THE ROLE OF THE AFRICAN UNION IN AFRICAN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

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The Role of the African Union in African Peacekeeping Operations

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This SRP assesses the readiness of the African Union (AU) to participate in African peacekeeping operations (PKOs) in the context of the current African Peace and Security Architecture. An assessment of AU PKOs in Burundi and Sudan affirms that the organization is subject to constraints on the political, institutional, and conceptual levels that detract from the effectiveness and readiness of the AU. However, as the leading continental organization, it has a moral and institutional responsibility to contribute prominently to African peacekeeping requirements. Therefore, with violent armed conflicts still raging across the continent, it is difficult to imagine the need for the AU contributions to African PKOs diminishing in the near future – even, if the readiness of the organization is in question. This SRP confirms the necessity for collaborative global peacekeeping partnerships between the AU and other international actors, since the organization is not ready to conduct unilateral PKOs in Africa.

Readiness, Changing Security Reality, Capacity Building
THE ROLE OF THE AFRICAN UNION IN AFRICAN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

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ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Colonel John Peter Matthews Kobbie

TITLE: The Role of the African Union in African Peacekeeping Operations

FORMAT: Strategy Research Project

DATE: 26 March 2008 WORD COUNT: 7841 PAGES: 38

KEY TERMS: Readiness, Changing Security Reality, Capacity Building

CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

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THE ROLE OF THE AFRICAN UNION IN AFRICAN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

To resolve conflict in Africa is like operating on a patient that is anaesthetized – it constantly moves around.”

—Anon

The current strategic environment in Africa evolved due to significant changes in the international security architecture at the end of the Cold War and the events in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Consequently, the United Nation (UN) has been obliged to acknowledge the need for such continental organizations as the African Union (AU) to play a more active role in settling armed conflicts in Africa. This renewed interest in the role of the AU began with the failure of UN peacekeeping operations (PKOs) in Africa during the 1990s (Rwanda, Somalia, Angola, and Sierra Leone), coupled with the indifference of the international community to participating in 21st century African PKOs. Moreover, the recent impact of foreign power interests on the continent adds another dimension and complexity to the role of the AU in African PKOs.²

The role of the African Union (AU) in African PKOs has been extremely complex due to the evolving African strategic security environment. This was particularly evident in the deployments of the AU to Burundi and Sudan, during which the AU’s role was tested with significant implications for the future of peacekeeping in Africa.³ AU PKOs were tested politically (articulation of appropriate political and military strategic guidance for AU PKOs), institutionally (appropriate structures and resources to conduct effective AU PKOs), and conceptually (appropriate peacekeeping concepts to meet AU peacekeeping challenges). These tests reveal the changing nature of the African strategic environment; they also indicate a paradigm shift away from traditional
peacekeeping as foreseen by the UN. Consequently, in view of the changing security milieu, certain policy, institutional and conceptual, changes are needed in the AU Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) in order for the AU to better respond to armed conflicts on the continent. However, there is considerable uncertainty about whether the AU is ready to effectively respond to the current evolving security reality - indeed whether the AU is able to fulfill its proper role in managing contemporary complex PKOs in Africa. The African strategic environment also serves as impetus for an assessment of the role and readiness of the AU in PKOs. The AU’s role as the continental leader will be determined largely by its capability to resolve conflict on the continent.

This SRP assesses the readiness of the AU to participate in African PKOs in the context of the new strategic reality. First, it provides a brief background of the nature and the root causes of violent conflict in Africa to identify the most urgent threats to the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). Second, it describes the peacekeeping role of the forerunner of the AU, the Organization of African Unity (OAU). This discussion provides a historical perspective on African PKOs, showing that OAU’s failures in peacekeeping endeavors led to the establishment of the AU and the reasons for the AU. Third, it discusses the emergence of the AU and its quest for peace and stability in Africa, noting the AU’s role in the establishment of an effective APSA through the institutionalization of the AU Common African Defense and Security Policy (CADSP) and the development of an African Standby Force (ASF). Fourth, this SRP assess the role of regional organizations in peacekeeping, emphasizing the two fundamental circumstances that shape and focus the assessment - namely, that armed conflict in Africa can no more be resolved by the UN alone, and that the concept of peacekeeping
evolves continuously. Fifth, this SRP briefly analyses the AU's involvement in Burundi and Darfur; these current conflicts provides some evidence regarding AU’s readiness to respond effectively to armed conflict in Africa. In assessing the AU's peacekeeping involvement in these conflicts certain critical limitations and constraints of the organization are identified. This SRP concludes with, recommendations for improvement of AU's readiness to play a leading role in African PKOs.

The Nature and the Root Causes of Violent Armed Conflict in Africa

The AU's participation in African PKOs cannot be analyzed without a proper understanding of both the nature and the root causes of violent armed conflict and its subsequent impact on the readiness of the AU to conduct PKOs. Contemporary armed conflict in Africa is characterized by various national and international actors, to include state and non-state actors, insurgents, terrorists, various belligerents and warlords, illegal arms merchants, criminal drug cartels, and transnational criminals. These miscreants operate in an environment of failed African states or states emerging from civil conflict.⁶ The root causes of war in Africa cannot be attributed to a single factor, but the causes are interrelated and interwoven into a complex nexus.

The aforementioned actors participate in violent armed conflict that is more often characterized as intra-state rather than inter-state. Their violent activities usually have a spill-over effect, with regional ramifications.⁷ Moreover, regional instability entices the unintentional or purposeful involvement of neighboring states that host or support certain of these actors.⁸ The actors and the environment within which they conduct their undesirable behavior illustrate the inter-connectedness and complexities associated in resolving armed conflicts in Africa.
The nature of violent armed conflict in Africa, as defined by the actors and the changing security environment, has certain implications for the role and readiness of the AU in African PKOs. These operations are complex, and there is an increasing need for AU PKOs. The actions and behavior of these actors in such a complex environment makes it difficult for the UN to intervene. The UN will not sanction peace interventions unless the parties to the conflict will enter into ceasefire agreement and will assent to the UN intervention. Because belligerents in African conflicts refuse to make such accommodations, the AU must be ready to respond to African peacekeeping requirements. African conflicts have their own dynamics, involve their own actors, take place in a unique environment and require a different approach and solution - especially if the root causes of the conflict are not properly analyzed.9

