Learning About Counterinsurgency
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HUMINT-Centric Operations
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Principles and Priorities in Training for Iraq
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A Model Counterinsurgency: Uribe’s Colombia
Thomas A. Marks, Ph.D.

FEATURE:
General Petraeus on the Way Ahead in Iraq
**Report Documentation Page**

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**Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)**
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FEATURED ARTICLES

2 TRANSCRIPT: General Petraeus on the Way Ahead in Iraq
General David H. Petraeus, U.S. Army
“Hard but not hopeless”: The new commander of Multi-National Forces-Iraq assesses the war and previews the way ahead.

5 Learning about Counterinsurgency
Lieutenant General Sir John Kiszely, British Army
The director of the Defence Academy of the United Kingdom offers his thoughts on how best to prepare leaders for the complex challenges of COIN warfare.

12 HUMINT-Centric Operations: Developing Actionable Intelligence in the Urban Counterinsurgency Environment
Colonel Ralph C. Baker, U.S. Army
In a companion piece to an earlier article on information operations, a successful BCT commander describes how he revamped his intelligence approach for COIN.

22 Principles and Priorities in Training for Iraq
Lieutenant Colonel (P) Christopher Hickey, U.S. Army
A former squadron commander shares his insights on the importance of cultivating judgment in subordinate leaders preparing to deploy.

33 How to Negotiate in the Middle East
Lieutenant Colonel William Wunderle, U.S. Army
U.S. military leaders must become more adept at negotiating. Specifically, they must understand how our cultural traits, values, and assumptions differ from those of Middle Eastern countries.

38 The Role of USAID and Development Assistance in Combating Terrorism
Colonel Thomas Baltazar, U.S. Army, Retired, and Elisabeth Kvitashvili
The USAID, now recognized as a critical component for fighting the War on Terrorism, is transforming to take on greater responsibilities to shore up unstable countries.

41 A Model Counterinsurgency: Uribe’s Colombia (2002-2006) versus FARC
Thomas A. Marks, Ph.D.
The former pupil has eclipsed its teacher. Under President Uribe and a dynamic cast of military reformers, Colombia has now neutralized its longstanding insurgency.

57 Reflections from a Red Team Leader
Susan Craig
Red team leaders acquire skills and a mindset that can serve us all. Here are some suggestions to help others “think like a red teamer.”

61 The Shi’a Remembrance of Muharram: An Explanation of the Days of Ashura and Arba’een
Major Jean-Marc Pierre, U.S. Army, Captain Edward Hutchinson, Australian Army, and Hassan Abdulrazak, Ph.D.
COIN warriors need to understand the culture they are working in: How Husayn’s death at Karbala in 680 CE influences Shi’a Muslim beliefs and actions today.

Cover Photo: 1SG Arthur Abiera of Apache Troop, 1-33 Cavalry, 3d Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division, during a routine presence patrol on the outskirts of Sadr City, Iraq, 17 April 2006. (DOD)
The Next Gunpowder: The Power of BCKS and the Command Net Forum

Colonel Kim L. Summers, U.S. Army, Retired, and Michele Costanza, Ph.D.

The Battle Command Knowledge System’s Command Net, an online forum, harnesses the brainpower of a thousand brigade and battalion commanders.

WRITING CONTEST WINNERS: THE 2006 MACARTHUR AWARDS

1st Place: Managing Expectations While Leading Change

Major Everett S.P. Spain, U.S. Army

Managing expectations is a critical task for those overseeing change. Here are 12 practical lessons learned about leading change that can apply to COIN operations.

2nd Place: Emotional Intelligence and Army Leadership: Give It to Me Straight!

Major David S. Abrahams, U.S. Army

Leaders who cultivate “emotional intelligence” develop better command climates and more motivated subordinates.

3rd Place: Targeting of the American Will and Other Challenges for 4th-Generation Leadership

Major David Harper, U.S. Army

An exploration of some of the profounder implications of 4th-generation warfare for leaders and leader training.

INSIGHTS

105 U.S. Strategy in Iraq

Brigadier General Mitchell M. Zais, U.S. Army, Retired, Ph.D.

“What we have now is not a real strategy—it’s business as usual.” A highly regarded retired general delivers a withering critique of our strategy so far in Iraq.

109 Producing Victory: A 2007 Postscript for Implementation

Lieutenant Colonel Douglas A. Ollivant, U.S. Army, Ph.D., and Captain Eric D. Chewning, U.S. Army

In a postscript to an earlier article, the authors reassert that a strong Iraqi Government and support from the population are essential to moving forward in Iraq.

111 U.S. Military Advisors—A Need for Guiding Principles

Major Mark M. Weber, U.S. Army

Common-sense advice from an experienced officer on how to execute one of the world’s toughest jobs.

Clasics Revisited

Book Reviews Contemporary readings for the professional

Letters to the Editor
The following is a transcript of General David H. Petraeus’s opening statement before a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on his nomination to be the commander of Multi-National Force-Iraq. At this critical point in the war, and with General Petraeus about to preside over a new strategy, the editors of Military Review deem it important that this assessment be given widest dissemination.

GEN. PETRAEUS: Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you. I’d like to begin this morning by briefly reviewing the situation in Iraq, explaining the change in focus of the new strategy and discussing the way ahead. This statement is a bit longer than usual, but as I discussed with you last week, Mr. Chairman, I believe it is important that the committee hear it, and I appreciate the opportunity to present it.

The situation in Iraq has deteriorated significantly since the bombing this past February of the Al-Askari Mosque in Samarra, the third-holiest Shi’a Islamic shrine.

The increase in the level of violence since then, fueled by the insurgent and sectarian fighting that spiraled in the wake of the bombing, has made progress in Iraq very difficult and created particularly challenging dynamics in the capital city of Baghdad.

Indeed, many Iraqis in Baghdad today confront life-or-death, stay-or-leave decisions on a daily basis. They take risks incalculable to us just to get to work, to educate their children, and to feed their families.

In this environment, Iraq’s new government, its fourth in three and a half years, has found it difficult to gain traction. Though disappointing, this should not be a surprise. We should recall that after the liberation of Iraq in 2003, every governmental institution in the country collapsed. A society already traumatized by decades of Saddam’s brutal rule was thrown into complete turmoil, and the effects are still evident throughout the country and in Iraqi society.

Iraq and its new government have been challenged by insurgents, international terrorists, sectarian militias, regional meddling, violent criminals, governmental dysfunction, and corruption. Iraq’s security forces and new governmental institutions have struggled in this increasingly threatening environment, and the elections that gave us such hope actually intensified sectarian divisions in the population at the expense of the sense of Iraqi identity. In this exceedingly difficult situation, it has proven very hard for the new
government to develop capacity and to address the issues that must be resolved to enable progress.

The escalation of violence in 2006 undermined the coalition strategy and raised the prospect of a failed Iraqi state, an outcome that would be in no group’s interest save that of certain extremist organizations and perhaps states in the region that wish Iraq and the United States ill. In truth, no one can predict the impact of a failed Iraq on regional stability, the international economy, the global war on terror, America’s standing in the world, and the lives of the Iraqi people.

In response to the deterioration of the situation in Iraq, a new way ahead was developed and announced earlier this month. With implementation of this approach, the mission of Multi-National Force-Iraq will be modified, making security of the population, particularly in Baghdad, and in partnership with Iraqi forces, the focus of the military effort.

For a military commander, the term “secure” is a clearly defined doctrinal task, meaning to gain control of an area or terrain feature and to protect it from the enemy. Thus, the tasks will be clear-cut, though difficult. Certainly upcoming operations will be carried out in full partnership with Iraqi forces, with them in the lead whenever possible and within arm’s length when that is not possible. Transition of Iraqi forces and provinces to Iraqi control will continue to feature prominently in the coalition plan, and as recommended by the Iraq Study Group, the advisor effort will be substantially reinforced.

The primacy of population security in the capital will mean a greater focus on that task, particularly in the most threatened neighborhoods. This will, of course, require that our unit commanders and their Iraqi counterparts develop a detailed appreciation of the areas in which they will operate, recognizing that they may face a combination of Sunni insurgents, international terrorists, sectarian militias and violent criminals.

Together with Iraqi forces, a persistent presence in these neighborhoods will be essential. Different approaches will be required in different locations. Whatever the approach, though, the objective will be to achieve sufficient security to provide the space and time for the Iraqi government to come to grips with the tough decisions its members must make to enable Iraq to move forward. In short, it is not just that there will be additional forces in Baghdad, it is what they will do and how they will do it that is important.

Some of the members of this committee have observed that there is no military solution to the problems of Iraq. They are correct. Ultimate success in Iraq will be determined by actions in the Iraqi political and economic arenas on such central issues as governance, the amount of power devolved to the provinces and possibly regions, the distribution of oil revenues, national reconciliation and resolution of sectarian differences, and so on. Success will also depend on improvements in the capacity of Iraq’s ministries, in the provision of basic services, in the establishment of the rule of law, and in economic development.

It is, however, exceedingly difficult for the Iraqi Government to come to grips with the toughest issues it must resolve while survival is the primary concern of so many in Iraq’s capital. For this reason, military action to improve security, while not wholly sufficient to solve Iraq’s problems, is certainly necessary. And that is why additional U.S. and Iraqi forces are moving to Baghdad.

The way ahead is designed to be a comprehensive approach. Indeed, the objectives of helping Iraqis increase the capacity of their governmental institutions, putting Iraq’s unemployed to work, and improving the lot and life of Iraqi citizens requires additional resources, many of which will be Iraqi. In carrying out the non-kinetic elements of this strategy, however, our Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, and civilians downrange must get all the help they can from all the agencies of our government. There is a plan to increase that assistance, and it is hugely important. This clearly is the time for the leaders of all our governmental departments to ask how their agencies can contribute to the endeavor in Iraq, and to provide all the assistance that they can.

Our military is making an enormous commitment in Iraq. We need the rest of the departments to do likewise, to help the Iraqi Government get

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the country and its citizens working, and to use Iraq’s substantial oil revenues for the benefit of all the Iraqi people.

Having described the general approach, I would like to offer a word on expectations. It will take time for the additional forces to flow to Iraq, time for them to gain an understanding of the areas in which they will operate, time to plan with and get to know their Iraqi partners, time to set conditions for the successful conduct of security operations, and of course time to conduct those operations and then to build on what they achieve.

None of this will be rapid. In fact, the way ahead will be neither quick nor easy, and there undoubtedly will be tough days. We face a determined, adaptable, barbaric enemy. He will try to wait us out. In fact, any such endeavor is a test of wills, and there are no guarantees.

The only assurance I can give you is that if confirmed, I will provide Multi-National Force-Iraq the best leadership and direction I can muster; I will work to ensure unity of effort with the ambassador and our Iraqi and coalition partners; and I will provide my bosses and you with forthright, professional military advice with respect to the missions given to Multi-National Force-Iraq and the situation on the ground in Iraq.

In that regard, I would welcome opportunities to provide periodic updates to this body. Beyond that, I want to assure you that should I determine that the new strategy cannot succeed, I will provide such an assessment.

If confirmed, this assignment will be my fourth year or longer of deployment since the summer of 2001, three of those to Iraq. My family and I understand what our country has asked of its men and women in uniform, and of their families, since 9/11.

In fact, I would like to take this opportunity to thank the American people for their wonderful support in recent years of our men and women in uniform. Tom Brokaw observed to me one day in northern Iraq that those who have served our nation since 9/11 comprise the new “Greatest Generation.” I agree strongly with that observation, and I know the members of this committee do too.

Over the past 15 months, I have been privileged to oversee the organizations that educate our Army’s leaders, draft our doctrine, capture lessons learned and help our units prepare for deployment. This assignment has provided me a keen awareness of what we’ve asked of our Soldiers and of their families. In view of that, I applaud the recent announcement to expand our country’s ground forces. Our ongoing endeavors in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere are people-intensive, and it is heartening to know that there will be more Soldiers and Marines to shoulder the load.

I recognize that deploying more forces to Iraq runs counter to efforts to increase the time at home for our troops between deployments. I share concerns about that. However, if we are to carry out the Multi-National Force-Iraq mission in accordance with the new strategy, the additional forces that have been directed to move to Iraq will be essential, as will, again, greatly increased support by our government’s other agencies, additional resources for reconstruction and economic initiatives, and a number of other actions critical to what must be a broad, comprehensive, multifaceted approach to the challenges in Iraq.

Many of the emails I’ve received in recent weeks have had as their subject line “Congratulations—I think.” I understand the message they are conveying. I know how heavy a rucksack I will have to shoulder in Iraq if confirmed. I am willing to take on the position for which I have been nominated because I believe in serving one’s Nation when asked; because I regard it as a distinct honor to be able to soldier again with those who are part of the brotherhood of the close fight; and because I feel an obligation to help the shab el-Iraqi, the people of Iraq, the vast majority of whom have the same desires of people the world over: security for themselves and their loved ones, satisfaction of their basic needs, and an opportunity to better their life.

In closing, the situation in Iraq is dire. The stakes are high. There are no easy choices. The way ahead will be very hard. Progress will require determination and difficult U.S. and Iraqi actions, especially the latter, as ultimately the outcome will be determined by the Iraqis. But hard is not hopeless, and if confirmed, I pledge to do my utmost to lead our wonderful men and women in uniform and those of our coalition partners in Iraq as we endeavor to help the Iraqis make the most of the opportunity our Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Marines have given to them.

Thank you very much. MR
LEARNING ABOUT COUNTERINSURGENCY


INSURGENCY, IT SEEMS, is with us to stay—for a while, anyway. There are a number of reasons why insurgency—the use of subversion and armed conflict by an organized movement to overthrow a constitutional government—has become a form of conflict much in evidence at the start of the twenty-first century, and why it is unlikely to become less so in the years immediately ahead. Among the most obvious reasons are the erosion of the sovereignty of nation-states, the increase in the number of failed or failing states, the rise in intra-state conflict, the advent of transnational insurgency, and the perceived ability of terrorists to achieve their aims—“to coerce or intimidate governments or societies to achieve political, religious or ideological objectives.” Equally obvious—to insurgents, at least—is the technological battlefield superiority of the world’s most powerful armed forces, and the resultant folly of taking on such armed forces on the conventional battlefield. Even if General Sir Rupert Smith may be overstating the case by declaring that “war no longer exists,” he is surely right that war off the conventional battlefield, or “war amongst the people,” is by far the more likely activity. There is, of course, nothing new about insurgency—the nineteenth and twentieth centuries provide plenty of examples of this type of warfare—and, therefore, no shortage of opportunities to learn lessons. But how well do militaries, in general, learn the lessons of counterinsurgency? What factors affect this learning process? And what might the answer to these questions tell us about how armed forces should approach the subject of learning about counterinsurgency in future? This article sets out to answer these questions.
Learning the Lessons?

It does not require a comprehensive survey to find evidence to suggest that not all militaries learn the lessons of counterinsurgency as well as they might. The British armed forces have tended to be quicker to cite such evidence in the performance of others rather than in their own, but some introspection is valuable. The Malaya Emergency 1948-1960, for example, is a much lauded counterinsurgency campaign, but often overlooked is the fact that in the early years, before the arrival of General Sir Gerald Templer in 1952, the British Army achieved very limited success. One reason for this was its initial tendency to view the Emergency essentially as a security problem with a security solution; on arrival, Templer found it necessary to remind his force that “the shooting side of this business is only 25 per cent of the trouble.” Moreover, the British military’s early approach in Malaya was essentially a warfighting one—manoeuvring to bring firepower to bear on the enemy—not least on the grounds that that was the approach for which it was trained, and which had, after all, proved successful all over the globe in a World War only a few years previously. Typical of this approach was its favoured tactic of large (up to brigade-size) “sweeps,” described by one commentator as “pursuing insurgents as if it was engaged on a large scale partridge drive,” and its use of warfighting measurements of success: for example, the numbers of enemy killed, wounded and captured. In noting this approach, John Nagl quotes the General Officer Commanding Malaya in 1948, Major General Charles Boucher, who described his programme to the Malayan Legislative Council as follows:

My object is to break the insurgents’ concentrations, to bring them to battle before they are ready, and drive them underground or into the jungle, and then to follow them there, by troops in the jungles, and by police backed by troops and by the RAF outside of them. I intend to keep them constantly moving and depriving [sic] them of food and recruits, because if they are constantly moving they cannot terrorize an area properly so that they can get their commodities from it; and then ferret them out of their holes, wherever these holes may be.7

General Boucher had some experience of counterinsurgency, but rather less understanding of it.8 In the absence of any contemporary counterinsurgency doctrine, he might have benefited from a closer historical study of, for example, T. E. Lawrence, Orde Wingate or Mao Zedong. There was an earlier text that could also have proved useful: Charles Callwell’s book, Small Wars, published in 1906, about Britain’s imperial counterinsurgency campaigns.9 As Callwell makes clear, what defines “small wars” is not their size, but their characteristic. Those tempted to fight small wars as if they were big wars might have noted Callwell’s warning that “the conduct of small wars is in certain respects an art by itself, diverging widely from what is adapted to the conditions of regular warfare.”10 Nagl cites the British Army in the Malayan Emergency as an example of an army as a “learning institution,” but concludes that in the first four years, “Whereas there were encouraging signs of learning from below…the middle and high levels of command demonstrated marked resistance to change, remaining entrenched in their desire to fight in Malaya as they had in Europe.”11

...the conduct of small wars is in certain respects an art by itself, diverging widely from what is adapted to the conditions of regular warfare.

It is perhaps surprising that the lessons of the Malayan Emergency were not more obviously learnt in Britain’s subsequent counterinsurgency campaign in Cyprus. For example, one of the clearest early lessons from Malaya, stated in the “Report of the Police Commission of Malaya 1950,” had been the importance of an impartial, disciplined police force. But only five years later, the British commander in Cyprus, Field Marshal Harding, was basing his campaign on a police force renowned not only for its partiality and ill-discipline, but also for its corruption and brutality, thus playing into the hands of the EOKA insurgents and their leader, Colonel Grivas. As James Corum has pointed out, If Harding carefully had planned to alienate the entire Greek population of the island and push the moderate Greeks into full support of EOKA, he could not have done better than by his policy of unleashing a horde of untrained, poorly-led Turkish police on the
Moreover, despite the evidence in Malaya, Harding appeared to forego a hearts-and-minds approach in favour of one that would “bludgeon the population into compliance with British rule,” viewed the campaign as essentially military, favoured large-scale traditional operations such as formation sweeps on very limited intelligence, and failed to see the need to sustain the campaign in the long term. In the latter case, he was well aware of the strength of Templer’s views on the subject. In 1953, Harding, then Chief of the General Staff, had publicly announced that the Malayan Emergency “was nearly won.” Questioned about this at a press conference, Templer had declared, “I’ll shoot the bastard who says this emergency is over.”

Similarly, in Vietnam both the French and the United States militaries favoured what Max Boot has called “big war” methods, epitomized by General William Westmoreland, “sent to fight a war for which nothing in his training had prepared him. His way was the army way, the American way, the World War Two way. Find the enemy, fix him in place and annihilate him with withering fire power.” Like Boucher in Malaya and Harding in Cyprus, Westmoreland drew too heavily on his own experience and too little on a study of history or theory, contributing to his difficulty in comprehending the operational environment in which he found himself. Such historical and theoretical texts were certainly available; indeed, the early 1960s was a period rich in the publication of some highly notable ones, although perhaps not exactly of the type that Westmoreland was looking for.

Learning in the Military

Whilst it would be entirely wrong from such a brief and narrow survey to conclude that militaries never learn the lessons of counterinsurgency, there is enough evidence to suggest that they do not always learn those lessons as often or as quickly or as well as they might, and therefore a question should be raised about why this might be so.
At the outset of answering this question, it should be noted that imperfection in learning in the military is not confined to learning about counterinsurgency. There are a number of factors which can combine to retard the speed of learning in armed forces. First is a tendency towards anti-intellectualism. Although there is far less evidence to substantiate such a charge in many armed forces today, including the British, it was as late as 1984 that Sir Michael Howard was writing of “the complacent anti-intellectualism which has long been a predominant tendency of a British army which takes a perverse delight in learning its lessons the hard way.”

Secondly, since acceptance of criticism is often the first step to learning, a characteristic of a learning organization is its ability to accommodate criticism, both internal and external. Many militaries face a difficulty here; not only are armed forces rigid hierarchies—hierarchies being notoriously susceptible to feeling threatened by internal criticism—but they are also inherently proud organizations, and thus potentially resistant to external criticism. The more rigid the hierarchy and the prouder the organization, the less able it is to accommodate criticism. The third factor has been the absence in many militaries of a seat of learning. For example, the most significant contributions in the British military to the advancement of military science, in the widest sense of that term, have more often resulted spasmodically from the ideas of individuals, such as Basil Liddell Hart, JFC Fuller and Richard Simpkin, than from sustained development from within a military seat of learning, since no such thing existed.

Now, with the establishment of the Defence Academy, there is no such excuse. Fourthly, the key final part of the learning process is making the necessary change, but militaries are inherently conservative organizations, cautious about change, particularly change that affects structure or culture. Finally, militaries the world over are prone to confusing progress with activity, training hard but for the wrong thing. For example, writing of the Second World War British senior commanders in North Africa 1941-42, Field Marshal Lord Carver observed, “The British commanders were not supermen. They were neither better nor worse than those who succeeded them. They were faced with a form of warfare completely novel to all, for which their experience and training was of little value.”

JFC Fuller’s observations of earlier commanders indicates where the responsibility for such a state of affairs might lie: “Because they had learnt nothing from the wars of Alexander and his successors, the Romans invariably were surprised, as much by their ignorance and tactical blunders as by Hannibal’s insight, foresight and imagination. Nor was it the fault of the generals themselves, who seldom lacked courage, but of the Roman military system.”

Learning about Counterinsurgency

There are thus a number of factors—all essentially cultural challenges—which, if allowed to, can adversely affect the military’s ability to learn appropriately. But there are a number of further factors—again, essentially cultural challenges—which can adversely affect the military’s ability to learn appropriately about counterinsurgency in particular. Foremost amongst these is the perception that a military has of counterinsurgency. If it views it as a type of warfighting—easy to do, because counterinsurgency often looks, smells and feels like warfighting; indeed, some participants at some moments may be fighting for their lives—it is liable to make fundamental errors in application, not least in breaching one of Clausewitz’s most important dicta: “The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgement that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish…the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature.”

This is exacerbated by the military’s tendency, unless checked, either to ignore doctrine completely, or to treat it as Holy Writ, applying it unquestioningly, as a template, regardless of the circumstances. Of the two, the latter is probably the more dangerous. Doctrine tends to be labelled and
pigeon-holed by type of operation—for example, Warfighting, Peacekeeping, Peace Enforcement, Counterinsurgency—and can too often be seen by the unthinking, despite the health-warning on the packet, as prescriptive. Moreover, these reassuringly neat delineations sit uneasily with the reality that campaigns involving counterinsurgency are inherently messy—a kaleidoscope of different types of operation—and, therefore, remarkably resistant to neatness in delineation. Indeed, all counterinsurgencies are *sui generis*—of their own kind—making problematic the transfer of lessons from one to another.”26 Thus, unless they are careful, those embarking on an operation can tend to identify the anticipated circumstances in terms of the doctrine perceived to be closest to it, reach for the doctrinal publication concerned, and end up trying to fit the circumstances to the doctrine, rather than the other way round—thereby “trying to turn it into something that is alien to its nature.”

A related factor which detracts from the ability of many militaries to learn about counterinsurgency has been their tendency to forego serious study of history and theory beyond trying to find a “book to tell us how to do the job.” The reasons for this are related to the anti-intellectualism noted earlier, and also to a certain amount of intellectual laziness and lack of imagination; but the complex and *sui generis* nature of counterinsurgency makes a learning approach restricted to personal experience singularly fallible. This is not to decry personal experience as an important element in the learning process, but to emphasize a need to balance it with the study of both history and theory, the relationship between the two being well illuminated by Clausewitz: “Theory becomes a guide to anyone who wants to learn about war from books. It will light his way, ease his progress, train his judgement, and help him to avoid pitfalls.”27

Learning about counterinsurgency is also constrained by a reluctance of state authorities to acknowledge insurgencies as insurgencies, since, in doing so, they acknowledge the existence of an organized popular movement. There is, therefore, often a preference to portray the problem as being only a terrorist one; this can lead to conclusions that the antidote is, by definition, counterterrorism—a matter of security. This invariably results in counterproductive action when applied to insurgency, which requires an antidote of which security is but one ingredient. Applying only the security line of operation to an insurgency is a sure way of intensifying it.

But perhaps the single most significant cultural factor affecting a military’s ability to learn about counterinsurgency is the strength of its warrior ethos. To be capable of warfighting, an army needs to have as its characteristic cultural spirit, or ethos, one which is warfighting-oriented, and its soldiers need to have a self-perception as warriors. These are the essentials of the warrior ethos. Lose the warrior ethos and you lose the fighting power.28 But to be capable of operations other than war—operations such as peacekeeping and counterinsurgency—an army needs its soldiers to have a perception of themselves as something other than warriors. Without such a perception, they are liable to apply a warrior approach, for example exercising hard power when they should be exercising soft power, “fighting small wars with big war methods.” Combining these two cultures is remarkably difficult; it is thus remarkably difficult for an army to be really good at both warfighting and counterinsurgency. Notable examples of this dichotomy are the Russian and Israeli armies, highly adept warfighting machines with a warrior ethos so strong that they have found it almost impossible to adapt to the requirements of counterinsurgency. On the other side of this coin are those armed forces which have largely foregone warfighting as their core activity, instead choosing to become specialist peacekeeping forces, and which have found it less easy than they might have wished to regain the warrior ethos needed to meet the challenges of combat operations. Those armies with a very strong warrior ethos, whose soldiers see themselves purely as warriors, tend to view counterinsurgency as a fringe activity, rejecting the notion
of expertise in counterinsurgency as a meaningful yardstick of military prowess or professionalism.

This attitude is exacerbated by the nature of counterinsurgency itself, comprising, as it does, features with which the pure warrior ethos is highly uneasy: complexity, ambiguity, and uncertainty; politics; an inherent resistance to short-term solutions; problems that the military alone cannot solve, requiring cooperation with other highly diverse agencies and individuals to achieve a comprehensive approach; the need for interaction with indigenous people whose culture it does not understand; and a requirement to talk to at least some of its opponents, which it can view as treating with the enemy. Such a military sees its task hedged about with unfair constraints: over-tight rules of engagement, negating the use of its trump card—firepower; perceived overemphasis on force protection and its disciplinary consequences; the need to accommodate the media. Moreover, in the eyes of the warrior, counterinsurgency calls for some decidedly un-warrior-like qualities, such as emotional intelligence, empathy, subtlety, sophistication, nuance and political adroitness. Armies that find difficulty with these unwelcome features tend to view counterinsurgency as an aberration, look forward to the opportunity of returning to “proper soldiering,” and see subsequent training as an opportunity to regain their warfighting skills rather than to learn the lessons of counterinsurgency.

Conclusions

From this brief analysis of some of the problems militaries face in learning about counterinsurgency, a number of conclusions offer themselves about how armed forces should approach the subject of such learning in future. First is a need to recognize that adapting to counterinsurgency presents particular challenges to militaries, and that many of these challenges have at their root issues of organizational culture. The implications of this are outside the scope of this study. Secondly, there is a need to acknowledge that while counterinsurgency is war in the Clausewitzian sense of being “the continuation of policy by other means,” not all types of war are won by warfighting; indeed, some are lost that way. And those who practise counterinsurgency need to be much more than warriors within the narrow definition of that term as it relates to warfighting. The role of militaries is likely to remain as one of fighting and winning their nation’s wars, but armed forces do not have the luxury of choosing the type of war they will be required to fight. That luxury largely belongs to their adversaries, and the likelihood is that for militaries in the top warfighting league, for the very reason that they are in the top warfighting league, most wars in the years immediately ahead will be asymmetric, and will be wars of, or involving, counterinsurgency. The definitions of military professionalism and military excellence will need to accommodate this fact. The difficulty for militaries is that there is no guarantee that some of the wars ahead of them will not be warfighting affairs, or that some of the counterinsurgencies will not include significant elements of warfighting.

Many of the other conclusions of this study fall into the categories of improved “lessons learned” processes, updated doctrine and better training, and in many armed forces these subjects have received a great deal of attention in recent years, with significant progress being made. In addition, there has been increasing recognition from participants, military and civilian, in counterinsurgency campaigns that since success relies on all lines of operation working together in a joined-up way—the “comprehensive approach”—those organizations, governmental and non-governmental, national and international, that will find themselves working together need to train together.

But while this progress is wholly welcome, it goes only some of the way to address many of the issues identified, in particular the intellectual demands that the nature of counterinsurgency makes on military leaders at all levels. It is too easy to see meeting these demands as a question of better training and doctrine, overlooking the extent to which it is, instead, a question of education. It is necessary here to differentiate between training—preparing people, individually or collectively, to carry out specific tasks—and education—the development of mental powers. Training is appropriate preparation for the predictable; but for the unpredictable, education is required. As has been pointed out, operations involving counterinsurgency are characterized by unpredictability, and also by uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity; this calls for minds that can not only cope with, but excel in, such an environment, thus minds that are agile, flexible,
enquiring, imaginative, capable of rigorous analysis and objective thinking, that can conceptualize and innovate. Developing minds in this way is most decided not something that can be achieved as part of predeployment training.

In addition to developing minds is a requirement, where necessary, to broaden them—to make them more open and sensitive to the views of others, and less certain of their own omniscience and rectitude. Part of this is the ability and willingness of the military to comprehend the importance of what some might term the “non-military” factors inherent in counterinsurgency. This applies not just to counterinsurgency in the particular—that is to say, to a specific campaign—but to counterinsurgency in general; only then can valid comparisons and sound generalizations be made. Thus, military leaders, and not just senior ones, need a high level of understanding of factors such as the political dimension of counterinsurgency, the constituent elements of good governance and prosperity, the role of ideology and religion, the nature of societies and culture, and of minds and people. These leaders’ studies, therefore, need to include politics, economics, anthropology, sociology and psychology. And underpinning all of these is the study of history, with the need to undertake it, as Sir Michael Howard has warned us, ‘in width, in depth and in context.’

Moreover, the multi-disciplinary nature of counterinsurgency indicates that the history to be studied should not be confined to military history. But meaningful study in all these subjects is time-consuming, and time is a commodity in short supply for the military; in fact, the rate of current operational commitments means that for many militaries the time available for learning has never been less. The potential pitfall is, thus, that while acknowledging that learning about counterinsurgency is largely about developing understanding, armed forces will devote less time than is necessary to achieve it. One way of helping to square this circle is certainly to encourage continuous self-education as part of this process, although the degree to which very busy officers have the time available for this should not be overestimated. But there are no short cuts. Westmoreland was right: “There was no book to tell us how to do the job.” Nor is there one.

In summary, therefore, while it is easy to see the solution to improved learning about counterinsurgency purely in terms of improved training, this study concludes that this would be fallacious, and that at the root of the challenge lie questions of culture and education. MR

The views expressed in this article are personal and do not necessarily reflect British Government policy.

NOTES


2. See John Mackinlay, Defeating Complex Insurgencies (Royal United Services Institute [RUSI] Whitehall Paper No. 64, 2005), and Rick Brennan et al., Future Insurgency Threats (Rand, DRR-3443-OSD SOLIC, 2005). Quoted material derived from ADP 0-01.

3. Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force (London: Alien Lane, 2005), 1. Subsequently qualified as “war as cognitively known to most non-combatants, war as a battle in a field between men and machinery, war as a massive deciding event: such war no longer exists.”

4. One notable success was the “Briggs Plan” of Lieutenant General Sir Harold Briggs, Director of Operations from April 1950 to November 1951, but Briggs lacked the authority to overcome those who opposed change. According to one author, “Briggs battled on, keeping his frustrations to himself, until at the end of his tour in November 1951, when he went back to Cyprus a sick and disillusioned man, to die there within a year.” John Cloake, Templar: Tiger of Malaya (London: Harrap, 1965), 198.


8. In July 1948, he announced, “I have had experience in fighting red terrorists in Greece and India, and I can tell you this is by far the easiest problem I have ever tackled.” Coates, 31-32.


10. Callwell, 23.


20. MOD WO Code 9800 and MOD Land Operations AC 70516, respectively.


22. For brief periods, such as when Fuller was chief instructor at the Staff College, Camberley, the Service staff colleges could have advanced a claim to this, but not with much justification over a sustained period of time.


24. JF Fuller, Decisive Battles of the Western World (London: Eyre and Spot- tiswood, 1954), 127.


26. For example, much of Callwell’s Small Wars now appears highly dated and overly prescriptive, requiring critical analysis in gaining a better understanding of the subject.

27. Clausewitz, 141.

28. “The ability to fight, consisting of a conceptual component (encompassing the thought process involved in producing military effectiveness); a moral component (the ability to get people to fight) and a physical component (the means to fight), measured by assessment of operational capability.” MOD AAP-1.

29. Clausewitz, 87.

HUMINT-CENTRIC OPERATIONS: Developing Actionable Intelligence in the Urban Counterinsurgency Environment

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This article was solicited from the author by Military Review as a companion piece to his article, “The Decisive Weapon: A Brigade Combat Team Commander’s Perspective on Information Operations,” published in May-June 2006. It is based on an unclassified briefing COL Baker presents regularly to leaders preparing to deploy to Iraq and Afghanistan.

A FEW WEEKS AFTER assuming command of the 2d Brigade Combat Team (2BCT), 1st Armored Division, I found myself sitting in a tactical command center in downtown Baghdad conducting a brigade cordon-and-search. The reports flooding in from my battalion commanders were virtually all the same:

“STRIKER 6, this is REGULAR 6. Objectives 27, 28, 29 secure and cleared. Nothing significant to report. Over.”

We spent nearly ten hours searching for insurgents and weapons in hundreds of dwellings throughout our objective area, a bad neighborhood off Haifa Street that was a hub of insurgent activity—and for what? Ultimately, we captured a dozen weapons and a handful of suspects.

Much more worrisome to me than the meager results of our operation was the ill will and anger we had created among the Iraqi citizens who were the unwelcome recipients of our dead-of-night operations. I had been on enough such sweeps already to picture the scene clearly: mothers crying, children screaming, husbands humiliated. No matter how professionally you executed such searches, the net result was inevitably ugly.

That profoundly disappointing experience led me to a blunt realization: our dependency on conventional intelligence collection methods and our failure to understand the negative perceptions our actions were generating among Iraqi citizens threatened to doom our mission. If we did not change our methods, and change them quickly, we were not going to be successful in the urban counterinsurgency (COIN) environment in which we found ourselves. As a result of that realization, I made two decisions in the ensuing days that affected the way our combat team would operate for the remainder of our deployment. First, we would reform the way we conducted intelligence operations, and second, we would make information operations (IO) a pillar of our daily operational framework.

My purpose in writing this article is to share with the reader insights and lessons learned from the reform of our intelligence operations; specifically, what we learned by conducting human intelligence (HUMINT)-centric operations in a heavy BCT in Iraq. To that end, I want to briefly describe the initial state of my BCT and our area of operations (AO), identify the major intelligence challenges that we faced, and offer solutions and techniques we adapted or developed in order to overcome our challenges.
Background

Second BCT deployed to Iraq in May 2003. We were a conventional heavy BCT, task-organized with two mechanized infantry battalions, a cavalry squadron, an armor battalion, a field artillery battalion, an engineer battalion, a support battalion, and a military police battalion. The BCT’s train-up prior to deployment had focused on conventional, mid- to high-intensity combat, and our battalion and brigade headquarters and staff processes were still optimized to fight a conventional threat.

Our AO included two districts in Baghdad—Karkh and Karada. Within these two districts lived somewhere between 700,000 and a million citizens, among them Sunnis, Shi’as, and the city’s largest population of Christians. Our AO also included the heavily fortified Green Zone and several neighborhoods with large populations of retired Iraqi generals, plus numerous ethnic, sectarian and political entities (either preexisting or emerging, such as the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution, the Islamic Dawa Party, and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan).

With the exception of our counterintelligence warrant officer and a few other officers who had some previous exposure to HUMINT operations, we neither understood nor anticipated the inadequacy of our conventionally designed intelligence collection and analysis system. More importantly, almost no one understood the dominant role that HUMINT operations would play in developing actionable intelligence on a burgeoning insurgency.

The intelligence system we brought to Iraq was designed to identify conventional enemy formations, and our intelligence personnel were trained to conduct predictive analysis about an enemy based upon our knowledge of his equipment and doctrine. Exactly none of these conditions existed after Saddam’s army was defeated.

Instead, we found ourselves in the midst of an insurgency, confronted by an elusive enemy force that wore no uniform and blended seamlessly into the local population. Conventional intelligence collection systems just don’t work in this type of environment; our imagery operations, electronic reconnaissance, and standard combat patrols and surveillance operations were simply ineffective. After faithfully applying these conventional ISR (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) methods and assets to our combat operations, we netted almost no actionable intelligence.

Challenges

Realizing that we were fighting a growing insurgency and that the current conventional organization and training of our battalion and brigade intelligence sections were inadequate to address our needs, I decided to transition our conventional BCT intelligence system into a HUMINT-centric system.

Not unexpectedly, a change of this magnitude for a unit engaged in combat against a growing insurgency presented many challenges. After considering the circumstances we faced in our AO and our leadership’s lack of experience and familiarity with COIN operations, I found that our challenges could be grouped into three general categories: leadership, organization, and training.

Leadership

When people are confronted with substantive change that runs counter to their doctrine and training, it’s natural for them to be uncomfortable and therefore hesitant to embrace that change. I assumed this would be the case from the beginning; thus, I set about implementing mechanisms to ensure that compliance with our intelligence changes was rapid and “as directed.” From the beginning, I felt it was necessary to convince my commanders and staffs that transitioning to a HUMINT-based approach to intelligence was my absolute highest priority.

As a commander, you must set the conditions to ensure that your subordinates make HUMINT operations a priority and that they synchronize such operations with your headquarters. You must start out by providing a sound concept your subordinates can understand and follow: visualize the plan, describe it to your people, and then direct them in execution. After close consultation with my...
staff and other individuals with COIN experience, I presented a vision and draft organization for how I wanted units in the BCT to conduct intelligence operations. Central to our new intelligence system was the development of an extensive network of Iraqi informants. I felt it was absolutely key to identify and develop indigenous sources who had the ability to infiltrate Iraqi society and blend in. Such human sources of intelligence represent a critical capability that no ISR technology, no matter how sophisticated or advanced, can match.

Once we had decided to rely primarily upon informants for our intelligence collection, we modified our analysis process to bring it more in line with police procedures. This meant a heavy reliance on evidentiary-based link diagrams to associate individuals with enemy cells and networks, and some conventional pattern analysis when appropriate. Units were also directed to modify the organizational structures of their intelligence sections to accommodate new functional requirements such as intelligence exploitation cells, more robust current operations and plans cells, and additional subject matter experts who could support analysis and exploitation activities.

After we developed a concept and described it to the BCT’s leaders, the final (and most leader-intensive) part of our transition was getting those leaders to buy in. I fully expected that many of my subordinate commanders would be very uncomfortable changing their intelligence organizations, collection assets, and analysis processes, particularly in the middle of a war. Throughout their careers, they and their Soldiers had experienced only conventional military intelligence operations. Forcing them to abandon a system they were comfortable with and that they thought adequate required commanders at all levels, starting at brigade, to stay personally involved in all aspects of the transformation.

**HUMINT Battle Rhythm**

Anticipating that I would likely face some resistance from within my organization, I implemented mechanisms that would allow me to promote compliance, conformity, understanding, and confidence in our new approach to intelligence collection and analysis. Two particularly useful venues that allowed me to stay personally involved in intelligence operations with my subordinate leaders were weekly _

Once we had decided to rely primarily upon informants..., we modified our analysis process to bring it more in line with police procedures.
reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) back-briefs and BCT after-action reviews (AARs).

My weekly intelligence battle rhythm consisted of a brigade intelligence targeting meeting on Sunday, followed by a BCT fragmentary order on Tuesday, and then the R&S meeting on Thursday. I personally chaired the latter, with my intelligence officer (S2) and all the BCT’s battalion operations officers (S3s) in attendance.

**R&S meeting.** The R&S meeting was particularly useful for several reasons. First, it allowed me to confirm that the decisions, priorities, and guidance I had provided during my weekly targeting board had been accurately disseminated and interpreted by my subordinate commands. Second, it allowed me to monitor our weekly recruitment and development of informants, who were absolutely central to our HUMINT-based intelligence program. Third, it gave me the opportunity to directly provide or clarify guidance from the weekly brigade intelligence FRAGO to all of the BCT S3s. Fourth, it improved my situational awareness of each of my battalion AOs. Finally, taking the time to personally chair this meeting demonstrated my commitment to making HUMINT-centric operations a top priority in the BCT.

During these meetings, the battalion S3s were required to brief me on a number of mandated topics: the priority of their collection actions, the status of informant recruitment and training, the allocation of intelligence collection assets, and any additional R&S support they required from brigade level or higher. Each battalion used a brigade-standardized matrix to cross-walk their priority intelligence requirements (PIR) with the asset or assets they planned to dedicate against their PIR. Any informant a battalion was using was listed on this matrix along with our organic collection assets.

The gathering of battalion S3s was one of our most important and productive intelligence meetings. It allowed me to assess the development and use of HUMINT assets, to ensure that the battalions’ intelligence and collection requirements were nested with the brigade’s, and to see how the battalions were progressing in the development and use of informants. It also provided a venue for the battalions to share lessons learned about intelligence targeting and collection.

**Weekly BCT AAR.** Another meeting that facilitated professional and informative dialog and gave me an opportunity to provide guidance to my commanders on intelligence issues was our weekly BCT AAR. It was held on Saturday, with every battalion commander and S2 attending. Each AAR began with the brigade S2 providing a detailed intelligence update of the entire BCT AO, followed by a discussion to ensure that we all shared a common enemy picture. This forum also allowed for the dissemination of intelligence lessons learned and best practices, and it gave me an opportunity to identify challenges and seek solutions from fellow commanders. Once our intelligence portion of the AAR was complete, the battalion S2s departed with the BCT S2 to synchronize BCT intelligence issues. Commanders stayed and we continued our AAR of information and maneuver operations.

**Net gain.** These two weekly venues, the R&S meeting and the AAR, were essential to reforming our intelligence system and improving our individual and unit performance. They—

- Allowed me and the BCT S2 to routinely emphasize or reinforce key components of our intelligence system.
- Promoted a learning environment within a chaotic and fast-paced operational environment.
- Allowed the immediate sharing of lessons (good and bad) among key battalion leaders.
- Provided me with immediate feedback on how well we were adapting to our new system.
- Fostered a better understanding of, and leader buy-in to, our new method of intelligence operations.

Eventually, once leaders at all levels understood the new system of intelligence collection and analysis better, had gained experience with it, and had bought into it, I was able to back off and be less directive. My subordinate leaders were then free to adapt and modify their intelligence operations to best fit the needs of their AOs.

### Organization and Team Building

It was relatively easy to visualize, describe, and modify the organizational structure and the processes that we adopted to transform our intelligence operations. The greater challenge was manning our new model and training our Soldiers and leaders to conduct HUMINT operations.

As you would expect of a learning institution, our Army is changing its organizational structures and doctrine to address many of the intelligence
shortcomings that units experienced early on in Iraq. In fact, the intelligence section of today’s BCT now includes an exploitation cell—a capability (and personnel) we didn’t have just two years ago. In addition to these organizational and doctrinal improvements, BCTs now have more experienced leaders who understand the need to collect HUMINT in the current operating environment.

That said, manning is one of the challenges units encounter when they try to adapt their intelligence sections to HUMINT operations. HUMINT-centric operations are very manpower intensive—the amount of information that must be collected, analyzed, and synthesized to produce actionable intelligence can be overwhelming. Personnel needed for activities such as document and technical exploitation, interrogations, informant meetings, and plans and current operations present additional manpower challenges. As a result, commanders will find themselves undermanned when they have to staff their transformed intelligence activities according to the typical authorization for a conventional intelligence section. The number of authorized billets and Military Occupational Specialties (MOSs) is simply inadequate to conduct and sustain HUMINT-centric operations. To develop an effective brigade intelligence team, you will have to find additional personnel to man it.

