The Clinton Administration’s Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations

By

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[The following is a statement by Madeleine K. Albright, the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, before the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs of the House Appropriation Committee, Washington, DC, May 5, 1994.]

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the subcommittee, I am pleased to be here this morning, along with my colleague, Assistant Secretary of State Doug Bennet, to discuss U.S. policy toward the UN and the Administration’s budget request for fiscal year 1995.

For purposes of time, I will confine my remarks to an issue of central importance to the Administration and of demonstrated interest to the Congress: the future of UN peacekeeping. Although this is an issue which appears to be constantly in the news, it raises fundamental questions that are anything but new.

Today, we can look back at centuries of international efforts to deter conflict through a combination of force and law. Before the UN, there was the League of Nations; before that, the Congress of Vienna; before that, the Treaty of Westphalia; before that, medieval nonaggression pacts; and before that, the Athenian League.

Obviously, no magic formula has been found. Today, some Americans see UN peacekeeping as a dangerous illusion. Others consider it the linchpin of world peace. The Clinton Administration has a more balanced view. We see UN peacekeeping as a contributor to, not the centerpiece of, our national security strategy. We see it as a way to defuse crises and prevent breaches of peace from turning into larger disasters. It lends global legitimacy to efforts to mediate disputes, demobilize armed factions, arrange cease-fires, and provide emergency relief. It reduces the likelihood of unwelcome interventions by regional powers. And it ensures a sharing of the costs and risks of maintaining world order.

But for reasons that may be inherent in the institution, the UN has not yet demonstrated the ability to respond effectively when the risk of combat is high and the level of local cooperation is low. The UN’s impartiality can be a key to diplomatic credibility, but it is of less help when military credibility is what is required. And the UN’s resources have been stretched perilously thin by the dramatic increase in peacekeeping requests it has received.

So UN peacekeeping is not, in our view, a substitute for vigorous alliances and a strong national defense. When threats arise to us or to others, we will choose the course of action that best serves our interests. We may act through the UN, we may act through NATO, we may act through a coalition, we may sometimes mix these tools, or we may act alone. But we will do whatever is necessary to defend the vital interests of the United States.
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As you know, Mr. Chairman, the Administration has just completed a comprehensive review of peacekeeping policy. The one-sentence summary of our policy is that it is not intended to expand UN peacekeeping but to help fix it. We have already taken the first step by insisting that the Security Council overhaul its process for deciding when a peacekeeping operation should be initiated or extended.

MORE RIGOROUS DECISION-MAKING

Last year, soon after I arrived in New York, I began to ask: What criteria have we been using to decide whether or not to support a peace mission? What criteria did the previous Administration use, for example, when it voted to support new operations in the former Yugoslavia, Somalia, Angola, El Salvador, Cambodia, the Western Sahara, Mozambique, and Kuwait? What criteria were other members of the Security Council using? There was no clear answer.

We have changed that. We believe that the value of UN peacekeeping does not depend on how many missions are attempted but on how well each mission is conducted. So we are insisting that the key questions be asked before, not after, new peacekeeping obligations are undertaken. These questions include the following.

- Will UN involvement advance U.S. interests?
- Is there a real threat to international peace and security?
- Does the proposed peacekeeping mission have clear objectives, and can its scope be clearly defined?
- If the operation is a peacekeeping—as opposed to peace enforcement—mission, is a ceasefire in place, and have the parties to the conflict agreed to a UN presence?
- Are the financial and personnel resources needed to accomplish the mission available?
- Can an end point to UN participation be identified?
- What happens if we do not act?

These questions are intended to serve as an aid to decision-making, not as a substitute for it. Decisions have been and will be based on the cumulative weight of the factors with no single factor being an absolute determinant.

