
No	70	82	71	65

C.   INTERVIEWING PROCEDURES

1.   Group Interviews.

Group interviews were conducted using two different methods. During the first two series of interviews at Fort Bragg, NC, I was able to meet with small groups of service members. The groups were ideally broken down into enlisted (E4 and below), NCO (E5 to E8), and officer. In a few cases, this was not possible due to time and unit movement constraints.   When this occurred, only two groups were interviewed: (1) enlisted and NCO, and (2) officer.

The third and fourth interviews were more difficult since the units were deployed in Iraq and stationed at multiple locations. In many case, units themselves were further sub-divided and located in areas not at the primary unit location. Therefore, group interviews for the third and fourth series of interviews were generally mixed officer, NCO, and enlisted. When possible, groups were separated, but this was the exception and not the rule. Two units were able to maintain separation throughout the entire study period: C/414 CA BN and B/402 CA BN.

2. Individual Interviews

Individual interviews occurred when available. Two types of interviews occurred during the study. The first group of interviews was with service members assigned to the units in the study group: commanders, senior NCOs, and critical staff and operations personnel who could provide detailed descriptions on unit activities and effectiveness. The second group of interviews included personnel who trained, worked with, or came in contact with the study group. Examples of these personnel include the 1st Warrior Training Brigade at Fort Bragg, the Division G9 and Corps MNCI C9 staff cells, the 354th CA Brigade, and interagency personnel assigned to Provincial Reconstruction Teams supported by study group units.

3. Questionnaire

As part of the research effort, a comprehensive survey was conducted of personnel assigned to the study group. The survey remained consistent throughout the study and was given during each of the primary interview sessions (two at Fort Bragg and two in Iraq). The surveys were conducted anonymously in order to obtain a more realistic response. The first two surveys were conducted using hard copy surveys that were later converted to electronic files. The last two surveys were done using the Survey Monkey software suite. In the second set, interviewees answered the questions directly into a computer database. The flow of the questionnaire follows:

- Basic deployment history
- Thoughts about current deployment
- Personal opinions
- Perception of your current Civil Affairs unit

- Perception of training and deployment in civil affairs
- Perception of the working environment in your Civil Affairs unit
- Demographics

4. Survey Results

The following series of tables summarize the information gained during the study, broken down by question. There were a total of 89 questions in the overall questionnaire. Though the questionnaires can be broken down by individual unit, the presentation of data in this Appendix is aggregated across the entire study group.

1. What statement best describes your status?

	Number of Responses			
Question / Answer	Survey 1	Survey 2	Survey 3	Survey 4
I am assigned to USACAPOC as a USAR Soldier	72	90	73	87
I am assigned to USACAPOC as a U.S. Army Active Component Soldier	0	0	0	0
I am attached to Civil Affairs from the U.S. Navy Reserve	14	6	5	8
I am attached to Civil Affairs from the U.S. Navy	14	18	13	14
I am attached to Civil Affairs from the U.S. Air Force Reserve	0	0	0	1
I am attached to Civil Affairs from the U.S. Air Force	6	1	1	4
I am attached to Civil Affairs from the Army Individual Ready Reserve	32	49	34	48
Other (please specify)	4	13	19	24
Skipped the question	0	0	5	11
Total	142	177	150	197

2. If you are in the Reserves or National Guard were you a volunteer for this rotation?

	Number of Responses			
Question / Answer	Survey 1	Survey 2	Survey 3	Survey 4
Yes	49	65	57	62
No	78	106	86	109
Skipped the question	15	0	7	26
Total	142	177	150	197

3. If you are in the Reserves or National Guard and volunteered what were the primary factors that led you to volunteer? Pick as many as are relevant or add any that are not listed.

Question / Answer	Number of Responses			
	Survey 1	Survey 2	Survey 3	Survey 4
Duty / patriotism to country	33	43	10	34
Duty / patriotism to unit or team	25	13	11	14
Excitement	25	3	7	4
Monetary reward	4	8	7	7
Experience	9	6	12	16
Other (please specify)	22	104	100	114
Skipped the question	24	0	3	8
Total	142	177	150	197

4. Describe your current deployment history since 9/11. For the Reserves and National Guard deployment is defined as mobilized from the civilian status placed on active duty orders for greater than six months to serve in an operational assignment either overseas or in the United States and demobilized back to your civilian status. For active duty deployment is defined as deploying downrange (overseas) for at least four months in an operational assignment in support of the Global War on Terrorism.