One way to address this shortcoming is to screen and select non-intelligence-MOS Soldiers from your BCT who have the required skills: intellectual capacity, technical expertise, and a natural proclivity to contribute to your intelligence effort. We never hesitated to take Soldiers out of other sections or units to resource our intelligence sections. We had more than enough combat power in our organizations to overmatch the enemy in Iraq; what we didn’t have was the depth and knowledge in our intelligence sections to find the enemy in the first place. To fix that, we integrated infantry and armor Soldiers, cooks, communications specialists, and mechanics into our brigade and battalion intelligence sections. Commanders might also look closely at any National Guard and Reserve units attached to them during deployment. Many of the Soldiers in these units already have unique skill sets (e.g., law enforcement, finance, computers and telecommunications) that make them excellent choices to serve as intelligence augmentees.

Having to build and train our intelligence team during combat was hardly ideal. Fortunately, units today have the opportunity to reorganize and train their intelligence sections and systems at home station prior to deployment. When we redeployed to our home station, we endured the typical personnel chaos (Soldiers changing station and leaving the service) that occurs in the wake of a long deployment. After the majority of our personnel turnover was over, we immediately set about building and training our intelligence sections in anticipation of the brigade’s next deployment.

Working closely with the Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC) and 1st Armored Division Headquarters, we developed a HUMINT-centric pre-rotational training program to facilitate the early and progressive training of our new intelligence teams. The chief of the division’s All-source Collection Element (ACE) and CMTC’s scenario writers and leaders developed a detailed enemy situation and database that replicated an insurgent-terrorist activity, one that could fully exercise the BCT’s intelligence units. The intelligence flow began six months prior to commencement of our maneuver training exercise, as our intelligence sections at home received a steady stream of notional intelligence reports, interrogation debriefings, and programmed meetings with HUMINT sources. Using the torrent of information generated by the division ACE and CMTC, our intelligence sections were able to sustain the intelligence processes and techniques that we had developed while previously deployed to Iraq.

With that pre-rotational data and information provided in advance, our intelligence teams were required to conduct analysis, build link diagrams and target folders, and produce other intelligence products that passed along the hard lessons learned during our first deployment. We also continued to

...manning is one of the challenges units encounter when they try to adapt their intelligence sections to HUMINT operations.
run our weekly intelligence battle rhythm just like we had in Iraq. My staff would provide me with current intelligence updates, recommend changes or additions to our PIR, conduct current analysis of insurgent organizations in our AO, and suggest intelligence targeting priorities.

These pre-rotational intelligence activities supported three important goals: first, they allowed us to train our newly staffed intelligence teams throughout the BCT based upon lessons we had learned and processes we had developed in Iraq. Second, they enabled us to maximize our training experience when we finally deployed for our rotation—instead of spending valuable time learning undergraduate lessons at an expensive postgraduate training event, we were able to hit the ground running based upon actionable intelligence our sections had developed over the previous six months. Finally, and most importantly, they developed the confidence of the new Soldiers and leaders in our intelligence sections.

Informants

As I stated earlier, leveraging informants as our principal intelligence-collection asset constituted a significant shift from the way most of us had ever operated. The theory and logic behind using local sources to obtain information and intelligence is easy to grasp; however, the practical aspects of developing these nonstandard collection assets are less obvious.

In general, we had two challenges with informants: finding them and training them. Initially we relied upon informants who routinely provided unsolicited information to our units. We would track the accuracy and consistency of the information they gave us and, after they established a credible and reliable track record, we would begin to reward them for useful information. Later on, as our knowledge of our AO improved and, more importantly, our understanding of the culture and the nuances of local demographics increased, we became more savvy and cultivated informants from different ethnic, sectarian, political, tribal, and other groups within our AO. Eventually, the brigade’s intelligence sections developed a rapport with three to five informants who consistently provided reliable information we could develop into actionable intelligence.
Among our informants were members of political parties, local government officials, prostitutes, police officers, retired Iraqi generals, prominent businessmen, and expatriates. Of course we recognized that there was risk associated with using informants. For example, we were concerned that they might be collecting on us, or that the information they provided might have been designed to settle personal vendettas. Consequently, our BCT S2 and counterintelligence warrant officer developed a vetting program to minimize such risks. All of our informants were screened to validate the quality of their information and to check their motivations for providing it. We also implemented careful measures to ensure that informants were not collecting on U.S. forces or providing information that would put our Soldiers at risk.

Once we determined that a potential informant was reliable and useful, it became necessary to train and equip him so that he could provide more accurate and timely information. We typically provided our informants with Global Positioning System (GPS) devices, digital cameras, and cell phones. The phones not only improved the timeliness of information, but also allowed informants to keep their distance from us, thus minimizing the chance they would be personally compromised. Later on, as Internet cafes began to flourish in the Iraqi economy, we helped our informants establish email accounts and used that medium as another way to communicate with them.

GPS devices were also important, because most informants could not accurately determine or communicate address information that was sufficient to pinpoint target locations. With some basic training, our informants could use their GPSs to identify key locations using the military grid reference system. This increased the accuracy of location marking and measurably enhanced our ability to develop precise, actionable intelligence. Occasionally it was useful to give informants automobiles, too, to facilitate their movement and collection activities inside and outside our AO.

We discovered that identifying and training an informant was a complex and time-consuming process. Finding the right type of individual willing to work with you is both an art and a science. Our counterintelligence-trained Soldiers were instrumental in ensuring that we worked with the most reliable, most consistently accurate informants. Training and equipping our informants were key to their effectiveness and paid great dividends in terms of the volume and accuracy of their information. Because informants were the foundation of our HUMINT system in the brigade, we resourced them accordingly.

**Collecting and Exploiting Evidence**

Although developing indigenous sources of intelligence was central to the way we operated, we quickly discovered that there was another key component to our HUMINT-driven system: the collection and exploitation of evidence. It is not only frustrating, but also detrimental to your mission success to culminate an operation with the capture of insurgents or terrorists only to be directed to release them because your justification for detaining them can’t endure the scrutiny of a military or civilian legal review. We quickly learned after a couple of very avoidable incidents that our ability to successfully prosecute intelligence operations was directly linked to the ability of our Soldiers to collect, preserve, and exploit evidence related to our captured suspects. To remedy that, we initiated a training program to give our Soldiers and leaders the skills they needed to manage evidence.

Leveraging the experience and training of our military police, National Guardsmen with law enforcement skills, and FBI agents in-country, we were able to rapidly train our Soldiers on the essential requirements for capturing, securing, associating, safeguarding, and
exploiting evidence. Once they were armed with this training and an effective HUMINT-based intelligence process, our seizure and detention rate for insurgents, terrorists, and other miscreants soared.

Closely linked to the collection and association of evidence to suspects was the exploitation of that evidence. Early in our deployment we were frustrated by the inability of organizations above brigade level to exploit evidence in a timely manner and then provide feedback that we could use.

This was particularly true when it came to captured computer hard drives and cell phones. The standard policy was that these items had to be expedited to division headquarters within 24 hours of capture. This made sense because division was the first echelon above brigade that had the knowledge and expertise to exploit these devices. Unfortunately, for many reasons the turnaround time to receive intelligence from echelons above brigade was typically too slow, or the resultant product too incomplete, to help us.

What we needed was the ability to exploit these items at the BCT level for tactical information, in parallel with the division and corps intelligence shops, which were focused on other priorities. Based upon our previous working relationship with the FBI team in country, we managed to get a copy of a software program the agency was using to exploit hard drives. My BCT communications platoon loaded the software on their computers, received some basic training, and instantly we had the ability to exploit hard drives. We dedicated a couple of linguists to our communications platoon section, integrated this element into our S2X cell, and from then on conducted our own tactical-level technical exploitation of computers. We still had to forward hard drives and cell phones to division within 24 hours of capture, but now we just copied the hard drive, forwarded the complete captured system to division, and exploited the information simultaneously with the division.

This easy technical remedy to our hard-drive exploitation problem consistently provided big payoffs for us. The new capability was useful for documenting evidence to support the detention of an insurgent and for developing follow-up targets. We had the same challenge with cell phones. Unfortunately, we couldn’t acquire the technical capability we needed to exploit them as we had with the hard drives. I believe that phone exploitation is yet another trainable skill and capability that we should give our BCT communications platoons.

As with cell phones and hard drives, we were challenged to fully exploit our detainees. Specifically, we had to get them to provide information, and then we had to exploit that information to incarcerate them or to assist us in developing further intelligence to support future counterinsurgency operations. To address this challenge, we developed and adapted two useful tools as we gained experience at tactical-level interrogations. One was a detailed line of questioning that our HUMINT Collection Teams (HCTs) could use when questioning detainees; the other was the “cage infiltrator”—an Iraqi informant who would pose as a detainee in our holding facility to gather valuable intelligence from actual detainees.

Developed by the HCT team leader and the S2, a detailed line of questioning is extremely important for prioritizing the avenues of questioning that your trained and authorized interrogators pursue. It is an especially important tool given the latter’s extraordinary workload and the limited amount of time they can dedicate to initial and follow-up interrogation sessions.

As a commander, I found that it was imperative to take a personal interest in the line of questioning our HCTs pursued. For example, it was important to ensure that their line of questioning meshed exactly with the BCT’s PIRs and intelligence targeting priorities. I spent a lot of time with my S2 and battalion commanders refining our PIR and specific intelligence requirements (SIR), reviewing and establishing collection priorities, and synchronizing our collection efforts. This entire effort can be derailed if the line of questioning your interrogators pursue isn’t nested with your unit’s priorities.

To ensure development of the most effective interrogation line of questioning, my S2 required our HCTs to participate in the following five-step process (weekly or mission-specific):

- HCTs receive updated PIR and associated SIR from the unit S2.
- HCTs receive a current intelligence briefing from the NCO in charge of the unit S2X cell.
- Senior HUMINT warrant officer attends the BCT commander’s daily intelligence briefings to facilitate his understanding of the latest changes in intelligence priorities.
● HCTs develop lines of questioning and back-brief the unit S2 and senior HUMINT warrant officer.
● HCTs conduct interrogations.

We found that it was easy for our HCTs to determine the right questions to ask as long as they thoroughly understood our current PIR and SIR (which we continuously updated and refined).

Because detainees figured out very quickly that we treat prisoners humanely, it was not long before many of them refused to provide useful information. During interrogations we would typically hear things like “I’m innocent, I was just sleeping at my cousin’s house when you arrested me,” or “Saddam bad, Bush good, thank Allah for the USA.” If we didn’t have substantive evidence to link these detainees to a crime or insurgent activity, their strategy of denial, obsequious behavior, or happenstance alibi was difficult to dispute. One day, my S2 came to me with an idea. At his suggestion, we planted an informant in our holding facility with instructions to listen to the detainees’ conversations and then report to us what they discussed. This technique, which we dubbed “cage infiltration,” resulted in immediate intelligence.

Subsequently, we redesigned the individual spaces in our holding facility so that we could place our infiltrators in individual detention spaces, between suspected insurgent leaders and their possible followers. The only way these detainees could communicate among themselves was to talk past our infiltrator to their accomplice or cell member. Our interrogation teams would then remove our infiltrator under the guise of a routine interrogation, debrief him, and then return him to the holding area. Armed with the new information, our interrogators could often modify their line of questioning for more effective and productive follow-up interviews.

In a very short time, this technique became our single most effective method for gaining information and intelligence from our detainee population. An additional benefit to using cage infiltrators was that they were interactive. Over time, as they became more experienced and adept at what they were doing, they became quite clever at developing a dialog with their fellow detainees that would draw out additional information useful in incriminating the suspect or in developing future targetable information.

Another twist to this technique was the use of a taxi-driver informant. Despite our best efforts, there were times when we couldn’t build a case strong enough to support the long-term detention
of a suspect. When that happened, we would make our apologies for the inconvenience the suspect had endured and offer him a taxi ride back to his residence. It was not unusual for these suspects to brag to the driver or among themselves on their way home how they had deceived the “stupid” Americans. They would incriminate themselves in the process or reveal details that we could use to conduct follow-up COIN operations. Upon returning to our headquarters, the taxi driver was debriefed on the suspect’s conversation. Based upon the nature of any new information the informant presented, we decided either to recapture the suspect or to cease pursuing him.

Ensuring that the line of questioning our HCTs pursued was nested with the BCT’s intelligence priorities, coupled with some simple deception techniques such as using cage infiltrators in our holding facility, considerably improved the quantity and quality of intelligence that we obtained from our detainees.

Conclusion
Throughout the course of this article I have attempted to identify some of the major intelligence challenges my BCT faced during our first tour in Iraq. I have provided examples of how we met these challenges and adapted to best meet our needs at the time. I’ve also shared some of our more useful and effective practices in the hope that others may use or modify them to support their needs. I don’t pretend that the examples and practices I’ve offered represent definitive solutions to the countless intelligence challenges units face in Iraq. My intent, rather, was to demonstrate that by direct and constant leadership involvement at all levels, conventional units can effectively organize, train for, and execute HUMINT-centric operations in a COIN environment with great success.

One Final Thought
This article is designed to complement a previous piece I wrote for Military Review (“The Decisive Weapon: A Brigade Combat Team Commander’s Perspective on Information Operations”) in which I described the contribution that IO made to our COIN efforts in Baghdad.1 Although HUMINT-centric operations and IO may appear distinctly different in terms of their aims, they are closely linked; in fact, they are mutually supportive. HUMINT-centric operations target the insurgent and the terrorist, but in doing so they produce precise and timely information that allows our Soldiers to locate and attack insurgent forces with surgical precision, minimum violence, and minor collateral damage. A corollary benefit is that our actions result in minimal harm and inconvenience to the local population, helping us to convince them that we have the intent and capacity to improve their security and daily lives by eliminating the insurgent threat.

Likewise, IO synergistically supports our intelligence efforts by convincing the local population that it is in their best interest, personally and nationally, to tolerate and even support our efforts to improve their lives. Through IO, we share with the population the progress that is being achieved politically, economically, and socially, and we ensure that they know about the violence and harm the insurgents are wreaking upon their fellow citizens and their nation.

Similarly, through IO we are able to let the population know that we can separate and protect them from insurgent-terrorist threats when they have the confidence to share targetable information with us. The more adept we become at conducting IO and influencing the population, the more information the population will provide to enable us to target the insurgents and terrorists. It’s a win-win dynamic.

Given the environment our forces are operating in today and will continue to confront in the future, HUMINT-centric operations and IO are no longer merely “enablers” or supporting efforts. Quite simply, they are the decisive components of our strategy. Both of these critical operations must be embraced; they must become the twin pillars of the framework from which we operate. No longer can we allow our greater comfort with conventional combat operations to minimize these decisive components of a winning COIN strategy. MR

NOTES
Principles and Priorities in Training for Iraq

Lieutenant Colonel (P) Christopher Hickey, U.S. Army

As we stood outside my headquarters, the 2d squadron, 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment, in a small courtyard at the base of the 40-foot walls of an Ottoman-Empire-era castle in Tal Afar, Iraq, I reflected on my squadron’s operations over the past year. The troop commanders and their Iraqi Army and police partners had taken ownership of their area of operations. They were integrating their actions cohesively and effectively along our lines of operation: Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), information operations, civil-military operations, and combat operations.

The environment we faced required junior leaders to make hundreds of independent decisions every day. The sheer volume of information generated daily was staggering. Moreover, the operations tempo was very high, requiring the execution of dozens of missions simultaneously across the spectrum of operations. It would have been easy for any leader to be overwhelmed by the complexity of operating in such an environment. Yet, despite these circumstances, the squadron operated with little guidance from me. I knew all of the subordinate leaders’ capabilities and expected those leaders to aggressively exercise initiative while conducting operations. As I looked back on three years in command through two deployments, I recognized that my trust in their judgment—the faith that they could and would make the right decisions—was the key to our success.

Since my return from Iraq, I’m often asked by those preparing to deploy, “What are the most important things to train for?” Most commanders preparing their units for deployment share a common feeling that there is just not enough time to train for everything they think may be important. It can be frustrating: leaders not only have to prioritize essential tactical training, but also must find time to prepare equipment, reorganize into modular organizations, relocate to a new post, and allow for personal and family time for Soldiers.

I give those who ask a list of about a dozen things, based on our after action reviews, to focus on. With the number of combat-experienced leaders in the force, I am sure there are no surprises on the list. Identifying the tasks to train is the easy part. Our training doctrine is superb. The mission essential task list (METL) development process will lead units to the key tasks, and the intellectual energy that it takes to develop the METL creates

“The troops are unleashed,” I said to the squadron’s operations officer, “and I’m absolutely amazed at their speed and agility.”

(All photos courtesy of the author)
buy-in of the product. Even so, as I look back on my unit’s performance in Iraq, I’m convinced that whatever success we enjoyed had less to do with my day-to-day actions as a commander or with the actual combat skills learned in training, and more to do with a pre-deployment training environment that cultivated initiative in my junior leaders. I believe that a command climate that builds initiative—one that focuses on developing critical thinking skills so that leaders at all levels have not only the knowledge and training, but also the judgment, to make the right decisions in a combat environment—is the most important element in the training environment for units deploying to Iraq or Afghanistan.

Field Manual (FM) 6–22, Army Leadership, states that leaders can “set the conditions for initiative by guiding others in thinking through the problem.”1 I believe the converse of that is also true: leaders who do not create an empowering environment that allows for individual resourcefulness will stifle initiative. Consequently, their subordinate leaders will not develop the confidence they need to respond with well-reasoned judgment in the complex counterinsurgency environment we face today.

A program that promotes such intellectual capability must emanate from a command philosophy that considers individual initiative a priority. This philosophy is founded on building bonds of trust, instilling discipline, bolstering morale, and training critical tasks with special emphasis on rules of engagement (ROE) and risk management.

Command Philosophy

As a company commander, I never developed a command philosophy, probably because I didn’t know what one was. I suppose my subordinate leaders and troops implicitly learned what was important to me by observing my actions and listening to my guidance over time, but this clearly was not the best way of doing business. Over the years, I observed many great leaders and learned from their approaches to command, which, without exception, included setting forth a formal command philosophy to shape the unit. As a result, when notified of my selection for squadron command, I was already persuaded of the essential need for formulating such a philosophy. Well in advance of assuming command, I began crafting a philosophy that would reflect my personal priorities and leadership style.

I started to form my command philosophy by jotting down observations that resonated with me. I kept a piece of paper with me on which I recorded leadership principles as they occurred to me. Two books that especially made an impression on me were Leadership: The Warrior’s Art, by Christopher Kolenda, and Defeat into Victory: Battling Japan in Burma and India, 1942–1945, by Field Marshal Viscount Slim. Kolenda’s book is a collection of essays from active and retired leaders about leadership; Field Marshal Slim’s book provided practical insight into the influence of command philosophy and was a fascinating account of how a bad situation was completely turned around through skillful leadership. Slim focused on building competence and improving morale at the lowest levels to develop organizational cohesiveness and combat effectiveness.

When I knew which squadron I was to command, I contacted my future regimental commander to learn what his philosophy was so that I could nest mine with his. During the year before I assumed command, I noticed reoccurring themes on my piece of paper and began to see how the parts of my command philosophy would fit together.

Through this process, I reached the conclusion that, for a command philosophy to work, your unit must come to live it—it cannot be something that you merely write down during a pre-command course, hand out on your first day of command, and never see again. On the contrary, you and your unit must believe in it. Your philosophy should be so assimilated into the unit culture that even the jargon that expresses its concepts becomes part of the unit vernacular.

I wanted my philosophy to reflect a command climate that would encourage initiative—but initiative within the framework of a disciplined and specific combat purpose. However laudable initiative is in junior leaders and Soldiers, encouraging initiative for initiative’s sake, without an overall controlling intellectual and emotional paradigm, is counterproductive and potentially disastrous. It was clear to me from the outset that discipline had to be instilled and trust between the commander and subordinate troop leaders cultivated to develop initiative. Promoting initiative without such a foundation was courting disaster and would likely result in chaos.

To help me visualize my command philosophy and then communicate my intent, I designed the following illustration (see figure 1). Obviously, my
command philosophy is not the only good one—others will be different and perhaps equally or more successful. But I wanted to formulate and codify a philosophy specifically to help create a command climate that encouraged subordinate leaders to develop acute judgment and take initiative.

**Trust.** Within my visual construct, trust is a quality defined by character and competence. In my mind, one has character if he lives up to the Army values, which are all-important guiding principles appropriate for comrades-in-arms who place their lives in each other’s hands. I made it clear that I would assume that everyone who had put on a uniform and joined our unit was living up to the Army values, unless one proved otherwise through his conduct.

In the intellectual construct of my command philosophy, competence—having the skills, knowledge, and judgment to perform assigned duties—was never assumed, but had to be developed and ultimately demonstrated in practical application. Collective technical competence would only come about through team training and experience. It was understood that this process took time and patience: none of us is as competent on the first day in a new position as he is six months later. As the Soldiers improved their skills and grew confident in one another, they developed collective competence and came to trust their team members.

**Discipline.** I defined discipline as doing what is right when no one is looking. It is the self-determination that finds you working out before physical training or staying late to fix a deadlined vehicle. This kind of anonymous dedication to the mission and to one’s comrades is a key factor in assessing the health of a unit. It is the measure of buy-in to the command philosophy. Although no one sees you do it, or even knows about it, you do what you know should be done because this dedication, or loyalty, has been inculcated into you and you have accepted it as a value: it means doing the right thing all the time.

**Unit morale.** I emphasized the importance of developing an environment that promotes high morale. This is critical. Everyone wants to be informed, to feel he is important to the unit, and to know that his contributions are appreciated. Satisfying these desires through effective communications helps promote the climate of trust, discipline, balance, teamwork, and high morale in which initiative is most likely to prosper.

**Balance and teamwork.** Both in garrison and when one is deployed, it is important to keep a balance in life. In garrison, I made it a point not to work late or on weekends unless there was a real need to do so, for if I did, others would as well. Never use how late you or your subordinates work as a measure...
of performance: it can be counterproductive and makes for miserable relationships. Balancing your time and attention between work and personal time is always difficult in an Army career, but I believe you will actually accomplish more if you have a balanced lifestyle. Think of your Army career not as a 20-year sprint by yourself, but as a marathon in which your family runs with you as part of the team.

Teamwork is another key element of my command philosophy. Real teamwork means unhesitatingly helping each other out. If another unit asks for help, the answer is yes. To encourage teamwork, I would have lunch with my commanders each week. The entire focus of the luncheon was to share good ideas. Many of the commanders did the same with their leaders.

**Guidance to subordinates.** I told my subordinate leaders that a key principle of leadership was to explain their intent and provide the “left and right limits” to their subordinates. We called this “the rumble strip,” in reference to the rumble strips on the side of a highway. Rumble strips establish the outer driving boundaries for the direction you are headed. If you stray too far to the left or to the right, you hear the strips’ rumbling sound as a warning not to stray off the road. The phrase “rumble strip” became part of the vernacular of the squadron. For instance, when a junior leader said that something was “outside the rumble strips,” he was describing an action that was outside the leader’s intent.

A leader has to decide where to place rumble strips for each unit and clearly explain these boundaries in his guidance. As subordinates become more competent and earn the trust of their superiors, the distance between the rumble strips widens. A scout platoon leader with 20 months of combat experience, for example, is likely to have more latitude than a brand-new platoon leader.

Initiative happens within the limits of the rumble strips, so allow leaders the freedom to make decisions when they are on track. Sometimes, they will do things that might not be exactly the way you would have done them, but if their actions are within your intent and guidance, let them happen. Not only will it promote initiative, but it will also build trust, because trust is a two-way bond. However, if you see actions not in line with your guidance, then you must give the nudge to get them back between the rumble strips.

Mistakes are bound to happen as you cultivate initiative in your leaders, but that is the price of doing business. My command philosophy recognized the difference between negligence and a mistake that occurred when trying to do the right thing. I assumed that, more often than not, subordinate leaders who understood my intent, and who had been given the opportunity to develop keen judgment skills, would come up with better solutions than I in situations with which they were more intimately familiar.

For example, one concern we had in Iraq was the lack of protection for Bradley commanders from improvised explosive device (IED) blasts. Before we knew that the Army had a solution in the works, some of our junior leaders figured out how to mount up-armored HMMWV windshields to the right of the Bradley commander’s head so that the commanders could still see clearly through the windshield while their heads were better protected. We mounted these on our entire fleet. Within a week, one of our vehicles was hit by a blast from an IED mounted high off the road on a building. The windshield cracked, but it saved the life of the vehicle commander. In fact, these windshields saved many lives during our deployment. For showing such initiative, we awarded impact Army Commendation Medals to those who had developed the idea.

**Self-assessment.** Establishing rumble-strip guidance also provides a good yardstick for self-assessment. If things are not going as you intended, then it may be time to review the quality of your intent and guidance. You may have failed to clearly communicate your expectations, or perhaps your guidance is unworkable and you need to change it. In any case, confirmation and back briefs are essential to ensure the communications loop is working.
In addition, it is important to train yourself to listen. This is easier said than done, but it is absolutely vital for a combat leader. As was the case with the Bradley windshield, many—if not most—important ideas for improving units usually percolate from below. Consequently, if a commander listens, he will hear creative and reasonable solutions for needed innovations and can establish a feedback loop that can greatly improve a unit’s performance and morale. Troops will know that, although you may not always adopt their ideas, you respect and will listen to their ideas.

Training to Develop Judgment

Once a commander has a command climate that fosters initiative and allows subordinate leaders to develop the mental skills they need to make decisions in a crisis, it’s time to focus on exercising their judgment. General of the Army Omar Bradley once said, “Judgment comes from experience, and experience comes from bad judgment.” Taking the wisdom of General Bradley’s comments to heart, most of us would agree that it is clearly better to gain experience from bad judgment during training than during combat. So how do you design training that gives junior leaders the opportunity to exercise judgment?

For starters, I recommend reviewing and having leader professional development sessions on FM 7-1, Battle Focused Training. The manual states, “The ultimate goal of the Army’s leader training and leader development programs is to develop leaders who are self-aware, adaptive, competent, and confident.”

Figure 2, borrowed from FM 7-1, illustrates the transition “from the past” to the type of leader who will succeed in the contemporary environment.

For your program, you can identify some of the tasks to train using Army Mission Training Plans, but this is merely the beginning of the process. You will need to develop other tasks independently, ones that can realistically depict the conditions that your unit will face in counterinsurgency operations or combat. For those tasks, you will most likely be the one to establish the standard you want your Soldiers to achieve. Training the technical tasks to standard is essential, but I believe it is equally important to view the training of these tasks as a vehicle to cultivate judgment in your subordinates. Therefore, I suggest that the conditions be adjusted to improve and refine judgment using the crawl-walk-run method.

Adjusting the variables. I recommend drawing on the practical experience of combat veterans to generate realistic scenarios that closely replicate the situations your troops are likely to encounter, to include the complications of dealing with civilians in a combat environment.

Once your Soldiers are meeting the basic standard for a task, commanders can make the conditions
more difficult by adjusting the variables. You can increase the tempo of one task and then add additional tasks, or adjust the difficulty by modifying the amount of ammunition available, the number and intensity of opposing forces, the type of terrain, the severity of the weather, or the time of day. As you create tougher and more realistic conditions, fabricate ambiguous and unpredictable situations to force your subordinates to make deliberate decisions and take calculated risks. In this decision-making process, look for your leaders to consider the ROE and use the risk management process.

**Rules of engagement.** Training ROE involves more than just having the Army lawyer brief the unit before deployment. During these briefings, the lawyer often presents situations for which the training audience can apply ROE. This is good, but not good enough for the complex environment in which you will operate once you deploy. You must integrate ROE into your training scenarios to exercise judgment. Troop leaders should be intimately familiar with the ROE. They need to apply them in training scenarios exercised at night, in a house or in a city block where there is a mixture of enemy and civilians and the situation changes, causing a change in the mission. Integrating the application of ROE into operational decision making is absolutely key. The same is true with risk management.

**Risk management.** Risk management is another topic worthy of a leader development session. FM 3100.12, *Risk Management*, explains the risk-management process well, but to understand how to incorporate it into operations, planning, and training, you should consult several other sources. FM 3-90, *Tactics*, describes how to integrate risk management into tactical operations; FM 5-0, *Army Planning and Orders Production*, explains how to conduct risk assessment during the decision-making process; and FM 7-1 explains how to integrate risk management in each step of the training-management cycle.

Risk management cannot be an afterthought. There are two kinds of risks: tactical and accidental. Tactical “is concerned with hazards that exist because of the presence of either the enemy or an adversary.” These are the hazards you identify (IEDs, ambush, suicide bomber or car bomb) and the controls you take to mitigate them.

By contrast, accidental risk “includes all operational risk considerations other than tactical risks. It includes risks to the friendly force, those posed to civilians by an operation, and those to the environment as a result of an operation.” An example of accidental risk is a sandstorm. When this hazard is identified, possible risk mitigations involve either delaying the mission until after the storm or pulling well off the road and waiting it out. Both tactical and accidental risk considerations are important.

Insist that leaders and Soldiers integrate risk management into their planning and decision-making processes (see figure 3). Risk management should be intuitive and always considered, like the ROE: both help to determine what action to take. In my view, a leader who fails to manage risk is derelict in his duty. He is gambling that he or his Soldiers will never get into a situation where these hazards could affect them. In such a gamble, the odds are against you from the start.

I cannot emphasize this more strongly. Your leaders must be able to think through risk assessment and management when planning for future operations and make them part of their intuitive response when dealing with an unexpected, stressful, and oftentimes dangerous event. Neglect this process, and Soldiers will needlessly die.

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![Figure 3. The risk-management process.](image-url)
There are two levels of risk-management application: deliberate and crisis-action. Deliberate risk management is “the application of the complete process when time is not critical.”8 FM 5-0 requires that risk management be considered in each step of the military decision-making process (MDMP) and then built into the course of action. Risk management is not done separately from the order. It is a huge mistake to produce an order and then develop and conduct risk management: you must ensure your leaders and staff build risk mitigations into the plan.

Operationally, you are using the deliberate process when you prepare for a mission. Figure 4, taken from FM 3-90, depicts how the level of information/intelligence available for a mission increases or decreases the uncertainty of risk to a force, and how a commander should then adjust his plan to manage risk.9

As portrayed in Figure 4, the more information and intelligence available, the less the uncertainty and risk to the force. Conversely, the less information and intelligence available, the more the uncertainty and risk to the force. Insure your leaders are trained to assess the degree of uncertainty relative to a mission, and that they then base their plan on what is known, what is assumed, and what is unknown.

For example, in our Joint Operations Center, staffed by members of the squadron, Iraqi Army, and Iraqi Police, we would receive calls on our TIPs line from Iraqis telling us about an IED at a certain location. We didn’t know if these were legitimate calls, hoaxes, or invitations to a prepared ambush, but we couldn’t ignore such calls because most of the time they were legitimate, and citizens were trying to warn us.

To deal with the uncertainty surrounding each call, we routinely sent a relatively large force, usually a platoon with the firepower and capability to defeat anything we might encounter. We integrated aviation and/or unmanned aerial vehicles, engineers, and ISF into the mission. These MDMP and operational risk-reduction actions were examples of deliberate risk management.

By doctrine, deliberate risk management should be integrated into each step of the training management cycle. Performing deliberate risk management during training sets the conditions for a safe training event and serves as a vehicle to make risk management intuitive. The level of certainty is much higher in a training event than in combat operations, but people still get killed and injured.

Crisis-action risk management “is an ‘on-the-run’ mental or verbal review of the situation . . . It is used in a time-compressed situation.”10 Therefore, you should use the deliberate risk-management process to train crisis-action risk management as well. The steps of the two processes are identical, except that you must be more intuitive and able to mentally process the data that you do have faster during crisis-action risk management.

**Executing Situation Training Exercises**

Situation training exercise (STX) lanes provide a great opportunity for a commander to develop leader judgment and improve decision-making skills by incorporating scenarios that require junior leaders to apply ROE and deliberate and crisis-action risk management.

As a squadron commander, I trained troops and evaluated platoons. Before our second deployment, we executed STX lanes for every scout, tank, artillery, and engineer platoon in the squadron. We rotated the troops to the field so we could focus on each platoon. They conducted two missions a day, one in the morning and one either in the afternoon or at night based on their situation.

**Figure 4. Intelligence/risk uncertainty/tactical adjustments.**
on the desired conditions. Planning provided for multi-echelon training. Everyone in the troop was “in play” and got evaluated. We also took advantage of unplanned events. For example, if a vehicle broke down, the maintenance recovery operation became a tactical mission as important as the STX lane. To facilitate effective training evaluation and to give the troops instant feedback, we used camcorders and digital cameras to record good and bad tactical habits. For example, we recorded how high Soldiers rode in the hatch of an armored vehicle and whether they were wearing their protective glasses.

The missions the platoons had to execute in the STX lane came from the squadron via an order to the troop. As he would later do in Iraq, the troop commander managed the diverse, simultaneous missions of his platoons in his unit’s area of operations. This exercised both the commander’s ability to interact with his platoon’s troop-leading procedures and the troop command post’s ability to track the platoons’ and adjacent units’ tactical situations. A troop not executing the STX lane played the role of the opposing force and contributed “civilians on the battlefield.” We schooled these Soldiers on how to interact with the training unit to replicate a reasonably realistic scenario. An unexpected positive result of having Soldiers play Iraqis was that they saw the unit’s actions from the Iraqi perspective. Many of them said that it was an eye-opening event.

If I could do this again, I would use the squadron’s own Soldiers for role playing and observer/trainer duty. First, I would have our Soldiers simulate being members of the Iraqi Army and police force. Had I done this, it would have been very helpful when we later had to train Iraqi soldiers and police. When we initially started working with the Iraqi military, we tended to be very U.S.-centric in the planning and conduct of our combined operations. It took us time to get to know the Iraqi Army, develop mutual trust, and strike a balanced training and support posture. Had we learned some of the peculiarities of the Iraq Army and simulated interaction with them before deploying, the process would have been more efficient. For instance, during the first few weeks we worked with the ISF, we discovered that when they made contact with the enemy, or an Iraqi soldier negligently discharged his weapon, they would fire wildly in all directions in what we called a “death blossom.” While our efforts helped instill
fire discipline in our Iraqi partners, it would have been helpful to know of this behavior before encountering it.

Next, I would use my own troops as observer/trainers for the STX lanes. We brought in highly professional observer/trainers from another battalion, and they did a great job. However, I missed an opportunity by not having my own troops learn from observing, giving feedback, and conducting after action reviews (AARs) for other units. These are all tasks we found ourselves doing with the Iraqi Army. It would have benefited us greatly to have had the opportunity to prepare for these roles in advance.

Mastering Tasks and Building Initiative

We purposely limited the number of tasks that we trained, which gave us time to correct deficiencies and let the troops achieve mastery (that is, to accomplish the task to standard under complex and stressful circumstances).

Based on unit performance, we modified conditions to increase the difficulty. Most of the platoons started at what I would term a crawl. I was interested in evaluating the platoons’ ability to conduct troop-leading procedures and execute tasks under one form of enemy contact at a time. So initially, we gave each platoon a generous amount of time to conduct the procedures, and the terrain was usually more open. At the crawl level, we kept civilians out of the scenario and made ROE decisions “black and white.” That way, I could assess the platoon leader’s ability to conduct crisis risk mitigation in a less complex situation.

To know when and how much to modify the difficulty for each platoon requires well-trained observer/trainers who can evaluate the tactical situation, collect observations, and conduct AARs. Between the STX iterations and after the last mission, I met with the observer/trainers and the commander of the troop executing the STX lanes to review each platoon’s collective task rating and evaluation. The meetings typically lasted about an hour, during which the platoons were preparing for the next mission. Based on our observations, we would decide whether the platoon was ready to advance to the next level. If the platoon had not performed well, then it might have to repeat the mission or conduct a new mission with the same conditions. It depended on the problem. For instance, a leader problem might require leader retraining. One systemic problem we noticed with new platoon leaders was the difficulty they had conducting METT-TC (mission, enemy, troops, time, terrain and civilians) analysis and deliberate risk mitigation as they developed their plans. Anticipating where the enemy could apply forms of contact based on the terrain was something that took time for them to master. In this case, since the problem was systemic, I gave a leader-training class at night on the subject. The class helped them prepare for the next mission, but cut into their preparation time with their unit. This was the intended effect as we increased the difficulty.

Getting tougher. As we presented the platoons with walk-level mission conditions, we increased the type of enemy contact and its frequency. Some of the contact occurred simultaneously. For example, we would combine an IED attack with an RPG- and small-arms ambush. We also relocated to more challenging terrain, such as defiles or constricted areas; gave the platoons less time for troop-leading procedures; and injected civilian play into the battlefield. At this point, the ROE situations got a little ambiguous, challenging the platoon leader’s
judgment. Many platoon leaders got flustered trying to execute crisis risk management. They had not yet developed the mental acuity to evaluate the hazards, think of mitigating actions, and issue precise, concise, and clear task and purpose orders at the speed required to dominate the situation. If this deficiency happened early during the mission, we often conducted a quick platoon AAR, and either I or a senior observer/trainer called an administrative halt to take the platoon leader aside for a quick one-on-one AAR of his actions. After 15 or 20 minutes at the halt to conduct the AAR, we would immediately reset the mission and do it again. Platoons typically took a few missions to progress from the walk to the run level.

**Mastering the task.** At the run level, we tried to replicate the conditions of Iraq as closely as possible. The many forms of simultaneous enemy contact became more challenging and happened more frequently. We adjusted the terrain to close-in, urban conditions; issued a fragmentary order over the radio from the commander; and significantly compressed the platoon’s troop-leading procedures. The effects of many long, exhausting days became a factor, and distinctions between civilians and enemy combatants became uncertain. The light available was twilight or night light, because seeing the world through night vision equipment is like living in an alien world until you get used to it. In these scenarios, the ROE situations became more complex. In terms of crisis risk mitigation, the platoon leader had to be on his game, or it could be very ugly.

**Variety in the STX lane.** Not all the lanes had enemy contact. In fact, in some lanes all the Iraqi civilians were non-hostile. This is important because the troops will encounter this condition in Iraq. If the training conditions always include enemy contact, what do you think your unit’s mental picture will be when it deploys? We developed several scenarios that didn’t include enemy contact. For example, we had a platoon leader conducting a meeting with a village mayor. We evaluated how the platoon came into town, set up security, and interacted with the population. Then, based on the platoon’s actions, we adjusted the reactions of the crowd that gathered outside where the meeting took place. We reviewed the platoon leader’s patrol report to see if he noticed things like the picture of a Shi’a leader on a wall of the mayor’s house.

**Time Is a Zero-Sum Resource**

Time is a limiting factor as a unit prepares for a deployment, so we must find ways other than STX-type events to develop judgment in our leaders. For instance, predictable operational patterns are deadly in Iraq, so I would avoid having any standard schedule in garrison. Instead, I recommend allowing troop commanders to exercise their judgment as they perform their day-to-day activities. Decentralize garrison operations and allow your leaders to make command decisions appropriate for their level and position. Although having the whole squadron do maintenance on Monday might be convenient for me, it’s not the type of thinking I wanted to promote.

Other useful ways to exercise your subordinates’ judgment include having discussions over sand tables and simulations, encouraging all your leaders and Soldiers to read about the history and culture of your area of operations, and conducting leadership development seminars where subordinates can discuss their readings and experiences.

By focusing on developing the problem-solving skills of subordinates during predeployment training, I knew what sort of judgment each of my leaders had by the time we arrived in Iraq. My command philosophy still applied in combat. We pushed the rumble strips out farther based on each leader’s experience and signs of increased competence. Naturally, what we were capable of doing after a month of continuous operations was quite different from what we had done during the first month.

When your unit receives an attachment or integrates new leaders, you must take time to assess the experience and competence of the newcomers.

The after action review products for the 2d Squadron, 3rd ACR, have been posted on the Battle Command Knowledge System (BCKS), Counterinsurgency Operations (COIN) professional forum, and can be reviewed at the following links:

*PDF Overview:* https://leadernetwork.bcks.army.mil/secure/CommunityBrowser.aspx?id=333305
Providing more directive guidance and integrating new units with a more experienced organization until the new unit is up to speed will help mitigate the risk.

Putting It All Together

We worked very hard to train individuals and units to the standards for each combat task, but that wasn’t our only goal. By adjusting and tailoring the conditions based on the platoon’s performance, we developed the judgment of everyone in the platoon. Developing a platoon leader’s judgment under tough, realistic conditions is analogous to developing a quarterback’s judgment on how to read a defense while being rushed. Both the platoon leader and the quarterback are conducting crisis-action risk mitigation. The quarterback must follow the regulations. The platoon leader must follow the ROE. Finally, just as a coach removes a quarterback who isn’t up to the task of leading his team, as a commander you must realize that leading a platoon in combat is serious business, and not everyone is up to the challenge. It is tough to tell a platoon leader that he’s in the wrong business, but sometimes it must be done.

The vast majority of our platoon leaders became unbelievably good combat leaders. By the time we left, I had scout platoon leaders with two years of combat experience in places like Ramadi, Fallujah, and Tal Afar. I once departed a meeting with Iraqi leaders and was moving back to my headquarters in my tactical command post (TAC), a Bradley section, when one of my scout platoons encountered enemy contact. My TAC was in the area, so I coordinated on the troop net to see where the platoon needed the TAC’s combat power to support its operation. That platoon leader had the best situational awareness of the local tactical situation. I had trained him, had seen him operate calmly and decisively in some intense situations, and absolutely trusted his judgment. The platoon leader told me where he could use the help, and I positioned the TAC accordingly while I evaluated the situation to see if it required any other squadron assets.

This is how we operated. All the troops supported one another in similar situations. Speed and agility are critical to beat the enemy’s decision cycle. Succeeding in combat is about trust and judgment. It is amazing to see the power of initiative when judgment is developed.

Sabre Squadron TAC, February 2005.

NOTES

2. Ibid., 6-9.
4. Ibid., 5-11.
5. FM 5-0, Army Planning and Orders Production (Washington, DC: GPO, January 2005), 3-21.
6. Ibid.
8. Ibid., 1-3.
10. FM 3-100.12, 1-3.
How to Negotiate in the MIDDLE EAST

Lieutenant Colonel William Wunderle, U.S. Army

IT IS NOW COMMON during civil-military and combat operations for Soldiers of all ranks to become involved in negotiations, dispute resolutions, or bargaining for individual or collective advantages. This is particularly true during sudden, unexpected confrontations.

The values of people from other organizations and nationalities directly affect their understanding of any given situation. The success of military operations calls for Soldiers and leaders to be culturally aware when negotiating with persons from other cultures.

We Americans have an ethnocentric belief in our superiority, an attitude that may be helpful in winning wars on the field of battle, but can often work against us in sustaining the peace. As a Middle East cultural advisor and specialist during 12 Mission Readiness Exercises at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Polk, Louisiana, I have observed the U.S. military training for negotiations with local Iraqi leaders and seen firsthand a negative trend in the cultural preparation of our leaders and Soldiers. Simply put, we don’t seem to take culture training very seriously. A brigade combat team at JRTC even cancelled its scheduled culture training (a decision it came to regret later in Iraq). We need to do better. Figure 1, adapted from Frank L. Acuff, a respected lecturer on negotiation, suggests just how much better.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Competency</th>
<th>Grade</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Preparation</td>
<td>B-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Synergistic approach (win-win)</td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural I.Q.</td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adapting the negotiating process to the host country environment</td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patience</td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Listening</td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linguistic abilities</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Using language that is simple and accessible</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High aspirations</td>
<td>B+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal integrity</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building solid relationships</td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1. U.S. negotiators’ global report card.
Some Negotiating Basics

The term “negotiation” presupposes both
common interests and conflict between the two
or more sides entering the negotiation process.
Parties agree to negotiate when they cannot
resolve issues unilaterally. Negotiation implies
a willingness to accept a compromise between
one’s maximum goal and the absolute minimum
that one can countenance. A negotiation is cross-
cultural when the parties to it belong to differ-
ent cultures and do not share the same ways of
thinking, feeling, and behaving.

Today in Iraq, Afghanistan, and anywhere else
U.S. forces are deployed, military leaders from
squad leader to flag officer may have to conduct
negotiations with other parties to find and strike
a balance between realizing short-term gains
and cultivating long-term relationships that might
facilitate future interaction. Our leaders need to
understand the dynamics of negotiation and be good
at negotiating. Successful negotiations save lives,
enhance the ability to achieve campaign goals, and
facilitate transition to a secure environment.

Conducting negotiations is a three-phase pro-
cess: pre-negotiation, the negotiation, and post-
negotiation. The pre-negotiation phase is often the
most critical. Each party identifies its strengths,
assesses its interests, and works to understand the
negotiation’s wider context. This is the phase in
which it is important for a military leader to under-
stand the cultural context in which his counterpart
operates. To be effective, negotiators should base
their strategy and tactics on the situation and the
people involved.

