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Multi-National Force-Iraq Commander’s COUNTERINSURGENCY GUIDANCE

General David H. Petraeus, U.S. Army

- Secure and serve the population. The Iraqi people are the decisive “terrain.” Together with our Iraqi partners, work to provide the people security, to give them respect, to gain their support, and to facilitate establishment of local governance, restoration of basic services, and revival of local economies.

- Live among the people. You can’t commute to this fight. Position Joint Security Stations, Combat Outposts, and Patrol Bases in the neighborhoods we intend to secure. Living among the people is essential to securing them and defeating the insurgents.

- Hold areas that have been secured. Once we clear an area, we must retain it. Develop the plan for holding an area before starting to clear it. The people need to know that we and our Iraqi partners will not abandon them. When reducing forces, gradually thin our presence rather than handing off or withdrawing completely. Ensure situational awareness even after transfer of responsibility to Iraqi forces.

- Pursue the enemy relentlessly. Identify and pursue Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and other extremist elements tenaciously. Do not let them retain support areas or sanctuaries. Force the enemy to respond to us. Deny the enemy the ability to plan and conduct deliberate operations.

- Employ all assets to isolate and defeat the terrorists and insurgents. Counter-terrorist forces alone cannot defeat Al-Qaeda and the other extremists. Success requires a comprehensive approach that employs all forces and all means at our disposal—non-kinetic as well as kinetic. Employ coalition and Iraqi conventional and special operations forces, Sons of Iraq, and all other available non-military multipliers in accordance with the attached “Anaconda Strategy.” (See figure.)

- Generate unity of effort. Coordinate operations and initiatives with our embassy and interagency partners, our Iraqi counterparts, local governmental leaders, and non-governmental organizations to ensure all are working to achieve a common purpose.

- Promote reconciliation. We cannot kill our way out of this endeavor. We and our Iraqi partners must identify and separate the “irreconcilables” from the “reconcilables” through thorough intelligence work, population control measures, information operations, kinetic operations, and political initiatives. We must strive to make the reconcilables part of the solution,
even as we identify, pursue, and kill, capture, or drive out the irreconcilables.

- **Defeat the network, not just the attack.** Focus to the “left” of the explosion. Employ intelligence assets to identify the network behind an attack, and go after its leaders, explosives experts, financiers, suppliers, and operators.

- **Foster Iraqi legitimacy.** Encourage Iraqi leadership and initiative; recognize that their success is our success. Partner in all that we do and support local involvement in security, governance, economic revival, and provision of basic services. Find the right balance between coalition forces leading and the Iraqis exercising their leadership and initiative, and encourage the latter. Legitimacy of Iraqi actions in the eyes of the Iraqi people is essential to overall success.

- **Punch above your weight class.** Strive to be “bigger than you actually are.” Partner in operations with Iraqi units and police, and employ Sons of Iraq, contractors, and local Iraqis to perform routine tasks in and around Forward Operating Bases, Patrol Bases, and Joint Security Stations, thereby freeing up our troopers to focus on tasks “outside the wire.”

- **Employ money as a weapon system.** Money can be “ammunition” as the security situation improves. Use a targeting board process to ensure the greatest effect for each “round” expended and to ensure that each engagement using money contributes to the achievement of the unit’s overall objectives. Ensure contracting activities support the security effort, employing locals wherever possible. Employ a “matching fund” concept when feasible in order to ensure Iraqi involvement and commitment.

- **Fight for intelligence.** A nuanced understanding of the situation is everything. Analyze the intelligence that is gathered, share it, and fight for more. Every patrol should have tasks designed to augment understanding of the area of operations and the enemy. Operate on a “need to share” rather than a “need to know” basis. Disseminate intelligence as soon as possible to all who can benefit from it.

- **Walk.** Move mounted, work dismounted. Stop by, don’t drive by. Patrol on foot and engage the population. Situational awareness can only be gained by interacting with the people face-to-face, not separated by ballistic glass.

- **Understand the neighborhood.** Map the human terrain and study it in detail. Understand the local culture and history. Learn about the tribes, formal and informal leaders, governmental structures, religious elements, and local security forces. Understand how
local systems and structures—including governance, provision of basic services, maintenance of infrastructure, and economic elements—are supposed to function and how they really function.

- **Build relationships.** Relationships are a critical component of counterinsurgency operations. Together with our Iraqi counterparts, strive to establish productive links with local leaders, tribal sheikhs, governmental officials, religious leaders, and interagency partners.

- **Look for sustainable solutions.** Build mechanisms by which the Iraqi Security Forces, Iraqi community leaders, and local Iraqis under the control of governmental institutions can continue to secure local areas and sustain governance and economic gains in their communities as the coalition force presence is reduced. Figure out the Iraqi systems and help Iraqis make them work.

- **Maintain continuity and tempo through transitions.** Start to build the information you’ll provide to your successors on the day you take over. Allow those who will follow you to “virtually look over your shoulder” while they’re still at home station by giving them access to your daily updates and other items on SIPRNET. Deploy planners and intel analysts ahead of time. Encourage extra time on the ground during transition periods, and strive to maintain operational tempo and local relationships to avoid giving the enemy respite.

- **Manage expectations.** Be cautious and measured in announcing progress. Note what has been accomplished, but also acknowledge what still needs to be done. Avoid premature declarations of success. Ensure our troopers and our partners are aware of our assessments and recognize that any counterinsurgency operation has innumerable challenges, that enemies get a vote, and that progress is likely to be slow.

- **Be first with the truth.** Get accurate information of significant activities to the chain of command, to Iraqi leaders, and to the press as soon as is possible. Beat the insurgents, extremists, and criminals to the headlines, and pre-empt rumors. Integrity is critical to this fight. Don’t put lipstick on pigs. Acknowledge setbacks and failures, and then state what we’ve learned and how we’ll respond. Hold the press (and ourselves) accountable for accuracy, characterization, and context. Avoid spin, and let facts speak for themselves. Challenge enemy disinformation. Turn our enemies’ bankrupt messages, extremist ideologies, oppressive practices, and indiscriminate violence against them.

- **Fight the information war relentlessly.** Realize that we are in a struggle for legitimacy that will be won or lost in the perception of the Iraqi people. Every action taken by the enemy and our forces has implications in the public arena. Develop and sustain a narrative that works, and continually drive the themes home through all forms of media.

- **Live our values.** Do not hesitate to kill or capture the enemy, but stay true to the values we hold dear. Living our values distinguishes us from our enemies. There is no tougher endeavor than the one in which we are engaged. It is often brutal, physically demanding, and frustrating. All of us experience moments of anger, but we can neither give in to dark impulses nor tolerate unacceptable actions by others.

- **Exercise initiative.** In the absence of guidance or orders, determine what they should be and execute aggressively. Higher level leaders will provide a broad vision and paint “white lines on the road,” but it will be up to those at tactical levels to turn “big ideas” into specific actions.

- **Empower subordinates.** Resource to enable decentralized action. Push assets and authorities down to those who most need them and can actually use them. Flatten reporting chains. Identify the level to which you would naturally plan and resource, and go one further—generally looking three levels down, vice the two levels down that is traditional in major combat operations.

- **Prepare for and exploit opportunities.** “Luck is what happens when preparation meets opportunity” (Seneca the Younger). Develop concepts (such as that of “reconcilables” and “irreconcilables”) in anticipation of possible opportunities, and be prepared to take risk as necessary to take advantage of them.

- **Learn and adapt.** Continually assess the situation and adjust tactics, policies, and programs as required. Share good ideas. Avoid mental or physical complacency. Never forget that what works in an area today may not work there tomorrow, and that what works in one area may not work in another. Strive to ensure that our units are learning organizations. In counterinsurgency, the side that learns and adapts the fastest gains important advantages. **MR**
The Baby and the Bathwater: CHANGING TIMES OR CHANGING PRINCIPLES?

Colonel John Mark Mattox, U.S. Army

Former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s 2001 pronouncement that the United States is engaged in “a new kind of war” appeared to constitute a clear signal from the highest levels of government that times had changed and that, accordingly, the nation must approach the war-fighting enterprise differently than it had in recent memory—or perhaps ever.¹ That pronouncement, and the events that precipitated it, came in the wake of a military transformation—a transformation that had placed on the table for re-examination every aspect of military culture: from force development, to financing, to basing, to acquisition, to training, to executing, to what constitutes a “win” of either the war or the peace. It is a transformation which continues today.

The Vortex of Change

In the face of this sweeping change, it is little wonder that some might question whether anything remains the same. The ancient philosopher Hericlitus might as well have been thinking of the U.S. defense establishment when he observed that no one ever steps into the same river. However, while Hericlitus may have been right, reflective observers of the changes now underway would do well to take some soundings as to how deep the current of change really runs—or should run. Is it possible for a burgeoning, bureaucratic institution like the military truly to transform itself unless it changes the principles of war, which govern its function? The answer to that question really hinges upon what one means by “principles.” Properly understood, the most fundamental principles embody world-ordering, foundational ideas: intellectual bedrock. However, reaching that bedrock requires one to traverse several strata of progressively more fundamental supporting principles. Thus, one cannot meaningfully conduct an investigation into whether principles have changed or should change without specifying just how fundamentally the discourse is to be focused. The point is not a trivial one; for, if practitioners of the profession of arms get muddled in their thinking such that they cannot clearly identify the stratum of principles under consideration and why—if at all—those principles should change, they risk marching, or sailing, or flying from the wrong point of departure on their transformational journey to a most uncertain destination. At the most fundamental stratum, the ideas that constitute and undergird the principles of war have not changed, and it is important to understand why this is so.

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What a Principle Is—and Is Not

In addition to the fact that not every principle is equally fundamental, it also is true that not every concept dignified by the honorific designation of “principle” really is a principle at all. Some dearly held beliefs simply are false, even if, given the information available, they seem to be true. For example, the idea of Thales of Miletus—the father of Western philosophy—that everything is water, seemed to make good scientific sense in its day: One could point to lakes, rivers, oceans, clouds, steamy vapor, snow and ice—all water, readily observe the change of that water from one state to another, and reason that everything might, in fact, be reducible to water. Thales and his disciples appear to have held this to be the ordering “principle” that governed their entire scientific world view. The eventual discovery that they had been in error did not mean that a principle had changed. Rather, it meant that an idea which they took to be a principle actually was not a principle at all!

Although ideas which actually turn out to be principles are always true within their sphere of application, new insights or changing circumstances that become evident with the passage of time force their “re-scoping.” That is to say, a principle may remain true within certain limits but prove not to be as broad in its application as once thought. The scientific revolution that marked the emergence of Einstinian physics from its Newtonian predecessor serves as a case in point: Newton’s famous formula, F=MA, was long considered to be the universal law of mechanics. However, Einstein later argued persuasively that Newton’s formula does not fare well at speeds approaching the speed of light. Einstein’s formula, E=MC², sets forth a relationship, which compensates for the shortcomings of the earlier Newtonian statement. That does not mean that F=MA is untrue or without practical value. On the contrary, within a very broad sphere of applicability, it continues to be of enormous value. It is, after all, the principle we use to build roads and skyscrapers, design automobiles, and do a billion other such things. Its application is, however, more limited in scope than once thought. Nevertheless, a change in scope of application for a particular principle does not necessarily mean that it is not a true principle or indicates a change in the principle itself.

Because true principles do not change, to ask the question, “Have the principles of war changed?” (to take an example from the contemporary debate on genetic engineering) akin to asking—not, “Are we now witnessing hitherto unseen developments that will cause us to rethink how we do things?” but rather—“Has the double-helix structure of the DNA molecule itself morphed into something hitherto unknown?” Thus, in order properly to dissect the question, one first must ask, “are the principles currently in use true principles and if so, are they still “scoped” properly for the war-fighting tasks at hand and for those one reasonably can expect the future to bring?”

Principium or Technē?

The English word “principle” debuted in the late 14th century and meant a “fundamental truth or proposition, on which many others depend; a primary truth comprehending, or forming the basis of, various truths.” The word derives from the Latin principium, which, interestingly, in its plural form (principia) refers to the front of an army—the staff and general’s quarters. Thus, even in its historical meaning, a principle, or principium, is that which guides the military in the direction that it must go if it is to be successful. In the American military tradition, nine concepts (namely, objective, simplicity, unity of command, offensive, maneuver, mass, economy of force, surprise, and security) have been accorded the designation “principles of
war”—concepts that the military must observe in order to be successful. These principles are important, time tested, and relevant. They are principles precisely because their foundational role has been evident throughout the historical record of warfare and because there is no reason to believe—even in the most fanciful, mind-stretching scenarios of science fiction—that they ever will cease to apply to future conflicts.

However, that does not mean that the scope or relative value of one or another of these principles cannot or will not change as circumstances evolve. Indeed, even now, they are evolving. For example, a successful Warsaw Pact armor assault, of the kind anticipated to come through the Fulda Gap, may have been expected to rely heavily on objective, offensive, and mass. The theory was: Throw enough tanks at NATO forces and, all other things being equal, some Warsaw Pact tanks are bound to break through. However, that assault would have depended commensurately less on maneuver, economy of force, or surprise. On the other hand, an effective cyber attack of the future may rely heavily on surprise, security, and economy of force, but may not meaningfully depend on mass, maneuver, or unity of command. The principles may differ in scope or application, based on circumstances, but one senses no need to call into question the truth or validity of the principles themselves.

The need to “re-scope,” re-prioritize, or assign new relative values to true principles should not give occasion to equate \textit{principia} with \textit{technē}—the ancient Greek concept for the art, way, or means in which principles are applied practically, and which is the historical root for the English word “technique.” Much of what we witness at present on contemporary battlefields—those in Iraq, for example—focuses on changes to \textit{technē}, or “tactics, techniques, and procedures,” as they frequently are called in the profession of arms. Thus, when the president enjoins the armed forces and the nation’s industrial support base to develop “new technologies . . . to redefine war on our terms,” he is issuing an explicit call for the armed forces to examine its \textit{technē}—the tools at its disposal—to ensure that those tools, whether they be mechanical or procedural, are appropriate to the task.\footnote{And indeed, as we are learning, a redefinition of our \textit{technē} is in order. For example, the Fulda Gap scenario, or even the Desert Storm scenario, had little need for armored HMMWVs—in contrast to Operation Iraqi Freedom, for which the need for armoured HMMWVs is significant. Although the principle of “security” applies in all three of these scenarios, the \textit{technē} required to implement the principle differs widely between the first two cases and the last case.}

The nine principles of war continue to be as foundational and applicable as ever. Every time a revolution in military affairs occurs, the question arises as to whether principles actually have changed or whether the change is merely, or largely, a reordering of \textit{technē}; and every time, the answer is the same: The evolution from stone and slingshot, to sword and shield, to pike and lance, to simple bow or longbow or crossbow, to musket or rifle or cannon or rocket, to atomic bomb or thermonuclear warhead, to satellites or lasers or cyber attacks—\textit{all of them}—operate on the basis of the very same principles of war, albeit in reshuffled orders of relative importance.

\section*{Digging Deeper}

However, just as shifts in tectonic plates can force the re-shaping of bedrock in ways not always anticipated, a consideration of the stability of still deeper strata of principles pertinent to the profession of arms is appropriate before one can say with confidence that the principles which underwrite the profession are not undergoing change. Thus, in order to find a truly interesting and non-trivial answer to the question, “have the principles of war changed?” one has to dig deeper. Just as thousands of individual \textit{technē} derive from the traditionally accepted principles of war, these principles, in turn, derive from even more fundamental ones, like Clausewitz’s often quoted (and often misunderstood) dictum that “War is . . . an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.”\footnote{Here, Clausewitz observes that the military instrument of national power is merely one means among many (i.e., diplomatic, informational, economic, etc.) that can be applied to the task of persuading another power to yield to “our will.” It is a very blunt instrument, just as the nine principles of war demonstrate it to be. However, the very fact that a blunt instrument is sometimes required stands as testament to the yet more fundamental principle that the freedom of human will is inviolable: no individual or nation actually can}
force any other individual or nation to act contrary to will. The former only can reason with, invite, persuade, cajole or—failing methods based on the use of more delicate instruments—induce such a degree of physical pain through fighting that the latter concludes that resisting the will of the former is more trouble than it is worth. It is on the basis of this principle elucidated by Clausewitz that the traditional nine principles of war rest, and nothing whatsoever has changed about that, either. Wars always have been, and always will be, as a matter of principle, tools for the infliction of unbearable pain so that resistance to “our will” no longer presents itself to an adversary as a viable option.

And Deeper

However, Clausewitz’s point, as profound as it is, does not take us the full distance to the most foundational principles that lie at the bedrock. Thus, underlying the question, “Have the principles of war changed?” is a still more fundamental question: “Why would America ever feel itself justified to use the blunt instrument of military power in the first place?” And underlying this question, one encounters still another: “What are the fundamental principles that govern America’s world view—a world view that includes the possibility for the use of war as an instrument of national power?” If the principles of war truly have changed, it must be due to tectonic shifts in the answers to these most basic questions at the ocean floor, and not to tropical squalls on the surface, however disruptive those squalls may seem to be.

Since America’s inception, it has embraced, as a matter of principle, the belief that some values (such as individual and collective self-determination, justice, or equity) are worth fighting for. Accordingly, the nation has felt justified, from time to time, in using the military instrument of power to inflict pain upon its adversaries to such a degree that they would rather change their wills and yield, if not conform, to these values than continue to fight. That does not imply that America always has been perfect in its judgment with respect to when, where, or how to fight. However, it does imply that, consistent with its fundamental values—its most deeply held principle, America at times has concluded that going to war was the best course to pursue as a matter of national policy.

Even then, America’s decision to go to war has never failed to be circumscribed by adherence to principles of the most fundamental character, to wit: It never has fought a war devoid of moral constraint. On the contrary, it always has invoked principles regarding the circumstances under which wars could be fought justly and, once begun, the way in which they could be prosecuted justly. These principles, embodied in the just war tradition, which America embraces, hold that wars must be fought only for just causes, with the right intention, as a last resort, for the restoration of a just and lasting peace, and only after concluding, in the nation’s best judgement, that the moral good expected to result from the war will outweigh the evils that its prosecution inevitably will entail. These most fundamental principles also enshrine the axioms that a war can be justly prosecuted if, and only if, it inflicts only proportional harm to adversaries, consistent with the principle of military necessity, and if, and only if, it discriminates between non-combatants and legitimate objects of military violence. The fact that America has, as a matter of technē, fallen short of moral perfection in the way it approaches or conducts wars does not imply that the principles which characterize the American way of war have changed or should be changed. (Witness the public outcry that erupts at the suggestion that an American soldier may have mistreated an Iraqi prisoner, or fired upon a non-combatant. No such outcry ever was heard from the Ba’athists of Saddam Hussein’s regime as the result of moral self-examination, for no such self-examination appears ever to have occurred!)

The fact is that, the deeper one digs beneath the technē of war fighting, the more obvious it becomes that America’s principles of war have not

Wars always have been, and always will be, as a matter of principle, tools for the infliction of unbearable pain so that resistance to “our will” no longer presents itself to an adversary as a viable option.
changed. The nine battlefield principles still apply; the Clausewitzian principle which describes the use of the military instrument of national power still applies; and the moral-philosophical principles which undergird and circumscribe the most soul-level aspects of a national decision to go to war and, once committed to the fight, to prosecute the war in a morally sound manner remain virtually unaffected by the sweeping and unremitting current of change that seems to typify the dawn of the third millennium C.E.

In Sum

To suppose that principles have changed just because the order of the day calls for house-to-house clearing on the streets rather than a Desert Storm-style tank battle with the Republican Guards is folly in the extreme, and the armchair pundits on Sunday morning talk shows who conclude otherwise would serve the public best by admitting that their analyses are intended only as superficial ones suited for sound-bite-size transmission. Indeed, it is absolutely critical that decision makers throughout the chain of command and up to the highest level of government clearly understand that no principles have changed. This is so because, while decisions based on the perceived need to change technē cause movements—even if large movements—in the rudder of the ship of state, decisions based on supposed changes in principles signal that we have come to believe that altogether new answers must be formulated to the most fundamental questions upon which our democracy and way of life is based. The military services need to transform. They need always to search for more efficient ways to use their resources by applying the right solutions to the challenges they face. They need always to search for ways to be more effective in the manner in which they fight wars so as to bring those wars, justly fought, to a speedy and peaceful conclusion. Some principles may have to be “rescoped” in terms of their sphere of application, so that, for example, trainees destined to become street fighters in Iraq are made to understand that “unity of command” does not imply lack of opportunity for initiative. But these needs always have existed.

Nothing about them really is new, and nothing really has changed.

For instance, the military may solve the problems of inadequate quantity and quality of vehicular armor. We can be sure that the insurgent enemy will also burn the midnight oil to develop technē to negate any solution’s effectiveness. Then, tomorrow, the military may develop other technē to overcome the insurgents’ countermeasures, whatever they may be. And so on. However, nothing will have changed at the level of true principle.

The same holds true at more fundamental strata of discourse. War continues to be what it always has been: a pain-exacting tool for persuading adversaries to yield their will to “our will.” Of greatest importance, however, is the realization that nothing has changed at the most fundamental stratum of principles, namely, those principles which specify the circumstances under which Americans should go to war and how and within what moral limits it will prosecute that war. The task is for America to ensure that it is true to its time-tested principles; the task is not to change its principles or to proceed on the assumption that the principles have changed. Indeed, if America is to be true to the high calling that its founders conceived it to have—that of a “a city on a hill,” a beacon for others to follow—the temptation to change its most fundamental war fighting principles is something against which the nation must jealously and zealously guard. If the nation or its military decides to change principles when what really is needed is to tweak its technē, it truly will have succeeded in nothing more than throwing out the baby with the bathwater. MR

NOTES

Scott Andrew Ewing was a student at Brown University when he took a leave of absence to enlist in the U.S. Army in 2004. He deployed to Tal Afar, Iraq with the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment as a cavalry scout in 2005. In the spring of 2008 he returned to Brown and is currently working toward a bachelor’s degree in cognitive science.

JUST AS COMMANDERS are responsible for the climate in their units, so the Army as an institution is responsible for the moral climate it fosters. In this article, I will outline some of the contradictions and ambiguities in Army regulations (ARs) and field manuals (FMs) that make it difficult for leaders to understand the distinction between corrective training and punishment. I will argue that ARs, case law, the Office of the Inspector General, and higher-echelon commanders have, nonetheless, made it clear that such a distinction exists and must be respected. Failure to recognize and respect this distinction can and often does lead to illegal abuses of authority. These abuses of authority within the Army’s ranks, and the cultural undercurrents that condone these patterns of behavior, cripple efforts to wage an effective counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign by fostering a mentality of paternalistic tyranny rather than good stewardship. The moral implications of this mentality are neither consistent nor compatible with counterinsurgency doctrine, which requires support of, and thus respect for, the local population.1

In July of 2005, while serving in Iraq, I began a search for the regulations that authorized a noncommissioned officer (NCO) to order a private to do painful, humiliating, or fatigue-inducing exercises as a means of addressing alleged misconduct or minor deficiencies. Such practices are commonly referred to as “smoking” a Soldier.2 An instance of a Soldier being ordered to do pain-inducing exercises as a response to alleged misconduct or minor deficiencies is called a “smoke session.” The practice is ubiquitous in the Army. It is also illegal.

To correct this situation, two things need to occur. First, several ARs and FMs need to be revised to clarify the difference between corrective training and punishment. Additionally, company and field grade officers and senior NCOs must enforce these regulations, and their interpretation, in accordance with judicial findings and the memoranda of higher-echelon officers.

Paternalism Gone Awry

Sergeants smoke Soldiers in the Army every day. Unfortunately, it is not easy to discern the legal boundary between corrective training and punishment by reading regulations. In my experience, NCOs and lower enlisted Soldiers are almost never aware of the location and content of the wording that addresses practices colloquially referred to as “smoke sessions.” Indeed, the term “smoke session,” while a part of the everyday lexicon of enlisted Soldiers, is nowhere to be found in ARs or FMs.
Legal guide. The terms, “corrective training,” “extra training,” “extra instruction,” and “punishment” are discussed, but there is considerable ambiguity in their definitions. The clearest distinction between extra training and punishment is in FM 27-1, *Legal Guide for Commanders*: “Do not use extra training and instruction as punitive measures. You must distinguish extra training and instruction from punishment or even the appearance of punishment.”

This passage exhorts a distancing of the definitions and practices of punishment vis-à-vis extra training. Such a distinction is important because punishment is illegal when it is administered prior to an Article 15 or a court martial. There is no provision anywhere in the Army that allows NCOs to preside over a court martial, and FM 27-1 explicitly states that NCOs are not authorized to impose nonjudicial punishment on Soldiers “under any circumstances.” An NCO’s summary decision to punish a Soldier is unauthorized. Smoke sessions, when punitive, are therefore unauthorized.

NCO guide. Unfortunately, FM 7-22-7, *The Army Noncommissioned Officer Guide*, does not specifically state that NCOs must not punish Soldiers. This publication gives some guidelines, shared with AR 600-20, *Command Policy*, for acceptable extra training, or “on-the-spot” corrections: “The training, instruction, or correction given to a Soldier to correct deficiencies must be directly related to the deficiency . . . Such measures assume the nature of the training or instruction, not punishment . . . All levels of command should take care to ensure that training and instruction are not used in an oppressive manner to evade the procedural safeguards in imposing nonjudicial punishment.”

Here, the wording, “such measures assume the nature of the training or instruction, not punishment,” merely declares that corrective training measures will be viewed as training, and not punishment, when they are directly related to the deficiency. But there is no statement in this passage that prohibits such training from being essentially punitive in nature.

In FM 7-22-7, a section on command authority states, “The chain of command backs up the NCO support channel by legally punishing those who challenge the NCO’s authority.” This statement also fails to make it clear that NCOs do not have the legal right to impose punishment. Instead, the wording simply recognizes the obvious fact that the chain of command may use legal measures to punish Soldiers.

FM 7-22-7 then also implies that punishment was historically the means by which NCOs controlled their subordinates, and leaves open the question of where the boundaries between corrective training and punishment lie. The Army began to define NCO duties explicitly during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The five or six pages of instructions provided by Frederick William Augustus, Baron Von Steuben’s *Regulations for the Order and Discipline of the Troops of the United States* in 1778 grew to 417 pages in the 1909 *Noncommissioned Officers Manual*. This 1909 manual also included a chapter on discipline that stressed the role of punishment in achieving discipline. The manual stated that the purpose of punishment was to prevent the commission of offenses and to reform the offender. Notably though, this manual stressed that treatment of subordinates should be “uniform, just, and in no way humiliating.”

Another section in FM 7-22-7 reinforces the idea that the routine duties of an NCO include punishing soldiers: “The day-to-day business of sergeants
and corporals included many roles. Sergeants and corporals instructed recruits in all matters of military training, including the order of their behavior in regard to neatness and sanitation. They quelled disturbances and punished perpetrators” (emphasis added). To administer punishment, the NCOs of the company established the “company court-martial,” which was not recognized by Army doctrine or official procedures (which leads one to ask why FM 7-22-7 even mentions it). This institution allowed the NCOs to informally enforce discipline without lengthy proceedings. In the days before the summary court martial, “it proved effective to discipline a man by the company court-martial and avoided ruin his career by bringing him before...officers of the regiment.”

This argument continues to be used by contemporary NCOs to justify the practice of smoking a Soldier as a sort of kindness, because there is no written record of the incident.

In the passage above, the first sergeant and other NCOs established and presided over this means of enforcing discipline without involving commissioned officers. But the summary court martial referenced as the modern-day descendent of the “company court martial” is presided over by a commissioned officer, not an NCO. In a discussion that covers a span of time from the Revolutionary War through the War on Terror, FM 7-22-7 mentions punishment in three separate cases as the legitimate duty of NCOs. Astonishingly, nowhere in this manual is it explicitly stated that NCOs do not have the authority to punish soldiers in today’s Army.

**Constitutional Guidelines**

The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states: “No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”

Note only the grand jury indictment requirement is waived in “cases arising in the land or naval forces . . . when in actual service in time of War or public danger.” If the authors of
the Fifth Amendment had wanted due process to be completely withheld from military members during wartime service, they would have written the amendment that way. But they did not, and therefore, a Soldier’s “life, liberty, and property” are protected under this amendment.

There is, however, no constitutional prohibition against pain-inducing corrective training, since the Eighth Amendment only prohibits “cruel and unusual punishment.” This semantic tug-of-war continues with the Sixth Amendment, which provides details of due process when a crime has been committed: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”

The semantic issues thus move the mechanics of law beyond an NCO’s reaction. One must first consider the Soldier’s action and whether it is in fact a crime. Military law is written so as to allow virtually any form of misbehavior imaginable to be construed as a crime that can be prosecuted. But the procedural safeguards alluded to in the Sixth Amendment are nowhere to be found when an NCO smokes a Soldier.

Crime and Punishment

In AR 600-20, Command Policy, commanders are warned that: “Care should be taken at all levels of command to ensure that training and instruction are not used in an oppressive manner to evade the procedural safeguards applying to imposing non-judicial punishment.” So, when an NCO chooses to address a behavior that could be construed as a crime, he cannot use “smoke sessions” to evade due process. Also, punishment must not be conflated with extra training because as soon as punishment is sought, and criminal behavior is being prosecuted as such, due process must be involved.

Ordering a Soldier to do a “reasonable number of authorized exercises,” however, is a form of extra training, not punishment, according to AR 600-20, which states: “When authorized by the chain of command and not unnecessarily cruel, abusive, oppressive, or harmful, the following activities do not constitute hazing:

(a) The physical and mental hardships associated with operations or operational training.
(b) Administrative corrective measures, including verbal reprimands and a reasonable number of repetitions of authorized physical exercises.
(c) Extra military instruction or training.
(d) Physical training or remedial physical training.
(e) Other similar activities.”

In this section, smoke sessions are construed as “not hazing” and are implicitly “corrective measures,” as long as they are not, “unnecessarily cruel, abusive, oppressive, or harmful.” The point at which a smoke session crosses this line is not given though, and in many cases, only the NCO and Soldier witness this arbitrary judgment. Even when others are present, smoke sessions are almost never challenged, regardless of their severity.

Despite the fact that FM 27-1 asserts the necessity for commanders to make a clear distinction between corrective training and punishment, several other regulations, when read together, bring ambiguity back to the issue by giving unclear guidelines about what is acceptable corrective training. AR 600-20, Command Policy, addresses corrective training in the following way:

“One of the most effective administrative corrective measures is extra training or instruction (including on-the-spot correction). For example, if Soldiers appear in an improper uniform, they are required to correct it immediately; if they do not maintain their housing area properly, they must correct the deficiency in a timely manner. If Soldiers have training deficiencies, they will be required to take extra training or instruction in subjects directly related to the shortcoming.

(1) The training, instruction, or correction given to a Soldier to correct deficiencies must be directly related to the deficiency.”

The passage gives two examples of extra training or instruction. First, a Soldier may be told to correct a deficiency such as an improper uniform. Second, training deficiencies may be overcome through “extra training . . . directly related to the shortcoming.”
This wording is then undermined by FM 27-1, which provides the following examples of proper corrective training:

“A Soldier appearing in improper uniform may need special instruction in how to wear the uniform properly.

A Soldier in poor physical shape may need to do additional conditioning drills and participate in extra field and road marches.

A Soldier with unclean personal or work equipment may need to devote more time and effort to cleaning the equipment. The Soldier may also need special instruction in its maintenance.

A Soldier who executes drills poorly may need additional drill practice.

A Soldier who fails to maintain housing or work areas in proper condition or abuses property may need to do more maintenance to correct the shortcoming.

A Soldier who does not perform assigned duties properly may be given special formal instruction or more on-the-job training in those duties.

A Soldier who does not respond well to orders may need to participate in additional drink and exercises to improve.”\(^{19}\)

(Emphasis added.)

This last sentence from FM 27-1, along with AR 600-20 paragraph 4-20, essentially sanctions the practice of smoking Soldiers. But wearing a uniform improperly, not cleaning equipment, executing drills poorly, failing to maintain a tidy barracks room, and not performing assigned duties—any misbehavior or deficiency at all—can be, and often is, construed as not responding well to orders. Thus, this last corrective training example obviates all of the previous ones in theory and practice. It dilutes the idea that training should be directly related to the deficiency, and “additional drink [sic] and exercises” has become the ubiquitous, almost exclusive form of extra training.\(^{20}\)

**Crossing the line.** The number of “reasonable repetitions of authorized physical exercises” used when smoking Soldiers must not, in order to comply with the regulations, assume the nature of punishment.\(^{21}\) Furthermore, the number of repetitions must not “be unnecessarily cruel, abusive, oppressive, or harmful.”\(^{22}\) To determine whether smoke sessions are generally consistent with these criteria it may help to look more closely at what a typical smoke session entails.

To be fair, there are many times when a Soldier is ordered to do twenty pushups, two minutes of flutter kicks, or some other relatively mild amount of exercise. But there are far too many cases where Soldiers are smoked for misconduct in a way that would be considered abusive and defined as improper punishment by any informed observer.

For example, one NCO in my troop smoked two enlisted Soldiers particularly harshly in the blazing heat of Kuwait after they missed an accountability formation. Afterward, our platoon sergeant told the NCO involved that the Soldiers had been given permission to miss the formation in order to eat. By then, the administration of pain-inducing exercises had been wrongfully imposed and the Soldiers simply accepted it, as did all who witnessed the corrective training.

In another instance, a private suffered second-degree burns on his hands after an NCO made him do pushups in the hot gravel in front of our C-huts in Iraq. Late in the deployment, a staff sergeant in my troop stood outside the C-huts one hot afternoon screaming into a private’s ear while the Soldier did pushups facing a pool of his own vomit. When we returned from Iraq, a Soldier who returned late from leave was smoked by multiple NCOs for hours, despite the fact that he explicitly requested an Article 15 so that he could have a chance to justify his late return in front of the commander.

In one of my units, the acting commander, a major, posted a memorandum at the staff duty desk that explicitly forbade smoke sessions, counseling in the front leaning rest, and other common practices
deemed abusive. The NCOs in this unit (including one who was pending a medical discharge for PTSD and was heavily medicated) persisted in smoking soldiers for trivialities even after this was brought to their attention. In one particularly memorable platoon meeting, the platoon sergeant explicitly told his subordinate NCOs that they should smoke soldiers behind the building, so the battalion commander would not interfere.

Virtually any enlisted Soldier in a combat unit could, if given the opportunity, cite similar instances of abusive and illegal “smoke sessions.” This is an entrenched part of Army culture, not a few isolated incidents of misconduct by capricious NCOs. Due process is nowhere to be found in the practice of smoking Soldiers. There is no legal hearing, no appeals process, and no evidence needed for an NCO to gratuitously order a Soldier to engage in jumping jacks or pushups until the Soldier passes out from exhaustion.23

As I tried to determine when smoke sessions crossed the line between corrective training and punishment, I found that AR 27-10, *Military Justice*, contained a vapid passage of circular reasoning that states: “Nonpunitive measures usually deal with misconduct resulting from simple neglect, forgetfulness, laziness, inattention to instructions, sloppy habits, immaturity, difficulty in adjusting to disciplined military life, and similar deficiencies. These measures are primarily tools for teaching proper standards of conduct and performance and do not constitute punishment. Included among nonpunitive measures are denial of pass or other privileges, counseling, administrative reduction in grade, administrative reprimands and admonitions, [and] extra training.”24

Here again, as in AR 600-20 paragraph 4-6, the regulation begs the question of what distinguishes corrective training from punishment by asserting that, “nonpunitive measures . . . do not constitute punishment.” This doublespeak seems to want to override our normal understanding of the reality of punishment. For reference, the Merriam-Webster dictionary defines the word “punishment” as follows:

1 : the act of punishing

2 a : suffering, pain, or loss that serves as retribution b : a penalty inflicted on an offender through judicial procedure

3 : severe, rough, or disastrous treatment.25

Notably, suffering and pain are included as examples of punishment. Also, it is, “a penalty inflicted on an offender through judicial procedure.” Such judicial procedures exist in the Army, and nonjudicial procedures are also available and afford some protections to the accused. When such punishment is “improper,” it falls under Article 93 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), *Cruelty and Maltreatment*, which states, “Assault, improper punishment, and sexual harassment may constitute this offense.”26 When smoke sessions are illegal, presumably they are also “improper.”

Improper punishment is a criminal offense that may result in the following punishment: “Dishonorable discharge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and confinement for 1 year.”27 I have never witnessed any NCO charged under the UCMJ for the improper punishment of a subordinate Soldier despite the existence of clear cases where such charges should have been sought.

AR 27-10 provides guidelines about punishments that may be imposed after a guilty verdict in a court martial: “Hard labor without confinement will...

(2) Focus on punishment and may include duty to induce fatigue...

(4) Not include duties associated with maintaining good order and discipline, such as charge of quarters and guard duties . . . ”28

This section of AR 27-10 emphasizes that punishment may include “duty to induce fatigue” but may not include “duties associated with maintaining good order and discipline.” Yet, FM 27-1 states that “additional drink [sic] and exercises,” which can certainly be described as a “duty to induce fatigue,” may be used as corrective training to maintain order and discipline.29 To my layman’s sensibility, this ambiguity is confusing at best, and perhaps a serious contradiction. This type of inconsistency sets conditions for criminal abuses

Improper punishment is a criminal offense that may result in the following punishment: “Dishonorable discharge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and confinement for 1 year.”
of Soldiers, and similar attitudes towards prisoners and noncombatants.

An NCO who orders a private to do pushups, flutter kicks, iron mikes, and low crawls through the mud means, at the very least, to induce pain and fatigue. NCOs in my units have also openly admitted that some of their techniques are meant to humiliate the Soldier in question. For instance, the “star man” exercise involves crouching down and then springing up while flinging one’s arms outward, repeating the words “star!” and “man!” upon each repetition. The “little man in the woods” involves crouching down and doing miniature jumping jacks. NCOs sometimes discussed which exercises were most humiliating to privates, and thus the most entertaining to watch.

Sadistic humor and creativity are not uncommon features of corrective training in the Army. A good overview of fairly typical strategies used by NCOs to “effectively” smoke soldiers can be found on a Blog by “Reaper” at: http://www.fatalfitness.com/how_to_smoke_somebody.

Although this is not an official site, it accurately describes (and endorses) many of the techniques used by NCOs, which will be familiar to most enlisted soldiers. Among other things, forcing a soldier to drink water and exercise until they puke is advocated. In general, a smoke session is described as a: “deomoralizing [sic] session of physical activity in which the subject[s] are most often times in trouble for something... punishment--if done correctly can be an effective training tool to help mold an individual’s character, or to deter some action.”

There is no effort made to pretend that a smoke session is not punishment. Although it is important to remember that many NCOs do not abuse their authority and generally act in a responsible manner, the guidelines given on this web site are entirely consistent with practices that I frequently observed.

There is no question that NCOs sometimes use exercise repetitions “in an oppressive manner to evade the procedural safeguards applying to imposing nonjudicial punishment.” But the point at which this becomes a violation of Article 93 (Cruelty and Maltreatment) is difficult to determine from the regulations alone. This ambiguity enables an Army culture that accepts, indeed encourages, summary judgment and the use of painful and humiliating inducements to subordinates to behave in a desired manner.

**Put to the test.** One final contradiction regarding the imposition of punishment follows, this time in the Manual for Courts-Martial:

“Pretrial restraint is not punishment and shall not be used as such. No person who is restrained pending trial may be subjected to punishment or penalty for the offense which is the basis for that restraint. Prisoners being held for trial shall not be required to undergo punitive duty hours or training, perform punitive labor, or wear special uniforms prescribed only for post-trial prisoners. *This rule does not prohibit minor punishment during pretrial confinement for infractions of the rules of the place of confinement.*”

(Emphasis added.)

According to this paragraph, “minor punishment” may be imposed “for infractions of the rules of the place of confinement.” This wording then clearly authorizes pretrial punishment, which is, everywhere else, strictly prohibited. With no further clarification about where to draw the line between “minor” punishment and normal punishment, the inclusion of the words “minor punishment” in the above passage is unnecessarily confusing and adds to the ambiguity of the wider issue.

