WAR TERMINATION: SETTING CONDITIONS FOR PEACE

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USAWC CLASS OF 2009

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## 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE

War Termination: Setting Conditions for Peace

## 6. AUTHOR(S)

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## 9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

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## 14. ABSTRACT

This project reviews the importance of war termination in a post 9/11 global environment using a historical analysis as a baseline. Levels of analysis of international relations are applied to patterns of war termination. These levels consist of the balance of power in international, domestic and individual level activities as they are influenced by national security policies and civilian and military relations. Conclusions are provided to support evidence that exists for successful war termination.

## 15. SUBJECT TERMS

Lasting Peace, Conflict Termination; Conflict Resolution

## REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

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ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Linda A. Legier-Topp
TITLE: War Termination: Setting Conditions for Peace
FORMAT: Strategy Research Project
DATE: 19 February 2009    WORD COUNT: 6624    PAGES: 32
KEY TERMS: Lasting Peace, Conflict Termination; Conflict Resolution
CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

This project reviews the importance of war termination in a post 9/11 global environment using a historical analysis as a baseline. Levels of analysis of international relations are applied to patterns of war termination. These levels consist of the balance of power in international, domestic, and individual level activities as they are influenced by national security policies and civilian and military relations. Conclusions are provided to support evidence that exists for successful war termination.
WAR TERMINATION: SETTING CONDITIONS FOR PEACE

The original means of strategy is victory—that is, tactical success; its ends, in the final analysis, are those objects which will lead directly to peace. The application of these means for these ends will also be attended by factors that will influence it to a greater or lesser degree.¹

—Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, 1989

Since World War I, the disintegration of empires has produced over 100 new states in the international system, and with this has come more turmoil.² Additionally, with the end of the Cold War and the end of a bipolar international system, today’s strategic security environment has become more volatile, uncertain, changing and characterized by more asymmetrical threats because of the emergence of nontraditional actors vying for power in achieving their interests. Within this security environment, more conflicts are expected in the future. The expectation of more conflicts, paired with the United States possessing the relative power to influence outcomes of conflicts and wars in the international system, makes war termination a national interest to the United States. U.S. leadership must have war termination policy which considers international relations concepts in order to gauge its capabilities towards an appropriate and proportionate response to achieve successful war termination results conducive to balance in the international world order and a lasting peace.

Seeing war as a “continuation of policy by other means” as Clausewitz stated indicates that the definition of war termination is not synonymous with the end of physical military operations.³ One of the fundamental problems in war termination is that while the physical military operations may cease, the will of the opposing force to fight may still be present.⁴ This is often because the actual causes of what started the conflict are never resolved.⁵ Clausewitz illustrated this point when he said “the ultimate outcome
of a war is not always to be regarded as final. The defeated state often considers the outcome merely as a transitory evil. The approach that the U.S. takes to conduct war termination can help ensure the U.S. achieves defined political end states focused at resolving root conflicts to help defeated states redefine their roles and interest in ways other than war.

Wars need to have clear political ends with complementary war termination strategies defined at the beginning of hostilities which can be refined over the continuum of war. War termination, from the victor’s point of view, has been defined as the last stage in a war once basic political objectives of the war are within reach. War termination can also be viewed as the transition from war to peace. The notion of shaping a lasting peace is deeply rooted in war theory. Military strategist B. H. Liddel Hart emphasized the point of shaping a lasting peace when he said,

The object in war is to attain a better peace—even if only from your own point of view. Hence it is essential to conduct war with constant regard to the peace you desire. This is the truth underlying Clausewitz’s definition of war as a ‘continuation of policy by other means’—the prolongation of that policy through the war into the subsequent peace must always be borne in mine. A State which expends its strength to the point of exhaustion bankrupts its own policy, and future.

A successful war termination strategy is important in the more short-term sense of minimizing military and civilian casualties and loss of human life while meeting political objectives, but also in the long-term sense of terminating war with an eye towards shaping a lasting peace.

This paper examines war termination strategies through the lens of the international relations framework of the international, domestic and individual levels of analysis. Three key case studies, World War I, the Vietnam War, and the 1991 Gulf War are examined to highlight historical linkages in war termination problems. The
conceptual and historical analysis will then be used to determine any gaps in U.S. policy through analysis of the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, and the National Military Strategy. Joint doctrine, Joint Publications (Pub) 3-0 and Pub 5-0 will also be examined for war termination gaps. This paper uses the conceptual, historical, policy and doctrinal analyses to determine key war termination conditions that may help in formulating strategy under the Obama Administration, therefore assisting in setting conditions for peace in the future.

