SEABASING: A STRATEGY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY?

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Seabasing: A Strategy for the 21st Century?

Colonel Christopher T. Mayette

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ABSTRACT

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The United States has traditionally maintained a persistent forward presence through the application of sea power and the forward basing of significant forces in overseas locations such as Korea, Japan and Europe. The current world environment challenges the efficacy and prudence of this practice going forward. Current seabasing concepts provide the flexibility to maintain a persistent forward presence in a changing world-operating environment while negating certain anti-access challenges and many of the disadvantages associated with land basing concepts. Seabasing is much more than a simple military capability; at its essence, it is a basing strategy. As such, this paper analyzes this strategy in the context of the current operating environment and national strategies by more clearly defining seabasing and associated operational concepts, as well as discusses some of the key diplomatic and economic considerations associated with employment of this strategy. Moreover, this paper seeks to make recommendations on the most effective employment of this concept and determines its strategic relevance for the 21st century.
SEABASING: A STRATEGY FOR THE 21\textsuperscript{ST} CENTURY?

U.S. forces must react promptly to theater needs from a posture that minimizes footprint. DOD is changing U.S. global basing policy, placing more emphasis on the ability to surge quickly to trouble spots across the globe, and making U.S. forces more agile and expeditionary. The new challenge is to project joint power more rapidly to confront unexpected threats.\textsuperscript{1}

—Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense

The United States has traditionally maintained a persistent forward presence through the application of sea power and the forward basing of significant forces in overseas locations such as Korea, Japan and Europe. The current world environment challenges the efficacy and prudence of this practice going forward. \textquoteright"The changing character of threats to international security and peace are more frequently requiring that U.S. military forces conduct operations in areas where host nation support and international cooperation cannot be guaranteed."\textsuperscript{2} Anti-access techniques directly challenge U.S. power projection capabilities and present significant obstacles to U.S. efforts to maintain a persistent forward presence and rapidly respond to emerging events around the globe. Diplomatic anti-access methods can restrict U.S. options as significantly as traditional physical obstacles such as geography or opposing military capabilities. Potential rivals are utilizing diplomatic means and economic incentives to counter the expansion of U.S. overseas basing in new areas required by the current international security environment. Several trends, such as the reduction in overseas airbases, expiration of several Status of Forces Agreements and increasing foreign intolerance for U.S. presence abroad, indicates a reduction in access to traditional overseas land bases.\textsuperscript{3}
In response to this changing world order, President George W. Bush announced a significant change to U. S. overseas basing posture by unveiling the Department of Defense (DoD) Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy (IGPBS) on August 16, 2004. The new basing strategy redistributed thousands of personnel from old cold war facilities in Europe and Asia to bases within the United States while mandating increased overseas reliance on more austere facilities. This new strategy designates these austere facilities as Forward Operating Sites (FOSs), which are expandable "warm facilities with a small U.S. presence and possibly prepositioned equipment, and Cooperative Security Locations (CSLs) with little or no U.S. presence, and operated by host nation personnel." In the absence of traditional basing and access options, the seabasing concept provides options to counter some of the anti-access challenges. Seabasing, however, is much more than a simple military capability; at its essence it is a basing strategy. As such, this paper analyzes the strategy in the context of the current operating environment and national security strategies by more clearly defining seabasing and associated operational concepts. Moreover, this paper explores some of the key diplomatic and economic considerations associated with employment of a seabasing strategy, as well as seeks to identify the most effective employment of this concept to achieve strategic relevance in the 21st century.

The Current Operating Environment

Numerous organizations, government agencies, think tanks, strategists and officials have tried to define the current operating environment. While many of the particulars of each analysis may differ, there are certain characteristics that appear
frequently. Characteristics such as uncertainty and change indicate the future operating environment will be dominated by dynamic complexity. Furthermore, the magnitude of change and complexity is now occurring at a much faster rate, as Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates points out:

Over the next twenty years physical pressures – population, resource, energy, climatic and environmental – could combine with rapid social, cultural, technological and geopolitical change to create greater uncertainty. This uncertainty is exacerbated by both unprecedented speed and scale of change, as well as by unpredictable and complex interaction among the trends themselves.6