Question / Answer	Number of Responses			
	Survey 1	Survey 2	Survey 3	Survey 4
I have completed a deployment supporting the Global War on Terrorism within the last 12 months.	10	8	4	11
I have completed a deployment supporting the Global War on Terrorism more than 12 months and less than 24 months ago.	12	16	6	8
I have completed a deployment supporting the Global War on Terrorism more than 24 months and less than 60 months ago.	24	23	20	29
I completed a deployment supporting the Global War on Terrorism more than 60 months ago.	5	9	5	9
I have never deployed in support of the Global War on Terrorism before this mobilization.	91	121	111	132
Skipped the question	0	0	4	8
Total	142	177	150	197

5. How much notice were you given to report to your new unit for this current deployment?

Question / Answer	Number of Responses			
	Survey 1	Survey 2	Survey 3	Survey 4
More than 90 days notice prior to deploying	19	28	22	18
60 to 90 days notice prior to deploying	16	17	15	15
30 to 59 days notice prior to deploying	51	55	45	73
Less than 30 days notice prior to deploying	54	77	64	83
Skipped the question	2	0	4	8
Total	142	177	150	197

6. How satisfied are you that you did what you need to prepare for deployment?

Question / Answer	Number of Responses			
	Survey 1	Survey 2	Survey 3	Survey 4
Completely satisfied	7	3	3	4
Pretty satisfied	66	49	34	23
Not very satisfied	69	122	109	162
Skipped the question	0	3	4	8
Total	142	177	150	197

7. Thoughts on your current deployment. The questionnaire asked the respondent to their satisfaction on a scale of 1 to 6 as follows: 1 – Strongly Disagree, 2 – Slightly Disagree, 3 – Neither, 4 – Slightly Agree, 5 – Strongly Agree, or 6 – N/A. The average result is listed in the table below.

Question / Answer	Number of Responses			
	Survey 1	Survey 2	Survey 3	Survey 4
I feel comfortable deploying in a Civil Affairs unit?	3.40	3.11	3.18	3.00
Deployment predictability is important to me.	4.32	4.14	4.17	4.43
I understand how the mobilization and deployment system works.	3.45	3.33	3.59	3.57
My deployed unit can take on nearly any task and complete it.	3.37	3.25	3.34	3.01
I am thinking of trying to become fulltime military after this deployment.	2.80	2.52	2.96	2.00
My work-groups overall level of effectiveness is very high.	3.31	3.25	3.32	3.44
I am happy with my deployed team's level of commitment to the mission.	3.78	3.78	3.86	3.36

Question / Answer	Number of Responses			
	Survey 1	Survey 2	Survey 3	Survey 4
I think I will be in the military five years from now.	3.38	3.09	3.12	2.72
I will leave the military as soon as I am able to separate.	2.56	2.79	3.04	2.72
The quality of the personnel I work with meets my expectations for accomplishing the CA missions.	**3.62**	**3.52**	**3.41**	**2.68**
In general I like working for the military.	4.25	3.93	4.18	3.8
Supporting the overall war effort is important to me.	4.52	4.29	4.14	4.24
If members of our deployed team have personal problems or concerns everyone wants to help out so we can get back together again.	3.79	4.01	3.69	3.18
Members of my unit are willing to share information with other team members about our work.	3.94	4.02	3.48	3.31
I would be very happy to spend the rest of my career with the military.	3.43	3.00	3.33	2.66
I feel anxious about working with members of other teams.	3.13	3.17	2.83	2.59
I have worked in joint units before.	2.87	2.99	3.57	3.16
I feel emotionally attached to my deploying unit.	3.02	3.21	3.07	2.62
I feel like a part of the deploying unit's family (for example my dependents are incorporated into the Family Readiness Program).	**2.67**	**2.71**	**2.37**	**2.04**
Deploying outside my normal military career field is hurting my chances for advancement.	2.64	2.67	2.84	2.36
I often feel the strain of trying to balance my military responsibilities and family.	3.09	3.24	2.86	3.42
Tension exists trying to balance my deployments and personal life.	3.26	3.36	3.00	3.59
My family dislikes me deploying.	3.81	3.85	3.76	3.95
My family understands my responsibilities to the military.	4.14	4.11	4.14	4.05
Skipped the question	0	0	4	8

8. Individual Feelings on Unit Composition. Rate the importance of these personal issues to you as an individual. The questionnaire asked the respondent to their satisfaction on a scale of 1 to 7 as follows: 1 – Not At All, 2 – Very Little, 3 – Little, 4 – Somewhat, 5 – Moderately, 6 – Greatly, or 7 – A lot.   The average result is listed in the table below.

Question / Answer	Number of Responses			
	Survey 1	Survey 2	Survey 3	Survey 4
Feedback from others?	5.17	4.77	5.00	4.67
Appreciation?	4.98	4.79	4.83	4.76
Opportunity to take time off when needed?	5.31	5.03	4.69	4.64
Sharing of duties?	5.17	4.95	4.93	4.72
Sharing of responsibility?	5.18	5.04	5.21	4.59
Emotional support?	5.01	4.54	3.90	4.38
Skipped the question	0	0	4	8

9. Rate the following questions based on your perception of your current Civil Affairs unit in accomplishing its Civil Affairs missions. The questionnaire asked the respondent to their satisfaction on a scale of 1 to 6 as follows: 1 – Strongly Disagree, 2 – Slightly Disagree, 3 – Neither, 4 – Slightly Agree, 5 – Strongly Agree, or 6 – N/A. The average result is listed in the table below.