Already, our new policy is making a difference. For example, we have made our support for potential expansion of missions in Angola and Liberia contingent on sustained progress in peace negotiations. We supported an increased UN police presence in Mozambique—but on the condition that the additional costs be offset by reductions in the military presence. We are insisting that “sunset” clauses be inserted in resolutions authorizing or extending peacekeeping missions so that the burden of proof rests on those who favor extension rather than termination. We have established what we hope will be a precedent by encouraging Cyprus—with help from Greece—and Kuwait to pay a significant portion of the costs of peacekeeping operations on their territory. We are relying on regional organizations such as ECOWAS and the CSCE wherever appropriate. And we review regularly the status of each UN operation to determine whether its objectives are being achieved or can be achieved.
I also must observe that no new UN peace operation has yet been proposed formally for Burundi, Sudan, Nagorno-Karabakh, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, or Sierra Leone despite the terrible violence that has occurred in each. This reflects not callousness on the part of the international community but rather a recognition of the limits of what UN peace operations can achieve in the absence of a demonstrated will on the part of contending factions to choose negotiations over force of arms.

ENHANCING CAPABILITIES

We also are working to make UN operations more efficient and effective once they are approved. Currently, the UN does not have the ability to manage peacekeeping as an integrated whole. Instead, each mission is financed and run separately by an understaffed Department of Peacekeeping Operations. As a result, support to the field suffers, economies of scale are lost, work is duplicated, and missions are delayed. The UN is left to scrape together the money, troops, and logistical support necessary for each operation essentially from scratch. To remedy these and other problems, the Administration is proposing or supporting:

- A unified budget for peacekeeping to replace the current ad hoc system;
- Reforms in procurement that will ensure competitiveness and provide economies of scale;
- The development of a computerized data base and a modular budget template that would allow for standardization of costs, enable quick and accurate budget estimates, and prevent over-assessments;
- A rapidly deployable headquarters unit with logistics support so that the UN can respond to emergencies in a timely way; and
- Improvements in planning, training, communications, intelligence, and logistics.

Our purpose in all of this is not to create some sort of global high command but rather to raise the level of performance to the point where UN peacekeeping is credible, cost-effective, and professional.

THE VALUE OF PEACEKEEPING

Of course, none of this would matter if carefully defined and well-executed UN peace operations did not serve the best interests of our people. This Administration, like prior Administrations, believes that they do; we think that most Americans agree.

First—to put things in perspective—the world spends about $900 billion each year for military forces. The UN spends about one-third of 1% as much on peacekeeping. Here in the United States, we allocate roughly $250-$300 for defense for every $1 we allocate to peacekeeping. The recent increase in peacekeeping costs brought about in part by the end of the Cold War remains far less than the savings that have been made possible by the relaxation of East-West tensions.

Second, the United States is one of five countries with the power to veto any UN peacekeeping operation. I can assure you that we will use our influence—and if necessary our veto—to block operations that would harm our interests. I can also assure you that our continued right to the veto is not negotiable.
Third, a narrow but not insignificant point: In 1993, the UN Headquarters purchased more than $250 million worth of goods and services from American sources—36% of the total value of UN Headquarters' procurement for peacekeeping.

Fourth, well-planned and well-implemented UN peace operations do contribute to goals of direct interest to us.

In Cambodia, the UN was asked to run elections, clear mines, repatriate refugees, disarm the Khmer Rouge, and help administer the country. The result was less than some hoped but far more than skeptics predicted. The Cambodian people responded overwhelmingly to the promise of peace and to the opportunity to vote. The result was an election with more than 90% participation, a constitutional government taking power, the repatriation of hundreds of thousands of refugees, and further discrediting of the Khmer Rouge.

In El Salvador, the UN helped end a 12-year conflict that took 70,000 lives. Observers from all sides agree that only the UN had the credibility to oversee demobilization, monitor human rights, assign responsibility for past atrocities, verify implementation of the peace agreement, and pave the way for elections which—despite significant problems—were the freest and most peaceful in the nation's history.