This vagueness is especially problematic when pretrial confinement is of such a nature that the accused is housed with Soldiers convicted and sentenced in a court martial. In *United States vs. Bayhand*, a Soldier was initially “found guilty by general court-martial of willful disobedience of a superior officer and willful disobedience of a noncommissioned officer.” The Soldier was accused of committing these offenses while in pretrial confinement, “awaiting trial on charges which were subsequently dismissed.” The Soldier, a private first class, refused to do labor alongside a prisoner who had already been convicted in court martial proceedings. After a detailed discussion of
the matter, the judges in this case found that it was unlawful pretrial punishment to force the Soldier who had not yet stood trial to perform the same duties on the same work detail as the convicted prisoner. This was after an acknowledgement that such duties might normally be legitimate routine labor such as cutting grass or digging ditches.34

The judge wrote in his decision: “By our holding in this case, we do not mean to suggest that unsentenced prisoners must remain unemployed . . . we are certain persons awaiting trial can be required to perform useful military duties to the same extent as a Soldier available for troop duty. However, it appears to us that when a man who is presumed innocent is ordered to work on a rock pile, in company with those who have been tried and sentenced for crime, the presumption is worth little, for he is already being punished.”35 With regard to the orders to conduct duties that are tantamount to punishment, the judge states, “We conclude the orders were illegal as a matter of law.”36 In his ruling, the Honorable George W. Latimer quotes from a discussion of the original authors of the 1949 Manual for Courts-Martial to make clear their intent: “A Soldier cannot be punished, other than by confinement, prior to the time his sentence is approved by the reviewing authority.”37

In this context, the judge sought specifically to address the matter of Soldiers awaiting trial being assigned to the same work detail as Soldiers already convicted of a crime. However, in so doing, he also makes it clear that a Soldier that refuses an order to perform duties that are tantamount to punishment is not remiss for doing so. It follows then that an NCO who orders a Soldier to perform duties that are tantamount to punishment is giving an unlawful order. When the Soldier in question follows this unlawful order, and is thus subjected to punishment, it is “improper,” and therefore constitutes a violation of Article 93, Cruelty and Maltreatment.38

A 2002 Inspector General newsletter from the Fort Knox Inspector General’s office gives the following example for clarification: “A Soldier who failed to show up for formation and was instructed to stay after duty hours and mop floors would be an example of improper corrective training. This would be considered punishment and does not relate directly to the Soldiers [sic] deficiency.”39

We can return to the argument that failing to show up for formation (or any other infraction of the rules) is a result of not following orders well. Corrective training, therefore, might consist of “extra drink [sic] and exercises,” that is, smoking the Soldier. But if we accept this reasoning, then we should also accept the reasoning that mopping floors is a means of instilling discipline. Through mopping the floors after duty hours, one may argue, one is training the Soldier to follow orders. After all, an arduous back and forth motion with a mop
is not so different than an arduous trip up and down the same hallway doing iron mikes, holding a forty-pound weight.

It stands to reason then, that the standard given by the Inspector General’s office at Fort Knox would disqualify iron mikes or any other arduous random exercise as suitable corrective training for being late to formation. This would not only be the case because such training could pose a health hazard to the Soldier, but also because it is not sufficiently related to the deficiency to comply with AR 600-20, paragraph 4-6.

There are provisions in the *Manual for Courts-Martial* that allow an NCO to lawfully smoke a Soldier. All an NCO needs to do is recommend to a commander that a Soldier be given an Article 15. Once the process is completed, if the commander decides punishment is warranted, extra duties meant to induce fatigue are clearly authorized.40 The commander could, for instance, impose a punishment of a single day (or a single hour) of extra duty, instead of the maximum. The crucial elements, though, are command involvement and due process.

The regulations surrounding corrective training and punishment need to be rewritten in clear language that any Soldier can understand. If “smoke sessions” are to be allowed, some guidance needs to be given to set a reasonable standard. If smoke sessions are to be prohibited, they should be prohibited explicitly, using the vernacular of the enlisted Soldiers to whom these issues are relevant.

The Iraq Connection

There are several ways in which this issue is important to the current conflict in Iraq. First, these common practices teach junior enlisted Soldiers and NCOs to treat those people over whom they have control with a lack of respect, and often with unethical or illegal cruelty. The idea that arbitrary punishments are informal tools for behavior modification fosters a careless sense of entitlement and
creates opportunities for physical and verbal abuse. Thus, by pure extension of intellectual habit and moral misconception, this illicit aspect of Army culture condones unproductive, punitive actions toward Iraqi civilians.

Yet Soldiers’ actions and attitudes do not need to reach the headline grabbing levels of Abu Ghraib to seriously affect our ability to win the support of the local population. We can interact with Iraqi citizens and military personnel with professional courtesy or, alternatively, with a contemptuous air of superiority. Even when the most egregious abuses are avoided, the latter approach insults the honor of the people whose support we are trying to gain. The cultural currents that permit the widespread unlawful punishment of Soldiers in the Army have contributed to attitudes and actions that fuel the insurgency and cost us lives.

In September 2006, during a major campaign in Tal Afar dubbed Operation Restoring Rights, my platoon was told to search aggressively in an evacuated neighborhood to teach the residents a lesson. In essence, we were instructed to punish civilians, against whom we had no evidence of wrongdoing, for having lived in a neighborhood in which insurgents were purported to have staged missions.

Lieutenant Colonel Christopher Hickey, the Sabre Squadron Commander, is quoted in The Washington Post as saying, “If we go in there and tear these people’s homes apart, we lose these people.” This sentiment made sense to me, given my modest understanding of counterinsurgency doctrine and the dictates of common sense. Our actions, however, were not consistent with this statement. In recent email correspondence with LTC Hickey, I asked him what his view was of the aggressive search techniques we had used and he replied, “The way you describe being ‘aggressive in our search’ I would characterize as being disrespectful and counterproductive to what we were trying to do. I do not support tactics that ransacked homes.”

I also asked him what the squadron’s policy was on smoking soldiers, and he responded, “Smoking sessions [sic] are wrong and, as you correctly state, against Army regulation. The squadron would never have a policy approving of such actions.” There is no question that we ransacked homes, and did so in a punitive manner. The obvious question that remains is: Why?

It should be relatively easy for commissioned officers to educate and control the actions of the NCOs under their command with regard to corrective training and punishment. The fact that this is not well regulated leads me to consider several possibilities:

- Commanders are oblivious to the conduct of their subordinates.
- Commanders are unwilling to enforce these regulations, perhaps because of the ambiguity.
- Commanders are unable to control the actions of their subordinates.

None of these possibilities bodes well for the counterinsurgency campaign in Iraq or future peacekeeping missions. My view is that commanders and NCOs are in some sense victims of a system that is highly resistant to change. I understand that it is difficult within the system to go against accepted cultural norms, but that is precisely why Army culture needs to be fundamentally changed and such changes subsequently supported at all levels.

There are three correlates with the assertions I have made thus far:

- The U.S. Army is culturally handicapped in its ability to occupy Iraq in a humane manner. The systemic acceptance of such illegal practices as “smoke sessions” is part of a mind-set that has crippled our attempts to implement effective counterinsurgency campaigns.
- The regulations surrounding corrective training, punishment, and “smoke sessions” are confusing and need to be rewritten.
- The problem must first be fully understood by high-ranking officers. To this end, the Army ought to investigate this matter in a substantive way, and encourage Soldiers to candidly testify about these practices without fear of reprisal or prosecution.
NOTES


5. FM 27-1, 4-0.


7. Ibid., 2-9.

8. Ibid., 1-4.

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid., 1-10.

11. Ibid., 1-4.

12. Ibid., 1-6.


14. Ibid.

15. Ibid.


17. Ibid., 29.

18. Ibid., 22.


20. It may be that this was originally meant to be “drill and exercise” but was changed to “drink and exercise” through a typographical error that persisted in the literature. Note that “commander” is also misspelled “commandeer” just two sentences later. If this is the case, then a typo has likely been the impetus for the traditional practice of forcing soldiers to drink excessive amounts of water while getting “smoked.”

21. AR 600-20, 29.

22. Ibid.

23. Note that both of these practices were cited as abusive in reports of detainee mistreatment at Abu Ghraib. See Eric Schmitt, “3 in 82nd Airborne Say Beating Iraqi Prisoners Was Routine,” New York Times, 24 September 2005.


27. Ibid., IV-26.

28. AR 27-10, 35.

29. FM 27-1, 7-2.

30. Reaper.

31. AR 600-20, 22.

32. MCM, II-21.


34. Ibid.

35. Ibid.

36. Ibid.

37. Ibid.

38. MCM, IV-25.


40. MCM, V-5.


42. LTC Christopher Hickey, email message to author, 1 October 2007.

43. Ibid.
INSTITUTIONALIZING ADAPTATION
It’s Time for an Army Advisor Command

Dr. John A. Nagl, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army, Retired

“Arguably, the most important military component in the War on Terror is not the fighting we do ourselves, but how well we enable and empower our partners to defend and govern their own countries. How the Army should be organized and prepared for this advisory role remains an open question, and will require innovative and forward thinking.”


ARMY DOCTRINE and recent events on the ground in two wars have demonstrated that the achievement of American goals in Iraq and Afghanistan will increasingly depend on the performance of the security forces of those countries themselves. U.S. Army and Marine Corps Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency, describes the many complicated and interrelated tasks that should be conducted simultaneously to defeat an insurgency and then notes, “Key to all these tasks is developing an effective host-nation (HN) security force.”1 In recognition of the enduring need for American advisors to coach, teach, and mentor host-nation security forces in Iraq, in Afghanistan, and in dozens of other countries around the globe, the Army should create a permanent standing advisory command with responsibility for all aspects of the advisor mission—from doctrine through facilities. An advisory command is essential to enable and empower the security forces of our allies to defeat extremism. Most importantly, any advisor command should have responsibility over a standing force of some 20,000 soldiers.

It has been argued that foreign forces cannot defeat an insurgency—the best they can hope for is to create the conditions that will enable local forces to do so.3 The most important contribution the U.S. Army makes to the development of security forces like the Iraqi Army (IA) and Afghan National Army (ANA) is embedded advisory (or “transition”) teams. These teams coach, teach, and mentor host nation security forces, training them before deployment and accompanying them into combat; the mission is described by the acronym FID, for “foreign internal defense.” Advisors bring important combat multipliers to the fight: artillery and close air support; medical evacuation and support; and, perhaps most importantly, a culture of leadership and training, two crucial pillars of success for all effective armies. From a strategic perspective, competent advisor teams also communicate a commitment to legitimacy.

Since host-nation security forces have important cultural awareness and linguistic advantages over U.S. forces and are likely to be far more palatable to the local public whose support is ultimately the key in any counterinsurgency
campaign, the advisory role of U.S. forces has become increasingly important. Strategic outcomes now hinge on advisor mission competence and success for at least two reasons. First, because America does not have enough ground forces to meet all security threats everywhere and must therefore rely upon the strategic leverage foreign troops provide; and second, because those forces have more legitimacy than do American troops who can be perceived as occupiers. American advisors serve as enormously efficient combat multipliers; the whole is far more than the sum of its parts, and effective host-nation forces, enabled and empowered by dedicated combat advisors, are now the foundation of U.S. strategy in Iraq and Afghanistan.

In Iraq, years of hard work to train, equip, and mentor the Iraqi Security Forces are beginning to show results. After effective U.S.-led counterinsurgency operations dramatically improved security in Iraq in 2007, consecutive Iraqi-led operations in Basra, Sadr City, and Mosul in the spring of 2008 have, following a shaky start, led to further gains that dramatically increased confidence in the government and Iraqi Army.

However, news from the other major front in the War on Terrorism is not as positive. General Daniel McNeil, outgoing commander of the International Security Assistance Forces in Afghanistan, noted in his farewell speech that the war against the Taliban is “under-resourced.” The United States cannot afford to substantially increase its forces in that country in the near future, while its NATO allies have, to date, proven unwilling to do so. To provide the forces Afghanistan needs to defeat a determined enemy in a difficult counterinsurgency campaign, Secretary of Defense Gates recently decided to double the size of the Afghan National Army—a long overdue decision that will require the Army to produce even more advisors for a theater that is already critically short of that resource.

As General George Casey, the Army’s Chief of Staff, stated on a visit to Fort Riley in 2007, “We will not succeed in our mission in Iraq and Afghanistan without the Iraqi and Afghan security forces being able to secure themselves. So these missions for the transition teams are absolutely essential for our long-term success.” Field Manual 3-24 recognizes the importance of the advisory mission to success in counterinsurgency campaigns and states clearly that FID is a “big Army” responsibility: “The scope and scale of training programs today and the scale of programs likely to be required in the future has grown exponentially. While FID has been traditionally the primary responsibility of the special operating forces (SOF), training foreign forces is now a core competency of regular and reserve units of all Services.”

**Strategic outcomes now hinge on advisor mission competence and success... because America does not have enough ground forces... [and]...because those forces have more legitimacy than do American troops...**

### Ad Hoc Solutions to a Permanent Problem

Unfortunately, the Army—and the U.S. government as a whole—has a poor history of placing the proper emphasis on the advisory teams it embeds in host nation forces and ministries, tending toward an ad hoc approach. The advisory effort in Vietnam was widely criticized as “the Other War,” lacking in the priority given to the main force war. Peter Dawkins and Andrew Krepinevich have both noted the often poor quality of Army advisors in Vietnam and the slapdash nature of the training they received before deploying to Vietnam. An Army officer of the time concurs that the advisory effort was crippled by the Army’s inability to adapt to what should have been its main effort in that war: “Our military institution seems to be prevented by its own doctrinal rigidity from understanding the nature of this war and from making the necessary modifications to apply its power more intelligently, more economically, and above all, more relevantly.”

Some have argued that the Army and the Marine Corps have repeated many of the same mistakes from Vietnam while implementing combat advisory efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan over the past six years. The teams were initially selected from National Guard, Reserve, and active duty forces on an ad hoc basis, while the quality of the training they received varied widely in different geographic regions.
locations. Doctrine for the mission is only now being written. Even the size and composition of the teams headed to Iraq and Afghanistan vary considerably; most Afghan teams consist of 16 soldiers with no medic, while Iraq teams consist of 11 soldiers including a medic. All internal and external studies of what are now termed “transition teams” in this war have concluded that the teams are far too small for the tasks that they have been assigned. Many of these ad hoc teams must be augmented in theater by additional security forces, again on an improvised basis.

The first step to solving problems is recognizing them, so the Army’s increasing institutionalization of the advisor mission is an example of organizational learning in progress. For example, in 2006 the Army decided to centralize training for transition teams at Fort Riley, Kansas, initially giving the training mission to two cadre-heavy brigade combat teams (BCTs). The training mission was later consolidated as the responsibility of just one brigade, the 1st Brigade of the 1st Infantry Division. This unit has created a 60-day training model that includes both advisory skills and combat survival skills. Although the fact that few of the cadre members had been advisors themselves initially made the training more difficult, this situation is improving. One of the four battalions conducting the training now boasts 13 former advisors among its 96 soldiers, most of them in critical field grade, company command, and first sergeant positions.

A recent decision by General Casey to increase career incentives for those who serve on advisory teams is another huge step in the right direction. Majors who lead transition teams will now be granted “key and developmental” credit; lieutenant colonels and colonels who lead teams will be centrally selected, as battalion and brigade commanders are currently, and will be given similar credit in recognition of the importance and difficulty of their missions. According to Casey, “the tasks associated with transition teams will be a major part of full-spectrum engagement in theaters of interest now and for the foreseeable future. I want to ensure that the officers that lead these teams are recognized and given the credit they deserve.”

Although the execution of the advisor mission has improved (and General Casey’s decision will further help in both training and execution), because of the importance of the mission, there is still more
One answer to the problem of insufficient advisory capacity, for now and in the future, is the creation of a U.S. Army advisor command led by a lieutenant general. This command would be the proponent for all aspects of the advisor mission: doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leader development, personnel, and facilities. It would oversee the training and deployment of 25-Soldier advisory teams organized into three 200-team advisor divisions, to be commanded by major generals who would deploy with the teams on their yearlong advisory to be done. The need for well-trained, professional combat advisors is unlikely to diminish any time soon. FM 3-24 states that “counterinsurgents should prepare for a long-term commitment.” The average counterinsurgency campaign in the twentieth century took nine years to come to a conclusion; the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns are likely to be on the long end of the counterinsurgency time spectrum. And long after the vast majority of conventional U.S. BCTs have gone home, the majority of the American commitment to those wars will be embedded advisory teams. It is long past time for the Army to institutionalize and professionalize the Manning and training of combat advisors in the permanent Army force structure. The most important thing the mission needs is one person in charge of this national-level priority, and that person must be a general officer.

**Developing an Advisor Command**

“The Department of Defense] has recognized that stability operations, including developing indigenous security forces such as the Iraqi Security Forces, are a core U.S. military mission. However, the services lack sufficient standing military advisory capacity to meet current, and potential future, requirements for that mission.”

—House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation, 2007

A U.S. National Police Transition Team conducts short-range marksmanship training with its Iraqi counterparts—the 3d Battalion, 8th National Police Brigade, 18 February 2006, Al Dora district, Baghdad, Iraq.
Adapting Force Structure

in the U.S. Army demonstrate the importance of flag-level mentors supporting lower-level innovators.17 The increased importance of advisors in the current operational environment is as important a change in the nature of warfare as were these previous innovations; it requires a similar degree of institutional advocacy.

As shown in figure 1, three major generals would command combat advisor divisions of 200 advisor teams. They would be responsible for the teams’ preparation for combat and for deploying with them into combat. These general officers and their staffs would fill the role currently filled by the Iraqi Advisory Group in Iraq and the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) in Operation Enduring Freedom, two more ad hoc formations that currently play the important role of overwatching the deployment and employment of military transition teams in Iraq and Afghanistan.

A combat advisor division would include eight division advisory teams (DATs), each commanded by a colonel. Some of these DATs would be organized to train combat skills and advise combat divisions; others would advise logistical units (the greatest weaknesses of the Iraqi and Afghan armies). Service as a DAT commander would be the equivalent of brigade command for colonels and the position would be a key, centrally selected developmental billet.

Stephen Peter Rosen’s *Winning the Next War* shows that innovation only takes root when it is part of a changed organizational culture that includes a pathway to flag rank for advocates of change. The development of strategic bombing and close air support in the U.S. Air Force, submarine and carrier warfare in the U.S. Navy, and armored warfare tours. This chain of command would simplify the in-theater command relationships with conventional forces that have limited the effectiveness of advisory teams now serving in Iraq and Afghanistan.16

The lieutenant general leading the advisor command would have overall responsibility for all combat advisor training and employment in the U.S. Army—a Title 10 “force provider” role. He would command a staff and school that would develop doctrine for combat advisors and train them for operational employment. He would also have an advisory role to combatant commanders employing his combat advisors, and could conceivably deploy into theater to serve as the senior advisor to a foreign ministry of defense (the role now played in Iraq by Multi-National Security Transition Command—Iraq, another ad hoc organization). Most important, he or she would be the advocate for all aspects of the advisor mission within the institutional Army.

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Each DAT would consist of five brigade advisory teams (BATs), commanded by centrally selected lieutenant colonels. Some of the BATs would be organized to train combat skills and advise combat divisions; others would advise logistical units. Each BAT would consist of five battalion advisory teams (BnAT), each led by a major who would earn key developmental credit for his or her service. In addition to their team leader and team sergeant, all the teams would include advisors to focus on personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics, medical support, and maintenance support for their own team and for the unit they are assigned to advise.

This organization (figure 2) would solve the vast majority of problems afflicting embedded combat advisors—providing them with doctrine, training, and a permanent home. Advisors would transfer to the advisor command for a standard three-year Army tour of duty. During their tour, they should expect to deploy for one year and then hand off the mission to the next set of advisors, facilitating right-seat

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**Advisor Command Commander and Staff**
- Lieutenant General Commander
- Includes responsibility for Combat Advisor School and Doctrine Development

**Division Commander and Division Staff**
(3 per Advisor Corps)
- Major General Commander
- Provides logistical support for teams in theater

**Division Advisor Team**
(8 per Advisor Division)
- Colonel Commander

**Brigade Advisor Team**
(5 per Division Advisor Team)
- Lieutenant Colonel Commander

**Battalion Advisor Team**
(5 per Brigade Advisor Team)
- Major Team Leader

Figure 1. Proposed advisor command composition and organization.
rides and the consolidation of lessons learned. At the end of their combat tours, some advisors could remain at the home of the advisor command, serving as trainers and doctrine writers, while others could return to the conventional Army sporting their new “combat advisor” tab—which should give them an advantage in competition for promotion as the advisory mission becomes the main effort in both Iraq and Afghanistan over the next few years.

A considerable advantage of this plan is that the combat advisors’ families would be able to create a family support group comprised of members living primarily in one geographic location, rather than scattered across the United States as is currently the case. This is a major issue for deployed transition team members today; it preys on their minds when they are deployed and interferes with their focus on their missions.

Building the advisor command would require that the Army build four fewer BCTs than it currently plans to build, which would represent a serious degradation of our conventional military capability. However, rather than focusing exclusively on conventional wars that may or may not occur in the future, the Army might better serve our Nation by building the most effective capabilities to win the wars of today. The number of advisors required in Iraq and Afghanistan, not to mention other important security-cooperation efforts that comprise the Global War on Terrorism, will only increase over time relative to the number of conventional units we deploy, outstripping the capacity of the Special Forces and straining current improvisational measures. Current practice takes Soldiers from BCTs and the institutional Army to create ad hoc advisory teams that are less effective than they could be at accomplishing what will, in the future, be the main effort of our Army in Iraq and Afghanistan. The alternative is to build the Army our country needs now, and will need far more urgently in years to come—an Army that includes an advisor command dedicated solely to the mission of raising, training, employing, and sustaining host-nation security forces that can defend freedom abroad. As Andrew Krepinevich has argued, “Their success will determine whether we win this war, and at what cost, and how soon.”

**Figure 2. Advisor team composition.**

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**NOTES**

12. As of this writing in June 2008, there is still no doctrine for Army general purpose forces configured as military transition teams, although Chapter 6 of Field Manual 3-24 is useful in this regard. The Air-Land-Sea Center is planning to publish Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Training Security Force Advisor Teams in November 2008. The Center for Army Lessons Learned published The Combat Advisor Handbook (No. 08-21) in April 2008; this book was written by former combat advisors for current and future combat advisors and would be a good foundation for a stand-alone doctrinal manual.
13. The opinion of a Marine Corps Reserve officer assigned to an advisor support team is that “The ten-man AST was simply too small to engage all of the appropriate Iraqi leaders at the same time. The number of advisors necessary was more than double the number of advisors assigned.” See Navarro, 136, 138. The most comprehensive analysis is the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Stand Up and Be Counted: The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces (2007), Chapter 7.
16. See Greg Jaffe, “A Camp Divided;” The Wall Street Journal, 17 June 2006, for a description of the chain of command problems that have limited the effectiveness of advisor teams forced to rely on neighboring U.S. units for their logistical support. Chapter 6 of The Combat Advisor Handbook also notes these problems, as does anecdotal evidence from advisor teams currently serving in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Integrating the Advisory Effort in the Army: A FULL-SPECTRUM SOLUTION

Major Michael D. Jason, U.S. Army

“Arguably, the most important military component in the War on Terror is not the fighting we do ourselves, but how well we enable and empower our partners to defend and govern their own countries.”

—Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, 10 October 2007

A CLEAR GAP EXISTS that the Army should fill by providing a sustained conventional advisory capability as part of national defense. U.S. Army history since World War II reveals the repeated use of general purpose forces (GPF) as combat advisors. Numerous strategic documents call on the Army to address this capability requirement, most notably, the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review. With the exception of FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, and a brief mention in the most recent FM 3-0, Full-Spectrum Operations, Army doctrine fails to address the use of GPFs as advisors.

This paper proposes the creation of a single headquarters, a hypothetical “Advisor Command,” at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, under the U.S. Army Forces Command, in collaboration with the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. This new command would include the advisor school and serve as the proponent for all issues relating to the advising and equipping of foreign conventional forces. The command would entail an institutional center of excellence and permeate Army force structure down to the BCT levels. Advisors could perform full-spectrum operations including training, equipping, liaison, and access to combat multipliers for our partners and allies.

Why Institutionalize?

One of the most contested subjects in today’s military is the composition and role of advisor teams. Many in the institutional Army urge returning this role to the Army’s Special Forces (SF), especially as they increase by five battalions. Others, such as Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl, argue for a permanent 20,000-man “Army Advisor Corps.” Noted analyst Dr. Andrew Krepinevich of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments recently briefed the Pentagon’s leadership on a similar proposal. Most recently, some called for placing the capability within BCTs. Yet, seven years after the invasion of Afghanistan and more than five years after the beginning of the Iraq war, the...
debate still rages, and the Army’s advisor mission continues to be at best an ad hoc effort. History and strategic guidance tell the Army to institutionalize the advisory role.

**Historic Context**

“The past is never dead. It’s not even past.”

—William Faulkner

The U.S. Army prides itself on being a learning organization. However, in the most recent advisory efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, much of what the institution has “learned” has really been relearned. A cursory look at advisor missions conducted by conventional forces since the end of WWII reveals a distinct pattern.

The post-World War II era coincides with the emergence of Special Forces, so one would expect a decrease in advisor activities by conventional Soldiers. Instead, the use of GPF in advisory operations remains vast and continuous. For example, conventional forces deployed to Greece to stand up, train, and advise the Greek Army in their struggle against communist guerrillas in the late 1940s. The Korea Military Assistance Group conducted similar efforts. Perhaps the most significant and well known conventional advisory effort occurred in Vietnam under the Military Assistance Command-Vietnam (MAC-V).

Numerous other operations have gone unnoticed. Advisors trained and mentored German and Japanese units after WWII and worked with French units in the 1950s against the Viet Minh. Army advisors have worked with Colombian forces and the Saudi Arabian National Guard for several years. Furthermore, conventional forces are used as advisors in Iraq, The Horn of Africa, and Afghanistan. Indeed, the short history of the last five decades indicates combat advising by conventional forces is nothing new.

**The Strategic Environment**

“As they stand up, we will stand down.”

—President George Bush, 2005

The War on Terrorism caused what author Tom Barnett dubs “the rule set reset.” Since the war started, nearly all U.S. strategic documents have been rewritten to take into account new threats and needed capabilities. One of the first such documents was the joint staff’s National Military Strategy Plan for the War on Terror (NMSP-WOT). With close collaboration between the joint staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, all of the services, and combatant commanders, the NMSP-WOT set the foundation for how the Department of Defense was going to take on what is now commonly known as the War on Terror. Key to this document is the emergence of the concept of “enabling partner nations to counter terrorism.” This effort helped shape the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review that clearly states that GPFs or “multi-purpose forces” need to be able to “train, equip, and advise indigenous forces; deploy and engage with partner nations; conduct irregular warfare, and support security, stability, transition, and reconstruction operations.”

Further guidance notes that joint ground forces must “possess the ability to train, mentor, and advise foreign security forces and conduct counterinsurgency campaigns.” Although Soldiers have responded to this mission, there is little evidence of Army institutionalization of this requirement.

As the Army looked ahead to what Chief of Staff General George Casey called an “era of persistent conflict,” only a few changes were made to how the Army viewed the task of advising our partners. In 2007, the Army published FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*. This was a very important event for the Army as a learning organization while in the midst of a protracted counterinsurgency. The FM articulates the numerous tasks and complexities of the modern battlefield and stresses that the “key to all these tasks is to develop an effective host-nation (HN) security force.”

In February 2008, the Army published its most significant revision of its capstone document, FM 3-0, *Full-Spectrum Operations*. The FM did not break with the past with regard to advising. Though the Army recognized that stability and reconstruction were as important as the offense and defense, it still captured advisor missions under the role of foreign internal defense, and within the mission of irregular warfare: “Special operations forces conduct most irregular warfare operations. Sometimes conventional Army forces support them . . . conventional Army forces may assume the lead role.”

“Army commanders back in the U.S. told us this was going to be the most thankless and frustrating job we have ever held, and boy, were they right.”

—U.S. Army LTC, Brigade Team Chief, Iraq 2006
Think-tanks, the joint staff, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense might be clear on their expectations of the Army regarding advisors in the War on Terrorism, but the service’s execution of these roles is as clumsy and ad hoc as its doctrine. Several articles from *The Wall Street Journal* provide insights into experiences on location at the advisor training schools as well as in theater, detailing a lack of focus, priority, and quality of personnel, and a general degree of frustration. Coincidentally, these are the exact same frustrations noted by MAC-V advisors 40 years earlier.

Looking at strategic guidance and the specter of history—and mistakes past—we can see there is a clear need to institutionalized this critical capability in the modern full-spectrum Army. The history and guidance justifies the need for this force structure change and the requirements should be analyzed across the spectrum of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) to resource this capability for national defense.

A Full-spectrum Approach

"The task of the ground-level advisor was extremely difficult. He had to be a jack-of-all-trades."—Jeffrey Clarke on MAC-V Advisors

There is no commonality across the varied processes of selecting advisors, training and equipping them, and developing an advisor mission focus. None of the challenges facing the Army’s various advisory efforts today have anything in common. The Army advisor mission splices together, from a vast hodgepodge of institutional diversity, a series of ad hoc efforts that make it impossible to figure out exactly who owns a mission, what exactly it is supposed to do, and how exactly it integrates into theater-specific command and control structures.

**Doctrine.** Building partner capacities is a precept of the way we fight in this new era; it is no longer irregular. All U.S. military forces should understand their roles as mentors, coaches, and advisors to our partners, friends, and allies. Many past combat advisors use the word “spectrum” to describe the variety of the missions they performed. On one end of the spectrum, conventional advisors might be involved in force generation, literally building an army from the ground-up as we are doing in Iraq today. On the other end, advisors may be liaisons, providing our allies and friends with technical combat multipliers such as aviation, medical evacuation, and fire support. The advisor mission might even be with allies who have no need of instruction. Providing a combat advisor team to a NATO battalion so it has better access to our intelligence, logistics, or fires capabilities is an example. The advisor mission might even include helping a governor with disaster relief efforts in a state. In essence, the advisor team can be a plug-and-play hub with selectable capabilities (see figure). Such a concept would mesh well with Field Manual 3-0, *Full-Spectrum Operations*. A permanent conventional advisor capability allows each BCT to work with bilateral partners and allies across the range of war actions.

What this spectrum does not encompass is unconventional warfare. Dropping a team behind the lines to raise a guerrilla army and conduct sabotage will remain the purview of SOF. This distinction provides a simple doctrinal delineation between general purpose forces and SOF, a distinction that is necessary to start the debate for institutionalizing an advisor capability in the conventional Army.

**Organization.** The organizational structure for this effort is likely to meet the most bureaucratic resistance. Currently, the Army’s SOF community does not wish to “own” the Army’s conventional advising effort, but it wishes to have a role. The general purpose Army needs to accept the eventuality that Army special operations forces will not be available for the conventional advisory role.

Other advising missions fall under different laws and authorizations. One, already mentioned, is the Office of the Program Manager-Saudi Arabian National Guard. Another is the Army’s Security Host Nation Force.
Assistance Command. Traditionally tied to more political strategic objectives, its missions have long been associated with foreign military sales (FMS), an activity closely linked with the Department of State. In whatever manner they are funded, clearly active duty GPF Soldiers are executing the task of advising foreign militaries. Even so, the entire effort suffers from a lack of unity and synergy.

I suggest creating a single three-star level command under Forces Command, in partnership with Training and Doctrine Command, called the “Advisor Command.” It would assume command of all other commands that control the advising, equipping, and training of foreign forces. Under this command, three rapidly deployable 240-man teams would be formed, each capable of advising an entire division. In addition, each of the Army’s 48 active component BCTs would stand up five 10-man advisor teams: one at the brigade level and one in each of four battalions (logistics, two combined arms, and one reconnaissance and surveillance squadron). These teams would not be dual-hatted, but would have as their sole role the training, advising, mentoring, and partnering of other forces. During reset or dwell periods, these teams could attend language and other training, deploy in support of regional theater security cooperation missions, or assist in the training of their own BCTs. A separate training and travel funding pool with ties to the advisor command would ensure the teams had the latitude and ability to achieve their full potential (and perhaps even attract volunteers).

“The important thing for the Advisor is for him to know the specific problems of his own small area. This must be learned in country, since you really can’t prepare for a job until you know what it is.”

—Helpful hints for officers assigned to Vietnam, 1966

Training. The aforementioned command would include a school to handle the training of these Soldiers. If located at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, this school would not only be collocated with the advisor command headquarters but also the Army’s Special Operations Command; this facility would best leverage five decades of conventional and unconventional experience in advising foreign forces. A basic course on advising would last only a few weeks. Based on requirements and missions, future advisors could receive training in additional modules, including languages, foreign weapons, combat life-saving skills, and others. Advisors would earn a combat advisor tab and a new skill identifier after completion of the basic advisor course.

Materiel. The materiel solution is a simple one to state but complex to work out. In terms of equipping the actual advisor teams, the small amount of equipment allows for delivery and maintenance in Army units. The rapid deployable units at the advisor command would also maintain ready-to-deploy equipment sets, including vehicles, communications equipment, weapons, and life support.

Lashing up foreign military sales with the newly created advisor command will be challenging. Combat advisors in the field have to have a direct line to the materiel component of their mission. This complication has been and continues to be a hurdle. Placing the capability to supply foreign armies under the same command as the advisors would have an impact on the success of combat advisors. An initial step could be a close working relationship between the hypothetical advisor command and the State Department’s political-military office, perhaps exchanging permanent liaisons.

Leadership and education. Leadership and education are the most important elements of the entire advisor mission. How the Army will view this mission in terms of leadership is the critical factor to attracting the right leaders, preparing them for their mission, and ensuring their success. In June of 2008, the Army announced that majors serving as combat advisors would receive “key developmental” credit and that lieutenant colonels chosen to lead brigade-level advisor teams would be chosen from the battalion command selection list. This move is clearly meant to better recognize the importance of this mission in terms of leadership. Though it remains to be seen what the impact of this mission will be for individual officers’ careers, the Army has made a monumental move towards institutionalizing the mission. The combat leadership of Army officers working closely with foreign units in complex counterinsurgency or conventional combat operations should and must count in the path to promotion. In this latest decision, the Army has formally acknowledged the leadership and educational value of these professionally challenging assignments.

_The wrong soldiers were being chosen for the training teams and . . . they were being poorly taught._
The shortcomings were ‘seriously undermining the effectiveness’ of the overall training mission and ‘fundamentally detracting from the U.S. strategy for transition in Iraq.’

—U.S. Army Study on Advisors Training for Iraq at Fort Riley, KS, 2008

**Personnel.** How the Army handles the personnel of the advisory mission demonstrates how it views this mission. So far, the Army institution has treated this mission as a fad, something that one hopes will go away before much has to be changed. At the time of this writing, there are signs that the Army is beginning to see challenges in the retention of mid-grade officers and noncommissioned officers. The advisor mission may be an opportunity to address both issues.

This proposal calls for approximately 5,000 Soldiers to be taken from the latest end-strength authorizations. As noted above, each of Active Army’s 48 BCTs would be manned with five 10-man teams. This would account for 2,400 embedded advisors in the active component brigades. The advisor command would have three rapid deployable advisor units, each able to advise an entire division. These three 240-man units allow for a three-way rotation in a long-term effort or two simultaneous operations with one unit in reset. Of course, elements of these three units could be dispatched globally to perform exercises with partners, assist in humanitarian emergencies, or conduct training missions. The remaining 1,900 Soldiers would fall under the advisor command itself. Some will be instructors, others will work administrative requirements, and others bound for the command will be students in the Army’s TTHS account. Furthermore, additional capability could be added to the National Guard and Reserve force structure.

Key to the success of this effort would be the attraction and selection of quality Soldiers and leaders. The awarding of a “Combat Advisor Tab,” a skill identifier, language training, and perhaps special pay, would go a long way to help attract the best. Furthermore, the exciting and fulfilling nature of this mission will have a significant impact on retention of quality leaders, given they are rewarded and promoted for their efforts. The latest decision to use officers from the command list will have a dramatic impact in setting the right tone and climate for the importance of this mission. Absolutely critical is the addition of new advisors to the force structure. Developing a formal advisor program cannot simply be a system of badges and identifiers issued to leaders simply to announce they have attended the training and achieved some level of certification (for instance, the way parachute advisors as instructors: 1SG John McFarlane works with Iraqi NCOs of the 1st Battalion, 1st Brigade, 9th Iraqi Army Division on close quarters marksmanship with the AK-47.
wings and Ranger tabs encrust people who never see airborne and ranger units). The habit of dual-hatting tactical unit officers and NCOs as advisors must end.

Facilities. Lastly, there are numerous facilities that can house such a small footprint. Fort Bragg provides a clearly suitable location. The proposed parent headquarters, Forces Command, is close to the Army’s Special Forces School, the institutional experts for the last fifty years. If approved, other commands could move from their present locations to fall under any advisor command (most notably, Fort Belvoir’s Security Assistance Command). At present, the advisor training mission is moving from Fort Riley to Fort Polk.

“Present your suggestions carefully, in detail, with adequate reasons. An explanation of the advantages will usually be effective.”

—MAC-V Advisor Handbook 1969

Conclusion
Since the end of WWII, conventional Soldiers have been involved in advisory missions in Greece, China, Korea, Vietnam, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Columbia, Japan, and numerous other locations. There is a wealth of knowledge in lessons learned waiting to be discovered. Guidance from strategic documents tells us this mission will only increase in scope. The Army has taken some steps forward. Much more needs to be done. Somewhere between the current ad hoc efforts and a 20,000-man “Advisor Corps” lies a plausible course of action. Filtering some ideas through the DOTMLPF construct, this paper attempts to define one possible course of action. The Army needs to be able to work effectively with our partners and allies during full-spectrum operations. This is one approach. MR

NOTES
1. Defense Secretary Robert Gates, speaking to the Association of the U.S. Army, 10 October 2007, as reported by COL Robert Kilbrew in “SecDef has signaled a turning point in US defense thinking,” Armed Forces Journal, <www.armforcesjournal.com/2008/02/3240799>
2. Many do not like the term general purpose force or GPF. In this paper, this term is used to clearly delineate those forces other than special operations forces, or SOF.
5. Since the beginning of the Iraq Advisor effort, training has gone from Camp Atterbury, to Fort Benning, to Fort Bliss, to Fort Carson, to Fort Hood, to Fort Riley, and will now move to Fort Polk. Assignments continue to be on an individual basis, based more on a Soldiers’ timing rather than experience, deployments, or other considerations. It also continues to draw on over 1,500 Army Reservists from institutional training divisions whose legacy training was training the conventional Army as part of a full mobilization. A separate paper can be written on whether these assignments are career enhancing or limiting. To most carrying out this mission, the jury is still out.
7. Just an example of the many flavors of advisors in Iraq and Afghanistan: military transition team, border transition team, special police transition team, national police transition team, embedded training teams, advisory support team.
18. Ibid.
19. Numerous discussions with author by advisors of 1st Brigade, 9th Iraqi Division, during the course of a full tour as a Battalion Team Chief, December 2005-November 2006.
20. In a 21 May 2006 roundtable with a recently returned Army Brigade Combat Team (BCT) Commander, he described sending a “robust LNO [liaison] team” with his attached Georgian Army Battalion—in other words, exactly what this paper argues, only it would not be out of hide for a commander in the future.
22. Current training at Fort Riley, Kansas, consists of 3 months of intense preparation for advisor teams. Most of the time is spent preparing for theater specific survival and combat tasks. As the advisors would join permanent units (either the 240-man rapid deployment units or teams in BCTs) the only training to be conducted at the Advisor Command School is advising. Combat critical tasks, such as first aid, marksmanship, convoy operations and others would be conducted with their permanent units. Without these tasks, the actual Advisor Course could be much shorter. In the spring of 2008, the U.S. Army announced a Transition Team Identifier.

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From Tactical Planning to OPERATIONAL DESIGN

Major Ketti Davison, U.S. Army

The purpose of this article is to encourage dialogue that may lead to the development of a coherent framework for operational design, which our doctrine needs but currently lacks. We have a proven planning process that the force widely accepts. There is no compelling reason to replace it at the tactical level. At the operational level, however, there is a need to augment it through explicit design. Planning solves problems; design ensures that the problems being solved are the right ones. This article discusses the most prevailing planning process, the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP); the emerging techniques associated with so-called “effects based operations” (commonly referred to as EBO); and an approach that may potentially inform future doctrine—systemic operational design (SOD). I shall compare the conceptual foundations, decision-making models, and applicable organizational structures of the three approaches.

Operational thought is constantly adapting and evolving to suit the context in which it is applied. The recent evolution of military thought has closely followed the evolution of systems theory. As the understanding of systems continues to evolve, so must military thought.

Three models represent the successive theoretical shifts in systems thinking. They reflect a progressive understanding of systems, beginning with the concept of the systems as a mindless mechanical tool, then as a uni-minded biological being (that is an entity making unilateral decisions), and finally as a multi-minded socio-cultural system.