One of the key considerations in analyzing the future operating environment is determining where the most likely threats will occur. The Commission on the Review of Overseas Military Facility Structures notes that part of the change in the world environment is a geographic shift of threats to the “arc of instability” -- an arc stretching from West Africa across Southwest, South and Southeast Asia, through the Pacific, and into the Andes as depicted in Figure 1 below.7
This shift has significant implications for future basing posture, as well as the U.S. ability to project power and maintain a permanent persistent presence in these emerging regions. A recent Congressional Budget Office (CBO) study notes that 85% of the world’s nations are not landlocked and indicates that seabasing provides access to 70% of the world’s surface, which is water, 20-30% of the world’s land area and 30-40% of the world’s population. The commission reviewing overseas facilities also recognized the implications of these shifts in terms of the types of capabilities required in this environment, acknowledges in its report:

Since we cannot know the precise threats that will pertain, our strategy -to include our basing strategy- must allow for a degree of uncertainty and hedge against that uncertainty. ...We can devise a force structure and basing posture to meet those commitments only in so much as we allow enough flexibility to meet changing conditions.

Consequently, the current environment poses significant demographic shifts, rapid technological and political transformation, physical and increasing social pressures that are all occurring simultaneously and at a much faster rate than before. An environment characterized by such dynamic complexity, a high rate of change and a geographic shift to the “arc of instability” demands the U.S. maintain capabilities that provide a high degree of flexibility.

Seabasing Defined and Operational Concept Overview

Sea based operations are not new. The Navy and Marine Corps doctrinal publication on seabasing lists 14 sea based operations, such as tsunami and hurricane relief operations, between 1991 and 2005. However, seabasing is an emerging concept, and as such, there is still significant confusion as to what seabasing is and how the concept fits into a national strategy. This section distinguishes between
traditional sea based amphibious operations and the future seabasing concept, provides a working definition of seabasing and explores some of the operational considerations, advantages and threats associated with this concept.

The Congressional Research Service defines the distinction between traditional concepts and seabasing as follows:

Under a traditional concept of operations for conducting expeditionary operations ashore, the Navy and Marine Corps would establish a base ashore, and then use that base to conduct operations against the desired objective. Under seabasing, the Navy and Marine Corps would launch, direct, and support expeditionary operations directly from a base at sea, with little or no reliance on a nearby land base.\(^\text{12}\)

In strategic potential however, the concept of seabasing extends beyond Navy and Marine Corps capabilities. Seabasing represents a national capability that can facilitate the ability to conduct all types of operations, from security cooperation, counterinsurgency (COIN), Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR) to Major Combat Operations (MCO) from a sea base. The most recent examples of some of these capabilities are the use of U.S. naval forces in providing disaster relief following the December 2004 tsunami in the Indian Ocean and Hurricane Katrina along the Gulf Coast.\(^\text{13}\)

Seabasing is a scalable capability that can range from one to two ships to a large sustainable base at sea capable of executing five lines of operation: close, assemble, employ, sustain and reconstitute a force as depicted in Figure 2 below.
The ability to maintain a persistent presence capable of conducting at-sea closure, assembly, employment, sustainment and reconstitute forces with little or no reliance on established Air Ports of Debarkation (APODs) or Sea Ports of Debarkation (SPODs) is one of the key characteristics distinguishing the seabasing concept from traditional amphibious or expeditionary operations.

An excellent example of the seabasing concept in execution on a small scale is the African Partnership Station (APS). This is a joint, interagency and multinational persistent Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) initiative in the Gulf of Guinea to increase the professional capacity of African partner nations. APS maintains a
persistent presence rotating ships on a seven-month cycle and performs diverse missions from humanitarian assistance to military and civilian training.\textsuperscript{15}

There are several definitions for seabasing in existing documents; however, the Seabasing Joint Integrating Concept (JIC) provides the most comprehensive description:

Seabasing is defined as the rapid deployment, assembly, command, projection, reconstitution, and re-employment of joint combat power from the sea, while providing continuous support, sustainment, and force protection to select expeditionary joint forces without reliance on land bases within the Joint Operations Area (JOA). These capabilities expand operational maneuver options, and facilitate assured access and entry from the sea.\textsuperscript{16}