Jeswald Salacuse outlines “ten factors in the
negotiation process that seem to be influenced by
a person’s culture.” According to Salacuse, cul-
turally different responses in a negotiation tend to
fall within an identifiable range. Figure 2 depicts
Salacuse’s ten factors and their associated ranges of
possible responses. A discussion of each follows,
with comments where relevant to negotiations with
Middle Easterners.

Goals. Goals reflect the purpose or intent of
the parties to a negotiation. In business, American
negotiators typically regard the signing of a contract
between the differing parties as their primary goal.
They consider the contract a binding agreement
that outlines the roles, rights, and obligations of
each party. Middle Eastern business negotiators,
however, differ in their aims and expectations.
They usually seek sustainable business relationships
rather than contracts, eschew the “Western tradition
of legalism,” and “prefer to leave things vague.” In
the Middle East, personal relationships take time
to build, are founded on loyalty and reciprocity,
and are important when negotiating. Trust between
partners must never be feigned.

Attitude. Negotiations are affected by the
attitudes or dispositions each party brings to the
table. In what theorists call distributive bargaining,
negotiators see each other’s goals as incompatible
and believe only one party can gain, and only at the
expense of the other (I win; you lose). In integrative
bargaining, the negotiating parties consider them-
selves to have compatible goals and assume that
both parties stand to gain from the final agreement
(I win; you win). In business, negotiators, regard-
less of cultural background, prefer to come out
ahead. The attitude they bring to the negotiations
depends on their personalities or their positions
of power.

Personal styles. Style refers to the way a nego-
tiator interacts with his counterparts at the table. In
the Middle East, negotiators usually prefer longer, less
formal sessions, insist on addressing counterparts by
their titles, and are given to expressing philosophi-
cal statements that are often more important to the
negotiation process than the technical issues of the
problem. Arab culture is high context; that is, Arab
negotiators attach great importance to context. For

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Negotiation Factors</th>
<th>Range of Cultural Responses</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Goal</td>
<td>Contract ↔ Relationship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attitude</td>
<td>Win/Lose ↔ Win/Win</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Styles</td>
<td>Informal ↔ Formal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications</td>
<td>Direct ↔ Indirect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time Sensitivity</td>
<td>High ↔ Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotionalism</td>
<td>High ↔ Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agreement Form</td>
<td>Specific ↔ General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agreement Building</td>
<td>Bottom Up ↔ Top Down</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Team Organization</td>
<td>One Leader ↔ Consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk Taking</td>
<td>High ↔ Low</td>
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</table>

Figure 2. The impact of culture on negotiation.
example, they “make a sharp distinction between the way matters of state should be conducted and matters of commerce.” Other contextual factors, such as history, which might be thought extraneous to the process by U.S. negotiators, will also affect discussions with Arabs.

Middle Eastern cultures allow more touching than Americans are used to during greeting rituals and more eye contact during negotiations. In Arab cultures, eye contact is taken as a sign of trustworthiness.

Communications. Some cultures adopt direct, simple methods of communication, while others prefer indirect, more complex methods. Middle Eastern cultures fall into the latter category. When communicating with Arabs, pay attention to body language, eye movements, and hand gestures. Arabs can use such nonverbal communication to contradict, emphasize, or substitute for verbal messages. For example, most Middle Easterners will often say “yes” when they really mean “no” because they prefer to avoid conflict or want to save face.

Time sensitivity. Americans view time as monochronic (one thing happening at a time), sequential, and absolute. They value promptness. Arabs and some other Middle Easterners, on the other hand, tend to view time as polychronic (many things happening simultaneously), non-linear, repetitive, and associated with other events. That is, “they have a cultural preference to establish a relationship before beginning negotiations proper,” and therefore may involve many people. For Arabs, the time it takes to complete an interaction is unbounded, not subject to a timetable or schedule.

Unlike Americans, Arabs tend to exchange pleasantries at length before getting down to business. They will also employ silent intervals, which American negotiators try to avoid, for contemplation. Another aspect of time relevant to negotiations with Arabs is that they tend to focus on the past. U.S. negotiators focused on the present should be mindful that their counterparts might see the past as part of the present.

Because most Middle Easterners prefer to establish a relationship before they begin the negotiations proper, and because they favor a consensus-based decision-making process, U.S. negotiators should be prepared for slow deliberations and long negotiations.

Emotionalism. Different cultures have different views about the appropriateness of displaying emotions. These differing cultural norms may be brought to the negotiating table. Arab negotiators, in a high-context culture, are more likely to show emotions than are Americans.

Agreement forms. As I mentioned earlier, Americans prefer detailed contracts that anticipate...
Agreement building. Middle Eastern negotiators tend to begin negotiations by establishing general principles that become the framework on which to build an agreement. They employ a deductive, or top-down, process. Americans, on the other hand, generally use an inductive, or bottom-up, process, and tend to begin negotiations by first dealing with details.

Team organization. Groups organize themselves in culturally specific ways that reflect and affect how the group makes decisions. A negotiating team usually will have a designated leader who appears to have complete authority to decide all matters. In the Middle East, though, a hidden authority rests with the group, and, as aforementioned, decision making often occurs through consensus. Thus, negotiating teams may be relatively large due to the greater number of personnel thought to be necessary to the decision-making process.

The concept of “power distance” refers to the acceptance of unequal power between people and the degrees of deference thought appropriate. High power-distance cultures are those in which some people are considered superior to others because of their social status, gender, race, age, education, birth, personal achievements, family background, or other factors. Middle Eastern cultures are high power-distance cultures; thus, their negotiators are comfortable in high power-distance situations. Middle Eastern negotiators accept hierarchical structures and clear authority figures, use power with discretion, and defer to status.

Risk taking. Some cultures are more risk-averse than others. In general, Middle Easterners seek to avoid uncertainty. This proclivity can affect their willingness to take risks in a negotiation. They may be less likely to divulge information, try new approaches, or tolerate a risky course of action. Gaining the trust and confidence of Middle Easterners can be difficult. Americans have a higher tolerance for uncertainty. They tend to value risk-taking, will entertain risk if it might lead to problem solving, and employ flat organizational structures that tend to diffuse control.12

Two More Cultural Considerations

Salacuse’s ten factors to consider in cross-cultural negotiating are useful but not exhaustive. In my experience, negotiations in the Middle East can be affected by two other factors: the Arab imperative to save face, and the American need to use interpreters.

Saving face. Face and the allied concepts of honor and shame are important in the Middle East. Face has to do with a person’s reputation and the respect in which others hold him. In addition to attaching high importance to creating bonds of friendship and trust between negotiators, Arabs believe it is imperative that negotiating partners respect each other’s honor and dignity. To an American, losing face may be embarrassing, but to an Arab, it is devastating. Losing face is the ultimate disgrace, and an Arab will go to almost any length to avoid it. U.S. leaders must keep the concept of face in mind when conducting negotiations in the Middle East. Failure to do so could freeze or kill a negotiation.

Interpreters. U.S. forces don’t have enough Arabic-speaking linguists and contracted third-country interpreters, so they rely on locally hired interpreters. This can cause problems. With their disproportionate influence and their personal biases, interpreters can favor some groups at the expense of others. Animosity toward interpreters can also impair the U.S. mission. For example, U.S. forces that used Kuwaiti interpreters were received coldly by Iraqis because of the animosity between Iraqis and Kuwaitis. Similarly, an interpreter’s tribal and sectarian affiliations might interfere with U.S. objectives and operations. In short, the lesson is to be aware of one’s operating environment and the differences between the nationalities and ethnicities in the Middle East.13

The Bottom Line

Cultures differ in the amount and type of preparation they do for a negotiation, in the value they place on efficiency (time on task) versus interpersonal relationships, in their predilection for principles instead of specifics, and in the number of people they include who have a say in the negotiations. Although cultural stereotypes are simplistic, many contain elements of truth. For example, the United
States is likely to give one negotiator complete control, and Middle Eastern cultures will often pursue subtle, protracted negotiations.\textsuperscript{14}

There is no one right approach to negotiations, only effective and less effective approaches that vary according to contextual factors. As negotiators understand that their counterparts may see things very differently than they do, they will be less likely to make negative judgments and more likely to make progress.\textsuperscript{15}

\section*{Cultural Awareness: How Far to Adapt?}

This is a question I am often asked. The answer is, it depends. But military leaders who must negotiate with representatives of other cultures will not go wrong by adhering to two basic rules:  

\begin{itemize}
\item \textit{In order not to cause serious offense, it is appropriate to show some degree of cultural sensitivity.} This involves more than just knowing the “dos and don’ts” presented in typical cultural briefings; it requires the negotiator to preserve face and demonstrate respect for his or her counterpart. At best, cultural insensitivity can lead to an impasse; at worst, to increased hostility and competition. Negotiations can fail because the negotiator was unwilling to pay the respect considered appropriate by the other party. The ultimate result can be mission failure and the negation, for the foreseeable future, of any past gains.\textsuperscript{16}
\item \textit{Respect the culture of your counterparts, but be yourself.} It is neither necessary nor appropriate to be culturally subservient when conducting negotiations with members of a foreign culture. In fact, doing so might put you at a marked disadvantage. In other words, it may be appropriate to “do as the Romans do” when you are in Rome, but you should not try to become Roman.\textsuperscript{17}
\end{itemize}

Your counterpart wants to understand who you are and what type of person you are.

\section*{Last But Not Least}

I see problems today as the U.S. military attempts to deal with other cultures in the international arena. To be good negotiators, we must understand how our cultural traits, values, and assumptions differ from those of others. When conducting some sort of negotiation, formal or informal, with a person or persons from another country, we have to be sensitive to the cross-cultural dimensions of the operating environment. Traditionally, we have not understood these issues at all and so have largely ignored them. But to conduct successful negotiations—negotiations that could be critical to winning the peace—you must have or develop strong cross-cultural skills. \textit{MR}

\footnotesize
\textbf{NOTES}

1. Figure adapted from Frank L. Acuff, \textit{How to Negotiate with Anyone, Anywhere Around the World} (New York: AMACOM, 1997).
4. An excellent primer for conducting negotiations is Roger Fisher and William Ury, \textit{Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement without Giving In} (New York: Penguin Books, 1983). The authors' goal is to develop a method for reaching good agreements. They explain that a good agreement is one that is wise and efficient and that improves the parties' relationship. Wise agreements satisfy the parties' interests and are fair and lasting. Negotiations often take the form of positional bargaining, in which each party opens with its position on an issue and the parties then bargain from their separate opening positions to agree on one position. Haggling over a price is a typical example of positional bargaining. Fisher and Ury argue that positional bargaining does not tend to produce good agreements. It is inefficient; the agreements often do not satisfy the parties' interests, and it encourages stubbornness, which tends to harm the parties' relationship. Fisher and Ury claim that principled negotiation provides a better way of reaching good agreements. They develop four principles of negotiation: 1) separate the people from the problem; 2) focus on interests rather than positions; 3) generate a variety of options before settling on an agreement; and 4) insist that the agreement be based on objective criteria. Their process of principled negotiation can be used effectively in almost any type of dispute.
6. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
14. Mitrovica, 48-50. I wish to acknowledge that I derived much of the rest of the information in this section from Max Smith. See note 8.
15. LeBaron.
17. Ibid.
Since 11 September 2001, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has played an increasingly prominent role in the War on Terrorism. The agency’s humanitarian and development assistance programs, especially those directed toward at-risk populations and regions, have been recognized as critical components in the U.S. National Strategy for Combating Terrorism and its accompanying National Implementation Plan. These programs can play a crucial role in denying terrorists sanctuary and financing by diminishing the underlying conditions that cause local populations to become vulnerable to terrorist recruitment. Moreover, USAID programs directed at strengthening effective and legitimate governance are recognized as key tools with which to address counterinsurgency.

Historically, USAID supported national security objectives by providing humanitarian assistance and fostering long-term economic and political progress in the developing world. However, as a result of a changing international environment, USAID was increasingly tasked to respond not only to humanitarian crises such as floods and famines, but also to complex emergencies in places like Somalia, Rwanda, the former Yugoslavia, and, more recently, to crises in Sudan, Afghanistan, and Lebanon. Government-wide recognition of the importance of development in shoring up states prone to instability and vulnerable to terrorism has led to its designation as the third “D” in the 2002 U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS). This designation makes development—along with diplomacy and defense—one of the key pillars of national security. The National Security Strategy noted that “development reinforces diplomacy and defense, reducing long-term threats to our national security by helping to build stable, prosperous, and peaceful societies.”

Addressing Risk Factors

This change in doctrine led to internal and external changes at USAID. Internally, a white paper identified instability and conflict—present in many countries where USAID operates—as conditions terrorists seek to exploit. The paper noted the need for short-term, conflict-sensitive programming to stabilize these environments before USAID could implement its long-term, traditional development programs. In 2003, USAID established the Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM) to lead efforts to better identify the underlying causes of instability, conflict, and extremism and to design programs to ameliorate them.
The 2002 NSS also emphasized a “whole-of-government” approach to the War on Terrorism. Although various USAID offices, such as the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance and the Office of Transition Initiatives, have worked with the Department of Defense (DOD) and other federal agencies to conduct humanitarian assistance, stabilization, and reconstruction operations, the new strategy determined that a more holistic, integrated development-defense-diplomacy approach was required. Recognizing the need for a USAID specific entity to support this integrated interagency approach, USAID established the Office of Military Affairs (OMA) in 2005 to serve as the focal point for interactions between USAID and DOD, to improve USAID’s capacity to work with governmental agencies and other actors in synchronized national-security programming, and to help develop USAID positions on national security issues. The office is staffed by former military officers, Foreign Service officers, and subject-matter specialists.

These internal and external changes have already produced a number of interagency initiatives to thwart terrorism. Some examples include the Trans-Saharan Counter-Terrorism Initiative (TSCTI) and the newly planned joint counter-extremism projects in the Horn of Africa.5

Launched in 2004, TSCTI targets extremism, instability, and violence in the Sahel region of Africa. Supported by USAID’s West Africa Regional Mission and several country missions and embassies, the State Department, USAID, and DOD’s European Command (EUCOM) conducted joint assessments in several Sahelian countries to identify causes of extremism and terrorist recruitment. The assessments identified a number of factors, including remoteness, porous borders, proximity to known terrorist groups, large marginalized and/or disenfranchised populations, and exclusion from political processes, as key causes of instability in the region. Recommendations from the assessments led to targeted interventions in Mali, Niger, and Chad. Examples of such intervention include youth development, former combatant reintegration, education, rural radio and media programs, peace building/conflict management, and small-scale infrastructure projects such as drilling wells and constructing schools. USAID’s TSCTI advisor maintains regular contact with EUCOM regarding the implementation of these programs.

In the Horn of Africa, USAID, the State Department, and the Combined Joint Task Force for Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) are collaborating on a number of counter-extremism projects based on a USAID funded assessment that examined the causes of extremism and identified the most unstable areas in the region. To implement these initiatives, CJTF-HOA is building or rehabilitating essential infrastructure such as schools, clinics, and wells (hardware), while USAID is providing educational and medical training and resources, developing instructional materials, and building institutional capacity (software).

As an illustration, USAID’s East Africa Mission based in Nairobi teamed with CJTF-HOA to rehabilitate 10 clinics and hospitals in the urban and district capitals of Djibouti. CJTF-HOA carried out the physical rehabilitation, and USAID provided health care training to local health care providers. This integrated programming is facilitated by improved interagency communication. Examples of this integration include CJTF-HOA staff regularly participating in USAID project planning meetings and USAID representatives accompanying civil affairs teams in their planning and programming activities.

In addition, OMA and CMM, along with other USAID offices, are developing a Tactical Conflict Assessment Framework (TCAF) for the U.S. military to use in conflict zones. The TCAF, grown out of CMM’s conflict assessment framework methodology, is intended as a practical tool to identify the root causes of conflict in a particular area of responsibility and as a guide to determine what adjustments should be made in the program to resolve those causes. The TCAF will contain both the diagnostic questions that target the local populations’ potential incentives for violence and the detailed directions for military personnel on how to collect answers to these questions. It will also provide illustrative project examples and information on funding sources for possible follow-on interventions, as well as a cultural awareness guide.

The TCAF was initially field-tested in late June 2006 as part of a field training exercise at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. This was the first time USAID had trained with U.S. Army civil affairs personnel, and it provided a valuable opportunity to bring development-oriented, conflict-sensitive
approaches into an integrated interagency planning process. Representatives of all offices in USAID’s Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA) participated in the exercise. As a result of the exercise’s success, we anticipate that USAID and the State Department will participate in future exercises with the U.S. Army.

Fostering Communication and Understanding

On 29 June 2006, the deputy commander of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and the assistant administrator of DCHA signed a memorandum of understanding for the exchange of liaison officers between USAID and CENTCOM, the objective being to foster communication and understanding between the two organizations and to strengthen planning and operations through improved coordination. USAID liaison officers, called senior development advisors, will share what USAID has to offer in terms of resources and capabilities for stability operations, conflict/crisis situations, humanitarian assistance, and long-term programs for weak, fragile states. USAID senior development advisors are already in place at EUCOM and U.S. Southern Command. A senior development advisor has been selected and will soon be posted to U.S. Pacific Command.

Although this level of collaboration is relatively new, it is rapidly moving forward, and many joint interventions, tools, and strategies are being molded into shape. It will take time for joint collaboration to fully develop between the agencies, and surely the relationships will continue to evolve as time progresses and needs change. USAID welcomes these opportunities to partner with relevant government agencies and offices within agencies, such as the State Department’s Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization. Together, the agencies will be able to fulfill their mandate in the War on Terrorism and help link development, diplomacy, and defense to create a safer world for everyone. MR

This article is based on research conducted by James Derleth, Senior Strategic Planner and Conflict Specialist, USAID Office of Military Affairs; and Adam Reisman, Conflict Specialist, USAID Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation.

NOTES

1. USAID is similarly engaged with others in the interagency on the issue of counter-insurgency (COIN) and how development is part of the full-spectrum COIN response.
4. Ibid.
6. Field-based interagency discussions have concluded that extremism is a greater threat than terrorism in the Horn of Africa, where internal concerns and conditions are the primary targets of terrorism. Links to the War on Terrorism are tenuous, whereas extremism threatens regional stability.
A MODEL COUNTERINSURGENCY: 
Uribe’s Colombia (2002–2006) vs FARC

Thomas A. Marks, Ph.D.

Little is heard of U.S. involvement in counterinsurgency (COIN) in Colombia. That which does appear is often inaccurate and ideologically skewed. Yet progress in America’s “number three war” has been significant and appears all the more impressive given the increasing difficulties experienced in Iraq and Afghanistan.

What is noteworthy is that the approach being used is “classic counterinsurgency.” In this, there is considerable irony, because many of the significant aspects of the campaign were developed and implemented by American-educated leaders, assisted, both directly and indirectly, by Americans. That the Colombians have improved upon the original foundation makes examination of the case all the more compelling and urgent.

Background to Conflict

Upon taking office in August 2002, President Álvaro Uribe Vélez of Colombia was faced with a difficult strategic situation that required a fresh approach. This was forthcoming in a new document, the Democratic Security and Defense Policy, which radically reoriented the state’s posture from negotiating with to confronting its principal security challenge, an insurgency inextricably linked to the narcotics trade and other criminal activity.

Although multifaceted in its dimensions, the new policy effectively assigned the cutting-edge role to the Colombian armed forces, most prominently the dominant service, the army. It required the forces to pursue COIN aggressively against a well-funded, entrenched adversary within a complex international environment decidedly unsympathetic to internal war campaigns. Regardless, the armed forces performed in impressive fashion.

These same armed forces had already set the stage for the shift in policy by pursuing a reform movement that had enabled them to conduct more aggressive operations even as Uribe’s predecessor, President Andres Pastrana (1998–2002), had unsuccessfully sought a negotiated settlement with the main insurgent group, Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, or FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia), and to a lesser extent with the distant second group, Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional, or ELN (National Liberation Army). Continued combat was necessary because neither FARC nor ELN altered its military posture during negotiations. To the contrary, FARC used Bogota’s provision of what was supposed to be demilitarized space, the Zona de Despeje (or Area de Distension), to facilitate an intensification of the conflict via main force warfare while it continued to conduct terror and guerrilla actions.
Thus, Colombia’s COIN approach during the Pastrana years was not the result of deliberation and consultation within the government, but of an uneasy, unstated compromise, as Pastrana and his intimates negotiated with a duplicitous insurgent leadership on one hand, while on the other, they confronted the security force’s growing unwillingness to accept the administration’s increasingly discredited strategic calculus. When, in the face of all evidence to the contrary, Pastrana attempted to push through a second Zona, this one for the ELN, he faced a virtual popular revolt in the designated area. Cutting his losses prior to the first round of that year’s presidential elections, Pastrana ordered the military in February 2002 to reoccupy the original Zona.

Situation Prior to Uribe’s Election

Lack of government leadership during the Pastrana years had left security matters to the army (Ejército Nacional, or COLAR); navy, of which the marines were a part; and air force. The state, in other words, did not engage in counterinsurgency. This meant that although annual military plans included a basic civic action component, they were necessarily incomplete. That this did not prove disastrous stemmed from the nature of the major security threat, FARC (ELN was essentially a law and order concern).

Committed ideologically to Marxism-Leninism, FARC had increasingly drifted to a vaguely defined “Bolivarian” populism that had little appeal in Colombia. Polls consistently found the movement with minimal popular support or even sympathy. Its efforts at armed propaganda had fallen off to nothing after a mid-1980s high, and it was increasingly corrupted by reliance for funding upon criminal activity—drugs, kidnapping, and extortion (in that order, perhaps $250 million total). Consequently, its approach to insurgency, modeled after “people’s war” doctrine of the Vietnamese variant filtered through, in particular, the FMLN (Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front) of El Salvador, had become a perversion of the original and had more in common with the focismo of Che Guevara than Maoist armed political action built upon mass mobilization.

FARC’s reliance upon the normal apparatus necessary to support armed campaigning—base areas and mobility corridors—resulted in a dual center of gravity vulnerable to Colombian military attack: the insurgent units themselves and their sources of sustenance. Allowing for the low numbers organized in a nationwide support base (frequently inspired by terror), the armed units basically comprised the movement.

FARC’s vulnerabilities had been recognized by the new military leadership that emerged following Pastrana’s inauguration. They had crafted their
approach to neutralize FARC’s strategy even as they instituted a far-reaching and comprehensive military reform process that affected everything from recruiting (a largely draftee COLAR became one-third volunteer, with key units essentially 100 percent “professionals”), to military schooling, to assignment policies, to structure, to operational art. The result was a reclaiming of the strategic initiative by the time of Uribe’s advent.

Military reform was central to all that occurred during the Pastrana years. A combination of internal dislocation caused by the growing drug trade, U.S. efforts to “punish” Colombia during the Samper administration (1994-98) for inadequate “cooperation” in counter-narcotics (CN) efforts, and mediocre senior military leadership had all combined to cripple a sound military. Reform, primarily a COLAR project, touched upon virtually every aspect of the institution, but focused mainly on revitalizing the military education system, turning lessons learned into operational and organizational modifications, and developing sound NCO leadership to enhance small unit performance. Simultaneously, greater attention was paid to human rights instruction, information warfare, and joint and special operations.

The profound institutional and strategic shifts outlined above occurred as the United States, in the aftermath of 9-11, altered the approach of the Clinton years (1992-2000) and dropped the artificial barrier that had separated counter-narcotics (CN) from COIN. This was critical because, during the Clinton administrations, the war had been artificially divided in accordance with the demands of American domestic politics. Washington was compelled to focus upon CN to the virtual exclusion of COIN. Only where COIN objectives could be subsumed within CN action was U.S. aid allowed to assist in the security campaign.

Consequently, the U.S. contribution to Plan Colombia, a multifaceted effort to identify Colombia’s critical areas for action to facilitate national revitalization, was structured wholly to support CN (for projects and allocations, see Table 1). Its centerpiece was an American-funded, -equipped, and -trained CN brigade manned by COLAR personnel but dedicated entirely, for legal reasons contained in the implementing legislation, to support of eradication. The brigade was severely limited in its operational and geographic scope, even though it had several times the number of helicopters in the entire COLAR aviation inventory.

Of greater consequence than the lack of fully relevant support was the battlefield fragmentation and distortion—the disruption to unity of effort—that the U.S. strategy entailed. Committed to assistance in the only fashion politically viable, and in an America forced to focus upon the supply side of its own drug problem, U.S. officials, forces, and individuals tended to embrace the flawed logic that Colombia’s problem was narcotics, with the security battle merely a by-product. Insurgent reality was stood on its head.

American urgings that Colombian armed action focus upon a narcotics center of gravity were rejected by the military’s leaders (often in conflict with the Pastrana administration). As far as they were concerned, U.S. input during this period was appreciated, but tangential to the real issue, COIN. Committed to area domination by regular (largely draftee) brigades and divisions, with strike forces organic to each of these units, COLAR would deploy but limited additional forces to augment the CN brigade. The focus of the internal war, in its estimation, had to be the population, 95 to 96 percent of which lived outside the drug-producing zones of the llanos, or eastern savannah.

Ironically, even the eventual drop in the bar between CN and what came to be labeled CT (for counterterrorism) assistance, did not change this situation. Although U.S. funding was impressive in raw figures (see Table 2), it was still overwhelmingly committed to a CN campaign driven by its own internal measures (most prominently, hectares of narcotics fields eliminated). Controversial due to its reliance upon aerial spraying, the eradication effort

**Table 1. U.S. Allocations for Plan Colombia.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>U.S. Contribution $1,318.6 Billion</th>
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| Support for Efforts in Southern Colombia | $416.9 M  
| Support for Interdiction (includes FOLs*) | $378.1 M  
| Support for Colombia National Police | $115.6 M  
| Alternative/Economic Development | $106.0 M  
| Human Rights/Judicial Reform | $122.0 M  
| Regional Support | $180.0 M  

*FOL: Forward Operating Location
incorporated a variety of other components, from air and riverine interdiction to alternative development, but its actual impact upon insurgent operational capabilities proved difficult to measure.

Also clouding the picture were periodicals of record in the United States that tended to lump over-all U.S. aid figures into “support for the Colombian military,” thus reviving a Vietnam-era stereotype of a hapless ARVN (Army of the Republic of Vietnam) held together by American money and “advisors.” Nothing could have been further from reality in Colombia. The bulk of U.S. funding to date has gone mainly to the CN effort (e.g., 85 percent of the 2005 figure above), with only incidental impact (from this source) upon the Colombian forces. The funding that has gone directly to the Colombian military has been important, especially as dispersed through the actions and programs of the highly regarded military assistance mission, but during the Pastrana years, Colombia’s armed forces were quite on their own in both their operations and their reforms.

Colombia’s basic military framework for waging counterinsurgency was created by the geographical assignment of the 5 COLAR divisions (18 brigades) and a joint task force, with a division-strength national reaction force. Of its 145,000 troops, COLAR had some 20,000 in volunteer counterguerrilla units organic to its brigades and divisions. Altogether, the volunteer units amounted to 47 counterguerrilla battalions (batalones contraguerrillas, or BCG) and 3 mobile brigades (brigades moviles, or BRIM) each comprised of 4 BCG, for a total of approximately 59 BCG (each with approximately 40 percent of the manning of a line battalion, but with additional machine guns and mortars).

The regular formations that comprised the rest of COLAR were overwhelmingly draftee. Domination of local areas was the linchpin of the counterinsurgent effort, and a variety of imaginative solutions were tried to maintain state presence in affected areas. Essentially, the draftee regular units were used in area domination and local operations, the BCG and BRIM to strike at targets of opportunity. Specific missions that required specific skills, such as guarding critical infrastructure or operating in urban areas, were carried out by dedicated assets, as were special operations.

But in the absence of local forces, which had fallen afoul of constitutional court restrictions and thus were disbanded, it was difficult to consolidate gains. As areas were retaken, they could not be

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Table 2. U.S. Assistance, 1997–2005. (as briefed by the U.S. State Department)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1998</th>
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<td>225.8</td>
<td>492.6</td>
<td>827.2</td>
<td>686.8</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Legend: ATA, Anti-Terrorism Assistance; FMF, Foreign Military Financing; IMET, International Military Education and Training; INC/ACI, Int’l Narcotic Control/Andean Counterdrug Initiative (*funding for counter-drug arms transfers, training, services; †funding for counter-drug economic and social aid); 506, Emergency Drawdowns; 1004, CN from Defense Budget; 1003, Riverine CN from Defense Budget; Not included—ETA, Excess Defense Articles ($10.1 million total); ESF, Economic Support Funds ($7.0 million total). (figures in millions of dollars)
garrisoned with home guards. Instead, regular units rotated in and out in a perpetual shell game designed to keep FARC off balance (to a lesser extent ELN; only FARC operated with main forces).

Further complicating the situation, a legal framework that did not respond to the needs of internal war meant that all action was carried out under the provisions of peacetime civilian law. The Pastrana administration passed no emergency or anti/counter-terrorist legislation of any sort. This sometimes placed soldiers in absurd situations, particularly since the police were not available to accompany operations, being preoccupied with their own efforts to survive. Half a dozen times, for instance, towns and their police garrisons found themselves attacked by FARC forces using homemade but nonetheless potent armor.

Faced with such an array of challenges, it was a credit to the power of the military reform movement and the improvements made by its leadership that the strategic initiative had been regained by mid-2002. This occurred because the reform movement in the dominant service, COLAR, was driven by personalities who evinced an understanding of counterinsurgency and Colombia’s unique circumstances. Thus they were able, despite the state’s lack of strategic involvement, to arrest the negative trends that had emerged with growing force as early as the Samper administration.

Most importantly, the reform leadership defeated FARC’s attempt to transition to main-force warfare (i.e., mobile or maneuver warfare, stage two in the people’s war framework). Using the Zona as the staging ground for attacks by “strategic columns” comprised of multiple battalion-strength units, FARC found itself bested by the CG (Commanding General) IV Division, MG (Major General) Carlos Alberto Ospina Ovalle, who worked intimately with Tapia’s place (upon the latter’s retirement). Ospina, after serving as CG IV Division, became COLAR Director of Operations, under Mora; then IG (Inspector General) Joint Command, under Tapia, who used the IG principally as a combat inspectorate; and, finally, CG COLAR (with full general rank) when Mora moved up upon Uribe’s inauguration. When Mora himself retired in November 2003, Ospina became CG Joint Command.

What these officers shared was a correct understanding of Colombia’s war and a well-developed approach to institutional transformation and strategy realized in operational art. Mora and Ospina were noted for their close working relationship and the general esteem they were held in throughout the armed forces. Both had proven themselves tactically time and again as they advanced through the junior ranks, then operationally and strategically as more senior commanders.

Ospina was apparently the most combat-decorated officer in COLAR at the time he became its CG, in addition to being universally regarded as COLAR’s “brain trust” with a deep knowledge of insurgency and counterinsurgency. Working together under Tapia, Mora and Ospina fashioned highly effective COLAR annual campaign plans that forced FARC onto the defensive. Their correct appreciation of the situation, though, could not be translated into a true national counterinsurgency until Uribe’s election.

**Uribe’s Democratic Security and Defense Policy**

A third-party candidate who won an unprecedented first-round victory in May 2002, Uribe introduced a dynamic style to security affairs that prominently included producing, early in his
administration and with U.S. encouragement, the aforementioned Democratic Security and Defense Policy (officially released in June 2003). Unlike the Plan Colombia of the Pastrana-Clinton years (written with U.S. input), which had been a virtual catalog of national ills with proposed solutions beyond Bogota’s ability to operationalize or fund, the new policy was intended to be a course of action. As such, it was built upon a fairly basic syllogism:

A. Lack of personal security is at the root of Colombia’s social, economic, and political ills.

B. This lack of personal security stems from the state’s absence from large swaths of the national territory.

C. Therefore, all elements of national power need to be directed toward ending this lack of national integration.

Addressing this assessment was the policy itself, its thrust stated directly: “Security is not regarded primarily as the security of the State, nor as the security of the citizen without the assistance of the State. Rather, it is the protection of the citizen and democracy by the State with the solidarity and cooperation of the whole of society. . . . This is, in short, a policy for the protection of the population.”

According to the policy, citizens and the stability of the country were threatened by an explosive combination of “terrorism; the illegal drugs trade; illicit finance; traffic of arms, ammunition, and explosives; kidnapping and extortion; and homicide.” The hitherto intractable nature of Colombia’s security conundrum stemmed from the interlocking nature of these threats.

It was this dynamic at which Uribe’s plan was aimed. If one course of action stands out as central to the whole, it is “consolidating control of national territory,” the indispensable element of any counterinsurgency. The plan details a “cycle of recovery” that evokes images of the approach used in successful counterinsurgencies in Thailand, the Philippines, and Peru, and it outlines precisely the strategic approach to be used:

- “The Government will gradually restore state presence and the authority of state institutions, starting in strategically important areas.
- “Once the Armed Forces and the National Police have reestablished control over an area, units comprising professional soldiers, campesino soldiers [i.e., local forces] and National Police Carabineros [police field force] will maintain security and protect the civilian population. This will enable state organizations and criminal investigation authorities to work in the area.
- “Once a basic level of security has been established, the State will embark upon a policy of territorial consolidation, re-establishing the normal operation of the justice system, strengthening local democracy, meeting the most urgent needs of the population, broadening state services and initiating medium to long term projects aimed at creating sustainable development.”

Necessarily, since Colombia’s plan calls for nothing less than waging internal war against a hydra-headed threat, the security forces undertake the most prominent and difficult tasks. Although responsibilities are outlined for all state bodies, it is the security forces that are to provide the shield behind which restoration of legitimate government writ takes place.

Under the Ministry of Defense (Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, or MDN) the security forces prepared their own plans to implement the Democratic Security and Defense Policy. Both the military’s Joint Command and the national police (Policia Nacional, or CNP) were subordinate to MDN and used as their guide the strategic document drawn up by Defense Minister Marta Lucia Ramirez de Rincon and her staff after consideration of the Uribe policy. Their product was issued as a four-year vision applicable to the entire Uribe presidency. COLAR’s objectives were, for all practical purposes, those of the Joint Command.

The central elements remained “protection of the population” and “elimination of the illegal drugs trade in Colombia,” to be accomplished through the application of national will, resources, and power. As the premier element of national power in the internal war at hand, the military clarified its role further in a “general military strategy” issued by CG Joint Command, General Mora. This is still the key document regarding the application of military action to support the president’s “democratic security” counterinsurgency approach.

Implementing Uribe’s Plan

With the framework established, implementation followed. In this, the military was far ahead of other state elements, since it had already gone through dramatic change during the Pastrana years. So far-reaching were the military reforms that, in many
respects, the armed forces presented Uribe with a new tool upon his taking office. The key had been a continuity of exceptional leadership able to reorient, under difficult operational and material conditions, the military’s warfighting posture.

Central to this reorientation was the inculcation in the officer corps of greater professional knowledge concerning not only the operational and tactical mechanics of internal war, but the strategic knowledge of insurgent approaches and aims. It was here that Mora’s faith in Ospina’s understanding of counterinsurgency paid off.

Ospina was adamant that seeing the insurgents as merely narcotics traffickers or criminals or terrorists obscured the deadly symbiosis that drove the conflict. Whatever it engaged in tactically, whether terror or the drug trade, FARC was a revolutionary movement that sought to implement people’s war as its operational form, to include focusing upon the rural areas to surround the urban areas.

Hence, as concerned the security forces, the strategic and operational threat had remained relatively constant in nature, regardless of increasing insurgent (especially FARC) involvement in the drug trade and other criminal activity. The insurgents sought to dominate local areas, eliminating through terror those who persisted in their opposition. Guerrilla action targeted the police and smaller military units, with task-organized columns (columnas) appearing as main forces whenever a target invited. Other, nonviolent, elements of the FARC people’s war approach—mass line, united front, political warfare, and international action—remained anemic to the point of irrelevance, leaving the “violence” line of operation the only real issue.

As noted previously, when Uribe took office, the military had already spent nearly four years developing an effective COIN approach specifically applicable to Colombia. The strategy recognized the need to dominate local areas by providing a security umbrella under which the normal functions of the state could be exercised. The operational vehicle for carrying out the effort was to place a “grid” over the target area, with specific forces carrying out specific missions, all coordinated in such manner as to stifle insurgent activity. The immediate problem was that there had not been enough units or enough funding.

Counterinsurgency is manpower and resource intensive. Uribe sought to provide both assets to a military leadership that was already out of the starting gate. Not only did he raise the military’s general funding level, but, in a dramatic gesture of commitment, he also asked Congress to levy a one-time war tax for a substantial expansion of actual forces, primarily COLAR (which in mid-2004 reached a strength of some 202,000). The tax brought in approximately $670 million, which was allocated to Plan de Choque 2002-2006 (Plan Shock), a phased scheme to substantially increase the specialized COLAR forces needed to make the grid viable.

Units of all types were integrated into the force structure according to plans predating Uribe, but hitherto unfunded: new BCG and BRIM were added, with every division getting its own organic BRIM (IV Division received two; COLAR-wide, there are now at least 17 BRIM, up from the previous three) and others going to the general reserve (if all formations are considered, there are now roughly 100 BCG, up from the Pastrana total of 59); urban special forces (joining “rural” special forces, the traditional mode of operation); special transportation network protection units (Plan Meteoro, or Plan Meteor); high-mountain battalions specifically situated and equipped to block insurgent mobility corridors through hitherto inaccessible heights; strengthened infrastructure protection units (PEEV, from Plan Energético y Vial, or Energy and Road Plan); and local forces (Soldados de mi Pueblo, “Home Guards”) to provide security, particularly for rural urban centers.
At the same time and from the same funding source, individual soldier effectiveness was to be improved by converting draftee slots to volunteers at the rate of 10,000 per year—an expensive undertaking, since it costs approximately ten times more to field a volunteer.

All components were related to each other. The standing up of local-forces platoons, for instance, although initially intended to enhance the population’s security, was soon found to produce a much greater information flow to the forces, which enabled more accurate and intense employment of regular and strike units. Greater activity in an area forced the insurgents to move, especially the leaders, presenting targets for the upgraded special operations capability. Loss of leaders meant greater freedom of movement, and special units secured the transportation arteries, just as they did the critical infrastructure. Business picked up; the economy improved; kidnappings and murders dropped substantially.

If there was one element in the grid that provided the missing link, it was the deployment of local forces. These were indispensable to establishing state presence in affected areas and neatly sidestepped legal objections (and fierce opposition from international human rights organizations) by utilizing a forgotten law, discovered still on the books, that allowed a portion of the national draft levy to opt for service in hometown defense units. These 40-man units were constituted as regular platoons assigned to complement regular battalions stationed nearby. They were trained, armed, and equipped as regular soldiers; officered by regulars; and fielded systematically according to Plan de Choque funding. Soon, they were present in more than 600 locations selected according to the Joint Command campaign plan. Most were COLAR assets, although a number were run by the marines, mainly in a special “mini-divisional zone” assigned to the marines, south of navy headquarters in Cartagena on the Caribbean coast.

Local forces had all the more impact because the police, responding to the same need for government presence if security was to be guaranteed, systematically established a presence in every municipio (county) in the country. Those areas from which they had been driven, or that historically had been considered too dangerous for police presence, were manned by police field forces, the Carabineros, under regular CNP jurisdiction. The Carabineros functioned in units of the same size and type as the COLAR local forces, but they were more mobile and often better armed. Where necessary, they constructed fort-like police stations to project state presence. Backing them up was a highly trained reaction force.

Incorporation of police involvement into the grid highlighted a further development: the increasingly joint and interagency nature of Colombian operations. Although the military services had always answered to CG Joint Command, they had previously functioned together more as a matter of courtesy than command. This had not posed any insuperable problems, particularly given COLAR’s dominance, but it was not the ideal way to conduct counterinsurgency, where unity of command is crucial. It was especially the case that the CNP, under Pastrana, was not integrated at the national level in any of the counterinsurgency planning. This ended under Uribe.

Within the military itself, a clear trend toward greater “jointness”—which had emerged under Tapias as CG Joint Command and matured under Mora (and Uribe)—blossomed under Ospina. Plans to implement “joint operational commands” in place of the exclusively COLAR divisional areas met with fierce resistance in parochial circles, but were being pushed through by late 2004.

This transformation alone would be enough to produce a measure of turmoil within the military. Even the existence of the integrated Fuerza de Tarea Conjunta (Joint Task Force), controlled by CG Joint Command and operating in FARC’s traditional base complexes in the east, generated disquiet in some circles—particularly as it became clear that it was a model of what is to come. If present plans are pushed through, the individual services will become more like “service providers” in the U.S. sense, while CG Joint Command will exercise operational control of joint forces that resemble U.S. combatant commands (e.g., Southern Command, which supports Colombia’s effort). Such a development will be entirely logical for waging counterinsurgency, but will represent a sea-change in the way Colombian services have historically functioned.
Integration extended beyond the military. Other government agencies were directed to participate. The state’s involvement brought a new closeness to integrated efforts that hitherto had normally depended upon interpersonal relations in areas of operation. In particular, law enforcement and judicial authorities became an important part of operations. This provided government forces with enhanced flexibility, because the police and officials could engage in actions not legally devolved to the armed forces (e.g., the right to search).

Operationally, the guiding document was the Joint Command’s multi-year Plan Patriota (Plan Patriot), which prioritized areas of insurgent activity according to FARC’s dispositions and activities—and outlined sub-plans for the group’s neutralization. FARC’s demise was to be achieved via the tested technique of “holding” in “strategic maintenance areas,” where the situation was already considered in hand, while concentrating forces in “strategic operational areas” where insurgents still operated freely. The first such operational area was Cundinamarca, the state surrounding Bogota, which throughout 2003 was systematically cleared of major insurgent presence. So complete was the effort that FARC assessments outlined a disaster of the first magnitude, even as the security forces “moved on” to the insurgent base complexes in the east, especially in the area of the former Zona.

“Moved on,” of course, has meant only a concentration of forces for the purpose of conducting the continuous operations, unlimited in time but directed at a particular space, that the Joint Command has termed masa dispersa (dispersed mass). These are conducted under tight operational security. Once Cundinamarca was cleared, Fuerza de Tarea Conjunta assumed priority of effort and systematically combed the “strategic rearguard,” as FARC termed its decades-old base complexes, restoring government presence and popular freedom of movement and livelihood. A particular chore was to deal with the numerous and widespread unmarked minefields FARC had emplaced.

Challenge of Assessing COIN Progress

Uribe was able to deliver the state commitment, strategic framework, and enhanced resources that propelled take-off. While he provided the dynamic leadership, the Defense Ministry’s job was to offer further guidance but, in particular, to engage in matters of policy that allowed the military forces to exist and operate. A confusion of roles—a desire to lead the military rather than manage it—led to the replacement of Defense Minister Ramirez in November 2003. Ramirez had clashed repeatedly with the military leadership. CG Joint Command Jorge Mora also stepped down.

The Minister and CG were replaced, respectively, by Jorge Alberto Uribe Echaurria and Carlos Ospina. Moving into the CG COLAR position was the COLAR Director of Operations, MG Martin Orlando Carreño Sandoval. Mora had planned to step down in December, in any case, so the transition was smooth. Minister Uribe adopted a more careful style than his predecessor, and there were no significant changes in the 2004 planning and policy guidance: the military was left to lead the implementation of the counterinsurgency. In this, however, Carreño did not inspire the support necessary to keep his position more than a year. He was replaced in November 2004 by the Fuerza de Tarea Conjunta commander, MG Reinaldo Castellanos Trujillo. Subsequently, Minister Uribe himself, weary of criticism in congress, stepped down and was replaced by Camilo Ospina Bernal. Castellanos, however, was himself replaced only a year later by MG Mario Montoya. Ultimately, in the second Uribe administration, both Carlos Ospina and Minister Ospina stepped down, and Ospina’s deputy, LTG Freddy Padilla, became CG
Joint Forces. Juan Manuel Santos became Minister of Defense. 

Such personnel upheaval notwithstanding, military support for the Democratic Security and Defense Policy proceeded in near textbook fashion. Politically, the danger was that Colombia would become distracted, as it was by the debate that surfaced about Uribe’s then still low-key effort to be allowed to run for a second term, which required constitutional amendment. To oppose a second term for Uribe all but demanded that his first-term record be attacked. The attacks, however, did not involve direct assault on the security forces; rather, they argued that too much effort was being placed upon security, that “social matters” were just as important. The precise point of Uribe’s approach, however, was that the second was not possible without the first.

Nevertheless, what emerged was a FARC response that sought to strike at the counterinsurgents’ will to persevere. If Colombia’s operational implementation of its plan had been successful just where the United States had stumbled in Iraq and Afghanistan—the Colombians successively dominating areas and restoring government writ—this did not prevent critics at home and abroad from attacking Bogota’s approach. Their criticism allowed FARC to appear much stronger than it was. Insurgent tactical assaults were given strategic consequence with spin. This spin came not from FARC, but from the president’s political enemies and from the media’s often dubious reporting. The result was that FARC’s minor tactics, inconsequential in and of themselves, stood a chance of generating strategic reversal for the state.