In Cyprus, the UN has prevented the outbreak of war between two NATO allies. Through its presence on the Golan Heights, it has helped to preserve peace between Israel and Syria for more than two decades. In Namibia, it helped to create an outpost of democracy and stability in a strategic part of Africa. In Mozambique, it is arranging elections this fall and demobilizing factions that had waged a bloody civil war. UN sanctions against Iraq, combined with a UN presence on the Kuwait border, are helping to keep Saddam Hussein's ambitions in check.

A few weeks ago, I traveled to South Africa, where UN observers worked hard to make last week's elections a success—to drive the final nail into the coffin of apartheid and make possible a government that is truly responsive to the people. There is an abundance of bad news in the world today; there remain enormous obstacles for South Africa, but the miracle of a democratic transition in that country should inspire us all. President F.W. de Klerk and President-elect Nelson Mandela found a useful ally in the UN.

In Croatia and The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, UN forces are helping prevent a wider Balkan war. And in Bosnia, the UN has worked in a sometimes uneasy partnership with NATO to restore a semblance of normal life to Sarajevo, to open the airport in Tuzla, to end the violence between government and Bosnian Croat factions, to lend belated credibility to the safe-haven concept, and to maintain a humanitarian lifeline to those in desperate need.

Last weekend, for the fourth time, the U.S., NATO, and the UN acted in tandem to implement Security Council directives aimed at ending the violence and encouraging peace. The first time was in February, when a NATO ultimatum resulted in the removal or control of heavy weapons in and around Sarajevo. The second was in late February with the shootdown of Serb planes violating the no-fly zone. The third was three weeks ago, when limited air strikes were ordered in response to the initial Bosnian Serb attacks against Gorazde. The fourth was the NATO ultimatum demanding a withdrawal of Serb forces and heavy weapons from around that same town.

The purpose of these actions is to see that the will of the Security Council is respected and that the parties are encouraged to negotiate seriously for peace. The Bosnian Serbs must understand that continued aggression will be met by internationally sanctioned military force.
We Americans support these operations because they contribute to a world that is less violent, more stable, and more democratic than it otherwise would be. History teaches us that democracies rarely commit aggression. And experience warns us that when small powers fight, larger powers are often drawn in, and that aggression, when unchecked, only leads to more aggression. It is far more effective and far less risky to treat the symptoms of global disorder when they appear than to wait until the consequences of conflict arrive at our door.

In summary, we should not ask the UN to take on jobs that we have not equipped it to do. And we should equip the UN to do the jobs we would like it to do. The United States will be better off if the United Nations is better able to prevent and contain international conflict.

PAYING FOR PEACEKEEPING: THE U.S. SHARE

Despite the burden-sharing aspects of UN peacekeeping, the United States remains by far the largest single financial contributor to the UN, and no one should forget that. This reflects our position as a permanent member of the Security Council and as the world’s leading economic and military power.

The system for assessing peacekeeping costs was created in 1973 with U.S. support. For a variety of reasons, the share of peacekeeping costs we are assessed has risen in recent years from about 28% to more than 30%. In December 1992, the breakup of the Soviet Union and the resultant decrease in contributions from that source caused the UN to raise our assessment even further—to 31.7%. We made it clear that we did not accept this most recent change, however, and continue to acknowledge an assessment rate of 30.4%, upon which our budget calculations are based. The Administration believes that the 30.4% rate is still too high, and we are seeking support at the UN for a reduction to the 25% rate recently mandated by Congress beginning in 1996.

We have informed the Secretary General of our determination—and of yours—to see that the U.S. assessment is reduced. He shares our concern and has sent emissaries to conduct consultations in key foreign capitals. We are conducting our own consultations both in New York and abroad. We note that the General Assembly will be reviewing requests for alterations in the current assessment scale this spring and fall. I can assure you that we will keep you informed of developments as they occur.

THE ADMINISTRATION’S BUDGET

Successful UN peacekeeping operations serve our interests. But they will more likely succeed if we have met fully our obligation to help pay for them and if we encourage other member states who have fallen behind in their payments to do the same.