The Seabasing JIC further describes a capability to close, assemble, employ, sustain and reconstitute joint forces from sea base for operations ranging from Major Combat Operations (MCO) to Humanitarian Assistance (HA) and Counterinsurgency Operations (COIN) in the 2015 to 2025 timeframe.\textsuperscript{17} Yet the systems, doctrine and capabilities to execute this concept on a larger scale remain immature. Under current program timelines, the first real capability to close, assemble, employ, sustain and constitute a force will not occur until 2017, and the seabasing concept will not be fully enabled until 2022.\textsuperscript{18} Performance objectives established include “closing and assembling the force in 11-17 days, movement of one brigade ashore in 8-10 hours and the sustainment of two brigades indefinitely if located within 2,000 nautical miles of a land base.”\textsuperscript{19}

Consequently, the ability to conduct MCOs is limited to a two-brigade capability even when the concept reaches full maturity.

The seabasing concept offers numerous potential advantages over strict reliance on established land bases. Seabasing allows U.S. forces to achieve many key objectives of a persistent presence strategy, such as “assuring allies and friends,
deterring aggression, dissuading potential adversaries, rapidly responding to irregular, catastrophic and disruptive challenges, and if necessary, quickly defeating foes in combat,” while avoiding many of the pitfalls associated with traditional land basing.

Operating from a sea base also allows for persistent demonstrations of support by the U.S. to local governments without the requirement for U.S. forces to occupy sovereign territory. This process limits impacts on the local population to specific exercises and training events, while enhancing local government legitimacy by reinforcing the perception that those governments can handle their own security requirements and are truly in a partnership relationship with the U.S. Furthermore, the sea base is inherently mobile, consequently, it provides the opportunity to be completely non-intrusive and can be repositioned over the horizon when diplomatic or informational developments dictate. This flexibility is not present in a strictly land based engagement strategy.

Inherent in the mobility of the sea base is an increased level of force protection against many of the common lower end threats. While the “political and security climate in some locations proposed for the U.S. forward bases could require a disproportionate amount of manpower be dedicated to local security requirements,” the sea base derives much of its security from its physical location. Most irregular warfare or unconventional adversaries would need to strike at forces while they were operating ashore. The sea base itself is secure from random small arms fires, mortar fire, car bombs and attacks of that nature. In order to strike at a sea base over the horizon, adversaries would require sophisticated intelligence and surveillance assets as well as sophisticated strike capabilities such as missiles, mines, submarines or a fleet capable of challenging U.S. naval superiority. These sophisticated capabilities do pose a significant threat to the sea
base. Nevertheless, these more conventional threats occur in areas where the U.S. can draw on a sizeable naval and technological advantage compared to most adversaries.

Seabasing affords many of the advantages necessary for power projection noted in the overseas basing commission study, including “flexibility of options and response packages, reliability of allies, dependability on access to bases and their collocated resources, and speed of action.” Therefore, seabasing constitutes a basing strategy designed to provide a critical military capability that allows for rapid force projection to areas of likely future conflict on a scale necessary for both combat and non-combat operations while lessening the reliance on land bases and their associated physical and political uncertainties. It provides a tailored force package capable of operating across the spectrum of operations while providing maneuverability, increased force protection and the ability to overcome many of the access challenges inherent within the current international environment. The key distinctions between the seabasing concept and current sea based operations is the functional capability to connect various ships and vessels together at sea to create floating ports and airfields which provide the ability to conduct closure, arrival, assembly, employment, sustainment and reconstitution of a large force at sea for indefinite periods.

Foundation in Current Strategic Guidance

Strategic guidance is found in multiple documents as well as policy statements by national leadership. These various sources offer a wide range of strategic guidance that impacts force structure, posture and basing. Three primary sources of guidance to determine the relevance of a seabasing strategy are the National Security Strategy (NSS) the National Defense Strategy (NDS) and the Integrated Global Presence and
Basing Strategy (IGPBS). Although the NSS changes with each administration, “it is generally accepted that the United States core national interests are: security of the homeland; economic well-being; stable international order; and promotion of national values.” In the 2006 National Security Strategy, President Bush established two pillars of our national security, “promoting freedom, justice and dignity”, and “confronting the challenges of our time by leading a growing community of democracies.” These two pillars imply significant efforts in the areas of engagement and forward presence when coupled with the president’s declaration to “choose leadership over isolationism” and to “fight our enemies abroad instead of waiting for them to arrive in our country.” To achieve this policy and these goals, the administration laid out nine key tasks the U.S. must accomplish. The two that have most relevant to basing considerations are diffusing regional conflicts and transforming national security institutions. The way ahead for working with others to defuse regional conflicts states: “The Administration’s strategy for addressing regional conflicts includes three levels of engagement: conflict prevention and resolution; conflict intervention; and post conflict stabilization and reconstruction.” A comprehensive military basing strategy should provide the flexibility to respond to multiple regions and support all three of these engagement strategies.