It could be argued that this is the very stuff of insurgency, where every action is intended to have a political consequence. True as far as it goes, the observation misses the point that, in today’s international environment, what insurgents and terrorists do is in one sense irrelevant: few citizens accept their proffered agendas. But their actions provide ammunition for political attacks occasioned by the normal infighting inherent to democratic politics. Rather than targeting their intended mass base, the insurgents try to cut corners by attacking the will of their enemies. This is what happened in Colombia.

As it was, Uribe was able to adroitly fend off the attacks even while successfully overseeing and completing an arduous process of constitutional amendment and reelection that culminated in an unprecedented second term in office (beginning August 2006) after another first-round victory in the presidential vote. Uribe’s win ensured that operational implementation of his strategic framework would continue. This was significant because the approach, as discussed above, was both correct and sustainable, thereby satisfying two of the three requirements of successful counterinsurgency.

What the political controversy highlighted was a little understood element in successful counterinsurgency. With a correct and sustainable approach in place, the counterinsurgent “plays for the breaks,” those shifts in the internal or external situation that work against the insurgent and favor the state. Such play normally requires an extended period of time and leads to a “protracted war.” This long time-frame makes it difficult for democracies to sustain counterinsurgency campaigns, particularly in the present world environment where there is little agreement upon strategic ends and means, much less operational and tactical concerns. Yet it does not in any way obviate the reality that there is no other option.

How then was the state to think about the tremendous progress it had made in Uribe’s first term? What future steps would allow Colombia not only to assess sustainability but to continue its success? What drives any assessment is the nature of the situation on the ground as it can be measured. Efforts to judge COIN progress in Colombia have produced a variety of statistics. These have been used to support both proponents of Democratic Security’s efficacy and opponents who question, if not the approach as a whole, certain of its emphases and components.

Statistics, in other words, are a double-edged sword:

- First, there is the political reality: efforts to arrive at metrics for assessing the progress of an approach, although absolutely necessary, take on meaning only as they are interpreted by an audience. All parties to the present Colombian political debate, for example, agree that by any metric utilized (e.g., a decline in kidnapping and murder), there has been demonstrable (even stunning) progress towards normalcy. Yet there is little agreement as to what normalcy, as an end-state, should actually look like.
Second, there is the empirical reality that the causes behind insurgency cannot be statistically explained. Hence, to measure COIN progress by gauging how much the country has moved toward a notional state of normalcy is like looking at annual percentage increases in the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) without actually being able to measure the GDP itself. “Progress,” then, ends up being a state of popular mind, a belief by the populace (and its leaders) that the situation is improving.

In the matter of statistics, a combination of quantitative and qualitative indicators has given rise in Colombia to the judgment that progress is being made. This does not mean, however, that merely advocating “more of the same” is the prescription for further action so much as “staying the course.”

Democratic Security has been built upon acceptance by the political authorities of the Uribe administration position that the Gordian knot in Colombia’s security impasse is FARC. Only FARC continues to seek state power while simultaneously demonstrating the capacity to negate state armed capacity. ELN, the “other” insurgent group, is a nuisance, while the vigilante AUC (Autodefensas Unida Colombia, or United Self-Defense Groups of Colombia), the so-called paramilitaries, have historically been a consequence of lack of state presence. As the state has expanded its control, the AUC has been willing to strike demobilization deals. ELN has likewise indicated a desire to open a peace process. In contrast, negotiations with FARC have not proved successful, so only armed action by the state remains. The desired goal is reincorporation of FARC into the political process, but it is recognized that incentive must be created by armed action.

Compelling FARC to undertake a course of action necessarily involves neutralizing its ability to remain viable. Thus, the intent of the government’s counter-insurgency grid is to attack FARC’s ability to recruit, sustain itself, move, and initiate actions. Domination of populated areas such as Cundinamarca prepared the way for the present operations against FARC’s “strategic rearguard” in the former Zona and other southern areas. These operations continue to this day due to the sheer size of the counter-state FARC constructed over four decades. The forces committed to these and other priority efforts have not been robbed from established counterinsurgency areas (effectively, the army’s divisional zones), but deployed from new assets. Their actions are sustainable virtually indefinitely.

That the government’s operations have made life more difficult for FARC is unquestionable. But just how difficult is the query that cannot be answered definitively. The least reliable way to judge results is to match FARC casualties with the organization’s order of battle. The top figure of some 17,000 combatants (reached during the Pastrana administration) is now put at below 13,000, with most counts claiming that AUC combatants at the time of their demobilization actually outnumbered their FARC rivals (ELN was perhaps a fifth the size of FARC). It is not that these numbers are necessarily wrong; rather, it is unlikely that they mean much given the realities of an insurgent movement operating with a minimal but adequate support base and funding generated outside any popular base.

During the Mora and Ospina tenures, the need to count insurgent casualties was not driven by the Colombian military, which made a concerted effort to stay away from the “Vietnam body-count trap.” Instead, the political authorities (many of whom have business backgrounds) and the press felt it necessary to give the public the numerical equivalent of sound bites that elevated quantitative measures to heights the military itself did not.

Greatly debilitated, FARC (and ELN) now rely on terror. Soldiers guard the site of a bombing in La Union, Antioquia Department. Insurgents had bombed the houses of 11 families who had rallied against them.
subscribe to. The military’s approach was clear if one inspected its internal documents. These gave pride of place not to body count, but to measures of FARC’s initiative and armed capacity (such as the ability to initiate major attacks).

Not only do the military’s metrics contrast sharply with the indicators favored by the political authorities and the press, but they also serve to highlight the abuse of statistics that became a routine part of the present political debate surrounding President Uribe’s desire to earn a second term. Critics of Uribe and the Democratic Security approach regularly claimed to possess data showing an explosion of FARC incidents and initiative, but their position was not backed by realities on the ground. What must ultimately drive any assessment is the nature of the incidents being counted. The military knows this and has incorporated such an approach into its own analysis. Nature can involve anything from size to context.

An insurgent group such as FARC, forced from mobile warfare back to guerrilla and terror actions, of necessity needs to up the ante. This FARC attempted to do by cultivating an association with the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), which sent some two dozen training teams into FARC areas before the pipeline was effectively shut down in 2001. FARC efforts to utilize a variety of PIRA terror techniques rarely or never seen in Colombia, ranging from the precise placement of bombs to inflict maximum structural damage, to the use of secondary explosions to wreak havoc upon crews responding to incidents, were all designed to inflict maximum casualties—and generate maximum terror. That they failed to do so left FARC with the one option it has now pursued: pinprick attacks that can produce tactical heat but lack strategic fire.

In only one way can FARC’s tactical actions have strategic or even operational significance: if they can be parlayed into political consequence. Strategic, operational, and even tactical techniques for using violent action to effect political gain are a central element of the people’s war approach used by FARC. They are recognized as such in FARC doctrine, and they were critical to the FMLN effort in El Salvador that was so important to FARC’s doctrinal evolution. A key issue is whether FARC is attempting to use its tactical efforts to exploit rifts in the Colombian political spectrum. Captured documents and information gleaned from prisoner interrogations demonstrate that FARC is well aware that by inflicting casualties and appearing to be “alive” despite all that the security forces have done, it can provoke political problems of sufficient magnitude to damage or even end Democratic Security.

It is ironic that the strategic progress of Democratic Security is unlikely to negate completely FARC’s tactical ability to initiate guerrilla and terror actions. But the group’s “successes” in these low-level actions really count for little. For instance, there have been many mine casualties among the security forces, but that has little to do with anything save FARC’s extensive use of the internationally banned weapons. Mines do not hold towns and villages, and they do not create sympathy for the insurgents; they are indiscriminate defensive weapons. Most COLAR casualties from mines, in fact, have been suffered as the army pushes ever deeper into insurgent base areas and dismantles the FARC counter-state.

Eliminating the “strategic rear guard” is crucial. There is a common misconception that “guerrillas” are self-sustaining, obtaining all they need either by

Democratic Security covers all bases: comic books, cartoon shows, a website, school appearances, and other psyop products have been deployed to win over Colombia’s newest generation.
generating it or capturing it from the government. In reality, insurgents can rarely if ever obtain crucial components of their war effort, notably arms and ammunition, from within the battlespace and thus must pursue outside acquisition. FARC indeed gets most of its weapons and ammunition from abroad. Even food, as demonstrated by massive caches uncovered in the strategic rearguard throughout 2004 and 2005, is stockpiled and pushed forward to combatants. Eliminating the base areas and their stockpiles therefore eliminates FARC’s ability to mass and forces it to engage in terror and guerrilla warfare, which can be much more easily managed by the enhanced capabilities and presence of the state.

Faced with this profound threat to its viability as an insurgent movement, FARC must respond. As a consequence, there should be no doubt that “violence” in Colombia will continue indefinitely. Yet the state should continue to do precisely what it is already doing: meeting the insurgency in a “correct” and “sustainable” manner. The Uribe approach is certainly correct in the way it conceptualizes the problem and seeks to respond to it. The approach is also sustainable, in its present form, because it demands no unacceptable investments of human or material resources—or of will. It will face adjustments if the U.S. contribution ends, but it is unlikely this will happen for some time.

What has not registered fully on the Colombian political class is that a correct and sustainable approach is always put in place in order to play for the breaks. There is no formula for how long the process will take. In the Philippines, OPLAN Lambat Betag (Net Trap) took approximately six years to produce dramatic results; in Thailand, Prime Minister (PM) Order No. 66/23, “The Policy for the Fight to Defeat the Communists,” required roughly half that after its implementation. Still, if the spectacularly successful Peruvian approach against Sendero Luminoso took just somewhere in between the length of these two campaigns, normalcy in Ulster was achieved only through a grueling 25-year effort. And Ulster was but the size of the small American state of Connecticut, with just half its population. Colombia is the size of California, Nevada, Utah, and Idaho, with a population of 42 million. Hence, patience must be as much a part of the equation as a desire to create precisely the correct mix of techniques that will produce demonstrable results.

Lessons Learned

Formal announcements in the first quarter of the new Uribe administration seemed to portend a necessary shift in emphasis in Democratic Security implementation, from strike to consolidation. Yet the announcements occurred even as a string of distressing events shook public confidence in the administration. Particularly disturbing were several highly publicized episodes of institutional corruption apparently driven by the need to produce quantifiable results in response to political demands, as well as evidence of political links between prominent backers of Uribe and the outlawed AUC. Nevertheless, the unease and its attendant debate served the useful purpose of highlighting two issues that emerge time and again in the assessment of any counterinsurgency:

- Leadership matters. Uribe has proven to be the right man at the right time, as have figures in other places and times—one thinks of Magsaysay in the Philippines or Templer in Malaya. Four and a half years, which is all that Uribe has had so far, is not enough time to see through a counterinsurgency. Uribe is keenly aware that his success in winning a second term has brought with it the responsibility not merely to do more of the same, but to recalibrate success in such manner as to deliver “victory.” Defining victory in a counterinsurgency, as indicated above, is tricky, but clearly the metrics any political actor uses to measure his standing will be the benchmarks. Overall, Uribe has offered a model of skillful, dynamic leadership.

It is the armed forces that have been the key element, because they provide the security upon which all else that has happened depends. Can they continue to function in the manner of the past eight years? Have the myriad reforms been institutionalized? The answer would seem to be affirmative on both counts. It might especially be noted that institutionalization is as much a function of individuals as structure and procedures. Colombia’s military reformers have been followed by others who, in their career particulars, look much like Mora and Ospina.

Despite the optimistic assessment above, we should not underestimate the extent of the challenge facing the military, mainly COLAR, as a result of its expansion and increased operational tempo. COLAR was previously a draftee force of “in and out” enlisted ranks led by a professional
officer corps. It now is one-third volunteer. These individuals expect to make the military a career. A host of issues, from family welfare to promotion requirements to NCO rank, must be codified and then allowed to mature.

Adding to the challenge is the continuous nature of the small-unit operations conducted to keep FARC on the run. Everything from block-leave procedures to family counseling (e.g., to cope with a rising level of turmoil within families in a force that historically has had relatively few disciplinary problems) has had to be instituted. Topping all this is the ever-present threat of corruption in an environment saturated with the easy money of the narcotics trade.

In the field, the strategic initiative has seen some tactical setbacks. This was predictable. The insurgents, after all, also have a learning curve. As FARC has been forced to break up into small units, the security forces have done likewise. This has created opportunities for FARC to surprise isolated or tactically sloppy government units with rapid, medium-sized concentrations that then disperse. The technique is not new, but recent actions have seen FARC grappling for a middle ground between “large” and “small” concentrations, so that it can attack platoon- or squad-size positions without exposing itself too much. Such measures, though seeking tactical initiative, are strategically and operationally defensive—and an indication of just how successful the government has been. Before the military reforms kicked in, in the Samper/early Pastrana years, FARC fielded large columns that would attack even reinforced companies.

Beginning in February 2005, FARC units, responding to instructions from the organization’s secretariat, began an effort to inflict maximum casualties. Their intent, obviously, was to exploit the pressure for “no bad news” placed upon the military by the political structure. They sought to spook at least a proportion of the Colombian “chattering classes” into viewing the normal give-and-take of tactical action as a sign of larger strategic defect. Although they could have a strategic impact by manipulating perception and spurring on the debate about “sustainability,” in reality, FARC’s small, hard-to-prevent tactical successes have meant nothing to the strategic situation.

The current favorable strategic situation, some have argued, could be undone in a flash by follow-on personalities. Is this likely? No, for all of the reasons discussed above. In particular, both the reforms and the demands of internal war have accelerated change in military (particularly COLAR) leadership. Warfighters who would be as comfortable in the U.S. system as their own have begun to dominate promotion boards, with “service in the field” as the salient factor in selection. This is a critical element, since the military is the shield for all else that occurs in the counterinsurgency.

As combat-tested officers have begun to dominate the services, the question emerges as to what sort of men they are (there are no female general officers in Colombia). In terms of the institution they have made, the results disprove the constant drumbeat about lax standards and abuses that outsiders, especially international human rights organizations, often make. To the contrary, the military, under its reform-minded leadership, has consistently emerged in Colombian polls as one of the most respected institutions in the country, with favorable numbers reaching near the 80th percentile.

In sum, the reforms have endeavored to demand more from officers professionally, particularly as regards the mechanics and theory of warfighting. This has resulted in greater knowledge at the strategic and operational levels of war as well as increased tactical expertise.

Put together, military popularity and effectiveness have undoubtedly contributed to President Uribe’s own consistently high rating with the public. It remains to be seen how recent scandals will affect his position, but the damage is unlikely to be long-lived or deep.

For his part, Uribe has dealt with the military in an increasingly sophisticated and collegial manner. He especially grew to respect the professional judgment of Carlos Ospina, when Ospina was CG Joint Command. This allowed Ospina to exercise a degree of influence and to be heeded when he counseled caution at appropriate times. It remains to be seen, in the post-Ospina command environment, if Uribe will be so dominant as to upset the civil-military balance necessary for the armed political campaign that is counterinsurgency.

● The strategic approach is critical. The strategic approach, with its operational (lines of action and campaigns) implementation, must be the foremost concern of leadership in a counterinsurgency.
this end, Uribe was fortunate to have officers of the caliber of Mora and Ospina. If Mora saw COLAR through its early transformation, Ospina not only finished the job, but implemented the central operations of Plan Patriota. He had to do this even as resources remained constrained and demands rose for greater emphasis upon other national priorities.

It is not enough, say critics, to regain control of the population; areas seized and held must be consolidated. The military is keenly aware of the point at issue—and has U.S.-supported programs designed to address this dimension of the conflict. The real questions revolve around resource allocation and timing. Here, Uribe has stood his ground, remaining true to the spirit of his strategy: security is the necessary basis for all that follows. Now, in his second term, he has indicated that he intends to exploit counterinsurgency gains and put additional emphasis upon consolidation.

It is precisely the substantial progress made in restoring a semblance of “normal life” that has allowed internal debate over other issues to surface, to include discussion of trends in civil-military relations. The latter is often overlooked in judging the effectiveness of military leaders, but here, too, Colombia has been well served. Ospina, in particular, sought to implement a very “American” vision of the military’s subordinate relationship to civil authority.

However, as with the emphasis upon combat as the key determinant for promotion, so the reinforcement of civilian authority as the final word in matters of moment has not sat well with some military elements. It is President Uribe’s understanding that healthy civil-military relations depend upon an invisible line not being crossed—by either side—that has tempered any military discontent and made operations function as smoothly as they have under various defense ministers. The military has maintained firmly its right to determine operational and tactical particulars, and President Uribe seems to have acquiesced.

That COLAR continues to transition from its “German” heritage (transmitted historically through Chilean vectors) to an “American” model has been stated directly in command briefings to officers. (The air force has long looked to America for inspiration, the navy to the British.) Yet this has not led to an uncritical adoption of either U.S. forms or procedures. American difficulties in Iraq, stemming at least in part from the intervention of civilian leadership in military operational efforts, have been a poignant reminder that a balance must be struck between obedience to civilian authority and institutional independence. In Colombia, what this balance should be has been left deliberately indeterminate.

**Challenges to Come**

In the larger sense, Uribe’s national policy has always stood upon three legs, not merely security but also fiscal health and social development. Fiscal health is necessary for all else to proceed and has given no grounds for complaint. Social development remains at the heart of all illegal actors’ ability to recruit manpower. It, too, has been addressed by progress in the other two sides of the triangle. That one would wish for greater emphasis or speed is a judgment call that imprudently ignores demonstrable progress.

Although the Democratic Security approach might not require major adjustments, there are strategic areas that bear close monitoring, especially by Washington in this, a critical theater of the battle against global insurgency:

- **The battle is not over.** U.S. support, both materiel and personnel, will play an important role for the foreseeable future. It must be maintained. Unfortunately, a tendency has emerged in U.S. circles that seeks to interpret realities on the ground
in terms that speak to the artificial deadlines created by funding legislation. This is extraordinarily dangerous, particularly the notion that the war is won and it is time to talk of winding down U.S. aid and converting Colombian forces to other uses (such as United Nations peacekeeping).

- The U.S. Government needs to grasp the true nature of Colombia’s struggle. In some U.S. political and media circles, the conflict is still labeled counter-narcotics, or counter-terrorism, or counterinsurgency, or something else. It is all of these things and must be approached in a unified manner. This is precisely what the Colombians have been fighting to achieve, and they have made dramatic strides, although these have come at considerable political and personal cost for key players such as President Uribe, former Minister Uribe, and former CG Joint Command Ospina.

- The drive toward unity of effort must extend to the U.S. side. Greater effort is necessary to raise the level of awareness in Washington that what happens in Colombia underpins our Latin American position. This is not a new domino theory so much as a recognition that, in the present strategic environment, Latin America is the forgotten theater, Southern Command the forgotten command, and Colombia our forgotten but closest, most reliable ally. At a time when the forces of the radical left are again on the march throughout the hemisphere, to include advocating a severely restricted fight against drugs, Colombia’s interests coincide with those of the United States. More than that, Colombia remains a stable democratic state committed to reform and the market economy. Its contrast with an increasingly unstable and strategically dangerous Venezuela could not be greater.

- Operationally, recognition of the points above should lead to an enhanced relationship between U.S. and Colombian forces and the two countries’ strategic cultures. Military cooperation could be enhanced in myriad ways, in particular by augmenting training programs so that they more accurately reflect the close relations between Washington and Bogota. Simultaneously, both governments should encourage closer relations between U.S. and Colombian centers of strategic thought, risk assessment, and regional analysis. Colombia has a level of expertise and analytical capability surpassing any in Latin America, but its talents have been underutilized. They could make a greater contribution to Democratic Security, as well as the larger war against terrorism.

There are other areas one could highlight, such as the desire for even greater force strengths and mobility assets. Yet these must be carefully balanced against available resources and the system’s ability to absorb any more inputs. Burnishing what the Uribe administration has already done should pay greater gains than seeking to load any more requirements onto the system.

What bears repeating is the point to which this analysis has returned often: the present effort is both correct and sustainable; it is the right strategic posture required for progress and popular security. Hence, continued care must be exercised to ensure that Democratic Security remains a multifaceted approach—a strengthening of the state’s governance, finances, and democratic capacity enabled by the ever more powerful and capable shield provided by the security forces. By themselves, these facets are not the solution—that lies in the use of legitimacy to mobilize response against those using political violence for illegitimate ends—but they will certainly enable it. MR

NOTES

1. At one point Colombia was third in U.S. foreign aid, behind only Israel and Egypt.
2. A sixth division was organized during the Uribe administration from what previously had been the Joint Task Force (which had been positioned in the extreme south). The COLAR order of battle thus became 1 Division (2, 4, 11, 17 Brigades); II Div (5, 14, 16, 18 Brigades); III Division (3, 8 Brigades); IV Division (7, 9 Brigades); V Division (1, 6, 13 Brigades); and VI Division (12, 26, 27 Brigades). Later, in July 2005, a seventh division was created when the very large I Division area was split. The new VII Division (based in Medellin) had assigned to it 17, 11 (both from I Div) and 14 Brigade (from II Div). The former Caribbean-bounded I Div heartland became a joint command. Additionally, the national reaction force, or FUDRA (Fuerza de Despliegue Rápido), which matured during the Pastrana administration, is a light division equivalent, with 3 mobile brigades and 1 Special Forces brigade (of 4 SF battalions). An independent task force (Omega) of virtual division strength operates in the south.
3. Literally, “Commanding General of the Military Forces,” which accurately defines the authority and responsibility inherent to the position. I have rendered it as “CG Joint Command” to facilitate my analysis.
5. Ibid, 42.
6. Recent official documents have dropped “nacional” from their translations of Ministerio de Defensa Nacional.
7. Initially, the local-forces were called Soldados Campesinos (Peasant Soldiers); a name the troops themselves disliked—Colombia, despite its substantial agricultural sector, is classified as approximately three-quarters urban, and the units were universally located in rural towns. Hence, Soldados de mi Pueblo (“Home Guards” would be the most useful rendering) came to be used simultaneously.
8. Masa dispersa, or “dispersed mass,” is a slang rendering of the technique. It is not a formal term.
9. MG Mario Montoya was promoted to lieutenant general (the highest rank in the Colombian military system) in early December 2006.
Reflections from a RED TEAM LEADER

Susan Craig

RED TEAMS HAVE BEEN recommended and legislated as a way to prevent the kinds of failures of imagination and critical thinking that were apparent in the wake of 9/11 and the invasion of Iraq. But how, when, and where exactly should red teams be employed? While the Army and the intelligence community continue to grapple with this, those of us who attended the first University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies’ Red Team Leader Training course at Fort Leavenworth in 2006 were challenged to get outside of our traditional ways of thinking and to become more culturally aware (of both our own culture and others), more effective in communicating and negotiating, and more critical and creative. We had to examine our most closely held beliefs and assumptions and fundamentally transform the way we think. Regardless how our red team skills are deployed, our new perspective and approach will undoubtedly serve our respective organizations and our Nation well. I share the following observations and reflections so that you may better understand what a red team is and, further, because it seems that, in our increasingly complex and demanding operational environment, these lessons are relevant to everyone.

Critical and Creative Thinking

● Being a good red teamer is about asking good questions. Questions should stimulate thought, not cause alienation; they should be more helpful than critical; and they should point out assumptions or factors that are not being addressed. Most importantly, you can’t ask a blue question of a red system and expect a blue answer—it is imperative to think within the construct of the culture you are examining. For example, the extensive interviews conducted by U.S. Joint Forces Command published in the Iraqi Perspectives Project demonstrated that both the Americans and Iraqis failed to think outside of the context of their own cultures, so the information gathered both prior to and during Operation Iraqi Freedom was used to reinforce their preconceived notions.

PHOTO: Two North Korean soldiers observe the south side at the truce village of Panmunjom in the demilitarized zone, 24 July 2006. (AP Photo/Lee Jin-man)
Doing nothing is a course of action. This may seem contrary to our military’s can-do, action-oriented culture, but in order to fully gauge the second and third order effects of our deeds, sometimes you just need to wait and see.

When you interact within a complex system (such as an economy or ecosphere), you cannot precisely predict the results. Accept that you will never be able to predict this, but if you watch closely and choose appropriate metrics, you should at least be able to recognize patterns. Challenge constructs (such as Operational Net Assessment) that assume that such complexity can be easily understood.

Identifying the problem is the first, most important, and often most overlooked task of solving it. This is difficult, which is why it is often skipped.

Using measures of effectiveness is the only way to prevent what we call ballistic decision making—making quick decisions without following up to ensure the intended outcome of the decision has indeed occurred. If you execute without a method to track and measure the results, you’ll never know whether the action was successful. But finding the right metric that truly measures whether you’re on the right path is difficult. It is not necessarily up to the red team to develop such metrics, but it is up to them to identify poor measures of effectiveness and to think creatively about behaviors or indicators that could provide better feedback.

Decision making is heavily dependent on experience and instinct: the value of these should not be underestimated. Good decision makers are flexible, appreciate the complexity of their situation, and ask more “why” than “what” questions. Too much information can impede decision making. Compiling data just to reduce the sense of complexity and uncertainty is not necessarily helpful.

Coalitions are a difficult but necessary component of military operations. An important part of the Army’s definition of red teaming is to understand not only our adversaries, but also our partners. A red team leader who understands a partner’s constraints, capabilities, and political will can facilitate the development and maintenance of these important relationships.

Training and Doctrine Command’s Threats Division developed twelve critical variables to define the contemporary operational environment: physical environment, nature and stability of state, sociological demographics, regional and global relationships, military capabilities, information, technology, external organizations, national will, time, economics, and culture. These variables serve as a useful frame of reference with which to view the operational environment, and we spent much of our class time trying to characterize these variables in any given situation. But more importantly, we found that it is essential to understand how they influence one another. Identifying a culture’s geography is not difficult; how it affects the culture’s concept of time, its economic capabilities, or the stability of the state is.

That said, avoid using a single construct to define the operational environment, and be wary of inappropriate metaphors or analogies. The myriad constructs for defining the contemporary operational environment demonstrate its complexity. For example, some useful ways to bound a problem include using the above 12 critical variables, using Thomas Barnett’s “core and gap” model (detailed in The Pentagon’s New Map), or categorizing challenges as traditional, irregular, catastrophic, or disruptive (as defined in the 2004 National Defense Strategy). But strict adherence to only one model or application of an inappropriate analogy allows for mental shortcuts that lead to failure. An example of a construct that may limit our understanding is the “network” construct of terrorism. As guest lecturer and terrorism analyst from the Institute for Defense Analysis Mark Stout argued, the network construct limits our analysis to links and nodes, while terrorism may be more accurately portrayed through a “movement” lens, which would require a broader focus on hearts and minds.

Two things to remember about your adversary: the enemy gets a vote, and they shouldn’t be underestimated. The U.S. claims that the war on terror is not about religion. Problem is, the enemy thinks otherwise. To them, it is most definitely about religion. Failing to take their position into account only...
makes the fight harder. Underestimating them, most of all their will and their public support, will also make the mission to defeat them more difficult.

- In the words of experienced red team leader Lieutenant General Paul Van Riper (USMC, Retired), “cast your net widely.” It is only through a wide diversity of readings and experiences that one can think creatively and independently. In other words, go to the opera, read a lot, learn a language, travel—maintain broad and diverse interests, and never stop learning.

**Cultural Awareness**

While a red team leader can never understand every culture, he/she can know what to look for in a culture. A red team should be able to ask the right questions and find the right experts. We can also understand our own culture enough to appreciate how and why it is perceived as it is by others. So instead of an impossible ‘round-the-world culture survey, the red team leader course curriculum took a comparative approach, with studies in both Western and Eastern military theory and doctrine, and offered a heavy dose of anthropology.

Understanding our own culture and how it is perceived by others was the first step in our growing cultural awareness. It was only after studying Western military theory that we could recognize the dramatic differences—and similarities—between our military culture and eastern military culture. Studies of Arab civilizations led to the same finding. The following are some insights from this approach.

- There are several enduring themes in Eastern military thought that distinguish it from Western military theory. The most important of these is the uniquely Chinese concept of *shi*, which loosely translated means the strategic configuration of power. Shi is about managing reality through maximizing circumstances, or recognizing what one can and cannot control and then preparing to leverage that which you can control when the time is right. This concept elucidates the Chinese emphasis on preparation, seizing the strategic initiative, and their holistic, “win-win” perspective. Other themes enduring to Eastern military theory that set it apart from Western theory include deception, subtlety, surprise, harmony, and reliance on the unorthodox.

- There are several themes that set our culture apart and cause us to think about the world and our ability to influence it in a fundamentally different way than others. First, Western culture values the individual and his/her free will. Both Eastern and Islamic culture give precedence to the community and believe that destiny plays a role in determining reality (demonstrated through *shī* as described above and *Inshallah*, loosely translated as, “if Allah wills it”). Second, Western culture emphasizes rational thought. We think of things as right or wrong, black or white. But much of the rest of the world allows for more grey. Eastern use of dialecticism (recognizing the possibility that both the thesis and antithesis may be correct) and the Muslim concept of *Taqiyya* (the dispensation given to Muslims to deny their faith under threat of persecution) demonstrate these cultures’ acceptance of cognitive dissonance, contrary to our notion of rational thought.

- While such differences are important, there are also commonalities that provide valuable opportunities for communication, understanding, and shared terms of reference. For example, leadership, training, preparation, morale, the power of the people—these are important concepts in both Eastern and Western military thought. There are also several themes that Christianity and Islam share: the importance of faith, giving alms, heaven and hell, a belief in one God, and the significance of individuals such as Abraham and Jesus.

- Applying anthropological concepts is a good start to understanding a culture. These concepts include examining a society’s formal and informal economy; sociological, political, and religious systems; sociolinguistics; semiotics; and its concept of violence. For example, much of North Korea’s economy is informal, as citizens barter and exchange commodities and the government engages in illicit activities outside the boundaries of international law, such as counterfeiting currency and narcotics trafficking. Appreciating that much of North Korea’s economy is unregulated and non-quantifiable goes a long way toward understanding how the country sustains itself.

- An even greater understanding can be gained by identifying a culture’s ceremonies, rituals, symbols, and myths. Through these, you can effect change, by either working through these cultural specificities or by challenging them. Using North Korea as an example again, the country is bound together by a very strong myth of the “people’s
paradise.” It is widely accepted by North Koreans that they are the most spiritually and technologically advanced country on earth, and their Western counterparts are decadent and corrupt. Recognizing this myth serves first to provide insight into North Korean culture. But further, it creates opportunity. If this myth can be disproved and North Koreans no longer believe it to be reality, Kim Jong II’s power and legitimacy in the eyes of his people are significantly weakened.2

Red Teaming

Lastly, here are a few of the lessons learned specific to the role of red team leaders and how they can function most effectively.

● A red teamer is different from an intelligence analyst in several important ways. First, the red team is not bounded by the construct/plan developed by the staff or by the need for evidence and corroborations; next, the red teamer is more like a historian (whose job is to ask big, broad questions) than an intelligence analyst (whose job is often to answer very specific, narrow questions); and finally, the red team’s job goes beyond understanding the environment to include understanding how we can shape it.

● Effective communication is vital. This means knowing how and when to ask questions, knowing your audience and the personalities with which you are dealing and for whom you are crafting your message, and using and demanding precise language.

● Diversity in red team composition is very important. The value of diversity—in rank, service, expertise, age, and gender—was evident just by our class composition, which included not only officers and warrant officers from the Army’s Active and Reserve Components, the Marine Corps, and the Navy, but also civilians. Our varied experiences, perspectives, and expertise fostered dynamic classroom dialog and debate.

● To implement a red team’s recommendations requires not just top cover, but also top engagement. Top cover, meaning buy-in and protection of the person at the top, is required for the red team to have access to the people and information it needs to make a good assessment. But in order for a red team’s recommendations to be implemented, they need more than access; they need top engagement, or leadership that is committed to making changes based on red team findings.

● Understanding the organization, its procedures, the personalities within it and their relationships, and the overall dynamics of the system in which you are inserting yourself is necessary to affect change. It is also important to appreciate the organizational impetus not to change. Advocacy, persuasion, and vigilance are thus required of a good red team leader.

While you may never interact with a red team in your organization, the mindset and the skills needed to be a red teamer can serve us all. We all know the mistakes that have been made as a result of not questioning our assumptions, not thinking like the enemy, or not voicing our dissent more persuasively. The above insights and reflections can help us avoid similar mistakes in the future. MR

NOTES


EXCLAIMING “YA! HUSAYN! Ya! Husayn!” rows of Shi‘ite men strike their exposed backs with chains. In the flurry of religious passion, the ancient streets of Karbala turn red with blood that flows from gashes cut deep into the skin. The men, some hardly old enough to shave, are within view of the Ha‘ir, the enclosed site around the Ali Abbas Mosque and the Imam Husayn Shrine, the inner area of which is forbidden to nonbelievers. Within the wall, the remains of Husayn lie under a gilded dome.

Once a year, on the 10th day of the Islamic month of Muharram, Karbala teems with the Shi‘a faithful who have come to remember the death of Husayn in 680 A.D. This activity is part of Ashura, one of the world’s great religious processions, and as many as 2 million Shi‘ites gather in Karbala to wave flags, chant, dance, and beat their chests. During the frenzied 10 days, some people observe modest candlelight vigils or say prayers inside the holy sanctuaries. Others offer tributes to Husayn that include self-flagellation designed to allow the faithful to empathize with their martyr. Some tap sharpened blades on their foreheads (tadbear) or perform a form of corporal self-punishment using heavy chains, batons, or leather whips that peel layers of flesh from their backs (tharb al zangil).

The Shi‘a Awakening

Shi‘ites make up 29 percent of Muslims in the Middle East and are a major component of the Middle East’s strategic equation, especially given their influential fulcrums in Iran, Iraq, and increasingly, Lebanon. Many Sunnis fear the Shi‘ites and their politics and faith. Countries where leaders are politically secure permit the Ashura ritual, but many authoritarian Middle Eastern governments limit the practice, fearing its symbolism because Shi‘a Islam melds faith with politics, and Ashura is a reminder that political disputes separate the ummah, the Islamic community.

The Shi‘ite perspective matters today especially because a psychological fixation on the Battle of Karbala—the “Ashura Complex”—forms the sum of conservative Shi‘a aspirations. In Iraq and Iran, Shi‘ites have come together at the behest of their religious leaders to form specifically Shi‘a states. In 2004, Iraqi Shi‘ites formed political parties to capitalize on the
political opportunity afforded by the overthrow of the Sunni-led Ba’athist regime. They established a transitional government, wrote and ratified a constitution, and then stared down suicide bombers to elect a Shi’a-dominated parliament in 2005. It was ironic that 30 days after the 2005 Iraqi elections, which created the world’s first Shi’a Arab majority state (Iran, of course, is Persian), Shi’ites went to Karbala for Ashura.

A Brief History of the Islamic Schism

In the 7th century A.D., the Prophet Mohammad united the Arabian Peninsula into a thriving desert federation. The nomadic and the settled inhabitants of Arabia were once warring tribes competing for scarce resources. Mohammad, the unchallenged “Messenger of God,” became the regional peacemaker, a position he used to unite all Arabs under his leadership. After his death in 632 A.D. and in the absence of a designated male heir, two factions vied for political control. The Party of Ali (Shi’ites) claimed that Mohammad had directly passed the governmental (caliphate) and spiritual leadership (imamate) of the Islamic polity to Ali ibn Abu Talib, his cousin, son-in-law, and childhood confidante. The Companions of Mohammad, a rival faction of Muslim elders, argued that Mohammad had made no appointment and unanimously elected Mohammad’s father-in-law, Abu Bakr, as the first of the four “Rightly Guided Caliphs.” Abu Bakr’s supporters were called the People of the Sunna and the Assembly, or Sunnis.

Abu Bakr was followed by Umar ibn al-Khattab and then by Uthman ibn Affan of the house of Umayya. Both caliphs expanded the Islamic community throughout North Africa and into Byzantine territories, but Uthman’s reign, characterized by corruption, nepotism, and greed, was considered a disaster. Under Uthman, enemies of Mohammad were placed in positions of power throughout the Muslim empire, including the governorship of Damascus, which went to Mu’awiya, a major opponent of Mohammad.

After Uthman’s death, Mohammad’s family members became the ummah’s great hope for restoring Islamic order “in the midst of iniquity and evil.” Although Ali’s influence had diminished, he was finally elected as the Fourth Caliph in 656 A.D.

Ashura in Iraq, 2007

In January, security in Karbala and Najaf forced anti-Iraq forces to attack smaller Shi’a sites during Ashura. Suicide bombers detonated their explosives in a crowd of worshippers at Shi’ite mosques in Mandali near the Iranian border and in Khanaqin, a largely Kurdish town. In Baghdad, drive-by shootings killed seven Shi’ite pilgrims in a bus heading to the Ashura observances at the Kadhim Shrine, the burial site of the 7th Imam.

The bloodiest Ashura 2007 occurrence happened 12 miles northeast of the holy city of An Najaf, where a little-known Shi’ite millenarian cult/militia called “Medwadiya” (Soldiers of Heaven) fought a 16-hour battle with government and U.S. forces. Established in the 1990s by Saddam Hussein to compete against the authority of Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the Medwadiyas (according to the government) intended to kill al-Sistani and as many Ashura pilgrims as possible. They wanted to spark a civil war to provoke the end of time and the return of the Mahdi—the hidden 12th Imam and Shi’ism’s equivalent of a messiah.

Post-battle, the government reported several hundred Medwadiyas killed, hundreds more captured, and a large cache of weapons seized.

An effigy of executed dictator Saddam Hussein hangs next to a portrait of Shi’ite spiritual leader Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, during a demonstration in Basra, 4 January 2007. (AFP)
(Shi’ites would venerate him as the First Imam.) His caliphate was not well established, however, and his first five years as caliph were marred by the legacy of Uthman’s rule and the first Islamic civil war, between Ali’s and Mu’awiya’s followers. In 660 A.D., when Mu’awiya captured Jerusalem and declared himself caliph, Ali was politically neutered. The next year Ali was assassinated in Kufa, and Mu’awiya was free to consolidate power as the founder of the Umayyad Dynasty.

Shi’a opposition to the Umayyads continued with Ali’s two sons, who became symbols of the political dichotomy of Shi’a Islam. First there was the quietist, Abu Mohammad Hasan ibn Ali (Hasan). After accepting a promise of military aid from the garrison in Kufa—aid that never materialized—Hasan abdicated his claim to the leadership of the ummah without a fight in order to avoid pointless bloodshed. He signed an oath of allegiance—a bay’ah—to Mu’awiya, and then retired on a state pension as a cleric in Medina. Although Hasan abjured politics, Mu’awiya nonetheless assassinated him in order to secure Umayyad control of the caliphate.

Next there was the activist, Hasan’s younger brother, Abu Abdullah Husayn ibn Ali (Husayn). In 680 CE, Husayn saw an opportunity for Mohammad’s descendants to return to power. Like his brother, Husayn entertained an offer from the Kufans of an army to help him depose the newly crowned Umayyad caliph, Yazid I, a known drunkard who openly violated Islamic laws. Accusing the Umayyads of losing the Islamic direction of the Prophet and arguing that he had an obligation, as the Prophet’s heir, not to submit to Yazid I, Ali broke his family’s détente. He claimed that a bay’ah with the caliph would have violated Islamic norms and constituted an endorsement of Yazid’s immoral character and way of life.

Against a background of nearly five decades of leadership disputes, Husayn attempted to seize control of the Islamic caliphate. After performing the Hajj ritual, he left Mecca with a small entourage of 100 loyalists consisting of 18 fighters from the House of Ali, 54 Shi’a supporters, and 28 other family members. Husayn intended to cross the Euphrates to launch his revolt from Kufa. Yazid I heard of Husayn’s challenge and sent a 4,000-man force from Damascus to secure the city. When the Kufans were quickly suppressed, Husayn lost all succor east of the Euphrates River. He did not return, however, to his home in Medina. Shi’ites believe that “[Husayn] realized that mere force of arms would not have saved Islamic actions and consciousness. To him [the faith] needed a shaking and jolting of hearts and feelings. This, he decided, could only be achieved through sacrifice and suffering.”

The Umayyad army surrounded Husayn’s encampment on the Euphrates and cut him off from water. By 10 October 680 A.D., Husayn and his fighters were parched from extreme thirst. After seven days of failed negotiations, the two sides engaged in sporadic fighting near the small town of Karbala. Archers decimated the small Shi’ite party. By noon, Husayn’s brother and standard-bearer, Ali Abbas, had been skewered with an arrow and Husayn himself had been captured. Husayn begged to pray one more time. Once he was on his knees, the Umayyad commander decapitated him and left his naked body on the battlefield to be trampled by the Umayyad cavalry. The next day, Yazid’s army marched the survivors in a victory procession through Kufa behind the severed heads of Husayn and his fighters.

The story of Karbala does not end with Ashura. On 30 November 680 A.D., forty days after the massacre, Jabir ibn Abdullah al-Ansari, one of Mohammad’s and Husayn’s companions, visited Husayn’s burial site. Jabir’s journey to Karbala was, in effect, the first Arba’een pilgrimage. The Shi’a Remembrance of Muharram ritual began when the story of Karbala was relayed, and it has continued for the last 14 centuries with elaborate displays in remembrance of the patron of the Shi’ite movement.

Culture and Customs of Ashura

The Remembrance of Muharram is not a celebration or a festival. It is a communal reflection of Husayn’s martyrdom. The faithful conduct passion plays and mock funerals as they parade icons of their handsome Arab hero. Ashura sanctifies Husayn’s activism in a trancelike fervor that reminds the faithful of the injustice he and they believe they have suffered at the hands of Sunnis. Beyond the requiems and obsequies, Ashura stokes 1,400 years of sectarian animus.

Several visual pieces come together to dramatize the event, reminders to the Sunnis that the Shi’ites
will not forget. Shi’ites arrange majalis (gatherings) to review Islamic teachings. These events feature a khateeb, a reciter/poet/bard of the Husayn passion saga, and a radub, who incites the faithful to beat their chests. The cathartic chest beating is part of the longstanding display of solidarity with Husayn.

Flags and water are included in the visual displays. Colored flags represent tribes or have a religious significance: black for grief and allegiance to Husayn; red for the injustice done to Husayn, the injury committed against the Prophet’s family, and the decadence of Yazid; green to tie the worshippers to the 12 venerated imams. Finally, water is life in the deserts of the Middle East. When the Umayyads deprived Husayn of water, they sentenced him to death. Today, Shi’ites cover water pots in black cloth and inscribe them with mottos to memorialize Husayn’s thirst.

Marches and processions (mawakib) are important components of the Ashura and Arba’een observances. During the Remembrance of Muharram, Iraqi Shi’ites conduct the 3-day mawakib between the holy cities of An Najaf (the burial place of Imam Ali and Shi’a Islam’s most sacred site) and Karbala. Shi’ites also conduct the mawakib on the roads from Baghdad and from other Shi’ite enclaves to the south and east of Karbala. Pilgrims beat their chests and chant as they walk, jog, or crawl along the dusty Iraqi roads. Bystanders construct roadside eateries to feed hungry pilgrims at rest stops. Makeshift tent villages appear as believers sleep along the highways. In 2006, tens of thousands of Shi’ite pilgrims from Iraq and Iran conducted the mawakib.

The most spectacular events in Karbala include frenetic gatherings where the ultra-orthodox faithful crawl through city streets or fall on their hands and knees as they approach the Ha’ir. These gatherings grow in intensity in the days leading up to Ashura. Shi’ites mourn outside the shrine into late evening. At some venues, clerics chant dirges for Husayn from pulpits as believers carry simulated corpses or replicas of Husayn’s sarcophagus through the city streets and the bazaars. In the evenings, Ashura passion plays (ta’ziya) reenact each day of the Battle of Karbala.

Among the mock funerals and eulogies for Husayn and his followers, Ashura’s most visible sign occurs. Rows of men stripped to the waist or in backless robes conduct tharb al zangil, rhythmically scourging their backs until bloodied. Throughout these acts of self-flagellation (latum), the faithful wail “Ya! Husayn! Ya! Husayn!” or “Hasan, Husayn, Ali!” to honor the first three wronged imams. One existential explanation for this practice is that ultra-orthodox Shi’ites are willing to punish themselves in repentance for their ancestors who failed to fight at Karbala with Husayn. However, many Shi’ites see this ritual as archaic, an embarrassment to the sect.
On the 11th day, the faithful return home for 40 days of mourning. The second major event during the Remembrance of Muharram is Arba’een (40), a religious gathering in Karbala at the end of those 40 days. The religious underpinning of this event, based on Jabir’s pilgrimage, is the Shi’ite belief in Husayn’s power to intercede in the temporal well-being of pilgrims. Husayn will forgive their lapses, grant supplicants’ prayers, protect property and family, and heal. Arba’een has developed into a pan-Shi’a rally that binds the faithful worldwide to Husayn’s cause: the maintenance of Islam.