Question / Answer	Number of Responses			
	Survey 1	Survey 2	Survey 3	Survey 4
Working as a member of a Civil Affairs unit has increased my ability to perform efficiently at assigned tasks.	3.19	3.05	2.93	2.96
I generally like working as part of this Civil Affairs unit.	**3.59**	**3.43**	**3.17**	**2.96**
I have confidence that my unit can perform effectively.	**3.64**	**3.55**	**3.14**	**3.08**
My deployed unit has a lot of team spirit.	**3.73**	**3.77**	**3.03**	**2.76**
Being in my unit gives me the opportunity to support the overall war effort.	4.16	3.91	3.31	3.39
I often think about quitting my job with the military.	**2.49**	**2.76**	**2.76**	**2.89**
When needed members of my unit help each other out.	4.06	4.05	3.55	3.42
Members of our deployed team stick together outside of work time.	3.54	3.92	3.66	3.07
Members of my unit cooperate to get the mission accomplished.	**4.01**	**4.11**	**3.93**	**3.5**
The thought of this deployment worries/worried me.	3.21	3.32	2.76	3.14
I am concerned with how I will fit in with the team.	2.87	2.81	2.24	2.37

	Number of Responses			
Question / Answer	Survey 1	Survey 2	Survey 3	Survey 4
My leadership cares about me personally.	3.59	3.65	3.52	2.88
My leadership cares about me professionally.	3.64	3.68	3.52	2.87
My leadership is concerned with ensuring my family is taken care of while I am deployed.	**3.40**	**3.30**	**3.31**	**2.43**
Skipped the question	0	0	4	8

10. Rate the following questions based on your perception of the training and deployment of your current Civil Affairs unit. The questionnaire asked the respondent to their satisfaction on a scale of 1 to 6 as follows: 1 – Strongly Disagree, 2 – Slightly Disagree, 3 – Neither, 4 – Slightly Agree, 5 – Strongly Agree, or 6 – N/A. The average result is listed in the table below.

	Number of Responses			
Question / Answer	Survey 1	Survey 2	Survey 3	Survey 4
I think the current training plan effectively prepared my unit to conduct its mission in Iraq.	**2.29**	**1.73**	**2.00**	**1.38**
I think the current training plan to deploy as a unit is better than deploying as individual augmentees to other units already in Iraq.	3.74	3.46	2.97	3.29
Overall I like the way Civil Affairs has implemented the training and deployment plan.	**2.32**	**1.79**	**1.83**	**1.53**
I feel better if I deploy with individuals from my old unit.	3.79	3.58	3.59	3.51
All in all I am satisfied with my job.	**3.41**	**3.25**	**3.28**	**2.93**
I feel better if I deploy with individuals from my own service or branch of service.	3.54	3.53	3.34	3.45
Compared to other units I have been associated with the effectiveness of my current unit is excellent.	2.93	3.19	2.69	2.53
Skipped the question	0	0	4	8

11. Rate the following questions based on your perception of the working environment in your current Civil Affairs unit. The questionnaire asked the respondent to their satisfaction on a scale of 1 to 6 as follows: 1 – Strongly Disagree, 2 – Slightly Disagree, 3 – Neither, 4 – Slightly Agree, 5 – Strongly Agree, or 6 – N/A. The average result is listed in the table below.

Question / Answer	Number of Responses			
	Survey 1	Survey 2	Survey 3	Survey 4
If given the choice I would prefer to work at the tactical level (going into the field frequently).	3.81	3.81	3.69	3.75
If given the choice I would prefer to work at the operational and functional specialist level (working in a base camp with limited to no trips outside the gate).	2.50	2.50	2.52	2.28
I feel a strong sense of belonging to my deploying unit.	3.49	3.40	3.14	2.71
If given the choice I would prefer to work at the strategic level or somewhere outside the combat zone.	2.63	2.60	2.48	2.43
I think deploying outside my service/branch is justified in wartime.	3.57	3.53	3.66	3.54
I like the people in my unit.	4.11	4.17	4.00	3.39
I find I have to work harder at my job because of the leadership problems within my unit.	**2.67**	**2.90**	**3.24**	**3.37**
There is too much bickering and fighting within my unit during the deployment.	**2.34**	**2.53**	**3.21**	**3.36**
My unit leadership is competent in doing their job.	**3.76**	**3.54**	**3.17**	**2.79**
Based on your Civil Affairs training completed to date you understand what the Civil Affairs mission in Iraq requires you to accomplish?	3.54	3.10	3.07	2.95
My unit leadership was unfair to me.	1.87	2.02	1.86	2.46
My unit leadership showed too little interest in the feelings of subordinates within my unit.	2.26	2.28	2.21	2.83
I like my unit leadership.	3.77	3.68	3.45	2.92
Our deployed team is united in trying to succeed.	4.02	4.04	3.93	3.3
Our deployed team members have conflicting aspirations for the team's performance.	**2.64**	**2.67**	**3.14**	**3.24**
The deployed team provides me opportunities to improve my personal performance.	3.70	3.54	3.55	3.21
Our deployed team members rarely socialize together.	2.57	2.25	2.38	2.7
Our deployed team would rather go out on their own than get together as a team.	2.55	2.47	2.69	2.97