The three military decision-making models reflect a parallel progression in the evolution of systems thinking. Initially, rational military decision-making supported solving well-structured problems such as those found in a mechanistic system. Decision-making primed by recognition subsequently evolved to address problems occurring in natural settings with which the decision-maker had experience. An intuitive decision-making process then emerged to cope with those situations for which decision-makers had no previous experience.

Working from these basic models, advances in systems thinking and decision theories have triggered subsequent developments in organizational structures. The hierarchical model that enabled commanders to act decisively at the operational level gave way to a network organization that emphasized lateral information sharing. The networked organization laid the foundation for transition to a learning organization that continually updates its thinking and enables the adaptation and innovation required for the best outcomes.
Continued evolution of operational thought is vital to gaining and maintaining the cognitive initiative and maintaining effectiveness in the rapidly changing operating environment.

**MDMP**

The prevailing planning process, the MDMP, amounts to a mechanistic view of mindless systems. The mechanistic view of the world that evolved in France after the Renaissance maintains that the universe is a machine that works with a regularity dictated by its internal structure and the causal laws of nature. The elements of mechanical systems are “energy-bonded” in that they reflect Newtonian mechanics; laws of classical physics govern the relationships among the elements. Concepts based on this mechanistic view pervade current military doctrine, as evidenced by terms such as center of gravity, mass, and friction. The mechanistic perspective focuses on physical logic and is entirely appropriate—at the tactical level. It becomes incomplete, however, at the more conceptual operational level, where the political objectives of war are at least as important as the physical disposition of forces.

The MDMP is a rational decision-making process. It proceeds by well-ordered steps conducted in an objective, reasoned, and logical manner. The commander must clearly state the end-state he wishes to achieve at the outset of the planning process. The staff develops a number of alternative courses of action to achieve that end-state. The commander selects the most efficient means of achieving his end-state from the alternatives presented to him. This type of rational thinking provides an orderly approach to solving well-defined problems. It has also led to significant accomplishments in the areas of science and technology.

Yet the problems the operational commander faces are seldom well defined and are complicated by time pressures, vaguely understood requirements, and often-conflicting goals. Dynamic conditions that characterize natural settings affect all of these factors. Rarely is there enough time or sufficient information to make a systematic rational approach work outside of a laboratory.

The MDMP was originally developed for use in a hierarchical organization. (Hierarchy refers to the distribution of authority based on organizational position, such as the commander of a military unit.) Authority and vertical communication combine to permit highly placed individuals to receive information from all individuals at lower levels. The highly placed individuals are also well placed to exert control over their subordinates. The tight control associated with a hierarchical structure, however, is one of its greatest operational-level drawbacks. The only persons with a full perspective of the organization’s current situation are those positioned where the information comes together, at the top. Consequently, the ones with the most knowledge tend to be the planners, not the executers. The military exhibits this shortcoming when its rational decision-making model, the MDMP, encourages the separation of course of action development and course of action implementation.

Higher commanders and planning staffs formulate courses of action, but subordinate commanders implement them. The commanders tasked with implementing a course of action are not privy to all the factors that went into developing it. The planners responsible for developing the course of action are not as familiar with the subordinate units’ capabilities and strengths as the unit commanders are. This separation of duties is fraught with communication problems that greatly reduce the chance that the optimal course of action will be the one developed. The separation can also affect the commitment of commanders who must implement a plan that they were not part of developing. The rational decision-making model used by the military’s hierarchical organization rests on a linear communications process that places more emphasis on ideas flowing from top to bottom than on those flowing from bottom to top. Yet, in the contemporary operating environment, those with the most current situational awareness are at the bottom of the hierarchy. The recognition of these shortcomings led to the development of a new operational approach.

**Concepts based on this mechanistic view pervade current military doctrine, as evidenced by terms such as center of gravity, mass, and friction.**
Holistic Planning, Networked Organization, and Uni-Minded Systems

Systems thinking akin to so-called “effects based operations” reflects the second stage of systems theory, a biological view of a uni-minded system.6 The biological thinking that led to the concept of an organization as a uni-minded system initially emerged in Germany and Britain. The disparate parts of a uni-minded system react in a predefined manner to events in their environment, while a single command center, acting like a brain, controls the operation of the system as a whole. Concepts based on this biological model permeate EBO, as demonstrated by the effect-node-action-resources process that acts on a part of the system to trigger the desired behavior change of the whole.

EBO applies the elements of national power against the threat’s political, military, economic, social, informational, and infrastructural systems to cause the threat to behave in a pre-determined manner.7 The assumption that these parts will react to events in their environment in a predictable way is one of the key tenets of EBO. Such “effects-based” thinking is wholly dependent on viewing organizational complexities as though they were uni-minded. However, most emerging threats are not centrally controlled systems, but complex adaptive systems.

Complex adaptive systems are systems that contain agents or populations that seek to adapt to improve their fit to the environment.8 Most complex adaptive systems have distinctive interaction patterns that are neither random nor completely structured.9 EBO attempts to exploit these patterns of interaction by identifying and acting on key nodes, or relationships between nodes, in order to bring about the desired behavior. The effect-node-action-resources process relies on identifying cause-and-effect relationships. However, establishing even short-term causes and effects in a complex adaptive system is difficult due to the nature of its interactions. A system is complex when it has many autonomous agents that interact with each other in many ways.10 A system is adaptive when it responds to interactions with its environment by spontaneously self-organizing and seeking to turn whatever happens to its advantage.11 Complex adaptive systems operate in a state of continual change as new information is learned and assimilated. EBO-like systems thinking seems to demand the impossible: predicting future behavior in a continually learning, changing, and adapting system.

Long-term prediction of complex adaptive systemic behavior is complicated further by the inevitable rise of emergent properties. Emergent properties are properties the whole system has that the separate parts do not. Emergence occurs as complex adaptive systems respond to environmental changes through evolutionary adaptation. The system’s emergent structures constantly adjust and readjust in response to input from the environment because they are open systems. Analysts cannot understand emergent properties by examining the system’s separate parts, so predicting which emergent structures will arise from interacting parts in an open system that exhibits novelty and complexity is not feasible for all practical purposes.

Taking action to produce a predicted “effect” ignores a complex adaptive system’s potentially sensitive dependence on initial conditions. This is the same phenomenon that makes determining long-range weather forecasting impossible.12 Prediction requires an ability to identify the true principal driving forces in the system, as well as how these forces will affect the outcomes of interest. What makes prediction especially difficult is that the forces shaping the future do not add up in a simple, system-wide manner. Instead, their effects include nonlinear interactions among the components of the system. The conjunction of a few small events can produce a big effect if their impacts multiply rather than add. The effect of events can be unforeseeable if their consequences scatter unevenly within the system. In such an environment, current events can
dramatically change the probabilities of many future events. Small changes in complex systems have wide ranging and unpredictable consequences that EBO cannot consider. That shortcoming is EBO’s crippling weakness.

Nonetheless, EBO-like systems thinking brings a crucial strength to operational-level planning: holistic understanding. EBO pioneers the first systemic, rather than systematic, method of studying and understanding threats in their environments and contexts. EBO considers not just the separate components of the threat system, but also properties that arise when the disparate parts come together. Looking at the entire system compensates for a key fault in the reductionist, systematic MDMP approach, which is “similar to trying to reassemble the fragments of a broken mirror to see a true reflection.” From a very early age, Western culture teaches learning by breaking apart problems (analysis) and fragmenting the world. While this psychological process may serve to make complex tasks more manageable, there is an enormous hidden price. The relationships between parts often go under-appreciated or vanish in the analysis. An understanding of how the consequences of localized actions affect the larger whole also often vanishes in the analytical process. EBO tries to remedy this problem by gathering and sharing a greater amount of knowledge to better understand the system as well as its components.

Effects-based thinking enables recognition-primed decision-making. Recognition-primed decision-making incorporates both rapid assessment of the situation and mental course-of-action evaluations. Development of recognition-primed decision-making resulted from field research on the way experienced personnel made decisions in real-world settings. The research explains how experience allowed the decision-makers to react quickly and make sound decisions without having to explicitly contrast options. Decision-makers begin by recognizing the situation as one with which they have some type of experience in the past. Their previous experience enables them to develop an abstract mental model or prototype of the situation, set priorities, determine which informational cues are relevant, ascertain what to expect next, and call upon various ways of successfully responding. Experience allows the decision-maker to filter out unnecessary information and focus on the meaningful pieces. EBO’s collaborative information environment permits rapid access to enormous amounts of data that the recognition-primed decision-maker can use his experience to sort out.

Recognition-primed decision-makers develop viable courses of action in an extremely short timeframe. In order for a decision-maker to make sense of an observation, he must have an idea of what might be seen and a framework of beliefs into which new observations, both confirming and disconfirming, may be interwoven. He calls upon prior learning to structure his new perceptions and uses these new perceptions to advance learning in the form of theory construction and modification. Experience facilitates the decision-maker’s rapid understanding of a situation and enables him to develop contextually appropriate mental prototypes. Recognition-primed decision-makers implement the first viable course of action they develop rather than generating and comparing multiple ones. In fact, research indicates that only novices need to develop multiple courses of action and compare...
them in order to determine the best one. Recognition-primed decision-making makes extensive use of mental simulations. Mental simulation, or mental wargaming, occurs in the initial assessment of the situation, when generating expectancies, and while evaluating courses of action. Courses of action are mentally wargamed in the order they are developed. Mental simulations help explain the pieces of incoming information by arriving at a context that best accounts for them. They also enable course-of-action evaluation by previewing how a course of action will unfold and identifying obstacles it might encounter. Once the experienced decision-maker determines that a course of action is viable, he will gain very little by continuing to develop subsequent courses of action. By making vast amounts of collected information available to the decision-maker, EBO enables recognition-primed decision-making for known and well-developed threat situations.

Effects-based thinking moves towards a networked organization and away from a focus on an organizational structure based on hierarchy at the operational level. Units and agencies linked to each other through the collaborative information environment constitute a network organization. The network organization replaces vertical communication and control relationships with lateral relationships. Formal ties are less important than informal partnerships. Network organizations encourage information sharing and inspire innovation. However, there are several significant complications with network organizations. The sheer amount of information to disseminate may actually hamper situational awareness and decision-making unless appropriate filters are in place. Various components in a network organization may also pursue their own self-interests and agendas at the expense of others in the network, especially if they lack hierarchical ties, are separated from each other geographically, face competing priorities, and exhibit different senses of urgency. EBO’s shift toward a network organizational structure replaces one set of communication problems with another. Fortunately, another approach is emerging.

SOD

Systemic operational design, which may potentially inform future doctrine, reflects the most recent stage in the evolution of systems theory—the socio-cultural view of a multi-minded system. Social organizations exemplify multi-minded systems. Neither the biological nor the mechanical models can explain the behavior of a system whose individual parts display autonomy. The critical variable is intention, or purpose; an entity is purposeful if it can produce the same outcome in different ways in the same environment, and different outcomes in the same or a different environment. The various interests of the purposeful parts (their intentionality) are constantly re-aligning in relation to each other and to the whole.

Multi-minded systems are also information-bonded; they achieve guidance and control by agreement based on a common perception preceded by a psychological contract. An example is riding a horse as opposed to driving a car. Who the rider is matters to the horse, and the rider can only enjoy a proper ride after he exchanges information with the horse. The mutual influence represented in this analogy illustrates a socio-cultural view that permeates SOD. Social interaction in SOD evinces a process of injecting energy into a multi-minded system through action to learn more about, or discover, its purpose. Rather than relying on a presumed certain understanding or complete information, SOD recognizes that uncertainty is an attribute of complex adaptive systems and addresses it through continuous reframing. Whereas EBO’s holistic approach focuses on disrupting nodes and relationships, SOD focuses on transforming the relationships and interactions between entities within a system. This different emphasis allows SOD to develop a rationale for systemic behavior that facilitates the system’s movement in accordance with the designer’s aim. SOD uses the term “operational” to signify its focus on the link between strategy and tactics. SOD develops concepts of operation
aimed at disrupting entire systems through systemic shock. It ensures that the tactical forms of action developed are consistent with the logic inherent in the strategic aim.

Systemic operational design occurs in the context of a learning organization (as adaptive to emerging information) and is driven by the design team. The commander selects members of his design team based on their ability to contribute to a rigorous discourse and continually update their thinking by remaining open to conceptual shifts. The discourses utilize a dialectic approach that examines the differences between the friendly context (thesis) and the rival context (antithesis), in order to develop a synthesis—a conceptual understanding of the system. This synthesis then becomes the starting point for the next dialectic. SOD is composed of seven sets of structured discourse: “systems framing, rival as rationale, command as rationale, logistics as rationale, operation framing, operational conditions, and forms of function.” These discourses provide the framework for continual learning and adaptation. They also permit the rapid incorporation of new information bearing on the problem. Each discourse informs the next in a fluid process that moves from the broad to the narrow and from the abstract to the concrete. Three products result from the discourses: a literary text that explains the logic of the system, a visualization sketch that embodies the logic of the form of maneuver, and a conceptual map that communicates the holistic impression of the body of knowledge gained through the dialectic.

The concept of “design” to inform plans construction makes SOD stand apart from both the MDMP and effects-based thinking. Design focuses on learning, and planning concentrates on action. The design team sets the problem in context through critical questions that lead to rigorous thought. The planner then enables adaptive action to solve the problem set by the designer. Both functions are necessary, but neither is sufficient by itself. SOD does not replace the planning process; it incorporates the element of design to enlighten planning by being sensitive to the multi-minded quality of the environment.

Traditional operational planning approaches use existing approved templates, as abstractions, to solve current concrete problems. These templates lose their validity when the threat system adapts and exhibits new emergent properties. SOD iteratively creates new patterns that tune into the unique logic of the emerging context, avoiding the pitfalls of relying on an enshrined, albeit irrelevant, abstraction. It adapts to the changing operational environment through its cycle of design, plan, act, and learn. SOD accomplishes this through a series of discourses that lead to a holistic design of an operation that ensures the creation of a plan relevant to the current context.

Systemic operational design uses intuitive decision-making. Intuition is a natural outgrowth of experience and preparation; intuitive decision-making translates that experience into action by making inferences calibrated to empirical environmental similarities. Where EBO applies recognition-primed decision-making to identify familiar patterns
based on previous experience, SOD uses intuitive decision-making to spot anomalies from experience and develops inferences about appropriate action. SOD takes the lock-step out of effects-based thinking by rigorously recognizing and processing the need to adapt to likelihoods presented by anomalies. It takes advantage of intuitive decision-making to identify points of departure from previous experience. Intuitive decision-makers are able to recognize when an emerging context does not match their experience base, and calls for either a new approach or a reframing of the problem. They are quick to notice anomalies because they have a clear idea of what to expect and a refined sense of what is typical.

Intuitive decision-making uses reframing to account for deviations from expected patterns. Reframing enables the intuitive decision-maker to perceive the problem differently. This change in perspective leads to a new interpretation that changes the way the problem is perceived and a refined sense of what is typical. It applies to environments characterized by time pressure, high stakes, experienced decision-makers, inadequate information, ill-defined goals, poorly defined procedures, cue learning, context, dynamic conditions, and team coordination. SOD applies intuitive decision-making to maximize inherent human capabilities and tendencies, while mitigating human fallibilities. The emphasis is on being poised to act rather than being paralyzed by information, expectations (within the accepted analytic framework), and evaluations. Learning through action enables the intuitive decision-maker to gain experience even if the emerging context has unfamiliar properties. No other approach explicitly incorporates learning about deviations from expected patterns, which is precisely where learning is most crucial.

Systemic operational design differs from earlier approaches by harnessing the concept of emergence to drive the learning process. By actively searching for emergence, SOD provides a means for the organization to adapt to the constantly changing operating environment. SOD regards the use of force not only as a means to shape the operational environment, but also (and mainly) as a tool for asking critical questions, an instrument for clarifying ambiguities, a measure for disproving hypotheses, a mode of operational research, and a mechanism for organizational learning. Because SOD reflects the latest developments in the evolution of systems thinking, it presents a more appropriate approach for adapting and innovating in an environment characterized by uncertainty and change. MR
CARING FOR MILD traumatic brain injury (mTBI) continues to be challenging for both the military and the Veterans Administration (VA). The Army can make a difference in the care provided to Soldiers by incorporating aspects of sports medicine’s approach to treating closed head injuries. Several sports medicine “best practices” can assist in caring for Soldiers who have been exposed to explosive blasts and are suffering from mTBI.

Traumatic brain injury (TBI) and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) are often confused and incorrectly interchanged when referring to consequences associated with blast injuries. These afflictions are not the same, and a Soldier can be diagnosed with both. TBI is a physical wound to the brain. PTSD is a physiologically induced wound to the mind (i.e., information processing and mental functioning). The focus here is on TBI, primarily in its mild form, mTBI.

Sports teams have taken aggressive steps to mitigate brain injury on playing fields. The number of collegiate and high school football players incurring closed head injuries resulting in mortality has dropped over the last half century due to increased awareness and research. In 1968, for example, 36 fatalities related to head injury were reported. By 1990, however, the average number was five per year. Comparatively, the Army’s challenge has escalated since the start of the War on Terrorism. An estimated 150,000 Soldiers have been diagnosed with some level of traumatic brain injury, primarily from exposure to explosive blasts.

The Army and the VA are taking action to find best care practices by making mTBI awareness a top priority. All leaders are directed to participate in the on-line educational TBI awareness and treatment program. The VA’s lead organization for this program is the Defense and Veterans Brain Injury Center (DVBIC) in Washington D.C. The DVBIC facilitates innovative partnership ventures with private and public sectors by bringing together the experts from both sides to identify the best technology and achieve the best care possible.

This article explores blast effects on the brain and identifies some best practices the military can adopt from established sports related programs. The essential core of sports-related programs for dealing with head/brain concussion is three-fold:

- Sports teams conduct extensive pre-season cognitive testing to establish a neuropsychological baseline on every player. These reports become invaluable in both the detection of and the recovery from concussive
Blast Injuries

Injury. Sports teams use several inexpensive and easily obtained software packages to gather data and conduct accurate cognitive testing. These cognitive testing database software packages are web-based and can be networked using mobile hand-held devices.4

- Sports trainers and physicians use an integrated approach to recognize trauma and evaluate the rate of recovery of a player with mTBI. Paramount in this effort is the combined use of scanning technology and cognitive testing in the detection and recovery phases of an injury. An example of emerging technology that has outperformed the accuracy of traditional brain imaging is the Magneto Encephalography (MEG). The MEG system is twice as accurate as traditional systems in identifying post concussive abnormalities.5 Integrating this new imaging technology with cognitive testing management systems produces a holistic approach to diagnosing and treating closed head injuries.6

- Sports teams have thorough testing regimens that evaluate patient recovery and validate readiness for athletes to return to play. Trainers and coaches alike recognize the increased risk of serious injury or even death when a player suffers a second concussion when not fully recovered from the first.7 Care providers typically use scanning technology to determine the readiness of an athlete to safely return to play.

Athletes, unlike Soldiers, do not routinely risk their lives responding to the call for duty to the Nation. Soldiers, however, relate easily to competitive team sports and exhibit the same spirit to win. Frequently, winning entails personal risk. Infusing sports best practices with current Army mTBI identification and treatment procedures can greatly enhance overall Soldier recovery and readiness. By adopting these best practices, the Army will gain a system that provides increased objectivity and greater accuracy in assessing brain injury. Soldiers, like athletes, sometimes need to be told when to rest.

Understanding Blast Mechanics

A blast produces an energy wave that causes an immediate change in atmospheric pressure. There are three blast phases: primary, secondary, and tertiary. The primary phase creates a wave of energy pressure that leads to the secondary and tertiary blast phases. Even though improvised explosive devices (IEDs) seek to cause penetrating damage, this initial energy wave surrounds the body, causing an extreme but temporary change in atmospheric pressure on the organs and the cardiovascular system.8 We know that this surrounding pressure can cause a Soldier to feel dazed or even to lose consciousness, but the full consequences of exposure to this energy wave are not well understood with regard to the human body, especially the brain.9

The secondary blast effect is made up of physical elements that are picked up by the primary blast energy wave and propelled through the air, often impacting and injuring the human body with assorted shrapnel.10 Finally a tertiary blast effect results in the body being thrown into or against an object. A tertiary effect, for example, occurs if a Soldier’s head snaps back from the blast pressure and hits the inside of the vehicle door with sufficient force to cause injury.11

Understanding these three phases of blast effects is crucial. We take extensive measures to protect Soldiers from the secondary and tertiary elements of the blast by providing state of the art equipment such as helmets, eye protection, groin protection, additional hardening of vehicles, and even seatbelts. However, we need to do much more to identify the best way to protect troops from the impact of primary blast effects pressure on the brain.

Effects of Blast on the Brain

Brain bleeding is a common effect from a blast event. Bleeding can occur immediately, or it may take several days for blood vessel seepage to appear. Some scanning techniques effectively identify bleeding and swelling. What is more difficult to identify, however, is the damage caused by a sheering and stressing of the microscopic nerve axons in the brain. This damage is referred to as Diffuse Axonal Injury (DAI). Because the brain is
made up of billions of microscopic nerve cells, DAI can go undetected. Severe whiplash or jolting of the head can contribute to injuring these axonal fibers. The most feasible way to determine DAI is cognitive testing. Unfortunately, axonal fibers cannot be visualized on Computed Tomography (CT) or Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) scans. Consequently, sports teams combine both cognitive testing and scanning technologies to provide an optimum diagnosis. For these reasons, the sports industry invests substantial time and resources in using cognitive testing methods to build a player’s baseline.

Brain damage can occur even when the head does not sustain a direct blow. When the body below the neck receives massive injury from a blast, hypoxia can occur. Hypoxia is oxygen deprivation with the potential to result in brain damage. James P. Kelly, a leading sports brain injury advisor to sports teams like the Chicago Bears, recently described this condition. When the body is under incredible surrounding pressure like that produced from a blast or massive physical trauma, the results are similar to that of “holding a tube of toothpaste and squeezing.” As the blood rushes to the head there is no place for it to go. The normal pressure of blood flow from the heart and the rush caused by the pressure of the blast compete for limited space, causing shock and imbalance in the cardiovascular system.

This pressure can produce a state of hypoxia and potential DAI or bursting of blood vessels. When rabbits and rats were exposed to blasts in the thoracic region, even while the head area was protected by steel plates, a pattern of neuronal abnormalities similar to DAI occurred.

**Risk From Exposure to Repeated IED Blasts**

U.S. ground forces are experiencing high levels of blast exposure. These effects are being studied in both a combat and home-station environment. Army programs that clear blast injury victims for return to duty must be objective, standardized, and above all accurate. To protect troops, maneuver commanders today develop unit policies derived from lessons learned from previous commanders or from their own personal experiences after repetitive combat tours.

A recent U.S. Air Force study conducted in the combat zone at Forward Operating Base Anaconda, just outside Baghdad, Iraq, determined that upwards of 60 percent of the Soldiers exposed to IED or other blasts suffered tympanic membrane, or eardrum damage. Importantly, the presence of tympanic membrane damage is a good marker to identify potential brain injury.

Captain Dennis Terry, United States Military Academy boxing coach, recently noted that when training for upcoming bouts, he counsels his cadets to neither deliver nor take any more head punches than necessary. The coach further explains that military leaders are beginning to understand that troops do not just shake off concussions. People with a first time head injury or concussion are at a 50 percent greater risk of death should they be injured a second time before the symptoms of the initial injury are gone. This effect is called second impact syndrome.

Today’s Soldiers are averaging three to four year-long combat tours over a six-year period. Their dedication to the mission and each other increases their risk of being exposed to multiple IED blasts. A historical example of Soldiers repeatedly exposed to blasts occurred in April of 2004 when Muqtada al-Sadr’s al-Madi Army Militia held a terrorist siege on the holy city of Najaf. The lead element for the Stryker battalion opposing the terrorists was the scout platoon led by 1LT John Hicks.

Five RPGs simultaneously hit the third vehicle in the platoon. The explosions threw everyone to the floor and knocked out all electrical power and communications. The Scouts returned fire with their .50-caliber machineguns and Mark-19 grenade launchers. Moments later, Hicks received a report from the disabled vehicle via the crew’s squad radios. They reported that no one was injured and the damage could be repaired in a few minutes. The Scouts moved forward several hundred yards past the ambush site. As they dismounted, the enemy struck again.

Although blasts were reported by the unit, they were not reported against particular crew members or individuals in the fast-moving combat environment. Soldiers rarely report an injury unless it is visible and requires immediate medical attention. Today’s leaders continue to struggle with accurately accounting for mTBI in a combat environment.
Affecting the Life of a Soldier

Based on my experiences as both a commander on the ground in combat and a chief of staff at a major installation concerned with Soldier well-being, I have witnessed the daily struggle of Soldiers and their families dealing with mTBI. A Soldier exposed to a severe blast may experience an immediate loss of consciousness or become dazed and confused following the event. Much like a sports player suffering from a concussion, the Soldier can have symptoms including migraine headaches, dizziness, irritability, difficulty sleeping, loss of balance, and short term memory problems. Table 1 identifies common symptoms associated with blast related brain injury. Unlike most sports related concussions, however, blast related concussion symptoms can persist for months and in some cases actually increase in severity over time. Any one of these symptoms can immediately affect a Soldier’s ability to shoot his weapon, move under fire, and to communicate with others on the battlefield. Exposure to a second blast can have additive effects on the brain, thus greatly increasing the risk of death or permanent loss of cognitive function. Upon returning to home-station and rejoining family, Soldiers with mTBI can experience challenges readjusting to everyday life. Family members may have difficulty understanding the changes because there are no apparent physical wounds. Frustrated and not understood, a Soldier may become overwhelmed with previously simple tasks such as driving a car or just managing to be in the right place at the right time.

Sleep deprivation and memory problems plague both family and military life and can lead to a downward spiral in quality of life. Unable to reintegrate into family life and maintain the rigors of unit training, Soldiers may feel they are becoming increasingly isolated. Many do not want to call attention to their symptoms for fear of being labeled as a problem or viewed as weak by peers and/or leaders. When struggling with issues such as these a Soldier can become aggressive, seek to self medicate, abuse alcohol, and fall into a pattern of misconduct.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Common Symptoms of Brain Injury</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Difficulty organizing daily tasks</td>
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<tr>
<td>Blurred vision or eyes tire easily</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Headaches or ringing in the ears</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feeling sad, anxious, or restless</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Easily irritated or angered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feeling tired all the time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feeling light-headed or dizzy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trouble with memory, attention, or concentration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More sensitive to sounds, lights, or distractions</td>
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<tr>
<td>Impaired decision making or problem solving</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difficulty inhibiting behavior, impulsive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slowed thinking, moving, speaking, or reading</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Easily confused, feeling easily overwhelmed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in sexual interest or behavior</td>
</tr>
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Table 1. Veterans Affairs Quick Fact TBI Card information.
Comparing the Cognitive Testing Approaches

The Department of Veterans Affairs has recommended that care providers use the Glasgow Coma Scale as the accepted cognitive testing methodology for post-deployment determination of brain injury severity. This method is subjective as it relies on a patient’s own account of symptoms and his or her recollection of the incident, thus, the evaluation depends on the patient’s memory of the event.21 When dealing with mTBI, the simple reality is that he or she may not remember the event at all or may have forgotten many of its details, particularly when time has passed since the date of injury.

The primary cognitive testing system used immediately following a suspected brain injury is called the Military Acute Concussion Evaluation (MACE). This is a very simple checklist used to conduct initial screening when diagnosing a Soldier exposed to a blast.22 This method is limited to only one version of cognitive questions and is completed by hand. MACE assessment is rudimentary in comparison to athletic testing systems as it does not assess reaction time with any accuracy or provide data for use against a comparison baseline.

Zoroya has claimed that injured troops in Iraq and elsewhere have cheated on the very problem-solving tests used to spot traumatic brain injuries to avoid being pulled out of combat units. Lieutenant Colonel Michael Jaffee of the DVBIC stated, “With highly motivated individuals . . . there is a motivation to stay with the unit and stay on the job or in the game.”23

Sports cognitive testing methods such as evaluating against a cognitive data point greatly improve accuracy and allow for objectivity, thus increasing the probability of detection and recovery. These systems rule out the possibility of cheating or deception. The systems being used by sports teams to capture data and assist in managing brain injury recovery include: Automated Neuropsychological Assessment Metrics (ANAM), Immediate Post Concussion Assessment and Cognitive Testing (ImPACT), and CogState Sport. Adopting any one of these concussion management programs would greatly increase Soldier readiness and care.24

One of the most successful cognitive testing protocols for sports teams is the ANAM Sports Medicine Battery (ASMB).25 With baseline cognitive average of mental agility documented, any substantial deviation in test scores can mean a breakdown in information processing capability. If an injury is caused by blast exposure, one can quickly identify slowed response time as well as changes in information processing. Upon identification of injury, Dr. James Kelly declared that first and foremost we must “rest” the injured brain.26 As a player recovers, he or she uses the ASMB to help decide when to return to play.

Recovering players should be tested both at rest and while physically taxed to rule out second impact syndrome and any remaining symptoms prior to return to play. Documenting the time spent unconscious at the point of injury is also a critical factor in the required length of time an athlete must demonstrate symptom free behavior prior to returning to play.27 For example, a player who has lost consciousness for a few seconds must be symptom free for a week. For injured Soldiers, a detailed neurological cognitive evaluation, both at rest and while exerted, is essential in the evaluation of recovery. As part of a reintegration testing and training program, Soldiers should be able to demonstrate both the cognitive and dexterity skills necessary to survive in combat prior to returning. An example of reintegration testing in a combat environment situation might be demonstrating proficiency in the basic combat skills like shooting a weapon, moving under fire, and communicating, all executed at half-step, walk, and then run speeds. Ideally, progressive recovery would be measured by multiple testing and cognitive comparisons against previously acquired baseline data.

The ImPACT concussion management program is another universally practiced cognitive testing program used to capture data on players. At present, about half of baseball’s 30 professional teams

Documenting the time spent unconscious at point of injury is also a critical factor in the required length of time an athlete must demonstrate symptom free behavior prior to returning to play.
belong to ImPACT concussion management programs. These teams can identify mTBI in players who show drops in cognitive testing following a head injury. Veteran trainer Stan Conte of the Los Angeles Dodgers is keenly attuned to the risks of putting a player back on the field after an injury. Conte says, “The worst thing anybody can do—a doctor or a trainer—is put somebody else in harm’s way without even knowing it.”

CogState Sport is widely used by athletes to perform cognitive associated tests over the Internet. Regardless of the player’s location, he or she can access the system, view the appropriate cognitive reaction history, and/or request to take a test. The system reports a cognitive testing score via email and allows for the compilation and storage of pre-season averages. CogState Sport and similar cognitive testing systems have tremendous potential for supporting an Army continuously on the move. By introducing a cognitive testing protocol similar to ASMB, CogState Sport, or ImPACT, the military can better and more effectively diagnose mTBI. Additionally, data could identify trends and assist the Army in countering the enemy and the effects of IEDs on Soldiers. CogState Sport software is relatively inexpensive, only costing $40.00 per administration, and the necessary computer hardware is already in our current fielded micro-processors.

Using Magnetoencephalography (MEG) to Determine Abnormality

Several scanning and imaging technologies are available to further evaluate head trauma. Injuries resulting from massive brain hemorrhaging are comparatively easy to identify. That is not the case with respect to mTBI, however. Soldiers suffering from mTBI frequently do not display obvious markers for brain injury. Consequently, scanning technology is an important element in detection. In a recent study comparing scanning technologies, the MEG achieved 86 percent accuracy in positively identifying abnormalities in patients with closed head injuries. Other scanning technologies were less effective. The MRI and Single Photon Emission Computed Tomography identify abnormalities at the levels of 18 percent and 40 percent respectively. The data strongly suggest the MEG scanning system is the preferred diagnostic tool for detecting abnormalities in personnel mTBI symptoms.

Tests sponsored by the University of Pittsburgh School of Medicine demonstrate the value of both functional MRI and neuropsychological cognitive testing for determining when athletes can safely return to play without risk of suffering Second Impact Syndrome. Our Soldiers need the same combination of medical and technological support before being returned to mission.

Finding a Solution

Sports teams have identified effective means for identifying and managing player concussions. The military should follow suit and make the following adjustments:

- Pilot an “off-the-shelf” cognitive testing program like ASMB, CogSport, or ImPACT to build a pre-combat Soldier baseline database in support of all Soldiers in the Reserve and active component. Introduce this testing at basic training and in support of all deploying units. Establish policies that ensure units test and consolidate individual data prior to deployment. Link these concussive management programs to Army Knowledge Online web-based systems, allowing Soldier access via the Internet throughout the world. Educate leaders, trainers, and Soldiers on the importance of this data contribution. Invite sports medicine experts to share knowledge with our leaders about concussive injury. Increase our understanding of primary, secondary, and tertiary phases of blasts and their respective impacts on the body and the brain.
- Teach leaders and care providers to recognize that blast-related injuries like diffused axonal injury can go undetected without the proper evaluation. Develop a comprehensive cognitive testing and scanning capability that can deploy to the installation or combat zone as needed. Develop policy to ensure standard scanning technology is available at each duty station. Leaders
must know what scanning technology is available and ensure these technologies are available to support Soldiers. Installation commanders should track scanning technology and operators at installations in the same manner they track sensitive items in a combat unit and establish policies that measure rate of use and Soldier accessibility.

- **Develop policies that standardize recovery protocols for all Soldiers.** Use both cognitive testing and scanning technology to assist in the management and verification of Soldier readiness before returning to the combat environment. Integrate these procedures into current deployment and combat operations models. Coordinate efforts between deployed units and home-station operations to ensure medically evacuated Soldiers are tracked by rear detachment commanders and are integrated into a recovery program.

Infusing sports best practices with current Army mTBI identification and treatment procedures will enhance our overall Soldier recovery and readiness and ultimately return these heroes back safely to their families. **MR**

### NOTES

4. Ibid., 289.
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8. James P. Kelly, Professor of Neurosurgery and Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation at the University of Colorado School of Medicine, interview in Denver, Colorado, with the author, 1 October 2007.
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IN UNCLE SAM'S BACKYARD:  
China's Military Influence in Latin America

Loro Horta

When analyzing China’s relations with Latin America, most observers tend to give marginal attention to the military and defense dimensions of the relationship and focus primarily on economic matters. A survey of official and academic publications on China’s involvement with Latin America shows the minimal attention given to the military aspect of the phenomenon.1

Many have pointed to China’s limited arms sales to Latin America as a clear indicator of China’s insignificant military position in the region. But weapons trade is not the only avenue available for establishing military influence abroad. Military and defense education, official visits by military officers and defense officials at various levels, participation in joint exercises, UN missions, air shows, and the provision of both non-military and military services are ways the Chinese are increasingly building a presence in Latin America. China’s defense ties with Latin America have until recently been sporadic, involving little more than a few widely spaced official visits and even fewer hardware sales. However, since 2000, China has engaged in a patient, comprehensive diplomacy strategy toward Latin America. The PLA’s new charm offensive is slowly but steadily winning a foothold. Initiatives beyond arms sales are incrementally allowing the PLA to create a foundation for long-term military cooperation in the not so distant future.

There are significant political, economic, and military dimensions to most weapons trade. By that, I mean that major arms sales tend to follow or run in parallel with close and favorable political and economic relations. For instance, major recipients of U.S. arms, such as Israel, are allies of Washington that enjoy a close, privileged relationship. The same applies to NATO members and U.S. allies in Asia and the Middle East. Arms sales take place in a larger political and diplomatic setting. A direct link exists between major arms transfers and the nature of political and economic relations.

Using this line of reasoning, we can conclude that China’s arms sales to Latin America are likely to increase as China’s political and economic relations with Latin America progress. Beijing’s rising economic and political influence in Latin America may pave the way for major Chinese arms sales and a further expansion of its military influence. China’s sophisticated new defense diplomacy is a major force driving this process.

China’s Military Diplomacy

Defense-related and military education is an increasingly important, albeit unnoticed, instrument in Chinese defense policy. Training of Latin American
military officers in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) academies has certainly been on the rise. Not so long ago, few officers from Latin America attended Chinese military academies. However, in the past several years, over 100 officers representing the three services of 12 Latin American countries graduated from PLA academies.

China trains officers at all levels of command and in all services. For instance, at the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) Command Staff College, junior and senior officers from Latin America attend different levels of education in the same year, allowing the Chinese military to become acquainted with officers from different generations and from all services. Most significant perhaps is China’s training of the upper echelons of Latin America’s military at Beijing’s elite national defense university, PLANDU. Each year Spanish-speaking senior officers from all services attend a four-and-one-half month-long course on grand strategy. By inviting these officers, the PLA is ensuring that attendees are those who will be in positions of power, which will allow closer relations with China and enhance influence and prestige with the Latin American military.

Surprisingly, officers from countries hostile to the United States such as Cuba or Venezuela no longer frequent these courses, while countries with traditionally close relations with the United States such as Colombia, Chile, and Argentina do. In addition to the academic component, these courses include a strong element of defense diplomacy and personal networking. Course participants visit historic places and monuments such as the Great Wall and engage in scenic and picturesque activities such as cruises along the Yangtze and Pearl Rivers. In the words of a Uruguayan air force colonel, these visits aim at “socializing the barbarians into the splendors of Chinese civilization.”

Other visits and field trips showcase China’s new wealth and technological prowess. Visits to the country’s major armaments companies such as Northern Industries, China State Shipbuilding, China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation, and other military-related firms figure preeminently in the program. Other visits include the Baosteel aluminum plant in Shanghai, car assembly plants, and aviation research centers. Visits to some of the country’s more modern and innovative buildings are an opportunity for foreign officers to marvel at China’s architectural and engineering achievements. (During these visits, the hosts usually do not mention the names of the Western architects and companies who actually did most of the work.)

The PLA has also sent its own officers to courses held in Brazil, Chile, Argentina, Venezuela, Cuba, and Mexico. However, the number of Chinese officers heading for courses in Latin America has been smaller than the number of South American personnel attending Chinese military academies. In 2007, some 40 officers from the Americas studied in China, while only 6 PLA officers attended courses in Latin America, attending mostly short language courses and internships at local academies. Lack of fluency in the language seems to be the major reason that so few PLA officers attend Latin American military establishments. Most PLA officers proficient in Spanish and Portuguese are young, recently graduated lieutenants too junior to attend higher command courses. In addition, the PRC sees itself as the senior partner in these exchanges and believes Latin America’s militaries have far more to learn from China’s military traditions than the PLA has to learn from what they see as undisciplined, party-prone Latin American officers.

In addition to inviting Latin American officers to study at PLA schools, the Chinese military offers them scholarships to attend China’s most prestigious civilian universities. China has also funded the education of some military officers and defense officials at Beijing National University and the Shanghai Institute of International Relations. In 2007, officers from Ecuador, Uruguay, Bolivia, and Venezuela attended Chinese language and culture courses at civilian universities.

Official visits. Official visits and other exchanges have become an important aspect of Sino-Latin...
American defense relations as Beijing has intensified its defense diplomacy with the hemisphere. Nearly all chiefs of defense forces and ministers of defense from Latin America have visited China. In August 2006, Bolivia’s minister of defense visited the People’s Republic of China (PRC) for a week, and the commanders of the Uruguayan army and navy visited Beijing a month later. In April 2007, the chief of the Bolivian defense force visited Beijing; the Chilean, Peruvian, and Ecuadorian chiefs of defense forces followed suit in May and June. In August 2007, the Argentine minister of defense and the chief of the Brazilian army visited the PRC as well.

Ship calls in China by South American navies are becoming far more frequent. Peruvian, Mexican, Chilean, and Colombian vessels visited mainland ports in the past several years. The only visit by PLAN ships to Latin America took place in 2002 when the Chinese navy conducted its first circumnavigation of the globe. On that occasion, a missile destroyer and a supply ship visited Ecuador, Peru, and Brazil.

The Chinese navy is increasingly able to operate far from its regional waters, at least for purposes of limited naval exercises. It demonstrated this in September 2007 by participating in joint naval exercises with the British Royal Navy in the North Atlantic and with the Spanish and French navies in the Mediterranean. However, to preclude tensions with the U.S., the Chinese navy avoids showing a regular presence at Latin American ports.

Between January 2005 and June 2006, Chinese officials visiting Latin America included the Deputy Chief of the PLA General Staff, the Commander of the Lanzhou Military Area Command, the Commander of the PLA Air Force, the Political Commissar of the PLA Air Force, the Political Commissar of General Logistics, the Political Commissar of General Armaments, and the Deputy Chief of the General Political Department. In addition, logistics delegations, regional area commands, heads of departments, and members of the PLANDU academic staff paid informal and less senior-level visits to their South American counterparts.

