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 Remarks as delivered by Congressman Geoff Davis at the Project on National Security Reform/Reserve Officers of America luncheon, 8 May 2008.

Congressman Geoff Davis represents Kentucky’s 4th District. He holds a B.S. from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point. Congressman Davis served as an Assault Helicopter Flight Commander in the 82d Airborne Division and later served in the Middle East where he ran U.S. Army aviation operations for peace enforcement between Israel and Egypt.

PHOTO: U.S. Navy Sailors take part in an emergency replenishment working party onboard the USN Whidbey Island Class Dock Landing Ship USS Tortuga while underway off the Gulf Coast during the Hurricane Katrina relief efforts, 3 September 2005. A USN Sea Dragon helicopter awaits directions in the background. (U.S. Navy, JO3 Brian P. Seymour)

THANK YOU for the opportunity to join you today. National security organizational reform is of vital importance to our nation. As a member of the House Armed Services Committee and Co-chair of the House National Security Interagency Reform Working Group, furthering such reform is one of my highest priorities as a member of Congress. It is also a priority that is shared by distinguished colleagues on both sides of the aisle. This afternoon I would like to share my perspective on one essential component of a major reform initiative—national security interagency reform to ensure more effective interagency operations.

In beginning my discussion, it may be useful to define interagency operations in the simplest possible terms. The definition I prefer is “operations conducted by two or more federal departments or agencies in support of a national security mission.”

Significantly, these departments and agencies include those that are not commonly associated with overseas deployment for national security operations. Examples include the Departments of the Treasury, Justice, Agriculture, HHS, Transportation, Education, and Homeland Security.

Next, a simple definition of the problem is in order. Simply stated, our current interagency process is hamstrung and broken. There are regulatory, legislative, budgetary, resource, and cultural impediments to effective interagency operations. These problems are independent of personalities, policies, and particular presidential administrations. In order to protect the United States’ interests and citizens, it is critical to reform the executive and legislative branches to allow better coordination and communication between currently stove-piped departments and congressional committees. Indeed, our agency community needs to pass through an organizational and process transformation similar to the American manufacturing transformation of the 1980s and 1990s in order to make our agencies leaner, flatter, and more agile.

Effective interagency operations must be based upon the principle that the application of non-military, or “soft” power, should be effectively integrated with military power. A successfully integrated interagency process will empower the U.S. to more effectively deploy our non-military instruments of power abroad. This ability will allow the U.S. to more effectively fulfill its interests while reserving the use of lethal military force as a last resort. In fact, leaders and policy makers need two things:

- An overarching national strategy that frames the intent of all policy.
- A tool box of resources that can be configured – hopefully in a preventive way—to fulfill our strategic objectives.
The interagency system was devised over 60 years ago for a different era and based on a very specific national strategy, when national security was primarily a function of military capabilities wielded by one department in overseas missions. At the time, major combat operations and nuclear deterrence were the principal focus of U.S. national security strategy. This system required only limited coordination of activities between vertically structured military and civilian departments and agencies.

Today, national security involves a much wider array of issues that can be addressed only with a broader set of capabilities that are highly synchronized and carefully calibrated. Since the end of the Cold War, the national security environment has changed in five significant ways:

- First, today’s environment is both less structured and more interdependent, making it less amenable to management through conventional military force alone.
- Second, the shared threats of the Cold War (including the threat of nuclear war) resulted in fixed alliances which, with the end of the Cold War, no longer constrain state behavior as they did in the last century.
- Third, states are often less susceptible to diplomatic pressure alone and the United States needs a wider array of tools to avoid resorting prematurely to major military force.
- Fourth, non-state actors and individuals wield influence that is far greater than any other time in human history.
- Fifth, globalization creates potential for transfer of disease, technology, ideas, and organization that never existed before.

In one sense, our global advances in technology and connectivity have the potential to cause us to regress to an era prior to the Treaty of Westphalia, an era in which the acceptance of the nation-state was effectively codified.

This makes it imperative that the United States is able to interact effectively with institutions below the national level. For example, in Iraq, the United States must be able to interact effectively with provincial, local, and tribal leaders to accomplish security goals. We must prepare to do so in a dynamic, less predictable environment, where issues and geographic areas move rapidly from obscurity to strategic significance and national boundaries are highly permeable. We must have the ability to customize solutions on a diverse and massive scale—often in the same region. For example, a structure that may work in Mosul may not be suitable in Najaf, but each can fulfill the intent of the strategic objective.

Frequently, the United States will be unable to anticipate the exact capabilities it will require in advance of a crisis, necessitating the ability to rapidly matrix capabilities from different sources. The United States will no longer be able to separate national security from homeland security.

Many agencies are not conscious of or prepared to act in their national security roles. Many civilian departments and agencies do not believe they have a role in the national security system, and the cultures of these organizations produce few incentives for staff to participate in national security missions. These agencies often lack “expeditionary” capabilities. Even if they have the desire to help, they may be prevented from doing so by a combination of factors including personnel shortages, lack of other resources, lack of statutory authorizations, and regulatory constraints. They may also lack the ethos and structure required to sustain an embedded culture that enables continuous and adaptive operational planning, both long term and contingency.

There are also disparate departmental approaches to deployments and risk management. For example, the reluctance of departments and agencies to contribute
personnel to the Coalition Provisional Authority, because of the factors I have cited, caused the CPA to operate throughout its tenure with approximately two-thirds of its required personnel.

Additionally, interagency operations are not governed by standard concepts and procedures. For example, during the 1994 invasion of Haiti, the lack of standard interagency concepts and procedures caused many departments and agencies to not even be aware other departments and agencies had arrived in the country.

Without standard concepts and procedures, interagency operations tend to be very ad hoc in nature. For example, Paul Bremer, head of the Coalition Provisional Authority in post-war Iraq, believed he reported to the President, through the Secretary of Defense, and did not want to be bogged down with the interagency process. CPA staff was ordered not to respond to requests for information from other departments or agencies. State Department employees detailed to the CPA were forced to conduct backchannel communications via personal Hotmail accounts, and National Security Advisor Rice’s senior deputies checked the CPA web site every day to see what new orders Bremer had issued. Such ad hoc arrangements are enormously inefficient and liable to produce erratic outcomes.

The multinational coalition in Iraq suffered from a lack of unity of command. One result was a contentious relationship between the senior civilian official in Iraq (Paul Bremer) and the senior U.S. military commander in Iraq (Lieutenant General Sanchez). The fact that U.S. military forces in Iraq learned of the unilateral disbandment of the Iraqi army—the cornerstone of all U.S. security planning—through a cable news report is indicative of the disconnect between the Coalition Provisional Authority and the U.S. military command.

We must also ensure that civilian agencies have the resources required for effective integration with the Department of Defense. For example, the State Department’s Foreign Service is too small and is not designed to effectively meet the demands of interagency deployments. Nor is it prepared to support field efforts. Agencies like the Departments of Agriculture, Justice, and Treasury are not allocated resources or staffed with national security interagency operations in mind. Think what could have been done to deter the growth of criminal militias if the Department of the Treasury had assisted in the rapid implementation of simple electronic banking systems to get money and payroll to the people of Iraq during the post-conflict stabilization period.

A National Security Act is needed to update the organization and procedures created by the National Security Act of 1947. Such overarching legislation has the potential to, in simplest possible terms, speed awareness and reaction to the spectrum of threats America faces. We must codify an adaptive approach that flattens, simplifies, and integrates the agencies of the executive branch and the committees of Congress.

While it would be premature for me to detail the specifics of a National Security Act, there are some basic considerations that should underlie legislation that is intended to amend the national security interagency system to make it more responsive to the strategic environment of the 21st century. In the interests of time, I will briefly address three areas that should be carefully considered with regard to any such future legislation.

First, we must ensure a system that assures proper planning guidance is issued to all departments and agencies that have national security roles, including specific objectives, roles, and responsibilities for fulfilling mission requirements. If done right, this planning guidance should enable subordinate departments and agencies to produce departmental and agency national security implementation plans. Additionally, operational plans and planning procedures must be constantly updated through regular scenario simulations that test ideas and processes in order to expose problems and constraints early so that the desired outcome can be achieved.

Second, we should require that personnel who are selected for senior executive service positions, in departments and agencies with national security roles, have the professional development via institutional training and/or operational assignments in agencies other than their own to effectively participate in the national security interagency system. There is a precedent for such professional development within DoD. The most talented officers are inculcated with the knowledge, skills, and abilities required for effective participation in joint service operations. DoD’s approach to joint service operations was reformed as a result of Goldwater-Nichols.
The reformed approach was exemplified by one scene from post-Hurricane Katrina recovery operations. Some of you may remember an Army assault helicopter battalion landing on a carrier in the Port of New Orleans. That would not have happened 20 years ago. That was the fruit of reform, including major changes in DOD personnel policies in support of joint service operations.