Question / Answer	Number of Responses			
	Survey 1	Survey 2	Survey 3	Survey 4
This deployed unit is one of the most important social groups to which I belong.	2.88	2.93	2.66	2.16
I would consider being part of this type of deploying unit in the future.	**3.21**	**2.95**	**2.79**	**2.42**
Some of my best friends are on this deployed team.	**2.40**	**2.64**	**2.90**	**2.38**
I am going to miss the members of my unit when this deployment ends.	**3.46**	**3.52**	**3.72**	**3.04**
I have problems working with others on deployments.	1.78	1.95	1.83	1.96
If members of our deployed teams have professional problems or concerns everyone wants to help out so we can get back together again.	3.62	3.68	3.55	2.93
I avoid extra duties and responsibilities within the deployment.	1.83	1.86	1.97	1.88
My unit was very effective on the deployment.	3.18	3.05	2.97	2.87
All in all my unit was very competent.	3.37	3.27	3.34	2.89
In my estimation our unit gets the job done effectively.	3.59	3.52	3.24	3.14
Skipped the question	0	0	4	8

12. Taking all things together how would you describe your preparations for deployment?

Question / Answer	Number of Responses			
	Survey 1	Survey 2	Survey 3	Survey 4
Very Happy	10	7	2	0
Pretty Happy	62	52	22	38
Not too Happy	70	118	123	146
Skipped the question	0	0	3	13
Total	142	177	150	197

13. If you mobilized as an individual and were assigned to a Civil Affairs team after arrival how long did it take you to feel as if you were part of the unit?

Question / Answer	Number of Responses			
	Survey 1	Survey 2	Survey 3	Survey 4
Less than 7 days	29	31	13	32
7 to 15 days	18	33	16	25
16 to 30 days	20	26	14	24
31 to 60 days	17	27	37	36
61 to 90 days	28	35	44	49

I never felt a part of the deployed team	30	25	18	23
Skipped the question	0	0	8	8
Total	142	177	150	197

D.   DEVIATIONS

A number of deviations in the survey sampling occurred over the length of the study duration. These events are summarized below.

1. Four U.S. Army Reserve Soldiers assigned to the study group were killed in action. Two soldiers were assigned to the Individual Ready Reserve prior to mobilization and two were assigned to USACAPOC Army Reserve units. All four Soldiers took part in the first three surveys but not in the fourth.

2. Two Soldiers were wounded in action, evacuated, and did not participate in the fourth survey.

3. Approximately 27 Soldiers were transferred into or out of the survey group at various times throughout the survey. The two primary causes for these transfers were reassignment to other units outside of the study group and reassignment to other units within the study group. In a small number of cases, less than five, Soldiers were transferred into study group units.

4. U.S. Air Force (USAF) personnel assigned to the study group deployed on a six month versus one year rotation cycle. Therefore, the initial five USAF personnel assigned to the study group units were only present for the first three interviews. The fourth interview was conducted with the replacement personnel.

5. Unit gaps occurred during the interviews at Fort Bragg prior to unit deployment. This occurred because unit personnel were assigned to professional certification or qualification schools at the time of the interviews and were not present at Fort Bragg for duty.

6. Unit gaps occurred during interviews in Iraq. These were primarily due to two reasons. First, a number of individuals were not present for duty (e.g., leave) at the time of the interviews. Second, a number of teams were moved to remote bases as part of the overall operational plan in Iraq. In many of these cases, it was impossible for me to travel to these locations due to time and logistical constraints in theater.

APPENDIX C: INTERVIEW LIST

Appendix C contains a listing of all unpublished interviews conducted during the course of the research. It is categorized by date and location. Specific citations used during writing of the thesis are incorporated as footnotes in the report.

Table 6.   List of Interviews.

Date	Interviewee	Location
January 11, 2006	Captain Bethany Aragon, United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command, G3	Fort Bragg, NC
March 13, 2006	Major General Herbert Altshuler, Commander, USACAPOC(A)	Fort Bragg NC
March 13, 2006	Colonel Rose, Commander, Warrior Training Brigade	Fort Bragg, NC
March 13, 2006	Lieutenant Colonel William Woods, Commander, 414 Civil Affairs Battalion	Fort Bragg, NC
March 13, 2006	Major Chris Oswalt, Operations Directorate, Warrior Training Brigade	Fort Bragg, NC
March 13, 2006	Command Sergeant Major Terry Davis, Command Sergeant Major, 402 Civil Affairs Battalion	Fort Bragg, NC
March 13, 2006	Lieutenant Colonel Goto, Chief of Operations, USACAPOC(A)	Fort Bragg, NC
March 14, 2006	Command Sergeant Robert Zglenski, Command Sergeant Major, 414 Civil Affairs Battalion	Fort Bragg, NC
March 14, 2006	Group interview with enlisted and NCOs, A/414 Civil Affairs Battalion	Fort Bragg, NC
March 14, 2006	Group interview with officers, A/414 Civil Affairs Battalion	Fort Bragg, NC
March 14, 2006	Group interview with enlisted and NCOs, B/414 Civil Affairs Battalion	Fort Bragg, NC
March 14, 2006	Group interview with officers, B/414 Civil Affairs Battalion	Fort Bragg, NC
March 14, 2006	Group interview with NCOs, HQ/414 Civil Affairs Battalion	Fort Bragg, NC
March 14, 2006	Group interview with officers, HQ/414 Civil Affairs Battalion	Fort Bragg, NC
March 15, 2006	Group interview with enlisted and NCOs, C/414 Civil Affairs Battalion	Fort Bragg, NC
March 15, 2006	Lieutenant Colonel William Mason,	Fort Bragg, NC