Levels of Analysis

Kenneth Waltz in *Man, the State, and War* explained the causes of war through a level of analysis framework: the international system, the state, and the individual.\(^{10}\) As this framework is useful for understanding the causes of war, it is also useful for understanding why and how they end. In order to facilitate informed policymaking for war termination, it is important to understand the concepts of war termination within the international, domestic, and individual levels of analysis framework. Viewing war termination through this framework is useful in strengthening U.S. policy for war termination that may help set the conditions for a lasting peace following future wars or conflicts.

War termination at the international level is wrought with complexity and unintended consequences and outcomes by actors in the international system.\(^{11}\) This level examines how the interaction and interdependencies between two or more states at war impact the success of war termination.\(^{12}\) At the heart of this level are the “power relations” among “two or more warring states”\(^{13}\) that can be shaped by factors such as alliances and coalitions, economics, globalization, geopolitics, international institutions,
non-state actors, international law, conventional and transnational threats, as well as by societal perceptions, culture, and competing values.\textsuperscript{14} For example, economic pressures can be useful as a basic political objective to reach a ceasefire to induce war termination as was seen during the 1918 Paris negotiations.\textsuperscript{15} However, economic incentives can also have far reaching objectives to yield mutually beneficial war outcomes to set conditions for long term peace as was the case with Japan and the United States after World War II. The ability to reset the balance of power among two or more warring nations, utilizing the various international factors, is useful to successful war termination and establishing a lasting peace in the international system.

At the domestic level of analysis, the interaction of actors within a state or society\textsuperscript{16} can affect war termination outcomes. This level examines the struggles, policies, and attitudes within domestic society and politics pertaining to the success of the termination of wars and setting conditions for peace. Factors within the domestic environment most likely to affect war termination outcomes are synchronizing short-term objectives to political end states, executing with integrated civil-military relations, and strengthening public diplomacy to help focus public opinion and national morale during war termination.\textsuperscript{17} A state’s overall policy on war termination is critical because policy will determine how to best organize and employ its military arm, as well as the diplomatic, information and economic national instruments of power. Policy shapes the overall conduct of a war leading into its termination. Therefore, the conduct of war is inextricably linked to the success of its termination. For example, Japan may have won the military battle at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, but at the end of World War II,
this Japanese military victory did not translate into a successful war termination for Japan.\textsuperscript{18}

Civil-military relations can stress the conduct of war and therefore its war termination when the opinions of military and civilian leaders are opposed. The question of how far to go militarily in future wars brings out the aspect of civil-military relations when military objectives may not mesh with civilian leader’s political objectives in war termination. “…The overarching problem of war termination….is difficulties in matching military courses of action, not to the most basic political objectives, but to other political considerations that were important if ‘a better state of peace’—a more favorable and durable peace—were to emerge.”\textsuperscript{19} Traditionally, military professionals do not interfere in broad policy or political considerations of appointed civilian strategic leaders.\textsuperscript{20} Civil-military disconnects between military and civilian leaders’ opinions have negatively impacted U.S. war termination events, as in World War I and the Vietnam War. Similarly, public opinion can greatly impact U.S. decision makers, as was the case of Vietnam\textsuperscript{21}, and public opinion and overall national morale can also impact U.S. success in war termination, especially with an American public averse to American casualties.\textsuperscript{22} A casualty adverse public can impact war termination in several ways. First, such a public can demand that the war should terminate with some level of satisfaction towards justifying the sacrifices made by their sons and daughters, which could prolong the war to achieve such satisfaction. Second, the opposite could occur: the public could demand an immediate end of the war without achieving political end states. Third, the public could demand reparations against the warring nation (s) that are non-conducive to achieving long term political end states. While public opinion is critical, the U.S. must be
able to keep the public informed of its political end states to better be able to justify actions towards favorable war termination conditions. The interaction of these domestic forces must be understood in order to better achieve successful war termination strategies.

At the individual level of analysis, the role of individual leaders and their attitudes toward war termination can affect war termination outcomes. Leaders’ cultural differences, values, perceptions, and loyalties contribute to decisions made during war, as well as during war termination and peace negotiation stages. This was evident in Wilson’s role during the 1918 Paris negotiations which did not result in setting conditions for peace, and likewise, in the decision not to terminate war as was Hitler’s role to refuse to surrender in the face of defeat which only resulted in more costs to his army and people. Understanding the role that individuals can play in war termination outcomes is an important aspect to achieving more successful war termination strategies.