The Political Relevance of Ashura

In An Introduction to Shi’i Islam: The History and Doctrine of Twelver Shi’ism, Moojan Momen writes, “During the 1979 Iranian Revolution, banners proudly proclaimed: ‘Everywhere is Karbala and every day is Ashura.”

The Ashura Complex. The moral allegory of the Battle of Karbala has developed into a cultural fixation, the Ashura Complex, that colors all parts of Shi’a political life. Shi’a Islam and its revolutionary movements (e.g., Hezbollah) are tethered by Husayn’s failed push for power. The metaphors of Ashura, with their vibrant displays, are used by Shi’a radicals to trigger theocratic zeal. Other cultures are branded as oppressive and otherwise unrighteous, and the Shi’a faithful, drawn by the pious language of Ashura, can be mobilized for a righteous struggle.

The strategy is simple. Using religious language to identify good and evil—God versus the devil—makes it impossible for national and ethnic identities grounded in faith to choose whatever has been branded anathema. Nationalist movements with religious overtones intensify their struggles, have a better ability to mobilize the disaffected masses, and are more likely to defeat secular movements also vying for power. Their absolutist assertion of religion over political issues elevates power interests from common politics to a sacred calling; it rallies the faithful to “transcendentalize disputes, elevating them . . . from the mundane to the cosmic level.”

The Ashura Complex makes Shi’a Islam a convenient state-builder. This was true with the Iranian Revolution in 1979, with Iraqi self-determination in 2004-2005, and in many ways with Hezbollah’s 2006 war with Israel and the group’s recent attempts to topple the current Lebanese government. In Iran, the Ashura Complex powered a theo-nationalist movement. Religious symbolism rallied rural people and the religious urban middle class toward fundamental values and against external threats to those values. In this way, the pursuit of a divinely ordained state, one based on divinely ordered principles, gained immense appeal.

The ability of the Iraqi Shi’a political parties in 2004 and 2005 to mobilize the faithful in multiple electoral events is also emblematic of the Ashura Complex. The world saw Iraq’s Shi’ites rally together under the guidance of their clerics despite individual political differences. Much of the Iraqi experience, like the Iranian experience, was a result of public confidence in the authority of Shi’a clerics and a lack of confidence in secular governance. In Iran, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini held sway. In Iraq, it was Ayatollah Muhammad
Ali al-Sistani who brought otherwise feuding Shi’a factions together to form the United Iraqi Alliance. Under Sistani’s auspices, the politically and culturally oppressed Iraqi Shi’a organized themselves to become the dominant power bloc behind the writing of the new Iraqi constitution and election of a Shi’a dominated parliament. After 1,400 years of Sunni hegemony in the region and literal subjugation of the Shi’a under Sunni rule, Husayn’s spiritual heirs had established the first Shi’a led Arab nation in history, and that by popular election.

**The Shi’a political worldview.** What is the Shi’a political worldview? First, due in large measure to the long history of domination and persecution by their Sunni rivals, the Shi’a had come to believe that theirs was a calling to endure persecution for the sake of their vision of Islamic destiny. At the same time, Shi’ites in general blamed (and still blame) the Sunni for what they regard as a millennium and a half of murdering Shi’a leaders and debasing the sect’s distinctive rituals. Moreover, they hold the Sunni responsible for anciently and unapologetically banishing, imprisoning, and murdering 11 of the 12 imams so sacred and essential to the Shi’ite system of worship. This oppression bred passivity into the Shi’ite cultural psyche. For centuries, Shi’ites maintained an apolitical way of life, suffering in silence through political detachment. Safety meant remaining unobtrusive and letting the government operate without Shi’ite criticism. However, history now appears to be revealing that stoic compliance out of political and social necessity did not mean apathy. Rather, events suggest that as a body, the Shi’a were uniquely willing to suffer centuries of oppression with quiet forbearance until they thought the time was right. Now, they have risen collectively to force a change aimed at achieving the distinctive religious and political goals envisioned in Shi’a Islam.

Second, for conservatives, a Shi’a takeover of the state will also work against a Western style open, pluralist system. Husayn rebelled against Yazid to achieve a religiously upright society, not to increase individual freedoms as understood in liberal societies. The priorities of Shi’a politics consequently have little to do with open political participation or free enterprise. Instead, Shi’a politics are concerned with self-determination for the Shi’ite community. This means freedom, under God, from the dominion of man over man—the freedom to establish a society founded on Islamic private virtue and public morality. Only after these preconditions for the state and society have been achieved can conservatives entertain ideas for economic prosperity. The ideal Shi’a government is not as concerned with state control of the economy as with state enforcement of social morality and securing the interests of an Islamic state.18

Moreover, under the cover of modern pluralism, the Shi’a faithful will participate in the system as dictated by their clerical handlers. In the case of Iran’s or Hezbollah’s attempts at state domination, populist movements are orchestrated to place clerics in positions to govern exclusively according to divine will. For example, after a nationalist revolution, Khomeini built his Islamic Republic on an imamate structure. His political theory followed the 19th-century doctrine of the authority of the jurists (wilayat al-faqih); that is, in keeping with the tradition of the imams, the best-qualified clerics should head the nation. In Khomeini’s scheme, clerics are the ultimate arbiters of both faith and politics. Khomeini essentially replaced the singular autocrat with a singular cleric, destroyed any barrier separating mosque and state, and transformed Iran’s religious authority into what has become a theocratic oligarchy.19 Even today, Iran’s elected president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, must obey Iran’s Supreme Leader.

Third, whether as political underdogs or political activists, there are three accepted ways for the Shi’a faithful to relate to governmental authority: political cooperation, political activism, or political aloofness.20

- **Political cooperation.** Cooperating with an established, just authority by accepting positions in the government gives the state legitimacy. By cooperating, Shi’ites prevent anarchy and keep civil order so Muslims can fully implement Sharia, the Islamic law regulating all aspects of public and private life. Those opposed to non-Shi’a or unjust governments cooperate in order to ensure some sort of governmental representation or to avoid needless death.21
- **Political activism.** When Shi’ites enter politics to bring the temporal authorities into line with Sharia, it is considered political activism.22 For the politically active Shi’ite, cooperation with an unjust government is unacceptable; otherwise, worldly encroachments into the ummah will become normative. The unjust state must either comply with the wishes of the Shi’ites and be dominated or it will
face continued active opposition. Husayn, the only imam who actively resisted injustice, despotism, and sexual license, demonstrated how to fight when the Shi’a believed the time was right. Just as Husayn refused a bay’ah in order to be an example of righteous struggle against immorality, Shi’ites are called to resistance to protect Islam. There is no negotiating when ideas are made absolute by faith.

While admiring the quietist character of the first two imams, Ali and Hasan, Shi’ites praise Husayn’s political activism. Khomeini, this era’s Husayn, yanked Iran’s Shi’ites out of their political inertia into activism. He was a radical of a strident reactionary stripe, not an innovator. Iranian Communists or socialists could not match Khomeini’s grassroots mobilization. His was the perfect theo-nationalist revolution. Khomeini equated Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi of Iran and his security forces to Yazid I, the drunken usurper of the Islamic caliphate, and his oppressive Umayyad army. At the same time, Khomeini cast himself as Husayn leading his followers against the apostate enemies of Islam. Using the religious language of the familiar Husayn saga to appeal to the average Iranian Shi’ite, he delineated between the perceived good (Khomeini) and evil (the Iranian Government, the modern Umayyads). Shi’ite clerics Muqtada al-Sadr in Iraq and Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah in Lebanon are following the same model in order to seize control of their governments and bring their respective states in line with Sharia.

- Political aloofness. Shi’ites may opt to remain distant from all political matters—their traditional attitude. Hasan showed how to suffer oppression quietly. By maintaining silence on secular matters, many Shi’ites believed they were obeying Sharia. Even the “guardians of public morals,” the Shi’a clerics, broke silence only when they felt a caliph had greatly deviated from the path of Sharia.

The Need for an Adversary

There is an interesting dichotomy in Shi’ite politics. Opposing opinions of quiet resistance and active rebellion give Shi’ites extraordinary political versatility within the dominant themes of martyrdom and patient endurance caused by government oppression; however, inherent to this underdog philosophy is a need for an adversary when downtrodden and a scapegoat when the faithful flourish. An external element—an outside malicious force—must exist to serve as the root of Shi’a suffering. An adversary is especially useful for transferring accountability for government failures. To preserve the momentum of political initiative, Shi’a religious radicals must popularize fears of the modern world as corrupt, impious, debauched, and violent—every vilified feature of Umayyad and American cultures. Throughout the centuries, the external foci for Shi’a hostility have been the imperial Sunnis or Christians, secular modernity, conspiratorial Zionists, and lately, the United States—the Great Satan.

Regional Fear of the Shi’a Rising

Several Middle Eastern countries, especially authoritarian, non-democratic states, are weary of the symbolism of Ashura. They see a threat in the Shi’ites’ faith and politics. Primarily, Sunni leaders fear for the security of their own regimes. Khomeini preached of expanding the Iranian Revolution into a worldwide revolution. After the once-quiet sect toppled the Shah’s government, Sunni states, many as autocratic as the Shah’s former regime, saw themselves as vulnerable to the ideological adventurism of the Persians.

In 1989, Khomeini’s successor, Ali Khamenei, and Iran’s president, Ali Akbar Rafsanjani, reiterated Iran’s policy objectives of maintaining an Islamist Iran, defending the republic, and expanding the Islamic Revolution. After an eight-year interlude of reformist moderation (1997-2005) led by President Mohammad Khatami (but tempered by Khamenei), Iran moved back to its old path under its current president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

With the rise of a Shi’a-led government in Iraq, Sunni Arab states are still concerned about the expanding Shi’ite influence emanating from Iraq but under Iranian influence. Given the Iranian model, Sunnis fear that Shi’ites can mobilize their religious apparatus against Sunni regimes. Autocratic states tremble at Ashura-based slogans: The Ruler is wrong; The Ruler has deviated from the
path of Islam. Since faith and politics are inseparable, these Shi’a themes could incite uprisings in restive populations.

Many in power fear that a Shi’a takeover of governments will be all-encompassing. Once Shi’ites are in power, these leaders say, they would not acknowledge secular authority but would consolidate around religious figures, in accordance with the doctrine of wilayat al-faqih. This fear is amplified by the Iraq model, where even with democratic institutions in place for the 2004-2005 elections, Shi’ites were the first to mobilize and vote. Their exercise in democracy was led by their religious authority, resulted in the current Shi’a-dominated government, and has led to wrangling over whether or not Iraq should be an Islamic republic with Sharia law as its final word. In fact, Article 2 of the Iraqi Constitution states, “Islam is the official religion of the State and is a foundation source of legislation . . . No law may be enacted that contradicts the established provisions of Islam.”

Iraqi Shi’ites were effective at forming a representative government, and Sunnis worry that they will not share in it. Even under the best of circumstances, Sunnis fear that the political and religious authorities of local communities will continually be at odds. Like Husayn struggling against the authority of Yazid, Shi’a reactionaries today must have an unending rivalry—they must have scapegoats—to validate their worldview.

Further, there are fears that the prestige and influence of Iran, a non-Arab (Persian) country, could grow, especially as it begins to export its ideas to the Sunni Arab world. Some Sunnis believe that Shi’ite Arab Iraqis are deeply linked to Iranian Persian Shi’ites and that Iraqi Shi’ites are prone to betraying the Sunni Arab world. Shi’a Islam is headquartered in Iraq, specifically in the city of An Najaf. Shi’ite scholars from Iraq and Iran study at religious centers in An Najaf and Karbala. Iraqis and Iranian Shi’ites have intermarried. Iranians routinely conduct pilgrimages to Karbala and An Najaf. Most especially, there is growing fear of Iran under Ahmadinejad, who continues to preach exporting the Shi’a revolution throughout the Middle East and beyond.

Fear of Iran fosters animosity in many Sunni Arabs. In 2006, the Arab League, which had once defended Saddam Hussein’s regime because it was their buffer against the westward expansion of Shi’a Islam, continually waffled on supporting the development of the new Shi’a-Arab-led government of Iraq. This occurred even though Article 3 of the Iraqi Constitution describes the country as a founding member of the Arab League and commits Iraq to the League’s charter. The League did propose a reconciliation conference for the summer of 2006, but it never took place. Similarly, the group opened a diplomatic mission, but then promptly closed it because of a lack of funding. Ironically, with the squandering of the Arab League’s opportunity to help rebuild Iraq, the only neighboring country that offered unlimited support to the new government in Baghdad was Iran.

Finally, some Sunnis, especially the influential extremist Wahhabi sect, consider Shi’ites to be heretics. Wahhabis reject the Shi’a imamate and its rule by a religious-civil leader, and they dismiss all notions of Ali’s claim to leadership of the ummah. They also spurn the Ashura rituals as a violation of Islam and
repudiate as idolatry the notion of Shi’a shrines, Shi’a iconography, and Shi’a veneration of the imams.

From the time of the Sunni-Shi’a schism in the 7th century, Shi’a graves have been desecrated. The Abbasid Caliph destroyed the Imam Husayn shrine in Karbala in 850 A.D. The dome was destroyed again in the 11th century. In 1801, Wahhabis sacked the entire town of Karbala. In 1843, the town was sacked again, this time by the Ottomans, with a later attack occurring on the An Najaf shrine. More recently, on 22 February 2006, Wahhabis destroyed the Askayri Shrine of the 10th and 11th imams in the Iraqi town of Samarra.

The fear of Shi’a expansion has actually increased since the fall of Hussein’s regime because it had been the Sunni firewall against the westward movement of Shi’ism. Sunni fears are hardly assuaged by the ecstatic frenzy televised annually during the Remembrance of Muharram rituals. The once taciturn Shi’a sect, both Arab and Persian, is emboldened, empowered, and expanding.

Recap

As sung by khateebs, the Battle of Karbala on 10 Muharram 680 A.D. is akin to a great Greek or Shakespearean tragedy. Like Agamemnon descending from his chariot or Julius Caesar entering the forum, Husayn was warned of impending danger. Ignoring peril, he resolutely went to his death and in doing so became an iconic figure. How then do we sum up the importance of Husayn and his sacrifice at Karbala? We cannot overstate the influence of the Battle of Karbala on both the 1,400-year-old Islamic schism and modern Shi’a Islam. In our day, the Ashura Complex—the psychological fixation on the Battle of Karbala—continues to fuel Shi’a poetry, rituals, iconography, social customs, folklore, and a versatile political theory. It brings the faithful together every year to express their common identity and, at times, to express their anger at the government in a cathartic frenzy. In one sense, Husayn was an unfortunate adventurer who overestimated his capacity to depose Yazid. On the other hand, he became a martyr fighting impiety in order to shock the ummah back to its moral roots.

Ashura remains in the background of Iraq’s complex Shi’a culture. Its association with politics injects nationalism into the lives of average men who idealize notions of heroic martyrdom and long for a Shi’ite paradise on earth free of human greed and Westernization. From the farmers along the Euphrates to the merchants in Basra to the elite classes in Baghdad, Husayn’s sacrifice serves as a Shi’a parable of struggle against oppression, immorality, and external domination. Husayn offered a model of resistance and activism to emulate, so that when the opportunity arrived, as it did for the Iraqi Shi’a in 2005, the ummah would grab the reins of power. Win or lose, they believe their’s will have been a just fight on God’s behalf.

For the foreseeable future, Shi’ite power interests will have to be a major consideration in any country’s Middle East policy. The interweaving of Ashura’s motifs with political ideologies has motivated a long-oppressed segment of many Middle Eastern populations, but at the same time it threatens many in the Sunni world, and there is fear that it might even lead to regional turmoil. In Iraq, Shi’ites were the best organized to vote and form a government, but the struggle goes on to turn the world’s newest democracy into a modern state. Viewed internally, the current course of Shi’a history continues to be one of struggle and a search for self-representation.  

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11. ibid., 27.
12. ibid., 28-29, 32.
13. ibid., 30.
14. ibid., 32.
15. ibid., 30.
16. ibid., 30.
17. ibid., 30.
18. ibid., 30.
19. ibid., 30.
20. ibid., 30.
21. ibid., 30.
22. ibid., 30.
23. ibid., 30.
24. ibid., 30.
25. ibid., 30.
26. ibid., 30.
27. ibid., 30.
28. ibid., 30.
29. ibid., 30.
30. ibid., 30.
31. ibid., 30.
Imagine a battalion or brigade commander able to quickly and easily access a well developed data bank from online knowledge resources and from information provided by members of a virtual community that shares common experiences and solutions to specific issues of command. Imagine further that commander being able to readily discuss such issues online in discussion groups made up of current and former commanders who face, or have faced, similar challenges.

Such a system now exists. Command Net is a functioning online professional forum designed specifically for past, present, and future battalion and brigade commanders. It offers large amounts of data relevant to brigade and battalion command while it hosts just such virtual discussions among commanders on topics of concern and interest. The implications are profound. At no time in the Army’s history have battalion and brigade commanders had the kind of advantages such a Web-based discussion platform provides. Knowledge can now be shared on a massive scale among peers, and with unprecedented efficiency and speed.

Command Net is a key initiative within BCKS—the Battle Command Knowledge System, centered at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The mission of BCKS is to support the online generation, application, management, and exploitation of Army knowledge in order to foster collaboration among Soldiers and units. The forum enables the sharing of expertise and experience; facilitates leader development and intuitive decision making; and supports the development of organizations and teams. Its objectives are to—

- Enhance professional education.
- Facilitate exchange of knowledge.
- Foster leader development.
- Support doctrine development.
- Support lessons learned.
- Support training.
- Enhance battle command.¹

Command Net has been designed specifically to enable discussions between commanders in such areas of interest as warfighting, military law, command philosophy, and standard operating procedures, among others. Sponsored by the School for Command Preparation at Fort Leavenworth, Command Net is a natural offspring of the powerful CompanyCommand.army.mil, an online community with which many commanders are already familiar, and the BCKS S3-XO Net professional forum (sponsored by the Center for Army Tactics at Fort Leavenworth).
The technology platform supporting Command Net allows commanders to participate in their community of practitioners in a myriad of ways. When commanders register for an account in Command Net, they give enough information about their backgrounds and areas of expertise to allow other members to locate their names when conducting a keyword search. After registration, commanders are expected to contribute to the collective database by posting documents or briefings of general concern or relevance that may start or stimulate discussion threads. The postings provide context for discussion and facilitate the networking of members through virtual interface with others sharing similar problems and challenges. Through conversations and interactions sparked by the discussion threads on Command Net, battalion and brigade commanders can access a treasure-trove of military experience of potentially inestimable value. Over time, this process will not only enhance the professional education of incoming commanders, but also support individual decision making during actual command in battle.

Although individual learning is important, organizational learning through such collaborative methods is increasingly essential to the Army’s overall success. To promote the internal military culture required for organizational learning, students at the Command and General Staff College are familiarized with Command Net. Once they leave the schoolhouse and take command, they can then use BCKS as a reach-back tool.

Power of Access, Exchange of Knowledge

Because BCKS and Command Net exploit the true power of the information age, they may eventually come to be viewed as being among the most significant advances in military affairs since gunpowder. The proliferation of centers of information to which soldiers and commanders have instantaneous access is changing fundamentally the way we will manage the application of military force in the future.

Information is among the key elements for exercising control of any kind—including control of military power. The fundamentals of control in past conflicts were shaped in large measure by the (often restrictive) methods used for gathering and synthesizing information and then disseminating the results to users. Not surprisingly, today’s proliferation of means to information access has not only changed the dynamics governing how information itself is collected, processed, and distributed, but has also changed with it the fundamental dynamics of control.

Previously, in the competition for control, whoever was the gatekeeper of information collection and dissemination processes controlled information, thus controlling its associated entity. Before the proliferation of information access capabilities, media outlets that transmitted information were relatively few in number and weren’t widely interconnected; as a result, control over the processes for collecting and disseminating information remained largely the purview of those who could or would grant access. In contrast, today, even though there are ongoing challenges regarding how information is gathered and synthesized, dramatic advancements in the means to broadly disseminate information through the worldwide Web have shifted information control away from a select few to virtually anyone who has access to the Internet.

Information access by way of cheap technology solutions has proliferated across the globe to every sector of society, including those who mean to do only harm. Moreover, because any person at any echelon of an organization can, at least theoretically, gain unprecedented access to formerly restricted forms of information, the complexity of solution sets to issues caused by access has increased exponentially. Similarly, because of untethered access throughout the global community, the sheer number of problems demanding resolution has also increased. As a result, although the emerging global
information system has remarkable potential for supporting those who would solve problems, it also provides equally great potential for those who want to promote an unacceptable societal agenda.

Why has this happened? The answer lies in each individual’s ability to access any and all types of information, which in turn has removed the controls—both formal and informal—that previously governed the use of information in society. From the perspective of those who deem knowledge sharing to be among the features of technology that promote the highest social good, such universal access is a highly positive development. They believe that information access will ultimately empower social strata previously bound by the shackles of ignorance and denied access to information that would end their intellectual dark age. By connecting the world in a virtual global society that can share knowledge, intelligent inquiry and informed opinion, information empowerment will be key to removing barriers to social growth and political participation.

While thinkers and practitioners are still debating the final impact of these revolutionary developments in information access, potential concerns should not inhibit our developing and extending the processes of knowledge sharing within the military. Harnessing the collective intelligence of the military as a professional body promises to be a tremendous enabler. Toward the objective of exploiting the Army’s collective knowledge and experience, BCKS Command Net has an ever-expanding capability to collect, collate, and distribute specific bodies of knowledge—bodies adapted for either the army as a whole or for members of discrete specialties—unimpeded by the previous restrictions of geography, time, and physics.

A few real-world examples might best illustrate how unfettered access can generate military power. Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth Cerney teaches and directs the U.S. Army Reserve’s Battalion and Brigade Pre-Command Course. To facilitate knowledge exchange and to enhance the professional education of his students, he started a discussion in Command Net. Cerney posted a request asking current commanders to share their unit’s training guidance with his students. Within a week, he received replies with attachments of training guidance from commanders in the field.

Cerney directed his students to join Command Net and download the experienced commanders’ training guidance from the discussion thread in the course topic folder. The students and Cerney then used the guidance to generate classroom discussion. Discussion stimulated thought, and thought yielded feedback, which they posted on Command Net so that each contributing current commander could read the assessments of his or her guidance. After considering the changes the classes recommended and adjusting his guidance accordingly, one commander emailed his revised guidance to Cerney for posting on Command Net. He commented on the value of getting feedback from the students and how interesting it was to see their thoughts, thus closing the feedback loop in the discussion thread. Cerney continues to facilitate this ongoing discussion with each new course.

The experience of Lieutenant Colonel Marcus De Oliveira, an observer-controller at the Joint Readiness Training Center who started a reconnaissance squadron discussion forum on Command Net, produced similarly positive results. Over the course of six months, De Oliveira initiated and facilitated a discussion thread that provided feedback from rotations as commanders posted replies. Due to the observations collected, the discussion thread effected a change in Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs).

Apart from changes to training guidance and TTPs, such feedback will also be key in facilitating needed changes to doctrine in a more timely manner. As an example, after discussions within the Air Force and Army training communities, Colonel Mark R. Mueller, Joint and Combined Arms Training Directorate, wanted to investigate other issues pertaining to air-to-ground training. Mueller therefore posted a request on Command Net for feedback from battalion and brigade commanders. He received numerous insightful replies from experienced commanders.

Saving Commanders Time

Currently, all future commanders are familiarized with the capabilities of Command Net during pre-command training. These future senior leaders are exposed to the system’s tools and links and shown how to navigate and contribute to the site. More importantly, they assume ownership of the Command Net forum and its potential. The goal of BCKS and the School for Command Preparation is to expand and evolve the forum to create a broad but professional information repository for commanders at all levels. Command Net is the digital portal to command excellence. By teaming with our customers, we at Command Net continue to improve
the forum, maintaining its relevancy and harnessing the power of collective professional wisdom. We aim to provide commanders with professional development tools and information related to research topics on battle command, commandership, rear detachment commands, non-traditional commands, and the human dimensions of command. We also offer professional reading lists for commanders and serve as a place to find qualitatively evaluated recommendations about relevant issues. Other BCKS goals and concerns are to—

- Expand the learning environment of the School for Command Preparation by putting the Pre-Command Course and Tactical Commanders Development Program curriculum on the Web, along with other online educational tools.
- Increase the sharing and exchange of tacit knowledge from all corners of the profession as it relates to the art and science of command.
- Give commanders access to subject matter experts in various fields who can offer a true reachback capability.
- Expand the professional body of knowledge through collaborative teaming that combines the theoretical underpinnings of research with real-time feedback from the laboratory of real-world operations—all through networked forums.

To provide pertinent, fast, and unfiltered access to any type of information related to the profession of arms that commanders might need is the crux of our challenge. What information do commanders need, and when? These questions need answering if commanders are to truly capitalize on access. Command Net also seeks to save battalion and brigade commanders time. As the community continues to grow with the addition of new members, so will the likelihood that someone has already contended with a problem another community member may be facing. Using the search features in Command Net, a member can quickly discover if anyone else has already developed a solution. If a solution cannot be uncovered in a keyword search, then posting a discussion thread might solicit useful feedback from other commanders. Another benefit is that such interactions further link our Army’s strategic and operational leaders to its tactical level commanders. By registering and posting issues, experienced commanders will contribute to the profession’s collective knowledge and receive real-time feedback from current commanders—a win-win result for our Army.

Future Direction of Command Net

In the future, Command Net will use its discussion forums to garner vignettes from the field and develop instructive scenarios based on leadership and command challenges. A sample scenario, such as the following from the “Tacit Knowledge for Military Leaders: Battalion Commander Questionnaire,” may be placed on Command Net and tied to a discussion thread where commanders not only rate their choices of the worst to best actions while viewing the choices of their peers, but also participate in a dialogue about those choices:

“You are a battalion commander and it is the end of your first battle at a major externally evaluated training exercise during which your unit revealed some major shortcomings. During the After Action Review, the Chief Evaluator is highly critical of the battalion and dwells on all the negative things your unit did that day. You carefully record all of the negative observations, but you know full well that the battalion also did some very positive things that day. What should you do?”

Using this scenario as an example, ideal discussion postings would include commanders sharing tacit knowledge from their experiences in the field. From those discussions and experiences, we could then develop a collaborative vignette, which would then be posted online in a simple slide presentation or more elaborately via audio or visual files. The vignettes could also be used in the schoolhouses and on other professional forums to enhance professional education, facilitate knowledge exchange, and foster leader development.

In sum, the BCKS Command Net online professional forum encourages the building and transfer of knowledge by saving members time as they go about solving problems, by fostering collaboration among experts, by socializing new members into the community’s belief system, and most importantly, by serving as the focal group for the community’s passion for the art and science of command. MR

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3. The vignette is considered collaborative because the brief incident or scene used in the case study is developed through the interactions of the discussion participants.
“Expectations need to be managed from the beginning, and throughout the process—which requires a major effort of public information and education...Otherwise expectations are unrealistic, and [people] are inevitably disappointed. When disillusion sets in, people can easily turn against the agreement they had at first welcomed.”

—Kofi Annan, Secretary General, United Nations, 14 October 2004.1

Understanding the importance of managing expectations is tough, and actually managing those expectations well is even tougher. But such oversight is a critical factor in leading successful change. I believe many organizational leaders see leadership and its more specific subsets of leading change and managing expectations as primarily unidirectional attempts to influence, rather than the complex two-way processes that they are.

However, to lead significant change, we as leaders will have to revamp our view of managing expectations from a simple perspective of “getting the message out” to one of a complex system of consistent, conscientious communication mechanisms that evolve as the situation develops in order to reinforce the leader-stakeholders relationship.

This paper argues that managing expectations is a critical factor in leading successful change. It goes on to provide ideas for choosing your key stakeholders, then gives a four-part definition of managing expectations, twelve applicable lessons learned about managing expectations, and a framework for analyzing what level and context of expectations management a leader should focus on.

In its essence, managing expectations involves a change-leader seeking out and building effective communication bridges to his stakeholders, and then using those bridges to understand, and to help the constituents understand, the change process. Managing expectations can significantly improve the chance of success to lead change, but it is a complex process that takes a conscientious leader’s focus.

Teachers, parents, managers, and educators all need to learn how to manage expectations. Right now, there is probably no place where managing expectations is more significant than in Iraq, where the U.S. Government and the U.S. Army are leading a massive transformation. If the United States is to be successful, many organizational leaders at all levels must make the conscious choice to actively manage the expectations of their key stakeholders.

For example, in providing oversight and legitimacy for Operation Iraqi Freedom, the president of the United States is attempting to manage the expectations of the U.S. Congress, the global media, and international leaders. Lower on the totem pole than the president, but also of strategic importance, is U.S. Army
Lieutenant Jeremy Holman. Responsible for the security of the al-Kinde neighborhood in Baghdad, he is simultaneously working to manage the expectations of the local tribal councils, his military bosses, and disenfranchised, but influential, former members of the Ba’ath regime living in the area. Both Lieutenant Holman and the president have a similar challenge in that they both rely on the support of their stakeholders, via managing expectations, for their success.

**Identify Your Stakeholders**

As a change-agent, you should know that your key stakeholders’ perceptions will determine whether you are successful. Consequently, identifying those stakeholders is the crucial first step to success in leading change. The following are some examples of who the central stakeholders could be:

If you are a U.S. Army company commander in Iraq, your key stakeholders could include your Soldiers, their families, your battalion and brigade commanders, the local Iraqi leaders, and the global media.

If you are a consulting firm vice-president, your key stakeholders could include your team, your managing director inside the firm, the leaders of the firm for which you are consulting (i.e. your client), and often the key influencers of the employees of your client.

If you are a professor and head of a college academic department, your key stakeholders could include the dean, your students, the other department heads, the professors in your department, and even the staff of the school newspaper.

If you are the president of the United States, your key stakeholders include the legislature, the citizenry (via political action committees, the media, legislatures, and U.S. corporations), political parties, leaders of multinational (and state) organizations, and leaders of other nation-states.

The major categories of stakeholders in each of the above three examples are surprisingly similar. In fact, most all organizational leaders have the following categories of stakeholders:

- Employees.
- Bosses.
- Key influencers (and potential spoilers) in your customer base.
- Key influencer peers (and potential spoilers) inside your organization.
- The media.

Leaders should ask the following question to determine if a person or a group of persons is actually a key stakeholder: “Does the success of this leading-change effort depend significantly on this person’s active support, participation, or approval (either now or in the future)?” If the answer to that question is “yes,” that person most likely is a key stakeholder.

The U.S. Government has recognized the need to manage the expectations of key stakeholders for Iraq and has taken some efforts in this direction. For example, the White House recently created the Office of Strategic Communications (OSC), headed by former presidential advisor Karen Hughes, and commissioned it to “ensure consistency in messages that will promote the interests of the United States abroad, prevent misunderstanding, build support for and among coalition partners of the United States, and inform international audiences.”

Similarly, the U.S. Army is doubling the size of its Psychological Operations (PSYOP) capabilities because one primary PSYOP mission is to convince Iraq’s population to support legitimate Iraqi Security Forces and Iraq’s democratically elected government. In addition, the U.S. Army recently formed a separate Information Operations (IO) career field for select officers. The IO officers coordinate the Army’s information efforts, which include communicating a consistent, effective message to multiple stakeholders, such as the American public (through public affairs officers) and Iraqi citizens (through organizations such as civil affairs units).

Although these efforts to improve communication across multiple venues are steps in the right direction, they alone may not be enough. The problem is that the OSC, PSYOP, and IO organizations are designed to send messages, but do not place as much emphasis on receiving messages from stakeholders: effectively managing expectations calls for two-way communication, not just unidirectional influence.

**Managing Expectations Defined**

Managing expectations is consistently communicating with your key stakeholders to understand their spoken and unspoken expectations, while realistically shaping their perceptions of—

- Your true character and intentions.
- The benefits of the long-term change process.
- What constitutes short-term success.
- Specific stakeholder responsibilities required to achieve both short- and long-term outcomes.
Managing expectations thoughtfully is a decision you make. A change-leader has too many key stakeholders with too many diverging goals and internal influences to leave managing their expectations to chance. Your stakeholders will not have realistic, positive perceptions about managing expectations unless you deliberately help them get there. Believing otherwise is overly idealistic. Let us explore in detail how the change-leader must shape the four areas of stakeholder perceptions.

**Shaping perceptions of your character and intentions.** “I know everyone from my civilian life, so I have extra incentive to get them all home alive. When we get home, I’ve got to look at all of their mamas.”

—Staff Sergeant Hardin, squad leader, Arkansas National Guard

If you are truly leading change to serve, rather than to manipulate, you had better prove it fast. The first aspect of managing expectations is to realistically communicate your organization’s intentions and character. For example, when the U.S. Army’s 3d Infantry Division attacked in Iraq in 2003, it expected most of the population to treat it as a liberator, but many Iraqi people turned out to be distrustful and leery of the American Soldiers, likely because the Americans’ true intentions and character were simply unknown to them. Similarly, some members of the global media and the U.S. population believed we were attacking Iraq for the primary purpose of securing access to oil resources in the region. Although the U.S. Government stated that the purpose of the U.S. attack was to enforce United Nations resolutions, suppress terrorism, free the Iraqi people from Saddam’s oppressive regime, and promote democracy in the Middle East, many Iraqis did not believe this because they did not trust the U.S. Government.

Convincing people you are trustworthy is the key to your influencing their perceptions, and such trust can only be built over time and with effort. For example, to establish trust with the global media, the U.S. military now embeds reporters with deployed military units. Brigadier General Vincent Brooks, the former chief of public affairs for the U.S. Army, said that it is essential to give the media both access and context. Let them know and see for themselves what is going on (i.e., provide access), while making a deliberate effort whenever possible to explain why the U.S. actions are what they are (i.e., include context). To illustrate, when Iraqis and the world watch television and see Soldiers passing out food and providing medical treatment, many of their perceptions of the Soldiers’ true intentions and character dramatically change.

Another essential factor when building trust is to study and respect the culture of your stakeholders so that you can better relate to them. This is an essential factor when building trust: by working to understand why they think what they do and

CPT Eric Lawless, a member of 1-161 Infantry Battalion and leader of a mobile Iraqi Army training team, talks with an Iraqi Army company commander and his executive officer at the activation ceremony for an Iraqi Army company. The newly formed unit had experienced officers, but an inexperienced NCO Corps and a severe shortage of equipment.
by practicing reflective listening, a change-leader communicates that his constituents have important values and needs. Even though your stakeholders won’t always agree with a course of action, if you give them access and context, and if you listen to them reflectively, your stakeholders will begin to trust you and develop accurate perceptions of your character and intentions.

Building faith in the long-term process. “A leader’s job is to give their people hope.”
—Rudy Ruettiger, Notre Dame football player.

A change-leader must help his stakeholders visualize the end state. Challenges and hardships are often associated with the process of change, so the final outcome must be “worth it” to the stakeholder before he or she will support the change leader. Therefore, it is important that the leader help the constituents understand the value of reaching the goals that long-term change requires and encourage them to have faith in the plan.

For example, Major Danny Hassig, a U.S. Army Reserve civil affairs officer, arranged a meeting with Sheik Saad, an influential Iraqi who lived in the Karada Peninsula (the Baghdad equivalent of Manhattan, New York). Because Saad was an informal leader in Karada, Hassig introduced himself and made an effort to meet with Saad every few weeks in order to help manage the expectations of the Iraqi people regarding U.S. forces in Karada.

Saad was wounded in an assassination attempt a month prior to this particular meeting, and was risking his life to meet with Hassig. When Hassig asked Saad what the locals thought about the Americans, Saad explained that his people were pleased that the United States had followed through on its promise to transfer sovereignty from the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) to Iraq’s temporary government. Saad also commented on how his people had recently seen new soccer fields and new gardens installed in their communities, courtesy of Hassig and U.S. forces funding of local Iraqi contractors. The Iraqis were thankful American Soldiers were patrolling as partners with the Iraqi Police and mentoring the embryonic Iraqi democratic government.

Hassig believed that Saad now trusted him, so he used that trust as a foundation. He asked the sheik to apply for a coalition-funded economic development loan that would potentially energize the economy of the sheik’s neighborhood. Such a large loan would tie Saad into a long-term business relationship with the coalition. Saad applied for the $3.5 million loan because he felt the United States was reliable, pro-Iraqi, and trustworthy. Saad summarized his people’s new faith in the long-term process by concluding, “When we see the U.S. Army in Iraq, we feel safe.”

A wise expectations manager understands and feeds such hope without promising what he cannot guarantee. Author and psychotherapist Viktor Frankel, who wrote about his experiences as a prisoner in the Auschwitz concentration camp during World War II, concluded that a person’s attitude in a difficult time could overpower actual circumstances and give that person hope. However, he noted that in the fall of 1944, when fellow prisoners spread rumors that Allied forces would liberate the prisoners by Christmas, but no day of liberation came, an unusually high percentage of inmates died the next month. Their expectations had been so high that when they were not liberated, their hopes were crushed.

Shaping perceptions of short-term success. “The Iraqi people know the U.S. has put men on the moon, so they don’t understand why they still don’t have electrical power 24 hours a day, even though they didn’t have 100 percent power under Saddam Hussein.”
—Major General Ron Johnson, former commander, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Gulf Region Division.

Managing expectations is a long-term process, but a change-leader can only influence those expectations within the context of consistent short-term actions. U.S. Army Captain Darin Thomson did exactly this when leading his company in Iraq in 2003.

Two weeks after coalition forces liberated Iraq from the Ba’ath Party, Captain Thomson and his infantry troopers (known as the “Bravo Bushmasters”) received the mission of securing and stabilizing the town of Taliyah, which was about 50 kilometers south of Baghdad. Although he and his troopers did not experience any hostilities from the 15,000 locals during their first 72 hours in town, Thomson was concerned that he needed to connect quickly with the local leaders. Thomson’s boss, a lieutenant colonel, had stopped briefly in the town and had a cursory meeting with some local leaders before moving north, so Thomson had to convince the locals that he, a captain, was actually in charge before he could even start to manage their expectations for the more complex short- and
long-term issues, especially since he had no idea of how long his company would be assigned to stay in Taliyah.

Thomson quickly discovered that most of the established local government officials were members of Saddam Hussein’s Ba’ath Party and had left town before the Americans arrived. Even though the local government was defunct, four locals came forward to claim leadership roles—including a representative from the town’s dominant tribe, the town’s electrician and water engineer, a food-distribution supervisor, and a man who claimed to have security expertise. Of course, the priorities of each of these emerging leaders were different. After a few hours of volatile conversation, Thomson heard a message loud and clear. The Iraqis desperately needed and expected U.S. aid in the form of medical care, fresh water, food distribution, and security (i.e., police).

Taliyah’s outpatient medical clinic was almost out of all supplies, including medicine, but continued to treat many sick people, including several who were likely wounded from combat. The tribal chief supported medical care as the main need of the town.

Taliyah had received its drinking water from a pipeline that originated in a larger city to the north, but because the power generation facility outside of town was not working, the pumps that ran the pipeline were not operational either. Most of the large pumps had blown gaskets, and only 25 percent of the homes in town were connected to the freshwater network via underground piping. The town was surviving on imported bottled water, and those supplies were getting low. The town electrician said water was the most pressing need.

Food was scarce. The Ba’ath Party had distributed food to the city monthly via supply trucks, with residents using their government-issued ration cards to request each of their family’s share, but the last food delivery had been over a month ago. The Iraqi leader in charge of food delivery argued that this was most pressing for his people.

Taliyah’s prewar police force had been led by Ba’ath Party members who left town soon after the invasion and took all of the police department’s small arms (AK-47s) with them. The Iraqi who claimed he had security expertise said Taliyah needed 150 weapons and help from the U.S. Soldiers to patrol the city, because its citizens were experiencing an increase in crime, especially violent carjackings.

Clearly, the overall challenge that afflicted Captain Thomson was remarkably similar to that of many city managers during times of catastrophe—too many needs and not enough resources. Thomson assessed his capability to help Taliyah. He had 125 infantry Soldiers, 14 Bradley Fighting Vehicles, and 6 HMMWVs. His unit had no engineer capability, but it did have small maintenance, medical, and food sections, and several Soldiers had civilian skills learned before joining the service that might be useful.

Thomson knew he was the de facto government in town, and he realized that he had to develop an acceptable picture of what short-term success was to the locals, or risk losing his credibility. Therefore, Thomson called a second town meeting and showed the tribal leaders that he had no organic resources available to positively affect any of the major issues facing the town, except for security. After Thomson facilitated a thoughtful two-way discussion, tribal leaders agreed that security was the number-one concern, and that restoring a legitimate security force was the most realistic short-term goal to work for. Thomson also let the Iraqis know he could not provide large-scale assistance for their immediate food and water needs.

He informed the Iraqis what his unit was capable of in terms of medical care, and he did what he promised: he gave them two boxes of surplus supplies, including water-purification tablets. Also, on a case-by-case basis, Thomson’s unit treated wounded Iraqis that the Iraqi clinic could not.

With Thomson facilitating, the four emerging local leaders worked out a security plan. U.S. forces would immediately begin patrols to reestablish security and safety in the community. Thomson also coordinated to get the local leaders a few weapons to enable them to arm a small police force. The security plan consisted of patrolling and empowering the new police force. It was successful because Thomson had convinced the emerging Iraqi leaders to agree that security was the primary short-term goal for Taliyah. Instead of becoming frustrated that the U.S. forces were unable to help in other areas of need, the locals viewed the new force as a great success. Because the security the Bravo Bushmasters provided met the Iraqi’s expectations of success in the short-term, the Iraqis were pleased with Thomson and the American presence. 

Footnote:

8
Shaping perceptions of stakeholder responsibilities. “Captain Larry, when am I going to be able to go to the United States and see your universities and set up exchange programs?”

—Dr. Atabee, Dean of the College of Science, Baghdad University

Managing expectations is also about getting stakeholders to do their part. For example, Captain Larry Geddings, the commander of a mechanized infantry unit assigned oversight of the sector of Baghdad that included Baghdad University, and I met with Dr. Atabee, a Baghdad University College dean. I listened as Atabee pressured Geddings to buy plane tickets and authorize him to travel to U.S. universities to collaborate and create teacher and student exchanges. Geddings smiled and responded that he would look into it, knowing that he could ask for, but did not have authority to grant, Atabee’s wishes, while knowing that Atabee and Baghdad University had a great deal of work to do before such plans would become a reality.

Geddings was concerned that several problems at the university needed to be resolved before he could do anything to promote an exchange program with an American institution. For example, security was still a major issue. An unarmed American soldier had been killed while walking near a dozen students in the center of campus a few months earlier, but witnesses would not admit to seeing anything. University concern for basic sanitation was also a problem, as evidenced by the visitor bathroom across the hallway from the college president’s office, which was among the most unsanitary bathrooms of any I had seen in Baghdad. Finally, the legitimacy of Baghdad University’s granting of degrees was in question, since the university had conferred a Ph.D. in political science on Uday Hussein and a Juris Doctor on Qusay Hussein, even though Saddam Hussein’s sons did not spend much time in class. However, Atabee was ready to go to the United States immediately and begin exchanges, and he told Geddings that this was “the way it needed to be.” Of course, Geddings knew that, realistically, before starting an exchange program Atabee needed to ensure his campus was safe, that sanitation at his university was reasonably acceptable, and that the degrees granted were actually earned.

Stakeholders like Dr. Atabee need to understand that stakeholders within a transforming organization typically must take deliberate action to effect some of the changes themselves: they cannot just wait to be changed by the system. The leader of the change effort must clearly communicate what he or she expects the stakeholders to do individually and collectively to make the transformation a success.