Date	Interviewee	Location
	Commander, 402 Civil Affairs Battalion	
March 15, 2006	Group interview with officers, C/414 Civil Affairs Battalion	Fort Bragg, NC
March 15, 2006	Group interview with enlisted, HQ/414 Civil Affairs Battalion	Fort Bragg, NC
March 15, 2006	Group interview with enlisted and NCOs, B/402 Civil Affairs Battalion	Fort Bragg, NC
March 15, 2006	Group interview with officers, B/402 Civil Affairs Battalion	Fort Bragg, NC
March 15, 2006	Group interview with NCOs, HQ/402 Civil Affairs Battalion	Fort Bragg, NC
March 16, 2006	Group interview with enlisted and NCOs, C/402 Civil Affairs Battalion	Fort Bragg, NC
March 16, 2006	Group interview with officers, C/402 Civil Affairs Battalion	Fort Bragg, NC
March 16, 2006	Group interview with enlisted and NCOs, B/402 Civil Affairs Battalion	Fort Bragg, NC
March 16, 2006	Group interview with officers, B/402 Civil Affairs Battalion	Fort Bragg, NC
March 16, 2006	Group interview with officers, HQ/402 Civil Affairs Battalion	Fort Bragg, NC
March 17, 2006	Colonel Rose, Commander, Warrior Training Brigade	Fort Bragg, NC
April 25, 2006	Major General Herbert Altshuler, Commander, USACAPOC(A)	Fort Bragg, NC
June 4, 2006	Petty Officer Foose, G9 NCO, 4th Infantry Division (414 Civil Affairs Battalion)	Camp Liberty, Iraq
June 5, 2006	Chief Petty Officer Flanick, G9 NCOIC, 4th Infantry Division (414 Civil Affairs Battalion)	Camp Liberty, Iraq
June 5, 2006	Lieutenant Colonel Lopez, Multi-National Division-North LNO and Captain Serra, Multi Multi-National Brigade-Baghadad LNO	Camp Victory, Iraq
June 5, 2006	Lieutenant Colonel Alberto Rivera, Multi-National Corps-Iraq C9 Plans, 354 Civil Affairs Brigade	Camp Victory, Iraq
June 5, 2006	Captain (USN) William Hampton, MNCI C9 Economics Officer, 354 Civil Affairs Brigade	Camp Victory, Iraq
June 5, 2006	Colonel Baker, MNCI C9 Rule of Law Officer, 354 Civil Affairs Brigade	Camp Victory, Iraq

Date	Interviewee	Location
June 5, 2006	Captain Deitch (USAF), Deputy Public Affairs G9, 4th Infantry Division	Camp Victory, Iraq
June 5, 2006	Sergeant First Class Curtis Allen, MNCI C9 (Automation)	Camp Victory, Iraq
June 6, 2006	Lieutenant Commander Robert Koch, S3, 414 Civil Affairs Battalion	Camp Liberty, Iraq
June 6, 2006	Captain Duane Butler, HHC Commander, 414 Civil Affairs Battalion	Camp Liberty, Iraq
June 6, 2006	Mr. John McKenna, 126th Military History Detachment	Camp Liberty, Iraq
June 6, 2006	Lieutenant Colonel Parsons, Psychiatrist, 883rd Combat Stress Detachment	Camp Liberty, Iraq
June 6, 2006	Major Cooper, 30th Medical Brigade (Combat Stress)	Camp Liberty, Iraq
June 6, 2006	Lieutenant Isaac Kraushaiar, 414 Civil Affairs Battalion	Camp Liberty, Iraq
June 6, 2006	Major Ray Reidel, MNCI C9, 354 Civil Affairs Brigade	Camp Victory, Iraq
June 6, 2006	Lieutenant Colonel Alberto Rivera, Multi-National Corps-Iraq C9 Plans, 354 Civil Affairs Brigade	Camp Victory, Iraq
June 6, 2006	Ms. Jennifer Link, USAID LNO to MNCI C9	Camp Victory, Iraq
June 6, 2006	Captain (USN) William Hampton, MNCI C9 Economics Officer, 354 Civil Affairs Brigade	Camp Victory, Iraq
June 7, 2006	Lieutenant Commander Robert Koch, S3, 414 Civil Affairs Battalion	Camp Liberty, Iraq
June 7, 2006	Lieutenant Colonel Adrian Bogart, G9, 4th Infantry Division	Camp Liberty, Iraq
June 7, 2006	Group interview with enlisted and NCOs, HHC/414 Civil Affairs Battalion	Camp Liberty, Iraq
June 7, 2006	Group interview with officers, HHC/414 Civil Affairs Battalion	Camp Liberty, Iraq
June 7, 2006	Lieutenant Colonel Kukla, Deputy G9, 4th Infantry Division (Individual Augmentee)	Camp Liberty, Iraq
June 7, 2006	Group interview with enlisted and NCOs, S1, 414 Civil Affairs Battalion	Camp Liberty, Iraq
June 7, 2006	Group interview with enlisted and NCOs, A/414 Civil Affairs Battalion	Camp Loyalty, Iraq