Historically, the root causes of several violent armed conflicts in Africa are traceable to colonial rule, whose legacy of arbitrary colonial borders has precipitated intra-state and inter-state conflicts. The colonial powers gave little consideration to ethnicity, culture, and language when state borders were drawn: these borders often divided ethnic communities and joined traditional enemies into a common jurisdiction.10 In addition to the colonial legacy, the other causes of armed conflict include ethnicity, discrimination and national rivalries (Rwanda and Burundi), the illegal exploitation and competition for natural resources (Liberia with its illicit trade in diamonds), foreign intervention (DRC), the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (Sierra Leone), poverty (Sudan), fundamentalism, religious cleavages, crises of identity within a society and exclusionary ideological beliefs (Nigeria and Somalia), territorial disputes (Ethiopia and Eritrea), and the struggle for access to political power (Kenya and Zimbabwe).11
The expectations for AU peacekeepers in the current African strategic reality are imposed on a hostile, non-consensual environment, with the aim to disarm or seize weapons, to aggressively protect humanitarian assistance, to clear land mines, to establish law and order, and to monitor human rights and elections. This strategic environment and the aforementioned actors require AU peacekeepers to be both diplomats and peacekeepers or peace enforcers in an African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), ‘where there is no peace to keep’. Peacekeepers in this environment are required to ensure adherence to the terms of comprehensive peace agreements as they undertake a wide variety of complex tasks to help build sustainable peace. Therefore, the strategic context for AU PKOs has dramatically changed, prompting the AU to shift and expand its PKOs from “traditional” peacekeeping, involving strictly military tasks, to complex “multidimensional” operations.

The nature and the root causes of African armed conflicts also reveal the growing importance of the role and influence of regional organizations in the prevention, management, and resolution of violent armed conflicts since these organizations are well positioned to understand the root causes of armed conflict. Awareness of this circumstances prompted UN Security Council to make greater use of regional AU PKOs to address the root causes of African conflicts, because of their proximity to the conflict and their knowledge of local conditions. This collaborative approach requires a strong relationship and shared role between the AU, the UN and sub-regional organizations. They must divide their peacekeeping responsibilities, since their interests are common and it is of mutually beneficial to address peacekeeping challenges collectively. Also, the nature and the root causes of armed conflict within the current African strategic
environment requires the AU to be ready to conduct PKOs that are executed under different policies, by different institutions that use different concepts than the policies, institutions and concepts embodied in the traditional theory of peacekeeping as conducted by the predecessor to the AU, the Organization for African Unity (OAU).  

The Organization for African Unity and African Peacekeeping in Historical Context

The establishment of the OAU on 25 May 1963, the first pan-African intergovernmental organization, represents Africa’s first real attempt to deal with African peacekeeping challenges through continental arrangements. The OAU was the principal regional organization in Africa that responded to violent armed conflict during the Cold War. Historically, African peacekeeping requirements were addressed through the OAU’s Commission on Mediation, Arbitration and Conciliation; but the Commission was dismantled in 1977, due to its ineffectiveness and its reluctance to intervene in the internal affairs of member states. For instance, in October 1963, an OAU resolution sent military observers to a demilitarized zone between Algeria and Morocco, but this decision was never implemented due to the lack of political will and interest of OAU member states. The OAU was also reluctant to intervene in the Nigerian civil war during 1967-70, specifically because it did not want to interfere in the internal affairs of Nigeria.

The OAU mainly focused on and was pre-occupied with the elimination of all forms of foreign or colonial rule on the continent. African peacekeeping interventions were not a priority. The role of the OAU in African peacekeeping, rested on the ineffective principles of state sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-intervention. As a result, human rights were neglected. Likewise, OAU decisions to intervene in African
armed conflicts lacked credibility: member states lacked the will to implement them, especially if their interest were threatened by an intervention. The organization’s objective was to define the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence of member states. On the other hand, member states committed themselves to respect the sovereignty of other member states, with the belief that other African states would refrain from interfering in their own internal affairs. This principle of sovereignty was rigidly interpreted and applied accordingly. African states viewed international concern for human rights and democratic governance as pretexts for undermining their sovereignty. Not surprisingly then, grave human rights violations took place in Uganda in the 1970s when Idi Amin was the president. Amin’s transgressions highlighted the dangers of strict adherence to sovereignty and non-interventionist principles.¹⁸

To its credit, the OAU intervened on several occasions in African conflicts but with less than impressive results. Chad is a case in point. During 1979, Nigeria deployed as the first peacekeeping force in Chad after retroactively obtaining OAU support. Thereafter, an Inter-African Force deployed in early 1980, but withdrew when the civil war resumed in Chad. Other African countries intervened with international assistance, since the OAU could not sufficiently fund the PKOs. (The OAU contributed only US $400,000 of an estimated budget of US $192 million). Logistical problems and an unrealistic timetable for elections and the withdrawal of forces forced the OAU to withdraw in June 1982. Deployment of the peacekeeping force to Chad was thus a complete failure. Thus, the organization’s first peacekeeping mission of its kind and the first example of inter-African peacekeeping cooperation was a failure which haunted the organization for the next decade. It ended in failure due to inadequate planning,
confusion over the mandate, absence of an OAU command and control structure, the perceived partiality of some troop-contributing countries, minimal financial and logistic resources and, above all, the lack of political will.

The aforementioned failure would color future post-Cold War peacekeeping operations in Africa. Only in 1990 did the OAU again make a decision to send a peacekeeping mission to Rwanda. After several months of delays, a Military Observer Team (MOT) from Burundi, Uganda, and the former Zaire was deployed to Rwanda in April 1991. A Neutral Military Observer Group (NMOG) and NMOG II, that included observers and a follow-up force of 240 personnel from Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, Zimbabwe, Congo Brazzaville and Tunisia, later replaced the MOT. However, despite this deployment and the OAU’s mechanisms to prevent and manage conflicts, the Rwandan genocide took place in 1994, only to demonstrate once again the virtual impotence of the organization. These OAU failures demonstrated that the organization did not have the financial resources to conduct large-scale PKOs, other than its capacity to undertake observer missions, along with political or diplomatic efforts. This lack of resources has denied it the freedom to unilaterally decide on the strategic, operational and tactical aspects of PKOs that it may wish to initiate.

Demands for PKOs in Africa overwhelmed the OAU and the changed security environment with its complex mix of actors. Further pressure was placed on the OAU with the expansion of intra-state conflict, and the pressing issue of state sovereignty, poverty, globalization and abuses of human rights in Africa. The OAU was unable to respond effectively with well-resourced personnel, while the inadequacies of the Charter of the OAU no longer addressed the new African security and peacekeeping
challenges, since the wars against foreign rule and Apartheid had ended. The OAU was transformed into the AU at an Extraordinary Session of the Assembly of African Heads of State and Government in Sirte, Libya, on 9 September 1999. The AU was formed to address some of the issues identified during the analysis of the OAU PKOs.