Third, we should strive to build regional expertise across departments and agencies to ensure a bench of personnel with the knowledge and skills required to accomplish departmental and agency missions in all regions of the world that are of national security significance. For example, we should consider better regional alignment between DOD and the State Department. An example of this issue is that the Commander, U.S. Central Command, must interface with four State Department bureaus, making coordination redundant and cumbersome.

As my colleagues and I undertake the challenge of crafting reform legislation, I welcome the opportunity to interface with DOD, State, and DHS officials to gain their insights on the way ahead for reform.

While I am prepared to answer your questions, this afternoon I am primarily interested in getting your insights on this vital and complex issue. MR
Field Manual 3-07, Stability Operations: 
UPSHIFTING THE 
ENGINE OF CHANGE


THE RELEASE OF Field Manual (FM) 3-07, Stability Operations, in the coming months will acknowledge and stress the criticality of the “whole-of-government” approach essential to achieving sustainable success in an era of persistent conflict. This approach is the key to operating in the uncertain future before us. The new doctrine will also represent a number of important firsts. It will be the first stability doctrine—service or joint—to answer the immediate needs of the force already actively engaged in ongoing operations. It will be the first doctrine of any type to undergo a comprehensive joint, service, interagency, intergovernmental, and nongovernmental review. It will also mark the first time any service has attempted to capture and define a national approach to conflict transformation in doctrine, and to do so with the broad support of the agencies, organizations, and institutions that share in that approach.

The publication of FM 3-07 will fill a critical void in our knowledge base at a key moment in the history of our Army and our Nation. At a time when we find ourselves engaged simultaneously in the Middle East, the Far East, and Latin America, the new manual will provide the intellectual underpinnings needed to deal comprehensively with the uncertainty, chance, and friction so common to operations conducted among the people.

A Brave New World

The forces of globalization and the emergence of regional economic and political powers are fundamentally reshaping the world we thought we understood. Future cultural and ethnocentric conflicts are likely to be exacerbated by increased global competition for shrinking natural resources, teeming urban populations with rising expectations, unrestrained technological diffusion, and rapidly accelerating climate change. The future is not one of major battles and engagements fought by armies on battlefields devoid of population; instead, the course of conflict will be decided by forces operating among the people of the world. Here, the margin of victory will be measured in far different terms than the wars of our past. The allegiance, trust, and confidence of populations will be the final arbiters of success.

America actually possesses a rich and proud history of success and learning in wars among the people—what we recognize today as stability operations.

PHOTO: SGT Matt Radcliffe, 3d Special Troops Battalion, 3d Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division, and an Iraqi Army soldier from the 42d Brigade, 11th Iraqi Army Division, provide security at an Iraqi Army patrol base in the Sadr City District of Baghdad, Iraq, 19 April 2008. (U.S. Air Force, TSgt Adrian Cadiz)
However, from our colonial roots, when Congress appointed military commissioners to negotiate peace treaties and land purchases with Native American tribes, to our contemporary experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, our most enduring tradition has been an inability or unwillingness to institutionalize the lessons of those experiences. In a cruel twist of fate, the answers we so desperately sought in recent years were collecting dust on bookshelves half a world away; the distant lessons of a remarkably successful Vietnam-era civil-military program sat largely forgotten, save by those few who had lived those experiences.

CORDS: A Classic Approach to a Modern Challenge

At the height of the Vietnam War, we faced an enemy who hid among the people. That enemy had evolved from the one first confronted by American ground forces in 1965 to become a complex mix of guerrilla forces, political cadre, and conventional regulars. In a few short years, the enemy had adapted, changing from a strategy focused on main-force engagement to one that stressed insurgency, guerrilla tactics, and, most important, patience. The enemy had learned the hard-fought lessons of jungle warfare against a better equipped, technologically advanced opponent. By the time General Creighton W. Abrams assumed command of Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MAVC) in the summer of 1968, the enemy had evolved, and so had the war.

Two years earlier, General William C. Westmoreland, Abrams’s predecessor as MACV commander, had recognized that a fundamental shift in effort would be necessary to achieve any lasting degree of success. Ultimately, that success could only be attained through deliberate integration of the various political, military, security, and economic programs ongoing in South Vietnam. To that end, President Johnson signed National Security Action Memorandum 362, Responsibility for U.S. Role in Pacification (Revolutionary Development), on 9 May 1967, thus establishing the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) program. Through CORDS, the efforts of the Departments of State and Defense were integrated under a “single manager concept” that empowered Ambassador Robert W. Kommer as the deputy for pacification within MACV. Kommer’s appointment effectively unified the civil-military effort in South Vietnam.

The CORDS program leveraged an unprecedented ability to project significant manpower and resources into the Vietnamese countryside. It targeted the growing insurgency at the local level while focusing on the security and well-being of the people themselves. By 1969, with over 7,600 advisors assigned to pacification teams and economic assistance flowing into key programs and the provinces, CORDS began to hit its stride. The program’s advisory effort was instrumental in fielding significant numbers of trained Regional and Popular Forces, which maintained security in villages and hamlets. USAID land reforms orchestrated through CORDS were accompanied by an economic revival spurred by the reestablishment of effective rural administration.

But for all its success, CORDS was too little, too late. Limited in scope, it was not engineered to bolster the legitimacy and effectiveness of the central government, a need critical to consolidating and sustaining the transitory effects of programs at the local level. Moreover, even as the pacification effort achieved broad success across South Vietnam and, by all indications, brought the Viet Cong insurgency to its knees, American public support for the war had evaporated. The national will necessary to maintain the momentum gained through CORDS could not be regained; the initiative was lost and so, eventually, was the war.

In the aftermath of Vietnam, we failed to capture and integrate the most important lessons of the war into our training and education. We turned away from the bitter experiences of that time and left behind a rich body of lessons learned, especially the tactics, techniques, and procedures necessary to conduct successful counterinsurgency. The remarkable insights concerning the necessity and efficacy of unity of effort would never be institutionalized in doctrine or law, and the lessons of that experience would soon be lost to time and a far more insidious threat to national security, the Soviet Union.

Afghanistan and Iraq: New Versions of an Old Song

Winning wars is easier than winning the peace. This became abundantly clear following combat
operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, where initial, overwhelming victories against organized enemy forces were not consolidated in the immediate aftermath of conflict. In Afghanistan, remnants of the decimated Taliban and Al-Qaeda were able to withdraw across the porous border with Pakistan, from where they vowed to continue the fight. A seemingly glacial coalition response to the needs of the Afghan people allowed the Taliban to reconstitute and reemerge as active, aggressive opponents of the government. In Iraq, de-Ba’athification policy and demobilization of the national army sowed the seeds of a popular insurgency more complex than any in our history. The coalition failure to quickly contain rampant looting became symptomatic of a lethargic and disorganized approach to civil administration, an approach that left vast swaths of the population without dependable power, health care, and basic civic services. Unemployment, black marketing, and corruption soared while the economies collapsed.

In the wake of shock and awe, we faced disenfranchised populations neither shocked by our victory nor awed by our presence. We failed them in many ways, and much of our focus remained on applying the lethal and destructive aspects of our military might rather than the nonlethal, constructive capabilities so vital to success in operations conducted among the people. Our inability to exploit time effectively ceded the initiative to a course of events already spinning out of control. We won the war, but were quickly losing the peace.

As the Iraq insurgency continued to evolve, haunting parallels from South Vietnam grew difficult to ignore. Then, the threat came from a dangerous combination of guerrillas, political cadre, and North Vietnamese regulars. Now, the threat reflects a complex mix of outside foreign influences epitomized by Al-Qaeda irregular forces, sectarian militias, and terrorist extremists supported by a “third wave” of self-recruited fundamentalists who exploit the information domain to garner additional support and sympathy for their adopted cause. However, in sharp contrast to the jungles of Southeast Asia, this insurgency was spawned in one of the world’s most volatile cultural fault zones.