Cultural events. The PLA also increased its participation in cultural events in Latin America as a part of China’s defense diplomacy package. Such activities included visits by PLA cultural and entertainment teams, such as the PLA band’s visit to Grenada for that country’s 32nd anniversary independence celebrations. PLA bands and acrobatic troupes have visited Peru, Ecuador, Guyana, Venezuela, and Bolivia, while photo and movie exhibits have exalted PLA contributions and exhibited the PLA’s fighting prowess in countries throughout Latin America.

PLA units participated in military demonstrations and shows in Latin America as well. Chinese fighter jets and transports were at air shows in Chile, Argentina, Peru, and Brazil, and Chinese defense companies attended arms exhibitions and defense-
related conferences and seminars throughout Latin America. Beijing military attachés and PLA support personnel have travelled to the 14 Latin American countries that abide by Beijing’s one-China policy. The military attachés observe local military exercises and participate in seminars, cultural events, and other activities organized by the host countries’ defense academies.

Another way in which the Chinese military has been assisting local militaries is by deploying specialized personnel such as doctors, engineers, telecommunications experts, and other highly trained personnel to Latin America. The absence of such specialized personnel in some of the least developed countries in Latin America makes them a valuable and expensive commodity. China has deployed medical teams to military hospitals in Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela, and PLA engineers to Ecuador and Bolivia.  

Gifts and friendship prices. The fact that Chinese arms sales to the southern hemisphere have been marginal has led many observers to underestimate the role of Chinese arms in fostering closer defense ties. For instance, while Chinese arms sales to Bolivia have been negligible, donations of war materiel have not. Since President Evo Morales came to power in 2006, China has given the Bolivian armed forces significant quantities of military equipment and non-lethal equipment such as transport trucks, jeeps, and engineering and logistical equipment. On 11 September 2007, in a ceremony marked by great fanfare, senior Bolivian officials including President Evo Morales, the minister of defense, and the chief of the Bolivian defense force accepted delivery of 43 Chinese-made military transport vehicles for the Bolivian armed forces. A military cooperation agreement signed by the Bolivian minister of defense during a visit to the PRC in August 2006 provided the Bolivian military with $1.2 million in assistance in 2007 and $2 million in 2008. Moreover, China has supplied the Bolivian military with combat equipment such as medium artillery, mortars, heavy machine guns, and assault rifles, and has donated river patrol gunboats armed with light caliber cannons and machine guns. China may replace 38 shoulder-fired HN 5 antiaircraft missiles that a CIA operation took out of the country in 2005. The HN 5s were a concern for the U.S. military because this weapon system found its way to the narco-guerrillas of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, the military wing of the Colombian Communist Party. They used the HN 5s against American-made helicopters operated by the Colombian army. The Chinese missiles were effective in evading the defensive countermeasures aboard the American-made choppers. Thus, the CIA operation removed them from Bolivia after Evo Morales’ anti-U.S. government took power.  

China has supplied other Latin American countries with “non-lethal” military items. The armed forces of Guyana and other Caribbean nations have received uniforms, tents, field kitchens, vehicles, and engineering equipment. Police and paramilitary groups have received side arms, anti-riot equipment, communications equipment, and vehicles. China helped the Guyanese defense force construct sport and recreation facilities for defense force personnel and donated music equipment and educational materials. PLA-linked companies. Numerous PLA-linked companies and businesses operate throughout the world and are a rarely noticed component of China’s defense diplomacy. Most of these companies are under the General Logistics Department. China Northern Industries has major investments in Latin America in areas such as road-building; bridge-laying and maintenance; construction of electric power plants; shipping ventures; and automobile plants in Brazil, Argentina, Colombia, Peru, and Ecuador. China South Industries Group has invested in car assembly lines in Argentina and motorcycle and bus-manufacturing plants in Colombia. Chinese logistics companies have profited from supplying the private sector with uniforms, boots, gloves, helmets, trailers, construction materials, refrigerators, and air conditioners.

China’s major naval firms have also obtained lucrative contracts. In May 2006, Venezuela signed a $1.3 billion contract with China’s two most important shipbuilding companies to build 18 oil tankers to bolster exports. Harbin Aircraft Manufacturing sold 10 Y-12s for civilian use to Argentina, Cuba, Paraguay, and Bolivia, and China’s fast-growing helicopter industry caters to civilian interests in Argentina, Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia, and the Caribbean. Defense diplomacy and arms sales. Because of China’s patient, persistent defense diplomacy, the PLA has made steady progress in expanding its links
China’s influence within Latin America. While the Chinese military presence in the Americas has been marginal when compared with that of the United States, China is rapidly emerging as a military player in a region where its presence was once non-existent. The Chinese military has carefully nurtured a sophisticated, multidimensional defense diplomacy strategy to create a political environment for more ambitious initiatives in the medium- to long-term future. As argued above, major arms sales tend to take place in the context of a larger political and economic relationship and not in a vacuum. They serve as much as an opportunity for profit as an opportunity to cement political and diplomatic alliances.

**Arms Sales**

China’s blossoming has made it a significant economic player in Latin America. Its trade to the region reached $50 billion in 2006, and its newfound economic power in the Americas increased its political power accordingly. China is conducting its defense relations with Latin America in a political and economic setting that may pave the way for major arms sales. While it is difficult to acquire information concerning Chinese arms sales to countries with regimes the West deems hostile, open-source information and other analytical avenues indicate that Chinese arms sales to Latin America are slowly but steadily on the rise.

In 2005, China signed a contract with Venezuela to supply three JVL-1-type radars, a complete command and control system, spare parts, training, technical assistance, and a communications satellite leasehold for the price of $150 million. While this was a major arms deal by the standards of past Chinese sales to Latin America, making a profit was not Beijing’s main objective. Indeed, even for low-cost Chinese systems, the deal was a bargain; buying such a system and its related assets in the West would have cost at least two to three times as much. While making little if any profit, the sale of weapons at “friendship prices” allowed China to penetrate a new market and build good will among Latin America’s militaries.

This strategy seems to be slowly paying dividends. Venezuela purchased 24 aircraft from China’s state-owned Nanchang Aircraft Manufacturing Company and 10 more from Harbin Aircraft Manufacturing Corporation. According to *Jane’s Defence Weekly*, this included 24 K-8 basic trainers and ground attack aircraft and 10 Y-12 twin-turboprop, short take-off and landing, general-purpose transports. Chinese companies have sold bridges, pontoons, earth movers, and field kitchens to the Venezuelan military, and Hugo Chavez’s government has shown considerable interest in Chinese missiles and electronic warfare equipment. However, Beijing seems reluctant to transfer certain systems to the unpredictable Chavez because of the possible negative consequences to Sino-American relations.

Chinese military-aviation companies have made inroads into Peru, Bolivia, and Uruguay. In October 2007, the Bolivian air force took delivery of two Chinese-made M60 aircraft after receiving a $35 million line of credit from Beijing. By offering such generous payment terms, China’s defense industries hope to...
slowly accustom local militaries to their products and create a loyal Latin American clientele. This strategy seems to be working in Bolivia. The Bolivian air force is considering replacing its aging A7 aircraft with the J-7 fighter jet, a Chinese equivalent of the Russian MIG-21.

Financially strapped Bolivia has watched its neighbors acquire modern fighters from the West. Chile has the F-16; Argentina, the Mirage 2000; and Peru has advanced Russian fighters like the MIG-29 and Su-30. It is a matter of some urgency for the Bolivian government to acquire affordable, modern fighter jets; some Bolivian air force officers claim that the air force is 30 years behind those of its neighbors in modern equipment. China’s lines of credit and flexible terms of payment have made the J-7 an attractive purchase.

The Uruguayan air force may replace its aging A-7 fleet with J-7s as well by acquiring them on credit or through China’s forgiveness of Uruguay’s foreign debt. Ecuador has purchased Chinese air defense artillery, heavy machine guns, and military bridges, and Guyana bought a single Y-12 for its tiny air force and patrol boats to enhance its modest naval assets.

To “help the country defend itself,” Colombia may buy the PRC armored personnel carriers (APCs), artillery, rocket-propelled grenades, 81-millimeter mortars, assault rifles, logistics equipment, and side arms and submachine guns for the Colombian police and paramilitary.

Argentina may buy helicopters and transport planes, radars, heavy artillery, and antitank missiles. In August 2007, Latin American defense sources disclosed that Argentina was testing the Z-11, a Chinese version of Ecureuil AS 350 B2 built by Eurocopter. Argentina plans to spend $80 million to acquire Z-11s for army aviation. However, a Eurocopter representative challenged the sale’s legality, telling the Argentine press, “[China has] no license to produce this helicopter. Their helicopter is a bad copy of our Ecureuil; they bought a second-hand model and copied it.” The commander of the Argentine army replied, “The incorporation of this modern machine in to our force will significantly increase the operational capacity of the army’s aviation.”

A significant 2007 military cooperation agreement may lead to Argentina buying certain Chinese systems and producing them under license. Apart from the Z-11, the PRC will also transfer mobile radar technology, anti-tank missile technology and air defense systems to Argentina. Other licensed production agreements include non-lethal equipment such as transport trucks, jeeps, and engineering vehicles. In addition to its affordable prices and generous terms of payment, China’s willingness to transfer sensitive technology to local military industries makes its products an irresistible option. The Argentine government described the agreement with Beijing as “crucial and strategic for Argentina’s future.”

Technology transfers are likely to become a major factor in deciding future acquisitions by technologically advanced Argentina, Chile, and Brazil, which have been developing military industries for 20 years. Chile has shown interest in advanced communications and transport aviation and has purchased red arrow antitank missiles and Z9 utility helicopters. However, China faces strong competition from Western and Russian companies who have supplied the Chilean air force for decades and have strong links with the local authorities. The Z9’s acquisition is certain to cause controversy because the aircraft is a licensed copy of the French Eurocopter, AS 365N Dauphin II.

During President Alberto Fujimori’s administration in the 1990s, Peru acquired Chinese weapons by secret presidential decrees outside the control of the Peruvian parliament. Peru purchased weapons with Chinese private firms and individuals acting as intermediaries to avoid any incriminatory government involvement. A Peruvian senate inquiry discovered that six Chinese companies sold about $148 million worth of military equipment to the Fujimori regime between 1990 and 2000. The sales included six Y-12 transport aircraft, artillery, transport equipment, ammunition, and spare parts.

The Fujimori regime’s collapse in 2003 curtailed Chinese military sales, but China continued to
supply spare parts to Peru and service Chinese-made equipment. China remains an important supplier of non-lethal items such as uniforms and logistics equipment, and PLA-linked companies are active in various sectors of the Peruvian economy. However, for the time being, it remains unlikely that Chinese arms sales to the country will experience another 1990s-style bonanza.

In June 2001, the *Washington Times* reported that three Chinese ships carrying weapons and explosives entered the Cuban port of Mariel. China has close military relations with Cuba and a military base on Bejucal near Havana. Before an impoverished Russian government reluctantly abandoned it in 2000, the base was its main electronic eavesdropping facility in the tropics. The PRC took over the facility a year later and runs it under the utmost secrecy. The base can intercept civilian phone calls and faxes sent to and from the United States.27 Moscow also no longer gives Cuba any special privileges in weapons acquisitions. Chinese weapons and equipment use Russian technology, making them easy to integrate into the Cuban inventory while not requiring retraining for their use. Chinese companies are also an ideal source for spare parts, maintenance, and upgrades.

A final advantage of the China option is its cheap price. Most Chinese weapons systems are at least twice as affordable as those of the competition. A Russian SU-30 is as expensive as an American F-16, so Chinese aircraft and technical assistance are attractive alternatives. In addition to low-cost systems, China provides flexible and generous terms of payment. For example, in the 1980s and 1990s, the PRC sold the Thai military hundreds of APCs, infantry fighting vehicles, artillery, and naval vessels for 10 percent of the usual price and gave Thailand a 10-year period of “good will” before requiring it to begin paying for them. Beijing is pursuing a similar, albeit for now more limited, strategy in Latin America.

**Special case: Cuba.** Cuba has increasingly relied on Chinese assistance for its military because of generous terms. China helped Cuba upgrade its air defense system by providing more advanced communications equipment, improving its integration and central control, and assisting with maintenance and spare parts.28 China has also helped the Cuban air force maintain its aging Soviet-era fleet and upgrade some of its MIG-21s. China’s Northern Industries supplied the Cuban military with APCs, transport vehicles, and logistics equipment. However, it’s unlikely Cuba will make any major arms purchases from the PRC or that China will be willing to supply them. Advanced systems that would significantly enhance Cuban power projection capabilities—such as missiles, J series fighter jets, more capable radar and command systems, and naval assets equipped with cruise missiles—are therefore unlikely to come from China.

Cuba is unlikely to acquire such systems for three reasons. First, its doctrine does not envisage any power projection capability. To do so would be futile because of the proximity and tremendous power of the United States. Despite...
its anti-American rhetoric, Havana is well aware of the risks of provoking Washington when Cuba no longer enjoys super-power protection. Second, Cuba’s anomalous and stagnant economy cannot afford such systems even at Chinese prices. Third, various Cuban officers and others from across Latin America report that the Cuban military is not happy with the quality of Chinese weapons. (A Thai colonel who served over a decade as an armor officer operating Chinese and American tanks said, “Chinese equipment is fairly good in the first two to three years. After that, it gets all rusty. I would rather use a 15-year old American M-11 than a 4-year old Chinese APC.”){30}

For its part, China believes arming Cuba with advanced weapons systems endangers China’s relations with the United States. Challenging the U.S. from a country that neighbors the U.S. and arouses strong emotions in Washington might cost China more than any benefits it gained. Therefore, Beijing is cautious in dealing with Havana. Professor Guo Shuyong, an international relations expert at Shanghai Jiao Tong University, says, “We remember the Monroe Doctrine and respect U.S. influence in Latin America. China is not like the Soviet Union 50 years ago. There will be no Cuban missile crisis.”{30}

During a trip to Latin America in 2004, President Hu Jintao of China spent only a short time in Cuba and while there, refrained from making any comments that gave the impression the PRC intended to forge an alliance with Fidel Castro. Since then, Chinese trade and investment has been rather insignificant when compared with its presence in other South American countries, such as Brazil and Argentina.

**Brazilian focus.** Brazil is perhaps China’s most important relation in Latin America. Two-way trade between Brazil and China reached a staggering $20 billion in early 2007. China and Brazil have intensified defense and military ties and launched jointly developed satellites with the PRC funding 70 percent of the costs. By cooperating with the PRC, Brazil may acquire Chinese rocket technology in exchange for its advanced digital optical technology.{31} Chinese rocket technologies enable Brazil’s space program to be self-reliant and advance its secret missile program.

Indeed, reports emanating from U.S. intelligence sources claim China and Brazil have cooperated in sensitive military technology for ballistic missiles and advanced communications. We should not dismiss such a possibility given the advanced state of both nations’ military-industrial complexes and the West’s reluctance to supply sensitive technology to rising powers.{32} Because of the dual-use nature of the technologies involved, Sino-Brazilian cooperation in fields such as civil communications and aviation lends credibility to such a scenario. Brazil’s major aviation and arms manufacturing company and the China Aviation Industry Corporation II have jointly developed a medium transport turbojet aircraft, a 30- to 50-seat aircraft with a flying range of 3,000 kilometers and a ceiling of 11,000 meters. They sold 20 aircraft to Chinese airlines, and China may buy another 90. {33}

Another area of growing cooperation between the two defense forces is education and training for mid- and senior-ranking officers. Brazilian colonels have graduated from the PLA’s prestigious national defense university. Most Brazilian officers attend the PLANUD flagship course, a one-year defense and strategy course for senior officers and area-specific courses such as a one-month course for Caribbean and Latin American flag officers and civilian equivalents.

Brazilian junior officers have attended specialized PLA schools for logistics, artillery, special forces, intelligence, and command and staff, as well as Chinese language courses at PLA schools and some civilian universities. However, few Chinese officers travel to Brazil for military education because only a few speak the Portuguese language well enough to understand staff and strategic level courses. The PLA may also be reluctant to expose its officers to a foreign environment for a long period, particularly young officers vulnerable to cultural influences.

Frequent, high-level visits by military and defense officials are also taking place. Brazilian senior military officers and defense officials have visited the PRC in various capacities, and Brazil
expanded its military attaché office in Beijing to cope with the increase in defense cooperation.  

Conclusion  
Looking at China’s defense and military relations with Latin America solely from an arms sales perspective belies the true extent of China’s influence in the Americas. However, if one looks at defense and military education, visits and exchanges of personnel and equipment, and donations and sales at “friendship prices,” it becomes apparent that China’s defense relations with the Americas have been on the rise. While these sales are small when compared with those of Latin America’s main arms suppliers such as the U.S., Germany, Russia, France, Spain, and Brazil, one must consider how rapidly they have grown. China’s rising political and economic power and sophisticated defense diplomacy have allowed it to establish the necessary basis for future influence. China’s strong economic and political presence in Latin America has created the necessary environment for defense and military ties to flourish. Therefore, one may expect China’s military influence and arms sales in Latin America to increase. However, the PRC faces considerable challenges. The U.S. has a far longer and deeper defense relationship with Latin America and remains its main arms provider. China also faces competition from other Western nations and regional powers such as Brazil. Chinese weapons have a reputation for low quality and Latin American militaries have used Western equipment for decades. Nevertheless, China is on the march in Latin America. It has made substantial gains in a rather short period of time, and its defense relations with Latin America are multidimensional and sophisticated, reflecting the growing level of refinement and professionalism of the PLA and the Chinese state bureaucracy. 

NOTES  
2. The author visited the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy Command and Staff College in October 2006 and the Navy Technical University in May 2007.  
4. Comment made by a Uruguayan air force colonel during one of the trips.  
7. The author met some PLA officers who served in Latin American countries in various areas.  
28. Despite persistent reports, both Beijing and Havana have strongly denied any arms transactions between the two countries. However, senior military officials from Latin America and the United States interviewed by the author suggested there was a strong possibility that a significant quantity of lethal and non-lethal equipment was indeed sold to Cuba. Among the officials interviewed was a senior American civilian official in charge of the China desk at the National Defense Agency. The author interviewed the American official in late 2004 during a three-month course he attended at a U.S. Defense Department School in Hawaii.  
29. The author visited Thailand six times since 2005 and interviewed various Thai army officers. Because of the close nature of Sino-Thai relations, it is not appropriate to identify them. The Thai tank officer cited is a close friend of the author and a colleague from a defense course in the U.S.  

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Lieutenant Colonel Philippe Francois, French Marine Infantry

The FLN (National Liberation Front) estimated in 1962 that nearly eight years of revolution had cost 300,000 dead from war-related causes. Algerian sources later put the figure at approximately 1.5 million dead, while French officials estimated it at 350,000. French military authorities listed their losses at nearly 18,000 dead (6,000 from noncombat-related causes) and 65,000 wounded. European civilian casualties exceeded 10,000 (including 3,000 dead) in 42,000 recorded terrorist incidents. According to French figures, security forces killed 141,000 rebel combatants, and more than 12,000 Algerians died in internal FLN purges during the war. An additional 5,000 died in the “café wars” in France between the FLN and rival Algerian groups. French sources also estimated that 70,000 Muslim civilians were killed, or abducted and presumed killed, by the FLN.¹


ONE OF THE MOST internally divisive periods in recent French history occurred when France waged war (1954-1962) to retain sovereignty over French territory in Algeria. The French-Algerian war offers an unusually rich case study of an insurgency that contains valuable lessons in the dynamics of counterinsurgency and international conflicts arising from ideological, political, and cultural discontents.

Making comparisons between the French-Algerian war and the conflict in Iraq is tempting from a counterinsurgency (COIN) perspective, but one must remain cautious. Conducting a counterinsurgency campaign is not like cooking; lessons learned from one conflict do not automatically translate into recipes for resolving another. Many in the French military view the war in Algeria as a brilliant operational and tactical success story—and a great strategic and political failure, indeed, a debacle that had devastating short-term consequences for France and long-lasting adverse effects on the French military.

General Background and Context of the War

It is difficult to describe adequately the depth of feeling the French once had toward colonial Algeria. France’s relationship with Algeria as a colony was unique. Situated just across the Mediterranean Sea from France, Algeria was the closest non-continental part of the French Empire. Communications and travel were much easier and much greater than with other colonial outposts. France and Algeria had greater economic interdependence, and some
sectors of Algerian society identified themselves with France politically and culturally. Algeria was more than just a colony to the French. It was actual French territory, not just a vehicle for economic exploitation. About one million ethnic-European French citizens lived in Algeria. One out of every nine Algerians was a descendant of French colonists and regarded Algeria as part of France and an ancestral home. Most Frenchmen in Algeria regarded Algeria in the way that American citizens living in such places as Puerto Rico, Guam (or Alaska and Hawaii before statehood) viewed those places—as legitimate national territories.

Before the French arrived, there was no such place as Algeria in North Africa. The French created Algeria by incorporating a collection of independent city-states, coastal trading communities, and tribal areas into a single economic and political entity. In fact, the French-Algerian war gave birth to the nation of Algeria in the way America’s Revolutionary War with England gave birth to the United States.

Algeria’s origin and the nature of its relationship with France made the 1954 to 1962 conflict wrenching to the French national consciousness. The Algerian war pitted restive, indigenous North African populations seeking independence against die-hard French-Algerians determined to prevent independence. The French withdrew from Algeria under circumstances the military regarded as humiliating, degrading, and needless.

The war provoked national divisions and civil turmoil in France, and to this day the war’s outcome still, from time to time, generates tension. Resentment still simmers over what some Frenchmen view as the needless loss of legitimate French territory, and the conflict continues to influence the relationship between France and Algeria.

Part of this tragic legacy stems from the way the French military chose to deal with the emerging Algerian insurgency. Believing it had no alternatives, the military resorted to draconian measures—some of which, in retrospect, seem unnecessarily brutal. In addition, high-level French military officers openly rebelled against their elected civilian leaders, and by doing so soiled the honor of the French military.

The French military’s defiance of civilian authority came after a long, bitter struggle in Algeria that many in the military believed France had won at the price of heavy casualties. Many in the military expressed shock, revulsion, and outrage at the decision to grant Algeria independence after France had successfully put down the insurgent rebellion. Some regarded the move as a national betrayal. The decision brought dire consequences for French citizens who had put their trust in the government and the military. More than one million French-Algerian refugees were uprooted from their homes and forced to set sail for France after Algeria was granted independence.

Discontent fuelled by these developments led to the attempted assassination of a French president and two attempted military coups against a government that some in the military regarded as anti-French and illegitimate. Ironically, French military and civilian leaders could have learned many useful lessons from the conflict, but failed to do so. Lamentably, but understandably, the French military chose to have collective amnesia about Algeria for 40 years, and the number of people studying France’s involvement in Algeria declined sharply.

In time, the need to apply effective counterinsurgency techniques in Iraq and Afghanistan, Africa, Central Asia, and the Far East sparked renewed interest in the lessons of past insurgencies. U.S. agencies have studied and analyzed the French-Algerian war, but minimal French comment in this area continues to hobble efforts to glean lessons learned from the experience.

**France in North Africa.** After Rome destroyed Carthage in 146 B.C., the Romans were among the first Europeans to make contact with the Berbers who inhabited what is now modern-day Algeria. The Romans drove the Berbers back into Africa to make room for Roman settlement on the North African coast. Christianity arrived in the area in the second century A.D., and by the end of the fourth century, most Berbers had converted to it. In the fifth century, the Vandals conquered and settled
the same coastal region. Christianity’s influence among the Berbers was relatively short-lived. Arab military expeditions swept through the area in the seventh century, introducing Islam and the Arabic language. In time, the area became known as the Barbary States. Its population lived in urban trading centers, tribal areas in the hinterlands, and in enclaves controlled by pirates or privateers who made their living raiding seafaring traders travelling the Mediterranean.

Modern Algeria’s borders began to take shape in 1830 when the French government began exercising political authority over military and trading outposts and a steadily growing area settled by French European *pied noirs* (black feet), so named because of their mainly agricultural skills and merchants’ experience. To support the growth of agriculture and commerce, France organized “overseas departments” within the French government with northern Algeria prominently represented in the French National Assembly.

By 1848, France had brought nearly all of northern Algeria under its political and economic control. Subsequently, the Second Republic (under Louis-Napoleon) declared the colonized lands part of France itself. Pursuant to this declaration, it made Algiers, Oran, and Constantine French civil territories and administrative units under a civilian government. During this process, indigenous local leaders were either marginalized or eliminated and the educational system done away with.

The French administration of the Second Republic maintained that Algeria’s native Muslims and Jews were French nationals, but not French citizens. During France’s Third Empire period, Jews living in Algeria, who had been more amenable to French colonization, were given full French citizenship. In 1865, Napoleon III offered full French citizenship to Muslim nationals as well—if they renounced Islamic sharia law. Since most of the 8.4 million Berbers and Arab Muslims living in the area regarded such an action as apostasy, few sought citizenship.

The practical result of this was eventual dissatisfaction over what a majority of the Muslim population came to believe was an illegitimate French occupation. Ironically, such dissatisfaction grew as exposure to French culture and education popularized the ideals of human equality and natural liberty.

Along with the daily humiliation of disenfranchise-ment, this period was marked by great economic expansion, infrastructure development, and the formation of new Muslim social classes spawned in part by French ideas advocating universal human rights and political independence. This dissonance helped shape a separatist Algerian national identity.

During the early decades of the 20th century, the French administration responded to Muslim political protests and emerging Algerian nationalist sentiment by promulgating laws restricting protest and freedom of expression. This reaction was profoundly counterproductive and had precisely the opposite effect the French intended. Nevertheless, when World War II began, many Algerian Muslims rallied to the French cause.

In March 1943, Muslim leader Ferhat Abbas used war-time Muslim loyalty to France to press for political rights. His “The Manifesto of the Algerian People” demanded the Algerian constitution guarantee Muslims equality under the law and the right to participate in the Algerian political process.

The French government responded to the manifesto in 1944 with a reform proposal of its own that offered full French citizenship to certain Muslims based on a merit system. The Muslim community met this proposal with derision for several reasons, not the least of which was that it allowed only a relatively small number of Muslims to immediately qualify for citizenship. On 8 May 1945, when a pro-independence demonstration turned violent, French military and security forces responded with heavy-handed force to restore order, rounded up protest leaders, and closed centers used for organizing protests. During related actions, approximately 100 Europeans and 15,000 native Muslim activists were killed.

The bloody outcome of the protest produced an uneasy nine-year hiatus in open, organized defiance of the government, but, it also marked an important watershed in the attitudes of many Muslim activists. They no longer believed that peaceful demonstrations or protests would have any impact on changing French policies. Moreover, the French did nothing to change Algerian Muslims’ citizenship status.

The French government compounded the problem by focusing on rebuilding continental France from the devastation and disruptions of World War II in a modernization process that had been delayed for decades. France’s Fourth Republic, an
unstable political regime, successfully launched modernization projects but could not manage emergency situations like colonial crises effectively. The government’s weakness was complicated by the return of French servicemen from Indochina where they had just suffered defeat. Aware that they had abandoned a large number of Vietnamese loyalists to severe punishment or death at the hands of the Vietminh, the French servicemen saw the withdrawal from Vietnam as a stain on their honor. Embittered French officers and NCOs proclaimed that no experience of that kind would ever occur again in the former colonial empire on their watch.

However, the French people did not share this deep resolve. World War II and Indochina had made them indifferent to the situation in Algeria. Sending draftees to fight and die in what most regarded as still another futile foreign war did not sit well with them. Lack of popular enthusiasm for conducting military operations to retain foreign colonies was in step with the rest of the world as well; colonization was out of international favor. The international community was unified in exerting pressure against nations seeking to maintain their former colonies. The major global powers that had emerged from World War II—the U.S. and the Soviet Union—were both championing decolonization and independence movements, even if they did so for different strategic reasons.

French sovereignty over Algeria became more problematic when Algeria’s neighboring states, Morocco and Tunisia, became independent. The example of newly independent close neighbors provided an additional stimulus for Algeria to seek their former colonies. The major global powers that had emerged from World War II—the U.S. and the Soviet Union—were both championing decolonization and independence movements, even if they did so for different strategic reasons.

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The National Liberation Front
and the National Liberation Army

Indigenous opposition groups emerged in response to French intransigence in granting citizenship to Muslims. They were relatively unorganized and their efforts were ineffective at first, until an umbrella organization called the National Liberation Front (NLF) established itself on 1 November 1954. The NLF gathered most insurgent and activist groups into a single, unified organization to protest social and political inequities, poor economic conditions for the Muslims, poor administration and the lack of social services, and the disregard of religion as a characteristic of national identity, if not government.

The NLF began as a secret organization influenced by mushrooming anti-colonial independence movements. Although it was not a communist organization, the NLF successfully drew upon lessons learned from the Vietminh. Though it capitalized on the experience of Algerian Muslim veterans who had served with the French Army in Indochina, the NLF was a nationalist movement greatly influenced by Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, the main political figure in northern Africa at the time.

However, the NLF’s public appeal was limited because of the brutality with which it pursued its objective. The persecuted and the poor people who suffered most from its sometimes-indiscriminate terrorist acts hated the NLF. It also employed many common criminals recruited for their ability to perform covert actions. Their dishonesty and brutality stained the NLF’s reputation. Nevertheless, the NLF ultimately orchestrated most political and coercive insurgent activity.

To manage the movement, the NLF organized a provisional government consisting of a five-man executive committee and a legislative body. The NLF had two stated aims—independence for Algeria and equality for all. It divided Algeria into eight wilayas (regions), organized resistance, and prepared the foundation for a future post-colonial administration. Its major strategic line of operation was taking actions calculated to attract global attention to garner international sympathy for its cause and put pressure on the French government. The NLF used pamphlets, articles in newspapers, free

In 1954, one million Euro-French Algerians were living in Algeria among 8.4 million “half citizens,” who resented the situation.
radio, and psychological operations (PSYOP) to control the population; guerrilla activity to control rural areas; and terrorism to intimidate populations into cooperation and undermine confidence in French rule. It infiltrated democratic parties clandestinely to expand its control over the population. The authorities underestimated its influence.

The NLF established an armed wing called the National Army of Liberation (NLA) to conduct military and terror operations and maintained firm political control over NLA’s two components: guerrilla units and uniformed formations. The more conventional-style units operated from sanctuaries in neighboring Arab countries. Both components were equipped with light weapons, but they were inferior to those of the French.

The NLF organized its political and military wings into compartmentalized cells whose members, except for cell chiefs, were unaware of each other’s activities and identities. The chiefs served as links between two adjacent cells to coordinate activities. The typical “cell of three” included the henchman, in charge of a cell responsible for violent actions, pamphlets distribution, and contacts; the collector, in charge of a cell responsible for collecting revolutionary taxes established by the chief; and the chief, the only one in contact with other cell leaders and who received direction from higher authority and organized mission execution.

The NLA organized more than 30,000 fighters into units resembling regular army formations and stationed them in Moroccan and Tunisian sanctuaries. Thousands of part-time volunteers filled their ranks. When war erupted in 1954, the French faced a prepared organization ready to fight. By 1957, the NLA was a disciplined fighting force of 40,000 men.

The four stages of the war. A series of insurgent attacks on government targets during Algeria’s All Saint’s Day Celebration of 1 November 1954 started the war. The conflict unfolded in four phases:

- Phase I (1954-55) saw the spread and growth of the NLF.
- Phase II (1955-58) saw the rise of the NLF to shadow government status, as it successfully expanded its influence and control with a mix of terrorism and guerrilla tactics, although France rolled back NLF gains during brutal counterinsurgency warfare.
- Phase III (1958-61) saw French armed forces all but completely destroy the NLA in Algeria. However, as the military victory was being achieved, France began secret negotiations to grant Algeria independence. The NLA waited in sanctuaries for the outcome of the negotiations, while the NLF exiled itself to operate from Tunisia.
- Phase IV (1961-62) saw Algeria gain independence and a civil war break out between government forces supporting the NLF and die-hard supporters of French Algeria. This phase also saw a mass exodus of colonists, the slaughtering of indigenous Algerians who had previously fought alongside France, and the beginning of long-lasting tension in relations between the countries.

The seemingly unrelenting series of attacks that started the war killed noncombatants, destroyed property, and ignited outbursts of anger among the population. The police were unable to deal with the domestic upheaval by themselves because the terrorists conducted their campaign on a much grander scale than the French government had believed possible. Several thousand insurgents were involved, instead of the few hundred that some had anticipated. The NLF’s terrorism campaign had moved beyond being a simple law-and-order problem. It had become a full-scale insurrection.

**Lines of Operations**

Three lines of operations were clearly essential from a COIN lessons learned perspective:

- Maintaining the political will to support the conflict.
- Maintaining control of the population (the center of gravity for both sides).
- Destroying the political and military structure of the enemy at each stage of the conflict.

**Maintaining the political will to support the conflict.** One lesson the war broadly demonstrates is that a nation can win a war militarily and lose it strategically. France achieved an operational victory but suffered a strategic loss. If the goal of any war is to achieve a political end state, not merely defeat an armed adversary in the field, then the end state envisioned provides the framework that dictates every other aspect of the war. Clearly stated and achievable end states provide a unity of purpose and action that shapes the logistical, administrative, and diplomatic efforts necessary to wage the
war. An undefined, unclear, or wavering end state produces confusion and discord, making success of any kind unlikely.

France’s desired end state changed three times in less than a decade. It shifted from attempting to maintain a two-tiered society dominated by ethnic European French (in place since 1848), to granting French citizenship to Muslims in 1958 to entice them to support France’s retention of Algeria as French territory, to offering Muslims self-determination in 1960. The shifting end states sowed internal discord and ignited more chaos. “How to lose a military victory by the lack of a clear, stable political end state” might sum up the overall French Algerian war experience.

The first step in maintaining political will is to define—and then stick to—an obtainable political end state that provides hope to the population and undermines insurgent legitimacy. If the population does not “buy” the political project, the war is lost from the outset.

Obtaining a clear and stable political end state required maintaining the political will of the French government and people, and moving swiftly to establish law and order in Algeria. Thus, high-priority parallel efforts sought to cultivate favorable domestic and international opinion.

The Algerian conflict demonstrated that a stable end state cannot come from an unstable political entity. Political instability paralyzed France during the Algerian conflict. Because it viewed Algeria as French territory, the French government initially tried to treat the conflict as a law-enforcement issue, but what began as a public-order operation rapidly grew into a full-scale war for which the Fourth Republic was unprepared. Algeria shook the Fourth Republic so vehemently that the government collapsed.

France’s slow response to the conflict alienated the Algerian populace in greater numbers as the conflict widened, and those who were uncommitted initially later joined those who desired independence. The French government thus alienated those that offered the best hope to end the conflict on terms favorable to it. Meanwhile, the French public could not decide whether it was best to return Algeria to the pre-war status quo, negotiate for commonwealth status, or support the granting of

An estimated 40,000 people displaying French flags and signs that read: “French Algeria,” “De Gaulle to Power,” and “Long live Salan and the Army” jam the forum in front of the Government house in Algiers, 16 May 1958. General Raoun Salan was the French Military Commander in Algeria.
The political instability inherent within the French parliament led to a regime change in France itself in 1958.

The collapse of the Fourth Republic paved the way for still another change in the envisioned end state. General Charles de Gaulle returned to power in May 1958 and put an end to political stalemate that arose after a French military coup in Algiers. Spawned by perceived mishandling of the war, the coup sought to compel the government to keep Algeria a French territory. The Army presumed de Gaulle was committed to keeping Algeria a French territory and had an implicit, albeit vague, mandate to preserve French Algeria, but this proved not to be the case.

With hindsight, we can see that the Fourth Republic committed political suicide by giving de Gaulle complete authority. After he assumed power, a new constitution was written that granted him sweeping executive power to manage the conflict, and he came to believe that Algerian independence was inevitable, given world opinion and the anti-colonial tides. He initiated negotiations with the NLF that led to the Evian Accords of March 1962. However, de Gaulle’s move toward negotiations did not proceed unopposed. Although the negotiations began in secret, right-wing elements of the French Army and colonialists soon learned of them and responded violently. In April 1961, French generals opposed to the negotiations attempted a military putsch. Shortly after negotiations concluded, opponents organized a campaign of bombings in Algeria in an attempt to block the accords’ implementation.

In summary, France was paralyzed by the situation in Algeria. None of the branches of government had the power to manage the war efficiently or disengage from it on honorable terms. De Gaulle’s popularity made him the only politician with enough public and political influence to end the war against the will of the military and colonists, but even de Gaulle had to take a series of steps to achieve his goal.

Getting France out of the Algerian quagmire was a prerequisite to completing European reconstruction, French modernization, and NATO integration, but de Gaulle appeared to believe that the NLF had to be soundly defeated before negotiations for independence could develop on terms favorable to France. As the situation evolved into open war, some generals (including General Jacques Massu) in Algiers were given nearly free rein to deal with insurgents (as was evident during the Battle of Algiers when the Army began to search houses and detain civilians). The urgency of the situation inclined the armed forces under Massu to take on law enforcement duties. Untrained in police tactics, the Army’s extremely heavy-handed methods turned public opinion against the French.

Promoting support for the conflict was difficult. The conflict had much greater immediate interest than the colonial war in Indochina. A million French citizens lived in Algeria, many with close links to friends and relatives in France, and Algeria was close by. The French population was more invested in Algeria and paid much closer attention to the situation there. Volunteers fought the war in Indochina, but two million draftees fought in the Algerian war. These factors spurred a decline in public support for the war.

In addition, the Communist Party, extreme leftist movements, journalists, and intellectuals (such as the philosopher Jean Paul Sartre) contested the legitimacy of the war and its prosecution. The undeniable use of torture was adamantly denounced and became a key issue undermining public confidence.

Both international communist activists who saw the war as imperialistic and Americans who viewed the struggle as playing into the hands of communists opposed the war. Their critiques converged to erode French public opinion and turned world public opinion against the war. The news media played a pivotal role in the process. Controversial photographs called into question the legitimacy of French actions.

The French employed PSYOP techniques developed and formalized during World War II to influence key Muslim populations. However, the
PSYOP undercut their own aims in the world of ideas. Because the intellectually passionate people who formulate PSYOP are often wedded to ideologies and strong biases, operations formulated during chaotic emergencies can easily and inappropriately blur the distinction between legitimate military activity and partisan political advocacy. The French military’s relatively unsupervised use of PSYOP served to polarize many formerly respected French officers politically, and may have influenced their opposition to their civilian leaders. After the war, PSYOP were taboo for a very long time in the French military establishment. The lesson learned: senior military leaders and their civilian masters must carefully circumscribe PSYOP and ensure proper civilian oversight of such activities.

Maintaining control of the population. The French had to convince Algeria’s Muslims, the principal center of gravity in the conflict, that French control of Algeria guaranteed their security, that political and economic modernization was under way, and that Muslims representing their ethnic and national interests could gain political power. Unfortunately, the French did not fully understand the importance of these imperatives until it was too late to avoid chaos and war.

France eventually gained control of Algeria’s Muslims, too much by force, but French sovereignty over Algeria was by that time a lost cause. Compared with other counterinsurgencies, the strength ratio for the French Algerian war was unusually favorable for the French. For every eight Muslims, there was one French citizen determined to keep Algeria French and willing to join or cooperate with French Forces (Zouave units manned by colonists). In addition, many Muslims initially favored continuing under French rule if they could become French citizens. This segment appeared to be growing until 1958, only to decline when agreement on self-determination took place.

Colonist actions calculated to slow down political and economic modernizations that favored Muslim aspirations for citizenship undermined any demographic advantage the French could have gained by granting Muslims equal rights. For example, France could not apply an ambitious 1954 modernization plan designed to garner Algerian Muslim support due to parliamentary opposition mainly engineered by colonial interests. Moreover, the government did almost nothing to curtail or hold anyone accountable for brutal retaliations against Muslims for NLA terrorism. That many such attacks were never investigated, or even condemned, persuaded many Muslims that the French system of justice was never going to be applied equally to them, whatever their citizenship, and that their allegiance would get them nothing socially, politically, or economically.

To secure control over the population, the French methodically established security in one village after the next, trying to convince people the insurgency should be wiped out. They implemented a plan to destroy the rebels all over the country. This effort resulted in the reestablishment of security and law and order by 1958, as French forces uprooted NLF cadres and denied the insurgents control of both the physical and moral terrain in the towns and rural areas. The strategy of expanding influence and control required knowledge of the relationships and whereabouts of virtually everyone in the country.