The funds appropriated by Congress last year for peacekeeping in FY 1994 had to be used to meet prior-year commitments. Thus, our entire assessed share of UN peacekeeping costs in the current fiscal year—an amount we expect will exceed $1 billion—is currently unmet. We will need your help to find a way to provide that money. We also face the possibility of additional costs associated with new or expanded peace operations, both this year and next. As President Clinton made clear during his recent meeting with congressional leaders, funding for our peacekeeping obligations is a high priority, and we are prepared to work closely with you on this matter.

Our specific requests include $670 million in FY 1994 supplemental funds and $533 million in FY 1995, including funds for additional payments on our estimated FY 1994 requirements. We are also requesting from your subcommittee $75 million in voluntary contributions for multilateral peacekeeping in FY 1995.
Because we believe that the Departments of State and Defense should have shared responsibility for peacekeeping, the Administration is requesting, in addition, an appropriation of $300 million for a new Department of Defense peacekeeping account. Under the "shared responsibility" concept, the Defense Department will have lead management responsibility within the U.S. Government for those UN peace operations involving the likelihood of combat or the presence of U.S. combat units. This approach will ensure that military expertise is brought to bear on those peace operations that have a significant military component.

The State Department will continue to have lead management and funding responsibility for traditional peacekeeping operations that do not involve U.S. combat units. In all cases, the State Department will retain its traditional diplomatic responsibilities with respect to all peacekeeping operations and activities.

In urging favorable consideration by Congress of our peacekeeping budget requests, I stress three points.

First, UN peacekeeping will not be fixed unless it is supported financially by UN members. The current funding shortfall complicates efforts to plan efficiently, to implement reforms, and to make the investments that will save money in the long run. Already, the UN has fallen well behind in reimbursing troop contributors. We know that some nations have informed the UN that they will not contribute troops to future operations until past bills are reimbursed. This makes it harder to find additional troops for places like Bosnia and to maintain troops at adequate levels in places like Somalia. This, in turn, jeopardizes the success of such operations and puts the peacekeepers who are deployed at greater risk.

Second, we are already facing situations—and we can foresee others—in which we must choose between rejecting an operation we believe is very important to our interests or voting for an operation for which funds are not assured. This past week, for example, the Security Council voted—with U.S. support—to expand the authorized strength of UNPROFOR. This expansion is essential if our policy of extending real protection to designated safe areas such as Gorazde is to succeed. But expanded capabilities do not come without increased financial obligations.

We also have a strong interest in seeing that conflicts in the former Soviet Union are resolved in ways that maintain the integrity of the New Independent States. UN involvement is one way to advance that goal. But if we can't support an operation due to lack of funds or if UN members won't contribute troops because they fear they will not be reimbursed, the option disappears. This, in my personal judgment, is how grave historical errors come to be made.

Third, my ability to push our reform agenda at the UN would be enhanced greatly if I were able to say with confidence that we are going to pay our bills fully and promptly. This is true both with respect to the inspector general issue . . . and gaining a reduction in the U.S. share of peacekeeping costs.

AN APPROPRIATE ROLE FOR CONGRESS

America cannot lead in international organizations by executive action alone. Congress must play an important role because Congress, like the President, is accountable to the people. I can assure you, Mr. Chairman, that with respect to both funding and policy, we want to work with you and with your subcommittee. We have initiated and we will maintain close and regular consultations concerning all aspects of our peacekeeping policy.
In that connection, I will end by citing the conclusion of an excellent recent study on peacekeeping that was prepared under the auspices of the Stimson Center with the participation of Members of the House and Senate from both parties. That conclusion is also a pretty good summary of the Administration's own approach to peacekeeping policy.

The US can be as tough on approving new UN operations as it wants to be, and as selective in deciding whether or not U.S. forces should participate as it wishes to be. But if the UN's capacity for peace operations is improved successfully, it would provide a new security option to the United States, to be used at the U.S. government's discretion, permitting us to avoid the necessity of choosing between unilateral action and standing by helplessly when international conflict and atrocities occur.