**Doctrine: The Engine of Change**

As the insurgency in Iraq began to gain momentum in 2004, the Army’s leadership recognized the need for a different approach. But without a shared recognition of this need by the various agencies of the U.S. government, devising that approach would prove challenging. An important step in the process of building that interagency understanding came when Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England signed Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 3000.05 in November 2005, fundamentally changing the military’s concept of, and approach to, stability operations. No longer secondary to combat operations, stability operations were recognized as an essential capability on par with the traditional destructive cornerstones of military strength, offense and defense. The directive emphasized that stability operations were no longer secondary to combat operations:

Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct and support. They shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all Department of Defense (DOD) activities including doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning. As stability operations gained in emphasis and focus over the next two years, the Army became the first of the services to institutionalize the tenets of DODD 3000.05 in doctrine.

A new generation far removed from the Vietnam experience understood that war’s lessons and the need for change, and it initiated efforts to resuscitate a counterinsurgency doctrine relegated to obscurity for more than three decades. The publication of FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, in 2006 launched a doctrinal revival that resounded across the force. Counterinsurgency became the coin of the realm, and the hard-won lessons of the Vietnam War gained a new foothold in the twenty-first century. Even as the Army’s new counterinsurgency manual gained popularity with the military forces of other nations, a single vignette on the CoRDS program from that manual revived a memory of another time and another place, where effective interagency integration—
FM 3-0 is our Army’s “blueprint for an uncertain future.” It focuses on human solutions to the challenges of tomorrow, emphasizing that “Soldiers will consistently operate in and among the people of the world, conducting operations in an environment fundamentally human in character.” In this environment, the military must focus its efforts primarily on the local populace. These efforts—stability tasks—improve the people’s safety, security, social well-being, and livelihoods. In a contemporary parallel to the CORDS program, they shape a whole-of-government approach that integrates interagency efforts toward a common goal.

The manual also sets the context for the broad definition of stability operations set forth by DOD:

Stability operations encompass various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, [and] provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief effort.9

Just as CORDS realized unity of effort through interagency integration, FM 3-0 forges unity of effort by directly linking the Army’s primary stability tasks (establish civil security, establish civil control, restore essential services, support governance, and support economic and infrastructure development) with their complementary U.S. government stability sectors as set forth in the State Department’s Post-Conflict Reconstruction Essential Tasks (see figure 1).9 This ensures that the execution of stability tasks is fundamentally linked to a broader interagency effort, fulfilling the spirit—if not the letter—of DODD 3000.05. FM 3-0 recognizes the effort required to fully implement the broad goals of the directive; it paves the way for further development of stability operations in doctrine and concepts.

**Forging a Whole-of-Government Approach**

FM 3-0, Operations, continued a doctrinal renaissance that is reverberating across the Army and setting in motion forces that will fundamentally alter our concept of stability operations. In turn, FM 3-07 will effect sweeping change in approach, knowledge, and
understanding; when implemented, it will achieve the broad changes in doctrine so essential to establishing the cooperative, collaborative environment that enables the success of the other instruments of national power. Ultimately, FM 3-07 will be the driving force behind our ability to forge a whole-of-government approach to stability operations.

Today, the Army is undertaking the most comprehensive revision of stability operations doctrine it has ever attempted. Ultimately, it will publish not just a typical Army field manual, but a single-source, “how-to” guide for stability operations. FM 3-07, Stability Operations, will contain information that the joint force, sister services, interagency and intergovernmental partners, non-governmental community, and even the private sector can refer to and put to use. It will be the first such publication to thoroughly address the broad spectrum of activities required to conduct successful stability operations.

In the current conflicts, our inability to achieve interagency unity of effort, to forge a whole-of-government approach founded on shared understanding of a common goal, is the single most significant obstacle to our attaining sustainable, enduring success. Unity of command has long been central to exercising the military instrument of national power. More than just a principle of war, it is fundamental to coordinating the actions of all military forces, regardless of service, toward a single objective. In the absence of such command authority, leaders strive for unity of effort through coordination, negotiation, and consensus building. Appropriately resourcing and integrating the diverse activities of all the instruments of national power—diplomatic, information, military, and economic—requires a collaborative environment in which individual agendas are subordinated to a common goal. Such is the challenge of achieving unity of effort.

We began writing FM 3-07 with the ambitious aim of developing doctrine that not only provides the intellectual underpinnings needed to leverage the constructive capabilities of the force, but also sets the foundation for unity of effort across all forces, agencies, and organizations involved. Such a goal is only attainable with the consent and support of those stakeholders, and gaining both requires investing time and patience to build trust and confidence among diverse and often divergent personalities. We began with just 12 months to achieve this goal. Time was a resource in short supply.

Writing and coordination proceeded along parallel lines of effort. The endeavor began in earnest in October 2007, after an agreement brought together the other government agencies and several nongovernmental organizations. This collaborative network facilitated the sharing of concepts, products, and lessons from a broad community of practice with a range of experience that spanned the spectrum of conflict. Although Army doctrine authors would serve as the lead writers, they worked with fundamentals and principles representing a substantial body of people and knowledge.

The new FM 3-07 places engagement and intervention activities on a spectrum (figure 2) adapted from the precepts presented in Fragile States Strategy, published by USAID in 2005. In
doing so, FM 3-07 aligns Army doctrine with the National Security Strategy, which addresses the threat to national interests posed by failed and failing states. The spectrum defines a state according to two quantifiable, related factors: the amount of violence within its borders, and the degree of normalcy otherwise apparent in the country and its government.

Intervention can occur at any point along the spectrum, regardless of the conditions of the operational environment. The state of conflict within the country may be irrelevant; what we are now concerned with primarily is the viability of the host-nation, i.e., Is this state on the verge of falling apart and falling prey to actors hostile to the United States? If it is, then our intervention is warranted.

As a heuristic, the fragile-states graphic is simple, but it provides leaders and planners a way to think about what an intervention in a particular state ought to look like. After gauging the conditions of an operational environment, planners can formulate an engagement methodology and then begin to consider what progress toward success might look like.

The graphic also underscores the importance of security. In his book, Losing the Golden Hour, former USAID Mission Director James Stephenson notes, “Security trumps everything. It does little good to build a school if parents are afraid to send their children to that school because they may not come home.”

Stephenson further emphasizes the need to make quantifiable improvements in the security situation within the “golden hour”—that limited amount of time in which we enjoy the forbearance of the host-nation populace. Thus, we must plant the seeds for effective civil security and civil order during, not after, a conflict. The military instrument, with its unique expeditionary capabilities, is the sole U.S. agency with the ability to affect the golden hour before the hourglass tips.

In other words, the military can take decisive action before security collapses altogether and the civil situation completely deteriorates. The military can leverage both its coercive and its constructive capabilities to establish a safe and secure environment; promote reconciliation among local or regional adversaries; reestablish political, legal, social, and economic institutions; and facilitate the transition of responsibility to legitimate civilian authority. Military forces perform stability operations to establish the conditions that enable all the instruments of national power to succeed. By providing security and control to stabilize the situation and restore civil order, military forces provide a foundation for transitioning control to interagency civilians and eventually to the host nation.

In Post-Conflict Essential Tasks, the State Department breaks down post-conflict stability operations tasks into three categories: initial response, transformation, and fostering sustainability. These categories encompass the full range of military missions, tasks, and activities conducted in conjunction with the other instruments of national power during stability operations. However, while adopting the same task framework, FM 3-07 redefines initial response tasks as actions taken during conflict to influence conditions before hostilities end. Such anticipatory actions are essential to enable the success of the other instruments of national power and to secure space and access for nongovernmental organizations already operating in the area. These actions enable military forces to focus on maintaining security and civil order and facilitate the ability of civilian agencies and organizations to reduce the force’s humanitarian issues burden.

FM 3-07 lists essential stability tasks that the force must execute to accomplish the mission. Conducting such operations requires a combination of knowledge and understanding, the ability to achieve unity of effort, and cultural acumen. A finite amount of combat power is available to apply to essential stability operations tasks. Essential stability tasks
lay a foundation of security and civil order so that the other instruments of national power can come in and do their work. This foundation must also support the burdens of governance, rule of law, and economic development that represent the sustained future viability of the host nation.

Security Sector Reform: First Among Equals

According to James Stephenson, “Establishing security involves domestic security, secure borders, and relatively accommodating neighbors… Domestic security is the most important and often the most difficult to achieve.” A decorated Vietnam veteran well acquainted with the challenges of stability operations, Stephenson often highlights the necessity of security for lasting success. But even the largest occupation force cannot provide sustained security across nations as vast as Afghanistan and Iraq; in such situations, establishing domestic security depends on the early, continual involvement of the host-nation’s security forces. Just as in Southeast Asia, developing host-nation capacity for civil security and control requires a dedicated advisory effort focused on organizing, training, and equipping indigenous security forces.