Figure 1 depicts many of the broad changes that coalition forces in Iraq are working on. Each requires the Iraqi people to take some action themselves. Although the transformation of all of the areas in

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area of Change</th>
<th>Before</th>
<th>After (goal)</th>
<th>Action by Iraqis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Totalitarian</td>
<td>Democratic</td>
<td>Run for office, vote, support elected officials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economy</td>
<td>Socialist</td>
<td>Capitalist</td>
<td>Risk money and time via entrepreneurship, compete</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of common people</td>
<td>Subjects, paid no</td>
<td>Citizens</td>
<td>Pay income, sales, and property taxes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>income taxes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equality/suffrage</td>
<td>Male only</td>
<td>Equal rights</td>
<td>Males accept gender equality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>for women</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Process</td>
<td>Only Ba’ath Party, only</td>
<td>Multi-party,</td>
<td>Campaign openly, support all popularly elected officials,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Arab, discrimination</td>
<td>multi-ethnic</td>
<td>respect all</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>and distrust</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1. Broad changes coalition forces are working on.
Figure 1 involves significant understanding, defining the role and managing the expectations of the common people in each area are crucial steps for the macro changes to be successful. During Saddam Hussein’s regime, although common Iraqis were not allowed to vote in legitimate elections, they were not required to pay income taxes, either. Furthermore, they received power, water, and often food from the Iraqi Government pro bono, as oil revenues funded this dependency-fostering socialist environment. The Iraqi people paid eighteen cents per gallon for gasoline in the summer of 2004, a subsidized rate that caused huge lines at the few gas stations that actually existed, because entrepreneurs had almost no incentive to build a gas station to compete against the government-run and subsidized stations.

American commanders like Captain Geddings have to communicate clearly to Iraqis that they are expected to do their part and vote, adopt an entrepreneurial culture, pay taxes, accept gender equality, and support popularly elected officials if this transition is going to work. Doing this well is a key tipping point for change, as it changes stakeholders from customers into partners in the change process. Stakeholders are much more likely to accept their responsibilities to facilitate change if they trust your character and your organization’s intentions, have faith in the benefits of the long-term process, and understand what constitutes short-term success.

Lessons Learned in How to Manage Expectations

I have learned twelve lessons in my career while attempting to manage expectations. Using these lessons as a guide can help put change-leaders on a path toward creating positive and consistent communication channels with their stakeholders.

Lesson 1: Under-promise and over-deliver. “We believe the (U.S./NATO) mission (in Bosnia) is limited and achievable within approximately a year.”

—Vice President Al Gore

Vice President Gore’s effort in expectation management may have had some traction at the time, but it quickly slid into a ditch when we stayed in Bosnia past the one-year mark. (In fact, we are still there more than ten years later.) Gore was likely advised by his experts that his claim was reasonable, but the fact remains that it didn’t strengthen his stakeholders’ beliefs in the organization (the U.S. Government) or the action itself (peacekeeping in the Balkans) to claim something that didn’t actually come true. The fact of the matter is that the United States cannot predict when it will successfully complete a peacekeeping operation. Every situation will be different, and claiming an end date before beginning is like adding up a mathematical sum before having the actual amounts to add together.

Wise change-leaders will always ensure they have a robust enough system to accomplish their promised goals, even if Murphy’s Law hits them in the nose several times along the way. In service professions such as engineering, customers (who are stakeholders) depend on you to do a job for them, on time, on budget, and to quality standards. A customer, boss, or peer probably will not have a clear understanding of the particulars of the job (including the technical and logistical requirements and the impact of environmental factors) that can significantly influence when you can finish. Therefore, it is up to you as the organizational leader to define the measures of success by setting and communicating the timeline and standards that you intend to meet.
For example, assume you are the platoon leader with the 1st Cavalry Division’s 8th Engineer Battalion, with responsibility to oversee the infrastructure rejuvenation of the town of Zapharania, a poor suburb of Baghdad located about 10 kilometers southeast of the city center. After driving around the town, you note that liquid sewage is collecting on the sidewalks in many of the neighborhoods. Further research shows that the main cause of the pooling wastewater is dilapidated and overwhelmed underground wastewater pipes. The city leaders ask for your help with this problem.

You decide to work with the city hall officials and local contractors, and conclude that you can fund and oversee a contract for a complete renovation to the city’s wastewater lines. Your engineer technical advisors tell you that the project will be finished in two months if everything goes relatively well, and within four months if multiple obstacles come into play. You know that your Soldiers’ level of motivation is not a variable, as you will all work just as hard regardless of what you cite as a finish date.

Let us assume that you want to announce your intentions at tomorrow’s District Advisory Council meeting with the Iraq authorities. A wise expectation manager will cite the four-month expected finish date. Your unit may be able to finish early and exceed expectations (to the cheers of all stakeholders), but if the external factors turn against you during the project, you will still be able to finish within your projected timeline, and your stakeholders (primarily the Iraqi citizens) will still see you holding up your end of the deal. Remember, only promise things that are within your power to deliver.

**Lesson 2: Set short-term goals together with your key stakeholders.** In addition to setting realistic end dates for a project, you can (and should) manage expectations by establishing interim short-term goals with your key stakeholders, especially those who have to take specific actions to ensure those goals are realized. This will help you build trust with them and encourage them to commit to their own responsibilities.

**Lesson 3: Have your stakeholders commit in a public setting.** When you plan to ask stakeholders to commit to an action in a public meeting, always select the location based on who will be present. Public meetings are typically good settings for such verbal commitments because the stakeholders are more likely to be held accountable by their equals. Your stakeholders’ standing with their peers and neighbors often will have a greater influence on whether they follow through on their promises than their agreement with you alone. When stakeholders know that others expect them to hold up their end of the deal, they will be more likely to meet their commitments and will become partners in the change process rather than customers of it.

**Lesson 4: Repeat messages to communicate clarity.** An expectation manager is fundamentally a communicator, and repetition and simplicity are crucial for effectiveness. In his book, The Four Obsessions of an Extraordinary Executive, Patrick Lencioni notes that three of his four “obsessions” concern creating and communicating clearly what an organization is doing and why. Presidential advisor Karen Hughes states that “As a communicator, I like to boil things down and make them easy to remember. I also realized that about the time the rest of us get sick of hearing about them, is about the time when . . . they’ll begin to stick, and people will actually remember them.”

**Lesson 5: Changing the message is a strength, not a weakness.** I caution change-leaders that they must modify their message appropriately whenever the truth or situation changes. If they do not, they risk alienating their constituents, who will then perceive them as a propagandist rather than an authentic communicator. Stakeholders’ needs change, and they will actively try to find out whether you are listening to them by watching to see if your actions alter as a result of their new needs and requests.

If you do not listen to them and keep exactly the same messages and actions, you are likely to lose their support, because you will lose their trust. You cannot make all groups happy all of the time, and you must publicly accept and address this fact so that it does not torpedo your change efforts. However, if you change in response to stakeholder needs, your stakeholders will be more likely to hold up their end of the deal.
needs when possible, it will build strength for your overall endeavors.

**Lesson 6: Set up regular meetings and a single communications center.** Wise change-leaders should establish a primary, easily accessible central information clearinghouse for updated status and information about short- and long-term goals. The central information clearinghouse could be a public website or blog that is updated daily/frequently, a bulletin board in a hallway that is regularly accessed by all stakeholders, or a daily newspaper with editorial space for the public.

The consistency of communication events is much more important than the consistency of the message itself. Stakeholders want to be informed and can handle bad news: they just want to hear it from the change-leader, and they lose trust when they hear it from someone else. Similar to a civil engineer’s charts that track the status of engineer projects against the plan, these central information clearinghouses enable communication with the stakeholders, especially when the clearinghouses present both positive and negative factual stories, while providing a simple mechanism for the stakeholders to send their thoughts back to the change-leader. If these central communication clearinghouses do not have updated information on a daily basis, in a consistent and easy to understand format, they will be disregarded almost instantly.

**Lesson 7: Managing expectations calls for establishing two-way communication.** Two-way communication with your stakeholders is critical: it is simply not enough to communicate one-way by lecturing or making formal statements to your stakeholders. Research your stakeholders’ culture, unspoken expectations, and body language. Ask them to speak their minds clearly and frankly. Listen reflectively. Mentally put yourself in their positions, and think about what your expectations would be if you were them. This process will help you understand the values their culture holds dear so that you can influence their perception of your intentions.

**Lesson 8: Always communicate what is not possible and why.** Do not be afraid to say “no,” and stick to your guns if doing so is realistic. You run the risk of stakeholders losing faith in you if you promise and can’t deliver (recall Lesson 1). A change-leader must always be clear about limits.

For example, Captain Doug Copeland was the commander of Bravo Company, 2-7 Cavalry, and was responsible for providing security in the central Baghdad neighborhood of Salhiya, just north of the International (Green) Zone. His company raided the house of an insurgent and took him into custody in June 2004. A few days later, Copeland took a U.S. patrol to the insurgent’s home to inform the insurgent’s spouse of her husband’s status and to return his wallet and some identification papers she might need in his absence.

Copeland knocked on the door with an Iraqi translator on one side and a large soldier as his bodyguard on the other. The wife came to the door and requested her husband be returned. Copeland quickly gave the wallet and identification back to the wife and told her, “Your husband is going to jail for attacking coalition Soldiers, and he will not be back for a long time.” He also told her everything he knew about the situation, including where her husband was most likely going to be incarcerated. He did not have to return the wallet and identification or speak to the wife, but he wanted to ensure he managed the expectations of one of the Iraqi citizens in his security area.15

**Lesson 9: The organizational leader should lead the managing expectations efforts.** To build stakeholders’ faith in the overall long-term process, the organization’s leader should deliver the most recent managing-expectations message and allow stakeholders to communicate openly with him. If you assign the responsibility for managing expectations to a staff officer or assistant, you send the message that communicating with the stakeholder is an auxiliary task and that he is not important enough for the organizational leader to communicate with directly. That is not the message you want to send to your constituents.

**Lesson 10: Being positive is a catalyst in managing expectations.** Even when you are unable to meet expectations, providing enthusiastic and cheerful communication will help people see that the glass is half-full, not half-empty, and will encourage their positive responses.

**Lesson 11: Don’t fear inevitable incidents, just respond promptly to them.** In almost any long-term change effort, there will be negative press, rumors, or claims against your leadership efforts. Sometimes the claims will present true incidents.
that, when taken alone, appear to hurt your cause. In this situation, your stakeholders may lose trust in your efforts. Such an event may influences leaders to centralize control of their messages and limit the communication and initiative of their subordinates. For example, in some theaters of operation, various U.S. Army organizations require general-officer approval of any PSYOP product (poster, pamphlet, radio broadcast, and so forth). We all know of incidents that have captured the world stage through the global media, but a wise expectation manager will not let the potential of a negative event stifle his ability to conduct ubiquitous, decentralized communication at multiple levels in the organization.

Most change-leaders work hard to keep their organizations 100 percent morally straight and honorable, but, especially in large organizations, there will periodically be occasions where individuals who represent the organization bring discredit to their boss’s team. Such unfortunate incidents can cause a temporary loss of your stakeholders’ trust. What most expectation managers don’t realize is that people expect organizations to make mistakes and typically have a much higher capacity to forgive them than the leader imagines—but only if the organization responds swiftly and publicly with appropriate corrective action. By doing so, the organization will almost always restore that trust. However, if your stakeholders sense a cover-up of any type, you will lose their long-term trust and your ability to manage their expectations. Cover-ups are what destroy trust, not the isolated incident that will inevitably occur, so do not limit communication in fear of such episodes.

Lesson 12: Get around egos by always using honest, two-way communication. Always present your key stakeholders with a full spectrum of news—good news and some not-so-good news—and provide a mechanism for them to express their opinions to you. Presenting just good news makes you seem insincere and sets you up for discomfort and resistance when you have not-so-good news to discuss.

As a company commander deployed in Kosovo, I thought it was important to sit down with each of my lieutenants and first sergeant once a month and give them written feedback on their performance. I always planned to give them positive impressions using specific examples I had observed, and I always gave them one area of potential improvement, even when they were clearly the best first sergeant or best lieutenant in the battalion. They also knew that I would ask them for feedback about how I was doing in my job and what specific things I could improve to help our unit. At first, my key leaders were resistant to the mandatory negative feedback during counseling because their only previous experience with such counseling was on a by-exception basis. After a few months, the bulk of the resistance went away. In fact, they started looking forward to such “what I can do better” feedback. My incredible first sergeant valued the “needs improvement” part of his assessment so much that he began asking me for even more things to improve.

Having such feedback is most critical during a long leading-change process. It says, “We are going to truly communicate.” The recipient of such feedback is okay with it because it is routine. He receives it from you and, in turn, he provides input on what you can do better.

Focus Your Efforts by Knowing Your Level and Context
A wise change-leader will use multiple lenses when looking at his situation. This helps clarify the managing-expectations landscape and helps the leader tailor his actions appropriately within the context of idiosyncratic and fluid situations. Calibrating a managing-expectations strategy will differ depending on whether the change-leader is trying to influence people inside his organization, outside of it, or both. In addition, a change-leader must understand what level he is targeting, either strategic (large organizations and/or societies) or tactical (a smaller group of people, most of whom the leader can communicate with personally if he chooses to do so). However, it is important to note that the central themes of managing expectations and the four key perceptions of it remain the same—no matter the level and context of the situation.

A Framework for Managing Expectations
Figure 2 looks at four different situations where one would be managing expectations and presents my view of the ideal amount of activity for key variables at various levels. The key variables
include the impact of global media, consistency of themes required, the priority on listening, the need to update messages, and most important, the four key perceptions in managing expectations.

Managing expectations is fundamental when leading change. Wise change-leaders will work to identify their key stakeholders, build a bridge of two-way communication with them, strive to understand their spoken and unspoken expectations, and realistically shape their perceptions of—

- The leader’s character and intentions.
- The benefits of the long-term change process.
- What constitutes short-term success.
- The stakeholder’s specific responsibilities to achieve short- and long-term outcomes.

Doing this will empower the organizational leader to understand the complexities of the change situation, enable alignment of goals with stakeholders, and provide mechanisms to promote understanding and teamwork to achieve those goals. Managing expectations is an essential part of the fuel required to make the impossible a reality. 

**Figure 2. Managing expectations overview.**


4. Rudy Rudi, comments he made in a special feature included in the DVD, Rudy, Special Edition (Tri Star Pictures, 1993).

5. MAJ Danny Hassig, civil affairs team leader, 1-153 Infantry, observations and interview by author, Baghdad, Iraq, July 2004.


8. CPT Darin Thomson, commander, B/1-41 Infantry, interview by author, U.S. Military Academy, January 2005.


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Emotional Intelligence and Army Leadership: GIVE IT TO ME STRAIGHT!

Major David S. Abrahams, U.S. Army

THE SCENE IS Hollywood movie producer Harry Meyer’s office. Harry is talking to famously bad B-movie actor Johnny O’Connor. Harry tells Johnny he is not renewing his contract.

“I’m lettin’ ya go, Johnny!” he says. “Your contract’s not being renewed.”

“But . . .”

“You’re finished Johnny!”

“Whaddya mean?”

“I think you stink!”

“Don’t mince words, Harry. If you’re unhappy with my work, speak up, will you? Tell me now.”

“You’re through Johnny! You’ll never work in this town again!”

“Geez, Harry! Don’t leave me hanging by a thread! Give it to me straight! Let me know where I stand!”

“Johnny, I think you are the worst actor I have ever seen, and I get 500 letters a week telling me the same!”

“O.K., O.K., Harry! But, what’s the word on the street?”

This exchange, between comedians John Lovitz and Phil Hartman, highlights a proven aspect of human nature: it is sometimes difficult for us to accept negative feedback. Research suggests that leaders tend to overestimate their strengths and underestimate their weaknesses. This trait is thought to be essential for maintaining a positive self-image. However, it has a negative effect. It can blind a leader to his personal shortcomings.

This kind of blindness can be especially problematic for leaders of Army organizations. Elevated to positions of authority by rank and regulation, Army leaders can become so distanced from their subordinates that the candid feedback essential to organizational effectiveness is absent. In Primal Leadership, Daniel Goleman and his coauthors describe this as “CEO disease.” They define the condition as “the information vacuum around a leader created when people withhold important (and usually unpleasant) information.” The Army’s rigid hierarchy and traditions can contribute to such a vacuum. A leader attempting to divine subordinates’ perceptions is often required to infer the meaning of subtle feedback from the members of the organization.

How can Army leaders influence their organizations in such a way that they promote candid, constructive feedback? What aspects of leaders’ personalities allow them to recognize and understand feedback of all types from those...
around them? We might find one answer to these questions in theories about emotional intelligence. Emotional intelligence is the ability that an effective leader harnesses to influence his subordinates and the climate of his organization in a positive manner.

Redefining Army Leadership

The first step to understanding and applying emotional intelligence is examining the interpersonal relationship between leaders and followers. To understand the leader-to-follower connection as an interpersonal relationship, we have to back up once more and define leadership. In his bestselling textbook *Leadership: Theory and Practice*, Peter G. Northouse defines leadership as “a process whereby an individual influences a group of individuals to achieve a common goal.”5 Northouse uses the word “process” to describe how leaders influence because the word implies an interaction; that is, leaders “affect and are affected by” those they lead.6

The Army definition of leadership in Field Manual (FM) 22-100, *Army Leadership*, is more prescriptive than that used by Northouse. It says that “leadership is influencing people—by providing purpose, direction, and motivation—while operating to accomplish the mission and improve the organization.”7 This wording implies that leadership is a one-way action. The leader simply provides purpose, direction, and motivation, and the followers are influenced. In fact, in the next sentence the FM defines “influencing” as “getting people to do what you want them to do.”8 Put another way, Army leadership is simply telling people what you want them to do. There is no provision for subordinate input and no requirement for subordinate “buy-in.”

While “influencing” is a central tenet to Northouse’s and the Army’s definitions of leadership, the influencing process Northouse describes is quite different from the Army’s. It is getting followers to do what leaders want as a result of an interactive process between the two. Effective leaders are able to align followers’ goals and aspirations with the organization’s missions and long-term health.

Some Army leaders are likely to dismiss this process as too “civilian” and therefore irrelevant to the Army’s unique warfighting mission. That would be a mistake. According to research conducted by Craig Bullis and Colonel George E. Reed at the U.S. Army War College (AWC) in 2003, an inability to recognize the importance of subordinate feedback and buy-in is one of the symptoms of a toxic leader.9 Bullis and Reed had Army colonels fill out a survey, and all of them indicated they had worked for destructive leaders at some point in their careers. They described such leaders as unconcerned about, or oblivious to, staff or troop morale and/or climate.

Bullis and Reed’s finding suggests that Army leaders need to get in touch with subordinates’ perceptions and morale. Research has shown that this seems to hold true for hundreds of other organizations as well. Organizations with leaders whose perceptions of themselves more closely match subordinates’ perceptions enjoy greater long-term health and are more successful in terms of mission accomplishment.10 Clearly, leader self-awareness directly affects organizational effectiveness.

FM 22-100 does discuss the leader’s need to be self-aware.11 It states that self-aware leaders understand their own strengths and weaknesses better and that they are better able to benefit from constructive criticism. The issue is that the Army does not consider self-awareness a central component of leadership. As a result, Army leaders are not driven to understand this essential leader skill or make development of it a priority.

Let us assume that the definition of leadership does highlight the process of interaction and feedback between leaders and subordinates. Most leadership theories emphasize that this is an important relationship and that it is the responsibility of the leader to maintain it.12 What then should the role of emotion be in the development and maintenance of this relationship?

Emotions and Leadership

A manager develops systems and identifies key missions the organization must accomplish. A leader instills will and spirit into subordinates and inspires them to meet or exceed organizational objectives.13 The emotional connection between the leader and the led and the leader’s understanding and control over his own emotions characterize descriptions of leadership throughout history.

Ancient Greek philosophers wrote that emotion had to be controlled. To prevent the passionate leader from making emotional decisions devoid of rational thought, they prescribed *sophrosyne*, which
can be translated variously as moderation, prudence, or self-control. Ultimately, sophrosyne refers to the art of self-mastery. Central to the Greek concept of self-mastery was a directive supposedly passed down from the gods to the oracle at Delphi: “Know thyself.” In other words, one had to know one’s own personal weaknesses as well as those that are a part of human nature. With this knowledge, the Greeks believed, a reflective leader could develop the virtues or excellent character traits required to inspire followers. This leader would not be a slave to his passions, biases, or ignorance; he would control his emotions.

Thousands of years later, military theorist Carl Von Clausewitz described the characteristics he thought were required of a great leader in combat. According to Clausewitz, the leader or commander’s force of will was often the only thing that kept men from running away amid the chaos and horror of the battlefield: “By the spark in his breast, by the light of his spirit, the spark of purpose, the light of hope must be kindled afresh in others.” Clausewitz added, however, that the leader must also possess the virtues of steadfastness and resolve in addition to the spark of passion, so as not to let his emotions rule his decision making.

Although the leader should be steadfast and resolute, Clausewitz warned against overconfidence and egotism. A leader must be open to suggestions and input, especially if they show he has made an error in judgment. Clausewitz regards stubbornly resisting input as a “fault of the feeling and the heart.” A commander must avoid frivolous changes of course, he writes, but he must also avoid obstinately refusing to change course when conditions warrant doing so. Clausewitz says military genius resides in avoiding these extremes.

A commander must sometimes use his emotions to inspire and at other times override his emotions to make sound judgments. This is not easy. Nor is it easy to know when to implement feedback from subordinates and when to maintain direction in the face of uncertainty. Army leaders must be able to perform all of these actions to be successful. Recent theories of emotional intelligence explain how individuals can attain some of the self-awareness and interpersonal awareness of great leaders as described by historians.

Emotional Intelligence

In 1983, research psychologist and bestselling author Howard Gardner proposed that there is more than one kind of intelligence. He took issue with using a single number, the intelligence quotient, to measure human intelligence. Gardner posited the existence of seven different human intelligences: linguistic, musical, logical-mathematical, spatial, bodily-kinesthetic, intrapersonal, and interpersonal. He believed that each of these intelligences developed independently of the others and that high performance in one did not predict high performance in another. (Gardner uses the words “talents” and “intelligences” interchangeably.)

Emotional intelligence theory deals with the last two types of intelligence defined by Gardner: intrapersonal and interpersonal. Intrapersonal intelligence refers to an individual’s ability to fully comprehend his own emotions and thought. Interpersonal intelligence refers to the ability to notice and interpret the moods, temperaments, motivations, and intentions of others. Peter Salovey and Goleman combined intrapersonal and interpersonal intelligences to create emotional intelligence.

Neurological research suggests that chemical and electrical reactions in the brain allow emotions to influence thought and, in cases of extreme emotions, shortcut thought to induce an automatic reaction. The ability to keep one’s emotions and thoughts in harmonious balance is what distinguishes a person who has high emotional intelligence from one who does not.

Emotional intelligence is divided into four skills—

- Knowing one’s emotions.
- Managing emotions.
- Recognizing emotions in others.
- Handling relationships.

Knowing one’s emotions. Self-awareness describes an individual’s ability to understand his feelings, even as they change from moment to moment. It allows the individual to regulate his actions, if he needs to, in the midst of an emotionally distressing experience.

Clausewitz regards stubbornly resisting input as a “fault of the feeling and the heart.”
Goleman calls this a “parallel consciousness that correlates physiological response to emotional stimuli with an understanding of mood.” Goleman and others state that a high level of self-awareness in an individual can sometimes make the difference between lashing out in anger or simply thinking “I am angry right now.” Science has proven that much of what an individual feels occurs in the subconscious, and that these feelings can subtly guide a person away from potentially harmful (physical or emotional) choices. The ability to “hear” such feelings might be the key to better intuitive decision making, among other applications. Self-awareness is an essential building block for managing emotions.

Managing emotions. According to emotional intelligence theorists, understanding alone cannot prevent people from being slaves to their emotions. The body’s physiological response to emotional stimuli is such that certain emotions build on themselves if we leave them unchecked. In experiments testing the body’s physiological response to anger, scientists found that levels of the chemical that corresponds to angry emotions immediately spike when anger is felt. The chemical lingers in the body, dissipating at a much slower rate than it built up. A second anger-provoking stimulus, presented before the first response fully dissipates, will cause a chemical spike higher than the original. This results in a prolonged state of anger, and increased sensitivity to reduced stimuli. In other words, there is a chemical reason why average people get angry easier if they are having a bad day—the more anger-provoking events that occur in sequence, the easier it is to lose control. This research demonstrates why leaders need to be self-aware. A leader who does not recognize the physiological symptoms of his own anger is much more likely to succumb to a spiral of angry reaction. Only by recognizing his anger can a leader begin to control it. This finding appears to support the long-held belief that we need a cooling-off period to cope with anger.

Later research, by Donna Tice, debunked the long-standing myth that venting rage is an effective method for reducing anger and affirmed the need for a cooling-off period. Tice found that the angry output itself becomes a stimulus that prolongs the increased heart rate and skin temperature associated with a heightened emotional state. Tice also found, however, that conscious, positive “self-talk” reduces the physiological remnants of anger, making a person less likely to be overcome by an angry mood.

The applications of this finding for leaders are obvious. Research shows that emotions and moods directly affect cognitive capability and performance in teams and organizations. Emotions, which are derived from basic human instincts, do serve a purpose. Managing them does not mean stifling them completely. Aristotle wrote that being angry is not a problem if a person is “angry at the right person, at the right time, for the right reason.” Understanding and managing emotions is the **sophrosyne** Greek philosophers describe as an essential leadership characteristic.

Recognizing emotions in others. According to Goleman, recognizing emotions in others, also known as empathy, is the fundamental “people skill.” This skill cannot exist without a high level of competency in the other emotional intelligence domains. One cannot recognize emotions in others if one cannot recognize one’s own.

Extensive research demonstrates that we rarely express emotions directly. In a marriage, for example, when one member of a couple asks, “What’s wrong?” and the other exclaims, “Nothing!” before sharply turning and stomping off, both parties know instinctively that more content was present in “Nothing!” than the word implies. About 90 percent of the emotional message of communication is contained in the tone with which it is communicated and in the nonverbal language of posture, hand movements, and facial expressions. Knowing the “vocabulary” of tone and posture can help a leader better understand his subordinates and their feelings. Similarly, knowing that you are less likely to accurately empathize with others if you are angry or afraid can also help you empathize with your subordinates. It illuminates the need to manage oneself as a precursor to managing others.

Handling relationships. Empathy enables us to perceive and understand emotional clues in others. Handling relationships means capitalizing on such clues to reinforce (or assuage) perceptions.
Relationship management refers to an individual’s adeptness at using emotional intelligence in a group setting when organizing groups, resolving conflict, connecting in a personal way, and analyzing social dynamics. An individual with high emotional intelligence can sense the mood of a group and communicate information in a way that captures group members’ attention and ensures they are likely to understand the information. An experienced standup comedian adept at “working the room” is an example. Goleman is of the opinion that handling relationships boils down to managing emotions in others. An individual with high emotional intelligence is likely to do this in an authentic, nonmanipulative fashion so as not to cultivate feelings of distrust.

**Implications for Army Leaders**

Applying emotional intelligence theory to Army leader development and training is an idea whose time has come. The costs of selecting and promoting leaders with poor emotional intelligence skills are lost unit effectiveness and junior leader disenchantment. The Special Forces (SF) community, leading the way in the application of emotional intelligence theory, has already begun to incorporate it into the SF’s selection process.

**Self-awareness.** Army Special Forces needs soldiers who can adapt quickly in ambiguous and dangerous situations. SF soldiers must work closely with people from various cultures, services, and government agencies, and this requires tremendous interpersonal skills. Evaluators use various aspects of emotional intelligence as screening criteria in the Special Forces Selection Course. They select candidates open to feedback who are able to inspire small teams and work well with a wide variety of people. Successful candidates must therefore have an accurate view of their own strengths and weaknesses.

To help candidates accurately assess themselves—a key first step to self-awareness—SF cadre use a combination of assessment tools, including a 360-degree assessment by peers who have been teammates and subordinates during training. These assessments help candidates reconcile their concept of self with the perceptions others have of them, which helps the candidates become more self-aware. Candidates who cannot accept the feedback given and then improve on their performance are generally not selected. Overall, candidates picked for Special Forces score high in self-awareness, which is one building block of emotional intelligence.

Studies at the U.S. Army War College support the need to train and assess conventional-force Army officers for emotional intelligence as well. Participants in a study on command climate called for implementation of a 360-degree assessment program for officer evaluation. Such assessments, even if used solely for professional development, would go a long way toward increasing self-awareness in officers and helping leaders establish a more effective command climate.

**Command climate.** While a student in U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC) class 2006-01, I conducted a survey with the goal of probing the relationship between emotional intelligence and command climate. A total of 271 students responded to the survey. Of those, 254 had more than a year’s experience as a company commander. The survey asked these students to think of a battalion or brigade commander who had rated them while they had been in command and then to rate that individual’s competence on a series of leader actions, three of which were subsets of emotional intelligence behavior: managing emotions, assessing emotions, and understanding the impact of one’s actions on subordinates. The students also rated the organizational climate under the same commander. The survey used several of the variables of command climate proposed by Bullis and Reed in their 2003 AWC study.

Last, the survey asked students how leader actions and competencies affected the command climate and how command climate affected organizational combat effectiveness. Students then ranked the seven leader competencies in FM 22-100 from

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An individual with high emotional intelligence can sense the mood of a group and communicate information in a way that captures group members’ attention and ensures they are likely to understand the information.
most to least important with respect to setting a positive organizational climate.

When taken as a complete data set, the survey results tell a comforting story of the state of leadership in today’s Army. According to the respondents, more than 70 percent of the leaders exhibited “competence” or “exemplary competence” in all of the 36 leader actions on which they were rated. More than 60 percent of responses indicated positive results for all aspects of positive command climate. Similar to findings presented by Lieutenant General Walter F. Ulmer Jr. and others in Leadership Lessons at the Division Command Level, my findings indicate that poor leadership at battalion and brigade levels is the exception, not the rule.38

Asked which leadership competency was most important to shaping effective command climate, the highest number of students responded in favor of “interpersonal” followed closely by “influencing.” (See figure below.) If one equates interpersonal competency to the fourth emotional intelligence domain, “managing relationships,” survey results suggest that leaders high in emotional intelligence are more likely to set a positive command climate.

Actually, to discern a relationship between emotional intelligence behavior and command climate, it was necessary to analyze only those responses in which officers rated former commanders as having low (or no) competence in the emotional intelligence behaviors of self-management, empathy, and self-awareness. The survey results seem to show that there is a distinct relationship between poor emotional intelligence and negative command climate.

On the original sample, only 26 percent of respondents said that working for the rated commander was an unpleasant experience. When I checked the input of the 33 respondents who rated their commander poorly on all aspects of emotional intelligence, I found that 32 of the 33—96 percent—had said their commanders were unpleasant to work for. Commanders with poor emotional intelligence scored poorly on loyalty, communication skills, and sense of humor, all aspects that are indicative of the quality of command climate.39

Further analysis of the survey responses is required. It is possible that poor ratings on other leader actions, in addition or coincidental to the emotional intelligence domains, are responsible for the lower ratings on the indicators of command climate. Despite this potential bias, initial findings indicate that leaders who possess high levels of emotional intelligence are more likely to set a positive organizational climate. Because many leadership experts agree that a poor organizational climate will almost certainly preclude sustained operational effectiveness, the implications for the Army are potentially profound.40

A Failure to Communicate

One way that leaders with low emotional intelligence poison command climate is by isolating themselves emotionally from their subordinates.
The following scenario depicts the aforementioned CEO disease, Army style:

A battalion commander was already having a bad day when he walked into the battalion area. One of his company commanders met him at the staff duty desk. “Sir,” said the company commander, “just found out a few moments ago that Staff Sergeant Jones got a drunk-driving ticket this morning. I wanted to tell you in person.”

“Son of a bitch!” the commander screamed. “That is the third NCO caught drunk driving in the last 6 months. I hope the next one winds up dead in a ditch! Somebody around here better start showing some leadership fast!” The commander stormed down the hall to his office and slammed the door, oblivious to the 20 or so Soldiers in the headquarters who had witnessed his blowup.

Several months later, as the battalion commander was settling in for a day’s work, he received a call from his boss, the brigade commander: “How come you didn’t tell me about last night’s drunken driving incident, Bob?”

“Sir. First I heard of it, sir! I don’t know why the men don’t let me know when these things happen.”

This story is based on a real Army experience. It illustrates one reason why a leader with poor emotional intelligence might be left out of his unit’s information loop. The commander’s inability to gain control over his emotions caused him to snap and berate a subordinate over a bit of bad news. Worse, this display occurred in public, and news of his reaction was quickly passed throughout the unit. The commander had made keeping him informed a dangerous undertaking—and one that subordinates avoided when possible.

In the New York Times, S.L.A. Marshall wrote that “too much has been said in praise of the calm demeanor as an asset to the fighting commander.” The trick, however, is not to display those emotions with second-order effects that will poison the organization’s climate. This is the mark of a self-aware leader.

Calm acceptance of bad news is a direct reflection of a leader’s emotional intelligence. In fact, it signals competence in all emotional intelligence domains.

Concept Gaining Momentum

The concept of emotional intelligence is gaining momentum in the world of cognition. This new way of looking at how people interact has tremendous applications for assessing and training leaders. From the ancient past to contemporary times, philosophers have described great leaders in terms of their self-awareness, balanced temperament, and ability to inspire. Now a blueprint exists for achieving some measure of success in these areas.

Leaders with high emotional intelligence are more in tune with their own strengths and weaknesses and open to feedback understand their subordinates’ moods and stay in touch with the mood of the organization. They are more likely to establish organizational climates in which their subordinates...
can excel. The success of subordinates inspired by the interpersonal influence of an emotionally intelligent commander to work together in pursuit of organizational objectives creates organizational synergy. The Army needs leaders who are high in emotional intelligence.  

**NOTES**

4. Ibid., 93.
6. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
11. FM 22-100, 2-17.
12. Northouse describes 10 leadership theories and approaches. Each assigns varying degrees of importance to the leader–led feedback loop. For example, in the skills approach to leadership, human skills are what allow a leader to see from another’s perspective. in the style approach, it is concern for people that lets leaders look at how the brain works, see Steven Johnson, Mind Wide Open (New York, NY: Scribner, 2004), specifically pages 41–43 and 108–10, which discuss instinctive decision making.
13. Dolf Zillman, as construed by Goleman, 56, 60-63.
14. Donna Tice, as construed by Goleman, 63-65.
15. Johnson, 134-49. See also Goleman, Boyatzis, and McKee, 13-14, 24-25, and 27-29, and Goleman, 114-17.
17. Goleman, 43.
18. Ibid., 97-98.
19. Ibid., 104.
20. Ibid., 118.
24. Dolf Zillman, as construed by Goleman, 56, 60-63.
25. Donna Tice, as construed by Goleman, 63-65.
27. Aristotle, quoted in Goleman, Boyatzis, and McKee, 80.
28. Goleman, 43.
29. Ibid., 97-98.
30. Ibid., 104.
31. Ibid., 118.
35. Goleman, 43.
36. U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC) Survey No. 05-05, “Characteristics of Organizational Level Leaders,” Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2006. The survey was conducted as part of the research for the author’s Master of Military Art and Science thesis, “Emotional Intelligence as an Army Leadership Competency: A Hypothesis that Emotional Intelligence Behavior in Battalion Commanders Impacts Organizational Climate Effectiveness,” no date. The author will supply complete survey results on request.
37. Bulis and Reed, 6.
39. Bulis and Reed, 6.
40. Ulmer, et al., 17.
41. Goleman, Boyatzis, and McKee, 193.
42. Ibid., 92-96, 192-94.
43. Ulmer, et al., 4.

This article was written and submitted to the MacArthur Writing Contest in early 2006, almost a year before the publication of the Army’s new Field Manual (FM) 22-100, Leadership. Similarities between the article and the FM are coincidental.
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TARGETING THE AMERICAN WILL and Other Challenges for 4th-Generation Leadership

The U.S. MILITARY is currently focused on deliberate transformation to meet the challenges of the contemporary operating environment (COE) and the requirements of future wars, but something might be lacking in the military’s rush toward transformation: true transformation is more than reorganization and reequipping; it is a process of creation in which things are made anew. The most important transformation the U.S. national security apparatus must make as it prepares for future conflict is not limited to organizational or technological change; it requires transforming the military culture to manage the complex tasks of counterinsurgency and to avoid endangering the most cherished American values.

On 6 February 2006, the Department of Defense (DOD) released the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), a document deeply rooted in the recognition that the United States is engaged in a “long war.” QDR 2006 validates and continues the trends evident in QDR 2001, the Transformation Planning Guidance of 2003, Joint Vision 2020 (JV2020), and various other roadmaps and proclamations of transformation the country has produced during the past four years. These documents emphasize information dominance, intelligence gathering and synchronization, and capabilities-based planning while demanding the military transform into a smaller, more agile, network-enabled organization.

However, the nature of the operating environment facing U.S. forces today is not, and is not likely to be in the future, one we can best confront with technological enablers. Indeed, the fourth-generation threats we will face during the next decade will effectively negate our technological superiority in weapons systems, sensors, and even communications. Paradoxically, our current opponents are at once immune to many of our technological advantages while they themselves leverage the nature of the Information Age in their attempts to defeat us.

Defining the Threat Environment

Before describing what changes in our military culture are necessary to combat these threats, we need to define the threat environment itself. In doing so, an ethical dilemma posing a significant challenge to the military becomes evident. Pundits and defense professionals alike define the COE in myriad ways, yet all seem to agree that we have entered into a protracted struggle.
It’s when we begin weighing the significance of the struggles against insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan that analyses about the COE really begin to vary. For instance, some consider these insurgencies to be separate from the War on Terror, while others consider them integral. Iraq, the Army’s main effort for the foreseeable future, has been described by some as a warfighting anomaly, essentially a problem to be dealt with before we move on to more conventional threats. Unfortunately, this seems to be the prevailing opinion among those authoring the QDR. The technologically enabled force they envision is well suited to fight cold war threats and ill suited to combat insurgencies or conduct other stabilization and reconstruction missions.

In his excellent book, The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century, Colonel Thomas X. Hammes derided current transformation documents for this same failing: “If the smug tones of our professional journals and ‘idea’ papers, such as JV2020, ‘Network-Centric Warfare,’ and ‘Transformation Planning Guidance,’ are an accurate indication, we believe our systems exceed the capabilities of any opponent and will provide us with near-perfect understanding of the battlefield. This is despite the contrary evidence provided by [Al]-Qaeda, the Taliban, and other insurgents in Afghanistan and Iraq.”

A telling indication that the anomaly theory of insurgency (or bureaucratic inertia) remains prevalent in the military is that the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC) is still basing its core exercises on a largely conventional threat posed by a fictional nation possessing Soviet-era equipment and tactics. What Hammes and others recognize is that the insurgency in Iraq and the global insurgency embodied in Al-Qaeda are far from anomalous. Instead, these conflicts represent the evolution of warfare into what is termed fourth-generation warfare (4GW)—Information-Age insurgency—that is an extension and modification of the guerrilla tactics articulated by Mao Tse Tung and refined in Vietnam, Algeria, Afghanistan, the Intifada, and now in Iraq.

Defining 4GW

The tenets of fourth-generation warfare are—

- No conventional force can defeat a “hyper power,” such as the United States, or a bloc of Western nations in conventional combat, as amply demonstrated in Operation Desert Storm, Operation Enduring Freedom, and the conventional phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).
- An insurgent movement can defeat a superpower by defeating its political leadership.
- Depriving a superpower’s leadership of public support can defeat it. The U.S. experience in Vietnam and the Soviets’ struggle in Afghanistan demonstrate the importance of national will to the war efforts of any superpower.

Despite the wishful thinking of technophiles and others who wish to see the insurgency in Iraq as anomalous and thus be able to dismiss the insurgent nature of Al-Qaeda, current and future operating environments are going to be dominated by 4GW opponents. Even the quickest glance at a map of Africa reveals the tenuous hold that the concept of “nation-state” retains there and elsewhere. And, even if the “Chicoms” of red-scare fantasies were to suddenly engage the United States in warfare, one can almost guarantee that the war would take place largely within the 4GW paradigm.

One needs only to turn on a television or unfold a newspaper to see what 4GW looks like. It is information warfare. Because the primary objective for both sides of a fourth-generation conflict is to sway popular support, the main or decisive conflict becomes the information warfare campaign. David Galula explains the genesis of this in Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice: “The first basic need for an insurgent who aims at more than simply making trouble is an attractive cause, particularly in view of the risks involved and in view of the fact that the early supporters and the active supporters—not necessarily the same persons—have to be recruited by persuasion.”

It is not news that an insurgent force simply cannot survive for long without popular support.

Despite the wishful thinking of technophiles... current and future operating environments are going to be dominated by 4GW opponents.
The hearts-and-minds slogans of Vietnam at least nodded to our acquaintance with counterinsurgency theory, even if our actions often showed otherwise. Given this, popular support and national will become the center of gravity for any insurgent and counterinsurgent campaign. Separating the population from the insurgency becomes one of the main aims of the counterinsurgent. Galula explains: “The problem [for the counterinsurgent] is how to keep an area clear [of insurgents]. This can be achieved only with the support of the population. . . . The population, therefore, becomes the objective of the counterinsurgent, as it was for his enemy.”

As insurgency has evolved, under the influence of global media, into 4GW, it has become clear that defeating the will of the American people can be just as or more important than gaining the support of a local population. When an external force is battling an insurgency, two popular wills come into play: the popular support of those in the nation grappling with insurgency (the Iraqis in OIF) and the popular support of those sending external forces (the publics of the United States, Britain, and other coalition forces). Hammes, updating Galula, writes, “Strategically, 4GW attempts to directly change the minds of enemy policy makers. [This is accomplished] through the superior use of all available networks to directly defeat the will of the enemy leadership, to convince them that their war aims are either unachievable or too costly. These networks will be employed to carry specific messages to our policy makers and those who can influence the policy makers.”

By shifting the battle from terrain- or force-oriented objectives to one for public support and national will, the fourth-generation insurgent not only refuses to recognize the boundaries between nation-states, but also obliterates the boundaries between the tactical and strategic levels of warfare. Traditionally, warfare has been divided into three levels: the tactical (battle), the operational (campaign), and the strategic (war or national aims). Within this stratified paradigm, achieving multiple tactical objectives would lead to operational success for the campaign, which itself would lead to the eventual strategic conclusion of the war.

In the current operating environment and in 4GW in general, the strategic level of war has come to dominate the tactical and operational levels as the three strata have collapsed into one another. Focusing on affecting the national will of his adversary, the insurgent is freed from some of the original necessities and constraints of Mao’s guerrilla model or the extension of those formulated by Galula. For example, the fourth-generation insurgent might not need to control even base areas (a Maoist tenet) if he can coordinate his strategic effort from dispersed locations. The insurgent’s secure base area can essentially recede into cyberspace as lone leaders direct decentralized operations around the world from isolated locations. The responsibilities and fetters that come with holding territory and having a population to care for can be delayed until the balance of forces or influence gives the insurgent freedom of movement. The fourth-generation insurgent has no pressing need to capture arms and material because, for the most part, he can operate with homemade weapons and devices or even none at all if he embraces the insurgent methods used by Gandhi or in Intifada I.

Inducing the counterinsurgent to use disproportionate force against unarmed or poorly armed freedom fighters can be a significant information operation coup for insurgents. The primary maxim that the fourth-generation insurgent lives by, and that we have been agonizingly slow to realize, is that almost all insurgent actions are strategic in scope. There are very few tactical targets in 4GW. Every action, every car bomb, and every statement is calculated to affect not just its physical target, but also the public will of the adversary.

**Joining the Information Battle**

Unable to match his opponent’s military-industrial might, the fourth-generation combatant operates primarily in the information battlespace. An
improvised explosive device (IED) blast in Baghdad might be of little significance to the tactical situation—the bomb’s tactical target might escape unscathed or its effects, given the U.S. monopoly on tactical and operational power, could be negligible in the immediate context—but the intended strategic target, the international and U.S. audiences that will see the results on CNN, Fox News, and the front page of newspapers around the world, will certainly be affected.

The blast and its results will instantly become part of the statistics of the war, entering into the assessment and decision making processes of those who hear of it. Beyond the mere statistics, video of the event will almost instantly be accessible to various audiences with varying effects. The bombing might be shown on U.S. and allied news networks, prompting debate about whether the situation there is getting any better or about the rising costs of continuing the conflict. It might also be used on insurgent websites as a recruitment, how-to, or morale-boosting device. Insurgent websites and other Internet outlets regularly host videos of attacks on U.S. or Iraqi Government forces, often with soundtracks and heraldic devices superimposed on the image. That these bombings, assassinations, and kidnappings have relatively minor kinetic effect or tactical impact is irrelevant. Commanders in Iraq sometimes proudly affirm that the IED threat does not limit their freedom of movement, but the purpose of the IEDs is not to limit freedom of movement for tactical units, but to limit supporting the United States, and any Iraqis working for or believed to be collaborating with the United States.” However, the target of the attack does not actually matter in a tactical sense. What matters is that the attack happens and is publicized.