The Establishment of the African Union

The Sirte Declaration led to the establishment of the AU in 2002. One of the AU’s objectives was to enhance the security and readiness of Africa to respond to armed conflicts in Africa. Subsequently, the Constitutive Act (2) was adopted in Lomé in 2000; it established the AU and mandated the new organization, as continental guardian, to develop a new African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). The primary role of the AU was stipulated in Article 3 of the AU Constitutive Act: to maintain continental peace and security. The AU was created to avoid over-reliance on UN PKOs by seeking ‘African solutions to African problems’.20

The AU significantly departed from the OAU’s reluctance to intervene in states’ affairs. Indeed the AU embodies an interventionist and activist stance towards peacekeeping. It explicitly declares in its mandate that the organization will intervene in conflicts on the continent through PKOs, even when a peace agreement or cease-fire agreement is not in place. The AU is convinced that in certain conflict situations in Africa, it is not possible to negotiate peace agreements without first establishing a certain degree of stability. The organization once again departed from the position of the OAU, since the OAU intervened only in conflicts if they were invited by the parties to the conflict. In contrast with the OAU, the general belief of the AU is that the protection of civilians should not be sacrificed at the expense of sovereignty. Currently, the
organization is acknowledged as the world’s only regional organization that explicitly claims the right to intervene in a member state in response to grave humanitarian and human rights grounds, such as war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.  

Furthermore, to solidify its role as continental leader in PKOs, the AU adopted the Common African Defense and Security Policy (CADSP) to demonstrate its commitment to develop a common position on matters relating to defense and security in Africa. The CADSP seeks to identify the common security threats in Africa and attempts to approach security holistically, justifying this approach on the concept of human security. Moreover, the CADSP has been established to guide the work of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) which mirrors the Security Council of the UN. As a key component of the AU, the PSC is the principal decision-making element of the AU for PKOs: the PSC enable the AU to serve as a collective security and early warning arrangement to facilitate timely and efficient responses to violent armed conflict in Africa.

In addition, the proposed African Standby Force (ASF) will serve as the AU’s flagship program for the development of its peacekeeping capacity. It is also part of the broader African security architecture, conceptually consisting of standby multidisciplinary contingents, including civilian and military components in their countries of origin, ready to rapidly deploy as a preventative force where needed. The ASF is designed to provide the AU with a rapid reaction capability, which will limit ad hoc responses to crises on the continent. It will prepare to conduct either robust stabilization and peace enforcement operations, or multidimensional UN PKOs, including post-conflict disarmament, demobilization, re-integration, humanitarian
assistance and peacebuilding.\textsuperscript{25} Difficulties with the establishment of the ASF are related to its fundamental military approach,\textsuperscript{26} lack of funds for the brigades, logistics and structural problems. The AU, as the leading regional organization for PKOs in Africa, realized that deployments in Burundi and Darfur provided valuable lessons on how to meet the difficulties of the ASF and other AU PKO challenges.\textsuperscript{27}

The Involvement of Regional Organizations in Peacekeeping Operations in Africa

The remarkable surge in the increasingly complex UN PKOs in Africa after the Cold War and 9/11 renewed the interest of the international community in the concept of “partnership peacekeeping”.\textsuperscript{28} Although the primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security lies with the UN, Articles 52 and 53 of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter make provision for the role of regional organizations in the peaceful settlement of local disputes and enforcement operations under the authority of the UN Security Council (UNSC).\textsuperscript{29}

The increasing regionalization of peacekeeping is a pragmatic response mainly due to ongoing armed conflicts and the resultant humanitarian tragedies in Africa. Also the overstressing of the UN’s insufficient financial, logistical and human resources have contributed to regionalized responses.\textsuperscript{30} Moreover failed UN PKOs in Africa and the incapacity of certain African states to deal with the challenges of the current strategic environment have contributed to the AU playing an increasingly important role. The involvement of the AU is a further response by Africans to the indifference and lack of political will of the international community to intervene in African armed conflicts.

The exemplary willingness and increasing capacity of the AU should not be seen as an alternative to sustained UN PKOs. AU contributions are a complementary, not a
supplementary measure, that enables the UN to address violent armed conflicts more comprehensively by building on the strengths and compensating for the weaknesses of the UN, the AU and sub-regional African organizations. A division of labor is emerging, wherein the sub-regional organizations and the AU act as the initial respondents to the armed conflict, while the UN contributes more to peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction. Therefore, a pyramidal security framework has developed between the UN (top of the pyramid as world body), AU (critical linkage between the UN and sub-regions) and sub-regional organizations (at the base of the pyramid).\textsuperscript{31}

The UN has continuously emphasized the utility of developing effective partnerships between the UN and regional organizations in order to facilitate early responses to disputes in Africa through active cooperation. Such partnerships lighten the burden on the UN PKOs in times when the UN’s financial and logistical resources are limited and UN members are increasingly unwilling to deploy to Africa. The report of former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in 1995 stated the importance of regional organizations in PKOs:

The founders of the United Nations, in Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations, envisaged an important role for regional organizations in the maintenance of international peace and security. It is increasingly apparent that the United Nations cannot address every potential and actual conflict troubling the world. Regional or sub-regional organizations sometimes have a comparative advantage in taking the lead role in the prevention and settlement of conflicts and to assist the United Nations in containing them.\textsuperscript{32}

The UNSC was supported by the Brahimi-Report in August 2000 that warned of the limits on when and where the UN is prepared to operate, including the type of PKO to be embarked upon. This report stated unambiguously that PKOs, especially those with an enforcement mandate, should preferably be dealt with by a coalition of willing
states. It acknowledged that UN intervention will not always be the best answer to every problem in Africa and that the key to PKOs in Africa is to listen to the Africans. Furthermore, the report warned that the UN should be prepared to deploy to no more than one complex peace mission a year.³³

The report makes collaboration between the AU and the UN system even more urgent. Events in Africa reveal that regional and sub-regional organizations are the first to respond to emerging crisis situations. This division of labor between the UN and regional organizations accommodates the two organizations’ strengths and addresses their weaknesses.³⁴ In addition, the report commanded that peace enforcement should preferably be dealt with by coalitions of willing states and regional organizations. This demands the AU’s active contributions and partnership, rather than passive reliance on the UN as evident in AU PKOs in Burundi and Sudan, where the AU’s role was tested with significant implications for the future of peacekeeping in Africa.³⁵

AU Involvement in Burundi and Sudan ³⁶

The AU PKOs in Burundi (AMIB) and Sudan (AMIS) were the first PKOs entirely initiated, planned, and executed by AU members. These PKOs represent milestones for the AU in terms of operationalizing peacekeeping. As case studies, they provided lessons for the AU on how to better fulfill its role and readiness in PKOs and its performance in these PKOs is indicative of the current African strategic reality. Details from both PKOs can be used to better prepare for future AU PKOs.