Key strategic guidance from the Department of Defense is found in the NDS, statements and testimony of the Secretary of Defense and basing strategy documents. The DoD strategy has evolved over time to meet the requirements of core national values, the current administration’s policy goals and changes in the operating environment. In his annual report to the president and Congress in 2004, former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld explained that the DoD was reviewing global
posture to position forces not where “wars of the 20th century ended,” but in places that will allow them to deter and defeat adversaries who threaten our security -- or that of our allies -- in the 21st century. Consequently, the 2008 NDS directs continued transformation of overseas U.S. military presence to develop a more flexible forward network of capabilities and arrangements to ensure strategic access. The methods for achieving the primary objectives of the NDS include “shaping the choices of key states, preventing adversaries from acquiring or using WMD, strengthening and expanding our alliances and partnerships, securing U.S. strategic access and retaining freedom of action, and integrating and unifying our efforts.” The Defense Department rebasing plan envisions the use of main operating bases, FOSs, and CSLs that provide U.S. forces access to as many regions around the globe as possible. The seabasing concept provides capabilities that directly support these objectives and methods.

While the NSS and NDS change with administrations, the basing strategy produces long-term effects on capabilities available to the United States. The Commission on the Review of Overseas Military Facility Structure best articulates this idea:

The military basing structure of the United States is part and parcel of its national security strategy. Where we place our forces, how we stage them for commitment in the pursuit of national interests, where we position sets of equipment and supplies to sustain them and how and with whom we ally and train are more than reflections of current policy options. It is a strategy itself, not the totality of it, but a significant part. The basing posture of the United States, particularly overseas basing, is the skeleton of national security upon which flesh and muscle will be molded to enable us to protect our national interests and the interests of our allies, not just today, but for decades to come.

The IGPBS redeploy military personnel from old cold war bases in Asia and Europe to the U.S and refocuses the military abroad in more austere facilities. Given the
currently changing and uncertain operating environment, seabasing is a capability set which effectively facilitates the overall NSS, NDS and defense-basing concept. “Our national leaders will use Seabasing as a strategic enabler combining the aspects of forward presence and engagement with the capability to rapidly deploy and employ forces to meet the future security challenges.” As such, seabasing should be seen as one block in an overall strategy that includes main operating bases, FOSs and CSLs.

Diplomatic Considerations

A persistent physical military presence provides significant influence in a region. Forward deployed forces support rapid employment of those forces, but presence alone conveys varying diplomatic messages. The presence of U.S. forces can be seen as a show of support, demonstration of commitment or as a threat to foreign governments and their populations. Considerations such as diplomatic anti-access, alienation of the host nation population or government and perceptions of the United States are areas of concern in any basing strategy. Seabasing provides flexible options to convey U.S. interests particularly in developing nations and areas where the U.S. has no long-standing allies.

Diplomatic anti-access techniques pose a unique challenge to U.S. intervention efforts. To overcome diplomatic anti-access with force undermines the overall legitimacy of U.S. efforts. Given the vast superiority of U.S. conventional military capabilities relative to most adversaries, it is likely these adversaries will leverage political and diplomatic efforts in conjunction with physical components to deny, delay or degrade U.S. intervention. From the political and diplomatic perspective, adversaries will likely
seek allies within a variety of international bodies to pursue ways of undermining U.S.
intervention.”