To accomplish this, the French initiated a “totalitarian-like” urban protection program, designed and sponsored by Colonel Roger Trinquier, identifying family relationships through a careful and thorough census linked to a policy of security enforcement through family accountability. Under the program, traditional heads of every family were responsible for the movement and whereabouts of their kin. Family members were catalogued in small nuclear groups listed by houses, and then by extended family relationships within city blocks, districts, and regions. At each level, the French implemented security policy by making family leaders responsible for the whereabouts of every family member.

French leaders also understood the importance of population control. Because the conflict caused destruction and economic dislocations that aggravated poverty and worsened living conditions, the NLF began to alleviate such inequities and suffering to boost its appeal to the public. Its expanding shadow government was successful in providing services to areas under its de facto control.

When the French began uprooting and destroying NLF cadres and fighters, social problems deepened. To deal with them, the French developed and deployed special administrative sections (SAS), which they embedded in territorial units beginning in 1958. These SAS units divided rural areas where the government had neglected essential
services into grids and sectors and helped provide assistance and services that filled the vacuum left after NLF structures were destroyed. Modernization programs showed significant local success and helped establish order and population control, but they were launched too late to change the course of the conflict.

The French learned some important lessons from this failure, chief among them the importance of—
- Determining what has fueled popular support for the insurgency (often frustration over economic straits and lack of or poorly administered public services).
- Deploying SAS-like elements as early as possible in the conflict (while the population is still neutral toward the insurgency).
- Striking a balance between opportunistically promoting divisiveness and restoring order through reconciliation among indigenous groups.

Algeria’s Muslim population had numerous fault lines—Berbers versus Arabs, towns against rural areas, the burgeoning middle class versus poor peasants, and the rift between insurgents and the so-called native harkis (collaborators) fighting in the French Army. The divisions the French had intentionally promoted were so deep that no reconciliation was possible once the civil war began in 1962. Among the consequences was a massive exodus of colonists to France and the slaughter of thousands of harkis (largely abandoned by France and considered traitors by the NLF).

Another lesson learned: the timely empowerment of the elite leader class helps create a sense of hope for the future among the people. But France waited too long to include the Muslim elite in the political process. France missed an opportunity to do this in 1945 when it jailed moderates rather than embrace a system that provided Muslims a path to French citizenship. When France finally offered citizenship to Muslims in 1958, it was nearly too late. The Muslim elite most likely to have embraced citizenship, for the most part, had either been slaughtered by NLF or had defected to it. France’s lack of timely decisions created a political vacuum that the NLF and its supporters quickly filled.

Destroying the insurgents’ political and military structure. Total destruction of insurgent military units and the uprooting of their political structures were essential intermediate steps to permanently control the population. Military organizational structure, management of intelligence, and rigorous use of COIN principles from the Indochina war were key factors in destroying the insurgency’s political and military apparatus.

The French command and control structure in Algeria at the time was well suited for counterinsurgency. It duplicated the existing French system of civil administration to help ensure unity of command in support of operations. Algeria’s three main sectors (igamies) corresponded to the three French Army corps, its 15 departments to France’s 15 divisions, and its 72 districts (arrondissements) to 72 regiments.

French military units in Algeria were about 90 percent mobile and light infantry, capable and adaptable for fighting lightly armed insurgents. An army corps reserve on-call at the operational level supported them. Formations of indigenous troops reinforced every organizational level for intelligence and search-and-rescue operations. Some commando-type units were 100 percent Muslim. The NLF was especially wary of these units. After the war, many who remained loyal to France paid with their lives.

Modern-era force structure had to adapt to the guerrilla nature of the war. Army aviation employed lessons from Indochina. Ground units became heavily reliant on air assets for operational mobility and close air support. Twin-engine piston aircraft were called back into service to provide support because jets proved too fast and unwieldy to be effective. Some jet-trained pilots had to relearn how to fly the older aircraft. Ground forces reorganized into smaller, more flexible units, with firepower comparable to older regiments.

Both sides in the war identified the population as the center of gravity. Much of the fighting took place among the populace in which insurgents and terrorist elements freely mingled and were difficult to identify. Once French forces destroyed enemy forces, they had to hold and administer inhabited areas the enemy once controlled, not simply abandon them. Abandoned areas quickly fell into enemy hands. Anybody who had shown support for the French or who had remained neutral suffered the NLF’s wrath. Revenge killings terrorized the remaining inhabitants into submission and discouraged cooperation with French forces.

Nevertheless, terrain control was important.
The policy of gathering rural populations into strategic hamlets left vacant areas where guerrillas could freely roam. French forces subjected the areas to intensive search-and-destroy operations. Harki commandos that spoke the languages and were familiar with the culture and terrain hounded the insurgents.

Victory also required destroying the insurgent shadow government. Once the French eliminated NLF military and political structures in a village, they built pro-French village governments and implemented programs to train self-defense forces to help provide security.

**Intelligence collection.** Intelligence collection presents special obstacles. In conventional circumstances, it generally involves interrogating uniformed enemies under the Law of Land Warfare as codified by international treaties. Insurgencies, however, usually involve terrorism and criminal activities. Finding enemies hidden among the population or among refugees who wear no uniforms is tricky. It is even trickier to separate criminals from legitimate combatants. The legal status of terrorists under law is separate from that of legitimate combatants (including non-uniformed forces openly carrying arms and not engaged in prohibited practices). This separate legal status offered an excuse to justify otherwise illegal methods.

The French used two methods of interrogation to collect intelligence—torture when they needed information quickly, and standard questioning when they did not. The police were completely overwhelmed and the situation was out of control. The pressure for timely information created by the intensive terrorist bombing campaign prompted General Massu to allow expedient torture methods. Torture was not used by every unit. Some who had been tortured by the Gestapo accepted it as unavoidable, whereas others who had suffered the same horrid experience did not accept it. French political authorities covertly supported the decision to use torture.

Torturing people produced good short-term results. Following the torture sessions, a thorough and relentless analysis unveiled NLF/NLA organizations cell by cell, and these in turn were systematically taken down. Torturing suspects proved instrumental to short-term military success and helped destroy the NLF. Yet, public revelations that French forces had used torture had catastrophic strategic consequences. Torture was not strategically efficient from a COIN perspective. It had long-lasting negative moral and psychological effects on the population involved and on France’s own soldiers and citizens. In practice, its moral corrosiveness proved unconstructive.

In summary, intelligence collection in Algeria hinged upon effective population control techniques. These required—

- A good census.
- The use of indigenous people to infiltrate cells.
- Effective interrogation that included torture if necessary.

However, the interrogations crossed the line into morally and strategically corrosive actions that proved harmful in the long term. Nevertheless, actions stemming from such intelligence were largely successful in the short term because they forced the Muslim population into obedience.

The French special services engineers were able to induce savage domestic killings inside the NLF itself. They did so through manipulating information introduced by agents who had successfully infiltrated cells.

France defeated NLF military formations using four sub-lines of operations:

- Cutting external support from neighboring countries.
- Prevailing in urban warfare that resulted in the NLF losing control of the cities.
- Prevailing in rural areas, in part by fostering civil defense organizations within outlying villages.
- Using successful search-and-destroy techniques in sweeps of refugee areas.

NLA regular formations relied on Tunisia and Morocco for refuge. Tunisia also harbored bases for staging cross-border attacks and preparing supply missions for urban guerrillas. To cut off commu-
nication and supply routes, the French constructed the Morice Line, a 200 mile-long barrier along the Tunisian border that combined a fence and mobile, mechanized search-and-destroy units supported by artillery and complemented by weapons searches at seaports and airfields.

These measures later taught the French to use covert actions, if possible, against nations supporting insurgencies or terrorist groups. Such secrecy helps minimize outside criticism and political pressure. The French used covert operations to destroy shipments of weapons and neutralize support to the NLF.

In Algeria, the control of urban areas represented legitimacy. In pursuit of such legitimacy, the NLF exerted administrative control over urban centers while simultaneously undermining the government’s authority by disrupting security and essential services. To defeat the NLF, the French government had to seize and control those areas while also defeating the NLF’s shadow government.

General Massu assumed command of an ad hoc, in extremis force of police and armed forces and was granted domestic law enforcement authority for unity of command. Once assembled, the force began using previously collected census data to help formulate courses of action against the insurgents. Two battles for Algiers began.

The Battles for Algiers

In response to the threat of a general strike on 7 January 1957, the prefect of Algiers gave Massu’s forces police powers normally kept within the hands of civilian authorities.

In the first Battle of Algiers, the French broke up the strike organized by the NLF, initiated population control measures, and engaged in land warfare using patrols, cordon and search operations, and check points supported by NLF defectors. Meanwhile, covert operatives concurrently destroyed enemy networks.

Within a few weeks, France destroyed NLF’s political and military structures, dismantled its bomb network, and killed or neutralized 1,827 fellaghas (outlaws), including 253 killers and approximately 200 terrorists. During these stabilization actions, French forces suffered only two dead and five wounded—a resounding victory on its face. The key factors for military success in the battle were—

- Declaration of a state of emergency that empowered Massu with police authority to search homes and to detain people.
- Unity and freedom of action of the armed forces, the administration, the police and of all services, including those that were secret.
- Population control through the census.
- Effective intelligence gathered through infiltration.
- Destruction of terrorist networks.
- The use of mass interrogation techniques.
- The use of grids that cut up the Casbah like a cake.

Unfortunately, the successes in population control did not last. The NLF rebuilt its organization quickly, requiring France to engage in a second battle of Algiers to eradicate the enemy once again.

The second battle was more like a police operation; it required the support of only one airborne regiment. Success came largely from a disinformation campaign conceived and promoted by Captain Paul-Alain Leger in which agents infiltrated into the NLF and introduced rumors that created a tide of destructive suspicion and internal violence in NLF covert networks. The disinformation campaign convinced the NLF to execute a large number of suspected traitors within its ranks.

The French used harsh measures to secure Algiers and other urban centers, but this tactical success came at a high strategic and moral price. Some of the tactics used to wage the battle converted the victory into a moral disaster, with long-lasting negative effects on public support.

**Conclusion**

The study of the French-Algerian War is useful to contemporary students of counterinsurgency and revolutionary warfare. Its history reveals many of the same root sources of conflict and the same complexities found in the current global security situation. The lingering traditions, expectations, and policies of a past colonial power were the source of the conflict. Was the war winnable if France had handled matters more realistically from a political point of view?

One important lesson that emerges from the conflict is that a clear political end state is essential to shape all aspects of conducting such a war: if the end state is not clear, the use of force is often wasteful at best, and at worst, corrosive. In addition, the conflict highlighted the need to balance the use of force with measures aimed at winning the population’s hearts and minds. France eventually controlled the population, but never really won it completely over to its cause. French forces did much to alleviate the suffering inflicted on the population during search-and-destroy operations, but the use of brutal methods to obtain intelligence (i.e. torture or threats of violence) only traumatized the Muslim population into obedience and alienated them from France in the end. The morale and technical problems of mass interrogation marred France’s conduct of the war and remain in many ways unresolved.

A final lesson from the war is that in any COIN environment, it is likely that the old order is irretrievably gone; the conflict represents the birth of a new order, not an opportunity to return to an old order; and success depends on accepting, adapting, and shaping, not attempting to turn back the clock.

Key principles learned from the conflict still shape French Army operations today. These include recognition of the need to—
- Give a high degree of operational autonomy to units operating in such an environment.
- Require that units maintain close contact with the population to foster understanding and avoid alienation and loss of objective focus.
- Train indigenous troops to ensure loyalty to the cause and freedom of action for the force.

France continues to apply lessons learned from the French-Algerian experience throughout Africa and elsewhere four decades after the conflict in which they were learned.

The Algerian War left behind a mixed legacy in the French Army. It involved two military coups and brutal methods of intelligence collection, and it caused misunderstanding between politicians and segments of the military brought on by differing agendas during the prosecution of the war.

Finally, because Algeria obtained its independence in the midst of a civil war that took many years to settle, it has had a very complex and chaotic relationship with France, one of both hatred and love. The page is being turned right now for the best for the future of France and Algeria. **MR**

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**NOTES**

1. Library of Congress country study, Algeria.
2. The Islamic component of the Algerian insurgency should not be confused with the fundamentalist Islamic movements calling for Islamic rule in governments which exist today, and against which the modern NLF also fought fiercely in the 1990s.
Colonel Robert D. Hyde, U.S. Air Force, is the vice commander of the Air Force Inspection Agency at Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico. He has a B.S. from the U.S. Air Force Academy, an M.A.S. from Emory Riddle Aeronautical University, and M.S. degrees from the Air Command and Staff College and the National War College. He has served in various command and staff positions in the continental United States and in Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom.

Colonel Mark D. Kelley, U.S. Air Force, is the vice commander of the 366th Fighter Wing at Mountain Home Air Force Base, Idaho. He holds a B.A. from Southwest Texas State University, a Master of National Security Studies degree from the National War College, and an M.S. from the Air Command and Staff College.

Colonel William F. Andrews, U.S. Air Force, is on the faculty of the National War College at Fort McNair, Washington, D.C. He holds a B.S. from the U.S. Air Force Academy and an M.S. from the University of Alabama and is a graduate of the Air Command and Staff College, the School of Advanced Airpower Studies, and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces.

PHOTO: U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) CPL Jose A. Aguilera, 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit, Special Operations Capable, provides security as a USMC CH-53E Super Stallion helicopter prepares for a mission in support of Operation Anaconda, in Afghanistan, as part of Operation Enduring Freedom, 10 March 2002. (USMC, SGT Nathan J. Ferbert)

This article is counterfactual, but is based on accounts of Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan. Although intended to last only 72 hours, Operation Anaconda took place from 2 to 16 March 2002. It was a coalition attempt to clear Al-Qaeda and Taliban forces from the Khowst-Gardez region in Afghanistan before they could organize a spring offensive against the interim Afghan government of Hamid Karzai. Anaconda involved special operations forces (SOF) from the United States and six other nations fighting alongside about 1,400 conventional U.S. ground troops in a complex, high altitude, non-linear battlefield. The battle between U.S. troops and Taliban/Al-Qaeda was the largest ground engagement of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and took place at elevations over 10,000 feet.

This article describes how an Anaconda-like operation might have occurred by applying employment lessons from earlier phases of OEF as well as lessons from the actual event. This narrative is one of many possible versions and benefits from the clarity of hindsight and the clarifying direction of joint and service doctrine. The lessons of Operation Anaconda are not merely academic. The U.S. lost eight brave warriors and numerous others were wounded during more than two weeks of intense fighting. The authors hope this story and its approach to learning honor the brave Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines who fought heroically in the Shah-i-Kot Valley in March 2002.

December 2001: OEF Lessons Learned Conference

In December 2001, U.S. Air Force, Navy, and Army personnel from bases, ships, and command centers throughout the Middle East met at the U.S. Navy’s 5th Fleet headquarters in Bahrain for a lessons-learned conference. (This is counterfactual. In reality, although U.S. Air Forces, Central Command hosted a Tactics Review Board, there was no Joint Forces Command-wide hotwash of OEF ops.)

The attendees had just completed months of planning, controlling, and fighting in OEF, a SOF and air-centric offensive to take down Osama Bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda network and culpable Taliban theocracy in Afghanistan. The campaign had been a swift and overwhelming success, but like every military operation, there were lessons to be learned. These Soldiers, Sailors,
Airmen, and Marines spent four days in Bahrain assessing OEF operations from Mazar-i-Sharif to Kabul and Kandahar and identifying key areas for improvement in planning and execution. They also debriefed recent operations from the Spin Ghar and White Mountain ranges, better known as Tora Bora. The warfighters identified two primary lessons from the first few months of OEF: 1) the importance of joint component coordination in planning and execution; and 2) the necessity of dedicated and capable ground troops to block Taliban/Al-Qaeda egress routes.

The ground component of SOF and Marines in close coordination with the air component had performed spectacularly in OEF. One of their success enablers was the use of first-rate communications systems, laser designators, and precise coordinate-generating equipment for targeting. These lessons were not lost on the Army’s conventional ground-force planners attending the Bahrain conference.

The conference also highlighted the importance of having highly trained Airmen work closely with ground forces to deliver airpower where and when it was needed. Attaching a USAF combat controller to every OEF SOF A-Team had enabled close coordination across a dynamic, nonlinear battlefield. With their in-depth knowledge of both airpower and special operations, these combat controllers ensured air support during the first months of OEF. However, the coalition forces air component commander (CFACC), land component commander (CFLCC) and special operations component commander (CFSOCC) all agreed that upcoming OEF stabilization operations would use more conventional ground forces. In the event that these forces were challenged, they would need an increased level of air support and thus a more robust Theater Air-Ground System (TAGS). Both the CFLCC and the CFACC directed their staffs to build plans for bringing the Army Air-Ground System (AAGS) and the Air Force Theater Air Control System (TACS) to full capability in the near future.

**Late December 2001: Focus on Shah-i-Kot**

While the Bahrain conference progressed, the Joint Force Commander’s (JFC’s) multi-spectral intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets persistently stared down on Afghanistan,
making it the most imaged piece of real estate on the planet. National assets, E-8 JSTARS, RC-135s, U-2s, EP-3s and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) combed the valleys and roadways near Tora Bora. They revealed, and human intelligence (HUMINT) confirmed, numerous Taliban and Al-Qaeda survivors of Tora Bora moving towards Gardez in the Paktia province. The JFC’s chief of intelligence, the Central Command J2, estimated that approximately 1,500 to 1,800 enemy fighters were converging on the Shah-i-Kot valley in the Arma Mountain range in the same terrain that stymied Alexander the Great, the British, and most recently, the Soviets. It appeared Taliban and Al-Qaeda fighters intended to stave off the American military from these mountains as well. That estimate was more than enough to spur the JFC to action.

5 January 2002: JFC Established CJTF Pinnacle

With President Karzai leading a new Afghan government and with the enemy on the run, the JFC saw a tremendous opportunity to kill or capture large numbers of Al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters, and perhaps even a few high value targets, at Shah-i-Kot. At the same time the JFC and his staff were in the initial stages of political, operational, and logistical planning for a possible Iraq campaign. The JFC wanted to keep significant pressure, focus, and resources on Afghanistan and knew any operation into the Arma Mountains would be led by SOF and supported by air and conventional ground forces. With this in mind, the JFC established Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Pinnacle under the command of CFSOCC to focus specifically on the mission at Shah-i-Kot. The JFC’s initial order established CJTF Pinnacle’s mission and a joint special operations area (JSOA), assigned forces, and defined supported and supporting relationships with the other component commanders. CJTF Pinnacle was now the primary focus of the OEF forces. (This is counterfactual. The JFC’s 5 January 2002 FRAGO directed the CFLCC—not CFSOCC—to develop a concept of operations to kill/capture the forces believed to be gathering near Gardez. The FRAGO did not establish a CJTF or define the area of operations (AO). Most important, the FRAGO did not establish clear supported or supporting relationships with the component commanders.)

6 January 2002: Operation Boa Planning Begins

CJTF Pinnacle set up operations at Bagram Air Base, Afghanistan. The move from Karshi-Khanabad Air Base, Uzbekistan, not only moved the CJTF staff closer to the operation, but also avoided the problems of mounting political tension between the Uzbek and American governments. Each of the force components sent personnel to Bagram to form CJTF Pinnacle’s joint staff. CFSOCC, now the CJTF Pinnacle commander, sent experienced O-6s and small staffs as Special Operations Liaison Elements (SOLEs) to both the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) and the CFLCC’s headquarters. (This is counterfactual. Contrary to joint doctrine, the CFLCC established CJTF Mountain on 13 February 2002, commanded by the 10th Mountain Division Commander. Contrary to joint doctrine, there was no J-staff for the JTF. There was also no significant change in liaison officer manning until a few days prior to execution).

By 1 February 2002, planners saw Operation Boa as a large force operation requiring significant coordination, integration and synchronization of the unique capabilities of each combined force component. Most important, with the first large-scale use of conventional ground forces, CJTF Pinnacle and
the component commanders clearly understood the
need for comprehensive joint planning and execu-
tion, the likes of which had not yet been required
in OEF. The first step was to identify requirements.
(Counterfactual. 23 February 2002 was the first
time the CFACC was briefed on the extent of the air
component support required for Anaconda, sched-
uled to begin five days later on 28 February 2002.)

Two narratives influenced CJTF planners in the
requirements phase. First, allied Afghan ground
commanders relayed stories about the Soviet
Union’s experience in Shah-i-Kot, where the muja-
heedeen drew 200 to 250 Russian soldiers into close
combat and stoned them to death. To avoid this sce-
nario, planners wanted to use overwhelming force
from air and ground forces. CJTF Pinnacle planners
estimated that 200 SOF, 1,600 conventional ground
troops, and 1,000 allied Afghan troops supported
by 24/7 close air support (CAS) coverage were
needed for Boa. The introduction of 12 A-10s and
24 AH-64s, along with 1600 conventional troops
would strain the old Soviet base and its support
structure to the limit. (Counterfactual. The eight
available AH-64s were actually tasked by CJTF
Mountain as emergency CAS only. Also, A-10s were
initially based in Kuwait and then forward deployed
to Bagram four days into the operation.)

Bagram’s precious ramp space would also be
needed to support the airlift cycles required to
deliver personnel, ordnance, equipment, and fuel
for Boa. (Counterfactual. Because there was inade-
quately joint component coordination and plan-
ning, the logistics requirements to support the air
operation were not planned for. Only the ingenuity
and flexibility of the joint warfighters made the
operation possible.)

The second narrative that heavily influenced
CJTF Pinnacle planners was the success of SOF and
airpower during the first months of OEF. SOF teams
had refined this working relationship to a deadly art
but lacked the blocking power to cover the Shah-i-
Kot escape routes. The conventional ground force
had the manpower and firepower to block the escape
routes but needed to resolve several coordination
and equipment issues to fully integrate with the
air assets. The component commander’s plan for a
robust TAGS now paid off. Using that plan, CJTF
Pinnacle requested additional personnel and equip-
ment from the JFC. For the Army, building up the
AAGS meant ensuring the command and control,
aire traffic control, airspace management, and fire
support coordination pieces of Army airspace com-
mand and control activities were fully functional.
(See Army FM 3-52, Army Airspace Command and
Control in a Combat Zone, 1 August 2002, Chapter
2.) The CFLCC ensured that the assigned division
and brigade Tactical Air Control Parties (TACPs)
were in theater and ready for Boa and that the
Battlefield Coordination Detachment (BCD) at the
CAOC was correctly sized and trained.

Although many parts of the TACS were fully
functional during the first months of OEF, the
CFACC’s part of the robust TAGS plan required
three key changes. First, the CFACC established
an air support operations center (ASOC) at Bagram
to coordinate air support requests and conduct
time-sensitive targeting within the joint special
operations area (JSOA). (See Air Force Doctrine
Document 2-1.7, Airspace Control in the Combat
Zone, 13 July 2005, 37.)

Second, the CFACC sent an Air Force general
officer to CJTF Pinnacle’s headquarters as the head
of an air component coordinating element (ACCE)
tasked with integrating air and space operations
within the CJTF and the overall joint force. The
AACE focused on exchanging current intelligence,
operational data, and support requirements with the
CJTF staff, and on coordinating CFACC require-
ments for airspace coordinating measures, joint
fire support coordinating measures, and close air
support. (See Air Force Doctrine Document 2-1.7, Airspace Control in the Combat Zone, 13 July 2005, 31.)

The final requirement for the TACS was a fully functional air request network integrated with the components of the Air Force TACS and Army AAGS. The CFACC worked closely with the CFLCC and CJTF Pinnacle to ensure TAGS organization. Personnel and communications infrastructures were in place by 17 February 2002. (Counterfactual. The CFACC did work closely with CFLCC and CJTF Mountain to get the best TAGS possible after 23 February 2002).

The air-ground concept of operations, while not new to CJTF Pinnacle, called for ground commanders to submit air support requests through their assigned tactical air control parties to the air support operations center at Bagram, which would prioritize and coordinate with the CAOC in Saudi Arabia to provide airpower. Due to the high terrain in the JSOA, the ASOC would need help from JSTARS for C3 and air request relay. Terminal air controllers and forward air controllers-airborne (FAC-As) would control assigned aircraft and give weapons release authority within the JSOA for CAS and defensive fires. Preplanned strikes for air interdiction targets would be cleared through the CENTCOM target approval board. (Counterfactual. CAS C2 and weapons release procedures were not thoroughly understood by all Anaconda players and had not been tested in such a robust combat environment prior to Anaconda.)

By early February 2002, CJTF Pinnacle and the component commanders had refined the enemy estimate, determined force and logistics requirements, drafted a new airspace control order and started augmentation of the TAGS. (Counterfactual. None of this was done by early February 2002.)

With this critical planning and C2 infrastructure in place, CJTF Pinnacle planners turned their attention to the detailed concept of operations (CONOP) for Operation Boa.

**Boa CONOP Refinement**

CJTF Pinnacle planners, working closely with component staffs, developed the following CONOP for Boa:

“Seven days prior to Boa’s H-Hour, ISR assets conduct intelligence preparation of the battlefield, combing the Shah-i-Kot Mountains to find and fix enemy concentrations, mortar positions, and likely escape routes. Using this information, planners determine the best SOF insertion points and task ISR assets to monitor for enemy activity prior to the insertion. UAVs form an outer cordon to search for leakers heading east from Shah-i-Kot.

“The SOF insertion takes place 24 hours prior to initial airstrikes at H-Hour. SOF teams observe the entire list of preplanned targets Shah-i-Kot valley and relay any additional targets to JSTARS, ASOC, and CAOC. CAS assets are airborne during the SOF infil and CSAR forces are on alert at Bagram. After insertion, AC-130s remain over the objective at night then pass the mission to A-10s before sunrise to keep CAS firepower over SOF teams in the Boa JSOA.

“At H-Hour, air interdiction strikes begin on 53 JFC-approved targets to reduce the risk to U.S. troops if the enemy chooses a defense in depth, the most dangerous enemy course of action. . . .”

(Counterfactual. Only seven of 66 approved targets were approved for pre-infil airstrike due to the CFLCC’s desire to conduct sensitive site exploitation. Half of the planned pre-infil airstrikes did not occur because un-briefed ground forces directed the aircrews to abort their bomb runs.)

“Although the JFC approved 66 targets for pre-infil bombing, CJTF Pinnacle will conduct sensitive site exploitation on 13 of the 66 targets. The targets include enemy encampments spread over a large area, pinpoint firing positions, cave entrances, and landing zones. GBU-31 joint direct attack munitions (JDAMs) can strike most of them. Some can be destroyed by airburst M117s and dispenser munitions, but a few require the greater penetration of the 5,000-pound GBU-28 or the near-horizontal entry provided by laser-guided GBU-24s. To safely accomplish the strikes in minimal time, aircraft comply with strict time-on-target (TOT) windows, operating altitudes, and egress routes. Strike aircraft check-in with AWACS to get major situation updates (e.g., weather delay, aircraft fallout, target changes) then get pushed to JSTARS for the real-time Boa JSOA update immediately prior to their attack runs on the interdiction targets. If SOF teams are not in pre-briefed positions, or need to add or remove a target, SOF representatives onboard JSTARS inform the CAOC and the ASOC via the SOLE. The CAOC retains control of
the strike aircraft until the end of the TOT window.

“The next movement in Operation Boa is the Afghan army force’s move to Phase Line Emerald west of “the Whale,” the western boundary of the Shah-i-Kot Valley. The Afghan hammer force, accompanied by U.S. SOF with TACPs, is the main effort of Operation Boa. The hammer force separates into a north and a south component and holds at Phase Line Emerald until the air interdiction strikes are complete.

“The first weapons are laser-guided bombs from F-15Es on 12 mountainside caves to kill Al-Qaeda/Taliban fighters and close the entrances with laser-guided bombs. AC-130s monitor the cave strikes and engage enemy leakers attempting to escape. B-52s destroy enemy encampment areas with airburst JDAMs, Wind-Corrected Munitions Dispensers, and strings of M117s. U.S. Navy fighters and USAF F-16s employ JDAMs on enemy fighting positions and airburst JDAMs on insertion LZs immediately prior to the air assault. At the end of the 30-minute TOT window, the strike force moves out of the immediate area to refuel and await follow-on CAS tasking from the forward air controllers (FACs). Ground commanders assume weapons release authority and the ASOC gains control of the CAS aircraft marshaled in the JSOA after the air interdiction TOT window.

“After 30 minutes of airstrikes, blocking forces from the 101st Airborne Division and 10th Mountain Division air assault into seven landing zones on the eastern upslope of the Shah-i-Kot valley and move to designated blocking positions (BPs). A-10s and AH-64s escort the force to the LZs and, along with AC-130s, provide CAS. The AH-64 Apaches remain in radio and visual contact with the insertion helicopter force until they egress clear of the JSOA. The AC-130s remain overhead the SOF forces while the A-10s assume FAC-A responsibilities and establish communications with the terminal air controllers at each BP. With the “anvil” force in place and with airspace, communications, and FAC-A control established, the Afghan “hammer” force executes a pincer tactic around the north and south ends of the whale and moves to contact in the vicinity of three known enemy encampments in the valley. This main attack will force the enemy to stay, fight, and die, or attempt escape into the deadly fire of the BP forces and CAS.

“U.S. and coalition SOF will form an outer cordon along choke points to the east of Shah-i-Kot valley and the seven BPs. Paired with terminal air controllers, these forces will engage enemy forces who escape the main effort and bypass BPs. Combat operations will terminate when the Shah-i-Kot valley is cleared of enemy fighters and secure. Operation Boa should last no more than one week.”

Deception Plan: Operation Python

With a new TAGS system established for CJTF Pinnacle, new U.S. conventional ground troops operating new equipment in an extremely tight airspace structure and a new aircraft carrier on station, commencing Operation Boa from a “cold start” was an operational risk that CJTF Pinnacle and the component commanders wanted to mitigate. They needed a mission rehearsal for their significantly more capable and complex joint fighting force prior to facing 1,500 seasoned fighters at Shah-i-Kot. (Counterfactual. There was no mission rehearsal and no deception plan. Operation Python is purely fictional.)

They also realized this rehearsal presented them with a triple opportunity. First, the rehearsal would use the exact personnel, equipment, timeline, airspace, and TAGS structure as Boa. It would expose the task force to mountainous operations and allow evaluation of the Afghan ally’s responsiveness and the overall soundness of the Boa plan. Second,
rehearsal would be part of a comprehensive deception plan designed to inject ambiguity about the time and location of Operation Boa. The purpose of the plan was to draw forces and focus away from Shah-i-Kot, induce a false sense of security at Shah-i-Kot, and shorten the enemy’s reaction time when the real operation was discovered. Third, the rehearsal would be a real-world operation north of Jalalabad on Afghanistan’s eastern border with Pakistan to look for small pockets of Taliban/Al-Qaeda. The Jalalabad operation would be called Operation Python.

18 February 2002: Operation Python Execution

The pre-infil ISR results for Python resulted in two changes to the plan. First, the air assault landing zone was moved due to increased activity detected in a nearby village. Several cave entrances were also marked for exploitation due to infrared signature and detection of communication signals. High mountain wind turbulence delayed the SOF insertion for five hours but proceeded well after the delay. However, the pair of AC-130s assigned to cover the SOF infil were already airborne on a normal OEF air traffic operations (ATO) cycle, resulting in a requirement to hand off the infil coverage to other AC-130s and to conduct extensive airborne coordination between the aircraft and C3 nodes. The new AC-130s established communications with the SOF teams and then handed off coverage to A-10s out of Bagram before daybreak. The Python airspace structure was specifically designed to constrain strike aircraft in preparation for Boa. Interdiction targets for Python were limited to the air assault LZs, which were easily hit. Although not planning to engage other targets, remaining strike aircraft flowed into the Python AO on assigned timelines and altitudes to exercise airspace control measures. While deconfliction issues arose due to strike platforms’ varying turn performance in tight airspace close to the Pakistan border, these issues were resolved quickly.

The CH-47 troop carriers departed Bagram with their escorting AH-64s to the Python AO. A-10s waited over the Python AO for the conventional force as Predator drones and AC-130s focused their sensors on the LZs. Unfortunately, one soldier was injured at the second LZ and required extraction from the area by combat search and rescue (CSAR) and Medevac forces. All joint tactical air controller (JTAC) communications were established with A-10 FAC-As and the ASOC pushed strike aircraft to cycle through the different FAC-As and JTACs through the Python AO on simulated, and a few real-world, 9-line CAS attacks. The A-10s and JTACs had to sort through several instances of “who owned which aircraft when” but the air control plan worked well through the day.

After an hour of air control, the SF-supported Afghan force began their move southward. The SF officers assigned to the Afghan force knew that Python was a prelude to Boa and a post-Tora Bora evaluation of the Afghan force. AC-130s established contact with the Afghan force as it moved into the Jalalabad valley. After two days of movement-to-contact and additional air control, the Python force was extracted back to Bagram. Lessons would be rolled into the Boa plan that was scheduled in less than two weeks.

Operation Python resulted in some sporadic engagements with Taliban who had uncharacteristically fled north to Jalalabad after Tora Bora. The operation enabled all players to build their situational awareness about Operation Boa’s operational timeline and relative position of friendly forces in the JSOA. (This is counterfactual. These lessons were learned during and after Anaconda.)

More importantly, Operation Python had verified the basic logistics and coordination of the Boa plan and highlighted stress points within the tight airspace and C3. Several problems with the TAGS were identified and fixed, including adding tactical air direction (TAD) frequencies so each JTAC had a discreet TAD; clarifying rules of engagement for air interdiction strikes with SOF in close proximity; refining the roles and responsibilities of the AWACS, JSTARS, ASOC, and CAOC during mission execution; and specifying how CSAR and quick reaction forces would be tasked and controlled.

2 March 2002: Operation Boa Execution

CJTF Pinnacle and component commanders were ready to execute Operation Boa on 28 February 2002. The ISR force had intensely imaged the JSOA for the preceding seven days, focusing on target and LZ locations. The intelligence preparation of the battlefield confirmed the enemy estimate and gave planners high confidence in the location of
enemy forces, likely escape routes, firing positions, and cave entrances. Operation Boa was delayed two days due to adverse weather in the Shah-i-Kot Mountains. SOF team infiltration proceeded on schedule with AC-130 coverage. The teams observed the area and the 53 interdiction targets, and reported back to JSTARS that all targets were cleared for interdiction strike. The SOF-supported Afghan hammer force moved as planned and held at Phase Line Emerald.

At H-30 minutes, F-15Es hit all 12 caves with one requiring immediate restrike due to a weapon malfunction. All pre-planned LZs, enemy encampments, and fixed fighting positions were hit as well. However, one of the airburst JDAMs failed to detonate on an LZ, forcing the use of an alternate LZ due to unexploded ordnance.

At H-Hour, the strike force flowed out of the area as the blocking force inif began. AH-64s swept over the LZs in front of the Chinooks while Predator UAVs, A-10s, and AC-130s monitored the air from directly overhead. One CH-47 aborted a landing due to unexpected ground fire. Fortunately, both the Predator and AC-130 located the firing position, which was neutralized by the AC-130 and AH-64s.

After a 10-minute delay, the CH-47 returned to the LZ and uneventfully disembarked troops. At another LZ, a ranger was injured fast-roping into rough terrain. As in Python, a Medevac team was called to extract the Soldier. A-10s escorted the Medevac H-60 into the LZ and monitored the extraction.

Although all JTACs established radio contact with the A-10 FAC-As, one JTAC radio lost its crypto load, requiring calls in the clear using pre-briefed code words. Several A-10s responded to calls for suppressing fire and the ASOC pushed Navy attack aircraft and a B-52 to work with FAC-As and JTACs. Most targets were enemy mortar tubes, which were quickly located through night vision goggles and infrared sensors and engaged by air assets.

With the anvil force in place, the Afghan hammer force executed the double-envelopment. During this maneuver, they called for fires from airstrikes. Pressured from both the north and south, many Al-Qaeda and Taliban forces attempted to flee eastward out of the valley. Airstrikes engaged and killed scores of them before they reached the blocking positions. Those that reached the blocking forces along the exit routes were captured or killed. A few enemy troops who knew the terrain well attempted to escape via remote donkey trails or “rat lines” leading through the valley. With SOF eyes and an ISR umbrella scanning every square foot of the Shah-i-Kot valley, these fighters were spotted and engaged by the outer cordon of SOF and CAS airstrikes. In one instance, a B-52 aborted its bomb run 10 seconds prior to release when a civilian airliner flew directly under its bomb release point. The CAOC staff worked with civilian air traffic control authorities to re-route traffic around the JSOA enabling the bomber to reattack the enemy fighters after a 10-minute delay.

4 March 2002: Objective Gilligan

As the Afghan hammer force was mopping up the last fighters in the three valley villages, and the outer cordon SOF were killing and capturing leaks, a SOF team was inserted at Objective Gilligan, a southern Shah-i-Kot BP. (This part of the narrative is loosely based on the actual events on Robert’s Ridge, also known as Objective Ginger or Takur Ghar.)

Several cave entrances on this mountain were in the group of 13 reserved targets because intelligence sources believed there was a high probability of high-value Al-Qaeda leadership hiding there. Twenty-four hours of persistent ISR coverage showed significant enemy activity near the planned infil point so the SOF team inserted lower on the ridge and moved by foot. (The initial SOF team landed high on the ridge, unaware of intel given to the CJTF Mountain HQ hours earlier showing significant enemy activity in the area.)

Throughout the night, moderate-to-heavy fire from small arms, Dishka machine guns, and mortar attacks was quelled by the bravery and effective tactics of the SOF team, an embedded JTAC, a ranger quick reaction team and Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines air assets that provided CAS around the clock. By noon on 5 March 2002, Objective Gilligan was secured, dozens of the enemy were killed, and several were captured. Unfortunately, one U.S. SOF Soldier was killed in action and eight other U.S. Soldiers were injured.

Operation Boa continued for two more days as small pockets of fighters were killed or captured,
and sensitive site exploitation was conducted. Helicopters extracted the anvil force back to Bagram. The Afghan hammer force left a small company to hold the valley as the rest of the Afghan forces returned to Gardez.

**Conclusion**

Operation Boa was a tactical and operational success. The commander’s objective was attained: hundreds of Al-Qaeda and Taliban troops, including several top lieutenants, were killed and scores were taken prisoner. Although no high-value targets were discovered, several key pieces of intelligence were gathered that aided CJTF Pinnacle in follow-on operations.

The initial key to success was the establishment of a Joint Task Force with a clear command structure and well-defined supported/supporting relationships that ensured unity of command. Establishing liaison and coordination elements (SOLE, ACCE, ASOC, BCD, etc.) at the JTF and component headquarters ensured clear communication and unity of effort for both planning and execution. Standing up a JIC and focusing ISR ensured refinement of disparate intelligence assessments and established accurate estimates of enemy strength and intentions.

The combined planning effort built a universally understood CONOP, utilizing overwhelming force to engage worst-case enemy strength, tactics, and intentions. By employing a new theater air ground system with a new conventional ground force in a constrained airspace structure, the Operation Python mission rehearsal increased JTF command and control capabilities, interoperability, situational awareness, and confidence while also serving as a key part of an integrated deception plan. In the end, weeks of JTF planning, close coordination, and employment had developed a confident, capable, and synergistic joint air and ground team for Operation Boa. *MR*
ON 23 JULY 2008, Army Lieutenant General (LTG) Ann E. Dunwoody was confirmed by the U.S. Senate for promotion to the rank of general (four stars). This promotion is historically groundbreaking because Dunwoody is the first woman in the U.S. military to attain the rank of general. Her achievement is a milestone that has taken 12 years to reach since LTG Carol Mutter, U.S. Marine Corps, was nominated and approved as the first woman to attain three-star rank in 1996. LTG Claudia Kennedy followed Mutter a year later as the Army’s first woman three-star. Progress to the four-star tier has been slow in coming, given the relative numbers of women officers, but the July 2008 Army promotion list to Brigadier General (which had five women selected for promotion) inspires hope that competent women in the Army can and are advancing to the highest levels in the male-dominated hierarchy.

Research on the views and opinions of senior women leaders in the U.S. military is rare. Army nurse Anna May Hayes was the first Army woman promoted to brigadier general in June 1970. Including BG Hayes, only 42 women have been selected and promoted to general officer (GO) rank in the active duty Army.1 Even in progressive societies, male dominance remains a fact of life, a legacy from a pre-reflective, pre-technological past. Except for history’s handful of warrior queens, senior military leadership positions have always belonged to men. Biographies and histories document pervasive male dominance in military roles. Female progress in military leadership has yet to be documented beyond mere statistics.

This article’s research data clearly point to factors and competencies the male-dominated Army had already enshrined as roles, norms, and values. In that sense, my results differ not at all from what one would expect from an all-male GO study. Does this convergence of expectations for Army officers represent an objective, legitimate validation of the roles, norms, and values—or is it an unavoidable solidarity, perpetuating male-dominance within a social construction?