Conceptually, the regionalization of contemporary complex multi-faceted African PKOs in Burundi and Sudan, conducted in the midst of armed conflict, has profoundly impacted the evolution of the traditional concept of peacekeeping. These AU PKOs
proved that African PKOs in the current strategic context will not necessarily progress through the sequential linear process of preventive diplomacy, followed by peacemaking, peacekeeping and post-conflict peacebuilding. In contrast, to “keep the peace”, PKOs may now be conducted as a tool of preventative diplomacy, to either enforce the peace or to avoid the recurrence of armed conflict. This often takes place without an agreed cease-fire and belligerents consent in place. These concepts, including, neutrality and impartially, no longer possess a universally accepted meaning and are not held in the same esteem as before.

Both AMIB and AMIS challenged the traditional concepts related to peacekeeping. AU leaders did not seek the consensus of all the conflicting parties to intervene militarily in the internal affairs of the respective countries’ armed conflicts, nor was a formal cease fire agreement in place prior to the interventions. However both operations required the consent of the ruling government to enter the country, and AU peacekeepers operated under a limited mandate. In Sudan, AU peacekeeping troops did not have the authority or manpower to disarm the Janjaweed and other paramilitary forces, since the mandate stipulated only the PKO authority to monitor the peace agreement, but not to enforce the peace.37

The success of the AU’s involvement in Burundi and Sudan can be measured by three criteria: the fulfillment of the mandate of the PKO as set by the AU; the resolution of the underlying disputes precipitating the conflict, and the contribution of the PKO to the maintenance of peace and security by reducing or eliminating conflict in the area of operation (basically conflict containment and the limitation of casualties).38 These criteria will guide the following evaluation of both AMIB and AMIS; they assist in
identifying the strengths and weaknesses of both AU PKOs. These findings then inform the capability of the AU to conduct successful PKOs. The structure, effectiveness and efficiency of both operations are also critical in assessing the readiness of the AU. 39

AMIB deployed in April 2003 in the absence of a comprehensive and all-inclusive ceasefire in Burundi. The mandate of AMIB was to facilitate the implementation of the ceasefire agreements, to ensure that the defense and security situation in Burundi was stable and further, to protect politicians who had return from exile and would assume roles in the transitional government. AMIB also sought to create conditions that would allow internally displaced persons and refugees, who lived in the eight Burundian provinces and three refugee camps in Tanzania, to return to their homes. The AMIB mission also had the task of establishing conditions that would enable a UN peace operation to enter the country, since the UN was reluctant to enter a situation that had the potential to relapse into conflict. A comprehensive ceasefire agreement was reached on 16 November 2003. The mandate of AMIB concluded on 31 May 2004, leaving the responsibility of peacekeeping to the UN Operations in Burundi (ONUB). AMIB was thus only a “holding operation” pending the UN sanctioned peacekeeping mission. 40

Notwithstanding severe challenges, AMIB can be credited with stabilizing about 95 percent of Burundi, with facilitating the delivery of humanitarian assistance and with providing adequate protection to the designated returning exile leaders. Throughout its period of operation AMIB succeeded in de-escalating a potentially volatile situation. In the absence of the AU mission, Burundi would have been left to its own devices, which probably would have resulted in an escalation of violent conflict.
When measuring the success through the identified three methods, we can conclude that AMIB had fulfilled its mission; contributing to the resolution of the dispute by addressing its underlying causes and contributed to peace and stability in Burundi even in the face of serious policy, institutional and conceptual limitations. The AU in Burundi made a positive difference despite financial, logistical, and planning difficulties. The AU presence prevented violence against women, reduced the recruitment of children into armed forces, assisted with displaced persons and protected humanitarian corridors and convoys. AMIB demonstrated the AU’s commitment to PKOs and took the necessary steps to prevent a security vacuum in Burundi, which then enabled the UN to intervene.

On the other hand, the involvement of the AU in Sudan (AMIS I and II, and later separately AMID - African Mission in Darfur) represents one of the most critical tests of the role of AU in African PKOs. The instability in Darfur has assumed regional and international dimensions, evolving into a large-scale humanitarian crisis in Sudan and bordering countries, claiming over 200,000 lives, displacing over 2 million people, and poses security threats to neighboring countries. The AU intervened with the deployment of a peacekeeping force and by initiating peace talks seeking an agreement, to disarm the Janjaweed, to rebuild Darfur, and the integration of various armed groups into the national army. The AU was initially authorized only to monitor the ceasefire with a 120-person Ceasefire Monitoring Commission and more than 6,000 AU peacekeepers, but with no peace enforcement mandate. However, on 31 July, 2007, the Security Council passed UNSC Resolution 1769 authorizing the AU PKO, with an initial strength of 7,400 personnel, to evolve to an envisioned joint 26,000
UN/AU Chapter VII peacekeeping force (UNAMID). The AU’s monitoring mission continued to evolve to this envisioned strength as other countries contribute troops to the operation.

In contrast to AMIB, when measuring the success of the AU PKO in Sudan through the identified three methods, the finding is that these criteria were not successfully addressed, especially the adequacy of the structure of AMIS and the effectiveness of its operations. The underlying reasons for the conflict were not successfully addressed due to the limited and inadequate mandate of the initial AU deployment in Sudan as arranged between the AU and the Sudan government. The initial purpose of the operation was monitoring, not peacekeeping, reminiscent of the ineffectiveness of OAU deployments.\(^43\) AMIS has been criticized for deploying slowly and the fact that it only had to protect the civilian and military observers, and could not intervene when civilians were under threat.\(^44\)

Furthermore, the contribution of the AU PKO in the resolution of the underlying disputes generating the conflict and the maintenance of peace and security has been very limited. Institutionally, this situation was caused by a lack of sufficient manpower and essential equipment, such as armored personnel carriers and helicopters, to carry out even the most elementary of peacekeeping tasks. However, the main reason for the ineffectiveness of the AU PKOs is political in nature, particularly due to the indifference and polarization of the international community over the resolution of the Darfur crisis, coupled with the obstructive behavior of the Sudanese government.\(^45\)

The involvement of the AU in Burundi can be regarded as a success, while the PKO in Sudan achieved only limited results because the AU force was not large enough
and the mandate was too weak. The 7,400 AU troops in Darfur were authorized only to
monitor the situation and to report ceasefire violations: they were not authorized to
protect civilians from attacks by the Janjaweed. The mission was further weakened by
the lack of resources.