Historical Case Studies

War termination events from a historical context are useful “in clarifying the complexities of war termination by focusing on its essential elements.” While events of war termination do not have predictive value, they serve as a way for strategic leaders to better understand how forces at the international, domestic, and individual levels can shape and influence war outcomes. In order to facilitate informed policymaking for war termination, it is important to understand the essential unsuccessful elements by reviewing selected war termination events of World War I, the Vietnam War, and the 1991 Gulf War.
World War I ended with a war termination process characterized by problems. Unsynchronized military and political objectives, public opinion, economic conditions, and Presidential style contributed to an unsuccessful war termination. Domestically, at the end of World War I, Pershing pushed for an unconditional surrender from Germany during the war termination stages rather than accepting an armistice agreement while Wilson pursued diplomatic means towards an armistice. This action illustrated a war termination problem concerning civil-military relations when Pershing’s military objectives and courses of action did not mesh with Wilson’s political objectives or with objectives of U.S. allies who bore the brunt of the fighting. In this case, military victory did not equal gaining the political end, but rather, the military end became the “end in itself, instead of as merely a means to the end.” While Pershing’s insistence on a decisive victory brought the end of military operations that led to an armistice agreement, it was influences at the international level of analysis which neutralized the positive effects of a decisive military victory, and thus contributed to an unsuccessful termination.

The domestic issue between the lack of synchronization between military and political goals spilled into the international arena and resulted in an allied problem. Britain did not want the war to continue, counter to Pershing’s insistence of a decisive victory, as by so doing would lead to increasing U.S. influence over the allies at the peace table. Additionally, British and French public opinion (domestic issue for these allies) insisted that Germany pay dearly for the war through harsh economic clauses in the treaty agreement to make Germany pay for war reparations. The allied influence impacted negatively at the international level not only because of the punitive nature of
the peace agreements, but also because the U.S. and allies did not set up post-war economic incentives to help rebuild Germany. While on one hand “emptiness of stomach, produced by the economic pressure of sea-power…” helped to terminate hostilities leading to an armistice agreement, on the other hand, leaving Germany with punitive peace agreements while in this distraught state, and without economic restoration, weighed the tide against setting conditions for peace following World War I. John Maynard Keynes wrote of the peace treaty in 1919, “includes no provisions for the economic rehabilitation of Europe, nothing to make the defeated Central Empires into good neighbors, nothing to stabilize the new States of Europe…” While the Western democratic powers could have provided institutional proposals for a more positive postwar order, European conflicting interests over U.S. “domination and abandonment” contributed to dooming the 1919 peace agreement. Furthermore, “behind the inability of the United States to bind itself to its European allies were factors that had to do with Wilson himself.”

At the individual level of analysis, President Woodrow Wilson’s ideological convictions and attitude to make wholesale democratic changes in Europe was his demise for being able to negotiate a peace agreement that would lay a foundation for lasting peace in Europe. “Wilson’s goal to orchestrate a democratic movement in Europe” by gaining British and French public opinion “on moral and ideological grounds, rather than through the exercise of American power” ended in failure. Wilson’s peace plan, which called “for the reduction of war reparations, the disarmament of the victors as well as the vanquished, and the adoption of liberal trade ideas,” failed to win the hearts and minds of European leaders, notably Lloyd George
and Clemenceau. Wilson’s role to ineffectively negotiate the Versailles Treaty through the implementation of his Fourteen Points led to harsh conditions of the Treaty which contributed to setting conditions for renewed German nationalism two decades later. Lack of institutional agreements which could have helped to restore European post-war order also contributed to poor war termination conditions. Additionally, “lacking a team to aid him in the decision-making, President Wilson found himself overburdened with work…which further diminished his already unimpressive capacity to bargain effectively.”

In summary, World War I war termination events suggest that it is not enough to gain a decisive victory to achieve successful war termination results. While the U.S. and allies met the basic objective to achieve unconditional surrender of Germany, the U.S. and its allies failed to establish postwar European balance of power favorable to the West that could have set conditions for a lasting peace. Additionally, punitive peace agreements that do not reestablish regional or international economic order and stability also suggest that economic rehabilitation and post-war nation building (order restoration) activities are ingredients for successful war terminations.