Post-modern analysis has not yet varnished the perceptions and experiences that the women in this study have articulated, and this study cannot address the question of whether the military culture is hopelessly chauvinistic, or not. Their answers to questions simply reflect what leadership factors and competencies they think enhanced their ability to be selected for senior leadership positions. One can only observe that it would be surprising and ironic if these factors and competencies did not reflect already well-defined Army expectations.
My analysis reveals seven universal themes:

- Professional competency and doing a good job.
- The value of interpersonal skills, including good communication skills and taking care of people.
- Being known by your good reputation.
- Taking and excelling in demanding positions such as being a commander.
- Luck and timing.
- Not aspiring to make general officer too early.
- Mentoring, sponsoring, and coaching.

The above suggest that the same expectations and behaviors contribute to career progression and selection as a general officer, regardless of one’s gender.

### Background of Women in the Army

Although women have been in the U.S. Army unofficially since the Revolutionary War and members of the Women’s Army Corps (WAC) since its inception, Congress did not pass the Women’s Armed Services Integration Act until 1948. The act made women (other than nurses) eligible to serve in the active duty military in times of peace as permanent regular and reserve members of the Army, Navy, Marines, and the recently formed Air Force. It also set limits on the number of women who could serve in the Armed Forces. Enlisted women could total no more than 2 percent of the total force in each branch of the service, while women officers (excluding nurses) could not exceed 10 percent of the enlisted women strength. The act also limited career opportunities. It did not allow women to have command authority over men.

Another major change occurred in the mid-1970s after the Vietnam War when the military became an all-volunteer force. Because enlistment in the new all-volunteer Army was low, the Department of Defense concluded that widening roles for females would ameliorate troop shortages and fill vacant positions. President Gerald Ford signed Public Law 94-106 in 1975, opening the formerly all-male U.S. service academies to female applicants, and thereby creating conditions in which women officers would lead men. Public Law 94-106 also deliberately expanded leadership positions beyond those previously allowed under the Women’s Army Corps.

Women volunteered for the military services in record numbers after these changes, and, as the number of military women increased, the military and the government saw the large numbers of female volunteers as essential rather than optional to the readiness of the service branches. Especially in the Army, these increased numbers of women brought about a major change in Americans opinions about gender, the full of effects of which we have yet to see.

In the 30 years since then, the percentage of women soldiers serving in the U.S. Army has increased significantly. In 1972, 1.8 percent of Army soldiers were women. In 1991, with 93,100 women serving, the ratio had risen to 11 percent. By 2005, the number was 14.3 percent. A corresponding increase occurred in the number of women selected, trained, and placed into officer or primary leadership roles. Department of Defense personnel tables show 15.3 percent of active duty Army officers were women in 2005. Army officer rank by gender for that year is shown in Table 1.

### Demographic Data of the General Officer Participants

When I conducted this study in 2006, there were 38 living women Army GOs. Of the 38, 14 were serving on active duty. There were also 24 living women GOs who had retired from the Army. I interviewed 12 of the 14 serving GOs and 11 of the 24 retired women GOs, for a total of 23 participants.

**Age and time in service.** The youngest general interviewed was 47 years old. She had served on active duty for 25.5 years, and she had been commissioned an Army officer in 1981. The oldest general interviewed was 77 years old. She had retired from the Army in 1986, at age 57. The oldest GO interviewed entered the Army in 1954, and she had served 32 years in the Army: 2 years as an enlisted member of the Women’s Army Corps and 30 years in service.
as a commissioned officer in the Regular Army. She retired in 1986. The average amount of leadership experience among all 23 participants serving as an Army officer was 30.5 years. The number of years serving as a general ranged from 1 to 11 years, with an average of 3.8 years spent as a GO.

**Commissioning sources.** The 23 participants entered the Army and were commissioned through five sources. Most of the GOs (15 or 62.5 percent) entered the Army as a direct appointment rather than going through a more typical precommissioning process like the Reserve Officer Training Course (ROTC) program or Officer Candidate School (OCS). Twelve of the 15 participants (or 80 percent) who entered the Army through a direct appointment were members of the WAC. Of the remaining 8 GOs, 3 (13 percent) were commissioned through ROTC, 2 (8.7 percent) were commissioned through OCS, and 2 (8.7 percent) were commissioned through the United States Military Academy (USMA) at West Point. One GO was commissioned through the Air Force Health Professions Scholarship Program prior to transferring into the Army.

**Education.** The education levels of the participant GOs included: 2 with only baccalaureate degrees, 11 with 1 masters degree, 6 with 2 masters degrees, 1 with 3 masters degrees, and 3 who had earned doctorates or an equivalent degree.

**Marital Status.** The 23 participants included 13 who were currently married and 10 who were currently single (including 2 women who had divorced and 2 who were widows).

**Branch.** The participants’ Army training included an array of branches and specialties. They included 4 Adjutant General GOs, 3 Signal Corps GOs, 2 Transportation GOs, 3 Army Nurse GOs, 1 Medical Corps GO, 1 Medical Service Corps GO, 1 Aviation GO, 1 Military Police GO, 1 Military Intelligence GO, 1 Quartermaster GO, 1 Chemical GO, 1 USMA professor GO, 1 Finance GO, 1 Ordnance GO, and 1 Judge Advocate General GO.

**Sampling and confidentiality.** Purposive sampling is a deliberate method researchers use to select study participants with particular characteristics from an accessible population determined to be appropriate for the needs of the study. I selected active duty women Army officers who currently hold or who have held high leadership responsibilities within the Army, and who have been selected and promoted to the rank of brigadier general or higher. To protect the identity of the participants and allow the participants confidentiality, I assigned pseudonyms for each participant.

**Findings**

I asked each of the 23 participants several questions. Three interview questions directly provided insight and a better understanding of the factors and competencies that might contribute to the career ascension of a female U.S. Army officer into the role of GO.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank/Grade</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>% Female</th>
<th>% Male</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>General</strong></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lieutenant General</strong></td>
<td>45</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Major General</strong></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Brigadier General</strong></td>
<td>152</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>96.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Colonel</strong></td>
<td>3,775</td>
<td>3,328</td>
<td>447</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>88.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lieutenant Colonel</strong></td>
<td>9,134</td>
<td>7,975</td>
<td>1,159</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>87.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Major</strong></td>
<td>14,835</td>
<td>12,822</td>
<td>2,013</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>86.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Captain</strong></td>
<td>24,967</td>
<td>20,449</td>
<td>4,518</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>81.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1st Lieutenant</strong></td>
<td>7,490</td>
<td>5,879</td>
<td>1,611</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>78.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2nd Lieutenant</strong></td>
<td>8,666</td>
<td>6,926</td>
<td>1,740</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>79.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 1. Army active duty officer personnel by rank/grade and gender.** (30 September 2005)

NOTE: Table 1. Adapted from U.S. Department of Defense, 2005. This information is U.S. government public domain material and is not copyrighted.
Interview question #1. From your experience, what specific personal competencies and skills contributed most to your career development and advancement? GO14’s response was typical; “I think the skills I had [that] sustained me [were] teamwork, effective communications, [and] inspiring others to reach their potential; all of those things, just really working and developing those that work around you. It’s really been those personal things that have guided me. It’s really all about the Soldier. You know, taking care of Soldiers. Leading them well, managing them.” The majority of the participants (13 or 56.5 percent) stated working with other people, interpersonal skills, or communication skills were the most important skills that contributed to their career development and advancement.

GO2 replied, “I think first of all is basic confidence in my abilities to lead people, to command, to make tough decisions, and to take risk.” GO6 stated, “I believe I’m really good with people. I’m empathetic. You know there is a whole body of literature about the way women lead. We lead differently. I think that’s part of it. People have always said how good I am with people, and that they’ve enjoyed working with me and for me. So, I think that was key. Also being physically fit was important. That’s one of those things, at a young age in the Army, I recognized that my ability to run and to work out [was important]. Men noticed me because I could run well. Leadership recognized that and whether or not that’s fair or not, that was reality. I am also an excellent speaker.”

GO10 stated, “I am very mission-focused and results oriented. I understand the role that my organization has in the overall mission accomplishment. I’ve always understood that. I’ve always been able to communicate that to people. I’m very dedicated to getting the mission done.”

GO20 stated, “I’m nice. I like people. If you don’t like people you can’t be a leader, because you’re not sensitive to what’s going on with them. I think more than anything else, it would be a love of people.”

Table 2 lists a composite summary in order of rank of specific participant skills and competencies based on the participant experiences that contributed to their career advancement and development.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Skills and Competencies</th>
<th>Number of Responses</th>
<th>Participant Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Communication skills (speaking/listening)</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>60.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpersonal skills/People-person</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>43.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership/Command</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>39.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good value system/Courage/Confidence/Loyalty</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>34.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hard work/Take tough jobs</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>26.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teamwork</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>21.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical fitness</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>21.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domain knowledge/Education</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>17.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good sense of humor</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>17.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develops/Helps people</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flexible/Adaptive</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caring/Trusting</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission focused/Results oriented</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Values history</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emulates good practices</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lifelong learner</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organized/Disciplined</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Innovative</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. Participant skills and competencies that contributed to Army career advancement.
Interview question #2. *How did you prepare yourself for high levels of command and leadership?* Several participants expressed that their actual Army experiences and performing well in various duty positions was a very important factor in preparing for higher levels of command and leadership in the Army (48 percent).

GO2 said, “When you are being looked at as a colonel or brigadier general, then what you bring to the table are the lessons learned from your cumulative experiences and hopefully everything that I had learned, or the real lessons, the nuggets you take from commanding at three separate levels before I made brigadier general.”

Almost half (11) of the GOs mentioned the importance of directly observing both good and bad leaders and learning vicariously through their accomplishments or failures.

GO8 stated, “I think a lot of it was done by paying attention to what was going on. Picking and choosing the best of everybody around me. Learning; learning from other people’s mistakes.”

GO5 commented, “I had the opportunity to watch general officers at high levels do their jobs and hear their philosophy on what works and what doesn’t work. Of course that goes two ways: you learn what you want to do, and you learn what you don’t want to do.”

A large percentage of the participants, 43 percent, stated education and military schooling were instrumental in their preparation for increased levels of responsibility and leadership. For example, GO23 replied, “I think the Army prepared me. They [the Army organization] prepared me through professional assignments and schooling and mentors and coaches who I met throughout my career.” Over a third of the 23 GOs (35 percent) believed that the mentoring they received from males or females throughout their career helped develop their leadership abilities and the qualities expected of leaders. GO4 mentioned, “I think the key is finding someone who can help encourage you and help you look at opportunities that you did not see for yourself. I had great mentors who encouraged me to take on a lot of hard jobs. Jobs that I did not think I was qualified for or that I would not succeed at. They said, ‘Look, you have nothing to lose by trying. Go and do it. You can do it. We believe you can do it. Now just trust in us and go try.’”

Interview question #3. *From your lived experiences or perceptions, what factors do you think are important in getting promoted to general officer?* This interview question was intended to provide factors the participants thought were important in getting promoted to GO. The responses to this question allowed me to compare and contrast factors the participants considered important. Core themes of the research question emerged from this interview question.

Over half of the participants (15 or 65 percent) stated that working hard, taking the hard jobs like command, and being professionally and technically competent were factors they believed are important in the process of getting promoted to GO. GO6 stated, “I think those that get promoted have had all of the right kinds of jobs, especially the command-track jobs. You’ve got to command, at all of the levels, to get promoted to general. Part of it also is networking. You’re not going to get assigned to PERSCOM [Personnel Command] or HR [Human Resources] Command unless you know people and they’ve heard about you. So it’s commanding at all of the levels and then networking.”

Almost half of those interviewed (11 or 48 percent) stated one’s reputation, visibility with other officers in different branches or specialties, or being known by others in other Army career fields is important in getting promoted to general. To illustrate this idea, GO2 said, “There are people who will be sitting on your board who know you for good and or know you for bad. Those people will more or less direct the destiny of whether you will be promoted or not.” Similarly GO16 stated, “If you
are fortunate enough to be selected for promotion, the number one reason is your reputation.”

Almost one third (7 or 30.4 percent) of the participants believed luck and timing is an important factor in getting promoted to general officer. GO4 stated, “I ran the brigadier general boards as a recorder on the selection boards. I ran a couple of them. There is that factor of timing that’s incredible. We all know people who should have been generals that weren’t. A lot of that has nothing to do with anything except timing.”

“If you are fortunate enough to be selected for promotion, the number one reason is your reputation.”

Mentorship and sponsorship were also cited as factors in being promoted to GO, but some of the participants did not have a mentor or sponsor when they were selected for promotion to brigadier general. GO11 said, “We’ve lots of great colonels. Unfortunately the Army can’t pick all of them for general officer. I think probably the ones that do get picked, they have someone who along the way had sponsored [them] in their words or in their actions; then [recommended them] to other people so that they [became] known entities among the senior folks. And of course, their record; I think it’s understood, it [your record of performance] has to stand on its own. You have to have an outstanding record.”

It was interesting to note that 5 of the participants (22 percent) stated an important factor in getting promoted to GO was not worrying about it or not making the promotion a priority in an officer’s career. GO10 commented, “I guess, I never signed up to be a general officer. I never said that’s what I want to be. In fact, my goal was to make major. As a lieutenant, I thought majors could do anything.”

Conclusions
The data presented in this article provide career strategies or ideas for Army senior leader advancement, female or male, and parallel experiences of senior managers in the business world. While the seven major themes and patterns noted above emerged from female participant responses to questions, clearly the answers are pertinent to leadership and management in general. Although other themes emerged in this study, the seven noted were overarching themes and were consistently mentioned during the interviews.

Doing a good job with professional competence emerged as the most common theme perceived as important. Professional job competence aligns with the research of Ruderman, Ohlott, Panzer, and King who stated the skills, abilities, and behaviors an organization valued included: “working hard, demonstrating technical proficiency, having good people skills, accomplishing goals and contributing to the bottom line, exhibiting strategic thinking and being open to change, taking risks, making good decisions, applying creativity and innovation, and dealing effectively with conflict.” The majority of the participants (65.2 percent) mentioned competence and doing a good job paramount for promotion to Army GO.

Answers to interview questions also accentuated the importance of having good interpersonal skills to lead others effectively. The majority of the study participants (60.9 percent) reported communication skills such as their speaking and listening skills contributed most to their career development and advancement. GO9 mentioned, “I would definitely say, being able to articulate oneself, either in writing or orally, because that is a very important skill set; to be able to concisely counsel someone, to motivate them, to encourage them, whether that is on a one-on-one basis, or in a crowd.” GO17 commented, “God gave me an ability to speak. I think you can’t underestimate the power of being able to talk to people; being able to use the way you speak as influencers [sic] with people.”

Being known by your good reputation was also an important theme shared by the GOS. The participants spoke of having your good reputation known by others as: “reputation,” “visibility,” “exposure,” and “being known.” Almost half (47.8 percent) of the participants believed a person’s reputation and being known to the board members sitting on the brigadier general promotion board is an important factor for selection to general officer. This data aligns with the research of Mainiero, Williamson, and Robinson who reported executive women
discussed the importance of obtaining support and acknowledgement from higher leaders in an organization.10

Taking, and doing well in, the tough jobs is a theme replicated in the business world. Catalyst conducted a worldwide research study of executive men and women and their career advancement. Both genders reported that having been provided leadership opportunity (83 percent) and receiving challenging assignments (80 percent) were very helpful factors in their personal success in the organization.11 It appears that job experience and taking the challenging jobs (and doing well) can advance both men and women in their careers.

Luck and timing was cited by 30.4 percent of the female GO participants as important in getting promoted to general. Cummings defined luck as, “successful or unsuccessful outcomes that appear to result from the convergence of confidence, control, preparation, and opportunity.”12 GO19 stated, “Then [after professional competence and taking the tough jobs at Division and Corps], probably the most important factor in making general officer, is standing in the right place when lightening strikes.”

The comment, “do not aspire to make GO” frequently came up as the GOs shared their experiences. GO11 stated, “I’d tell them not to aspire. I think this is the approach I took, and I give that as advice, and that is, do your best. I don’t think you can be a lieutenant coming in [the Army], planning to be a general officer. I think at some point you get to be much more self-serving than the servant or the shepherd serving our Soldiers and our men and women in uniform.” The researcher thought it was interesting that 39 percent of the participants stated they were surprised when they made GO, or that they had not made making general officer a goal in their Army career. GO2 described herself as an “accidental general” because when she entered the Army in 1959, the highest rank a woman officer in the WAC could attain and serve in was lieutenant colonel.

Mentoring relationships have always existed in the workplace, although the term mentoring has not always been used to describe the relationship. Mentoring, also called “sponsorship” and “coaching,” was a factor mentioned by 26.1 percent of the participants when asked what factors they thought were important for promotion to Army general officer. Through mentoring relationships, some of the participants believed they were given tough assignments or assignments they had not considered that played a major role in their career selection and ascension to GO. Many of the participants in this study mentioned the helpfulness of mentoring or coaching (primarily by senior male Army officers). GO3 commented, “I listened to my mentors; all of which were men, because there really weren’t any women out there.”

In summary, the study’s methodology involved questions aimed at understanding what 23 women GOs perceived as critical factors and competencies for their selection and promotion. The results of this study indicate that female general officers have the same attitudes and draw the same conclusions from their experiences as their male counterparts: Any officer who aspires to higher levels of Army leadership should do the best possible job in the assignments they are given; prepare themselves mentally, physically, and emotionally; accomplish the mission; take care of their soldiers; mentor and be mentored; stay true to their Army values; and not aspire to make general officer until they are colonels in the Army. MR

NOTES


Major Jeffrey H. Powell, U.S. Army

IMAGINE EVERY MAN, woman, and child in an American city of 781,000 brutally murdered in four months, the victims mostly hacked to death with machetes. In 1994, Rwanda, which lies at the crossroads of the Great Lakes Region of central Africa, experienced murder on such a scale—a genocidal frenzy. The following discussion examines what conditions could possibly set off such a horrific slaughter and how the country has attempted to recover from the calamity.

Until 6 April 1994, few people in the world knew about Rwanda or its rich history. Even as the slaughter occurred, the world knew little of the event, or that the major players in Rwanda’s internecine holocaust lived well beyond Rwandan borders. The country’s colonizers, Belgium and Germany, and world powers such as the United States and France helped create the conditions for genocide as much as the Hutus and Tutsis themselves did.

A Legacy of Hatred

Rwanda was born of European colonialism. The calculated policies of Belgium, Germany, and France divided Rwanda against itself for easier colonial rule. These policies of 19th century rule had a lasting effect and are currently the major reasons for obstacles to 21st century reconciliation and stability.

Different theories suggest origins for traditions that divide the Hutus from the Tutsis, but discernable facts prove that Hutus and Tutsis are ethnically and anthropologically the same. They have always shared the same language, territories, traditions, and taboos. Moreover, Hutus could (and still can) become Tutsis by marriage or the procurement of wealth. The arbitrary identity of Tutsi or Hutu could change based on the number of cattle a person owned. Classically, Hutus have been farmers and Tutsis have been herdsmen, a divide as ancient as the mythology of Cain and Abel.1

This Hutu-Tutsi societal division thrived as a colonial caste system based on folklore and perpetrated through political policies.2 Every European country responsible for the colonial rule of Rwanda exploited the so called “anthropology” of Hutuism and Tutsism for economic purposes. The Belgians, for instance, designated Tutsis as the administrators and Hutus as the workers under their rule.3 Two other factors accentuated this artificial distinction: the Belgian requirement that Hutus and Tutsis carry identification cards denoting them as such and the “Hamitic Theory” emphasized by the Hutus when they subsequently came to power in 1959.4

These societal distinctions led to official and unofficial bigotry before and after Rwandan independence. Before independence, the colonial departments
governed through a Tutsi hierarchy. After independence in 1959, international support switched to the Hutus. During the entire period of Hutu governance, Tutsis became the scapegoats for all failed policies and suffered decreased educational opportunities, segregation from government positions, removal from positions of influence as teachers and judges, and massacre at the hands of the Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR).5

Resentment from the societal divide has always threatened Rwanda’s security environment with instability. From a political standpoint, the rift has led to the perceptions of nepotism in government positions, biases in the adjudication of justice, and divisive attitudes about governmental re-education of both Hutus and Tutsis. These conditions undermined efforts of any tribe or party that came to power. War and the cataclysmic genocide subsequently had a devastating effect on the Rwandan economy, totally destroying the country’s basic industry, civil services, and key infrastructure.

Only by overcoming segregation and its humiliating effects will Rwanda become a functional, stable country. Progress will require internal and external security from a functioning government not based on a caste system. Recovery will also mean revitalizing an integrated economy through international funding and cooperation. The Rwandan government will have to develop political policies that encourage economic renewal for Hutus and Tutsis and a security apparatus that ensures the success of both. Full reconciliation will not be possible without these measures.

Today, Rwanda is rebuilding to this end, establishing new civil-support apparatuses, and trying to reconcile populations who have regarded themselves more as Hutus and Tutsis than as Rwandans. As with conflict resolution case studies in other Military Review articles in this series, foundations for progressive change rest in the societal framework: the political, security, and economic policies forged by the country in transition.

In Rwanda’s case, the three-part process of amnesty, reintegration, and reconciliation (AR2)—developed as a rubric for this series of articles—fits only roughly in helping understand what has so far transpired. For instance, at present, there is no amnesty in Rwanda, only a “victor’s justice.” Theoretically, the country must have some form of amnesty to achieve reconciliation. As the AR2 model suggests it would, lack of amnesty has led to a retributive form of justice that inhibits reintegration and eventual reconciliation. Worse still, reconciliation in this case—not only forgiveness but also the belief that all Rwandans can contribute to Rwanda’s success regardless of their social origins or caste—will mean overcoming hundreds of years of fear and ignorance created by forced segregation undergirded by policy, myth, and folklore. Such conditions present a formidable challenge to AR2. And without AR2, Rwanda will face bleak prospects in the future, which could include another civil war.

A pickup truck on the road near Rugende, some five miles east of Kigali, carries Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) rebels to front line positions closer to the Rwandan capital of Kigali, 14 May 1994.
War, Assassinations, and Genocide

The Rwandan civil war lasting from 1990 until August 1993 stemmed from the inability of Tutsis and Hutus to form a mutually nurturing society that benefited all Rwandans. Rwandan Government Forces (FAR), representing the politically and socially dominant Hutus, and the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) (essentially exiled Tutsi rebels) fought a 4-year war. Rwanda was on the verge of reconciliation from this struggle via the Arusha Accords when the country collapsed into the final throes of civil war and genocide in April 1994.

In August 1993, when regional and international actors arranged detailed peace negotiations to be enforced by the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), a brokered reconciliation effort began. From October 1993 until April 1994, there was little movement towards peace and reconciliation, or implementation of the Arusha Accords. Failures by both the Hutu-led government of President Juvenal Habyarimana and the RPF bogged down the comprehensive peace plan. The Secretary General of the United Nations, as well as leaders of African regional neighbors (particularly Tanzania), made a concerted effort to put the peace initiative back on track.

During this effort, Rwanda’s President Habyarimana flew to Dar-es-Salaam, Burundi, to meet with other signatories of the accords. On his return flight, Hutu extremists in the Presidential Guard shot down his plane on its approach to Rwanda’s capital city, Kigali. This assassination ignited one of history’s worst genocides.

Colonel Theoneste Bagosora, the Secretary-General of the Ministry of Defense, seized power. Although Bagosora did not ascend to the presidency of Rwanda, his machinations led to the murder of Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana. In the first hours after the downing of Habyarimana’s plane, Bagosora began consolidating Hutu-extremist power by proscribing key Tutsi and moderate-Hutu leaders. Within 48 hours, Bagosora replaced the entire government. Bagosora was able to whip the FAR and local militias, known as interahamwe, into a frenzy bent on mass extermination of all Tutsis.

Almost immediately, Major General Paul Kagame of the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA), the military arm of the RPF, began an offensive to halt the murderous FAR attacks on the civilian population. Kagame made his intentions known by remaining in constant contact with the UNAMIR force commander, Canadian General Romeo Dallaire. Kagame’s RPA intended to capture Kigali and end the Tutsi slaughter. The RPA alone was responsible for ending the Rwandan genocide. From their offensive on 8 April 1994 until the fall of Kigali on 4 July 1994, Kagame’s forces handily defeated the numerically superior FAR.

However, during these four months, Hutu extremists massacred nearly one million Tutsis and moderate Hutus, with very little intervention from the international community. The UNAMIR force was militarily incapable of stopping the rampaging FAR. It lacked both the United Nations mandate to act as an armed reconciler and the military force structure to accomplish such a daunting task. Furthermore, on 21 April 1994, the UN Security Council (UNSC) amazingly voted to reduce the UNAMIR’s mandate and force structure, further
weakening its capability to stop the genocide. In May 1994, the UNSC reversed itself, increased the UN mandate, and increased the troop strength to 5,500 in order to help restore peace, but it was already too late.10 The genocide did not end until the RPA achieved a fragile peace with the fall of Kigali and the routing of the remaining FAR forces to Zaire in July 1994.

Even with the RPA’s victory, Rwanda faced complex internal, external, and regional security problems. Reintegration and reconciliation required a degree of security not then found in Rwanda. Indeed, the Hutu-Tutsi conflict spilled into the Democratic Republic of Congo and Burundi. The challenges of securing Rwanda thus began immediately after the fall of Kigali in July 1994. Hundreds of thousands of Hutu Rwandans fled into neighboring Zaire, now the Democratic Republic of Congo. Intermingled with the fleeing civilians were the interahamwe, the Hutu militia that had carried out most of the genocide. The exodus also included key FAR leaders, and 20,000 FAR soldiers with 62 armored vehicles and numerous heavy weapons.11

Other Hutu extremists escaped into a security zone created during Operation Turquoise. In June 1994, the French government declared it would set up a “safe zone” in the southwest of Rwanda. On 20 June, France introduced a draft resolution to the UNSC that authorized the French-led force for a two-month mandate. After two days of consultations and the personal approval of the UN Secretary General, the Security Council adopted the draft as UNSC resolution 929. Operation Turquoise began on 23 June 1994 when a force of 2,550 French and approximately 500 African troops from Senegal, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania, Chad, Egypt, Niger, and the Republic of the Congo entered Rwanda. They established a safe zone (known as Zone Turquoise) that comprised a fifth of the country. This action largely stopped the mass killings; however, several smaller-scale Hutu operations to kill Tutsis in the zone continued. The UN force left when its mandate expired on 21 August.

For approximately the next two years, Hutu forces launched attacks into Rwanda against the RPA. Finally, the RPA allied with the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (ADFL) and counterattacked into Zaire, raising the ire of the international community but effectively securing Rwanda’s western border. The RPA incursion also led to the Zaire government’s fall and a UN Mission that secured the Zaire-Rwandan border.12

Continuing the conflict into Zaire placed enormous strain on the RPA. Already stretched thin by casualties from four years of fighting and conducting the campaign to seize Kigali and operations to secure the western Rwandan border, the RPA had to police Rwanda, secure internally displaced persons, and guard the overcrowded prison systems. Beset with untrained volunteers and expatriates, and no longer the well-trained, disciplined force that had achieved victory over the FAR, the RPA began seeking revenge for the genocide.13
The RPA’s incursion into Zaire had drawn the Great Lakes Region states into the fighting, but it all seemed to end with the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement on 10 July 1999. The DRC, Rwanda, Angola, Namibia, Uganda, and Zimbabwe agreed to end the conflict.\textsuperscript{14} The Lusaka Agreement failed within months of its implementation however, as fighting ignited again. The struggle only ended later in 2002 with the signing of the Pretoria Agreement.\textsuperscript{15}

By then, hatred between Hutus and Tutsis had magnified, having festered in the 12 years of armed conflict. Thoughts of amnesty and reconciliation were unimaginable. Rwandans still faced cross-border attacks from Hutu insurgents despite the presence of the largest on-going peacekeeping mission on record, the United Nations Mission in the DRC. Facing constant threats to their security, Tutsis felt no sympathy for Hutus displaced beyond Rwanda’s borders or for Hutu citizens in Rwanda. Lack of empathy and inability to forgive their enemies for the genocide persisted after the Pretoria Agreement. And although Rwanda had achieved a ceasefire, the social divisions between Hutus and Tutsis continued to make an offer of amnesty out of the question.

**Political Hurdles to Reconciliation**

After 12 years of armed conflict and attempts to gain international recognition, Rwanda is finally implementing policies allowing reconciliation. The Rwandan Patriotic Front placed many of its military leaders in government leadership positions to stabilize the country, restore infrastructure, and bring the perpetrators of genocide to justice.

Rwanda is ostensibly a democracy with the RPF as the government. (Rwanda moved from being an authoritarian to a semi-authoritarian state after holding elections in 2003.) Like the former Hutu regimes, the RPF killed or exiled its adversaries. Currently, political parties with views contrary to those of the RPF, such as the Democratic Republican Movement, are said to have a “genocidal ideology” or are seen as threats to state security and have been disbanded. Tutsis, and a smattering of Hutu moderates that ascribe to the political and ideological beliefs of the Tutsis, make up the current regime led by President Paul Kagame.\textsuperscript{16} The authoritarian/semi-authoritarian path gives the government great latitude to implement two major policies for reconciliation and reintegration—the *gacaca* (grassroots) courts and the *ingando* camps. These institutions have replaced the international community’s initial attempt to implement justice for the Rwandan genocide.

**Gacaca courts.** Perhaps Rwandan reconciliation began in November 1994 with UN Security Council Resolution 955, which implemented the International Tribunal for Rwanda to prosecute crimes from the genocide.\textsuperscript{17} The tribunal was supposed to bring the interahamwe to justice. However, when many of those convicted faced execution, the retributive justice of the tribunals further widened Rwanda’s societal divide. In addition, given the large number of persons charged with crimes, experts estimated that the international tribunal process would require almost a century of adjudication to complete. As a result, the Rwandan government introduced the gacaca tribal justice courts to speed up the process and to deliver restorative justice.\textsuperscript{18}

The gacaca court system placed the power of reconciliation with the people. Local populations elected the judges of the courts. After a short training period, during which judges received instruction on types of genocidal crimes, punishment, and how to interpret the laws, local communities...
could begin implementing their gacaca courts. The genocide law passed in 1996 determined four levels of interahamwe:

- Planners, organizers, and leaders of the genocide.
- People guilty of voluntary homicide.
- People who committed violent acts without intent to kill.
- People who committed crimes against property. Gacaca courts could adjudicate all but the highest level of interahamwe.\(^{19}\)

The gacaca courts lightened the burden on Rwanda’s traditional court system and began a kind of low-level reconciliation within Rwandan communities by meting out punishments ranging from community service to life imprisonment.

Although innovative, the gacaca system has its drawbacks. When accused persons confess to committing acts of genocide, they must meet three criteria to gain their freedom. First, they must give the court all information about the crime they committed. Second, they must apologize to those against whom they committed the crime. Third, they must implicate their co-conspirators in the crime. The final requirement creates the possibilities of false accusations and acts of revenge that could slow the reconciliation process. Even so, the gacaca system is the best vehicle to achieve reconciliation without further aggravating the societal rift that has long divided the Rwandan people.

**Ingando camps.** Another government policy to heal the rift in Rwandan society is the policy of ingando, or solidarity camps, aimed at illuminating Rwandans about their history, bringing them together as one people, and indoctrinating them in the principles and ideologies of the Rwandan Patriotic Front. The ingando program is for all members of Rwandan society, from former soldiers of the Hutu regime to prostitutes to gacaca judges. Its goal is to make Rwandans identify themselves as Rwandans instead of as Hutus or Tutsis. The program seeks to wipe out the Hutu-Tutsi caste system in Rwandan society. Rwanda’s public education system teaches ingando principles at all levels of education. While ingando is well intentioned, it has several shortfalls. It does not acknowledge all of Rwanda’s history, it identifies colonialism as the root of Rwanda’s societal division, and it has characteristics that tempt some to compare it to Marxist-Leninist indoctrination.\(^{20}\)

The goal of ingando camps is to ensure that all members of Rwandan society have upward mobility and that identifying labels based on a caste system do not hamper their aspirations. If the program achieves its goal, it could change the country’s future. By allowing all members of society to compete equally regardless of their previously assigned or inherited social caste, Rwanda will be able to grow and compete economically with other countries on the African continent.

**Economics and Reconciliation**

The greatest international aid to Rwanda has come in the form of economic assistance. At the focal point of the international aid is the World Bank, which funds the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP):

MDRP complements national and regional peace initiatives, providing vital support for the social and economic reintegration of ex-combatants. It provides comprehensive support for demobilization and reintegration by helping establish standard approaches throughout the region, coordinating partner initiatives, and providing financial and technical assistance in the demobilization, reinsertion, and reintegration of ex-combatants.\(^{21}\)

The MDRP is vital to Rwandan reintegration and reconciliation. It provides needed financial support to critical programs that will enable Rwanda to reconcile itself with the 12 years of conflict it endured. MDRP has four objectives in Rwanda:

- Demobilize an estimated 36,000 ex-combatants from the RPF and other armed groups and support their transition to civilian life.
- Support the repatriation of ex-FAR in the spirit of the Arusha Agreement.
- Support the social and economic reintegration of all demobilized ex-combatants who remain socioeconomically vulnerable.
- Facilitate the reallocation of government expenditures from defense to the social and economic sectors.\(^{22}\)

Founded in 2002 by the World Bank, the MDRP coordinates funding, but the funds come from a multitude of sources. It also provides expertise to help rebuild Rwanda’s government and economic infrastructure. By integrating 10 different UN programs, the World Food Program, the International Labor Organization, the European Union,
the African Union, and the Food and Agriculture Organization, the MDRP is helping Rwanda solve many economic problems with expertise rivaling that of developed nations.23

The MDRP is thus bringing about change in Rwanda. By reconciling and reintegrating ex-combatants—whose numbers include most of Rwanda’s male population—the MDRP is helping build a country that observes the rule of law, contributes economically to the region, and respects its neighbors. With economic progress, Rwanda could become a stalwart of stability in the Great Lakes region of Africa.

Building a New Rwanda

Amnesty, reintegration, and reconciliation are conceptual tools for clearing centuries of moral debris from the Rwandan societal landscape. One of the RPF’s failures was its inability to forgive the Hutus and grant them amnesty. Because of the genocide’s ferocity and the ensuing civil war, the RPF had to begin reconciliation in 2002 without granting amnesty. The RPF also has not acknowledged facts pointing to the illegal actions of some members of the RPA during the conflict and the possible need to grant amnesty to them as well.

The failure to grant amnesty has mired the reconciliation process. Despite the international tribunals, the gacaca courts, and the ingando camps, an undercurrent of hatred still exists between Hutus and Tutsis. This hatred, coupled with the semi-authoritarian regime, could lead to another humanitarian crisis in Rwanda.

The policies of the current regime neither include nor forgive Hutus. They do not recognize that throughout the civil war both sides committed atrocities against each other, and one way to overcome the cyclic legacy of those crimes is to forgive the perpetrators and grant them amnesty. Rwandans have taken great strides in the last five years, but they still have a long way to go to complete reintegration and reconciliation.

Throughout its history, Rwanda has been divided. Only a true AR2 process can pull Rwanda out of a downward spiral and make it a viable member of the international community. For that to happen, Rwanda must have an amnesty that all members of society accept.

A government policy of amnesty is only half the solution. The people of Rwanda must embrace that policy. From amnesty, the roots of reconciliation and reintegration can grow, beginning the stabilization of Rwanda for future generations. MR

NOTES

4. Arthur J. Klingshoffer, The International Dimension of Genocide in Rwanda (New York: University Press, 1998) 6-7; Destexhe, 40-42. In Rwanda, the Hamitic hypothesis stated that the supposedly “Hamitic” Tutsis (the term has Biblical origins) were superior to Hutus because they were deemed to be more like white people in their facial features, and thus destined to rule over the Hutus. Because of tribalism and the belief among Tutsis that they were superior to the Hutus, the Hutus began to see the Tutsis as outside invaders of their land. The concept of a Hamitic racial or linguistic difference has been discredited.
5. Destexhe, 41-47.
10. Vaccaro, 376-78.
11. Waugh, 100-1.
13. Waugh, 125.
Winning Battles but Losing Wars: 
Three Ways Successes in Combat Promote Failures in Peace

Christopher E. Housenick, Ph.D.

RECENT DIFFICULTIES in post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction efforts in both Afghanistan and Iraq stand in stark contrast to the overwhelming successes of their respective maneuver combat operations. While reasons abound for why these problems have arisen, one rationale is still under examined—the methods utilized when conducting direct combat operations. Only by making fundamental changes in American military doctrine can these problems be alleviated, thereby increasing the likelihood of success in stabilizing post-intervention states.

While the U.S. military has always played a role in post-conflict reconstruction operations during phase IV operations, current rebuilding efforts in both Iraq and Afghanistan have been stymied by instability. A resurgent Taliban in southern Afghanistan and increasing opium production raise questions about the effectiveness of U.S. and NATO reconstruction efforts in that country. Reconstruction efforts in Iraq have often stalled because of a dangerous and unpredictable security environment; violence perpetrated by insurgents, militias, cults, foreign terrorists, and profiteering criminals has made the security situation in Iraq untenable. At one point, the Iraqi security environment deteriorated to the point that over two million Iraqis fled their homes and entered neighboring countries.¹

These daunting post-conflict challenges stand in stark contrast to the successes during the maneuver operations (phase III operations) during these two wars. When conventional U.S. military forces began their campaign in Afghanistan in October 2001, Afghanistan’s capital, Kabul, fell in only two months, and most major cities in the country fell by the end of the year. During the 2003 invasion of Iraq, it took a mere six weeks to push into and capture Baghdad. Maneuver operations in both conflicts were powerful, quick, and decisive.

There is no lack of opinions as to why reconstruction was far more challenging than expected in Iraq and Afghanistan. Some critics point to intelligence failures before the wars began and during reconstruction efforts; others point to underdeveloped and ad hoc approaches to post-conflict reconstruction.
planning, while still others place the blame on senior leaders of reconstruction efforts.²

One potential explanation is rarely discussed: the conduct of combat operations before the beginning of reconstruction. Oftentimes discussions of phase III and phase IV operations occur in relative isolation, and we assume the operations are independent of each other. However, these two components of military actions are highly intertwined and interconnected. Is it possible that the way the U.S. military conducts wars makes it harder to achieve long-lasting, peaceful outcomes?

I believe that the “American way of war,” that is, the doctrine followed and tactics used used during phase III operations, creates great difficulties and additional problems to solve during phase IV operations. Methods that are highly successful during the maneuver phase of conflicts directly contribute to increasingly difficult post-conflict reconstruction efforts.

Is it possible that the way the U.S. military conducts wars makes it harder to achieve long-lasting, peaceful outcomes?

Cause and Effect

We cannot expect easy post-conflict stabilization operations in our current military operations because of three conditions we either fostered or failed to control. The overwhelming use of force espoused by the Powell Doctrine, the targeting of state infrastructure, and the presence of increasing numbers of foreign nationals, all create problems that continue to plague efforts in reconstruction. I will discuss each of these considerations in turn.

Overwhelming use of military force. One of the most common axioms of military action is to use overwhelming force in order to defeat an adversary.³ A commonly held guideline when planning an offensive operation is to possess a 3:1 advantage in personnel in combat operations and an even greater numeric advantage during military operations in urbanized terrain.⁴ In practice, however, the United States military almost always attacks with less than that ratio. By employing advanced technology, such as next-generation attack aviation assets and advanced armored vehicles, the U.S. often makes up for differences in numeric quantity.

This approach has been quite successful in recent history. Even though coalition forces barely outnumbered the Iraqi military forces in 1991, U.S. and allied forces soundly defeated an entrenched Iraqi army with a five-week air campaign and a 100-hour ground offensive. In 2003, the predominantly U.S. and British invasion coalition force of 263,000 soldiers attacked and defeated an Iraqi army of approximately 375,000 soldiers and captured Baghdad in six weeks. The use of overwhelming force made these difficult military maneuvers possible even though the coalition was at a noticeable numeric disadvantage.