On the other hand, the mission in Burundi was well-defined; it enjoyed a clear
mandate, and had the political support of most of the belligerents. But AMIS lacked a
well defined mission, lacked a clear mandate, and a plan for reaching peace. It also
lacked funding and manpower throughout the mission. Finally, there was no
commitment to complete the mission. The UN eventually managed to convince the
Khartoum government to accept a hybrid UN/AU peacekeeping force, UNAMID, in
response to the degenerating humanitarian and security conditions in Sudan. In short,
AMIS was not able to contain this crisis due to its limited mandate, manpower and
equipment. The crisis in Darfur has expanded and now affects the entire region’s
stability, fueling conflicts in Sudan and Chad that have become mutually reinforcing. In
this environment, UNAMID remains ineffective because it is understaffed, under-
equipped, and overextended.

African Union Peacekeeping Constraints and Challenges

AMIB and AMIS proved that the greatest constraints and challenges to the
readiness of the AU in African PKOs are political, institutional, and conceptual in nature.
Both PKOs highlighted the AU’s limitations to respond to the new strategic reality.
These political, institutional, and conceptual constraints and challenges have a profound
impact on the role and readiness of AU PKOs.
Politically the AU is, in some cases, captive to the internal politics or interests of member states, foreign powers, and host governments. These circumstances prevent it from acting effectively with governments such as Sudan, out of fear of reaction from key African member states or foreign powers. This uncertainty effectively undermines AU PKO credibility and recalls OAU’s weakness.\textsuperscript{48} This lack of member states’ political will is a major impediment to the effective deployment of PKOs. Furthermore, both African and non-African leaders are not willing to risk the loss of soldiers in poorly understood countries where there may be no perceived strategic national interests at stake. As a result, African peacekeeping requirements are being addressed in an ad hoc manner, with states acting independently, reflecting the same inabilities and weaknesses that characterized the OAU.\textsuperscript{49} The very same mistakes of the OAU have been repeated: Foreign countries continue to prefer to deal with states, rather than with continental organizations such as the AU. Therefore capacity-building initiatives for African PKOs reflect the interests of the international actor and the regional actor, instead of the organization as a whole.\textsuperscript{50}

Another political challenge faced by AU PKOs, specifically in Sudan, is the difficulty of reconciling the apparent contradictions between state sovereignty and the need for intervention in intra-state conflict. Although AMIS represented a bold step by the AU to intervene in Sudan and Darfur, the PKOs in Sudan have demonstrated that the AU did not yet overcome the political weakness inherent in the OAU because of its fixation on the principle of sovereignty and resulting indifference to the grave humanitarian and human rights situation in the country. African governmental leaders, even if their legitimacy has been questioned, continue to be protected by the AU.
The Sudanese situation proves that the organization has not provided the kind of leadership and political will envisioned when it was transformed from the OAU to the AU. This weakness has negatively impacted AU PKOs. The AU PKOs are still constrained by the principles of sovereignty, consent and territorial integrity in that restricted mandates are negotiated that limit the authority and operational effectiveness of peacekeepers. So, although the AU proclaims that the organization is currently acknowledged as the world’s only regional organization that explicitly recognizes the right to intervene in a member state in response to grave humanitarian and human rights issues, its interventionist and activist stance towards peacekeeping remains paralyzed by host country demands for restrictive mandates.

Institutionally the AU Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD) lacks the capacity to plan and guide the conduct of ASF deployments at the strategic level because strategic goals are not being properly articulated. The AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS), for example, exposed gaps in the planning and guidance at the strategic level. It also experienced challenges in integrating the various components of the mission, such as the military, police, political, and humanitarian activities on the operational level. Furthermore, minimal strategic direction or guidance is provided, critical vacancies at the strategic level are not filled early enough during PKOs, the senior strategic leaders are insufficiently trained and the roles of international partners are unclear. These AU problems were painfully exposed in the Sudan PKOs. Further, there is insufficient linkage between the PKO Division and other departments of the AU Commission or the Peace and Security Council (PSC).
Similarly, the PSC is not yet experienced in managing a complex PKO. Its current involvement in Africa’s conflicts reveals that it does not have the capacity to properly prepare and support African forces for AU PKOs.\(^{53}\) The institutional shortcomings of the AU on the strategic level will indubitably produce ineffectiveness on the operational level, especially in the areas of operational direction and combat readiness. Successful AU PKOs are impossible without proper planning and properly articulated strategic goals, even if it is the best possible operational AU peacekeeping force. This constraint impacts the readiness of the ASF, since its rapid reaction capability or ability to conduct robust peace enforcement operations and multidimensional AU PKOs depends on appropriate strategic guidance.

Another institutional deficiency is the reality that AU PKOs are challenged by financial, logistical, and personnel constraints. There are not enough well-equipped and trained troops to deploy rapidly as a credible, robust PKO force. Moreover, the AU lacks the means to project power sufficiently and rapidly, due to insufficient airlift and rapid air response capability; forcing it to rely on external partners for this vital support.\(^{54}\) This is further aggravated by delays in member states’ mobilization. Member states do not share the same decision-making processes, timelines and interests in PKOs within their respective governments.\(^{55}\)

The impact of these political, institutional, and conceptual deficiencies on both AMIB and AMIS demonstrate that the AU is not yet ready to conduct intervention operations and multidimensional PKOs on its own. The AU’s lack of financial and logistics capacity exposes its needs to continue to collaborate with other peacekeeping organizations, such as the UN or EU, to be successful in complex PKOs. This
dependency means slower deployment times because of the need for increased political coordination. Also, these case studies indicate that the AU’s plan to have the ASF ready by 2010 to handle multi-dimensional PKOs in Africa will be very difficult to fulfill due to strategic and operational shortcomings.

Recommendations

The relatively early stage of the AU’s involvement in complex PKOs and the fact that the organization is not yet fully functional does not warrant definitive judgments on the role of the organization in these situations. The AU has a long way to go to successfully fulfill its role and readiness in African PKOs, as these case studies show. The current strategic reality in Africa demonstrated that it is unlikely that the AU will be able to conduct entirely self-reliant PKOs in Africa in the near future. This organization will continue to be dependent on external support to execute AU PKOs - even uncomplicated situation monitoring PKOs. This reality has, however, an influence on other important factors that contributes to the appropriate role and readiness of AU PKOs such as the political, institutional and conceptual capacity of the organization. How does the AU prepare its policies, institutions and concepts at the strategic and operational level for future AU PKOs?