[The following are reprints of opening statements at a press briefing on the peace operations presidential decision directive (PDD) by Anthony Lake, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and LTG Wesley Clark, USA, Director for Strategic Plans and Policy for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC, May 5, 1994.]

Anthony Lake

This week, President Clinton signed the first comprehensive U.S. policy on multilateral peace operations suited to the post-Cold War era. This policy has the full support of the entire Administration. It benefited very greatly from the work that had been done in the previous Administration on this issue and from very detailed consultations in the Congress with dozens of key legislators. In fact, in drafting the final policy, we incorporated many very useful contributions by Members of Congress.

The central conclusion of the Administration's study is that, when properly conceived and well-executed, peacekeeping can be a very important and useful tool of American foreign policy. Our purpose is to use peacekeeping selectively and more effectively than has been done in the past.

The post-Cold War era is, as we see every day, a very dangerous time. Its defining characteristic is that conflicts in this era take place more within nations than among them. And this makes it a particularly difficult time, both conceptually and practically, for us in the international community to come to grips with questions of when and how and where we will use force.

Some of these internal conflicts challenge our interests, and some of them do not. But the cumulative effect of all of these internal conflicts around the world is significant. We have all, over the last year—you and I and the others in the Administration—spent a great deal of time working on various conflicts of this kind, whether in Somalia, or Rwanda, or Haiti, or Bosnia, or elsewhere.

The further problem here is that these kinds of conflicts are particularly hard to come to grips with and to have an effect on from outside because, basically, of course, their origins are in political turmoil within these nations. And that political turmoil may not be susceptible to the efforts of the international community. So neither we nor the international community have the mandate to, the resources for, or the possibility of resolving every conflict of this kind.

When I wake up every morning and look at the headlines and the stories and the images on television of these conflicts, I want to work to end every conflict. I want to work to save every child out there. I know the President does, and I know the American people do.
But neither we nor the international community have the resources or the mandate to do so. So we have to make distinctions. We have to ask hard questions about where and when we can intervene. And the reality is that we often cannot solve other people’s problems—and we can never build their nations for them.

So the policy review is intended to help us make those hard choices about where and when the international community can get involved; where and when we can take part with the international community in getting involved; and, thus, where and when we can make a positive difference.

Let me emphasize again that, even when we do take action, the primary responsibility for peace rests with the people and the parties to the conflict. What the international community can do is to offer a kind of a breathing space for the people involved to make and preserve their own peace.

That’s the principle, for example, that we have employed in recent months in Somalia. We continue to urge the Somali people to take advantage of the breathing space that we helped provide for them and to seize this opportunity to resolve their differences peacefully. While we are hopeful—and there are hopeful signs—that they can do so, there are also disturbing signs in Somalia in recent weeks, and we do not know what the outcome will be. But we did our job, we believe, in providing that breathing space, and we believe that the more than 15,000 UN personnel there are doing theirs today.

So we must be selective, as I have just said, and we must also be more effective. The U.S. is committed to strengthening UN peacekeeping capabilities, because effective peacekeeping serves both America’s and the world’s collective interests. It can produce conflict resolution and prevention, as on the Golan or in El Salvador; it can promote democracy as it has in Namibia and in Cambodia and, again, in El Salvador; and it can serve our economic interests as well, as, for example, in the Persian Gulf.

And peacekeeping is burden-sharing, which is certainly in our interests. We pay less than one-third of the costs of the UN troops and UN operations—and less than 1% of UN troops in the field are, in fact, American.

While there are limits to peacekeeping—and even setbacks, as we have seen in Rwanda in recent days—we have to be careful never to overlook the impressive successes and the personal courage that have been shown and are being shown today by UN peacekeepers around the world.