While stunning military defeats through the use of tremendous amounts of force are important for successful phase III operations and force protection, these types of devastating defeats of American adversaries may come with unintended and problematic consequences once phase IV operations begin. The overwhelming use of military force can spawn a desire for revenge or retribution in defeated adversaries.⁵ There are several instances where a humiliating defeat in one war planted the seeds for future wars. As Robert Harkavy writes:

The extent or depth of defeat may be very important in determining the level of resulting humiliation. The Arabs in 1967 and Iraq in 1991 suffered overwhelming, humiliating defeats of the kind that produces lasting shame. In both cases, before-the-war boastfulness (enemies were going to drown in their own blood) was followed by almost comic-opera levels of military performance, widely interpreted throughout the world as something akin to cowardice that, subsequently, was to produce high levels of shame.⁶

This sort of relationship is not limited to the Middle East. The contentious relationship between Germany and France during the balance of power era in the late 1800s and the numerous wars between India and Pakistan demonstrate that defeat in one war has sown the seeds of the next conflict in direct, explicit terms, a psychological need for the restoration of state honor through military might.

Former enemies often point to one significant indicator when discussing damage to and loss of
their honor and respect—vast differences in casualties from their opponents. When one side takes a disproportionate level of casualties, it often believes their lives are seen as less valuable or important than the lives of their adversaries, and the need for revenge and retribution grows. This argument is very common when discussing the conflicts and wars between Israel and the Palestinians. Anger because of dramatic differences in casualties has surfaced in U.S. military activities. In the 1991 Persian Gulf War, more than 25,000 Iraqi soldiers were killed compared to only 268 American soldiers. During Operation Restore Hope in Somalia, 18 U.S. soldiers were killed in the October 1993 Battle of Mogadishu, while more than 1,000 Somalis were killed in the fighting. These statistics clearly illustrate that there was a significant difference between the number of U.S. soldiers killed and the numbers of adversaries killed, and in both instances, these battles created dramatic and appreciable levels of hostility.

Targeting infrastructure during combat operations. Infrastructure has always been a critical component of military and security operations. The Roman Empire was able to maintain its control over vast expanses of territory because of the road system it constructed throughout Europe and Western Asia. Strategic road junctions at Gettysburg made the battle there a critical point of the U.S. Civil War because the army that possessed those crossroads would have far greater freedom of maneuver throughout the country. In World War II, German harbors, railroads, and bridges were bombed to curtail and cut off re-supply and troop reinforcements. During the 1991 Persian Gulf War, U.S. warplanes targeted communications nodes and major highways so Saddam Hussein’s armies could not coordinate and plan a coherent defense or retreat, leaving them isolated, without instructions, and more vulnerable to coalition attacks.

While it is an important and viable military consideration to target, damage, and destroy these systems during phase III operations, these same infrastructure networks are critical systems that are necessary for successful reconstruction operations in the occupied state during the aftermath of an invasion. A telephone exchange, which can be used to pass along orders and information when attempting to stop a U.S. advance or invasion, is also used in peacetime to pass along information and orders from the central government to outlying areas of the state. A bridge used for moving tanks during wartime can be used to move trucks containing food and other tradable goods during post-conflict rebuilding and peacetime. Targeting these systems in war denies everyone their use in times of peace.

The problem of targeting infrastructure stands out in the Balkan countries. When NATO authorized and implemented an air campaign against Serbia in 1995 and against Kosovo in 1999, one of the primary targets of these campaigns was the infrastructure of these states. The logic of these strikes was to stop the flow of troops, weapons, and orders into Serbia and Kosovo, thereby slowing and potentially stopping the ethnic cleansing in those regions. The costs of targeting infrastructure in those countries is still being paid today, almost a decade after those conflicts. Large numbers of bridges, roads, and tunnels are still not rebuilt, leaving the fabric of those countries torn, and the long process of rebuilding infrastructure prolongs U.S. involvement in that region.

Compounding these problems is the systems’ generally diminished and degraded status in many conflict-torn countries. When a country breaks down and the primary focus of the central government is state survival, funds and efforts to maintain or construct infrastructure become almost non-existent. This problem is most acute in states that were involved in long-term civil wars, such as Haiti, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Sudan. At a minimum, the infrastructure in these states is neglected, and it is far more common that these important systems are often completely ignored for a substantial length of time (perhaps even for decades).

Phase IV reconstruction is going to be far more difficult and costly without these infrastructure systems, regardless of whether combat operations...
or years of government neglect destroyed them. Moving material into remote locations without roads or bridges often requires the use of helicopters or air drops, which are far more expensive to operate than convoys of trucks. Loss of potable water because of combat operations often means that expensive water systems have to be shipped into reconstruction zones, again taking substantial amounts of time and funds. Coordinating phase IV operations across an entire country without a working, serviceable phone system will be considerably more difficult than if a functioning system were in place. Rebuilding destroyed infrastructure costs money that could best be spent elsewhere, and it substantially prolongs U.S. involvement in post-conflict reconstruction.

**Non-indigenous combatants in conflict zones.** The presence of foreign fighters and support personnel operating against the United States in combat zones should be a growing concern for military planners and policy-makers alike. Many times, we assume the invading force will be fighting and pacifying the people of the state they are “standing in,” and will only have to deal with the citizens of that country, but assuming the population and military of a target country only consists of one nationality is dangerous. Greater numbers of foreign nationals are now present in states where military interventions are planned. Broadly speaking, there are two types of foreign nationals that are increasing in numbers and could be involved in direct combat operations against the U.S.—foreign combatants and employees of private military firms (PMFs).

During any international conflict, a number of foreign nationals are drawn to the sound of warfare and combat. Whether they are mercenaries that seek wars for profit or warmongers that seek combat because of bloodlust, when conflicts and wars arise there is an appreciable pull into combat for certain foreign citizens as soldiers and combatants. This pattern has been most obvious and prevalent in various conflicts throughout the Middle East in the last three decades. When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1980, there was a heavy flow of foreign-fighters into the ranks of the Afghan Mujahadeen. When civil war broke out in Lebanon in 1983, large numbers of foreign fighters streamed into that state to fight against whichever side they found objectionable, and they continue to do so today. This same problem has manifested itself in Iraq. Foreign nationals from Afghanistan, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Syria and a diverse array of countries-of-origin have entered the combat zones of these three conflicts. This trend is not isolated to the Middle East; the phenomenon is quite prevalent on the global stage. During the interstate and civil wars in East Africa, fighters from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, and Uganda intermixed and operated across their respective national borders.

While foreign nationals are one source of trouble, they are not the only foreign presence on today’s battlefields that can complicate military operations. Private military firms are increasingly utilized by
all states of the international system. More than 160 countries contracted some form of PMF to help provide services to promote state security. Many of these firms are neither based nor headquartered in the United States, and several operate in multiple countries simultaneously. The global increase in the use of these companies heightens the probability that U.S. or other intervention forces will encounter the citizens of a third-party state during wartime.11

Foreign fighters from any source create additional challenges for any military during both phase III and phase IV operations. Foreign fighters often fall outside standard chains-of-command of the official state military. Because these troops operate outside a formal command structure, it is far more difficult (and potentially impossible) to stop their violent activities when a cease-fire or other peace agreement is made or established. They may continue to fight based on their ideological dispositions or contractual obligations, rather than abide by the terms of a cease-fire agreement.

In addition to the above, foreign fighters in a combat zone can create larger diplomatic challenges and potentially initiate additional crises. The presence of foreign nationals in any combat zone, regardless of whether they are active combatants or not, can create international tension and incidents. The accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade during the air strikes on Serbia created appreciable diplomatic tensions between the U.S. and China during that conflict, even though those personnel were in no way involved in the conflict. If a group of foreign nationals takes up arms against U.S. forces, the capture or death of these nationals could create a large-scale diplomatic or even a military crisis with their country-of-origin.

**Policy Recommendations**

While it is important to identify what phase III actions make phase IV operations difficult, it is not enough just to criticize them; setting forth guidelines and recommendations for future planning is
equally important. Some will note that the changes presented here are often political as well as military proposals. Because the military is the instrument that carries out combat operations, it will be in place immediately as reconstruction efforts begin. Speed of restoration and repair of former combat zones is of the essence; the first 60 to 90 days are critical during phase IV operations. Civilian organizations, while quite useful, may not arrive in a timely enough fashion to help during this critical period, so the military must be prepared to be the lead organization on a variety of issues for several months in order to increase the chances of post-conflict success.

Minimizing humiliation and the need for revenge. It should be a priority for future military planners to identify a middle ground between the need to use overwhelming military power to end wars quickly and the need for defeated enemies to “save face.” If a military force is overwhelmingly defeated to the point of humiliation, they will be far more likely to look toward terrorism, insurgency, and guerrilla warfare as an avenue to restore their lost honor and reputation. If the force can be defeated in such a way as to leave it some level of dignity and honor, it should be less likely to try to restore its reputation through the aforementioned methods. Working this consideration into tactical, operational, and strategic planning is not an easy task and is probably the most challenging of the recommendations made here. Force protection is one of the most important considerations for military commanders. However, leaving the honor of an adversary intact is a vital consideration that must be addressed and realized in order to increase the chances of success in post-conflict stabilization.

Wars are becoming more deadly for soldiers and civilians alike. Unrestricted warfare is taking a greater toll on everyone involved, from the soldiers doing the fighting to the civilian populations engulfed by conflict. Every casualty during maneuver operations or in post-conflict reconstruction, civilian or military, intentional or accidental, makes some person more likely to decide to support or join an insurgency. The United States should become a world-leader in working to reduce casualties, both military and civilian, in every conflict around the globe. It should be a U.S. policy goal to make the sterile, cold term “collateral damage” a thing of the past. “Human protection”—a policy of preserving the life and limb of both foreign civilians and enemy military personnel alike—must stand on equal footing with force protection to reduce the dangers to people in conflict zones and reduce and remove the motivations for taking up arms against U.S. soldiers in post-conflict environments.

One way the U.S. military can begin to promote this viewpoint is to focus far greater attention on the increasing development and deployment of mass-effect, non-lethal technologies. Recent technological breakthroughs have made these instruments far more viable and important than they were only a few years ago. Parabolic megaphones and focused microwaves can subdue people without causing permanent harm to them, thereby reducing casualties. These weapons systems have shown dramatic promise in Iraq and elsewhere; we should widely distribute and heavily utilize them during post-conflict reconstruction, and doctrinal planners should begin to incorporate their use into phase III operations.

Targeting, reconstruction, and expansion of infrastructure. The U.S. should change its approach of attacking infrastructure during both phase III and phase IV operations. Future campaigns cannot leave a country in shambles as was done in Serbia or Kosovo. Continuing this approach will lengthen post-war commitments, dramatically increase financial costs of reconstruction, and therefore necessitate longer military involvements in reconstruction efforts. Part of the remedy for this problem is already beginning to take shape with the advent and increasing importance of “effects-based targeting.” Rather than damaging and destroying infrastructure in its entirety, military planners are working towards identifying critical hubs and points where the greatest effect can be achieved with the least amount of damage, thereby making post-war
reconstruction efforts easier. While this is an important first change in approach, it is far from sufficient, and new standardized policy directives need to be incorporated during phase IV operations to increase the chances of success once the shooting stops.

It should become part of standard military planning for phase IV operations that any and all infrastructure damaged or destroyed should be restored to pre-conflict conditions within 60 days of the conclusion of major combat operations. If the basic infrastructure systems are so repaired in such a dramatically short period of time, inconvenience to civilians will be minimal and the economic and social fabric of the state will be quickly restored, thereby minimizing the social displacement that contributes to people taking up arms against the U.S. While repairing damage caused by an invasion is important, it is often not enough to promote the long-term health and welfare of a state. Both military and civilian planners should consider and decide, during pre-combat planning and preparation stages, the degree to which they need to improve and elevate the infrastructure of a state facing a military intervention beyond its pre-war, pre-intervention capabilities. Infrastructure is critical for the basic operation and functioning of all states, and most states that are target candidates for interventions lack adequate infrastructure systems to function. Only by improving these systems throughout a country can state-building efforts take root and promote a long-lasting, stable society capable of governing and defending itself without outside support. Before the shooting starts, military and civilian planners should systematically examine and draft a plan to improve the infrastructure capacity of the state to ensure lasting, successful post-conflict operations.

U.S. Marines from Marine Wing Security Battalion 372 engage in civil disturbance training on Al Asad Air Base, Iraq, 23 December 2007. During the training, the Marines learn how to neutralize aggressive rioters using nonlethal tactics in the event of a disturbance on base.
It should become part of standard military planning for phase IV operations that any and all infrastructure damaged or destroyed should be restored to pre-conflict conditions within 60 days of the conclusion of major combat operations.

Quarantining and minimizing external combatants in conflict zones. It is impossible to completely alleviate the prospect of foreign nationals being killed during a military intervention. However, proper military planning can ensure that this problem does not become worse as the conflict and post-reconstruction phase progress. A major objective in any future intervention effort should be to seal off all of the invaded state’s borders to reduce the influence of foreign combatants. Allowing the free-flow of terrorists and extremists into a country is a recipe for disaster. Many are well trained and experienced soldiers and combatants, bringing their dangerous expertise to bear against U.S. forces. By sealing off a country’s borders, we contain the threat of foreign fighters and do not permit it to worsen. While there may still be foreign fighters present in the battlespace, when the borders are sealed their number will not increase and exacerbate post-conflict reconstruction problems.

When it comes to private military firms, fewer solutions are available. Many PMFs would be deterred from supporting governments directly opposing the U.S. because nothing hurts their profit margin more than their utter military defeat. There are very few scenarios worse for these firms than to openly oppose and fight against the U.S. military. However, deterrence may not be enough. Gaining intelligence on firms and the roles they fulfill should be a fairly straightforward and public endeavor using open-source research because these firms operate in the corporate and legalistic domain. With this information, the U.S. should ensure that any and all PMFs have been notified that they are potentially in the line of fire from a military intervention, by making it a practice to send notices and warnings to both the corporate offices of PMFs and the countries where they have corporate headquarters. When it is clear the U.S. is planning to invade, most firms will make it a point to evacuate the target country of an intervention.

Conclusions
Overall, current U.S. military practices are second to none in successful warfighting. However, the problems that seem to have plagued post-conflict reconstruction efforts over the last six years somewhat overshadow this record of success. Working to modify warfighting techniques can alleviate some post-conflict reconstruction problems. The military will have to take the lead on attempting to reduce and minimize human casualties, the destruction of state infrastructure systems, and the numbers and influence of foreign fighters within combat zones. If the United States can be successful in this effort, it will increase the long-term success of post-conflict reconstruction.

NOTES
3. The use of overwhelming military force is best captured in the Powell Doctrine.
8. Assaf Moghadam, "Palestinian Suicide Terrorism in the Second Intifada: Motiva-
A JULY 2008 REPORT laying out a “Framework for a 21st Century National Security Strategy,” composed by a group of highly regarded foreign policy mavens, lifts the dialogue about post-Bush foreign policy to a new level. Instead of focusing on what must next be done on one or another specific front such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran, or China, the report lays out a set of broad principles to guide U.S. military and diplomatic policy. Better yet, the report fully realizes that no state has unlimited resources and leverage, and accordingly, it sets clear priorities. Most significantly, the report recognizes that security can and must be promoted in failing states and in dealing with rogue states without first democratizing the regimes involved.

Some of the report’s authors (mainly Democrats) have served in key positions in previous administrations and some have been identified as advisers to the Obama campaign. I list them here in the same non-alphabetical order as the document: Anne-Marie Slaughter, Bruce W. Jentleson, Ivo H. Daalder, Antony J. Blinken (Majority Staff Director of the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations), Lael Brainard, Kurt M. Campbell, Michael A. McFaul, James C. O’Brien, Gayle E. Smith, and James B. Steinberg. The report also includes a brief foreword by Susan Rice, senior foreign policy advisor to the Obama campaign.

I cannot stress enough, that although a good part of what follows spells out different ways we may march forward, there is no doubt in my mind that the report points us very much in the right direction.

The Ending of U.S. Supremacy

An important underlying theme of the report is that the days of the United States as the leading global power are numbered. While the United States held a virtual monopoly on power at the end of World War II and then in a bi-polar world, in recent years it has faced a world marked by what the report refers to as a “diffusion of power,” and what others have referred to as a “multi-polar” or even a “non–polar” world. The United States, the report argues, must now function in a world also marked by high and increasing levels of “interconnectedness,” where no one is entitled to leadership; it must be earned.

To put it differently, because power is sectoral, the decline of American supremacy is uneven but fairly comprehensive. In some areas, and in nuclear capabilities in particular, U.S. capabilities remain unmatched. Yet for most exercises of power, nuclear weapons are not useful. Similarly, U.S. conventional forces remain the best and strongest in the world, but their relative
strength is not as obvious as it was at the end of World War II, especially in dealing with so-called non-state actors. U.S. economic and ideological power is much diminished. Moreover, there is no reason to expect these trends to reverse. On the contrary, as China’s and, arguably, the EU’s economic power increases, as still other nations accrue more economic and military power, and as non-state actors continue to threaten and wage asymmetrical warfare, the diffusion of power in several sectors is likely to further unfold.

We can draw two different conclusions from this observation: one, the U.S. will have to work more closely with existing and new potential allies and let others take the lead on some fronts. The other: it will have to rely more on international laws and international institutions such as the UN and even the International Criminal Court (ICC). (As has long been noted, playing by the rules is of greater interest to weak or weakening parties.) While urging that both approaches be followed, the report wisely leans towards pursuing a division of labor among allies (say, let the allies deal with the next Kosovo) and multilateralism than towards internationalism.

Recent developments with North Korea, if they continue on course, support favoring this multi-national approach, although it has not worked so far in dealing with Iran. It is hence important to note that the report, though written by people considered progressive, explicitly recognizes that there are circumstances in which the U.S. will have to act unilaterally.

In reaction to the global criticism the United States has faced in recent years, amounting to what the report describes as “an historic nadir” of “America’s international standing,” much attention has been paid to the importance of regaining legitimacy. Some starry-eyed liberals believe that nations could gain security by being on the side of what people across the world consider just; by abiding by what international law, especially the Geneva Conventions, dictates; and by adhering to what the Security Council rules—a particularly odd notion given the very unrepresentative nature of the UN. (India and Lichtenstein, Germany and Grenada each have one vote in the General Assembly; Cuba, Saudi Arabia, and China are among those in charge of human rights; the composition of the Security Council is antiquated at best, and so on.) Most advocates of soft power—including the authors of this report—realize that it must be combined with hard power; a combination often referred to by the infelicitous, yet fashionable term, “smart power.” While the report favors paying much more mind to legitimacy than the current administration has, the authors are clear that the U.S. will have to rely on its economic power, and, when push comes to shove, on military force. Soft power is good, but not good enough.

The report centers on the promotion of security, liberty, and prosperity. One might breeze past such a statement as merely rhetoric, echoing the Declaration of Independence. But, neither the founding fathers nor the authors of this report assembled these key goals in random order. Security is listed first—before liberty. This reflects a direct reversal of the key neocon precept that only democracies (best if prosperous, based on free markets) make reliable partners in peace. This precept provided the justification for forced regime change as an essential step toward security. Indeed, when it comes to the five top priorities set by this report, democracy building is not among them.

I may as well disclose my “bias.” I tried to show elsewhere in some detail (Security First, Yale, 2007) that (a) the right to live is more basic than all others, as all others are contingent on security; in plain English, dead people have few rights; and (b) when people lack basic security, whether in Baghdad...
(2004–7), in Moscow (early 1990s), or in the U.S. (when violent crime was high, and in the months following 9/11), most people are all too willing to trade liberty for security. Only once security is reasonably secured do people become keen to have their legal and political rights respected. (Note that in the most often cited cases of successful democracy building, Germany and Japan after World War II, democracy building took place after hostilities ceased).

The report does not deal with the question of how the primacy of security over political and economic development should influence the approach to the Muslim world by the United States and its allies. As long as the West makes the litmus test for who is a “good” Muslim based on whether he or she favors a secular, liberal democracy and the full plethora of human rights, the West will continue to define most Muslims as part of the opposition with which we must vie. If instead the West uses as its first litmus test the rejection of terrorism and a willingness to forego WMD, it will find that most Muslims—including those in the biggest nations such as Indonesia and Bangladesh—are on its side. They can be partners in peace, working with us against the small violent minorities among their ranks.

Libya is a small but telling case in point. One of the greatest successes of the Bush Administration has been to lead Libya to give up its support for terrorism and cough up its program of WMD (not merely open its facilities to inspection). In response, the administration wisely allowed Libya to emerge from isolation and sanctions, despite the fact that it has barely begun to reform its authoritarian regime. Such reforms can now be promoted as a second stage. In short, putting security first, no regime change required up front, can work well. This approach is now being tried in dealing with North Korea, and should be with Iran.

Setting Priorities

There is one other crucial conclusion that a diffuse world points to, one that held true even under earlier circumstances but holds true ever more strongly under current ones: setting priorities is essential. Anyone who has read about the U.S.’s confused dealings with North Korea in Meltdown by Mike Chinoy, or about the chaos in dealing with post-war Iraq in Bad Days in Basra by Hilary Synnott, or Imperial Life in the Emerald City by Rajiv Chandrasekaran will have a vivid sense of why setting such priorities is necessary. The setting of clear priorities, and the choices made in the process, is the major contribution of this report. One naturally has some questions about the way each of these is spelled out—as well as a considerable number of kudos. I will review them in the order they are laid out by the authors.

Prevent catastrophic terrorism. The report not only grants security its due (rather than considering it what social scientists call “a dependent variable”), but also sets clear and appropriate priorities among the various security measures that must be undertaken, as not all of them can be delivered in short order. It defines preventing catastrophic terrorism (namely, WMD terrorism) as the highest priority. (The report does not differentiate among WMD. Actually, nuclear weapons and some biological agents are much more threatening than chemical and radiological arms.) Several sound measures are listed to advance this goal, such as preventing terrorists from gaining access to nuclear bombs and the material from which they can be made, reaching terrorists before they reach us, disturbing their financing and training, and improving our collection and processing of intelligence.

Regrettably, the report repeats—in this context and elsewhere—the very widely held notion that socioeconomic development can help prevent terrorism, especially by curtailing the sea in which terrorists “swim,” the sympathizers. However, there is very scant data to show that socioeconomic development turns sympathizers against terrorists, especially when religious or nationalistic motives are involved. For instance, there are more sympathizers in Iran, Iraq, and Palestine than in poorer countries in sub-Saharan Africa.

Even if socioeconomic development were a viable security tool, the U.S. and its allies still could not do much to develop the many nations whose governments are deeply corrupted, wasteful, and...
poorly managed. The West has been unable to turn around even small countries like Haiti and East Timor. Larger ones pose far greater challenges, as is all too evident in Afghanistan. I am all in favor of helping others—those who go hungry, who are ill or abused—out of humanitarian, moral reasons. However, framing such efforts as security building, admittedly a common practice, may not seem credible to many Americans. Preventing terrorism, especially of a catastrophic nature, is mainly a job for security forces, backed up by diplomacy.

Curb nuclear proliferation. Listing non-proliferation as the second priority for a new national security strategy is of great merit. The more nations that acquire nuclear arms, the more likely nuclear war becomes. The fact that the U.S. and USSR came close to nuclear blows on several occasions suggests that one cannot rely (as some have suggested) on the “rationality” of the actors to restrain themselves and deter one another. Israel reportedly has come close to using its nuclear arms when its defense minister believed the country was overrun. One can hardly presume that the messianic religious leaders of Iran will not seek to wipe out Israel—or attack Saudi Arabia, and even the United States—if they acquired nukes and long range missiles.

Regrettably, the report embraces an idea that has been recently championed by four senior and influential statesmen (George Schultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn). These statesmen argue that the way to proceed is for the United States and Russia to significantly cut their nuclear stockpiles. Such cuts, they assume, will generate sufficient political capital to propel other nations to give up their arsenals or to prevent them from acquiring any. In the same vein, the report calls for the United States to “reaffirm the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons,” suggesting that the America “start by reducing nuclear force levels to 1,000 weapons, provided Russia does likewise.”

At best, it might take the next administration years to reach such an agreement with Russia, and even more years to implement the cut. Meanwhile, nuclear hot spots would be left simmering. The possibility of the Taliban acquiring a Pakistani nuclear weapon poses a serious danger that must be dealt with in the near future. The Cooperative Threat Reduction Initiative must be accelerated to reduce the danger of loose nukes and the material from which they can be made in Russia and the former Soviet states. Even the Global Threat Reduction Initiative, which deals with reactors and fissile materials in the third world, ought to be accorded a higher priority than dealing with the stockpiles of the superpowers.

Even if the U.S. and Russia cut their arsenals in the near future, other nations are unlikely to follow. Pakistan, for instance, which relies on nuclear arms to counterbalance the much larger Indian conventional force, might be persuaded to give them up if the Kashmir territorial dispute was somehow resolved, and if UN peacekeepers were in place to secure the new border (and of course if India did the same); but not because of what the United States and Russia do or don’t do with their nukes. The same holds for Israel and Iran.

The other measures the report lists in service of non-proliferation are highly commendable, albeit not necessarily attainable. These include: negotiating an end to the production of weapons grade nuclear materials; a five-year global moratorium on the construction of all fissile material production facilities; establishing an international fuel bank for fissile materials under multinational control; and securing universal

Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Navy Admiral Mike Mullen converse prior to testifying before the House Armed Services Committee regarding the security and stability of Afghanistan during a hearing in Washington, D.C., 11 December 2007.
ratification of the nuclear test ban treaty. So far, there are next to no indications that most nations that seek to enrich uranium are willing to rely on foreign suppliers or that the nations which have yet to sign the test ban treaty are inclined to do so now.

Importantly, the report goes way beyond the concept on which the non-proliferation treaty (NPT) rests without ever stating so. Rather than allowing countries to build dual-use nuclear facilities, and then relying on inspections to ensure that they are not used for military purposes (as the NPT permits), we need—at least the way I see it—to move to a world in which nations do not have such facilities. Much can be done on this front, correctly highlighted as very important by the report, but it needs to be done without awaiting a Russia-United States nuclear arms reduction deal.

Climate and oil? The weakest part of the report combines the very popular notion of climate improvement with the need for reducing U.S. dependency on imported oil. Despite some claims to the contrary, climate improvement, however desirable, is not a pressing national security issue for the United States. Moreover, progress on this front is particularly hard to come by. As the report duly notes, whatever the United States and its allies do in this realm is most likely to be more than offset by damage to the climate from China and India and other emerging economies. At best, climate improvement is a very slow and costly process.

In contrast, a serious disruption in the supply of oil from other nations would pose a very serious and immediate threat to the United States economically, and even militarily. (The German counteroffensive in World War II stopped dead in its tracks when the tanks ran out of fuel.) Even without such a supply disruption, American import of oil at current prices amounts to a major wealth transfer that enriches its adversaries and helps finance their misadventures. The weekly oil bill from Iran exceeds whatever annual damage sanctions cause to this rogue nation. Venezuela and Russia are also emboldened.

The report lists several very sound measures that can be undertaken to reduce U.S. dependency on oil, including encouraging innovation and competitive-
implies that, although a military option ought to be considered, it is a very poor choice. And the report calls for intensifying the efforts to solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. All represent worthy but elusive goals. There are no big novel ideas (what about the Mediterranean Union, promoted by Sarkozy?) and no biting of the bullet with regard to Iran.

The report avoids the mistaken notion that the road to peace in the Middle East leads through Jerusalem, that resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict would magically turn the “Arab street” in the U.S.’s favor. However, it seems not to realize that the road to losing the Middle East leads through Tehran, that if the U.S. lets Iran become a nuclear power, thus the Middle East superpower, all bets are off.

Thus, this priority is also well placed, although there is room to differ on the ways it is best advanced.

**East Asia: new tigers?** The report calls for integrating China and India into a “cooperative global liberal order” for them to remain vibrant and open economies and become members in good standing of regional and global institutions. At the same time, the United States ought to prepare for the possibility that internal developments in China, over which the U.S. has no control, will lead it to become more of an adversary, not just economically but also militarily.

I am unqualified to comment on East Asia, as I am unfamiliar with the region and with writings and reports on that part of the world. (In contrast, I lived for 21 years in the Middle East and spent two and half of those years fighting.) However, my sociological instincts warn me against linear projections. It is far from obvious to me that China will continue to grow at anything near its current rate or that it will be able to avoid the internal turmoil that results from economic and technological changes already in place. It might well be wise to follow the caution expressed in the report—to be safe rather than sorry, and to be prepared for the worst—but, as the report does recognize, it seems too early to sound the alarm regarding China.

**The Wrong Public Diplomacy**

Major segments of the paper are devoted to soaring rhetoric, which many believe such documents need in order to inspire the public. Thus, the report calls on the United States to “stand up to tyranny, inequality and injustice” and “help [other nations] regain their power and prosperity as members of a spreading zone of liberty and peace.” The United States must “work to widen the circle of winners at home and abroad.” The report stresses that “in the American tradition, security goes hand in hand with liberty—for Americans and for all peoples.”

What can one say?

Even when it was the only superpower, when its economy was in a much better shape than it currently is and its military was not overstretched, the U.S. was unable to deliver on any of these goals, let alone on such a demanding list. Inequality is growing in the United States, and it is far from clear which policies could curtail it and win the voters’ support. (For instance, raising taxes on the richest may be a good and fair idea, but the record shows it does not do much to decrease inequality because the super-rich find ways to circumvent such new taxes, and their income keeps rising.) Presumably, the West would have a hard time urging others, say Russia, to curb their rapidly rising inequality if the United States and its allies do not know how to do it themselves. Moreover, a case can be made that as long as all boats rise, and some will rise more than others will, this is a morally acceptable development.

Standing up to tyranny is surely a very worthy idea, but the United States has not found a way to curb the abusive regimes in places such as Burma and Zimbabwe, or even—what I consider a very basic, minimalist humanitarian goal—to stop the genocides in the Congo and Sudan. When the United States sought to promote democracy in Egypt and Saudi Arabia, it got cold feet after Hamas won the election in the West Bank and in Gaza.

If public diplomacy is going to pay homage to such lofty goals with little reality to back them up, a jaded public (quick to note when nations do not
deliver on what they promise) will dismiss it. If you favor democracy, people across the world will wonder about your support for Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Did the CIA not train the police in brutal interrogation methods all over Latin America? And so on. Soon the public becomes first disenchanted and then resentful.

One cannot but wonder whether the time has come for the United States and its allies to frame their public diplomacy in the same terms in which some hold we should address our own disadvantaged citizens: we shall give you a hand up, but you must do your share. If you do not curb corruption, cease to support predatory government, change behaviors that lead to the spread of HIV, allow girls to be educated and all children to learn to think critically—we cannot and will not do the job for you. We should warn all concerned that the road to democracy and prosperity is a long one, which we will walk with them one step at a time, but one must expect setbacks and circumstances under which we will be unable to proceed. Above all, we ought to put ourselves in a position where we shall deliver more than we promise, and exceed expectations rather than so often disappoint.

The report lifts the dialogue about which security policies the next administration should follow to a higher level, and above all, to the needed scope. It sets priorities that make sense, at least to this observer, and it leaves ample room to re-specify, sharpen, and modify the agenda to which these priorities point. *MR*
**FINDING THE FLOW**

Shadow Economies, Ethnic Networks, and Counterinsurgency

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Captain Robert M. Chamberlain, U.S. Army

OFTEN PORTRAYED as Iraq’s shining “City on the Hill,” Tal Afar is the place where coalition and Iraqi forces successfully implemented a “Clear, Hold, Build” strategy and got things moving in the right direction again. In some areas of Tal Afar, markets bustle, children play, and Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) mingle with the local population. Yet nearby are endless rows of empty stalls, abandoned houses, and the scars of war. The Sunni population is gone, but not forgotten. It launches mortars, rockets, and massive truck bombs against the Shi’a community. The Tal Afar mayor’s office has embarked on an ambitious project to entice Sunnis back to the city in the belief that if Tal Afar achieves the ethnic balance it had before the war, sectarian tensions will dissipate. But is this true? Does reuniting Iraq’s religious communities represent the best hope for the fledgling democracy, or is it a hopeless quest to turn back the clock?

**The Only Constant is Change**

Many refer to Iraq as a society that is “thousands of years old” and point to the millennia of human habitation in the Euphrates river valley to explain away contemporary politics. However, Iraq is not thousands of years old, and Iraqi society has changed considerably over the past century. In 1908, Baghdad had a population of approximately 150,000.¹ The population today is about 5.7 million.² That’s the equivalent of the population of Topeka, Kansas, growing to be the size of Miami/Dade County, Florida, in a century, with an independence movement, a couple of revolutions, three massive foreign wars, and a decade’s worth of economic sanctions thrown in for good measure. Moreover, according to scholar Yitzhak Nakash, “there is no evidence...
that would suggest that the Shi’a were ever close to being a majority of the population in Iraq before the 19th or even the 20th century.” Iraq’s architecture may look timeless, but in fact, many of the cities in Iraq are of relatively recent vintage. Nasariya, for instance, only grew into its current manifestation “in the latter part of the [20th] century.” Iraq is moving from a Sunni nomadic culture to a culture of educated Sunni elites ruling over rural Shi’ites, to a multi-ethnic modern urban democracy. Violent contests over tribal, religious, and ethnic identity have accompanied political changes. Current societal divisions cannot be attributed to mythical conflicts in eons past; they stem from relatively contemporary political and economic contests.

For us to understand the alienation of the Sunni Tal Afar community, we must remember the former privileges it enjoyed. Ahmed Hashim suggests that most insurgents are Sunnis who used to be among Iraq’s elite and found themselves jobless and humiliated after the U.S. invasion: “Many of [Tal Afar’s] able-bodied men from the Sunni and the Shi’a tribes, but especially the former, joined the armed forces, security and intelligence services, and the Ba’ath Party in significant numbers. A considerable number of Turkmen NCOs and senior officers returned to the city either as veterans or as purged personnel after having served in Iraq’s three ruinous wars.” They took part in a brutal Salafist occupation that the 3rd Armored Calvary Regiment (ACR) defeated decisively in a battle that fundamentally altered the city in 2005. Shi’as now dominate a community that was formerly 70 percent Sunni. Shi’as made up 98 percent of the applicant pool in a July 2007 recruiting drive for the local police. The Sunnis moved to nearby villages and sought shelter with families and tribes, but they still think of Tal Afar as “their” city.

Follow the Money

Social divisions drive the violence in Tal Afar. To understand this, look at Tal Afar’s markets and supply chains and how people live—specifically, how they feed, clothe, and house themselves. In the West, society operates on the assumption that “business is never personal.” Consumers try to find the cheapest and most convenient way to purchase the goods they want, and it doesn’t really matter who’s selling them or how they got there. By contrast, in Tal Afar, business is always personal. Business ties exist alongside and are a part of family connections, political affiliations, and ethnic kinships. Markets “belong” to a particular group, and the group’s capacity for violence underwrites the safety of its supply chain.

One of the easiest ways to gauge the health and relative power of a community is to explore and understand its markets. A drive around Tal Afar is revealing in that regard. The southern half of town is predominately Shi’a. Its markets are thriving. Shops radiate outward from the gas station, and sell a wide variety of consumer goods—not only staples like food, clothing, and construction materials but also jewelry, appliances, and car parts. The shops appear to be heavily trafficked, and pedestrians dart back and forth between the cars that line the sides of the road.

However, as you drive north you cross an invisible line, and suddenly all signs of human activity disappear. There could be no starker indication of the success of one community and the hardships of another. Dozens of shop fronts still line the streets, but instead of colorful displays and bustling shoppers, a line of closed blue garage doors runs for blocks, each door identical to the next one except for the battle damage that marks it. Shop signs hang pointlessly overhead as a reminder that this was once a place where people worked and thrived.

However, the relationship between sectarian conflict and economics goes deeper than the health of local markets. In the words of Carolyn Nordstrom, you have to look beyond “place” and look at “flows.” The local market is embedded in a web of loyalties and identities. If everyone in the local market imports goods from the same merchant, the merchant is likely a well-informed and influential member of the community and affiliated with a political party, tribe, or insurgent organization that offers protection as his goods move to the local markets and money moves back to him—or he might be a political, military, or insurgent leader with business interests on the side.

**Current societal divisions cannot be attributed to mythical conflicts in eons past; they stem from relatively contemporary political and economic contests.**
On the other hand, local shops may only buy goods from merchants within their tribal or political networks. If this is so, there is no pre-eminent merchant supplying the market, and everyone uses shared resources (like roads, cell phone towers, or an electric grid) to generate income. Or perhaps the Shi’a and Sunni communities are really so estranged that even though they exist side by side, invisible boundaries separate them.

In Tal Afar and the surrounding area, Shi’as and Sunnis use different supply chains. When the Sunnis fled, they resettled to the east, along tribal and kinship lines to villages on the highway between Tal Afar and Mosul, and to the west, along the highway to Syria. They built new shops and enhanced the business of old ones. Most goods Sunni retailers sell come from Mosul (or the smuggling networks that flow from the Syrian border). By contrast, Shi’a merchants do not shop in Mosul; they go to Dohuk or other Kurdish cities. Iraqi Turkmen Front, a Sunni political organization, has even placed a trade embargo on Tal Afar and set up its own checkpoints to prevent the free flow of goods into the city. The Sunni and Shi’a communities are separate, self-contained universes, where commerce enriches only one side or the other.

Separate but Equal?
The political leaders of Tal Afar understand the seriousness of the situation and are trying to entice Sunni families back to the city to reinvigorate their markets. The mayor and Iraqi brigade commander have broadcast an appeal to the Sunnis who left, and they meet regularly with Sunni sheiks, scrupulously enforce Sunni-Shi’a parity in micro-loan programs, and actively try to recruit local Sunnis into the Iraqi Police (albeit with limited success so far). The provincial government has released millions of dollars in funds for infrastructure repairs and improvements in roads, water, electricity, and other public services. All this is in accordance with U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine.

Even so, Tal Afar remains the target of massive truck-borne IED attacks on such facilities as power stations, gas stations, and Shi’a markets. Some believe the violence is the work of outsiders trying to undermine the Iraqi government and coalition forces.

The Sunnis believe that they have no stake in Tal Afar and regard city improvements as support for the Shi’as from their patrons in Baghdad. The Shi’as can use additional fuel or power capacity to expand their dominance. The concentration of funds for reconstruction and services to be used in Tal Afar to the exclusion of the Sunni communities along the highway reinforces this perception. The coalition says its goal is to get Sunnis to move back to Tal Afar, not to make them more comfortable in their “shantytowns”. However, this approach contributes to Sunni disaffection and support for attacks against the Shi’as. Every project enriches the Shi’a in Tal Afar and the Shi’a do not share their wealth.

Should we focus on reintegrating communities or on facilitating peaceful coexistence? The International Organization for Migration reports that the Iraqis’ move “from religiously and ethnically mixed communities to homogenous communities” will have “long-lasting political, social, and economic impacts.” Post-invasion, post-Samarra Iraq is undergoing social reorganization as it searches for a post-Saddam identity. Ideally, that identity would embrace political pluralism, religious tolerance, a commitment to the rule of law, and
democratic governance. But, in reality, none of this might happen.

Secular, educated, and affluent Iraqis have fled the country in droves, leaving behind a population ripe for sectarian mobilization. This situation presents a serious challenge to coalition forces. If the coalition focuses on reintegration despite popular sentiment against it, either the Sunnis or Shi’as will misread the effort and add fuel to the cycle of violence. On the other hand, distributing resources along tribal and religious lines only reinforces the primacy of these irrational affiliations.

If your sheik or imam is your representative to the government and the coalition, then obedience to his authority becomes pretty important and your elected representative is a fairly insignificant leader by comparison. Thus, the widely held belief that Iraq is nothing but a quasi-democratic tribal confederation that uses government officials to distribute patronage becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy.

**Principles and Insights**

A growing body of work suggests that civil conflicts end when economic elites believe they can make more money from peace than from war. For example, opposing forces in Africa work in close proximity in an uneasy truce, because skirmishing disrupts business and is not worth the limited gains it brings. Unfortunately, the presence of primary resources (like oil) to export, a large quantity of young men, and easy access to cheap, durable weapons make this unlikely. A totally peaceful Iraq may be a long, long way off.

Still, economic analysis offers insights to help resolve local conflicts:

**Principle 1: Business is always personal.** This means that not only do you have to go to the markets to assess the markets’ health, but also you have to figure out to whom the markets “belong.” If 80 percent of the markets in an area are thriving, but they are all Shi’a, then the Sunni minority is likely to keep conducting attacks in the area until its own business returns.

**Principle 2: Think “flow,” not “place.”** Mapping the supply chains that feed local markets is critical to understanding the power relationships in your area, developing your area of interest, and identifying key leaders. Don’t just count the goods in the market. Understand how the goods get to the market.