Date	Interviewee	Location
June 7, 2006	Lieutenant Colonel Robert Savers, Chief of Operations C9, MNCI	Camp Victory, Iraq
June 8, 2006	Group interview with officers, A/414 Civil Affairs Battalion	Camp Loyalty, Iraq
June 8, 2006	Major Philip McIntyre, Commander, A/414 Civil Affairs Battalion	Camp Loyalty, Iraq
June 8, 2006	Major Workman Britt, S9, 4/101 Air Assault Division	Camp Loyalty, Iraq
June 9, 2006	Group interview with enlisted and NCOs, C/414 Civil Affairs Battalion	Camp Falcon, Iraq
June 9, 2006	Major Joliat, S9, 2/4 Infantry Division	Camp Falcon, Iraq
June 9, 2006	Major David Sigmund, MNCI PSYOP IO Chief	U.S. Embassy, Green Zone, Baghdad, Iraq
June 9, 2006	Major Mingo and Lieutenant Colonel Otto Busher, PRT- Baghdad	U.S. Embassy, Green Zone, Baghdad, Iraq
June 10, 2006	Group interview with officers, C/414 Civil Affairs Battalion	Camp Falcon, Iraq
June 10, 2006	Captain Erickson, CATA Team Leader, B/414 Civil Affairs Battalion	Camp Falcon, Iraq
June 10, 2006	Group interview with officers, B/414 Civil Affairs Battalion	Camp Taji, Iraq
June 10, 2006	Major Jose Acosta, S9, 4/4 Infantry Division	Camp Taji, Iraq
June 11, 2006	Staff Sergeant McGuire, B/414 Civil Affairs Battalion	Camp Taji, Iraq
June 11, 2006	Group interview with enlisted and NCOs, B/414 Civil Affairs Battalion	Camp Taji, Iraq
June 11, 2006	Major Robert Frander (Commander) and First Sergeant Stockinger, B/414 Civil Affairs Battalion	Camp Taji, Iraq
June 12, 2006	Group interview with officers and NCOs, G9 (HHC/402 Civil Affairs Battalion)	Camp Speicher, Iraq
June 13, 2006	Group interview of enlisted and NCOs from Headquarters Company, 402 Civil Affairs Battalion	Camp Speicher, Iraq
June 13, 2006	Specialist Lazar, Headquarters Company, 402 Civil Affairs Battalion	Camp Speicher, Iraq
June 13, 2006	Group interview with enlisted and NCOs, S1, HQ/402 Civil Affairs Battalion	Camp Speicher, Iraq
June 13,2006	Captain Reppenger, S1, HQ/402 Civil Affairs Battalion	Camp Speicher, Iraq
June 13, 2006	Ensign Gardipee, S4, HQ/402 Civil	Camp Speicher, Iraq

Date	Interviewee	Location
	Affairs Battalion	
June 13, 2006	Group interview with officers, B/402 Civil Affairs Battalion (PRT – Salah ad Din)	Camp Speicher, Iraq
June 13, 2006	Group interview with enlisted and NCOs, B/402 Civil Affairs Battalion (PRT – Salah ad Din)	Camp Speicher, Iraq
June 13, 2006	Commander (USN) Keesler, RROC Team Chief, HQ/402 Civil Affairs Battalion	Camp Speicher, Iraq
June 14, 2006	Quartermaster Machinist Mate Second Class Michael Pollard, Headquarters Company, 402 Civil Affairs Battalion	Camp Speicher, Iraq
June 14, 2006	Lieutenant Colonel James McKnight, G9, 101 Air Assault Division	Camp Speicher, Iraq
June 14, 2006	Master Sergeant Luis Juan, G9 NCOIC, 101 Air Assault Division	Camp Speicher, Iraq
June 14, 2006	Group interview with officers from Headquarters, 402nd Civil Affairs Battalion (S-3 Operations and S6)	Camp Speicher, Iraq
June 14, 2006	Group interview with S4 staff, HQ/402 Civil Affairs Battalion	Camp Speicher, Iraq
June 14, 2006	Group interview of enlisted and NCOs from C/402 Civil Affairs Battalion	Kirkuk, Iraq
June 14, 2006	Group interview with officers, C/402 Civil Affairs Battalion	Kirkuk, Iraq
June 14, 2006	Captain Jim Becker, Commander, C/402 Civil Affairs Battalion	Kirkuk, Iraq
June 15, 2006	Group interview of enlisted and NCOs, A/402 Civil Affairs Battalion	Camp Speicher, Iraq
June 15, 2006	Group interview with officers, A/402 Civil Affairs Battalion	Camp Speicher, Iraq
June 15, 2006	Ms Stephanie Miley, Department of State, Saleh ah Din Provincial Reconstruction Team	Camp Speicher, Iraq
June 15, 2006	Group interview with enlisted and NCOs from Bravo Company, 402 Civil Affairs Battalion	Camp Warhorse, Iraq
June 15, 2006	Group interview with officers from Bravo Company, 402 Civil Affairs Battalion	Camp Warhorse, Iraq
June 16, 2006	Ms. Kiki Munshi, Department of State, Baquba Provincial Reconstruction Team	Camp Warhorse, Iraq