Since 1948, over 650,000 men and women from all over the world have served in UN missions, and over 1,000 have given their lives—for example, some 200 in southern Lebanon, over 70 in Bosnia, 100 in Somalia, more than 150 in Cyprus. In Cambodia, Bulgarians, Japanese, Chinese, Bangladeshis, and others were victims of the Khmer Rouge, which attacked UN peacekeepers trying to oversee the elections there and make them possible. There were stories that I’m sure some of you recall of villagers stuffing messages into the ballot boxes in Cambodia thanking the UN peacekeepers for what they were doing and imploring them to stay on.

In the Bosnian town of Bakovici, some of you may remember that there were 100 patients in a mental hospital who were trapped there without heat or electricity over the winter, and UN peacekeepers were going in, back and forth, bringing in supplies to the mental hospital across the lines and getting fired at from both sides.
My point is that it is easy for all of us, when there is a setback, to dismiss the UN and the peacekeepers as a whole. We must not do that, because it does a disservice to the courage that they are showing today and to the sacrifices they have made in the past. Even so, because the needs for peacekeeping have outrun the resources for peacekeeping, it's important that we ask the tough questions about when and where we will support or participate in such operations. We are the first government that has—and this is the first time in the history of the U.S. Government that we have—cared and dared enough to do so and to ask those questions.

Peacekeeping is a part of our national security policy, but it is not the centerpiece. The primary purpose of our military forces is to fight and win wars—as specified in our bottom-up review, to fight and win two major regional contingencies nearly simultaneously and to do so unilaterally when necessary.

If peacekeeping operations ever conflicted with our ability to carry out those operations, we would pull out of the peace operations to serve our primary military purposes. But we will, as the President has said many times, seek collective rather than unilateral solutions to regional and intrastate conflicts that don't touch our core national interests. And we'll choose between unilateral and collective approaches, between the UN and other coalitions depending on what works best and what best serves American interests.

The policy review addresses six major issues. First, ensuring that we support the right operations; second, that we reduce the cost of peacekeeping operations; third, that we improve UN peacekeeping capabilities; fourth, that we ensure effective command and control of American forces; fifth, that we improve the way the American Government manages the issue of peacekeeping; and, sixth, to enhance the cooperation between the Congress and the executive branch. Let me say just a word about each.

First—ensuring that we support or participate only in the right types of peacekeeping operations. Not all such operations, obviously, make sense. We are, as I said, I believe the first nation to ask the tough questions at the UN before committing to costly new peacekeeping operations. The President said that we would do so in his General Assembly speech last fall, and we are, indeed, doing just that.

We've developed two sets of questions in the study to determine, first, when the United States should vote for such operations and, second, when the U.S. should participate in them. In the unclassified document we've handed out—"The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations," which summarizes the Presidential Decision Directive (PDD)—we have a complete list of those questions. They include such questions as:

- Does the mission advance American interests?
- Is there a threat to international peace and security?
- Does it have a very clear mandate?
- Does it have clear objectives?
- Are the forces and the funds actually available for such an operation?
- Second, we believe that we have to reduce the peacekeeping costs to the United States and to the United Nations. Peacekeeping simply costs too much right now. It can be a very good investment for us, but it would be an even better investment if it were less costly. So, first, we are working to reduce American costs. As the President has said, we are committed to reducing our peacekeeping assessment to 25% by January 1996, and we believe that other newly rich
countries should pay their fair share. And, second, we all save when the costs of UN peacekeeping operations are reduced generally. In the study, we propose—have proposed already in a number of cases—numerous financial and budget-management reforms to make UN peacekeeping operations more efficient and cost effective. For example, we would like to see a unified UN peacekeeping budget; we would like to see better procurement procedures; and, as a top priority and something we are working on right now, we would like to see a wholly independent office of an inspector general with oversight for peacekeeping.

Third, we think we have to improve the UN’s peacekeeping capabilities, and we are committed to doing this. So we’re going to work with the UN and member states on steps to improve the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and its field missions—for example, enhancing planning, logistics, procurement, command and control, public affairs, intelligence, and civilian police capabilities. And we will lead an effort in the UN to try to redeploy resources within the UN system to fund these reforms.