Reorganizing overseas basing locations to support the most likely scenarios in
the current operating environment, such as in and around the “arc of instability,” creates
a different set of problems. Overseas forward basing requires reliance on continued
cooperation of the host nation. Continued host nation support is never a given and it is
even more tenuous with new partner nations that are less predictable than traditional
long-standing allies such as Europe, Japan and Korea. Many developing nations the
U.S. seeks to develop as partner nations have less mature economic structures, which
American presence affects more significantly. Additionally, U.S. strategies promoting
democracy and human rights may come in conflict with the actions of partner nations in
these regions and result in termination of U.S. land basing rights. Recent events in
Uzbekistan well illustrate this dynamic:

During the late spring and summer of 2005, civil unrest in Central Asia
culminated in a slaughter of civilians purportedly at the hands of
government forces. When the United States protested the event and
called for international investigation, access to bases and our ability to
transit aircraft through the area came into question.

Additionally, other world powers may court these newer allies in an effort to
counter U.S. initiatives in a region. In the example cited above, “another reason for the
 eviction might have been the encouragement from China and Russia, who have
indicated increasing unease regarding U.S. military activity in the Central Asia region.”

The Chinese also appear to have utilized their economic instrument of power to
influence Uzbekistan’s decision to evict U.S. forces by providing $1.5 billion dollars in
agreements and contracts to President Islam Abduganiyevich Karimov. The net effect is
that not only will the U.S. lose the ability to utilize the base to project power and
influence U.S. interests, but also it will leave a multi-million dollar modern facility funded by U.S. taxpayers that can now be used by either Russia or China.  

A similar event occurred in February 2009, when Kyrgyzstan “announced an end to U.S. use of the strategic air base at Manas.” Manas air base plays a significant role in the logistical support of U.S. operations in Afghanistan and its closure “exponentially complicates Washington’s plans for a 32,000-strong troop surge in Afghanistan.” Once again, it appears the Russians simply outbid the U.S. by providing an aid package, which included loans, grants and debt write-offs “worth more than 60 percent of the Kyrgyzstan annual budget, which was enough to pull them back into the fold of their former Soviet Master.” “The closure puts pressure on Washington to enter a direct negotiation with Moscow—one that might involve having to make some key strategic concessions in the former Soviet sphere, particularly regarding Ukraine, Georgia and the Baltic states.” The U.S. should expect to see this type of diplomatic anti-access continue as it establishes major installations, FOSs and CSLs in developing areas where no long-standing traditional alliance or historical relationships exist. Such examples identify the unreliability of new partner relationships as well as how third country players will employ their diplomatic and economic elements of power to counter U.S. access initiatives. This calls into question the wisdom of establishing bases requiring significant investment that may not be available to support U.S. interests in future contingencies.

The presence of U.S. forces on foreign sovereign soil is an inherent imposition of power. It can be seen as a form of coercion; a partner nation can gain access to U.S. economic and or security assistance but must accept the imposition of U.S. forces on
sovereign territory. This creates an unbalanced situation from which resentment arises particularly as non-intentional but offensive acts occur.

In places ranging from Korea to Puerto Rico, U.S. Military bases have sometimes been seen in the local popular imagination to represent the heavy hand of foreign imperialism. In Saudi Arabia, the very fact of U.S. military presence probably helped ignite militant Islamic terrorism.46 Despite sound intentions and host nation government support, destabilizing events such as criminal activity by even a fraction of U.S. service members, training accidents or just the inconvenience of having U.S. forces stationed in their homeland all have the potential to alienate a population. A significant delta can develop between what a host leader will accept and what the indigenous people will tolerate.

Perhaps the most famous current articulation of this dichotomy between a government and its people concerning U.S. military presence is the 2006 Fatwa issued by Osama Bin Laden, which cites the presence of U.S. forces -- and specifically military bases in the Holy Land -- as unacceptable, and reason for Jihad.47 This type of friction is recognized in the monograph The Serpent in our Garden: Al-Qa’ida and the Long War, which reaches the following conclusion:

The military will continue to play a pivotal role in our Grand National strategy for counterterrorism and throughout the duration of the Integrated Long War Campaign Plan (ILWCP). However, we should immediately reduce the signature of our forward deployed conventional military presence in the middle East-Arabian Peninsula and continue to reduce presence as the situation in Iraq becomes increasingly more stable. …Developing new joint concepts and supporting joint-service doctrines is required if we are to improve and expand our irregular warfare capabilities, which is essential for our success in the 21st century. 48

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld also articulated the idea that forward deployed forces might cause frictions and frustrations with local populations because of a variety of issues such as noise, conduct, and pollution. As the secretary stated in testimony to
the Senate Armed Forces Committee on 23 September 2004, “in some cases, the presence and activities of our forces grate on local populations and have become an irritant for host governments. The best example is our massive headquarters in some of the most valuable downtown real estate in Seoul.”  