This is the essence of “security force assistance,” a relatively new term for a concept that pre-dates even the CORDS effort. FM 3-07 introduces security force assistance into army doctrine under the umbrella of security sector reform, which is the reestablishment or reform of the institutions and key ministerial positions that provide oversight for the safety and security of the host nation and its people. The advisory effort central to security sector reform extends beyond the military training teams that conduct security force assistance. It encompasses police training teams, provincial reconstruction teams, and civil affairs functional area specialists, all engaged in a broad effort to reform the entire security sector.

Of the myriad activities conducted in a stability operation, security sector reform requires the sustained integration of the instruments of national power, and it depends wholly on unity of effort for success. Because the security sector is closely tied
to each of the other sectors, efforts to reform it create ripples that affect the entire stability operation; typically, activities that reinforce progress in security contribute to success in the others. While sustaining successful development in the other sectors is not possible without an established foundation of security, persistent security is not possible without effective rule of law, a transparent judiciary, legitimate governance, economic prosperity, and a contented host-nation populace whose essential needs have been satisfied.

Ultimately, successful security sector reform is the proving ground for an effective whole-of-government approach. It requires the active, dedicated participation of all U.S. agencies to achieve success. Such success is not attainable without unity of effort across multiple lines of operations. It requires a willingness and ability to share limited resources—financial, military, intelligence, law enforcement, diplomatic, developmental, and strategic communications—while working toward a common goal that supports U.S. interests.

Institutionalizing Hard Lessons

In the years after the fall of South Vietnam, we failed to institutionalize perhaps the most important lesson learned: the need for broad unity of effort among all agencies of government in operations conducted among the people of a foreign nation. Instead, we turned away from the bitter experiences of that time, and in many respects abandoned the rich body of lessons learned and tactics, techniques, and procedures that we assumed we would never need again.

To that end, the new FM 3-07 institutionalizes the enduring successes of our past and embraces the hard-won lessons of our contemporary operations. It recognizes that military force alone can never win the peace, even if we win every battle and engagement. The new doctrine aims to bring the efforts of military forces together with the other instruments of national power to form a whole-of-government approach to engagement in an era of persistent conflict. In doing so, it holds the key to operating in the uncertain future before us. 

NOTES

3. Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency, was developed under the direct guidance of then-LTG David H. Petraeus, who commanded the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, KS. In a unique approach to doctrine development, Petraeus assembled a select group of writers from the Army, the Marine Corps, academia, and the civilian sector. The development of FM 3-0 followed in an even more robust fashion, with the writing team assembled from among recent combat veterans educated through the School of Advanced Military Studies, with very thorough vetting done within the interagency, media, and think tanks. The writing of FM 3-07 has been shaped by even more extensive interagency, intergovernmental, and nongovernmental organizational involvement, and it will undergo the most thorough vetting of any Army field manual.
6. FM 3-0, vii.
11. Ibid., 21.
DARFUR and Peacekeeping Operations in Africa

Lieutenant Commander Patrick Paterson, U.S. Navy

The Crisis in Darfur, which the United States has labeled genocide and the United Nations has called “the world’s gravest human rights abuse,” has revealed glaring weaknesses in the African Union’s (AU’s) ability to conduct its own peacekeeping operations. The situation also reflects a larger, more serious problem: since the end of World War II, Africa has been the site of the world’s worst violence. An estimated 8 million Africans have died in war since 1945, and 9.5 million other Africans remain displaced from their homes, accounting for one of every three refugees on the planet. Vicious acts of genocide in Rwanda and Darfur have killed one million. Now, new peacekeeping demands in Sudan, Chad, Somalia, and the Central African Republic will require 30,000 to 35,000 more troops over the next 6 to 12 months. The current situation is poised to overwhelm an already exhausted international peacekeeping system that has seen demand for forces increase 600 percent since 1998. The subsequent gap in peacekeeping abilities could spawn an era of ultra-violence on the continent affecting American interests across the globe.

History of African Peacekeeping

Wars of independence and civil conflict filled the power vacuum left by the post–World War II withdrawal of colonial powers from Africa. Since then, 17 of 46 (or almost 40 percent) of all UN peacekeeping operations (PKO) have occurred in Africa. The continent currently hosts nearly half (8 of 18) of all active UN peacekeeping missions; 81 percent of the 54,000 UN peacekeepers are serving in Africa. Of the UN missions created in the last 10 years, 60 percent have been in Africa, including four of the five largest operations—with over 50,000 PKO troops in Congo, southern Sudan, Liberia, and Cote d’Ivorie. Peacekeeping operations are expensive. The cost of fielding a typical UN peacekeeping force is about $45,000 per soldier per year. Peacemaking operations, the forceful separation of warring factions, are even more expensive, requiring about 10 times more personnel and equipment than a peacekeeping effort. The United States, Japan, and European countries mainly bear the cost of financing all these UN operations—more than $5 billion per year. The United States pays 26 percent of the annual UN peacekeeping bill. Experts expect recently proposed UN operations in Somalia, Chad, Darfur, and the Central African Republic to add $3.3 billion to the UN’s annual peacekeeping costs.
While the United States has made significant financial contributions to the UN, the U.S. does not send military forces for use in UN operations. As of July 2007, only 307 U.S. personnel deployed for the UN; most were police forces and only 10 percent were working in Africa. The current administration does not consider it politically or militarily acceptable for U.S. personnel to operate under another nation’s military leaders.¹¹

Nevertheless, the United States clearly sees the need for security on the continent of Africa. United States involvement on the continent has increased due to post-9/11 fears of terror-sponsoring nations. In 2002, the U.S. established its first permanent military base in Africa (in Djibouti) to intercept terrorists fleeing the Middle East into the Horn of Africa. The U.S. European Command (EUCOM) headquarters runs Operation Enduring Freedom, one part of which is a trans-Sahara counterterrorist program in nine Saharan nations and the third largest U.S. military operation after Iraq and Afghanistan.

African terrorists have participated in terror attacks against U.S. and Western targets. In August 1998, Al-Qaeda exploded two massive car bombs outside the U.S. embassies in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya, killing 224 people (including 12 Americans) and injuring 5,000. In 2003, four suicide bombers attacked Jewish, Spanish, and Belgian sites in Casablanca, Morocco, killing 33 people. African jihadists carried out the 11 March 2004 train bombings in Madrid, Spain, killing 191 people, and wounding 1,400 others. “We’re trying to prevent Africa from becoming the next Afghanistan or Iraq,” General James Jones, former head of EUCOM, explained.¹²

U.S. foreign assistance to Africa has tripled in the past six years to $4 billion a year.¹³ In December 2006, the U.S. assigned its first ambassador to the African Union. In February 2007, the White House announced the stand-up of the African Command (AFRICOM), a U.S. military regional headquarters dedicated solely to security issues in Africa. A four-star general will run AFRICOM, which will be operational by October 2008. Now located in Stuttgart, Germany, the joint services staff, heavy with interagency representatives, hopes to move onto the continent in the next few years.

U.S. humanitarian efforts in Africa have had mixed results. The Somalia relief effort in 1993, Operation Continue Hope, was to bring humanitarian relief to hundreds of thousands of Somalis caught between fighting local warlords. However, when American TV viewers saw the bodies of U.S. service members dragged through the streets following the Battle of Mogadishu in October 1993, approval ratings for President Bill Clinton’s handling of the situation fell to 30 percent. The operation cost the lives of 43 Americans and was the worst foreign policy setback since the Vietnam War. The President withdrew U.S. peacekeepers a week later.¹⁴ In a decision former President Clinton considers one of his greatest policy regrets, the resulting fear of commitment in Africa caused him to delay peacekeeping assistance to Rwanda until after Hutus killed 800,000 Tutsis and others in genocide there the following year. Clinton later said, “We did not act quickly enough after the killing began. We did not immediately call these crimes by their rightful name: genocide. We cannot change the past. But we can and must do everything in our power to help [Africa] build a future without fear, and full of hope.”¹⁵

The nations of Africa have recognized the need for their own response force. In January 2004,
representatives from each of the 53 African nations met at AU headquarters and agreed to develop an African peacekeeping force to ensure rapid humanitarian assistance during disasters. The new force, known as the African Standby Force (ASF), has five regionally based brigades of 3,000 to 4,000 troops and a sixth force based at the AU headquarters for a total of 15,000 to 20,000 peacekeepers. The AU forces have had limited success, and the recent deployment of 7,000 AU troops to Darfur has revealed significant problems in the program.