The Vietnam War, ending in an armistice agreement, had a very long and problematic war termination process. Allied influence, unsynchronized U.S. military and political objectives, and pressure from public opinion contributed to an unsuccessful war termination conclusion. At the international level, the Soviet Union and China provided significant military aid to North Vietnam, helping the North Vietnamese achieve a military advantage against the U.S. leading into the 1972 Tet offense. These alliances, however, also advised North Vietnam for a diplomatically based war termination
agreement rather than pursuing military escalation, but instead, Hanoi would not accept a cease-fire without an agreeable political solution, and proceeded with the Tet offensive in 1972, with the Politburo believing that the offensive would alter both the military and political balance of the war at this point. While Hanoi did not achieve a decisive change in military balance, the offensive prompted diplomatic negotiations towards an armistice agreement.

At the domestic level, the civil-military strife between President Lyndon B. Johnson and Robert McNamara with their Joint Chiefs of Staff was well known in the early part of the Vietnam War. The Joint Chiefs believed in the use of overwhelming military force while McNamara adopted the “graduated pressure” of limited and slowly escalating warfare. McNamara developed war plans absent of military advice based on his distrust of traditional military thinking and strategy. He also formed “the whiz kids,” analysts without military experience, who used statistical analysis to balance the cost-benefit of military costs to the war’s political payoff. Unsynchronized military and political objectives and civil-military strife continued into the later Vietnam War termination stages and contributed to U.S. inability to terminate with a decisive military victory. Nixon and his advisors admitted their regret in not taking more extreme military escalation in 1969.

Public opinion through anti-war demonstrations pressured U.S. policymakers to end the war as soon as possible, and this impacted overall national morale and support toward the War, and ultimately U.S. will. However, in the case of North Vietnam, the lack of public influence in this autocratic (or totalitarian) regime actually served to prolong the negotiation process and war termination.
Vietnam War termination events suggest that “policymakers on both sides of a conflict made their decisions for war or peace on the basis of the military balance and the costs and constraints of battle.” However, in the absence of clearly defined political goals on the side of the U.S., the military objectives probably had no good chance of success, and civil-military strife made that gap even wider.

In the first Gulf War in 1991, the U.S. used an overwhelming military force with the support of coalition forces to meet the basic political objective to expel Iraq from Kuwait. The war terminated when the U.S. unilaterally announced a cease-fire stating that the U.S. and the coalition forces had liberated Kuwait and defeated the Iraqi army, although not annihilating the elite Republican Guard. One of the problems domestically was that the U.S. neglected to have a war termination strategy prior to the cease-fire. Lack of strategy resulted in the U.S. being unable to turn a military victory into a political success story by forcing Iraq to accept defeat of the Gulf War. Another contributory element to turning military victory into political success may have been because of the Bush administration’s attitude toward civil-military relations. The Bush administration viewed the diplomatic side of war termination as a separate civilian/presidential function, and the military side of war termination as a purely military function.

When these functions are pursued separately, it is easy to result in unsynchronized objectives that do not work in concert toward successful war termination goals. At the individual level of analysis, for Saddam Hussein to have used military force with neighboring Kuwait to influence regional interests coupled with the hindsight of OIF years later, shows that nations under the control of such tyrants may
never accept defeat, regardless of the cost, and that perhaps only a regime change will set conditions for lasting peace.\textsuperscript{50} Tyrannical leaders such as Saddam left in power are then able to upset regional balance years later within an international system.

The 1991 Gulf War illustrated that a decisive military victory alone does not necessarily establish a lasting peace following the end of military operations. It also suggested that leaving the region without implementing institutional reform only gave Saddam time to rebuild his army to restart hostilities at a later date. While the U.S. achieved its stated military objectives, it failed to achieve more longer term political objectives to establish or enhance regional stability using an appropriate application of diplomatic, information, military and economic instruments of power following the cease-fire that could have better set conditions for peace in that region. Instead, one of Clausewitz’ fundamental problems with war termination held true: Iraq’s will to fight was still present and the outcome of the Gulf War was a “transitory evil” as evidenced by Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).\textsuperscript{51}

U.S Strategies and Doctrine on War Termination

U.S. national strategies and Joint doctrine address war termination to varying degrees. U.S. national strategies are not adequate in addressing strategic war termination principles. Joint doctrine more effectively discusses war termination at the operational level as part of the military instrument of power. The problem is that without clear national strategic guidance for war termination, it is difficult to design and plan joint operations beyond the most basic war termination objectives. The March 2006 National Security Strategy (NSS) discussed U.S. policy on how to resolve regional conflicts. Within this section, the NSS discussed its strategy on Conflict Prevention and
Resolution, Conflict Intervention, and Post-Conflict Stabilization and Reconstruction. Across these three areas, it basically stated that the promotion of democracy is the best measure for preventing conflicts. Next, it stated that the U.S. may have to intervene in conflicts to restore peace and stability. The NSS then led into a discussion on post-conflict stabilization after peace is restored. The problem is that the NSS had no bridging strategy discussing conflict termination between discussions on Conflict Intervention and Post-Conflict Stabilization and Reconstruction. The strategy the U.S. exercises to terminate wars will have a direct effect on the amount of success the U.S. will have to creating long term peace during post-war stabilization efforts. The NSS stated that the best way to provide security for Americans is “to help create a world of democratic, well-governed states that can meet the needs of their citizens and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system.” One of the key times required to help create democratic, well-governed states is during war termination stages and post-war activities, and therefore, the NSS should provide guidance on U.S. war termination strategy.