Furthermore, overseas basing takes an abstraction, the idea of American imperialism, and makes it a tangible reality. This supports antagonist information campaigns, which seek to discredit U.S. motives. This rhetoric resonates less if large U.S. contingents are not based within other nations, living among the population and interacting with local cultures. Moreover, U.S. presence can undermine the legitimacy of the local government by fueling perceptions the host nation government is incapable of handling internal security issues.

Proximity confers many advantages such as the ability to respond rapidly to events, project power and exploit informational, diplomatic and economic elements of power. Seabasing provides a power projection capability with a persistent presence in a manner that reduces impacts on the local population, limits perceptions of imperialism and is less likely to undermine the legitimacy of partner governments. While seabasing may provide numerous potential advantages to overcome diplomatic anti-access techniques and advantages that counter accusations of imperialism, each situation must be analyzed individually to gauge the influence of history, culture and divergent national interests. As the Overseas Basing Commission correctly points out, some countries may interpret a U.S. presence as a sign of commitment. Therefore, seabasing provides a tailored and nuanced engagement approach to each environment without
creating potential negative consequences of physical presence ashore, while likewise facilitating a flexible response to emerging international challenges.

**Economic Considerations**

In order to analyze economic considerations associated with pursuing a seabasing strategy this section reviews DoD’s primary roles in foreign assistance and foreign investment, as well as the complexity of foreign development and the potential ramifications associated with basing strategies. The basic premise articulated herein is that land basing through major installations, FOSs or even CSLs represent a form of direct foreign investment, and in developing countries this investment can be viewed as a form of foreign assistance. That assistance produces economic impacts on the host nation. The determinant factors for basing decisions, however, should remain defense concerns and not development criteria. Consequently, the impacts of such basing decisions are not given due consideration given the complexity of developmental issues which increases the likelihood of unintentional consequences. For the purpose of this paper, the DoD’s role in foreign assistance falls into two categories. The first category is the conduct of actual foreign assistance missions as mandated by Congress. The second role is the foreign direct investment associated with establishing overseas bases, which inputs capital into an economy.

The DoD has historically played a role in foreign assistance and Congress shapes that role through legislation and statues such as the Foreign Relations and Intercourse (Title 22 U.S. Code) and Armed Services (Title 10 U.S. Code) statutes. Responding to humanitarian and basic needs, building foreign military capacity and strengthening foreign governments are the three areas the DoD primarily contributes
regarding foreign assistance. DoD fulfills these foreign assistance roles because it “possesses the manpower, material, and organizational assets to respond to international needs,” including natural disasters, foreign military and police training and “small-scale economic, health and social projects.” There is evidence that DoD’s involvement in foreign assistance will continue to grow. Secretary Gates contends that until the government provides additional resources to civilian agencies -- such as the Agency for International Development (USAID) -- the DoD will have a mainstream role in providing these “nontraditional” capabilities. In 2007, the Department of State (DoS) argued for increased DoD authorities and this theme was reiterated in the 2008 National Defense Strategy, which includes a DoD mandate to “institutionalize and retain capabilities” for “long-term reconstruction, development and governance.”

The second category of DoD foreign assistance is foreign direct investment associated with the establishment of a U.S. base in a sovereign nation. “Foreign direct investment is one of the most important capital flows that an open economy can achieve,” and in developing nations can aptly be viewed as a form of foreign assistance. Basing has both quantifiable direct investments including infrastructure, maintenance, supporting stocks, forward positioned equipment sets and their protection, and less quantifiable indirect investments such as capital that servicepersons inject into the local economy.

The effectiveness of DoD foreign assistance activities remains debatable – if not controversial. “Critics find DoD state-building activities marred by a lack of strategic planning and application of economic development “best practices,” by the absence of civilian input, poor integration with civilian efforts and by insufficient oversight.”
Notwithstanding these criticisms, which highlight the complexity of developmental missions, DoD efforts in these areas are deliberate with the intent to provide foreign assistance as codified in both law and doctrine. That is not the case when determining the requirements for a land base, which focuses on a defense imperative vice developmental considerations. This lack of developmental focus can cause difficulties; “in the case of humanitarian and civic action activities in non-conflict areas, a lack of integration with long-term developmental plans can raise expectations of economic growth and development that cannot be fulfilled with the limited resources available.”