Date	Interviewee	Location
June 16, 2006	Mr Reed Whitlock, Department of State, Baquba Provincial Reconstruction Team	Camp Warhorse, Iraq
June 16, 2006	Major Hanhauser and Major Foster, 2nd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division S9 office	Camp Warhorse, Iraq
June 17, 2006	Lieutenant Colonel William Mason, Commander, 402 Civil Affairs Battalion	Camp Speicher, Iraq
June 17, 2006	Lieutenant Colonel James McKnight, G9, 101 Air Assault Division	Camp Speicher, Iraq
June 17, 2006	Captain (USN) Dever, Chief of Plans, MNCI C9	Kirkuk, Iraq
June 18, 2006	Colonel John Ward, MNCI C9	Camp Victory, Iraq
June 20, 2006	Colonel John Ward, MNCI C9	Camp Victory, Iraq
June 20, 2006	Lieutenant Robertson, MNCI C9	Camp Victory, Iraq
June 20, 2006	Captain Harold Morris, MNCI C3	Camp Victory, Iraq
June 21, 2006	Lieutenant Adrian Bogart, G9, 101 Air Assault Division	Camp Liberty, Iraq
June 22, 2006	Lieutenant Painter, Deputy G4, 4th Infantry Division	Camp Liberty, Iraq
June 22, 2006	Captain Tom DeKeiser, JSOTF-AP	Camp Victory, Iraq
June 23, 2006	Captain Neujeck, S-4, 414 Civil Affairs Battalion	Camp Liberty, Iraq
January 25, 2007	Group interview with LTC Woods, CDR McGinn, CSM and Zglenski, Command Group, 414 Civil Affairs Battalion	Camp Liberty, Iraq
January 26, 2007	Captain David Lowe, S-1, 414 Civil Affairs Battalion	Camp Liberty, Iraq
January 26, 2007	Command Sergeant Major Robert Zglenski, 414 Civil Affairs Battalion	Camp Liberty, Iraq
January 26, 2007	Colonel William Kehrer, MNCI C9	Camp Victory, Iraq
January 27, 2007	Lieutenant Colonel William Woods, 414 Civil Affairs Battalion	Camp Liberty, Iraq
January 27, 2007	Group interview with enlisted and NCOs, Headquarters Company, 414 Civil Affairs Battalion	Camp Liberty, Iraq
January 27, 2007	Ambassador Joseph Saloom, Director Iraq Reconstruction Office (IRMO)	Green Zone, Iraq
January 27, 2007	Mr. David Soroko, International Relief and Development	U.S. embassy, Green Zone, Baghdad, Iraq
January 28, 2007	Captain William Wald, Headquarters and Headquarters Company Commander, 414 Civil Affairs	Camp Liberty, Iraq

Date	Interviewee	Location
	Battalion	
January 28, 2007	Commander (USN) John McGinn, Executive Officer, 414 Civil Affairs Battalion	Camp Liberty, Iraq
January 28, 2007	Group interview with enlisted and NCOs, Alpha Company, 414 Civil Affairs Battalion	Camp Loyalty, Iraq
January 28, 2007	Major Philip McIntire, Commander, Alpha Company, 414 Civil Affairs Battalion	Camp Loyalty, Iraq
January 29, 2007	Major John Crean, S9, 2nd Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division	Camp Loyalty, Iraq
January 29, 2007	Major Jack Sattnick, Alpha Company, 414 Civil Affairs Battalion	Camp Loyalty, Iraq
January 29, 2007	First Sergeant Marvin Gonzalez, First Sergeant, Alpha Company, 414 Civil Affairs Battalion	Camp Loyalty, Iraq
January 29, 2007	Captain Clifford, Commander, Tactical PSYOP Detachment	Camp Loyalty, Iraq
January 30, 2007	Major Duane Butler, Commander, Charlie Company, 414 Civil Affairs Battalion	Camp Taji, Iraq
January 30, 2007	Team interview, 2/C/414 Civil Affairs Battalion	Camp Taji, Iraq
January 30, 2007	Team interview, 3/C/414 Civil Affairs Battalion	Camp Taji, Iraq
January 30, 2007	Major Juliet, S9, 1st, 2nd Infantry Division	Camp Taji, Iraq
January 30, 2007	Team interview, 4/C/414 Civil Affairs Battalion	Camp Taji, Iraq
January 31, 2007	First Sergeant Bonita Jones, First Sergeant, Charlie Company, 414 Civil Affairs Battalion	Camp Taji, Iraq
January 31, 2007	Major Duane Butler, Commander, Charlie Company, 414 Civil Affairs Battalion	Camp Taji, Iraq
January 31, 2007	Team interview, CATB/C/414 Civil Affairs Battalion	Camp Taji, Iraq
January 31, 2007	Major Simpson, S-9,2nd, 82nd Airborne Division	Camp Taji, Iraq
February, 1, 2007	Colonel Manny Deemer, Director, Counterinsurgency Academy	Camp Taji, Iraq
February 2, 2007	Sergeant First Class Robert Goulet, Bravo Company, 414 Civil Affairs	Camp Falcon, Iraq