The National Defense Strategy (NDS) links the NSS to the National Military Strategy (NMS). The NDS “addresses how the U.S. Armed Forces will fight and win America’s wars and how we seek to work with and through partner nations to shape opportunities in the international environment to enhance security and avert conflict.” The document does not, however, address war termination, and the section on “Win our Nation’s War” could be a logical section for a war termination discussion.

In the 2004 NMS, the section titled “Prevail Against Adversaries,” mentioned war termination. Within this section, the discussion on Stability Operations stated, “At the
operational level, military post-conflict operations will integrate conflict termination objectives with diplomatic, economic, financial, intelligence, law enforcement and information efforts. This statement suggested a linkage between the military instrument of power with that of the other national instruments of power in relation to conflict termination, but the guidance could actually be expanded.

In joint doctrine, Joint Pub 3-0 and 5-0 have fairly extensive sections on war termination. JP 3-0 described war termination as an element of joint operational design, and JP 5-0 discussed war termination in more detail as part of joint operation planning. These documents define war termination criteria as “the specified standards approved by the President and/or the Secretary of Defense that must be met before a joint operation can be concluded.” Both documents clearly described the importance of knowing when to terminate operations and that the point of terminating military operations is a political decision, and that the CJCS and JFC can advise in this process. Both documents described the basic principles of war termination through the lens of the military instrument of power. For instance, both documents emphasized the critical linkage between the military end state and its supporting objectives with that of war termination criteria and the national strategic end state.

While these joint documents cover the basic war termination principles from a military perspective, they were lacking in promoting positive civil-military relations within the context of war termination. The documents stressed the importance of the military working with civilian leaders, but did not discuss how best to transition from military operations to post-conflict within a joint context, only that “passing the lead from the
military to other authorities usually requires extensive planning and preparation prior to
the onset of operations.\textsuperscript{59}

Finally, JP 3-0 described three approaches to attaining the national strategic end
state: the “imposed settlement” which is “characterized by the threatened or actual
occupation of an enemy’s territory;” the “negotiated settlement” which is a “means for
termination through coordinated political, diplomatic, military, and economic actions;”
and, the “indirect approach” which is used to “gain legitimacy and influence over the
relevant population(s).”\textsuperscript{60} While these three approaches emphasized how to end
hostilities, they did not discuss whether these approaches should be peaceful versus
punitive, or how these approaches could set the stage for lasting peace in the warring
nation(s) or region. If the military is going to be a successful instrument in achieving,
and advising in, national strategic objectives and war termination criteria, then it is
essential that joint operational design and planning emphasizes war termination
strategies within the international relations framework.

\textbf{Setting Conditions for Peace}

\textit{International}. Including a war termination discussion in the NSS within the
context of the international level of analysis would strengthen U.S. policy towards war
termination with an eye towards lasting peace because the NSS is the overarching
policy that guides U.S. foreign relations. Within the international system, perhaps the
key element toward successful war termination strategies and a lasting peace is
enhancing regional and international balance of power. Geopolitics and U.S. policy
towards post-war order restoration are pivotal in attaining this balance. Geopolitics
greatly impacts how states behave in an international system,\textsuperscript{61} which makes balancing
power within a region fundamentally important to establishing a lasting peace internationally. The fact that “half of military conflicts between 1816 and 1992 began between neighbors,”62 is evidence supporting this thought. The 2006 NSS had a discussion on resolving regional conflicts but it could be expanded to help better achieve successful war termination events and ultimately a lasting peace.