Fourth—and this is tremendously important—we have to ensure that there is effective command and control of American forces when they are engaged in peacekeeping operations. I will ask LTG Wes Clark to address this for a moment.

Lieutenant General Clark

There has been a great deal of discussion on the issue of command and control, so let me begin by laying out the definitions that are relevant here. First of all, by command, what we’re speaking of is the constitutional authority to establish and deploy forces: to issue orders, separate and move units, resupply, provide medical support, enforce discipline. The President will never relinquish command of U.S. forces; that is inviolable.

Operational control is a subset of command. Operational control can be given for a specific time frame—for a specific mission in a particular location. Operational control may be the assignment of tasks to already-deployed forces led by U.S. officers. We may place the U.S. forces under the operational control of foreign commanders. That’s the distinction that’s in this peace operations document.

Now the involvement with foreign commanders, I would tell you, is nothing new. In fact, that’s the news of this document—that from the perspective of command and control, there is nothing new. In World War I and World War II, throughout our experience with NATO, and in Operation Desert Storm, we’ve always had the ability to task, organize, and place some U.S. units under foreign operational control, if it was advantageous to do so.

This PDD policy preserves our option to do that. We will be able to place U.S. forces under foreign operational control when it’s prudent or tactically advantageous. I would tell you that, as we look at it, the greater the U.S. military role and the more likely the operations involved entail combat, the less likely we are to place those forces under foreign operational control.

Even were we to do so, fundamental elements would still apply. The chain of command will be inviolate. All our commanders will have the capability of reporting to higher U.S. authority. They’ll report illegal orders—or orders outside the mandate that they’ve been authorized to perform—to higher U.S. authority if they can’t work those out with the foreign commander on the ground.
Of course, the President retains the authority to terminate participation at any time to protect our forces. There's no intent in this language to subvert an operational chain of command. What we're trying to do is achieve the best balance between cohesive, trained, well-established U.S. chains of command and unity of command in an operation involving foreign forces in a coalition or some other grouping.

So that's the intent behind this. And, as I say, it is no change from the way we've operated in the past. I would also tell you that our military has played a major role in defining the command and control aspects of this PDD. It's been thoroughly vetted in the Joint Chiefs of Staff system. It's been reviewed and approved by the Chiefs of Staff of our services and by the commanders in chief of our forces overseas.

Anthony Lake

Also—fifth—we think it is important that we improve the American Government's management of peacekeeping. We think so because peacekeeping, as we have seen, is important and complex and dangerous—and, thus, the perspective of our military and defense leaders should be brought more to bear in it. So we concluded that the Department of Defense should join the State Department in assuming both policy and financial responsibility for appropriate peace operations—what we call shared responsibility. You will not be surprised to know that each was more anxious for the policy responsibility than the financial responsibility, but it has been worked out, we think, very well.

The State Department will both manage and pay for traditional, non-combat peacekeeping operations—i.e., under Chapter VI of the Charter—when there are not American combat units involved. This represents, by far, the greatest number of such operations. The Defense Department will manage and pay for all peace enforcement operations under Chapter VII of the Charter—for example, in Somalia, the former Yugoslavia, and Kuwait now—and those traditional peacekeeping operations under Chapter VI in which there are American combat units.

We believe that this shared responsibility will not only mean better management but will help us solve the long-term funding problem that we face in peacekeeping. We still have an immediate arrears problem in our peacekeeping debts, and without new funding, the American arrearage will be over $1 billion by the end of this fiscal year—the end of September 1994. The President is very committed to paying off this debt, and he and we are working very closely with the Congress now to devise the means to do so.

Finally, [sixth] in the study, we have worked to recognize the need to improve the relationships and consultations between the executive branch and the Congress on peacekeeping operations. And we're going to take a number of steps to improve the information flow between the Administration and the Congress on these issues.