**A growing body of work suggests that civil conflicts end when economic elites believe they can make more money from peace than from war.**

**Principle 3: Everybody wins.** Spread civic improvements evenly. They lift the economic vitality of an area. Doling out projects that benefit communities separately encourages one community to attack the other one, lest it accrue too much power. Projects should extend into insurgent enclaves and benefit the whole area. This creates collective ownership of public resources—and undermines the insurgent narrative of alienation. If everybody is getting power from the new substation, everybody has an interest in protecting it.

**Principle 4: Make war bad for business.** If a market belongs to a tribal sheik and the tribe buys goods from its kin near the border, then anything that threatens the flow of goods from the border to the market takes money out of the sheik’s pocket. This includes coalition vehicle searches and interdiction of smugglers as well as enemy IED attacks. Require the sheik to personally vouch for cargo trucks delivering goods to market because he has a relationship with both wholesale and retail merchants. Align your interests with the local merchant’s and the local population’s interests.

The war in Iraq remains difficult, dangerous, and unpredictable, but adhering to the principles above can help commanders understand the communities surrounding them. A wise, market-conscious counterinsurgent can help build a local peace after years of war. **MR**

NOTES

4. Nakash. 35.

America’s experience in Iraq has inspired dozens of contemporary histories, many critical of the decisions made by American leaders in the days and weeks after Baghdad fell. With his autobiography, Wiser in Battle, retired Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez now adds his perspective to the collection.

Four years after he relinquished command of coalition forces in Iraq, Sanchez remains a controversial figure. A steady performer with considerable experience in joint staff assignments, Sanchez was commanding the 1st Armored Division in April 2003 when Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld hand-picked him to command V Corps in Iraq. Coalition forces had just occupied Baghdad, and the Pentagon was already planning the withdrawal of American ground forces.

Iraqi cities descended into lawlessness, the White House appointed career diplomat L. Paul Bremer III to establish the Coalition Provisional Authority to rebuild Iraq as a free-market democracy. After President George Bush announced the conclusion of all “major combat operations” on 1 May 2003, the U.S. military began redeploying from Iraq. Lieutenant General David McKiernan and the “dream team” of senior American officers who had run the war departed, leaving Sanchez, the Army’s youngest and newest three-star general, commanding not only his own corps but also all coalition ground forces in Iraq.

By most published accounts, including his own, Sanchez inherited a no-win situation. Senior policy makers in Washington showed little interest in Iraq’s social problems, instead focusing on mopping up Ba’athist dead-enders and finding Saddam’s weapons of mass destruction. To his credit, Sanchez spent the next 13 months fighting to establish security and rebuild Iraqi infrastructure while struggling with Bremer and senior Pentagon officials to obtain the manpower and money necessary to do so. During his tenure, however, coalition forces conducted an often heavy-handed occupation marked by major blunders at Abu Ghraib and Fallujah. By most measures, the coalition’s first year in Iraq was a failure.

Spoiler alert: don’t blame Sanchez. While he concedes some mistakes, Sanchez argues convincingly that his best efforts were stymied by a well intentioned but misguided Coalition Provisional Authority, by a lack of support from Army and Pentagon headquarters, and by conflicting political priorities at the White House. These obstacles have been widely reported in other publications, and Sanchez does not dwell on them.

Instead, he focuses on his own thoughts and actions as he navigates from crisis to crisis, and the book’s primary value derives from this account. As commander of coalition forces, Sanchez interacted on a daily basis with senior officials in Washington and junior leaders in Iraq. That unique, albeit tenuous, position allows Sanchez to convincingly describe sniper fire in Najaf on one page and cheap shots in Congress on the next. The book also provides Sanchez’s own version of the controversial events surrounding the prisoner abuse scandal at Abu Ghraib, along with his response to three official investigations of the incident. Sanchez’s most intriguing contribution, however, may be his description of conversations with nearly every senior American official involved with Iraq, including the president, Rumsfeld, Bremer, General Tommy Franks, and General John Abizaid.

The book is not, however, without significant flaws. The first of these is the decision to devote half of the book recounting Sanchez’s life story, starting with his impoverished childhood along the Rio Grande River and progressing through his education and military career. This lengthy and often tedious account portrays Sanchez as a competent officer whose career owed at least some debt to the mentorship of several influential senior leaders.

Additionally, the author insists on drawing important lessons from every anecdote. Recounting his first tour of duty as an Army officer, for example, Sanchez presents a laundry list of valuable observations that presumably shaped his future decisions. Later, during the first Gulf War, Sanchez speaks with a group of Iraqi soldiers captured by his unit: “That conversation proved to me the need to be ruthless in battle, but benevolent in victory . . . once victory is achieved, we must take care of our prisoners and treat them with dignity and respect.” These reflections suggest a gratuitous "a priori" defense of the conditions leading to the Abu Ghraib scandal, implying that because he knew better, Sanchez could never have sanctioned such misconduct.

Finally, Sanchez’s account of his nomination for a fourth star does more harm than good to his reputation. Regardless of whether Sanchez deserved the promotion senior officials promised him, the Administration’s decision to withhold that nomination now appears to have been a calculated political move heavily influenced by the impending 2004 election. Some readers may find, however, that the tone of this account implies a disturbing sense of entitlement.

Despite these drawbacks, Sanchez’s memoir constitutes a credible
and important contribution to the history of the war in Iraq. He presents a convincing argument that he accomplished as much as could be expected given the many challenges he inherited. One finishes this account wondering whether a Pershing, Eisenhower, or Marshall would have fared any better given the same conditions. This autobiography will hardly be the last word on the subject.

LTC Bill Latham, USA, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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Memoirs written by Soldiers are usually either self-serving and badly written or merely self-serving. Occasionally, some efforts transcend these two broad categories. Ulysses S. Grant and Porter Alexander are two whose civil war memoirs are readable and consequently still read. Winston Churchill’s recollections are well told stories. Dwight Eisenhower’s *Crusade in Europe* is good and *At Ease* is very good.

Today, another Soldier-author is on the scene. Arriving in May 2003, while “victory” lingered in the air, Colonel Peter Mansoor assumed command of the Ready First Combat Team (1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division) in Iraq. *Baghdad at Sunrise* chronicles his time in command of the Ready First Combat Team in Iraq. *Baghdad at Sunrise* is both good literature and good history, and thus Mansoor’s memoir merits mention in the same paragraph as those of Grant, Alexander, Churchill, and Eisenhower.

Mansoor, already the winner of a Society of Military History award for *GI Offensive: The Triumph of American Infantry Divisions, 1941-1945*, should be in the hunt for an award for *Baghdad at Sunrise* as well. His style is crisp, clear, and understated. Mansoor’s matter-of-fact account does not resort to complaints about his leaders or his subordinates, a circumstance that may initially spur suspicion, since no one seems to write anything other than “kiss and tell” narratives these days. Surprisingly, Mansoor carries this off well by telling what he knew and not what he believed then or now. His training as a historian and his inherent circumspection are evident. He tells his story from his viewpoint without judging others in the absence of unimpeachable evidence, and even then, lets the reader draw his own conclusions.

*Baghdad at Sunrise* presents a panoramic view of one brigade’s fight as seen from the top. The isolation of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and to some extent the next higher headquarters’ staff influenced how the CPA and the coalition military chain of command interpreted the fight. He clearly but dispassionately illuminates the complexity of problems ranging from sorting out local power networks to obtaining money for mission-critical infrastructure investment while fighting the enemy.

Mansoor admits he made mistakes in misinterpreting events or allowing himself to be misled by Iraqis using him and his troops against their rivals. He makes no claim of prescience in seeing that the transition would fail, but does seem to subscribe to the “end of history” view regarding the nature of warfare. He describes big battles in which his tanks played decisive roles, while musing on the irony that his first big operation as tank brigade commander involved no tanks. (This may be because the current taxonomy of warfare parses combat operations with unhelpful terms that suggest big fights will not occur in the future.)

Mansoor suggests that no one will fight the United States conventionally and most operations will be counterinsurgency operations, but he should also acknowledge that we cannot win a counterinsurgency by “unconventional” means alone. He may be right about the future of warfare, but why would the U.S. concede any advantage in the conventional realm when doing so invites challenges? He claims the U.S. will have to wage more fights like those in Afghanistan and Iraq, but his implication that the U.S. should optimize for counterinsurgency is not convincing. The tanks Mansoor used with great effect in 2003-2004 were old even then, and we are likely to need them well into the future. Why not build and train “general purpose” forces to fight major combat operations and conduct stability operations? The two types of conflict have common attributes. General-purpose forces, by definition, are able to fight along the spectrum from major combat operations to stability operations. Moreover organizing the army around brigade combat teams facilitates building general purpose forces that with some task organization can operate anywhere on the continuum of military operations. Perhaps, our decades-long focus on the Soviet Union has diminished our capacity to understand the operational environment in useful theoretical terms.

These small criticisms aside, *Baghdad at Sunrise* suggests that Peter Mansoor is a proven historian and a proven Soldier who will further develop the ideas he has so thoughtfully introduced here. As the General Raymond Mason Chair of Military History at Ohio State University, he has the bully pulpit and the opportunity to do so. We have not heard the last from Peter Mansoor; hopefully, there will be much more of his work to consider.

COL Gregory Fontenot, USA, Retired, Lansing, Kansas

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The publication of Bing West’s historical and political treatise, *The Strongest Tribe: War, Politics, and the Endgame in Iraq*, comes at an opportune time, as the presidential election draws near. A
well-respected author, journalist, and former assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs during the Reagan administration, West effectively argues that the United States is prevailing on the battlefield. He posits that this fact sets conditions for our next president’s political choice of staying the course in Iraq or pulling out.

West provides the reader with an understanding of the early inertia in Iraq after the invasion, the broad changes occurring since 2006, and the impetus behind those events. He combines eye-witness accounts at the tactical level with access to officials at the highest levels and expansive research to provide substantial foundation for his arguments. West’s extensive travels throughout Iraq between 2004 and 2008 enable him to effectively compare progress in a particular area over time and grasp the causes and effects.

West emphasizes how ineffectual strategic decision-making hampered our military efforts, highlights coalition force frustrations with the sectarian-minded Iraqi government and security forces, and lauds the incredible spirit, professionalism, and determination of the American military. He discusses strategic and operational context and their efforts and obstacles at the tactical level. He examines how political and strategic decisions by our senior government and military leaders led to mistakes and lost opportunities to prevent or mitigate the rise of the insurgency. West describes how our Soldiers and Marines are successfully applying counterinsurgency principles to regain the support of Iraqis and sustain military momentum. He also illustrates how, with a fresh strategy and energized leaders, the military surge leveraged the Anbar Awakening to turn the tide of conflict and set conditions for a political decision in Iraq. He underscores how these U.S. military efforts are succeeding even though a sectarian-based Iraqi government and police force are inhibiting efforts towards stability and national reconciliation.

However, despite well-researched material and relevant content, the author’s style of writing detracts from his argument and leaves the reader confused at times. While the book follows a rough chronological sequence, the author indiscriminately jumps back and forth in time and between topics, resulting in disjointed discussions. Pointed comments and assertions clearly demonstrate a bias against early U.S. leaders such as Ambassador Paul Bremer, General John Abizaid, and retired Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, among others. Conversely, he generously praises Stephen Hadley, Ambassador Ryan Crocker, General David Petraeus, Lieutenant General Raymond Odierno, and the “American ground warriors,” in devising and executing the surge strategy.

Nonetheless, I recommend this book to the defense community. The author provides the reader with a compelling view of military success in Iraq and a framework for deciding whether we should stay the course in Iraq or not. The Strongest Tribe: War, Politics, and the Endgame in Iraq is well worth adding to a professional’s library.

MAJ(P) Greg Penfield, USA, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


Those familiar with Ralph Peters’ work would not expect his new book Looking for Trouble to fall into the travel/current affairs category, but that is where his publisher places it. A more precise definition would be memoir. This collection of Peters’ travels from the early to mid-90s chronicles a few of his many travel adventures and shares some of his “you-won’t-believe-this” stories of the road. The book covers adventures across the globe: trips to several South American countries where Peters researched and analyzed counterdrug opera-

tions at General Barry McCaffrey’s request; his visit to the Kremlin as part of task force investigating the claim that American Soldiers from as many as four wars were imprisoned in the USSR; and a personally funded reconnaissance to Armenia to witness the 1993 war between Armenians and Azerbaijanis over the Nagorno-Karabagh region. This book is well worth reading for the author’s in-depth appreciation of history and understanding of human nature.

Peters is without doubt a skilled writer. Although the book has neither maps nor pictures (save for two on the cover), Peters’ descriptions throughout the book are quite vivid. The author knows how to tell a story, and he is quite adept in the art of transition. Who would not want to continue reading when a section ends with “that drinking bout came just before we flew down to check on the Mennonites growing dope.”

The book’s best sections include Peters’ assessment of the likelihood that American POWs from World War II, Korea, or Vietnam may have been taken to the Soviet Union. His assessments in this chapter alone make the book worth the cost. He describes how Saudi Arabia leverages its international charity work to convert those in misery to extremist Islam (Wahhabi Puritanism, he calls it). His observations are both disturbing and fascinating. According to Peters, the Saudis abandon those in need when the sought-after conversion is not forthcoming. As to the treatment of women in Pakistan, he observes that a society devoted to misogyny loses half its potential productivity.

For all its strengths, Looking for Trouble has its weaknesses. Peters makes a bizarre claim that General McCAffrey, whom he describes as a friend, was “the only division commander with true fighting spirit” in Desert Storm. One cannot help but wonder if this isn’t a superficial analysis affected by personal bias, in this case friendship. At times, Peters’ tone is problematic, particularly in his caustic treatment of fellow officers. He describes colleagues
at the Pentagon as “self-serving, their analysis superficial, the results negligible.” On the other hand, his exuberant praise for close friends from his unit who travelled with him is almost comical. There are two kinds of people in this book—the author’s friends, who are capable and gifted, and the rest of the officer corps, who are content as long as they can cycle oxygen.

Peters ends his memoir by explaining the reasons for his unexpected retirement: he was tired of “serving at the mercy of fools” and having his on-the-ground intelligence assessments ignored by those far away from the action (only to be proved correct later). In Greek mythology, the gods blessed Cassandra with the gift of prophecy but cursed her so that no one would ever believe her predictions. Ralph Peters seems to think he has suffered a similar fate. He believes he is blessed with brilliance but cursed because only a few people listen to him.

LTC James E. Varner, USA, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


Rumsfeld’s Wars: The Arrogance of Power, by Dale Herspring, is provocative to the point of being incendiary, but I don’t think I would recommend it to the readers of Military Review. The author has drawn heavily on widely publicized secondary sources (mostly selective newspaper reports and other anti-Rumsfeld books) and stitched those accounts together with a disturbing number of undocumented suppositions, insinuations, and inferences that make the piece read more like a prosecutor’s brief than a scholarly exposition.

In his own preface, the author reports his disturbing conclusion that Iraq’s possession of Weapons of Mass Destruction “was an idea manufactured by the civilian leadership in the Pentagon to justify the war” and that Donald Rumsfeld and subordinates “manipulated data and convinced the President of the United States of the necessity of invading Iraq.” In the opening section of chapter 4, which specifically pursues these accusations, he asserts that Rumsfeld’s civilian assistants “vowed to remove Saddam Hussein from power and set the Iraqi populace free,” “believed that democracy was the preferred form of government throughout the world,” and, as members of the “Iraq Hawks,” were responsible for pressuring the Congress into passing the 1998 Iraq Liberation Act—all without benefit of footnotes or other documentation. This rhetorical style persists throughout other chapters, which address DOD’s perceived blunders during the Afghanistan and Iraq Wars as well as its general ineptitude in pursuing modernization through military transformation.

The possibility that DOD leadership might have been responsible for any positive accomplishments is acknowledged only begrudgingly in rare terse paragraphs that are scarce indeed. In short, it is a hatchet job. There are many Rumsfeld haters who have already cheered the book, and they will probably be joined by many like-minded future readers. In truth, the former secretary of defense was highly unpopular and probably deserves much of the scorn heaped upon him. I am certainly not a fan of his. However, I do think his legacy deserves a fairer assessment than Herspring offers; the professional officials who read Military Review deserve a more balanced and objective analysis of his tenure. Making Rumsfeld and his minions the scapegoats for everything that went wrong in the Defense Department from 2001 to 2006 is just far too easy a way out.

The problems and challenges that Secretary Rumsfeld and the DOD staff faced during that period were unprecedented and extraordinarily complex. Their efforts need to be evaluated with more objectivity and insight than this book provides. To ensure that history does not repeat itself, senior military leaders also need to step up to the plate and take responsibility for letting some of DOD’s missteps happen. But that is not a message that is going to be well-received, and I definitely don’t think that anyone other than the generals themselves are qualified or possess the requisite credentials to deliver that message.

Someone like General (Retired) Ric Shinseki (to whom the author coincidentally dedicated this book) might better provide a more balanced picture of Rumsfeld’s tenure and legacy. Despite his shameful treatment at the hands of Mr. Rumsfeld and his assistants while serving as the Army Chief of Staff, I am quite confident that General Shinseki would render a more balanced and thoughtful assessment than Dale Herspring has provided.

LTC Michael P. Shaver, USA, Retired, La Crosse, Wisconsin


A basic tenet of American government holds that the armed forces subordinate themselves to the president, the Constitution, and the will of the people. In Securing the State, Colonel Chris Gibson asserts that this broadly understood concept does not specify the relationship of elected leaders, appointed officials, and senior military officers in enough detail, especially in a time of crisis. As war with Iraq loomed, for example, Gibson claims that the Joint Chiefs of Staff found themselves in such a subordinate and deferential position vis-à-vis Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld that they were unable to communicate wise military advice, unfiltered by the Secretary’s political and personal biases, to the president and the Congress, the nation’s elected leaders. Nor were military leaders allowed to develop plans as prudent, detailed, or as fully resourced as required for success in Iraq.
Many place the blame for this at the door of an impulsive, arrogant secretary, or a reckless, mysteriously motivated president. Gibson, to his credit, moves beyond easy personal judgments to trace the historical evolution and theoretical basis of a national military command dynamic that failed to generate courses of action likely to produce victory.

Colonel Gibson argues that the U.S. government lacks sufficient institutional structures and protocols to ensure that its “civil-military nexus” functions efficiently and effectively. He identifies a pendulum-like oscillation between opposing concepts and practices during the post-World War II era. At times appointed civilian leaders, especially aggressive secretaries of defense such as Robert McNamara and Donald Rumsfeld dominated the civil-military nexus. In other periods, the military has so strongly asserted its prerogatives that its perceived usefulness to elected leaders has been negligible. Colonel Gibson cites the mid-1990s, during the ascendancy of the powerful and charismatic General Colin Powell, as a period in which the military possessed an overdeveloped sense of its own importance and independence. The result, intentional or not, was that President Bill Clinton could not count on the military’s support, and consequently stopped asking military leaders to do things they didn’t already want to do anyway.

To counter these dysfunctional extremes, Gibson proposes a “Madisonian approach,” named in honor of founding father and fourth president James Madison. The Madisonian approach seeks to guarantee that both his senior military officer and his senior appointed official can present the president with courses of action, with both leaders accorded an equal stature within the administration. In Gibson’s eyes, the current practice, that the senior officer and senior appointed official adopt a unified position when advising the president, is a recipe for stifling good ideas and ensuring that an unseemly jockeying for dominance takes place.

Other ideological assumptions of a Madisonian approach include the notions that—
- The military owes its allegiance to elected, not appointed, leaders. Specifically this means the president, as opposed to the secretary of defense.
- The military is obligated to work closely with Congress, especially concerning force structure, budget, and other resource issues.
- The opinions and options offered by military leaders, minimally tainted by political considerations, are central to the decision-making process.

In practice, Gibson offers specific rearrangements of the national command structure:
- A readjustment of the Goldwater-Nichols Act to limit the power of the secretary of defense and enhance the importance of the nation’s senior military officer. Gibson would not have combatant commanders report to or through the secretary. Instead, they would work directly for the nation’s senior military officer. The holder of this position would neither defer to nor work for the secretary of defense. Instead, he would speak directly and in his own voice to the commander in chief, and the president would have the benefit of the most prudent military analysis and recommendations for action.
- The creation of a commanding general position to replace the current chairman, joint chiefs of staff billet. The commanding general of the military would exercise the powers outlined above, not as a senior staff officer and advisor, but as a leader in the chain-of-command.
- A wholesale revision of the joint strategic planning system into a more streamlined, productive process.
- Much more professional preparation of military and civilian leaders to function capably at the highest levels. For military personnel, this goal entails more advanced academic training and experience in Pentagon and joint positions. For civilians, Gibson recommends more education in military capabilities and decision-making processes.

Gibson’s recommendations would greatly increase the stature of the Pentagon’s ranking military officer. Adopting them would begin with a wholesale review of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. By and large, critics of the current administration’s prosecution of the Global War on Terrorism have not identified Goldwater-Nichols as a culprit for the rocky course of events in Iraq and Afghanistan, so Securing the State, unwittingly or not, opens up another avenue of attack for administration opponents. However, Goldwater-Nichols will eventually merit close scrutiny for its efficacy in helping the nation win the War on Terrorism; Gibson helps define the terms the debate will take.

Written while Gibson served a fellowship at the Hoover Institution of Stanford University, and for scholars and policy wonks as well as serving military officers, Securing the State has a blizzard of footnotes that might bore military professionals and sometimes turgid recaps of historical precedents and theoretical positions. However, those who persevere to the end will have much to contemplate, for Gibson has constructed a complex argument leading to a bold position. Although the book ultimately seeks to enhance the influence of the military, Gibson is not afraid to criticize many of its most visible leaders of the past two decades. He maintains a respectful, objective tone, but his disappointment with both specific individuals and military officer culture in general is palpable.

In its fullest dimension, then, Securing the State tests the limits to which serving officers can go in criticizing national and military affairs for the sake of professional and academic debate. Currently the commander of 2d Brigade Combat Team in the 82d Airborne Division, Colonel Gibson’s warfighting prowess should help him steer through whatever flak he generates. He may well get a chance to implement reforms as he rises through the ranks or becomes part of the civil-military nexus he has so closely studied. For most officers, who will never be players at the strategic
level, Securing the State’s primary lesson lies in the model of military professionalism that Gibson values and embodies. Key components of this model include intellectual vigor and courage, combined with a commitment to critique and debate, focused to best serve the Nation’s elected leaders and the American people. Anything less, in Gibson’s eyes, cheapens the notion of military integrity and substitutes a weak sense of loyalty for a stronger one.

LTC Peter Molin, USA, West Point, New York


Dr. William R. Polk is an accomplished academic who has taught at Harvard University and the University of Chicago and served on the State Department’s Policy Planning Council, which was responsible for the Middle East and North Africa during President John F. Kennedy’s administration. His book, Violent Politics, is a historical meta-narrative of 11 insurgencies beginning with the American Revolution and ending with the current war in Iraq. The book’s central thesis is that the nature of an insurgency is xenophobic; that is, the “heart of insurgency is essentially anti-foreign.” To prove this, Polk uses the concept of a “climate of insurgency” to describe how collaborationist government forces lose legitimacy to smaller, less-organized native associations. The author uses a four-phase model of insurgency to describe how local fighter-politicians battled American, French, British, and German invading or occupation forces armies. Polk suggests cultural differences between a foreign army and the native population doomed any locally contested occupation.

I recommend the book for those who want a quick primer on the history of insurgency and guerrilla warfare. Polk’s large-scale analysis of insurgency is well written and researched. Officers who read Violent Politics will benefit from its scant coverage of tactics and more trenchant descriptions of the social, cultural, and economic contests that accompany an insurgent’s use of guerrilla and terrorist tactics. A far more authoritative book on the subject of insurgencies is Robert B. Asprey’s War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History (Doubleday, New York, 1975). However, if you do not have the time or will to read that work, which is over 1,600 pages long, Polk’s book is a welcome addition to a growing body of academic work.

MAJ James F. Chastain, USA, West Point, New York


With The Son Tay Raid, John Gargus has produced one of the finest military history works of 2007 on the Vietnam War, a splendid and thorough account of the 20 November 1970 Son Tay raid that goes well beyond previous works such as Benjamin Schemmer’s The Raid: The Son Tay Prison Rescue Mission (Ballantine Books, New York, 2002). Through meticulous research of newly declassified documents, unpublished sources, and his own comprehensive interviewing of the participants, Gargus captures the spirit of this unique mission in special operations history, including the emotional denouement when no U.S. prisoners were found.

Gargus, an Air Force planner and lead navigator for the strike force, provides personal insight into the mission, avoids over-emphasizing his own participation by maintaining a historian’s objectivity and detachment, highlights the roles of each service in the planning and execution of the raid, and illustrates the challenge of disseminating intelligence, all the while maintaining strict operational security. The book is less about foreign policy and strategic considerations for the foray, than its operational and tactical aspects, which even include the North Vietnamese perspective on the raid. His research is impeccable, and the book is essentially flawless.

Particularly interesting are the accounts of the little-known naval component of the raid and the Air Forces’ challenges in flight-route selection and planning. Here the author renders the sections understandable for the non-aviation reader. The book has extensive notes, clear charts, interesting pictures, a glossary, informative appendices, and is a pleasure to read. I recommended it for all special operators, joint planners, historians, and aficionados of the Vietnam War. The book should be a mandatory part of the Command and General Staff College course curriculum for special operations planning and execution.

Kevin D. Stringer, Ph.D., Zurich, Switzerland

NOTHING LESS THAN FULL VICTORY: Americans at War in Europe 1944-1945, Edward Miller, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 2007, 346 pages, $32.95.

Edward Miller’s latest work, Nothing Less than Full Victory, produces a unique and fresh look at the U.S. Army’s campaign in Europe by focusing on logistics, organization, training, and deployment, areas of the war historians have for the most part neglected. Nothing Less Than Full Victory shows how in 1939 America’s Army had obsolete weapons and antiquated beliefs about warfare, even though scholars and the general public assumed that success in Europe was preordained. Miller argues that the Army received little credit for a tremendous and successful undertaking, its remarkable self-transformation during global conflict. Miller challenges the conclusions of many historians, journalists, and other authorities concerning the Army’s performance, saying that many works have ignored or underestimated the impact mobilization, organization, training, and logistics
had on operations. Examples from various operations illustrate how American Soldiers were matched far more evenly with the Germans than some histories would lead people to believe. Victory, in fact, was not secured through material superiority but through the will and courage of the Soldiers who succeeded despite the odds against them. Their ability to adapt and overcome brought victory.

Problems on the home front affected the fighting forces in Europe. American industry was beset with labor, contracting, production, and even racial problems—a far cry from the united effort portrayed in many histories. American industry never let the war interfere with its self-interest—a problem the Army was forced to contend with.

The author sets the record straight regarding the American Soldier’s performance in World War II and sheds light on the impact mobilization, organization, training, and logistics had on operations. The Army successfully recruited, organized, trained, employed, and sustained its forces while it simultaneously developed new processes and procedures, paralleling what the modern Army is trying to achieve today. This well-researched, easy-to-read book provides readers much to consider about World War II. I recommend it to all readers.

LTC Robert Rielly, USA, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


Sixteen-year-old John Slaughter joined the 116th Infantry Regiment to escape the Great Depression. A few months later, he was engaged in the serious business of preparing for a conventional, high-intensity world war. Omaha Beach and Beyond is a record of his experiences.

Slaughter advanced from private to staff sergeant squad leader; his Army service ended when he was only 20 years old but by then, he had done it all. He was also one of the first Army Rangers in World War II, experienced the war “up front,” lived in the dirt, squalor, weather, and spent days on the line, in a time when there was no forward support base for him to return to. The stress was phenomenal and some of his friends succumbed to what we now call post traumatic stress syndrome.

Slaughter became involved in veterans affairs after the war and was the driving force behind locating and building the World War II D-Day monument in Bedford, Virginia. The location was not arbitrary—the 116th Infantry Regiment suffered horrendous losses on D-Day, landing in one of the most heavily defended sections of Normandy. Soldiers were recruited to National Guard units from locales around their armories. The unfortunate by-product of this system was a very high number of casualties in the towns from which the units were drawn. Bedford, Virginia, had the highest per capita loss of any town in the United States for D-Day. Nineteen sons of this town died on the French shores.

Slaughter was one of three D-Day veterans to escort the president and other officials during the 1994 50th anniversary commemoration along Omaha Beach, where his regiment suffered and distinguished itself. It was fitting that Slaughter was selected to lead the 2004 60th Anniversary march of the 29th “Blue and Gray” Infantry Division in France.

Many of the 2,000 casualties suffered by the 29th and 1st Infantry Divisions on Omaha Beach never came home and now lie in the beautiful cemeteries in France. John Slaughter’s book reminds us of the sacrifice his friends and comrades made.

LTC Edwin L. Kennedy Jr., USA, Retired, Leavenworth, Kansas


Veteran newsman and military historian Max Hastings has written another gripping book, Retribution. One of Hastings’s previous books, Armageddon: The Battle for Germany, 1944-1945 (Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 2004), told the story of the last years of World War II in the European Theater. Retribution covers the same time, the bloodiest year of the war in the Pacific/Asia Theater. It included the British battles in Burma, the invasions of the Philippines, Okinawa, Iwo Jima, the strategic bombing of Japan, and the last military operation, the Soviet invasion of Manchuria and Korea.

Hastings, a former editor of Britain’s Evening Standard and The Daily Telegraph, tells his story from the theater war point of view as well as from personal experience. He described the war from the point of view of the high command, enlisted personnel, and civilians caught up in the war. Former news people have a particular gift for this, as Rick Atkinson did for World War II in Europe (The Day of Battle) and David Halberstam for the Korean War (The Coldest Winter).

Hastings does not hesitate to lace his writing with editorial opinions. For example, in his discussion of the U.S. decision to drop the atomic bomb he asks: “Why should the United States have endured prevarication from the sponsors of Pearl Harbor and the Bataan death march?” The book is aptly titled Retribution. While some readers may prefer more footnotes and a bibliography to trace the source of the data cited, they will nonetheless be hard pressed to find a more readable history of the final year of the Pacific War.

Michael Pearlman, Ph.D., Lawrence, Kansas


The Day of Battle is the second volume in Rick Atkinson’s planned Liberation Trilogy, which follows the U.S. Army as it assumes the theater war point of view as well as from personal experience. He described the war from the point of view of the high command, enlisted personnel, and civilians caught up in the war. Former news people have a particular gift for this, as Rick Atkinson did for World War II in Europe (The Day of Battle) and David Halberstam for the Korean War (The Coldest Winter).

In this
hefty volume, the author provides a grand narrative of what is now viewed as one of the epic war sagas of the U.S. Army.

The bloody Italian campaign, which many strategists at the time, as well as many historians today, condemned as unnecessary, was the brainchild of the redoubtable Winston Churchill, who doggedly bullied and cajoled the allies to attack what he viewed as “the soft underbelly” of the Axis up the Italian Peninsula. Unfortunately, Churchill’s sunny predictions turned into a bloody nightmare.

Numerous personality conflicts plagued the Italian campaign. Generals George Patton, Bernard Montgomery, Mark Clarke, and Harold Alexander are only some of the egos that competed for pre-eminence in the land of the Caesars. On the Axis side, Albert Kesselring, a former artillery officer who became a Luftwaffe general, led the campaign. Kesselring showed a mastery of operational defense using the rugged Italian terrain to make the Allies pay dearly for each foot of ground.

The tragedies, triumphs, and ethical dilemmas posed to soldiers and commanders are described vividly as befits the author’s journalistic background. Letters, diaries, press releases, and even oral recollections are all combed for pertinent material. From his rich sources, Atkins crafts a vivid narrative that probes the complexities of multi-national command while at the same time paying attention to the perspective of the GIs and “Tommys,” who marched under the burning Italian sun in summer and slogged up the wind-swept mountains in winter along with French, Polish, Australian, New Zealander, and other comrades. The legends, too, are given their share of coverage. Audie Murphy, William Darby, and Bill Mauldin show the impact of extraordinary individuals on the course of events. The text is complemented by a careful selection of photographs and maps illustrating such well-known operations as the “race to Messina,” the battles for the Anzio beachhead, and the siege of Monte Cassino.

The Day of Battle is fine narrative history for the thoughtful reader. It is not a definitive history in the scholarly sense because, although the author marshals an impressive bibliography, the subject is just too complex for one book. The text is referenced in an odd sort of way that avoids footnotes, presumably so as not to scare away a “popular” readership. In short, the book provides an excellent introduction and richly textured overview of one of the most bitterly contested campaigns of World War II. I highly recommend the book.

LTC Prisco R. Hernández, Ph.D.
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


Roger Crowley’s Empires of the Sea deserves a wide readership. It covers a broad span of dynamic, colorful history from the 16th century that features a clash of civilizations with relevance to our own day—with the major roles reversed.

Here is the master narrative: a super-power with hegemony at sea and an almost unbeatable army is advancing on all fronts. Although it has multiple security challenges and conflicts throughout its vast territories and areas of influence, its most vexing problems come from a loose confederation of religious fanatics who fight among themselves as much as against the superpower. Nevertheless, within almost 50 years, the superpower’s apparently inexorable advance is not only stopped but decisively defeated in the realm in which it thought it was all-powerful—at sea. The superpower in this case is Ottoman Turkey. The opponents, the polyglot mess that was Europe before the modern era, the Hapsburg-led Holy Roman Empire and Spain, an independent group of warrior-monks, the Papacy, Venetian oligarchs, Genoese mercenary admirals, and frightened Protestant princes newly separated from the Catholic universe.

Crowley has written a compelling history of this little-known but important chapter in military history. He makes it all come alive with unflinching portraits of Charles V, Suleiman the Magnificent, the Knights of St. John, Admiral Andrea Dorea, Don Juan of Austria, and the fearsome Islamic corsair brothers, Oruch and Hayrettin. Nor does he neglect those doing the fighting and dying or the innocent (and not-so-innocent) civilians caught in the crossfire. Crowley deftly uses the writing of men who witnessed the events to give the book the feel of a novel. From the epic siege of Rhodes in 1522 to the disaster that befell the Ottoman fleet in 1571 at Lepanto near modern-day Greece, the book describes the maritime conflict that led to the apogee and then the slow decline of the Ottoman Empire. Particularly commendable is Crowley’s care in retelling the story of Lepanto, which was the bloodiest day in modern history at the time, with over 40,000 people killed in a day of unimaginable carnage on 7 October 1571.

Crowley takes special pains to ensure his readers know that things could have gone differently, that the real significance of the event remained shrouded at the time. In doing so, he captures for the reader the contingent and even tragic nature of those times. The illustrations add value. They are almost uniformly contemporary prints, carvings, and even coin facsimiles that match the faces and geography with the fast-moving text. I strongly recommend this book to as wide an audience as possible. It achieves the rare combination of being entertaining, informative, and sobering—all at the same time.

John T. Kuehn, Commander,
U.S. Navy, Retired,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
Money as a Force Multiplier in COIN

LTC Thomas D. Morgan, USA, Retired, Steilacoom, WA—I was dismayed with an article in your May-June 2008 issue entitled “Money as a Force Multiplier in COIN.” As a taxpayer, I resent Soldiers giving all this money to basically people on the street. I believe that giving away $6.6M dollars to 33,000 Iraqis in Fallujah was one of the examples given. That is my money that is being given away and I did not authorize it. It is one thing to spend large amounts of appropriated money to fight a war (i.e., to pay for beans, bullets, gasoline, spare parts, and medical supplies), but quite another to bribe Iraqi citizens to do their civic duty. Sure they accepted the money and will act nicely as long as we keep paying. But, as soon as we stop the payments, they will go back to their old ways. This is not a way to fight a war. If we have to bribe them, then we should leave.

Iraq sits on a lake of oil and they can pay their citizens from that great source of wealth. The Iraq government only charges $1.15 for a gallon of gasoline. They should be paying us to fight this war, not the other way around. Last year the U.S. Army did not have enough money to properly run its Stateside military bases because the Installation Management Agency was underfunded to support the war effort. It is ridiculous for Soldiers to give money away when it is in short supply at home. If it is so important to pay the Iraqi civilians, why not levy every Soldier’s salary for a few hundred dollars to do it. NOT! I don’t think so, but that would make more sense.

Giving large sums of money away is a dangerous habit. It only feeds greed and corruption. I remember the stories of CIA and Special Ops Agents giving warlords in Afghanistan $1000 dollar bills when they first arrived in that backward country. What did that get us? The place is a mess now and the terrorists have made a comeback. Some of those very warlords who bought SUVs, cell phones, and fancy weapons from bootleggers with our money have now turned on us. It was not money well spent.

We have enough trouble with bogus contracts being given for faulty goods and services that have cost us billions! KBR, Custer-Battles, and the Miami-based storefront that sold $300M of worthless ammunition to the Afghans, engineering companies that built defective buildings, and a host of other incredibly stupid and wasteful actions have cost us billions with little or no return. Our money has just made those people more greedy and dishonest. They are learning it in spades from us.

Don’t publish anymore of those deceptive, feel-good articles about money being a combat multiplier. It is pure bunk and has no place in a professional military magazine. Money is not a force multiplier unless it buys things that are going to win the war. Bribing civilians will not.

MR Response

Your perspective presents one side of a legitimate debate. In theory, judicious cash outlays are an economy of force measure. They have always been and always will be used as a moderating influence during a conflict—a force multiplier. Military forces have used money rather than the lives of troops to pacify countries full of recalcitrant insurgents throughout history. There is a correlation between economic hardship and insurgency. Easing society’s economically straitened conditions may do more for peace and chances of lasting stability than multiples of times the equivalent cost in war materiel.

In a perfect world only those who are innocent and deserving would benefit from such money and there would be not a penny wasted—all contractors would be honest and careful. But the reality is that when military forces use cash to better society as a whole, bad people will benefit as well. Facing that reality does not mean we condone it; on the contrary, it means that zealous efforts have to be made to prosecute those who let others down through malfeasance, criminal mismanagement, negligence, fraud, or corruption.

A watchword for good stewardship should be the phrase “command responsibility.” If a commander wields his forces irresponsibly in an indiscriminate and disproportionate way, and ends up carelessly killing noncombatants he is there to protect, he should face the consequences for that failure even if he attains a battlefield victory. If he is judicious and disciplined, failure in his military mission will not be a failure of trust and honor. Likewise, the commander who uses money carefully as a weapon can save many lives. Money thus used in helping people who have suffered from the war is hardly a bribe. Even if the effort fails, we cannot say the money was wasted anymore than we can say the lives of Soldiers were wasted.
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2008 General William E. DePuy Special Topics Writing Competition
“Actions Required to Attain Overall Objectives in the Aftermath of Combat Operations”

★ RESULTS ★

The Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth is pleased to announce the winners of the 2008 General William E. DePuy Writing Competition.

Thirty-five manuscripts were received and judged by a distinguished panel of invited experts.

1st Place “The Ethical Challenges in Stability Operations and Nation-Building,” by SGT Jared Tracy, $1000

2nd Place “To the Victor Go the Sores: Learning from Moderate Muslim Governments: Approaches to Islamist Militant Activism,” by MAJ Erik A. Claessen, Belgian Army, $750


4th Place “Making Use of What is Already There: Leveraging Liminality in Post-Conflict Security Sector Reform,” by MAJ Louis P. Melacon, $250

Honorable Mention
“Building the Team: The Continuing Evolution of Embedded Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Task Force Marne and Beyond,” by SFC Jesse P. Pruett, $100

“Investing in Stability: The Need for Intelligence Preparation for Economic Operations,” by James E. Shircliffe Jr., $100

“It Ain’t Over Till It’s Over: The Things America Should Do When Combat Ends,” by MAJ E. Paul Flowers, $100

“Legitimacy: The Supreme Principle of Irregular Warfare,” by MAJ John W. Bauer, $100

“The Role of Detainee Healthcare as Part of the Information Instrument of Power,” by LTC Beverly D. Patton, $100

Members of the panel who reviewed this year’s contest submissions are:
Lieutenant General David W. Barno, USA, Retired, Director, Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies at the National Defense University, Washington, DC
Steven Metz, Ph.D., Chairman of the Regional Strategy and Planning Department and Research Professor of National Security Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle, PA
Michael W. Mosser, Ph.D., Assistant Professor of International Relations, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College’s School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), Fort Leavenworth, KS
Colonel Timothy R. Reese, Director, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS

The winning manuscripts will be published in upcoming editions of Military Review, the Professional Journal of the U.S. Army. Honorable Mentions and distinguished submissions that were not formally recognized will be given preferential consideration for publication subject to space constraints and the continuing relevance of the topic.
“Walk. Move mounted, work dismounted. Stop by, don’t drive by. Patrol on foot and engage the population. Situational awareness can only be gained by interacting with the people face-to-face, not separated by ballistic glass.”

—General David H. Petraeus, U.S. Army