The Crisis in Darfur

The major crisis in Africa today is the genocide occurring in the Darfur region of Sudan. Over 200,000 people have died in the violence and another 2.5 million left homeless, 90 percent of them women and children.17 A rift between the Arab Sudanese government and the Christian/animist people of Darfur dates back to 1983, the start of the 20-year civil war that eventually took the lives of 2.2 million Sudanese. The current conflict began in February 2003 when rebel groups attacked military posts in the region, accusing the central government of ignoring the region and discriminating against its inhabitants. The government struck back by employing local Arab militias, known as the janjaweed (men on horseback) to attack the rebel forces and loot villages. With government support and weaponry, the janjaweed used brutal terror tactics—burning villages, raping women, and massacring civilians. By late 2006, the janjaweed had destroyed over 2,000 villages in Darfur.18

In September 2004, the United States finally labeled the atrocities “genocide,” the first time U.S. officials had done that since the Holocaust of World War II.19 That same month, the European Union (EU) declared that the Sudanese government’s actions were “tantamount to genocide” and threatened to impose sanctions.20 This classification was important because, under UN guidelines, countries have a duty to interfere to stop genocide.

The janjaweed have been brazen in their attacks against foreigners, too. Since AU personnel deployed in 2004, 32 peacekeepers have been killed, over half of them in 2007. Additionally, 69 aid workers have been abducted, 37 relief convoys have been attacked, and 61 humanitarian vehicles hijacked.21

The conflict has spilled over into neighboring Chad and the Central Africa Republic where thousands of refugees fled to avoid the bloodshed. In the Central African Republic, 200,000 people have been forced out of their homes near the Sudanese border. An additional 236,000 refugees have crossed into Chad to avoid the bloodshed in Darfur. Chad declared a state of emergency and accused Sudan of supporting the rebels that attacked the Chadian capital in 2006. John Prendergast of the International Crisis Group sounded the alarm in the international community, saying, “The international community is actually missing the potential enormity of the crisis as it metastasizes to Chad and the Central African Republic.”22 Calls to action like Prendergast’s have driven European peacekeepers into motion. In late November 2007, EU officials met in an emergency planning session and voted to send 4,000 European troops to Chad and the Central African Republic to help refugees there.23
Fears of foreign interference in African politics have made many African leaders reluctant to accept outside assistance. South African President Thabo Mbeki visited President George W. Bush in June 2005 and insisted that Africans could handle the problem in Darfur, saying, “It’s critically important that the African continent should deal with these conflict situations on the continent. And that includes Darfur . . . We have not asked for anybody outside the African continent to deploy troops in Darfur. It’s an African responsibility and we can do it.” Others did not feel as confident. Senegal’s Foreign Minister Cheikh Tidiane Gadio said, “We are totally dissatisfied with the fact that the African Union . . . has asked the international community to allow it to be an African solution to an African problem and unfortunately the logistics from our own governments did not follow. The UN Security Council, the European Union, the African Union, the United States—we should all come together in a new way of dealing with the suffering of the people of Darfur—we have to do something.”

African Union peacekeepers began arriving in the region in 2004. The AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) consists of about 7,500 soldiers and police from Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, and South Africa. Their mandate, to “provide a safe and secure environment for the return of internally displaced persons and refugees,” has them spread across 34 refugee camps, some containing as many as 120,000 people. However, the forces lack the communications, vehicles, airlift, logistics, and intelligence capabilities to stop the militia attacks.

The AU deployment to Darfur, the first significant test of AU forces, has been a failure. Relegated to protecting heavily populated refugee camps in an area the size of Texas, the AU forces lack the arms and equipment of the government-supported militia forces. Their vehicles and radios are rarely operable and they lack sufficient manpower, weapons, and logistical support. Their rules of engagement do not allow them to challenge rebel roadblocks, and their most successful role to date is to protect groups of women from the janjaweed as the women collect firewood needed to fuel their open-pit fires. Many AU soldiers are not paid and do not receive regular food and water shipments. Corruption also presents a problem; in October 2006, two AU vehicles were intercepted while being illegally loaded on a plane for Nigeria. “As the security situation steadily worsens, AMIS’s credibility in Darfur as a military and civilian protection force is at an all-time low,” said a March 2006 International Crisis Group report. Villagers in the area seemed to agree, “I have given [the AU] so many reports but [they] did nothing. Many rape cases were reported and [they] conduct many patrols. But [they] have done nothing,” said one village chief to an AU patrol leader.

In June 2006, the UN and AU agreed that a UN force should take over peacekeeping in Darfur. However, the Sudanese government, led by President Omar al-Bashir, refused to cooperate with the
UN, claiming that a foreign force on its territory would violate its sovereignty. Al-Bashir has the attributes of many African autocrats that preceded him. A former general in the Sudanese Army, he seized power in a bloody coup in 1989, overthrowing President Sadiq Al-Mahdi’s democratically elected government. Once in power, Al-Bashir aligned himself with Islamic fundamentalists and implemented sharia law. In the mid 1980s, he gave refuge to Osama bin-Laden until international criticism forced him to withdraw the amnesty. In 1995, the United Nations levied sanctions on Sudan for its role in an attempted assassination of Egypt’s President, Hosni Mubarak. Since then, Sudan has dodged additional international condemnation by wooing influential international sponsors like China with its oil revenues, which now provide $1 million per day.

In the Darfur crisis, Al-Bashir plays to local fears, declaring, “The UN forces have a hidden agenda in Sudan because they are not coming for peace in Darfur. They want to recolonize Sudan.”27 His government has pledged to disarm the janjaweed during seven separate rounds of peace talks over the past three years but repeatedly failed to do so.28 There is also fear in Khartoum that many Sudanese government officials may face war crimes charges by the International Criminal Court, which opened an investigation into the atrocities in June 2005.

On 31 August 2006, the UN passed Security Council Resolution 1663, which calls for a 20,000-man force to deploy to Darfur by October 2006 to assist the AU. The force was supposed to have consisted of 17,300 military personnel and 3,300 civilian police officers under UN command with the African Union running day-to-day operations. The UN already has a 10,000-man force in southern Sudan (called the UN Mission in Sudan) to maintain the peace there after the two-decade long civil war. This new resolution in Sudan (called the UN-African Union Mission in Darfur or UNAMID) would have made it the largest UN PKO in the world, eclipsing the 17,500 men in the Congo.

However, disagreements among AU, UN, and Sudanese representatives blocked the deployment of the forces. In June 2007, after nearly four years of bloodshed, the Sudanese representatives finally agreed that an international peacekeeping force could deploy to the region. UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon welcomed the decision, saying it would send a “clear and powerful signal [of Sudan’s commitment] to improve the lives of the people of the region and close this tragic chapter in Sudan history.” A light support package of police advisers and staff has already been deployed to Darfur in the first phase of the UNAMID mission. However, the second phase of deployment will take months to execute because the UN has no standing army and must rely upon the goodwill of its 192 members to send troops.29 The third and final phase will be a combined AU and UN operation in Darfur using armed vehicles and aircraft to protect civilians.

The euphoria about the breakthrough agreement didn’t last long. On 29 September 2007, hundreds of rebels in 30 heavily armed trucks overran an AU base in eastern Darfur, killing 10 soldiers, kidnapping 50 others, and seizing tons of supplies including heavy weapons. Some AU soldiers ran out of ammunition during the attack, which was the deadliest on AU troops since they arrived there three years earlier. One relief worker in the region said of the rebel attack, “It’s indicative of complete insecurity. These groups are attacking anybody and everybody with total impunity.”30 Local authorities blamed the attack on renegade factions of the two rebel groups trying to gain legitimacy prior to peace talks in Libya. Others said the rebels wanted to punish AU troops who they thought were collaborating with the government. Still others think the attack was only an effort to seize weapons.

To make matters worse, cease-fire negotiations in Libya between rebel leaders, Sudanese government officials, and UN and AU representatives broke down when several leaders failed to appear. United Nations officials had described the cease-fire effort as a “make or break moment for Darfur.”31 As the turnover date for the UNAMID force arrived on 31 December 2007, the mission seemed more in jeopardy than ever. The Sudanese government continued to drag its feet on critical elements of the UN deployment, rejecting Norwegian, Swedish, Nepalese, and Thai members of the force, refusing to turn over land necessary for bases, denying overflight authorities for UN aircraft, and impounding communication equipment. In its most blatant act of aggression, the Sudanese Army fired
on a UN convoy of 20 vehicles carrying rations for UN soldiers, critically wounding one driver, and destroying a fuel tanker.32

As a result of the threat posed to peacekeepers, the African Union forces were banned from operating in certain areas of Western Darfur.