The United States and its coalition partners joined the information battle late, but are now fully engaged in the fray. The strategic battle for the American will is waged on the airwaves and through the networks that pervade the daily lives of our citizens. The information battlespace surrounds us. A typical exchange in this battle is the 2006 news event caused by a failed attack on a young medic in Iraq. The insurgents filmed the attack for use in their information campaign. By virtue of the attack’s failure, the film was recovered and the medic made the rounds of U.S. news outlets explaining how he was shot and then tended to the wounds of the person who shot him. The insurgents’ failed information operation became an opportunity to “counterfire” with evidence of their failure while providing a showcase of positive American values.

You are free to accept or reject the notion that future warfare is going to be dominated by information operations. However, the U.S. Government and military are beginning to look at the current conflict through just this lens. Speaking to the Council on Foreign Relations on 17 February 2006, then U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld expressed concern that America was “losing the media war to Al-Qaeda.” Rumsfeld said that some of the most critical battles were now in the “newsrooms” and...
declared that government communications planning must be a “central component of every aspect of this struggle.”9 A recently declassified and released copy of the Information Operations Roadmap reflects DOD’s concern in this arena.10

**Adjusting the Military for IO**

The dominance of information operations in current and future conflicts poses unique and potentially troubling challenges for the U.S. defense establishment. This feature of 4GW most urgently requires adjustments within the military culture. To explain why this is so, one must examine the effects caused by the destratification inherent in information warfare.

The U.S. military currently employs artillery targeting language to discuss its information campaign. Terms in vogue include “nonlethal effects targeting” and “information fires and counterfires.” Information operations for a division or component command are often coordinated by the fires and effects coordination cell of a headquarters, an operation often led by artillery officers or other “targeteers.” The use of such language demonstrates more than that the pace of change is outstripping the military’s prodigious ability to create new jargon; these terms highlight an important aspect of the information war. As fires and counterfires are “shot” through the media, who is the primary target? Who is being “hit” by these digital rounds, and who is in the crossfire? If, as shown above, the primary object of the fourth-generation insurgent’s attack is the American national will, then the logical extension of the conflict requires that the U.S. populace be strategically targeted not only by insurgents but by U.S. counterfires. This poses not only an ethical challenge to the military profession, but also a real danger to America’s democratic institutions.

A telling illustration of the primacy of the information war and its reach from the tactical level to the strategic level is Major General John Batiste’s account of the 2004 battle for Samarra. According to Batiste, then commanding general of the 1st Infantry Division, key to the division’s success was identifying four lines of operation (LOO): “governance, communications, economic development, and security.”11 Note that only security is directly tied to traditional military roles. Indeed, the first three LOO clearly focus on gaining popular support for government forces; they indicate that the division saw popular support as the center of gravity in the counterinsurgency fight.

The communication LOO is of most interest here. Batiste writes, “Any spectacular enemy attack made headlines around the world. In our opinion, the international news media, including major U.S. television networks and print media, largely emphasized negative events, especially during the period leading up to the U.S. election. Of course, the enemy, using media representatives sympathetic to his cause, waged disinformation campaigns to discredit the Iraqi Government and coalition forces. [This] called for a proactive, agile, and coordinated IO, psychological operations [PSYOP], and public affairs battle drill to correct inaccurate or incomplete reporting.”12 The key things to note in this quote are Batiste’s reference to U.S. media and his claim that the U.S. press exhibited negative bias in the run-up to political elections. Clearly, anti-Iraq forces would be targeting the U.S. and international publics with information campaigns alleging wrongdoing by U.S. forces. But at what point should commanders on the ground also target U.S. and international populations with a public affairs battle drill? Somewhere between correcting inaccurate reports and judging certain reports biased because of election-year politics, we could easily cross a line.

As Batiste elaborated on the action in Samarra, he clearly targeted both the Iraqi and the international press: “The key was never letting an inaccurate report go by without an attempt to correct it. . . Units throughout the division produced daily ‘drumbeats’—simple one-page English and Arabic summaries of good news stories—and distributed them to media outlets and higher headquarters.”13 While these reports were
aimed primarily at a local audience, we know that Batiste also had the electorate at home in mind. He says so. In fact, a commander’s public affairs officer exists to help supply (or target) the American audience with information about the current campaign.

Without question, Batiste and other U.S. military commanders are trying to get the truth (from their perspective) to the U.S. public, but a system that disseminates “command messages to the lowest level,” uses “positive drumbeats” as a necessary weapon in the information war, and is concerned about media bias in an election year begins to edge into dangerous and uncharted territories. This might be a logical consequence of a war in which the primary objectives are local popular support and retention of public support at home, but it puts the military professional and the national political authority in danger of subverting the very democratic freedoms they have sworn to preserve. If, in an effort to win the Nation’s wars, the military is forced to manipulate the public’s knowledge of events—knowledge critical to informed participation in the democratic process—how is that same military assured that the political authority and aims of the war remain legitimate?

The Smith-Mundt Act of 1948, along with Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 68 (“International Public Information”) of 1999, clearly outlaws information operations or PSYOP targeting U.S. citizens. Traditionally we have been so sensitive about subjecting Americans to government-controlled media that even Voice of America transcripts are not readily accessible within the United States.

PDD 68 establishes an International Public Information Core Group (IPICG) to “address problems identified during military missions in Kosovo and Haiti when no single U.S. agency was empowered to coordinate U.S. efforts to sell its policies and counteract bad press abroad.” However, while stressing that the group should provide “information designed not to mislead foreign audiences” and that information “must be truthful,” IPICG’s charter expresses concern over foreign media reports being picked up by U.S. news media that would create a backwash of information into American information sources. The concern was such that the charter requires information efforts to be “coordinated, integrated, deconflicted, and synchronized to achieve a synergistic effect for strategic information activities.”

Both PDD 68 and the IPICG charter are cited in U.S. Army Field Manual 3-13, Information Operations: Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, as legal constraints prohibiting PSYOP from targeting audiences within the United States. Clearly then, as the destratification of warfare and the activities of fourth-generation combatants push us toward aiming information operations counterfires or public affairs battle drills at U.S. and international communities, we should pause to consider consequences. While endeavoring to win the strategic information war, it could be all too easy to unintentionally cross these fine lines.

Informing the Populace

An unfettered media is a key part of the checks and balances of our democratic system. A democracy cannot function without an informed populace,
and constraints on media or state ownership of media clearly impede the people’s opportunities to make informed political decisions. Unfortunately, American military culture has often fostered an antagonistic relationship with the free press. At best, the military considers the press a tool or weapon used to get the sound-bite friendly command message out to its intended audiences. At worst, the press is an enemy.

In 2006, CGSC provided each class member the opportunity to participate in a mock media interview. This, along with media panels and classroom discussion, was meant to help future staff officers and commanders learn how to deal with the media. Too often, however, the media was represented as yet another enemy to contend with on the battlefield. Role-playing faculty intentionally caricatured the press as ignorant or extremely biased. Reporters were most often portrayed as being on the attack, rather than as being interested in getting a relevant, truthful story to the public. These are symptoms of and contributing factors to the continued tension between the press and the military. Part of the cause for this attitude is undoubtedly rooted in the military’s increasing isolation from mainstream American culture. In a critique of the U.S. Army’s performance in Iraq, British Army Brigadier Nigel Aylwin-Foster noted this isolation as a cause of U.S. difficulties in combating the insurgency: “The U.S. Army’s habits and customs, whilst in some respects very obviously products of American society, are also strikingly distinct. . . . U.S. Army Soldiers are not citizen soldiers: they are unquestionably American in origin, but equally unquestionably divorced from their roots.”19

Indeed, the overwhelmingly conservative-Christian, conservative-Republican U.S. officer corps is having only a slightly more difficult time adapting to Middle Eastern Muslim culture than it is in dealing with a free press. In both cases, the problem is culture. While there is nothing inherently wrong with the predominant cultural biases of the officer corps or the military at large until such biases are taken to extremes, monolithic conformity of thought is crippling in any organization.20 Dealing with diverse indigenous cultures and the press is necessary in order to prevail in current and future conflicts. Given the nature of destratified war and the decisive nature of IO, we cannot afford to leave the battle to an officer corps fettered by its own culture.

It is unfortunate that one of the officer corps’ greatest ethical conundrums of current and future conflict should involve the media and politics, as both strike at critical vulnerabilities of its current culture. Batiste’s concern about election-year bias reveals not only the political lens through which he views the press, but more tellingly, he seems to almost unconsciously assign political roles to the insurgents, the media, and his division. His tacit assumption that the press (and perhaps even the insurgents) would use negative war coverage to sway election-year politics in favor of one political party over another does not even seem to require discussion for his audience.

Batiste clearly knows that the majority of officers reading his article will share his worldview and assumptions. And, he is probably right. But that very polarization of the officer corps might prove a critical vulnerability while we are engaged in a strategic battle for the American will. The danger is not that nefarious officials in smoky rooms will plot psychological campaigns to sway public support one way or another or to mislead the American people. The danger is that well-meaning officers will almost unconsciously and unknowingly manipulate the American public as they counter enemy information operations without fully considering the third-order effects of such tampering.

Two factors make this particularly troubling. The first is the aforementioned and potentially blinding political, religious, and cultural conformity of the officer corps. The second is the just-don’t-say-no attitude of that same corps. The officer corps is awash in type-A personalities. “Never bring up a problem without a solution,” “the effective range of an excuse is zero meters,” “can do,” “hooah,” and other military clichés typify this problem of positivism. From the foxhole to the Pentagon, the military engenders a can-do attitude, even when the right answer might be “we can but we shouldn’t.”

Saying “No”

More problematic are the times when the answer might honestly be no. While the U.S. military and particularly its officer ranks enshrine honor, integrity, and personal courage, there seems to be an unwritten prohibition against the words “no” or “we can’t.” This reluctance to assert the negative is exacerbated in a destratified information war, when
any negative news might potentially be viewed as a victory for the insurgents.

From the perspective of well-meaning officers, to win the strategic information war, the drumbeats of good news will simply have to outnumber the bad-news beats. These factors make the officer corps particularly susceptible to becoming almost unwitting participants in the political struggle for the American will, unintentionally crossing legal and ethical boundaries until they find themselves targeting not only the fourth-generation combatant, but the American people.

Prevailing in a fourth-generation, destratified information war while maintaining cherished democratic values will not be easy. Already evidence exists that the conflict might be eroding the very values we strive to protect. Debates are ongoing about domestic spying, the privacy implications of the “USA Patriot Act,” and the status of and due process for detainees at Guantanamo Bay. The reaction to recent criticisms by retired general officers—MG Batiste among them—is emblematic of the problem. While in uniform, general officers are constrained by traditions of decorum from criticizing civilian leaders. After they retire, if their expressed opinions conflict with current policy, they are derided as armchair generals or disparaged for having political motives. In such a dynamic, where does the duty of the military professional lie? Is sound military advice actually available to appointed civilian leaders if asserting the negative is so frowned on within military culture? Military professionals must have the opportunity to provide expertise in an unfettered manner to assure right action and success.

To prevail and yet retain the values we fight for, significant reforms in the national security organization and culture must occur. The first major reform should involve the reassertion of political authority over foreign policy. The militarization of U.S. foreign policy has contributed significantly to the success and promulgation of fourth-generation insurgency. Galula recognized this threat and temptation: “The number of reliable personnel needed [to quell the insurgency] is staggering. Usually, only the armed forces can provide them promptly. As a result, the counterinsurgent government is exposed to a dual temptation: to assign political, police, and other tasks to the armed forces [or] to let the military direct the entire process.”

This temptation notwithstanding, the missions associated with counterinsurgency are best led by diplomatic/political leaders, not by military officers. Clearly a diplomat or civilian political authority should be more capable of directing efforts of governance, economic development, and communication. Far from passing the buck on these types of operations, the defense establishment should shift resources to state and other non-defense agencies to increase their expeditionary capacity while growing a military force better suited and equipped to support non-defense efforts.

Growing a Force

Growing a force and particularly an officer corps capable of operating in a 4GW environment will be time-consuming, costly, and politically difficult to accomplish. The first requirement will be to increase the size of the military (and the other agencies previously mentioned). Counterinsurgency is not a technological task. It is a face-to-face, hand-to-hand, street-to-street process of gaining trust and building consensus while providing security. Technology allows us only to find and kill insurgents. Low-tech interaction between Soldiers and civilians allows us to end the insurgency itself. An increased force size would allow more dispersion throughout the affected country instead of concentrating forces on heavily protected and isolated forward operating bases, or FOBs, where Soldiers become “fobbits” who rarely interact with civilians and therefore have little to no effect on the struggle against the insurgency.

A strategy of engagement involves risk: it risks Soldiers’ lives as they mingle among the populace, and it risks that they will contribute to the enemy’s strategic information campaign by their actions, inactions, or even their deaths. The only way to mitigate this risk is by providing quality leadership and
training. This goes beyond simple language training or IED-awareness drills. The force required in the 4GW world will need to have a culture distinctly different from that of the current Army.

To provide the quality force necessary to prevail in destratified conflict, we need to revise the concept of what it is to be a U.S. Soldier. I suggest the following primary reforms, which necessarily focus on the officer corps to lead change:

● **Deemphasize kinetic solutions.** The current warrior ethos would be a good place to begin to shift the U.S. Army’s emphasis. The emphasis that the new “Soldier’s Creed” places on kinetic force (“I stand ready to deploy, engage, and destroy the enemies of the United States of America in close combat”) is completely out of step with current and future trends for combat. We probably will not need an army of close-combat Soldiers now or in the future. We have much greater need for Soldiers who are knowledgeable about non-kinetic solutions and are willing to apply them.

Changing our emphasis will not be as easy as simply changing a creed, however. The military must embrace a widened definition of warfare and redefine the role of the military in these diverse conflicts. For example, training a unit to assist U.S. Agency for International Development personnel as they attempt to shore up shaky Nigerian public institutions might be difficult, but it is something we are going to have to learn to do. Asserting that our mission is simply to “fight and win our Nation’s wars” is no longer permissible when our definition of war is too narrow to be useful.

● **Produce empowered, diverse, and critically thinking leaders.** By building an army of such officers and Soldiers, we will be able to fight both fourth-generation information war and third-generation conventional war. The concern that focusing the military on fourth-generation warfare will cause it to lose its ability to defeat a conventional enemy is unfounded. The changes necessary to effectively combat destratified war will produce a more capable, more agile force better able to defeat any conventional threat. However, change must begin with the officer corps.

As mundane as it might seem, a shift in emphasis from a technical and/or scientific education to a broader liberal arts education would make a world of difference. The liberal arts background provides officers with the critical-thinking skills necessary to adapt and overcome as necessity demands. For example, during CGSC wargaming we found that traditional methods that track action-counteraction-reaction in a linear manner, and the ensuing quantification of results, were inadequate, given the complexity and nuance of counterinsurgency. Indeed, the ability to read and articulate metrics of a more subjective and ambiguous nature (especially results of non-kinetic effects targeting a nonhostile population) is more akin to skills found in liberal arts majors than those of scientific bent. To paraphrase the motto of the U.S. Military Academy English Department, the ability to read texts with attention to context, subtext, and nuance often translates to an ability to read one’s world. In addition, increased recruiting in these disciplines would attract a more diverse pool of applicants to augment those traditionally found in engineering or technical disciplines, perhaps bringing more diversity of thought to the officer corps.

● **Increase pre-commissioning demands and rethink the philosophy of professional military education.** On commissioning, each officer should have basic fluency in at least one language of interest as determined by DOD. The military should then provide opportunities for cultural immersion throughout the officer’s career. A period of internship in business or interagency experiences with the government would also foster the skills needed in stability and reconstruction operations as well as help maintain the officer corps’ integration into mainstream America.

Later, as captains and majors, many officers should serve in interagency positions to gain an appreciation of the interagency process and, again, to broaden their cultural exposure and prevent the continued isolation of the military culture. Currently, at the field-grade level, all officers are supposed to undertake intermediate-level education, formerly reserved for the top 50 percent of a given year group. Instead, with a larger force available to provide a larger float account (the Trainees, Transients, Holdees, and Students Account), the goal should be to provide every officer 18 months to 2 years of civilian graduate schooling, so each can obtain a master’s degree. The subject of study should be relatively unrestricted and include disciplines such as international relations, history, politi-
cal science, philosophy, and literature. Not only will such experience sharpen officers’ critical reasoning skills and return broadly educated leaders to the force, but time spent on a civilian campus will once again introduce them to the diversity of American thought and experience beyond the military.

- **Reintroduce rigor, challenge, and selectivity into officer careers.** Future operations will require officers of the highest quality. Reintroducing rigor, challenge, and selectivity into officer careers would be contrary to the current trend of removing discriminators such as senior-rater block checks from files and promoting more than 95 percent of applicants to the next rank. These practices do nothing but ensure that in five years we will have a sizeable batch of mediocre leaders at battalion and brigade level, moving up instead of out just when we will need quality leadership most.

Instead of attempting to retain all we can, we need to ensure that the officer career pattern once again becomes rigorous and competitive to combat the threats posed by a subtler, more intellectually challenging form of warfare. We might also need to look beyond traditional commissioning sources to find applicants suitable to conduct the missions we find ourselves doing in fourth-generation conflict.

- **Defeat the problem of positivism.** Transformation must be more of a bottom-up process. In the current environment of mandated transformation, junior leaders’ valuable contributions are dissuaded by an atmosphere of top-down, criticism-adverse management. The problem of positivism impedes change and adaptation keyed to current situations. While many seem to see the disjunctions between transformation and the current operating environment, few young leaders can find venues for critiquing transformation without fearing negative career consequences. Arenas like officer advanced courses and CGSC should be opportunities for company and field grade officers to test, validate, invalidate, or refine current and emerging doctrine.

- **Unshackle officer assignments (and promotions) from branch constraints.** The branch structure should be less of an impediment to putting officers where they belong in the force. For instance, an armor officer identified as an excellent civil-military liaison should be able to work in that field without hurting his chances for promotion or having to clear substantial bureaucratic hurdles. Indeed, the counter-insurgency and fourth-generation fight requires us to quickly identify those best suited to the sometimes ambiguous nature of the conflict and put them where their skills are most needed. Traditional gates for promotion and even quotas by branch might need to be jettisoned as we restructure our force to meet the demands of fourth-generation warfare.

### Allowing Truth to Prevail

If the battles of the next century are going to be waged primarily in the realm of ideas, with fighting over popular support and national will, we require an officer corps and military able to carefully navigate complex issues of ethical and strategic importance. If the enemy’s main objective is to turn the American will by means of a strategic information campaign, the American defense establishment must be able to enter the fray fully cognizant of the ramifications and capable of avoiding harm to the very democratic institutions it has sworn to defend.

While trusting that the free marketplace of ideas will allow truth to prevail and an informed populace to make right decisions, we must resist the temptation to restrict the flow of information or to target the American public with overzealous public information campaigns. Poet John Milton, who lived through decades of insurgency and sectarian violence during the English Civil War, later served as Secretary of Foreign Tongues for the Rump Parliament, providing it with services that might well be thought of as
strategic communications and public diplomacy. Yet, protesting policies of the Long Parliament in 1643, he wrote movingly in “Areopagitica,” his famous tract against censorship, about the power of truth: “I cannot praise a fugitive and cloistered virtue, unexercised and unbreathed, that never sallies out and sees her adversary, but slinks out of the race where that immortal garland is to be run for, not without dust and heat. Assuredly we bring not innocence into the world, we bring impurity much rather: that which purifies us is trial, and trial is by what is contrary.”

The battle of ideas, of truth and falsehood, of right and wrong, of tolerance and absolutes, must be given free rein if we are to remain assured that we are executing the will of the American people. A renewed military and government that believes and practices this will be in no danger of losing in the information wars to come. MR

NOTES

6. Ibid., 75.
8. Ibid., 175.
12. Ibid., 16.
13. Ibid., 17.
16. PDD 68.
17. Ibid.
20. Examples of the cultural bias and isolation of the officer corps abound. Some are relatively benign, such as officers referring to CNN as “the Communist News Network” in open-forum CGSC lectures, secure in their assumption that every other officer in the room will both affirm and disparage the network’s supposed liberal bias. That assumption presupposes a shared political affiliation among all officers. Other examples are less benign, such as the constant placement of Christian tracts (sometimes printed in Arabic) along the hallways frequented by International Fellows in academic buildings at CGSC. In another example, an organization called the Officer Christian Fellowship (OCF) thrives and actively recruits at service academies and professional military schools such as CGSC. This organization’s mission statement clearly indicates OCF’s intent to replace the leadership of the military with “Christian leadership” and to create “ambassadors for Christ in uniform.” Their website also warns against the dangers of “secularism” and “pluralism” in American society. This should give pause to those sworn to defend a constitution that establishes and protects our pluralistic, secular society and to those sending the military to promote and safeguard tolerant, secular, and pluralistic governments in the Muslim world and elsewhere (“Officer Christian Fellowship Strategy for 2002-2006,” <http://ocf.gospelcom.net/pubs/strategy.php>).
Brigadier General Mitchell M. Zais, U.S. Army (Retired), Ph.D.

ANY OF OUR faculty and staff have asked me my views about the current situation in Iraq. A few students have also asked. So I thought I would take this opportunity, two days before Veterans Day, to provide you with some insights as seen from the perspective of a combat veteran who served as the commanding general of U.S. and allied forces in Kuwait. I also served as chief of war plans in the Pentagon and have spent considerable time studying national security affairs. My resume includes a fellowship at the National Defense University. So while it’s true that everyone has opinions about Iraq, I would argue that not all of those opinions are equally well-informed.

This talk will address our strategy in Iraq. I won’t talk about what the next steps should be, what the long-term prospects for peace in Iraq are, or how we can best get out of the quagmire we are in. Those might be other talks. For today I’m going to focus on strategy.

Let me begin by saying that most of our problems in Iraq stem from a flawed strategy that has been in place since the beginning of the war.

It’s important that you understand what strategy is. In military terminology there are distinctions between strategy, operations, tactics, and techniques.

**Strategy** pertains to national decision making at the highest level. For example, our strategy in World War II was to mobilize the Nation, then defeat the Nazi regime while conducting a holding action in the Pacific, then shift our forces to destroy the Japanese Empire. Afterwards, our strategy was to rebuild both defeated nations into capitalistic democracies in order to make them future allies.

An example of an **operational** decision from World War II would be the decision to invade North Africa and then Italy and southern France before moving directly for the heart of Germany by coming ashore in northern France or Belgium.

**Tactics** characterize a scheme of maneuver that integrates the different capabilities of, for example, infantry, armor, and artillery.

A **technique** might describe a way of employing machineguns with overlapping fields of fire or of setting up a roadblock.

Our strategy in Iraq has been—

- Fight the war on the cheap.
- Ask the ground forces to perform missions that are more suitably performed by other branches of the American Government.
- Inconvenience the American people as little as possible.
- Continue to fund the Air Force and Navy at the same levels that they
have been funded at for the last 30 years while shortchanging the Army and Marines who are doing all of the fighting.

No wonder the war is not going well.

Let me explain how the war is being fought on the cheap.

From the very beginning, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, who thankfully announced his departure yesterday, has striven to minimize the number of Soldiers and Marines in Iraq. Instead of employing the Colin Powell doctrine of “use massive force at the beginning to achieve a quick and decisive victory,” his goal has been to “use no more troops than absolutely necessary so we can spend defense dollars on new technology.”

Before hostilities began, the Army Chief of Staff, [General] Eric Shinseki, testified before Congress that an occupation of Iraq would require hundreds of thousands of Soldiers. Shinseki made his estimate based on his extensive experience in the former Yugoslavia, where he worked to disengage the warring factions of Orthodox Serbs, Catholic Croats, and Muslim Bosnians.

Shinseki also had available the results of a war game conducted in 1999 that involved 70 military, diplomatic, and intelligence officials. This recently declassified study concluded that 400,000 troops were needed on the ground to keep order, seal borders, and take care of other security needs. And even then stability would not be guaranteed.

Because of Shinseki’s testimony before Congress, Rumsfeld moved the general aside. In a nearly unprecedented move, to replace Shinseki, Rumsfeld recalled to active duty a retired general who was more likely to accept his theory that we could win a war in Iraq and establish a stable government with a small number of troops.

The Defense Department has fought the war on the cheap because, despite overwhelming evidence that the Army and Marine Corps need a significant increase in their size in order to accomplish their assigned missions, the civilian officials who run the Pentagon have refused to request authorization from Congress to do so. Two Democratic representatives, Mark Udall of Colorado and Ellen Tauscher of California, have introduced a bill into Congress that would add 80,000 troops to the end strength of the Active Army. Currently, this bill has no support from the Defense Department.

When I was commissioned in 1969, the Army was one and a half million. Despite the fact that we’re engaged in combat in Iraq, in Afghanistan, in the Philippines; committed to peacekeeping missions in Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Sinai; and on operational deployments in over 70 countries, our Army is now less than one third that size. We had more Soldiers in Saudi Arabia in the first Gulf War than we have in the entire Army today. In fact, Wal-Mart has three times as many employees as the American Army has Soldiers.

As late as 1990, Army end strength was approximately 770,000. With fewer than a half million today, defense analysts have argued that we need to add nearly 200,000 Soldiers to the active ranks.

Today, the Army is so bogged down in Afghanistan and Iraq that fewer than 10,000 Soldiers are ready and able to deal with any new crisis elsewhere in the world. And because the Army is so small, after only a year at home units are returning to Iraq for a second and even a third 12-month tour of duty.

Let me add a parenthetical note here explaining a difference between our services. Army tours of duty in Iraq are for 12 or 13 months. For Marines, it’s normally 6 months. For Air Force personnel, it’s typically 4 months. So when a Soldier says he’s going back to Iraq for his third tour, it means something totally different than when an Airman says the same thing.

Because the active force is too small, the mission of our National Guard and Reserve forces has been changed. Their original purpose was to save the Nation in time of peril. Today they serve as fillers for an inadequately sized active force. This change in mission has occurred with no national debate and no input from Congress.

We have fought the war on the cheap because we have never adequately funded the rebuilding of the

We had more Soldiers in Saudi Arabia in the first Gulf War than we have in the entire Army today. In fact, Wal-Mart has three times as many employees as the American Army has Soldiers.
Iraqi military or the training and equipping of the Iraqi police forces. The emails I receive from Soldiers and Marines assigned to train Iraqi forces all complain of inadequate resources, because they are at the very bottom of the supply chain and the lowest priority.

We have fought the war on the cheap because we have failed to purchase necessary equipment for our troops or repair that which has been broken or has worn out in combat. You’ve all read the stories about Soldiers having to purchase their own bulletproof vests and other equipment. And the Army Chief of Staff has testified that he needs an extra $17 billion to fix equipment. For example, nearly 1,500 war-fighting vehicles await repair in Texas, with 500 tanks sitting in Alabama.

Finally, we are fighting this war on the cheap because our defense budget of 3.8 percent of gross domestic product is too small. In the Kennedy administration it averaged 9 percent of GDP. The average defense budget in the post-Vietnam era, from 1974 to 1994, was about 5.8 percent of GDP. If we are in a global war against radical Islam—and we are—then we need a defense budget that reflects wartime requirements.

A second part of our strategy is to ask the military to perform missions that are more appropriate for other branches of government.

Our Army and Marine Corps are taking the lead in such projects as building roads and sewage treatment plants, establishing schools, training a neutral judiciary, and developing a modern banking system. The press refers to these activities as nation building. Our Soldiers and Marines are neither equipped nor trained to do these things. They attempt them, and in general they succeed, because they are so committed and so obedient. But it is not what they do well and what only they alone can do.

But I would ask, where are our Department of Energy and Department of Transportation in restoring Iraqi infrastructure? What’s the role of our Department of Education in rebuilding an Iraqi educational system? What does our Department of Justice do to help stand up an impartial judicial system? Where is the U.S. Information Agency in establishing a modern equivalent of Radio Free Europe? And why did it take a year after the end of the active fighting for the State Department to assume responsibility from the Department of Defense in setting up an Iraqi government? These other U.S. Government agencies are only peripherally and secondarily involved in Iraq.

Actually, it would be inaccurate to say that the American Government is at war. The U.S. Army is at war. The Marine Corps is at war. And other small elements of our armed forces are at war. But our government is not.

A third part of our strategy is to inconvenience the American people as little as possible.

Ask yourself, are you at war? What tangible effect is this war having on your daily life? What sacrifices have you been asked to make for the sake of this war other than being inconvenienced at airports? No, America is not at war. Only a small number of young, brave, patriotic men and women, who bear the burden of fighting and dying, are at war.

A fourth aspect of our strategy is to fund Navy and Air Force budgets at prewar levels while shortchanging the Marine Corps and the Army that are doing the fighting.

This strategy, of spending billions on technology for a Navy and Air Force that face no threat, contributes mightily to our failures in Iraq.

Secretary Rumsfeld is a former Navy pilot. His view of the battlefield is from 10,000 feet, antiseptic and surgical. Since coming into office he has funded the Air Force and the Navy at the expense of the Army and Marines because he believes technological leaps will render ground forces obsolete. He assumed that the rapid victory over the Taliban in Afghanistan confirmed this belief.

For example, the Defense Department is pouring billions into buying the newest fighter aircraft, at $360 million each, to take on a nonexistent enemy Air Force.

But, for pilots like Rumsfeld and Air Force General Richard B. Myers, his former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, war is all about technology. It’s computers, it’s radar, and it’s high-tech weapons.
Technologists have a hard time comprehending the motivations of a suicide bomber or a mother who celebrates the death of her son in such a way. It’s difficult for them to understand that to overcome centuries of ethnic hatred and murder it will take more than one generation. It’s hard for them to accept that for young men with little education, no wives or children, and few job prospects, war against the West is the only thing that gives meaning to their lives.

But war on the ground is not conducted with technology. It is fought by 25-year-old sergeants leading 19-year-old Soldiers carrying rifles, in a dangerous and alien environment, where you can’t tell combatants from noncombatants, Shi’ites from Sunnis, or suicide bombers from freedom-seeking Iraqis. This means war on the street is neither antiseptic nor surgical. It’s dirty, complicated, and fraught with confusion and error.

In essence, our strategy has been produced by men whose view of war is based on their understanding of technology and machinery, not their knowledge of men from an alien culture and the forces that motivate them. They fail to appreciate that if you want to hold and pacify a hostile land and a hostile people you need Soldiers and Marines on the ground and in the mud, and lots of them.

In summary, our flawed strategy in Iraq has produced the situation we now face. This strategy is a product of the Pentagon, not the White House. And remember, the Pentagon is run by civilian appointees in suits, not military men and women in uniform. From the very beginning, Defense Department officials failed to appreciate what it would take to win this war.

The U.S. military has tried to support this strategy because they are trained and instructed to be subordinate to and obedient to civilian leadership. And the American people want it that way. The last thing you want is a uniformed military accustomed to debating in public the orders of their appointed civilian masters. But retired generals and admirals are starting to speak out, to criticize the strategy that has produced our current situation in Iraq.

But, if we continue to fight the war on the cheap, if we continue to avoid involving the American people by asking them to make any sacrifice at all, if we continue to spend our dollars on technology while neglecting the Soldiers and Marines on the ground, and if we fail to involve the full scope of the American Government in rebuilding Iraq, then we might as well quit, and come home. What we have now is not a real strategy—it’s business as usual. MR
This paper is a postscript to the authors’ July-August 2006 Military Review article “Producing Victory: Rethinking Conventional Forces in COIN Operations.” That article won the Combined Arms Center Commanding General’s Special Topics Writing Competition: Countering Insurgency.

"PRODUCING VICTORY" was an Operation Iraqi Freedom II product. We wrote the bulk of the article in mid-to-late 2005, but the essay’s foundational experiences clearly ended in late 2004. We believe that we gravitated to some key principles based on those experiences—specifically, that the combined arms maneuver battalion, partnering with indigenous security forces and living among the population it secures, should be the basic tactical unit of counterinsurgency warfare. However, that does not mean that the essay could not use some updating to serve as a framework for operations in 2007.

Of course, in many ways, we are manifestly unqualified to update the article. While one author keeps his hand in the intel world, he is in graduate school in Virginia; the other has served at division level since mid-2005 and makes no pretense about seeing today’s Baghdad, save by air. Nevertheless, with the strategy we articulated now being made possible by the “surge” of Army brigades, we felt compelled to add this postscript.

The tinder for ethnic and religious cruelty was always a flammable thread in the fabric of Iraq. Given the sadistic nature of the Saddam Hussein regime, the current conflagration sparked by the bombing of the Golden Dome is, in a sad way, understandable. This level of sectarian violence, new since 2004, makes the environment more complex, but it does not fundamentally change the battalion-level dynamic we prescribed. In particular, whether we portray the problem as insurgency or low-level civil war, the antidote remains much the same: a strong, representative government that has a monopoly on the use of force. The Iraqi Government needs to exert primacy over competing religious, tribal, and ethnic centers of power. It would have been preferable if this government had been built from the bottom up, drawing legitimacy from neighborhood and district advisory councils rather than from the top down, but this is now a moot point: we have to work with the government we have, not the one we wish we had.

Early 2007 finds the U.S. military in Iraq responsible for two related missions: counterinsurgency in support of the Iraqi Government, and nascent
peace enforcement between warring Shi’a and Sunni partisans. While analogies are slippery, our current predicament somewhat echoes pre-Dayton Bosnia. The most notable difference, of course, is that in Iraq all parties involved are also shooting at us.

To be sure, this is an Iraqi problem that ultimately requires an Iraqi solution. The coalition force mission is to catalyze this process by mitigating the effects of insurgents and partisans in battalion areas of operations while assisting the Iraqi Government at all levels in developing the necessary institutions to govern. At the same time, we need to be constantly aware of actions that empower one belligerent over another, particularly within the government itself.

Our mission to strengthen civil government rests on kinetic and non-kinetic foundations. As Soldiers, we are conditioned for kinetic action. While this visceral response is often the safest in the short term—and may be necessary—it often comes at the cost of local support. Four years into our experience in Iraq, it is unrealistic to expect that we would be overwhelmingly popular. But support from the population—even tacit support—is critical. Like a patient diagnosed with cancer forced to choose between chemotherapy and malignant decay, the average Iraqi can and should be expected to choose a path of distressed hope over terminal despair. But we must first demonstrate that there is such a path. Just as the 20th century required America to provide an alternative to both fascism and communism, the 21st century demands an alternative to both repressive dictatorship and Islamic extremism.

The non-kinetic component of this mission will take time and must be incorporated into initial planning. While kinetic action provides immediate results, economic opportunity and political empowerment promise long-term sustainability. Success, here and now, depends on the U.S. and Iraqi Governments offering a viable future to the Iraqi people.

By embedding U.S. maneuver elements throughout Baghdad and partnering them with Iraqi Security Forces, we should be able to clear militia-dominated neighborhoods and so reduce sectarian influence. With many of the key facilities in Baghdad repatriated to the government of Iraq, the joint security station concept—integrating coalition troops with Iraqi forces at secure locations in sector—represents a feasible alternative to the joint battalion basing we previously articulated. Further, commanders can supplement the joint security stations with additional combat outposts and patrol bases. The U.S.-Iraqi projection of security rests on the physical proximity between our forces and the population. Accessibility is, in a very non-doctrinal sense, a form of maneuver and certainly a form of protection. Living among the population enhances our ability to act.

Holding gains in the *mulhallas* will require a sustainable political solution that recognizes the local balance of power. Such a settlement will only result from the concentrated application of economic, military, and diplomatic influence at the lowest level. In an environment like Baghdad’s, success will be measured block by block, street by street, neighborhood by neighborhood. The Iraqi Government must replace tribal and religious actors as the primary suppliers of physical security, essential services, and economic opportunity—although tribal and religious actors will likely be incorporated into local arrangements. That said, communities must gradually learn to depend more on their civic institutions and civil society than on sectarian actors to resolve the problems of daily life.

Of course, challenges remain. As we previously articulated, interagency relationships, tactical intelligence collection, and civil-military operations have not yet been sufficiently restructured. Further, while we advocated a powering-down to battalion level, much of the theater seems to have gone in a different direction, with commands at echelons above corps proliferating. We remain unconvinced that “Mother Army” has shifted her mindset and now views the battalion as the “supported command.” We will all have to help foster this change as we move forward in operations that place a premium on activities at the battalion level.

From America’s own democratic experience, we know that building responsible government agencies is a time-consuming and dynamic endeavor. But whereas the United States had the luxury of dealing with its various internal tensions over time, the Iraqis seem destined to deal with them all at once, using weaker institutions as instruments. Forging a government with an identity distinct from the sectarian interests that formed it is the *Iraqi* challenge. Strengthening their institutions, so they can achieve self-sustainment within the timeframe allowed by U.S. public opinion, is our challenge. **MR**
“THE KEY TO VICTORY in Iraq is not kinetic” is a phrase now commonplace in the halls of military leadership the world over. The U.S. Army turned that rhetoric into action in the summer of 2006, when U.S. Army Chief of Staff General Peter J. Schoomaker directed a division headquarters and two entire combat brigades to shift their primary responsibility from warfighting to Iraqi training and advising.

This was a significant step, but it is only part of an equation that is complicated by the well-entrenched kinetic solutions of our best warfighters. It took years to hone those warfighting skills, and yet there is only a fraction of that time available to acquire the specific skills that the new trainer-advisors (and many others to come) need for their mission.

As with any skill, learning the basics often determines success or failure. But what are the basics for an advisor? What principles equivalent to the warfighter’s “shoot, move, and communicate” might guide advisors of any background or specialty and help them perform effectively?

Advisors need something less proscriptive than “don’t do it for them,” but more prescriptive than “assist them in their tasks.” I certainly don’t think I offer anything unique here, but I can tell you that after a year of interaction with dozens of our advisors in the Iraqi Joint Headquarters, the Iraqi Ground Forces Command, the Multi-National Division, and various Iraqi divisions and brigades, the things that were overlooked were fundamental. There are numerous reasons for an advisor to do more, but any advisor worth his or her salt will tell you that you have done well enough if you can stick to the three commandments presented below.

1 Offer Principles-based Assistance

Advisors should facilitate the Iraqi application of the following four basic skills and avoid getting into the details of how they choose to implement them.
• Follow the chain of command.
• Ensure proper staffing.
• Ensure the integrity of time and task management.
• Avoid acts or perceptions of favoritism.

Both Iraqi and coalition personnel will be tempted to violate any one of these in the name of some higher priority. You, as an advisor, must be prepared to police both sides.

When your Iraqi partner or his staff poses a question about whether or not an issue in question passes the test of principle, pose the question back to them. If they answer incorrectly, coach them on the principle and encourage them to come up with their own techniques for applying those principles. Offer your own technique only when they have none that meets the principle, but try to do so in the form of a loaded question, for example, “Since this deals with logistics and has not been to the G4, who do you think we should send this to before it goes in to the commander?” No matter how obvious and elementary the principles may seem to you, they are not always so clear to the Iraqis. In addition, they may simply find it far less convenient to do something the right way. That tendency, of course, isn’t a specifically Iraqi one: how many U.S. officers or NCOs do you know who would forgo these principles in their own commands if they knew they could get away with it?

Practice True Partnership, Not Surrogacy

Although everyone seems to know what partnership means, the first six months in a culture as foreign as Iraq’s can make even the best advisor forget his task and purpose. Partnership is not limited to your immediate partner. You may think it will save you time and heartache to focus only on your partner, but do not underestimate the destructive, undermining potential of his staff. To practice effective partnership, keep the following ideas in mind:

• “Where is your partner?” Partnership must include the presence and participation of the Iraqis. As obvious as this may sound, it should say something that I bother to mention it here. There is a high likelihood that your partner and his staff will routinely and sometimes intentionally violate the principles outlined above. When you find that you are saying the same things in the sixth month that you said in the first month, you must resist the inner drive and temptation to do their tasks for them. Doing the tasks yourself might be easier and less stressful than attempting, oftentimes in vain, to show an Iraqi counterpart how to do the task while you watch or struggle to coach. But remember: each time you do his job, you undermine your own efforts.

• “Practical” always trumps “ideal.” By now, many coalition officers know T.E. Lawrence’s dictum by heart: “Do not try to do too much with your own hands. Better the Arabs do it tolerably than that you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help them, not to win it for them. Actually, also, under the very odd conditions of Arabia, your practical work will not be as good as, perhaps, you think it is.” Whatever one chooses to take from Lawrence, you will save yourself grief if you accept the Arab and Kurdish cultural premise that, practically speaking, “a task completed is good enough.” The phrase “pick your battles” will take on new meaning for you as an advisor.

• Know when to prevent failure (the contradiction to partnership). To avoid being their surrogate, ensure the Iraqis perform all tasks themselves. Inevitably, though, you will face situations where you cannot let a specific task fail. If assistance is clearly required or you are directed to provide it, you must provide it in a way that avoids your doing the task outright. Before you act, judge whether a perceived failure will have critical implications. (A multinational division or Iraqi commander should assist in providing such guidance in this regard. Examples include circumstances where soldiers will not be paid or fed.) If the action in question allows the Iraqis to make a correction that prevents complete failure, let them do (or re-do) what is required. If intervention is unavoidable, at least make sure the Iraqi staff officer who failed his assigned task is standing right next to you while you pick up the pieces.

Be a Test Conduit/Issue Raiser, Not a Problem Solver/Investigator

As a partner to the Iraqi effort, you will be asked to look into issues for both the coalition and the Iraqis.

• Test conduit. Coalition information channels should be used to determine if a step has been skipped, if and where a problem exists in their (the coalition’s) system, or to track a significant action for the coalition. It should not be used to
solve problems or obtain information for the Iraqis; conversely, you should not let coalition leaders use you to resolve sticky issues directly with your Iraqi partner. They WILL ask. If you do serve as a test conduit for a specific issue, do not let your Iraqi partner know that you have done so. Your close relationship would demand that you provide similar assistance in the future when he asks for it.

- **Issue raiser.** If information (particularly an adverse issue or piece of information) has been raised through or by the coalition to you, be discreet in how you introduce it into the Iraqi system. First reports are just as incomplete in Iraq as they are in the United States, and Iraqi commanders are just as prone and tempted as coalition commanders to act immediately on critical issues.

- **Remain neutral.** When things go wrong or appear to be corrupt, do not become an investigator. Even more important, however obvious a wrongdoing may appear to be, do NOT take sides. Raise the issue with your Iraqi partner or staff as dispassionately and objectively as you can, and ask them what they think about it. Track the issue if you feel you must, but remain a neutral party during the exchange of information. Oftentimes the Iraqi partner is fully aware of the issue and he either believes that bad news actually will get better with time, or he does not want to carry or deliver bad news. Or, he may ask, or even insist, that the coalition take adverse action against one of his subordinates or that the coalition report the adverse action to Iraqi superiors.

**Final Advice for Advisors**

The irony running through many of these principles is clear: most of us are still learning how to exercise these principles in our own lives, where we are surrounded by family and friends of the same culture. This condition alone makes being a warrior in the U.S. Army easy in comparison to being an advisor. The best-trained warrior in the world may amaze the most seasoned Iraqi leaders and soldiers with what he knows, but his efforts will mean very little if he cannot convey the above basic principles. **MR**

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In 2004, before most of the military establishment had begun to recognize, courtesy of the souring situation in Iraq, that the nature of warfare had changed, retired Marine Corps colonel Thomas X. (T.X.) Hammes published The Sling and the Stone (Zenith Press, Osceola, WI, 2004), a substantive, thought-provoking book about the evolution of modern warfare and how to combat today’s emerging enemies (including those in Iraq). Although fairly well received when it first came out, the book seems to be gaining momentum now, both in sales—a new edition recently hit the street—and with military thinkers. Can a two-and-one-half-year-old book be reviewed as a classic? It can, and should, if it says the kinds of smart, prescient things that Hammes had to say in 2004.

Working within the generational warfare framework model credited to the likes of William S. Lind and Gary I. Wilson, et al., Hammes begins with an overview of the first three generations of modern warfare, then proceeds to detail how the previous generations logically led us to what he calls “4th Generation Warfare,” or 4GW—warfare that utilizes all available networks (political, economic, social, and military) to convince an enemy’s political decision makers that their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefit. According to Hammes, 4GW is measured in decades rather than months, and when properly employed, can defeat greater economic and military power. Hammes argues that the U.S. political bureaucracy and the Department of Defense’s cold war (3GW) defense posture stifled our ability to respond effectively to insurgents and terrorists who employ 4GW, and who now dominate the contemporary operational environment.