There is a concept in foreign development known as “Do No Harm.” This concept, advanced in 1990 by Mary Anderson, “seeks to identify and prevent the potential negative effects of humanitarian aid such as contributing to a war economy, disrupting local markets and prices, legitimizing unsavory leaders, and fostering dependency.” The “Do No Harm” construct further emphasizes, “there are sets of institutions, systems and processes in all societies that link people across subgroup divisions.” Foreign development aid affects those systems, which “can unite or divide people”, in several ways:

- **First,** there are distribution effects; “who” we give “what” is tremendously important. Second, there are marking effects. Assistance has influence on wages, prices and profits and can increase the incentives for people to dominate each other. Third, there are substitution effects. If donors assume responsibility for institutions and systems, they effectively free up the local population to concentrate on warfare or mechanisms of conflict (or corruption). Fourth, there are legitimization effects. International assistance can legitimize war leaders, institutions of war and war mechanisms (or corruption).

The development community accepts the complexities of unintended consequences associated with development aid and the “Do No Harm” principle. USAID incorporated the concept in its 2004 policy on assistance to internally displaced persons and
incorporates the Collaborative for Developmental Action (CDA) training manuals with multiple real world case studies on the USAID resource management portal to assist personnel in grasping the potential impacts of aid.  

Defining the long-term economic impact of establishing bases in foreign countries -- much like measuring the impact of foreign aid -- is complex and exceptionally difficult to quantify. “When the unit of analysis is the country, an extremely complex system in which, roughly speaking, everything affects everything else, the task for econometrics (the application of statistics to social science questions) is daunting indeed.” What does seem apparent is that “many developing countries are continuously tripped up by microeconomic failures.” Given this level of complexity in developmental initiatives, basing decisions made on primarily defense criteria are likely to produce more unintended consequences than careful, focused development aid conducted by agencies focused on those activities.

USAID suggests two tests for foreign assistance; “does the activity upgrade the most critical elements of the business environment in that particular country and what is the distinct advantage to the U.S.? It is a fair criticism to say that there is no evidence of DoD taking such considerations into account when determining basing requirements. As previously stated, however, the DoD imperative behind basing strategy does not include foreign assistance or development. This observation simply highlights that foreign aid is a byproduct of a land basing strategy, and that there are significant complex considerations associated with the application of foreign assistance, intentional or otherwise.
Historically, developed nations in which U.S. bases are located provide various forms of “host nation support.” This support includes “services, construction, and even cash payments in recognition of the benefit to local economies. However, many of the new locations, such as Kyrgyzstan, are demanding payments from the U.S. to allow basing on their countries.”  

In Kyrgyzstan, for example, the U.S. almost doubled the offer to $150 million dollars a year plus bonuses to government and key officials in the failed effort to maintain access to Manas air base. 

The U.S. makes significant investments in maintaining newer bases throughout and adjacent to the “arc of instability.” As such, some of the key investments in a land basing strategy include:

- Improvements to main operating bases, forward operating sites (essentially expandable facilities maintained with limited U.S. military presence) and cooperative security locations (facilities with little or no permanent U.S. military presence) require land and sea facility investments, operating budgets, and contractual services. Add to these the investment requirements for unit sets of equipment and supporting stocks, their protection (from environmental as well as security threats), maintenance and upkeep. Add again similar expenditures for procuring, securing, maintaining and exercising CSLs and other bases abroad (i.e. working with locals, entering into and using facilities, etc.) and using training areas. The sum promises to be appreciable. 

Furthermore, as discussed in the Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan examples, these investments are at significant risk in locations where the U.S. lacks long-standing allies and is developing partnerships with developing countries.