Date	Interviewee	Location
	Battalion	
February 2, 2007	First Sergeant Timothy Stockinger Jones, First Sergeant, Bravo Company, 414 Civil Affairs Battalion	Camp Falcon, Iraq
February 2, 2007	Major Erickson, Acting Commander, Bravo, 414 Civil Affairs Battalion	Camp Falcon, Iraq
February 2, 2007	Group interview with enlisted, NCOs and officers, Bravo, 414 Civil Affairs Battalion	Camp Falcon, Iraq
February 3, 2007	CW5 James Anderson, Assistant G1, 358 Civil Affairs Brigade	Camp Slayer, Iraq
February 3, 2007	Lieutenant Colonel Fitz Fitzpatrick, Deputy Commander, 358 Civil Affairs Brigade	Camp Slayer, Iraq
February 3, 2007	Captain Reppenger, S-1, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 414 Civil Affairs Battalion	Camp Speicher, Iraq
February 3, 2007	Group interview with enlisted and NCOs, S-1, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 414 Civil Affairs Battalion	Camp Speicher, Iraq
February 3, 2007	Lieutenant Commander (USN) Carlos Iglesias, Commander, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 402 Civil Affairs Battalion	Camp Speicher, Iraq
February 3, 2007	Phone interview, Major Joe Peterson, S-9, JSOTF-AP	Camp Speicher, Iraq
February 3, 2007	Captain Kim, Commander, combined B/402 and B/404 Civil Affairs Company, 414 Civil Affairs Battalion	Camp Warhorse, Iraq
February 4, 2007	Commander (USN) Burdick, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 402 Civil Affairs Battalion	Camp Speicher, Iraq
February 4, 2007	Mr. Joe Shroader, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Deputy Director, National Coordination Team	Camp Warhorse, Iraq
February 4, 2007	Mr. Reed Whitlock, Department of State, Baquba Provincial Reconstruction Team	Camp Warhorse, Iraq
February 5, 2007	Group interview with enlisted and NCOs, B/402 and B/404 Civil Affairs Battalion	Camp Warhorse, Iraq
February 5, 2007	Group interview with officers, B/402 and B/404 Civil Affairs Battalion	Camp Warhorse, Iraq

Date	Interviewee	Location
February 5, 2007	Mr. Joe Shroader, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Deputy Director, National Coordination Team	Camp Warhorse, Iraq
February 6, 2007	Command Sergeant Major Davis, C, 402 Civil Affairs Battalion	Camp Speicher, Iraq
February 6, 2007	Sergeant First Class Cullen, NCOIC, Salah ad Din Provincial Reconstruction Team, A/402 Civil Affairs Battalion	Camp Speicher, Iraq
February 6, 2007	Group interview with enlisted and NCOs assigned to Saleh ah Din Provincial Reconstruction Team, A/402 Civil Affairs Battalion	Camp Speicher, Iraq
February 6, 2007	Group interview with officers assigned to Saleh ah Din Provincial Reconstruction Team, A/402 Civil Affairs Battalion	Camp Speicher, Iraq
February 6, 2007	Major Menzemer, Commander, Salah ad Din Provincial Reconstruction Team, A/402 Civil Affairs Battalion	Camp Speicher, Iraq
February 7, 2007	Lieutenant Colonel Joe Stanton, Operations Planner, National Coordination Team	U.S. Embassy, Green Zone, Baghdad, Iraq
February 8, 2007	Lieutenant Junior Grade (USN) Heyrick, RROC, Assigned to Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 414 Civil Affairs Battalion from the 354 Civil Affairs Brigade	Camp Liberty, Iraq
February 9, 2007	Captain Tisdale, G9 office, 25th Infantry Division	Camp Liberty, Iraq
February 9, 2007	Colonel Dave Alvin, Deputy C9,MNCI	Camp Victory, Iraq
February 9, 2007	Major Johnny Spruiel, Executive Officer, C9, MNCI	Camp Victory, Iraq
February 10, 2007	Major Jose Mediera, C3 Joint Operating Center (Civil-Military Desk), MNCI	Camp Victory, Iraq
February 10, 2007	Lieutenant Jose Rose, National Coordination Team	U.S. Embassy, Green Zone, Baghdad, Iraq
February 11,2007	Lieutenant William Woods, Commander, 414 Civil Affairs Battalion	Camp Liberty, Iraq
February 11, 2007	Commander Downing (USN), Liaison to MNCI C9 from MNFI National Coordination Team	Camp Victory, Iraq
February 11, 2007	Lieutenant Colonel Joe Stanton,	U.S. embassy, Green

Date	Interviewee	Location
	Operations Planner, National Coordination Team	Zone, Baghdad, Iraq

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