Hammes credits Mao Tse-Tung with the birth of 4GW. Using a host of historical examples (e.g., Mao’s communist revolution, the Vietnam wars, the Sandinista rebellion, the two Palestinian Intifadas, and conflicts in Lebanon, Somalia, Afghanistan, and Iraq), he depicts the versatility of 4GW enemies—enemies who will, in their own time and under their own terms, make use of whatever the environment provides them to combat nations like the United States. Hammes’s examples also highlight the difficulty and complexity of preparing for and effectively engaging in 4GW. He reminds us that no foe will dare to engage the United States in conventional warfare because they know full well that they cannot succeed; conversely, they can and will engage the United States with 4GW tactics and techniques because no 3GW superpower has ever defeated a 4GW enemy.

Hammes’s assertion (in 2004, remember) that the U.S. military has wandered into a strategy and capability gap is compelling. He particularly emphasizes the military’s inadequacy at using the media domain and its enemies’ savvy use of same; the military’s over-reliance on technology; and the cumbersome nature of a cold war organizational structure that has responded poorly to today’s enemies. Hammes also addresses the importance of leveraging networking, employing integrated systems, training to operate in chaos, and gaining greater force flexibility. Utilizing his extensive military intelligence background, he details in a very persuasive manner what he sees to be the real threats to the United States versus the (then) prevailing misguided assessments.

Hammes forcefully lays out the steps necessary to rectify intelligence failures and other perceived shortcomings in military defense, defense strategy, and the military personnel system. Such reform is absolutely essential if we are to build a military capable of addressing 4GW.

Hammes’s practical solution to succeeding in 4GW, as well as preparing for what he sees as possible 5th generation warfare—exemplified by the anthrax and ricin attacks on Capitol Hill—is to 1) get rid of bureaucratic obstacles that keep civilian and military experts apart, so that they can discuss and resolve issues, rather than spend the defense budget on expensive high-tech weapon systems and associated technical training and upkeep; 2) use savings from the latter to teach Soldiers and Marines language skills, to make them culturally aware, and to enhance their knowledge of the regions they might deploy to; 3) spend more time in the field conducting real-world training to gain relevant practical experience; 4) establish longer tours to reduce turnover of personnel serving in critical positions; and 5) significantly reduce heavy ground forces and create more flexible, versatile, medium-weight units capable of sustaining a forward presence for peacekeeping and nation-building. Hammes also asserts that specialized skills need to be developed or expanded in military police activities, saturation patrolling, assimilating within indigenous populations, training indigenous forces, and conducting close-air support—all within a unified command structure that lends itself to effective, efficient coordination with government and non-government entities.

The Sling and the Stone was written to appeal to a vast and diverse audience. It provides numerous jewels of information for the general reader as well as senior military leaders,
military operational planners and supporters, interagency personnel, and U.S. political leaders who are looking for a provocative read to aid them in making informed decisions in support of U.S. national security. Since its first publication, this visionary book has ignited others in public and private life to read, research, write, and advocate for the United States to change its defense posture in order to meet the challenge posed by the advent of 4GW.

Many of Hammes’ ideas have now been adopted by the military and are currently in practice in Iraq and Afghanistan. Other ideas are being studied extensively within the Washington Beltway. U.S. homeland security and counterinsurgency doctrines have also been strongly influenced and shaped by this book. Hammes has truly been a catalyst for change.

I do have a few criticisms of this prophetic “young” classic, but they are minor. For one, Hammes doesn’t really acknowledge the significant role economics plays in 4GW. Also, I didn’t find the generational warfare construct he used to deliver his message necessary—his analysis can stand on its own merits. These quibbles aside, Hammes’s book is truly an enlightening must-read for Military Review’s readers, particularly those attending career military schools. It should remain so for many years to come.

Lieutenant Colonel David A. Anderson, U.S. Marine Corps, Retired, is an Associate Professor, Department of Joint, Interagency, and Multinational Operations, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.


In the midst of a global war on terror in which Iraq could very well represent the first cog to fall in what President George W. Bush referred to as the “Axis of Evil,” author Ali Ansari offers a thoughtful examination of American foreign policy efforts in the supposed linchpin of the axis, the Islamic Republic of Iran. The result is a work that is as timely as it is captivating. In Confronting Iran, Ansari questions not just the role of consistently fundamentally flawed foreign policy in maintaining a dysfunctional relationship with the troubled nation, but our own inevitable culpability in spawning a modern extremist state.

According to Ansari, most Americans were ignorant not only of our policies over the previous decades, but also how those policies had affected Iran’s attitude toward America. In the years since, American policy toward Iran has either been outright hostile (the general approach of Republican administrations) or simply indifferent (President Bill Clinton’s approach). Sadly, in the days after the 9/11 attacks, at a time when a policy of reconciliation would have been beneficial, America turned away from the conciliatory overtones of Iran’s reformist president, Mohammad Khatami. According to Ansari, the Bush administration’s refusal to open relations with Iran weakened the moderate Khatami, ironically clearing the way for the extremist Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to take the Islamic nation on a path that would further isolate Iran from the Western world.

Confronting Iran is an exceptional book. Ansari’s writing is succinct and to the point, offering an analysis of U.S. foreign policy in the region.
that is as revealing as it is exasperating to those pondering the current standoff with Iran. Few books are as insightful, especially with respect to our role in what is arguably the most volatile region in our world. For readers with preconceived notions of Islamic anti-Americanism, this book is a necessary addition to the bookshelf.

LTC Steve Leonard, USA, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

WAR MADE NEW: Technology, Warfare and the Course of History, 1500 to Today, Max Boot, Gotham books, New York, 2006, 624 pages, $35.00.

The prospect of a “revolution in military affairs” dominated American military thought during the final decade of the 20th century, as Soldiers, scholars, and journalists argued for various interpretations of how wars might be fought in the new millennium. Some of these theories have, in fact, proven their utility in combat, but necessity, not theory, remains the mother of invention. The ongoing “long war” has demonstrated and inspired a host of military innovations, from net-centric and asymmetric warfare to unmanned vehicles and improvised explosive devices.

In spite of these dramatic changes, the study of military affairs languishes on American college campuses. Nevertheless, the topic has become enormously popular in other venues, from the pages of major newspapers and magazines to cable news shows and best seller lists, and military analysis now seems omnipresent.

Enter Max Boot. A distinguished scholar and veteran journalist, Boot lends a particularly clear and pragmatic voice to our national conversation. His first book, The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power (Basic Books, New York, 2003), revisits the many lesser known conflicts that have shaped America’s military character and her problematic geopolitical status. His latest effort, War Made New: Technology, Warfare and the Course of History, 1500 to Today, casts an even wider net, examining how science has changed war over the past half-millennium.

Beginning with the French invasion of Italy at the height of the Renaissance, the author marches briskly through an interesting series of major and minor conflicts to illustrate how new and improved ideas deliver success on the battlefield and quickly inspire imitation and improvement. French artillery, for example, overwhelms the previously impregnable walls of city states such as Florence and Rome, leading to the development of new and better artillery, along with new and better fortifications to defend against it. Similarly, the Japanese navy borrows the idea for a carrier-launched attack at Pearl Harbor from the British success at Tarranto and in turn driven from the seas by American naval power, particularly carrier battle groups. U.S. ship yards, notes Boot, launched more than 100 new carriers by the end of the war.

Better technology and greater industrial capacity are ingredients within this formula for military superiority, but social factors also play an important role, favoring those nations that foster public and private innovation. Empires that stifle intellectual curiosity (and ambition), such as the Hapsburgs and the Chinese, consequently lose their power and influence. Thus, Boot repeatedly questions divine preference for larger battalions by illustrating the ways in which smaller forces repeatedly employ better weapons and better tactics to vanquish their opponents, from Swedish combined-arms formations at Lutzen to Japanese battleships at Tsushima to American special forces in Afghanistan.

Boot presents these findings persuasively, but many of them sound like variations of a familiar theme, perhaps because his chosen topic and format follow a proven pattern. In fact, the evolution of military tactics and technology has become a sub-genre within the larger field of military history writing, with John Keegan’s 1993 effort, A History of Warfare (Vintage, New York, 1994), among the more prominent recent examples.

Boot’s analysis of the current Iraqi conflict also strikes a disappointingly familiar chord, partly because the author and others have already said and written so much on a war that is still unresolved. Still, Boot brings a refreshingly clear and lively approach, one that reflects his own curiosity and enthusiasm for this subject. The author’s concise summaries of such technical developments as the machine gun, the airplane, and the computer move the narrative forward at an energetic pace without sounding simplistic.

In addition, Boot frequently demonstrates a journalist’s eye for the telling detail. For example, his description of the young, peripatetic Curtis LeMay waiting all night for his B29s to return from the low-level fire bombing of Tokyo sticks out as one of the book’s most memorable images.

Unfortunately, this same enthusiasm for lively narrative occasionally goes overboard. Boot’s description of the Battle of Assaye includes cavalry sabers that tear through flesh “as if it were tender steak” and British infantry who “must have felt as if they were in a shooting gallery with bull’s eyes on their chests.” Describing the Battle of Midway, he notes that the belief in the supremacy of battlewagons “would finally be consigned to Davy Jones’s locker.” In addition, Boot refers so regularly to movies (e.g., Zulu and Saving Private Ryan) to help illustrate various details that he borders on the patronizing.

These occasional excesses, however, amount to mere distractions within an otherwise intelligent and exceptionally entertaining work. Neither Boot’s topic nor his conclusions are revolutionary, but like many of the weapons and tactics he describes, his approach to military history represents an important addition to modern military thought.

LTC Bill Latham, USA, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

Writing in 1994, Army officer turned essayist Ralph Peters noted that “the soldiers of the United States Army are brilliantly prepared to defeat other soldiers.” However, the primary challenge facing the United States was not likely to come from other soldiers, but from “warriors” whom he described as “erratic primitives of shifting allegiances, habituated to violence, with no stake in civil order.” While not endorsing Peters’ view of warriors as “erratic primitives,” Richard Schultz and Andrea Dew’s Insurgents, Terrorists and Militias: The Warriors of Contemporary Combat analyzes the tactics and strategies fighters from traditional warrior societies employ in modern conflict.

Schultz and Dew point out that tools for the analysis of conventional militaries such as the Joint Military Intelligence College’s Handbook of Intelligence Analysis, which instructs intelligence officers to make use of the enemy’s written doctrine, troop movements, order of battle, and encrypted communications to determine their military capabilities and likely modes of combat, are inappropriate for analyzing tribal warriors who wear no uniforms, do not organize themselves into battalions and brigades, and transmit fighting tactics through word of mouth and traditional practices rather than field manuals. However, the authors argue, this does not mean that information about tribal methods of warfare is unobtainable. Applying a structured set of questions to historical, anthropological, and cultural sources, Schultz and Dew demonstrate that tribal methods of warfare can be analyzed and studied as easily as the military capabilities of conventional opponents.

Central to their approach is the recognition that different cultures understand and rationalize war in different ways. Thus, the tactics and means employed in warfare vary as well. As the authors themselves point out, this observation is hardly new: when assigned as a liaison officer to the anti-Turkish Arab forces during World War I, T.E. Lawrence wrestled with the problem of how best to employ the Arabs in battle. Eschewing traditional Western modes of combat because his study of Arab culture led him to conclude that his allies were unsuited to serve as conventional troops, Lawrence believed that the “Arab way of war” was particularly suited to guerrilla operations. In fact, the irregular warfare waged by Lawrence’s Arab warriors proved highly successful against the Turkish forces.

The source of Lawrence’s insight was the oral tribal epics and poetry that exalted the raid as the ultimate test of courage and skill for a tribal warrior. To the Arab tribes Lawrence was advising, irregular warfare was the way war should be conducted. Schultz and Dew claim that Lawrence’s example is illustrative of their approach to analyzing how modern warriors fight. Like Lawrence, the authors advocate thoroughly studying the culture and history of the society in question.

Schultz and Dew apply their method to four case studies involving conflict between conventional militaries and tribal warriors: the UN/U.S. intervention in Somalia in 1992; Russia’s first and second Chechen wars; the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan; and Operation Iraqi Freedom. Despite the general discussions of traditional warrior societies in the introductory chapters, Schultz and Dew have uniformly chosen examples where the warriors are Muslim and the conventional power is Western.

In all cases, the conventional military struggled with the irregular tactics and decentralized command and control structures of their tribal opponents. Furthermore, the cultural practices of defending family honor and avenging “blood debts” led tribal warriors to fight in a very personal way. This escalated the viciousness of the conflict beyond what their more conventional military opponents viewed as appropriate for achieving relatively limited aims. When opposing enemy forces on their home territory, the tribal societies adopted something akin to total warfare, in which all able-bodied men became fighters and the rest of the populace functioned as scouts, spies, or sources of aid. Adapting their traditional ways of war to modern conditions, they remained highly dependent on societal norms and traditions that emphasized personal combat skills, courage, honor, and valor in battle.

The authors’ fundamental point is that “soldiers and statesmen must grasp the following: (1) armed groups found in traditional societies have long-standing methods of combat and ways of organizing to fight outsiders; (2) their members are well-versed in these modes of fighting and are prepared for their wartime roles; and (3) these traditional concepts invariably take protracted, irregular, and unconventional forms of combat.”

There is a somewhat uneven quality to the case studies in Insurgents, Terrorists and Militias, but the insight gained from Schultz and Dew’s approach becomes progressively apparent with each study. In the Somali case, for example, it is hard to see how an awareness of Somali methods of war and the role of Mohamed Farrah Aidid in clan society would have radically changed the UN/U.S. approach. On the other hand, when applied to the Iraqi insurgency, Schultz and Dew’s method clearly indicates how various components (Sunni Arab rejectionists and Shiite extremists) could have been handled in a manner that would have minimized the number of Iraqis who took up arms against coalition forces.

The unevenness in the applicability of insight highlights a central shortcoming in Insurgents, Terrorists and Militias: How do you apply the knowledge gained from Schultz and Dew’s framework to defeat tribal warriors? Knowing how an enemy will fight is certainly useful, but the key is to know how to act
on that information. The authors note that “when soldiers fight warriors, they must also know how to adapt to their adversary’s way of war in order to prevail against it.” Unfortunately, they don’t provide any guidance about how knowledge gained from their framework can be used to defeat tribal methods of war. In fairness to the authors, they don’t claim to provide such prescriptive advice. However, more than 10 years after Somalia, the defense policy community is looking for more than such observations as “when statesmen and their military and intelligence services dismiss the capabilities of irregular adversaries as primitive, and fail to plan appropriately, catastrophe ensues.”

On the whole, Insurgents, Terrorists and Militias is a useful introduction to the topic of traditional warriors and modern warfare. However, the lack of prescriptive guidance for responding to the challenges posed by tribal irregulars leaves the reader wanting more. Those in search of works that combine analysis with recommendations would probably be better served by consulting John Poole’s Tactics of the Crescent Moon: Militant Muslim Combat Methods (Prosperity Press, Alexandria, VA, 2004) or the various writings of Ralph Peters.

Walter Ladwig, Oxford University, United Kingdom

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THE WOLVES OF ISLAM, Paul Murphy, Potomac Books, Washington, DC, 2006, 268 pages, $18.95

Paul Murphy has traveled extensively in Russia and Central Asia, and The Wolves of Islam, his fifth book, is an insightful account of the prolonged Chechen insurgency in the Caucasus. Relevant to both the long war and the ongoing counterinsurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq, it looks at a ruthless insurgency animated by nationalism and a radicalized Wahhabi version of Islamist ideology. The book is salient because it analyzes the external support of transnational nonstate armed groups and the financing linked to Al-Qaeda and its associated movements. Military strategists, defense specialists, and counterterrorism practitioners will also find the book useful because it covers a broad array of insidious asymmetric methods that the Chechens and some of their Arab allies have employed to inflict losses on Russian forces and protract the Chechen war.

Murphy offers a descriptive, chronological narrative of the characters and events between 1994 and 2004 that helped precipitate and protract a mélange of internal and external insurgent and terrorist actions in the Caucasus and the Russian heartland. Some of the violence and perfidy it captures is so barbaric that it seems surreal. Murphy’s depiction of the full panoply of insurgents, terrorists, mafia criminals, human traffickers, and foreign Arab fighters operating across the Caucasus is sordid, but instructive.

Khattab, “the Black Arab,” is one such predatory character. In a chapter entitled “The Black Arab and the Wahabbi Factor,” Murphy explores the roles and influence of Khattab and other members of an Al-Qaeda-trained cadre of radical Islamist Arab fighters who were active in Chechnya as early as 1995. The Black Arab’s task was to proselytize and train radicalized Wahhabi guerrillas to kill Russians. His methods were so brutal and vile that one could easily conclude that Abu Musab al-Zarqawi emulated them in Iraq a decade later.

Ultimately, The Wolves of Islam is germane because it illuminates one example of the network of Islamist nonstate armed groups and transnational criminals who pose grave threats to the Westphalian system of states. The book’s single biggest shortcoming is its absence of notes, which points to potential shortcomings in research. Nonetheless, I recommend Wolves as a worthy read that can give one a better understanding of the types of enemies we face in our own long war.

LTC Robert M. Cassidy, USA, Kuwait


Defending America, according to its publisher, “offers a telling glimpse into a military undergoing a demographic and legal transformation.” Elizabeth Lutes Hillman, a military veteran, former Air Force Academy history instructor, and now an associate professor of law at Rutgers University’s School of Law, aims to lead the way in both the historical and legal study of the military justice system. Moreover, she contends that studying cold war courts-martial reveals not only the condition of the U.S. armed forces at that time, but also the character of cold war America.

Hillman begins this brief volume with a discussion of post-World War II military justice reform and the institution of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). Although the UCMJ provided the accused greater legal protection, it also gave commanders more authority over the definition of crime, thus limiting reform. The new code, however, reduce the frequency of general courts-martial, largely because the new rules meant that such trials were more likely to expose “military folly.” Consequently, the military turned to less public and less drastic forms of discipline, such as Article 15 punishments, to “maintain exclusive military culture.” Overall, when convened, courts-martial were intended more as “spectacles” that testified to military values and reinforced the services’ control over service-members. Hillman concludes that cold war military justice was ineffectual, biased, and arbitrary.

Other topics of examination include the cold war military’s attitude toward dissent within its ranks, the tension between military obligation and family responsibility, race, women, and the sexual conduct of service personnel. In her discussion of official reaction to political dissent, Hillman seems to consider the Army’s response to
American prisoners of war (POW) who defected at the end of the Korean War a form of political oppression prompted largely by the defectors’ low social status. She declares that “communist doctrine had intrinsic appeal” to POWs who knew firsthand the “inequities of American society.” She does not explain why this intrinsic appeal did not convince more American POWs to defect. There is a note of surprise in her declaration two pages later that the military “could not tolerate soldiers” who “gave away secrets” or succumbed to “communist enticements.”

Hillman’s examinations of the military’s response to service-members’ family worries, racial minorities, and women are, on the whole, an extended discussion of sexuality, sexual behavior, and what was an apparently official obsession with service-members’ sex lives. The military was particularly concerned about homosexuality among its men and women, so much so that senior leaders generally escaped prosecution for most offenses save homosexuality. Hillman also claims that homosexual enlisted women were even more unacceptable than homosexual enlisted men.

According to Hillman, race was largely a matter of sex in the official view. It seems that “servicemen’s sense of sexual entitlement, fueled by the military’s culture of sexual opportunity, clashed with the military’s efforts to limit race mixing.” Indeed, interracial marriage and bigamy were “predictable” outcomes of military life.

Ultimately, Defending America is a curious little book. It is full of useful and fascinating information about military justice, but it also features stereotypes and generalizations and lacks the cold war context promised. Regardless, readers may find it a profitable source of information on military legal cases. Consider checking it out from your library.

Janet G. Valentine, Ph.D., U.S. Army Center of Military History


Deborah Avant, associate professor of political science at George Washington University, has written an extremely useful analysis of the global trend toward privatization of military and security forces. Avant moves past the heated debate concerning the immediate political, economic, or ethical pros and cons of this burgeoning industry and instead provides much-needed insight into its long-term implications. Peering into the past and studying the present, she identifies the potential consequences of privatization.

Avant makes her case by analyzing the relationship between institutional values that motivate action and the capability to control violence. She notes that “privatization should redistribute power over the control of violence, both within states and between state and non-state actors.” Although scholars have identified at least three dimensions—functional, political, and social—of the monopoly of force in nation-states, Avant maintains that “ultimately all three . . . (and how they fit together) hold the key to controlling violence.” The state’s ability to determine the military’s capabilities often enhances its (the state’s) power, but increased reliance on private security firms to fulfill specific roles can undermine the state’s monopoly on force. The lack of control or accountability that can result from using contractors detracts from political control—from “who gets to decide about the deployment of arms and services.” Thus, market forces begin to intrude on the range of options available to policymakers. Additionally, through democratic processes that serve as mechanisms of “social” control, private security forces may become even less accountable to established political institutions. Foreseeable results may include significant changes in political authority, shifts in societal and professional norms and economic practices, and alterations in the relationship between the state and its citizens.

Avant’s analysis is refreshing for two reasons. First, she neither advocates nor admonishes the private security industry. Avant notes that “strong state cases all experienced less impact from privatization than weak states,” with the key being to determine an appropriate balance of forces and capabilities. Additionally, and perhaps more interestingly, Avant acknowledges that institutional behavior does not derive solely from economic interests or random decisions, but rather is often the result of a variety of influences, including a sense of social norms derived from history and perception.

This work is useful to those who contemplate policy and to military professionals who must implement and manage privatization initiatives. Avant successfully blends theory, history, and contemporary knowledge into a comprehensive, mature work that analyzes the current state of the private military industry. She provides leaders with an informed vision of factors that will profoundly affect the future of military operations.

Deborah Kidwell, Ph.D., Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


Michael S. Sweeny states that he wrote The Military and the Press to “set forth what has been wrong, and what has been right, about American wartime journalism . . . ” Sweeny’s subtitle, however, provides a better indication of what his book is really about: the long-running conflict, with its off-again, on-again truce, between the Pentagon and the press. Sweeny does a relatively admirable job discussing what’s been wrong and what’s been right, but his tracing of the long, fitful relationship between the military and the media is excellent.

Overall, Sweeny gives us a history lesson on the genesis and development of military-press relations.
He begins with the Revolutionary War, ends with a discussion of future military-media relations, and in between covers the connection in every major U.S. conflict. Generally, Sweeney looks at how effectively or ineffectively the military used the media. In doing so, he shows how the media evolved from being an information agency for the government into an independent purveyor of information for political and profit-making organizations.

Not surprisingly, The Military and the Press discusses some of the key issues in the history of military-media relations, such as Sir William Blackstone’s groundbreaking attempt to codify what the relationship between the press and power ought to be, and the introduction of the Bill of Rights and the First Amendment. The reader also meets famous journalists—Richard Harding Davis, Ernie Pyle, and Marguerite Higgins, to name a few. Elsewhere, Sweeney’s analysis is mostly objective, but in describing Harding, et al., it sometimes seems as if he is writing a glorified biography. As a result, the book takes on the tone of a personal reminiscence, which detracts from his main points.

Vietnam, of course, severed the formerly close connection between the military and the press, and in “The Great Divorce” Sweeney describes what went wrong. The media chafed at the inconsistency of what military spokesmen were telling them compared to what they actually saw when they accompanied troops into combat. The military in turn blamed the press for eroding the U.S. public’s confidence in the armed forces’ ability to win the war. Since then, the truce has been truly “uneasy.”

Sweeney’s final three chapters discuss current military-media relations, how they got that way, and what the requirements will be for a successful partnership in the future. The escorts and press pools of Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the press’s exclusion from Afghanistan, and the embeds, press boosterism, and news distortions of Operation Iraqi Freedom, all with their implications for future conflicts, figure into what is arguably the most valuable part of the book for military readers.

On balance, The Military and the Press represents a good contribution to an important debate. It gives the reader a real appreciation for how media relations with the military have evolved and what it will take to ensure that both sides—and the Nation—benefit from their mutual relationship.

LTC Gerald F. Sewell, USA, Retired, Kansas City, Missouri

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DEFCON-2: Standing on the Brink of Nuclear War During the Cuban Missile Crisis, Norman Polmar and John D. Gresham, John Wiley & Sons, Hoboken, NJ, 2006, 384 pages, $27.95.

From 24 October through 20 November 1962, the Strategic Air Command (SAC) operated continuously at Defense Condition 2 (DEFCON-2) as the Cuban Missile Crisis brought the United States and the Soviet Union to the brink of nuclear war. The U.S. aggressively disputed Nikita Khrushchev’s attempt to protect Fidel Castro’s Cuba from invasion and to supplement Soviet strategic weapons by placing intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) on the island.

Norman Polmar and John Gresham retell this crisis from both the Soviet and American perspectives and make a number of interesting points. First, because of the possibility that American U-2 reconnaissance aircraft would be shot down over the island, the U.S. delayed flights for two weeks, thereby allowing the Soviets to achieve their unprecedented deployment in secret; in effect, the United States almost lost the argument before it began. Next, even though the United States eventually learned that Russia had based IRBMs on the island, imagery analysts were never able to locate the nuclear warheads. They also overlooked the presence of hundreds of smaller, tactical nuclear weapons that would have made the planned U.S. invasion of Cuba a bloody prelude to a world war. Furthermore, unlike in later cold war crises, in 1962 military leaders like General Thomas Power of SAC and General I.A. Pliyev, the senior Soviet officer in Cuba, had the power and the personalities to initiate hostilities even when their political leaders were trying to prevent conflict. Readers will also be surprised to learn that while seeking a solution, Soviet and American leaders showed little or no concern for the needs of their allies, such as Cuba and Turkey.

Although this new study is well researched, a few omissions result in an incomplete picture of events. The most important omission concerns the arrival of Russian IL-28 bombers in Cuba in late September. Although the authors mention the U.S. discovery of these bombers, they overlook Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara’s response. Informed of the bombers on 1 October, McNamara ordered intensified planning and the preparation of forces to invade Cuba, thereby initiating the buildup of U.S. forces two weeks earlier than most accounts of the crisis recognize. Overall, however, DEFCON-2 is a refreshing and informative study of a major strategic crisis in the history of the cold war. As such, it is instructive about many aspects of intelligence, government, and national security.

Jonathan M. House, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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In D-Days in the Pacific, Donald L. Miller addresses the issue of “D-Day” in the American collective memory. He argues that the “D-Days in the Pacific” have received short shrift because of the popularization of the Normandy landings in the national consciousness. Miller sets out to correct the record and educate Americans about the immense scope of their country’s amphibious operations in the Pacific. Eventually, when the U.S. invaded Okinawa in the last year of war, these operations exceeded that of Normandy.
From Guadalcanal to Okinawa, the amphibious operations in the Pacific were critical to our nation’s final victory in that vast theater of operations. Miller uses some of the latest scholarship to tell the story. Especially useful are analyses of the war’s end by a broad spectrum of scholars. Miller is also careful to remain objective: while he highlights the brutality of the Japanese military, he keeps a clear, unbiased eye on U.S. actions. The bulk of the book, though, is about the actual amphibious operations, and Miller proceeds chronologically through them all. By necessity, he sticks to the operational level, although he does block-quote from participants to give his narrative a gritty, firsthand feel. His anecdotes are well chosen and effective; they keep the reader’s interest.

On the downside, there is little new in terms of primary research in *D-Days*. Also, Miller perpetuates unfortunate myths about Guadalcanal and impugns the character of Admiral Frank “Jack” Fletcher, the nominal commander at both Coral Sea and Midway who has long been criticized by historians for “abandoning” the Marines at Guadalcanal. Miller would have done well to consult John Lundstrom, who finally gives Fletcher credit for being one of the great naval warfighters of the early war.

Despite these relatively minor issues, Miller’s book is a welcome addition to the literature on the Pacific War. The book has pictures as well as maps that help the reader understand the brutal and vast nature of this conflict. *D-Days* deserves a wide readership. Historians, students, and the general populace too will find it compelling.

**CDR John T. Kuehn, USN, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

The Battle of Britain is so enshrouded in myth that a reexamination poses serious challenges for a historian, not to mention a gentlemanly writer like Derek Robinson. Robinson, however, is up to the task. His new book, *Invasion 1940*, is a leisurely read done in an older style of writing that may lull the reader into complacency, but should not disguise the fact that the book is a first-class product.

Robinson’s thesis is that the Battle of Britain was not decided by the Royal Air Force (RAF), but by the continued existence of the Royal Navy. He covers old ground in setting the stage, relating how Adolph Hitler connived to allow the British Expeditionary Force to escape at Dunkirk and failed to take advantage of England’s vulnerability. Robinson’s twist on this standard historical take is that he blames Hitler’s architect, Albert Speer, for sidetracking the Fuehrer with plans for the new buildings of Greater Germania.

Robinson’s main contention is that historians have failed to account for the role the Royal Navy played as a deterrent to invasion. The usual argument is that if the Navy had had to return to England (from positions off Crete and Malaysia) to stop a seaborne invasion, it would have been susceptible to the Luftwaffe because it would have been forced to run a gauntlet of overwhelming fire. However, this counterargument doesn’t consider the RAF’s superiority to the Luftwaffe. In any running battle over great distance, the German Air Force would have been at a great disadvantage to the RAF, whose planes could stay in the fight longer. According to Robinson, the Germans’ major misstep was in failing to determine what the air campaign’s focus should be: air supremacy, local air superiority, or invasion coverage. The Germans could not address the campaign’s real center of gravity, the ability to invade by sea, because of their marked naval inferiority.

*Invasion*’s greatest strength lies in Robinson’s masterful description of German inadequacies in invasion planning and invasion fleet composition. His description of the German fleet and the series of defeats the Royal Navy would have inflicted on it argues compellingly that Hitler understood at some primitive level that Germany was not equal to the task in 1940 and called it off.

*Invasion* has only one good map and no photographs, equipment tables, or tables of organization. It is puzzling that Robinson, after sparing no detail in elaborating on the motley vessels comprising the German invasion armada, failed to include any photographs of them. The book is marred by printing glitches, too, and a few sentences that escaped the proofreader’s notice. Nevertheless, *Invasion* is a well reasoned book that is a pleasure to read.

**LTC Robert G. Smith, USA, Germantown, Maryland**


*Shattered Sword: the Untold Story of the Battle of Midway* is exactly as the title describes. Drawing upon Japanese primary sources for the first time, Jonathan B. Parshall and Anthony P. Tully have skillfully researched, analyzed, and drawn sound conclusions about the actual causes of Japan’s defeat at Midway. The authors evaluate wartime data and, in the end, expose many myths that surround the battle. This is the first truly complete and balanced examination of the decisive battle of Midway.

Parshall and Tully have made a complete study of their Japanese sources. Interpreting message traffic; analyzing original documents, doctrine, and tactics; and assessing the technologies the Japanese used and the decisions they made, the authors provide new insight. They skillfully describe the battle just as it transpired, and provide plenty of graphic aids—94, in fact—to illuminate the
text. The book’s most intriguing part is about the myths surrounding Midway, including the long-held one that the American dive-bomber attack on Japanese carriers preempted a decisive counterattack the Japanese were about to launch against the American carriers.

*Shattered Sword* is important because it is one of those rare books that offers a historical revision based upon information not previously considered by historians; moreover, it involves the intricate study of joint operations from both sides and integrates many facets of the battle into the overall study. The book is extremely relevant for today’s military officer, not only because of its joint flavor, but because it provides an example of how to analyze a battle from both the enemy and the friendly perspective.

**LTC Scott A. Porter, USA, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**


Many contemporary officers want to view the military arena as detached from politics. In fact, nothing is further from the truth. Throughout our history, the Army and politics have remained inextricably linked. Historically speaking, the years following the Civil War put the Army in the political arena more than in any other era.

Donald B. Connelly has produced a new examination of General John M. Schofield, a very important player in the politics of the post-Civil War Army. Connelly focuses on the impact of politics on military thought and deed throughout Schofield’s lengthy career, both in the military and after. Unfortunately, the jacket cover portrays Schofield in action against the Confederates, which may cause many readers to expect yet another drums-and-trumpet submission to Civil War bookshelves already clogged with such material. The first seven chapters are sure to please the war buffs, but it’s the second half, which will delight those seeking to know more about 19th-century civil-military relations, that makes a real contribution to military scholarship.

Connelly’s portrayal of Schofield speaks to the current experiences of many senior officers. Schofield’s tenure as a department commander (the regional commanders of their day) found him at odds with the presidential administration, Congress, and the Army bureaucracy at one point or another. Do we really think that today’s regional combatant commanders have it any different? Later, as superintendent of the U.S. Military Academy, Schofield again found himself contending with many of the same groups, although sometimes for different reasons than before. He even had a brief stint as secretary of war, while still holding the commission of a major general, an experience that gave Schofield an entirely different appreciation for operations in the political realm.

In producing an evenly critical assessment, Connelly succeeds where many biographers often fall short. While his regard for Schofield comes across clearly throughout the work, he candidly assigns blame where Schofield deserves it, especially regarding his subject’s racist and elitist attitudes. These came into play during his tenure as the military district commander for Virginia in 1867, and again during his involvement in the 1880 court-martial case of Cadet Johnson C. Whittaker.

Although the 19th century is beginning to seem like distant history, Connelly’s study of Schofield and the politics of generalship offers pertinent, unforged lessons and insights to anyone interested in the current relationship between the Army and its civilian overseers. On the whole, this work will go a long way towards better informing uniformed professionals about the important links between the military and its civilian leaders.

**MAJ Frederick H. Black, Jr., U.S. Army, Ph.D., Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**


Eric Walther’s biography of William Lowndes Yancey, sometimes described as the “Patrick Henry of the Confederacy,” follows the remarkable development of a man from a staunch unionist to orator of secession. The death of Yancey’s father, a Navy war hero, and the remarriage of his cantankerous mother to a New England preacher, had a profound impact on young William. He grew to hate his stepfather and the New England society that had spawned him, and that hatred would spur Yancey’s politics for the rest of his life.

By 1850, Yancey had come to believe that the best interests of the South lay outside the Union, and he began to agitate for secession. He tried, unsuccessfully, to split the Democratic Party in 1848 and then succeeded in splitting both the party and the Union in 1860-1861. Having brought about the division of the Union, he served the Confederacy as an ambassador to England, a position for which his often intemperate style ill-suited him. Later, Yancey served in the Confederate senate. He died in 1863, having lived long enough to see his Confederacy in deep trouble after the disasters of Gettysburg and Vicksburg.

Walther’s telling of Yancey’s story is intimate and thorough. While he notes the dangers of what he calls “psychohistory,” in Yancey Walther has a subject who is ripe for it. Yancey craved public approval and went to extremes to gain it. His rhetoric was often hyperbolic, and he had a penchant for violence—as a young man, he was convicted of manslaughter, and in a speech he once threatened to bayonet a political opponent. It is tempting, too, to look for psychological causes behind Yancey’s sea-change from arguing forcefully (pre-secession) for a strict construction of Federal Government powers to his
Although disastrous for the Republic in many respects, the War of 1812 has strangely been heralded as a great patriotic victory. In Don’t Give Up the Ship! Myths of the War of 1812, Donald Hickey attempts to show how this war could be conceived as a glorious triumph in spite of its unclear strategic aims, ruinous political and military execution, and ambiguous conclusion. The book exposes how little most Americans, even accomplished historians, know about the conflict and how even their limited knowledge is steeped more in folklore than in historical truth.

Hickey covers the war’s battles, weapons, logistics, and personalities by breaking each down into vignette-style analyses. These analyses seek to expose the truths behind the war’s major issues (e.g., its causes), its greatest mysteries (death of Tecumseh), and some obscure, overlooked tales (the Canadian Paul Revere). Each topic or tale has been meticulously researched and, despite Hickey’s somewhat encyclopedic organization, they are presented in an engaging prose style. Hickey also examines the broader impact of the war’s legacy on the American culture, its effects on Great Britain and Canada, and its geopolitical implications in North America and globally. Unfortunately, the work explores only the military aspects of the conflict; it does not delve deeply into the politics, economics, or social issues of any of the beligerent nations.

Hickey has clearly mastered his topic. Don’t Give Up the Ship! provides a cogent, entertaining examination of what its author considers (with great validity) the “forgotten war.” Students of military history wishing to alleviate their ignorance and misconceptions of this conflict will find it an enjoyable remedy.

Bradford A. Wineman, Ph.D.,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

A Cause to Live For

Lieutenant Colonel Gerald E. Paulus, U.S. Army, Retired, Mesa, Arizona—In Lieutenant Colonel Ross A. Brown’s article “Commander’s Assessment: South Baghdad” (January-February 2007) he did a great job describing his experiences in Iraq. We can all learn from his trials and tribulations. He had a great team, many of whom I trained with when preparing to deploy from Fort Carson, Colorado.

LTC Brown identifies correctly that the enemy blends into the population, learns and adapts, rapidly reseeds leadership positions, and has multiple groups with multiple cells operating in the area of operation (AO). There is a critical message here for our leaders.

The insurgency in Iraq, mostly composed of local men between the ages of 18 and 40, can be likened to criminal gangs or organized crime elements more than they can be to conventional war fighters or terrorists. Their fight is not an ideological manifesto like the media leads us to believe. They tend to be decentralized in operations, are local within a small territorial range (only kilometers from their homes), and recruit their fighters from local talent.

Upward mobility is important to the insurgents. They compete for leadership positions, which allows them to reseed quickly. Their “cause to die for” is a result of the government’s failure to provide hope to or meet the most basic levels of service. LTC Brown concludes that “the people in our AO would allow the insurgents to move freely through them and live among them […] Tribes [would] protect their own. Individuals willing to provide information about insurgents or criminals would do so about members of other tribes, but never about members of their own.” He makes the critical observation that the insurgents are truly locals.

LTC Brown speaks about the insurgents’ penchant for interpreting everything through the lens of self-interest (as is all human behavior). This is especially noticeable when dealing with people on the lowest rung of Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs. LTC Brown states that [...] while the Iraqis in [his] AO would accept gifts, money, and projects, such perks did little to sway them to our side.” Insurgents have little allegiance to anyone and this can be a key strategy in beating the insurgency. They can quickly apostatize. We must create a “cause to live for” that is greater than their “cause to die for.”

LTC Brown reminds us what Maslow told us long ago: “you can’t self-actualize when basic needs are not met” […] He clearly demonstrates that the root cause of the insurgency in Iraq is not religion, or terrorism, or sectarian rifts, or tribal feuding—it is poverty […]
From reading LTC Brown’s article, I have come to the conclusion that the “elusive Iraq strategy” is not as elusive as one might think […] The solution must stand on three pillars—economic, military (for security and stability), and political legitimacy. We must (in conjunction with the Iraqi Government), “stand-up Iraq” by converting military camps and/or build secured employment camps on a gradual basis using an “ink blot” methodology to rally the Iraqi people to a common cause. By feeding, sheltering, and rebuilding their country brick by brick you restore their hope. A key to this strategy is to move the men ages 18 to 40 into the work camps until the economic conditions improve. This is the “real deal” in Iraq.

**Why Reestablish USIA?**

Russell G. Rodgers, USA FORSCOM Command Group—In reading Michael Zwiebel’s recent article “Why We Need to Reestablish the USIA” (November-December 2006), one is struck by the sheer infantile approach we as a culture are making to the Global War on Terrorism. We continue to grope in the dark, searching for new systems, techniques, and methods by which we can defeat the Islamic insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan.

This article demonstrates this same approach. We keep looking for “new” tactics to deal with insurgents, “new” techniques to fight on the “asymmetric” battlefield, and “new” methodologies to “win hearts and minds.”

However, we have yet to question the fundamental premises or our own worldview and thinking on which all of this is based. We have forgotten the basic logical concept that says: if a premise is false, and the logic is correct, the conclusion is still false. Until we challenge and change our premises, all of our “new” systems et. al. will amount to nothing.

We need to ask a fundamental question: what are our democratic values? Pluralism and tolerance are not values, because by their very definition, they are valueless. As soon as somebody stakes a belief in anything, they become intolerant of its opposite. For example, some of those reading this letter are already bristling that I challenge the article written and consign it to an infantile approach. Those bristling at such are proving this point, and are demonstrating intolerance to my critique.

Amazingly, we continue to fall for such nonsense. We continue to slip into the fantasy world that everyone wants what we have. It never dawns on us that many in the world don’t even want freedom. Most people, even in this nation of ours, prefer security, which is the antithesis of freedom. But, the more security one has, the less freedom they get, or deserve, to paraphrase Benjamin Franklin.

When school teachers tell their students not to cheat on tests, they are demonstrating intolerance for cheaters. Conversely, if teachers tolerate cheaters they are demonstrating intolerance for those who refuse to cheat by at least granting cheaters, a special advantage on the tests. Our very drive for “pluralism” and “tolerance” demonstrates that we believe in nothing, not even democracy. Thus, with empty heads and vacuous minds, we blunder from one “system” to the other, searching for the silver bullet that will somehow make it all right.

With this approach we have become nothing but technocrats, striving to solve values-based problems with mathematical solutions. If we just find the right system, things will get better. All we need to do is solve for X. We keep looking for the technical solution to a values problem, and thus try to slam a round peg into a square hole. The problem here in the United States is that the vast majority of people no longer believe in anything, save for their personal peace and their material comfort. Thus, Kierkegaard and his “leap of faith” have met the “material girl” in a swiveling drivel of philosophical goo in which its practitioners no longer believe there is anything worth fighting, or for that matter, dying for. Unfortunately, our opponents on the other side of the asymmetric fight don’t think like us. And as a result, any serious student of history can see that we are in deep serious, trouble.

**To F.J. Bing West: Has the U.S. Military Become the Primary Source of Diplomacy?**

Staff Sergeant Sheila Huff, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois—Thank you [Mr. West] for your candid discussion of the situation in Iraq (“Waiting for Godot in Iraq,” F.J. Bing West, January-February 2007). I especially applaud page 7 where you remind your readers of the very critical fact that the State Department, AID, Department of Justice, and the rest of the U.S. Government never showed up. I’ve worked missions from the Cold War to present and have never felt such an absence of these agencies as I have in Iraq. As a PSYOP soldier, I often worked closely with the State Department in Bosnia and Kosovo as well as on missions in Central and South America. I cannot stress enough how the absence of these other agencies has negatively impacted the success of missions in Iraq. I am often left to wonder in the current state of affairs, has the U.S. military become our primary source of diplomacy???

**Mr. West responds:**

SSgt—you are quite welcome; and yes, the military has become the diplomatic corps because only the military has shown the resolve and fortitude to get out among the people.
LTC Bruce P. Crandall
U.S. Army, Retired
is Awarded the
Congressional Medal of Honor


LTC Crandall’s citation reads:

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty:

Major Bruce P. Crandall distinguished himself by extraordinary heroism as a Flight Commander in the Republic of Vietnam, while serving with Company A, 229th Assault Helicopter Battalion, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile). On 14 November 1965, his flight of sixteen helicopters was lifting troops for a search and destroy mission from Plei Me, Vietnam, to Landing Zone X-Ray in the Ia Drang Valley. On the fourth troop lift, the airlift began to take enemy fire, and by the time the aircraft had refueled and returned for the next troop lift, the enemy had Landing Zone X-Ray targeted. As Major Crandall and the first eight helicopters landed to discharge troops on his fifth troop lift, his unarmed helicopter came under such intense enemy fire that the ground commander ordered the second flight of eight aircraft to abort their mission. As Major Crandall flew back to Plei Me, his base of operations, he determined that the ground commander of the besieged infantry battalion desperately needed more ammunition. Major Crandall then decided to adjust his base of operations to Artillery Firebase Falcon in order to shorten the flight distance to deliver ammunition and evacuate wounded soldiers. While medical evacuation was not his mission, he immediately sought volunteers, and with complete disregard for his own personal safety, led two aircraft to Landing Zone X-Ray. Despite the fact that the landing zone was still under relentless enemy fire, Major Crandall landed and proceeded to supervise the loading of seriously wounded soldiers aboard his aircraft. Major Crandall’s voluntary decision to land under the most extreme fire instilled in the other pilots the will and spirit to continue to land their own aircraft, and in the ground forces the realization that they would be resupplied and that friendly wounded would be promptly evacuated. This greatly enhanced morale and the will to fight at a critical time. After his first medical evacuation, Major Crandall continued to fly into and out of the landing zone throughout the day and into the evening. That day he completed a total of 22 flights, most under intense enemy fire, retiring from the battlefield only after all possible service had been rendered to the Infantry battalion. His actions provided critical resupply of ammunition and evacuation of the wounded. Major Crandall’s daring acts of bravery and courage in the face of an overwhelming and determined enemy are in keeping with the highest traditions of the military service and reflect great credit upon himself, his unit, and the United States Army.

For more information, see http://www.army.mil/-news/2007/02/26/1987-army-aviator-awarded-medal-of-honor/