First, the political danger is that well-intended acts and policies, such as the sovereignty issue are exploited or not properly resolved to accommodate egregious human rights violations by member states. Furthermore, the AU will be responsible to those that contribute significantly to AU PKOs in Africa - the host government, belligerents, regional actors, and the international community. Therefore, the AU should confront political issues, such as sovereignty, political will, and the lack of consensus
among African leaders on collective security norms and practices, in order to avoid the pitfalls that befuddled the OAU.

Political disparity will also have an impact on AU PKOs at the operational level. Military interventions notwithstanding, the solution to armed conflict in Africa remains political, such as the implementation of lasting peace agreements that are supported by credible AU PKOs. Moreover, this political approach towards African peacekeeping challenges is best addressed through a comprehensive global approach that jointly establishes peacekeeping priorities that optimizes resources, and that allows greater AU ownership of African PKOs, despite its weaknesses. Because of the limited availability of resources, particularly financial and logistical, to meet the demands of AU PKOs, the AU should explore support agreements to demarcate a division of labor among Africa’s security actors, such as the UN, EU, USA and other major powers.

Second, it is recommended that the AU institutionally continue to prepare peacekeeping forces for PKOs that will be conducted in hostile, unstable environments, with regional and international implications, without a comprehensive ceasefire agreement and other restrictive mandates. The willingness of the AU to establish stable conditions in these areas, pending the deployment of a UNSC-mandated peacekeeping mission, will continue to be the future trend. Also, the current security reality dictates that the AU should not enter into peacekeeping agreements that allow only for the monitoring of events in a known violent environment with a restrictive operational mandate. The credibility of the organization is at stake if it enters into robust African PKOs on insufficiently robust terms with insufficient personnel and equipment, or on a peacekeeping mandate that excludes peace enforcement as an option.
A further institutional recommendation is that the AU should constantly improve its capacity to plan and guide the conduct of AU PKOs at the strategic level, in particular the PSC, which should articulate strategic goals properly and direct security on the continent. The PSC should address the incapacity of its strategic leadership through the appointment of competent strategic planners from African states in the PSC. PSC leaders must be well-versed in the strategic aspects of operations, logistics, communications and transport, and they must be also technically proficient. Moreover, with AU PKOs currently overstressed in Sudan and Somalia, it will benefit the PSC to approach the UN, EU, and NATO for external expertise that can support the strategic and operational goals of this council. Also, the PSC should strive to integrate the various components of the military, police, political and humanitarian efforts, not only at the operational level, but as a priority on the strategic level. This includes the obligation to staff the critical vacancies at the strategic level, train senior strategic leaders, and clarify the role of the international partners in African PKOs.

Furthermore, the AU also needs to invest in early warning mechanisms to identify emerging crises. This mechanism should be based on networking with the UN, NGOs, sub-regional organizations, and the international community. The AU’s plan to establish liaison offices in the different sub-regions, in the UN and international partners’ headquarters will enhance the sharing and collection of information and increase general situational awareness for the prevention of violent armed conflicts in Africa.

Additionally, the role of the AU in developing standards for equipment and training for the ASF is critical to establishing coherent, multi-national, multi-disciplinary standby brigade capabilities, especially if this initiative is related to integrated mission
planning and strategic headquarters capability. By establishing these standards through doctrine, training manuals, curricula and programs for both military and other peacekeeping agencies, the AU will be in a better situation to participate in UN-endorsed or UN-AU hybrid PKOs, including complex PKOs.

Third, conceptually it is recommended that African PKOs should no more be viewed through the traditional lenses, such as “no fighting field operations.” Rather, African PKOs must be robust peace enforcement operations that do not always have the consent of all the conflicting parties or proceed under a cease-fire peace agreement. Current African realities in Sudan and Burundi reveal that AU PKOs not only “keep the peace” but must be prepared to execute a rapid robust peace-enforcement approach. Armed conflict in Africa will remain complex, multi-faceted, multi-directional, and difficult to predict. Lightly armed African peacekeepers will be unequal to this new strategic security reality. Thus the AU should base its planning and role for PKOs in Africa on worst case scenarios in order not to be so surprised by the aggressiveness and lethality of the conflicting parties. The AU must be prepared for all eventualities, including full combat, and robust intervention operations, if required. This will require the various components of the AU to evolve at a more rapid pace to mature and institutionally develop the level of effectiveness adequate for AU PKOs.

**Conclusion**

Assessment of the role of the AU in African PKOs demonstrates that there is international confidence in the organization’s peacekeeping initiatives, demonstrating signs of hope and promise. The organization is, however, not yet fully politically, institutionally, and conceptually ready to confront African peacekeeping requirements on
its own. AU experiences in Burundi and Sudan confirmed the requirement for the institutionalization of legitimate and collaborative global peacekeeping partnerships underpinned by positive political support with strengthened, harmonized capacity building initiatives between African and other international actors. These experiences illustrate that the future role of the AU in African PKOs can only be properly defined and strengthened if the UN and global leaders acknowledge that peacekeeping is a global responsibility, endorsing “globally supported African solutions to African problems”. The AU should play the leadership role in cultivating strong global political will and donor support for complex African peacekeeping operations; which should bring together the various peace actors, from the national, sub-regional, continental, and international systems.

The predominant trend will be, first, to allow the AU, to settle African peacekeeping requirements through a stabilization force or an AU PKO, before referring the issue to the UN and wider international community. Similarly, it will be expected the UN will continue encouraging the AU and its various sub-regional security organizations, to rely on regional arrangements to resolve armed conflict on the African continent. Consequently, the AU’s role in African PKOs will gain gradual continental and international prominence and relevancy; which in return will require the AU to develop its own regional approach for future peacekeeping on the African continent.

With conflicts still raging across the continent and the threat of new outbreaks of violence in places like Zimbabwe, Guinea, and Ivory Coast, it is difficult to imagine the need for AU PKOs diminishing in the near future, even if the readiness of the organization is in question. To address this, the future role of the AU will increasingly
rely on other conflict resolution mechanisms other than a purely military approach. AU peacekeepers will be expected to deal with a variety of tasks, beginning with humanitarian, high-intensity peacekeeping, mediation and negotiation tasks in a theatre of operations that is non-hierarchical and saturated with various role-players other than soldiers. The changing face of peacekeeping and associated tasks, along with the acknowledgement that the solution remains political, requires technical skills beyond those of conventional soldiering.

The AU should be the leading continental PKO organization that brings coherence to peacekeeping activities of the different sub-organizations on the continent, since it is well-positioned to understand the root causes of armed conflict and to prevent or resolve these conflicts. However, the UN must continue to assume a vital role in supporting the AU, especially with regard to the implementation of regionally driven peace initiatives. The relationship between the UN and AU should be complementary, addressing African PKOs through a comprehensive strategy. These recommendations help establish baseline to make this comprehensive strategy possible.