“This is the moment of truth for Darfur,” said Jan Egeland, the UN undersecretary general for humanitarian affairs, in Khartoum. “We are playing with a powder keg. It could definitely get worse.” Egeland said Darfur’s crisis has recently worsened and now four million people depend on international aid to survive.33

“We are playing with a powder keg. It could definitely get worse.”
—Jan Egeland

Problems with African Peacekeepers

Washington recognizes the desperate need for peacekeepers in Africa. In March 2007, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice sent an urgent diplomatic cable to all U.S. ambassadors saying that the United Nations would soon approve peacekeeping efforts in Darfur, Chad, the Central African Republic, and Somalia. The peacekeeping operations would require 30,000 to 35,000 additional troops at a cost of $3.3 billion. In her opinion, the “UN is already hard-pressed to meet existing demand and will face significant challenges staffing these new missions.” Secretary Rice later said efforts to recruit additional PKO forces for duty in Africa received a “lukewarm response,” a dangerous situation that could result in unchecked violence and conflict across Africa.34

Other crises have frequently derailed efforts to bolster peacekeeping forces in Darfur. On 5 June 2006, the UN Security Council approved Secretary General Kofi Annan’s request for an additional UN force in Cote d’Ivore. However, the approval for 1,500 new police and soldiers was less than half of the 3,400 that the Secretary General had requested, reflecting a lack of availability of trained forces. The next month, the EU sent a 2,000-man force to the Democratic Republic of the Congo to safeguard the presidential elections, the first democratic elections in 40 years. The EU force complemented an existing 17,000-man UN force, at the time the biggest in the world, that kept peace between rival factions since a bloody civil war from 1998 to 2002 left over two million dead—the worst violence in any country since the end of World War II.35 The Congo operation has been an expensive venture for the United Nations, costing the UN and its donor nations $450 million.36

In December 2006, Ethiopia’s invasion of Somalia resulted in a U.S. call for an international monitoring force of 8,000 in Somalia to separate warring factions there. In early May 2007, AU Chairperson John Kufuor of Ghana expressed frustration in his efforts to recruit PKO forces for Somalia, saying, “The AU wants to send 8,000 peacekeepers [to Somalia] as soon as possible but we are having trouble finding the troops.” Only Uganda had provided troops, but in a disincentive for other African nations, AU headquarters had yet to pay their forces.37 The situation only got worse. In May 2007, Somali gunmen attacked and killed four Ugandan peacekeepers. Former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations John Bolton summarized the philosophy of involvement in African hotspots like Somalia or Sudan: “Sudan is a case where there’s a lot of international rhetoric and no stomach for real action.”38

The prevalence of AIDS on the continent is another serious problem that plagues African peacekeeping forces. Sub-Saharan Africa has just 10 percent of the world’s population but contains 60 percent of all the people living with HIV—over 25 million persons. Southern African nations are the most affected. Life expectancy has dropped below the age of 40 in nine countries. Four countries have declared HIV/AIDS the biggest threat to their national security.39 HIV infections are prominent in the armed forces of these countries. The military and police are especially susceptible to HIV infection because of long deployments away from family,

“Sudan is a case where there’s a lot of international rhetoric and no stomach for real action.”
—John Bolton
access to cash, the tendency to use prostitutes, drug and alcohol use while off-duty, and the plenitude of soldiers from poor and uneducated backgrounds. In 2003, Malawi Defense Force chief General Chimbayo said that troop strength in the country was down 40 percent due to AIDS deaths. China expelled over a third of the Zimbabwean officers sent for training in 2004 because of their HIV infections. The head of the police force in Mozambique said the country was no longer able to recruit and train police officers fast enough to replace those dying of AIDS. In July 2004, a survey of South African National Defense Force personnel revealed that 87 percent were infected with HIV. Some African countries have refused peacekeepers from southern Africa on the grounds that they would cause higher rates of infection in their civilian populations.

**U.S. Efforts to Train African Peacekeepers**

Before the Group of Eight (G8) industrialized nations in June 2004, President Bush announced a $660 million program to train and equip 75,000 peacekeepers around the world over the next 5 years. He said, “The Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) was necessary because we believe in human dignity. The world must have more effective means to stabilize regions in turmoil and halt religious violence and ethnic cleansing. We must create a permanent capacity to respond to future crises.”

The 2007 GPOI budget lists peacekeeping efforts in Africa as its biggest priority. Well over half ($47.5 million) of the $81 million annual GPOI budget goes toward peacekeeping programs in Africa. The funding for African PKO efforts is more than all the other areas of the world combined.

The African branch of the GPOI is the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance Program (ACOTA). The objectives of the ACOTA program are to develop and improve African military capacities to deploy and conduct peace support and humanitarian relief operations in Africa and other areas of the world. Thirty thousand African peacekeepers will train in basic military skills such as military policing, infantry tactics, human rights awareness, and engineering. By improving their military skills, the African peacekeeping forces hope to be able to respond quickly to crises to provide humanitarian or peace support operations. Once trained, forces combine into multinational units to conduct operations under the auspices of the AU, the UN, or regional security organizations. The Department of State oversees the program, and the geographic combatant commanders—U.S. European Command across mainland Africa and U.S. Central Command in the Horn of Africa—execute it. The AFRICOM will assume responsibility for the program once it becomes mission-capable in October 2008.

Another important goal of the ACOTA program is to improve interoperability and facilitate regional operations among African partners. When feasible, one of five regional security brigades that make up part of the African Standby Force (ASF) is supposed...
to address these problems. The ASF headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, has representatives from each of the regional security brigades: in the North, the Community of Sahel-Saharan States; in the West, the Economic Community of West African States; in Central Africa, the Economic Community of Central African States; in the East, the Inter-Government Authority on Development; and in the South, the Southern African Development Community. Of these forces, the Economic Community of West African States is the most advanced.44

Since its inception in 2004, ACOTA has trained 6,800 personnel (27 battalions), 200 cadre, and 100 command and control experts at the brigade level. These soldiers have deployed to monitor conflicts in Sierra Leone, Cote d’Ivore, Liberia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Burundi, Guinea-Bissau, the Central African Republic, Ethiopia-Eritrea, Sudan (Darfur), and Lebanon. The ACOTA goal is to train and equip sufficient numbers of African peacekeepers, including the 25 infantry battalions required to staff five Regional Economic Community (REC) stand-by brigades.

To date, 19 African nations have received ACOTA training.45 The training involves tactical field training for soldiers and command and staff training for officers. The typical six-week battalion-training program includes a command post exercise, field training, and human rights topics such as AIDS awareness and prevention, gender rights, and rules of engagement. Overwhelmed with a resilient insurgency in Iraq and a re-emerging Taliban threat in Afghanistan, the U.S. military has few forces to dedicate to peacekeeping training across 53 countries in Africa. For that reason, the Department of State has hired private contracted companies to conduct most of the training since September 2001.

However, there is a risk in providing military training to nations with poor human rights records. Heavy-handed tactics and atrocities against civilians could delegitimize the national army and further destabilize the region. Six of ten African nations that the Pentagon provided training for in 2006 (Algeria, Cameroon, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and Tunisia) have poor human rights records.46

**Solutions for Africa**

African countries are being asked to solve their continent’s security problems as many Western nations, entrenched in a global conflict against Islamic extremism, are increasingly reluctant to move farther afield to provide PKO in areas seemingly devoid of strategic objectives for their own countries. Nevertheless, the problem remains that African nations are unprepared for peacekeeping duties. Almost all African militaries lack the capability in training and equipment to perform this security role. Those who do have the capability do not have the resources to sustain the deployment very long. In addition, African leaders’ collective lack of political will threatens to jeopardize future efforts to equip these PKO battalions. Even with external assistance, prospects for success are limited. There is little reason for optimism.

The U.S. must collaborate with its allies to promote security in Africa. The French have conducted Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping Capacity (RECaMP) exercises since 1998 to train African peacekeepers. The bi-annual event focuses peacekeeping training on the REC. Standby brigades and 12 to 15 other European nations send mentors and advisors to the RECaMP exercise. Like ACOTA, RECaMP can provide multi-national training to the standby brigades that are supposed to respond to crises within their geographic regions.

A critical element of the African Standby Force is a rapid deployment capability (RDC). Currently, no means exist to send AU forces expeditiously into a conflict zone. In July 2007, AU representatives met at AU headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, to identify RDC requirements and parameters. Participants concluded that an AU RDC should deploy within 14 days, provide urgent assistance to existing peacekeeping forces, and be able to conduct self-sustained autonomous operations for 30 days. The conference forwarded the proposal to all AU nations’ heads of defense for ratification.