In short, the policy is designed to impose more discipline on the UN and on ourselves so that peacekeeping will be a more effective collective security tool for American foreign policy. This is a new era; we are all learning how to come to grips with the new problems that it presents to us. But there is no doubt in my mind that peacekeeping offers a very important way of making sure that today's problems don't become tomorrow's crises—because those crises will cost us a lot more in the long run than peacekeeping does right now.

This is an important—not the most important but an important—part of our national security policy. It is very, very important that we and the United Nations get it right, and that's what this study is about.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Last year, President Clinton ordered an inter-agency review of our nation's peacekeeping policies and programs in order to develop a comprehensive policy framework suited to the realities of the post-Cold War period. This policy review has resulted in a Presidential Decision Directive (PDD). The President signed this directive, following the completion of extensive consultations with Members of Congress. This paper ["The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations"] summarizes the key elements of that directive.

As specified in the "Bottom-Up Review," the primary mission of the U.S. Armed Forces remains to be prepared to fight and win two simultaneous regional conflicts. In this context, peacekeeping can be one useful tool to help prevent and resolve such conflicts before they pose direct threats to our national security. Peacekeeping can also serve U.S. interests by promoting democracy, regional security, and economic growth.

The policy directive (PDD) addresses six major issues of reform and improvement:

1. Making disciplined and coherent choices about which peace operations to support—both when we vote in the Security Council for UN peace operations and when we participate in such operations with U.S. troops.

To achieve this goal, the policy directive sets forth three increasingly rigorous standards of review for U.S. support for or participation in peace operations, with the most stringent applying to U.S. participation in missions that may involve combat. The policy directive affirms that peacekeeping can be a useful tool for advancing U.S. national security interests in some circumstances, but both U.S. and UN involvement in peacekeeping must be selective and more effective.

2. Reducing U.S. costs for UN peace operations, both the percentage our nation pays for each operation and the cost of the operations themselves.

To achieve this goal, the policy directive orders that we work to reduce our peacekeeping assessment percentage from the current 31.7% to 25% by January 1, 1996, and proposes a number of specific steps to reduce the cost of UN peace operations.

3. Defining clearly our policy regarding the command and control of American military forces in UN peace operations.

The policy directive underscores the fact that the President will never relinquish command of U.S. forces. However, as Commander-in-Chief, the President has the authority to place U.S. forces under the operational control of a foreign commander when doing so serves American security interests, just as American leaders have done numerous times since the Revolutionary War, including in Operation Desert Storm.

The greater the anticipated U.S. military role, the less likely it will be that the U.S. will agree to have a UN commander exercise overall operational control over U.S. forces. Any large scale participation of U.S. forces in a major peace enforcement operation that is likely to involve combat should ordinarily be conducted under U.S. command and operational control or through competent regional organizations such as NATO or ad hoc coalitions.
4. Reforming and improving the UN’s capability to manage peace operations.

The policy recommends 11 steps to strengthen UN management of peace operations and directs U.S. support for strengthening the UN’s planning, logistics, information and command, and control capabilities.

5. Improving the way the U.S. Government manages and funds peace operations.

The policy directive creates a new “shared responsibility” approach to managing and funding UN peace operations within the U.S. Government. Under this approach, the Department of Defense will take lead management and funding responsibility for those UN operations that involve U.S. combat units and those that are likely to involve combat, whether or not U.S. troops are involved. This approach will ensure that military expertise is brought to bear on those operations that have a significant military component.

The State Department will retain lead management and funding responsibility for traditional peacekeeping operations that do not involve U.S. combat units. In all cases, the State Department remains responsible for the conduct of diplomacy and instructions to embassies and our UN Mission in New York.

6. Creating better forms of cooperation between the Executive, the Congress, and the American public on peace operations.

The policy directive sets out seven proposals for increasing and regularizing the flow of information and consultation between the executive branch and Congress; the President believes U.S. support for and participation in UN peace operations can only succeed over the long term with the bi-partisan support of Congress and the American people.