Indirect investment results from service people spending their income, which may be significant by local standards and can create an influx of undirected capital into the developing economy, potentially creating imbalances and inflation. There are multiple potential economic impacts from both the direct and indirect investments described above. For example, as discussed in the Do No Harm concept, disrupting local markets
and prices is one of the primary potential negative effects of aid. A significant influx of capital associated with establishment of overseas basing in a developing country can unintentionally destabilize developing economies and skew the development of the labor force by pulling educated professionals to higher paying base jobs such as construction, life support contracting, translator and security jobs. The author witnessed numerous examples of this phenomenon during a recent deployment to Iraq in which educated professionals chose to fill lucrative jobs working for the U.S. Government instead of pursuing their professions. Colonel Michael Peterman, who recently returned from Afghanistan, observed this phenomenon in his own battalion’s area of operation where he discovered he had lawyers and a surgeon working as interpreters for his unit. It is difficult to get a developing society up and running when educated members find it more lucrative to take contracting jobs outside their profession.

While the loss of expensive land basing facilities, the potentially destabilizing effect on developing economies, and redistribution of educated professionals represent potential negative results of a land basing strategy, there are numerous examples of long-term positive impacts in both Europe and Asia. Okinawa is an excellent example where a “unique triangular relationship between Washington (which gets its Okinawa bases essentially free), Tokyo (which gets the U.S. security guarantee in return) and the local Okinawan authorities (who get the burden payments),” benefits all concerned parties. To gain and maintain support for U.S. basing interests, developmental impacts must factor into the equation a commensurate application of resources as realized at the end of World War II with the Marshall Plan. There can be successful
basing initiatives if the basing strategy follows a holistic approach and takes into
consideration both defense and developmental concerns.

Seabasing strategy facilitates DoD foreign assistance in the traditional areas of
responding to humanitarian and basic needs, building foreign military capacity and
strengthening foreign governments while mitigating unplanned economic development
assistance and unintended consequences of a land basing strategy by limiting capital
investments into the economy. Seabasing reduces much of the impact associated with
foreign direct investment and some of the indirect investment associated with
servicepersons injecting their money into the economy. Moreover, seabasing allows
investment to be more targeted and permits DoD to focus on traditional foreign
assistance categories. Land base decisions should include “development assessment”
conducted in conjunctions with USAID as part of the decision-making criteria.

Conclusions and Recommendations

As a concept, seabasing provides the ability to maintain a mobile forward
persistent presence in various regions of the world. From a functional perspective,
seabasing provides the ability to conduct closure, assembly employment, sustainment
and reconstitution at sea. Given the current and predicted future operating environment,
trends in political anti-access, demographic shifts, current national strategic guidance,
existing global presence and basing modifications, and diplomatic and economic
considerations, seabasing is an appropriate strategy to provide persistent presence and
strategic agility in a changing world environment.

While not ideal for all situations, such as major theater war or major combat
operations due to the limited two-brigade capability envisioned at full operational
capability in 2022, seabasing does provide an improved capability compared to overseas basing for higher frequency, low intensity operations. This is particularly true in the realm of second and third order unintended consequences from diplomatic and economic perspectives while simultaneously providing an operational capacity capable of supporting MTW or MCO type environments by complimenting land based forces. Operationally, seabasing provides a flexible, tailored force capable of sustained persistent presence with improved force protection against unconventional threats while relying on U.S. technological superiority against conventional threats. From a diplomatic standpoint, seabasing reduces imposition on the population, potential opportunities for misconduct of service people and mitigates claims of imperialism. Lastly, the seabasing concept supports a more precise and deliberate application of economic aid, in line with the “Do No Harm” development policies, by controlling both direct and indirect capital into the developing system.

The U.S government should do several things to exploit a seabasing capability. First, it should incorporate seabasing as a portion of an overall global basing strategy that includes major installations, future operating sites and cooperative security locations. This allows the most flexibility in an uncertain environment to assure current allies, develop new partnerships and position forces globally. There is potential to follow a graduated level of commitment with new partners ranging from seabasing operations, to CSLs and eventually FOSs. This would allow the U.S. to develop a stronger relationship prior to investing in these new partner nations. Second, given advantages of geography, level of development and the nature of emerging partnerships, the U.S. should focus seabasing operations in the Pacific Rim, South America and Africa. Lastly,
American policy makers must improve coordination between DoD, DoS and USAID to include an economic development impact assessment for all proposed land bases and seabasing operations. Pursuing these three objectives will assist the US in developing a holistic basing strategy that is flexible, agile and relevant to the 21st century.

Endnotes


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28 Ibid., 15.


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