Endnotes

1 United Nations Secretary-General, “An Agenda for Peace, Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping”, 17 June 1992, para 20–23. http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/files/portal/issueareas/measures/Measur_pdf/i_measur_pdf/UN_doc/o_UN_doc/se/A_47_277.pdf. (accessed 22 March 2009). The concept of peacekeeping has undergone substantial changes since the Cold War, partly due to more flexibility in the UNSC, and partly as a response to the changing nature of armed conflicts. The most common view was that PKOs were to be seen as somewhere in between the pacific settlement of disputes in Chapter VI and the more forceful action to preserve international peace in Chapter VII, thus peacekeeping occupies a hypothetical Chapter VI½.

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction especially in failed African states, the US Global
War on Terror; and increased international public awareness of African humanitarian or natural
disasters.

3 Roba Sharamo, “The African Union’s Peacekeeping Experience in Darfur, Sudan”,
FilesByRWDocUnidFilename/AMMF-6VJE97-accord-sdn-13nov.pdf/$File/accord-sdn-

4 United Nations Secretary-General, “An Agenda for Peace, Preventive Diplomacy,
files/portal/issueareas/measures/Measur_pdf/i_measur_pdf/UN_doc/o_UN_doc/se/A_47_277.p
df (accessed 11 March 2009). Traditionally, peacekeeping is defined as “a generic term for a
UN no-fighting field operation with the specific aim to maintain or restore peace in an area of
conflict” through military or para-military operations, undertaken with the consent of the
disputant parties. These operations further aim to monitor and facilitate the implementation
of an existing peace or truce agreement, in order to reach a long-term settlement in areas ravaged
by violent armed conflict. Peacekeeping is essential because it assists in providing politicians
and other international actors the necessary conditions for settling a dispute. It cannot end
armed conflict, but it can help prevent a recurrence of fighting, giving time and space for peace
resolution. Peacekeeping operations are authorized by the Security Council’s mandate, based
on certain fundamentals which include legitimacy, (deriving from international and regional
support); consent (parties involved in the conflict should give their consent); the minimum use of
force, and the credibility of forces deployed. Examples of traditional peacekeeping operations
include the operations in Cyprus, which have separated the Greek and Turkish communities
(UNFICYP, established in 1964); and in the state of Jammu and Kashmir, disputed by India and

5 Catherine Guicherd, *The AU in Sudan: Lessons for the African Standby Force* (New York:

countries out of 11 other international countries as failed states. The scenario of failed states is
illustrated by countries such as Somalia, Zimbabwe, Chad, The Central African Republic,
Sudan, and the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which are plagued by
armed conflicts that have caused catastrophic social dislocation and humanitarian disasters.

7 For example the eastern part of the DRC hosts rebel movements and refugees from both
Uganda and Rwanda, while conflict in Sudan negatively affects Chad and the Central African
Republic.

8 Kwesi Anang, *Africa: Confronting Complex Threats: Coping with the Crisis*, Working
Paper Series, (New York: International Peace Academy, February 2007) 3, 4. Refer also to
Adoyi Onoja, “Peacekeeping Challenges in Africa: The Darfur Conflict”, *Conflict Trends,2008*,
_PeacekeepingChallenges.pd. (accessed 11 March 2009). Adoyi Onoja also noted that
neighboring countries are not just disinterested observers, as seen in Rwanda’s support for
Laurent Nkunda in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC); Ethiopia and Kenya’s
interest in Somalia; Chad’s backing of the forces in Darfur; the attempt by the Khartoum government in Sudan to topple the regime in N’djamena, Chad; Uganda and Sudan’s involvement with insurgents within their countries; and the interplay of forces in both Liberia and Sierra Leone.


11 Kingsley Moghalu, “Electoral Conflicts in Africa: Is Power-sharing the New Democracy?”, *Conflict Trends*, No 4, (2008), 32-37. http://www.accord.org.za/downloads/ ct/ct_2008_4.pdf. (accessed 11 March 2009). Although inter-ethnic conflicts are still evident in Africa, the current primary causes for conflict are no longer predominantly underpinned by ideological and ethnic differences. Contemporary armed conflicts are rather resource-based, with external factors and access to political power contributing to their initiation and escalation. Recent studies attribute the causes and origins of most armed conflicts in Africa mainly to economic factors and the competition for natural resources, intentionally utilizing and exploiting ethnic differences which are not the actual source of the conflict, with the sole purpose to gain control of the state. The possession of natural resources within a particular country often triggers conflict, especially in a state where governmental structures and institutions are weak. Such weak structures create opportunities for elites to unfairly allocate and distribute natural resources or profits. Such practices have been said to be major causes of grievances that have led to violent outbursts as marginalized groups seek to obtain recognition and a share of state resources. These grievances and the competition for governing powers find expression in state elections often described as corrupt and non-transparent, such as the trend that has been set by the elections in Kenya and Zimbabwe. The problem in African conflicts is the convenient replacement of coup d’états with vote-rigging, a practice that has disenfranchised voters and created conditions for ethnic and political violence, uprisings and instability in African countries, such as Kenya and Zimbabwe. The conflict in Kenya during the elections in 2008, when political parties exploited the ethnic differences between the Luos and the Kikuyu ethnic groups, serves as an example of this unfortunate trend. Elections have become major sources of conflict and there is no mechanism in the AU to deal with issues of post-election violence. The imperative is to ensure political inclusion and participation, to re-evaluate whether electoral systems are suitable to the political and social dynamics of the countries in which they operate, and to establish mechanisms within the AU framework to address the legitimate concerns of aggrieved parties in election processes. The AU must seriously orient the political leadership of the continent and take decisive and necessary action, without which the challenges of ensuring successful PKOs will not be met.


13 Docking, “Peacekeeping in Africa”.

The entire document provides valuable updated information on UN PKOs, especially historical and current data regarding funding, concepts, definitions and the progress of UN peacekeeping.


18 Ibid.

19 Only five of these interventions can be classified as OAU traditional peacekeeping operations (Rwanda 1993; Burundi 1993 – 1996; Comoros in 1998; Congo-DRC in 1999; and Ethiopia-Eritrea from 2000).