The idea of a deployable peacekeeping force has been around for a while. President Clinton had proposed a similar type of UN RDC force in 1993.
During a speech before the UN General Assembly, President Clinton called for the “creation of a genuine UN peacekeeping headquarters with a planning staff, access to timely intelligence, a logistics unit that can be deployed on a moment’s notice, and a modern operations center with global communications.” In his book, *An Agenda for Peace*, then UN Secretary Boutros Boutros Ghali recommended a “rapid reaction force” of battalion-sized units stationed in their own countries with common training, procedures, and equipment, and operating costs of $1 billion per year after start up, extremely modest compared to the $6 to 8 billion per month operating costs for Iraq.

NATO has developed a rapid response force and tested its capabilities in exercises in Africa and Europe. For its part, NATO has expanded from a traditional role of defending territory in Europe to managing threats around the world before they can reach the European shoreline. The NATO Response Force, a 25,000-strong body which became operational in October 2006, is designed to respond to crises in five days, fight its way into hostile areas, and operate autonomously for one month before needing to resupply. While NATO has already formed its RDC, the UN and the AU seem unable to implement this and other strategies because of lack of troops.

**Conclusion**

At the UN Summit in October 2005, United Nations representatives pledged to “protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity” by passing Resolution 1674, the “Responsibility to Protect.” Likewise, the U.S. must do more to prevent a terror-sponsoring nation from appearing on the African horizon. The attacks of 9/11 showed the world the destruction that can emanate from a single failed state like Afghanistan. Although the U.S. Department of Defense designates peacekeeping as a “core military mission,” the quagmire in Iraq has absorbed military assets that Africa needs: the annual Global Peace Operations Initiative budget for Africa would last just five hours in Iraq.

The difficulty of training foreign peacekeepers is evident in the current conflict in Iraq. A recent report from the U.S. Congress House Armed Services Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee stated that, despite $19 billion spent on organizing, training, and equipping Iraqi military and police personnel, the effort has yielded only “mixed results.”

According to the Iraq Study Group report, U.S. military forces, “stretched nearly to the breaking point by repeated deployments to Iraq,” will find it difficult to send adequate troops to African nations that have an immediate need for training and advisement.

The situation in Africa presents a difficult dilemma for foreign policy experts. As Rear Admiral Richard W. Hunt, former Commander of Joint Task Force—Horn of Africa put it, “Africa is the new frontier that we need to engage now, or we are going to end up doing it later in a very negative way.” Yet the military peacekeeper solution is only one element of a more complex problem. Regarding Darfur, Former Secretary of State Colin Powell has said, “In my mind, there would never be enough troops to impose order on this place. The only way to resolve this problem is for there to be a political settlement between the rebels and the government.”

Bogged down in unpopular wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States has little political or diplomatic capital to spend to stop the Sudanese genocide in Darfur. Yet, genocides committed in locations such as Rwanda and Darfur demand an international response. The potential for terrorist training in failed states such as Somalia or Sudan is a threat that could have repercussions in Europe or the United States. American intentions in the region are suspect; suspicion runs deep among African nations with large Muslim populations. Furthermore, many Americans do not see a need to help Africa and see no strategic imperative worth defending to justify sending American troops there. Former U.S. Senator John Danforth, appointed by the Bush Administration as special envoy for Sudan, echoed this sentiment, saying, “This isn’t a country that has much strategic interest for the United States.”
President Bush himself expressed his aversion to peacekeeping operations in a speech at The Citadel. “The problem,” Bush said, “comes with open-ended deployments and unclear military missions. In these cases, we will ask, ‘What is our goal, can it be met, and when do we leave?’ We will not be hasty. But we will not be permanent peacekeepers, dividing warring parties. This is not our strength or our calling.”

Regardless of the assistance the United States and other industrialized nations provide for peacekeeping in Africa, the 21st century promises to be a challenging one for Africans. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs Theresa Whelan described the mission for the U.S. military in Africa: “We want to prevent problems from becoming crises and crises from becoming catastrophes.” For now, the hopes are slim that Africa’s own peacekeepers can prevent continuing genocide in Africa. MR

NOTES

2. The post-independence period in Africa gave rise to numerous conflicts. Estimates of the number of casualties range from eight million to as high as fourteen million. Among the most costly were wars in the Congo (1998-present) with 3,800,000 killed, Sudan (1983-present) with 1,900,000 killed, Ethiopia (1962-92) with 1,400,000 killed, and Nigeria (1967-79) with 1,000,000 killed. The African Union estimated in mid-2005 that there were some 10 million refugees in Africa.
3. The crisis in Rwanda in 1994 resulted in 800,000 deaths in the space of 100 days, mostly Tutsi and Hutu moderates killed at the hands of radical Hutus. Aid organizations in Darfur put the death toll of the more recent crisis at 200,000 though some estimates have it as high as 400,000.
4. SECSTATE WASH DC, message dtg 051635ZMAR07.
10. SECSTATE WASH DC, message dtg 051635ZMAR07.
17. Most international organizations agree that 200,000 people have died since the violence began in 2003. Some estimates rise as high as 400,000. The number of refugees is reported by aid organizations to be 2.5 million.
22. Nicholas Kristof, “The Fugitive’s Tale,” International Herald Tribune, 5 October 2006, 7A.
28. Lydia Polgreen, “Janjaweed and Peace are Elusive in Darfur,” International Herald Tribune, 13 June 2006, 6A.
34. SECSTATE WASH DC, message dtg 051635ZMAR07.
35. Aidan Hartley, “Congo’s Election, the UN’s Massacre,” International Herald Tribune, 17 August 2006, 3A.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid.
43. SECSTATE WASH DC, message dtg 161412ZMAY07.
54. Ibid.
W hen the brutal 12-year civil war between the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) and the El Salvador Armed Forces (ESAF) finally ended in 1992, it had claimed more than 75,000 mostly innocent civilian lives and left another 8,000 missing. In its later years, the fighting had bogged down. Neither the FMLN nor the ESAF could muster enough offensive strength to win decisively, so battles increasingly involved irregulars who demonstrated little regard for civilians. Eventually, a UNSponsored negotiated peace process paved the way for amnesty, reintegration, and reconciliation (AR2).

At times the AR2 approach worked well and showed progress, but at other times it fell far short of potential—in part due to a poorly applied amnesty program. Ultimately, however, even though the process failed to mend the rift completely between the warring factions, an effective reintegration plan did achieve a measure of reconciliation between the two sides. This article examines the implementation of AR2 in El Salvador as a study of conflict resolution.

Interdependent societal dimensions discussed in previous Military Review articles about AR2 can serve as analytical reference points to explain El Salvador’s partially successful process. These societal dimensions include a security aspect, a political aspect, and an economic aspect. As any review of El Salvadoran history will reveal, these dimensions directly influenced the conflict and the country’s ultimately tentative post-conflict stability.

Background

Since El Salvador’s inception as a Spanish colony, its demographics have reflected the legacy of European cultural domination over a dispossessed native population. The particular socioeconomic byproducts of cultural and racial chauvinism familiar to the hemisphere’s history have complicated and retarded El Salvador’s political and economic development. As with other nations in the Americas, a post-colonial oligarchic social structure constricted upward mobility for the poor and poorly served. El Salvador has thus suffered from a deep-rooted division between the economic and political elites of European extraction and the campesinos, the impoverished, mostly native working class.

As is often the case, class division translated into oppression. Oppression was so much a way of life in El Salvador that it became an expectation. In 1985, Clifford Krauss claimed in *The Salvadoran Quagmire*, “El Salvador is...
today what it always has been: a nation of betrayal and terror, where military strongmen, wealthy oligarchs, and village thugs seek final solutions of one political extreme or another.” The general tenor of Salvadoran society circa 2008 reflects the echoes of this dominion of thuggery. Thus, Salvadoran history serves as the lens through which this article attempts to analyze conflict resolution under the rubric of an imperfect AR2 process.

The Salvadoran Truth Commission and Amnesty

Given El Salvador’s history, it is not surprising that the nation’s efforts toward conflict resolution bore mixed results, even though the UN oversaw the process. In the security sphere, all issues were resolved with relative success. Politically, reforms succeeded in creating institutions necessary for democracy, but the participants exploited the reforms to their own advantage. Economically, reforms substantively changed the Salvadoran domestic economy for the good, but an economic regression could play a key role in any future destabilization.