The NSS under the Obama Administration should keep a discussion on resolving regional conflicts as the current strategy does, but it should add a discussion on bridging the gap between Conflict Intervention and Post Conflict Stabilization and Reconstruction. Such an addition would be a war termination discussion which emphasizes the importance of putting the distribution of power among warring states back into balance63, therefore shaping a lasting peace. The reason power relations become so critical to war termination strategies and setting conditions for peace is because warring nations seek greater security, both regionally among neighbors and also internationally among allies, than existed prior to the outbreak of war.64 Given that the NSS provides guidance for achieving greater U.S. and international security, and international relation concepts show that security can be achieved through a balanced distribution of power among nations within an international system, the NSS should capture this principle within the context of a war termination discussion. In fact, G. John Ikenberry stated that “the most important characteristic of interstate relations after a major war is that a new distribution of power suddenly emerges, creating new asymmetries between powerful and weak states.”65 Following a new war termination discussion in the NSS, the discussion on Post-Conflict Stabilization and Reconstruction should then be expanded.
The revised NSS should include a discussion on post-war order restoration in its Post-Conflict Stabilization and Reconstruction which emphasizes economic, social, and political development in the warring nations because this strategy can transform nations by helping them “define their interests in a way that makes war less important to them,” and this should give long term peace a better chance. Fred Charles Ikle contended that one of the keys “for the long-term outcome of many wars is whether the militarily victorious side managed to reform the enemy’s government, to transform a former foe into a new friend.” This section of the NSS should also emphasize means for achieving post-war order restoration through international institutions, alliances/coalitions, and economics. These means can all contribute positively to the war termination process at the international level. G. John Ikenberry claimed that “the character and stability of postwar order hinge on the capacities of states to develop institutional mechanisms to restrain power and establish binding commitments.”

Wilson failed to implement institutional mechanisms at the end of World War I which contributed to the failure of post-war order and balance of power among warring nations. The best successful example of institutional mechanisms is that following World War II when the U.S. restrained its power through the development of institutions rather than capitalizing on its hegemonic position. The U.S. did this through the establishment of “Bretton Woods institutions, the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty organization (NATO), the U.S.-Japan security treaty, and other alliances in Asia.” Effective alliances and coalitions not only contribute to the legitimacy of war termination strategies, but they also can contribute in gaining regional and international
community support in restoring a state’s post-war civil security and governance (if required) to set conditions for economic and political reform leading to a lasting peace.

A revised NSS which includes a discussion on war termination strategies that enhance regional and international balance of power, as well as postwar order restoration, can positively contribute to turning “today’s enemy” into tomorrow’s ally. Strategies of this type ultimately can contribute to stronger security for a nation, its neighbors and the international community. World War I termination demonstrated that the U.S. and its allies failed to establish postwar European balance of power favorable to the West, and implemented punitive rather than restorative economic conditions against Germany. Likewise, the termination of the 1991 Gulf War suggests that leaving Saddam in power along with not removing his military power base (the Republican Guard) left the Middle East imbalanced in political power which provided Iraq with the means to threaten regional and international security in the future, as proved to be the case through the 2003 Operation Iraqi Freedom.

If the revised NSS projects a policy of reforming a warring nation’s government through economic, social and political incentives, then that policy would guide the way the U.S. organizes, conducts and terminates war. Therefore, the new NSS should define a war termination strategy as described above, and this will better enable the U.S. to define future political end states in future conflicts and wars that may help “transform former foes into a new friend.” Likewise, if the new NDS, under the section titled “Win Our Nation’s War” emphasizes not just the defeat of states but the transformation of defeated (warring) states into “new friends,” this prominence could lay
Domestically, synchronizing military objectives and objectives of other national instruments of power is critical to achieving national political goals during war termination stages. Well-meshed civil-military relations in executing objectives, and a solid strategic communication plan to handle public opinion and national morale during war termination, are all key to developing successful war termination strategies that will set conditions for peace. The domestic level of analysis is important because actions within states can actually impact and explain outcomes in the international system.\textsuperscript{73}

As noted earlier, the 2004 NMS suggested a linkage between the military instrument of power with that of the other national instruments of power in relation to conflict (war) termination. However, in order to break from traditional thought and actually emphasize the importance of using all national instruments of power to achieve successful war termination results, the new Administration should consider replacing the NMS with a National Engagement Strategy (NES) which would provide policy and guidance on an integrated strategy that applies all instruments of power to achieve national political goals during war termination. If U.S. security strategy does not reflect this importance, then joint documents and processes will not successfully be able to provide guidance beyond using the military instrument during war termination. Comparatively, in World War I as a decisive victory leading to an armistice, and in the Vietnam War as a stalemate leading to an armistice agreement, the military side argued for decisive victories. The 1991 Gulf War, arguably a decisive victory, also led to less than favorable war termination in regards to instituting a lasting peace. These events

the groundwork for continuing this guidance for war termination into the NMS or like document.