22 The CADSP is based on three notions: defense, security, and common threats. The objectives of this policy are to promote defense cooperation between and among African states; to eliminate suspicion and rivalry; to promote the collective defense and strategic capability as well as military preparedness of member states; to establish a threat deterrence capacity; to integrate and harmonize regional initiatives on defense and security issues; and to encourage the conclusion of non-aggression pacts between and among all member states. The declaration also includes cooperation in defense matters through training, exchange of military intelligence and information; the development of military doctrine and the establishment of collective capacity. (See African Union Website. http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/index/index.htm)


24 Anang, Africa: Confronting Complex Threats: Coping with the Crisis, 8. Another function is to guide the implementation of the broader policy framework for the CADSP. Furthermore, the constructive cooperation between the UNSC and the PSC of the AU, in resolving African peacekeeping requirements, continues to be developed and strengthened, particularly over the longer term. The greatest challenge of the PSC is to implement the policies of the CADSP. The manner in which the AU will intervene in crises involving member-state governments also needs to be resolved.

25 The aim is to establish five regional brigades (15 000 – 20 000 strong ASF-force) in addition to a sixth continental formation situated at the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa. This will constitute the eventual African Standby Force (ASF) by 2010. The development of the ASF
will be conducted in two incremental phases: First, to conduct observer mission followed by the second phase that will develop the capabilities to conduct traditional peacekeeping to intervention operations by 2010. Sub-regions will develop standby-brigades as well as its rapid deployment capabilities. The intent is to have a reserve of 300-500 military observers and 240 police officers available in member states on a 14-day notice, and in certain situations on a 30-day notice. The ASF will operate on the basis of six scenarios, ranging from observer missions to intervention. (See African Union Website. http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/index/index.htm)

26 Guicherd, The AU in Sudan: Lessons for the African Standby Force, 3. The peacekeeping experiences in AMIS demonstrated that the complexity of contemporary PKOs requires an all-inclusive approach that encompasses other local, regional and international peacekeeping partners such as the police, civil agencies, and NGOs.

27 Functions of the ASF include: observation and monitor mission, peace support operations, intervention operations on request or response to grave circumstances, preventative deployment, and humanitarian assistance. The ASF was established to enable the PSC to perform its responsibilities regarding African peacekeeping operations as indicated in Article 4(h) and (j) of the Constitutive Act.


29 UN General Assembly Sixty-first Session Agenda Item 108 (a) Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly 05 October 2007 A/RES/61/296 Cooperation between the UN and the African Union, 2. See also the United Nations Security Council, S/2008/186, Report of the Secretary-General on the Relationship between the United Nations and Regional Organizations, in particular the African Union, in the Maintenance of International Peace and Security, 7 April 2008, 8. An example is the ten-year capacity-building program for the AU set out by the UN that stipulates the areas for cooperation between the two organizations. Cooperation has also been established between the UNSC and the PSC.

30 William Nhara, Conflict Management and Peace Operations: The Role of the Organisation of African Unity and Sub-regional Organisations, Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, No 21, February 1998) http://www.issafrica.org/Pubs/Monographs/No21/Nhara.html (accessed 23 March 2009). Regionalism usually entails the collaboration between states that are situated in geographically close and bordered areas for the pursuit of mutual benefits in one or more issue areas. Collective decisions are transferred to structures that complement, rather than supersede national institutions. The state remains the essential building block from which regional arrangements are created. Contemporary regionalism in the current multi-polar world expresses itself as a spontaneous process from within regions, as opposed to the bipolar Cold War context of the past. As in Africa, the constituent states articulated this desire for cooperation through the creation of the AU. Thus African states collectively deal with the impacts of globalization, since they lack capacity and means to manage this phenomenon on national level.


33 Docking, *Peacekeeping in Africa*. The Brahimi Report represents the first comprehensive attempt to assess the evolution and effectiveness of UN peacekeeping missions over the years. It also specifies important ways to improve the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and to identify and address the technical problems with UN peacekeeping operations.

34 Ibid.


36 Peter Pham, “Too Few Good Men – and Even Fewer Supplies: The Challenge of Peacekeeping in Africa”, *World Defense Review*, 6 December 2007) http://worlddefensereview.com/pham120607.shtml. The five most significant violent armed conflicts or flashpoints which will require the attention of the AU for the foreseeable future will be the Somalia, Sudan, DRC, the Maghreb and Zimbabwe.


39 Peacekeepers (2 870) from SA, Ethiopia and Mozambique deployed in Burundi as part of the AU peacekeeping force. Escorts were provided to humanitarian non-governmental organizations and protection and a reaction force was provided.


41 Ibid., 1.


The causes for the conflict are deeply rooted historically and relate to the marginalization of the Darfur population, to the gradual emergence of militia groups in the area, and to the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. Additional contributing factors include issues related to drought and famine, the government’s policy of ‘Arabization’, and the effects of the
north-south conflict. In Chad and the Central African Republic, the influx of displaced people from Darfur and the related refugee crisis has implications for the international community. China's support for the Sudanese government and involvement in neighboring countries like Chad, Eritrea, Egypt, Libya, as well as the intervention of international organizations such as the AU and the UN in Sudan, have further internationalized the conflict.

In 2006, a peace agreement was signed that provided for the disarmament and demobilization of the Janjaweed militia by the Sudanese government of national unity, the integration of former combatants into the Sudanese armed forces, upholding the right of the people of Darfur to elect their leaders and determine their regional status, and the establishment of protective buffer zones around camps for the internally displaced. The challenges the mission has faced include: the inability to make the rebel movements to comply with the ceasefire agreement and sign the peace accord; lack of an adequate warning system for imminent attacks; lack of comprehensive and timely intelligence; difficulty in distinguishing between combatants and allies. Inadequacies will always necessitated, the establishment of an AU-UN hybrid force to bridge the gaps.


45 Politically, the recent indictment and call to issue a warrant for the arrest of General Omar el-Bashir has added another impediment to the resolution of the Darfur crisis. The development has polarized the international community – in particular, the League of Arab States and the AU. These seeming differences play into the stubbornness of the regime in Khartoum over the resolution of the Darfur crisis. Furthermore, the real interest of the superpowers in Sudan has prevented genuine efforts to address the peacekeeping requirements in Darfur due to China’s oil interests, Russia supplying of weapons to the government, and USA/AU refusals to agree on the meaning of genocide. Sudan rejects US charge that actions in Darfur are genocide.


47 Peter Pham, “Too Few Good Men – and Even Fewer Supplies: The Challenge of Peacekeeping in Africa”. The 25,987 personnel of UNAMID, including 19,555 military personnel, 3,772 civilian police, and 2,660 formed security units, is inadequate to meet the peacekeeping requirements of Darfur. The planned force has not yet been fully raised. The Sudanese regime is insisting that AU Commission Chairperson, Alpha Oumar Konaré, fulfil his promise that the entire force for Darfur would be entirely African, a binding commitment that only African peacekeepers would be allowed in Sudan. The Sudanese government has refused to accept units from Thailand, Nepal, and the Nordic countries.


49 Ibid.