Domestically, synchronizing military objectives and objectives of other national instruments of power is critical to achieving national political goals during war termination stages. Well-meshed civil-military relations in executing objectives, and a solid strategic communication plan to handle public opinion and national morale during war termination, are all key to developing successful war termination strategies that will set conditions for peace. The domestic level of analysis is important because actions within states can actually impact and explain outcomes in the international system.\textsuperscript{73}

As noted earlier, the 2004 NMS suggested a linkage between the military instrument of power with that of the other national instruments of power in relation to conflict (war) termination. However, in order to break from traditional thought and actually emphasize the importance of using all national instruments of power to achieve successful war termination results, the new Administration should consider replacing the NMS with a National Engagement Strategy (NES) which would provide policy and guidance on an integrated strategy that applies all instruments of power to achieve national political goals during war termination. If U.S. security strategy does not reflect this importance, then joint documents and processes will not successfully be able to provide guidance beyond using the military instrument during war termination. Comparatively, in World War I as a decisive victory leading to an armistice, and in the Vietnam War as a stalemate leading to an armistice agreement, the military side argued for decisive victories. The 1991 Gulf War, arguably a decisive victory, also led to less than favorable war termination in regards to instituting a lasting peace. These events
suggest that decisive military force alone is not enough to force belligerents to end hostilities, or to set conditions for peace. A NES could be the first major policy document bringing together the Department of Defense with other interagency actors (State Department, USAID, Justice Department, Department of Treasury, etc) in order to structure, employ and project a broader and more balanced set of U.S. capabilities to work war termination strategies towards postwar peace. In fact, the 2006 NSS recognized the need to transform the Department of State into a more effective diplomatic arm of the government.

A NES which synchronizes the capabilities of all national instruments of power could have several benefits towards war termination. First, applying restraint to the military “means and ends of warfare is essential to reaching a successful outcome in most wars.” Restraint in warfare can be achieved when the military means is not the only effective means for terminating war. Applying the diplomatic, economic and information instruments provide additional perspectives, talents, and resources towards war termination. A larger menu of capabilities can assist in preventing unnecessary military destruction by potentially bringing hostilities to a more rapid end, thus helping to achieve domestic and allied political support and legitimacy that is required for successful war termination results, in most cases.

Second, a NES which focuses to employ all four instruments of power would demonstrate U.S. resolve required for terminating wars through clear political, economic, and information objectives that are synchronized with clear and concise military objectives. Unsynchronized political and military objectives was one of the
failures of Vietnam, which contributed to U.S. inability to weight military power in a manner that would translate to political success.

Third, such a NES could help improve and integrate civil-military relations. An integrated application of civilian-focused diplomatic, information, and economic efforts with that of the military means provides a broader conduit from which to work war termination. Civilian-military integration allows political and military leaders to work together to carefully weigh the overall costs and constraints of war and military balance because, as was shown in the Vietnam War, these factors make a difference on states’ decisions to terminate war. Integrated civil-military relations also provides combined diplomatic, informational, economic, and military leverage for ending a war and reshaping the political end state and war termination strategy, if required, to produce peace.76

Fourth, integrated civil-military relations can smooth the transition from military operations to the interagency arena, where the diplomatic, information and economic efforts are focused to work post-war civil efforts for peace. The emphasis on positive civil-military relations in regard to war termination can be carried into Joint Pub 3-0 and 5-0. As noted earlier, these publications do not promote positive civil-military relations, discuss how to transition from military operations to post-conflict within a joint context, or discuss whether war termination should be peaceful versus punitive. These joint pubs, within their war termination sections, should include an interagency discussion which describes how military and civilian efforts should work as part of a national security team to develop effective termination criteria to achieve unified action. Such a discussion could help the U.S. better transition from military operations to post-war
stabilization during joint operations and help bring the leverage necessary to turn
diplomatic, economic, information and military success into a lasting, peaceful solution.

Finally, all strategy and joint publications require a solid strategic communication
plan to guide public opinion and national morale by informing the public on the conduct
and termination of a war. Public opinion negatively influenced war termination objectives
during World War I and the Vietnam War. A solid strategic communication plan can help
focus public opinion support positively if the U.S. can show how the war termination
objectives directly support U.S. interests reflected through its designated political end
state for the war.

*Individual.* Personal values, cultural, social, and domestic political constraints can
influence how both civilian and military leaders view how nations should end wars. The
single most important factor that political and military leaders can provide for war
termination is resolve and will, and their leadership will hopefully guide the resolve and
will of the American people. Leaders’ resolve and will must be resilient but not so
ideologically determined, as was Wilson’s resolve during World War I, that their focus
becomes blurred. Negotiating peace agreements requires laying a foundation for lasting
peace; not pursuing peace agreements to achieve presidential political agendas.
Instead, U.S. leaders must be able to demonstrate resolve and apply resources to
pursue favorable war termination objectives, institute stabilization and restoration of the
warring nation, and provide influence in resetting the regional distribution of power of a
warring nation in order to achieve a lasting peace.

Negative leadership in nations led by tyrannical leaders is not a positive force for
regional or international stability, and this thought is endorsed in the 2006 NSS.
Negative leadership in such nations will make war termination more difficult, as was the case with Hitler during World War I and Saddam Hussein during the 1991 Gulf War. U.S. leaders must be prepared to exert the resolve, will and leverage necessary to reach favorable war termination results with nations led by such tyrant leaders.

Finally, during war termination stages, peace agreements or negotiations should be peaceful and not punitive. “Historically, the [just] treatment of a state after war is of pivotal importance to international security…” Punitive peace agreements, as in World War I, did not transform Germany into a “new friend” in Europe. This will not be easy to accomplish when public opinion will most likely be seeking punitive action and reparations against warring nations. It is up to political and military leaders to separate ill conceived actions of a warring nation’s government with that of its population, which most likely wants a future without war for their children as do Americans.

Conclusions

The blending of the international, domestic, and individual levels of analysis will help carve a path towards more successful war termination strategies. These levels are not mutually exclusive nor meant to be applied independent of one another, but rather, careful consideration of these concepts should be implemented into U.S. policy. U.S. political leaders/policymakers must define the political end state using strategic vision aimed at “a better state of peace.” The war termination strategy should evolve from the political end state before the start of any hostilities. In the 1991 Gulf War, there was no termination strategy prior to the cease-fire, nor a clear end state for how the Vietnam War would end prior to the beginning of hostilities; neither war terminated with a lasting peace. Clear policy and political purpose is important in visualizing the entire spectrum
of engagement which includes the “political, military, societal, cultural, [and] institutional” aspects of the strategic environment. Only then can the U.S. deliberately apply and synchronize the national instruments of power before committing, as is traditionally done, the military instrument of power as the primary means in a war.

The next war is not just going to be military on military. The deciding factor is not going to be how many tanks you kill, how many ships you sink, and how many planes you shoot down. The decisive factor is how you take apart your adversary’s system. Instead of going after war-fighting capability, we have to go after war-making capability. The military is connected to the economic system, which is connected to their cultural system, to their personal relationships. We have to understand the links between all those systems.  

U.S. policymakers must be able to visualize the entire system of a particular potential war/conflict and apply that understanding to both foreign and domestic policy in order to implement the most effective ways and means towards a peaceful end state following the termination of wars.

Endnotes


3 Clausewitz, On War, 69.

4 Ibid., 90.


6 Clausewitz, On War, 80.


10 Kenneth N. Waltz, Man the State and War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), 12.

11 Nye, Understanding International Conflict, 15.


13 Ibid., 15.


16 Nye, Understanding International Conflict, 36.


19 Lee, “Winning the War but Losing the Peace?” 456.

20 Ibid., 457.


23 Ibid., 15.


26 Hart, Strategy, 338.

27 Ikle, Every War Must End, xi.

28 Hart, Strategy, 345.


31 Ibid., 161.

32 Ibid., 155.

33 Ibid., 158.

34 Ibid., 160.


36 Lee, “Winning the War but Losing the Peace?” 452.

37 Daum, Gardner, and Mausbach, *America, the Vietnam War*, 118.

38 Ibid., 118-119.

39 Ibid., 119.


41 Ibid.

42 Ibid., 343.

43 Lee, “Winning the War but Losing the Peace?” 454.


47 Ibid., 47.

48 Ibid., 45.

49 Ibid., 44.

50 Ikle, *Every War Must End*, xxiv-xxv.

51 Clausewitz, *On War*, 80.

Ibid., 1.


War termination and conflict termination are being used interchangeably in this paper.


JP 3-0, GL-28 and JP 5-0, GL-24

JP 3-0, IV-7.

Ibid.

Nye, *Understanding International Conflict*, 34.

Ibid.


Ikle, *Every War Must End*, xi.


Ibid., 9.

Ibid.


74 Ikle, *Every War Must End*, xx.

75 Ibid., xxi.

76 Lee, “Winning the War but Losing the Peace?” 465.

77 Ikle, *Every War Must End*, 35.


81 Unnamed JFCOM analyst, quoted in Gladwell, *Blink*, 104-105.