Analysis of AR2 effectiveness requires definition of the terms amnesty, reintegration, and reconciliation as they apply to El Salvador. Amnesty, in this case, follows the legal definition from the Oxford Essential Dictionary of the U.S. Military: “An official pardon for people who have been convicted of political offenses.” In the case of El Salvador, the amnesty was preemptive in nature. Reintegration includes the totality of institutional reforms aimed at incorporating the disenfranchised back into a healthier Salvadoran civil society. Reconciliation denotes the process of forgiveness, whereby aggrieved people voluntarily choose not to pursue remedies for perceived or actual offenses committed against them during the conflict.

Theoretically, achieving a full measure of reconciliation requires a pragmatic application of amnesty as a necessary precursor to reintegration. In El Salvador’s case, an inappropriately timed and too-generous amnesty denied the nation a proper closure. Even though truth commission trials put the country in position to achieve fuller reconciliation, hasty government action truncated the AR2 process prematurely, preventing it from realizing greater benefits.

The truth commission. The Chapultepec Peace Accords of 1992 directed the creation of a truth commission under the oversight of the UN’s Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL). This measure had the potential to serve as the foundation for real reconciliation. Unfortunately, the commission’s mission and scope were flawed from the start. As Judge Thomas Buergenthal, one of the commission’s three members, pointed out, truth commissions themselves lack any true measure of judicial authority; most simply exist as fact-finding bodies, with some even lacking the authority to name names when appropriate (though the Salvadoran commission did retain this power). To achieve accountability, a court of law must act upon the commission’s findings and recommendations. In the Salvadoran case, the commission reported to ONUSAL and was not supplemented by any international or domestic court that could translate its results into punitive measures. Given the Salvadoran government’s later implication in upwards of 95 percent of extra-judicial killings, a specific requirement to address commission findings in the nation’s own judicial system would likely have doomed the peace accords.

Nevertheless, the commission’s mandate stipulated that all major human rights violations be investigated. Deliverables included recommendations to help the country achieve reconciliation. While the commission’s findings did not claim to serve as a complete record of abuses that took place during the 12-year war, the group went so far as to identify, by name when evidence was sufficient, individuals responsible for particular human rights violations.

The amnesty. Any real impact the truth commission report could have had was superseded only days after its release when the legislature approved a sweeping amnesty law. That legislature was controlled by the Alianza Republicana Nacionalista (ARENA), a right-wing party in power since 1989 whose founder, Roberto D’Aubisson, had been credibly linked to death squads. According
to ONUSAL, the amnesty effectively preempted any practical attempt to identify and prosecute individuals associated with extra-judicial killings during the war.\textsuperscript{10}

The amnesty law thus provided the Salvadoran government an expedient vehicle for distancing its criminal past while still fulfilling the accords’ letter. The state avoided a long, drawn-out battle between factions looking to place blame, and it escaped having to challenge its heretofore protector, the army, over allegations of excessive violence. To be fair, rumored threats of a military takeover probably led the political establishment to approve the excessively generous amnesty as an act of self-preservation.\textsuperscript{11}

Furthermore, by foregoing justice in the name of reconciliation, the law denied the populace any deterrent to the commission of future violations.\textsuperscript{12} It also demonstrated the vulnerabilities inherent in ONUSAL’s oversight: its already weak authority could be circumvented by passage of a domestic law. In any event, the Salvadoran people felt the general amnesty’s greatest impact, since it eliminated any legal recourse for civil war victims and drastically reduced the chances for a full national reconciliation.\textsuperscript{13}

**Limited success.** Measures to establish official state recognition of accountability have not improved in the last decade, probably signaling a permanently truncated AR\textsuperscript{2} process. In fact, as late as 2003, government officials testified in front of the UN that the three most publicized killings (those of Archbishop Romero of San Salvador, six Jesuits priests, and the massacre at El Mozote) were still under investigation, even though the truth commission had effectively established accountability.\textsuperscript{14} According to the officials, only the investigation into the murder of Archbishop Romero had met with any success—and that marginal, with the murder attributed to the actions of one lone man. Given the killing’s patently political motive, this was hardly a convincing conclusion.\textsuperscript{15}

If these officials reflect the nation’s unwillingness to adjudicate past crimes, it appears that progress in El Salvador is over. The state’s power brokers feel no compelling need to reconcile their society’s disparate segments. In short, by failing to provide even limited avenues of redress to the aggrieved, the government’s hasty amnesty undercut reconciliation. Amnesty set the conditions under which the reintegration process could proceed, but it forestalled full reconciliation. The interconnecting influences across El Salvador’s societal dimensions illuminate this partially successful but truncated AR\textsuperscript{2} process.

**Security Dimension**

The Chapultepec Accords directed the FMLN to disarm and demobilize, a prerequisite for peaceful transition. Conducted in five stages, the process was declared complete by the UN in 1993.\textsuperscript{16} FMLN demilitarization ended the military standoff and ensured that the civil war did not resume. It also laid the foundation for transitioning guerrilla forces into society. In exchange, the ESAF relinquished its role as a domestic law enforcer and assumed a defensive stance against external threats.\textsuperscript{17}

The accords also laid out a plan to reform the government’s forces. First, the ESAF was directed to establish an ad hoc commission to purge its officer corps of members linked to extra-legal killings during the war.\textsuperscript{18} It was also directed to dismantle its covert intelligence service, the National Guard, and the Treasury Police while reducing the army’s size by 50 percent. Finally, the military was placed under civilian control.
These measures met with varying degrees of success. The commission removed complicit officers from the command structure, the intelligence service was disbanded, and the army was reduced; however, the National Guard and Treasury Police were never dismantled—the ESAF merely renamed them and transferred their entire structures into the regular army. Additionally, it took several years for the military to hand over control of intrinsically nonmilitary government institutions to civilian authorities.

The disparity between the letter and spirit of the accords and their results is attributable to the leverage the military continued to exercise over politics and the economy. Not only did the army retain great sponsorship in the legislature, but most of the ad hoc commission’s members came from the military. Moreover, the commission exercised its responsibilities after the FMLN de-armed; thus the ESAF, with its long-time enemy bereft of military strength, felt no immediate need to show good faith and air its dirty laundry. The reforms were meant to redefine and transform the military—they were vital for reconciling both the guerrillas and the ESAF with the rest of society. Piecemeal implementation by the government would set the conditions for an unenergetic reconciliation process.

The Chapultepec accords also called for dissolution of the Policia Nacional (PN) and establishment of a new force, the Policía Nacional Civilista (PNC). The founding of the PNC marked the “first time that internal security was separated from the military.” Sixty percent of the new force was composed of civilians who were not associated with the conflict, while 20 percent came from the old PN and 20 percent from the FMLN. It was a creative way to develop a buffer between the people and the state while also limiting the economic impact of the expected influx of ex-FMLN fighters (many of whom lacked any basic skills beyond those required for waging war) into a state system that was experiencing a nearly one-in-five unemployment rate. However, in keeping with its historical reluctance to change, the Salvadoran government delayed PNC activation, blaming a lack of funds to train and deploy the force.

At this juncture, ONUSAL—and the reform process—lost traction. Mandated to monitor and verify changes, not enforce them, ONUSAL could do little to keep the reform ball rolling. It also had to contend with a perception problem; for example, if it pushed for security changes to move forward, it ran the risk of seeming to favor the FMLN, a perception that could have undermined the mission’s domestic and international credibility. The government exploited the mission’s vulnerability to perception and its lack of judicial teeth by using the amnesty law to shroud its degree of complicity in the killings from the international community. The government found it could declaw ONUSAL’s security recommendations by delaying or relaxing standards as it saw fit. Caught between the Scylla of judicial impotence and the Charybdis of fragile credibility, ONUSAL could only stand silently by and watch the government procrastinate. It took obvious, direct violations of the accords to elicit a confident ONUSAL censure.

Over time, fears that the government’s machinations would prevent full reintegration and reconciliation have given way to a sense that security concerns, at least, have been alleviated. Simultaneously, reformation of the ESAF has contributed to political reconciliation by halting the violence and by giving the populace an objective civilian law-enforcement unit that buffers them from military authority and allows for economic revitalization. The security dimension’s primacy in the peace process, therefore, allowed political and economic reforms to develop, albeit at a laggard’s pace.

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Political Dimension

Given El Salvador’s oligarchic history, the FMLN probably chose its ideology, Marxism, because it was appropriate to the socioeconomic nature of the group’s dissent. It was also convenient: Marxism was the politic du jour in the 1980s, and adopting it allowed the guerrillas to tap into a continuous flow of tangible support from ideological sympathizers, namely Cuba, Nicaragua, and the Soviet Union. Put
simply, Marxism was an understandable, pragmatic response to an oppressive situation; it was the form the FMLN insurgency took, not the motivator of that insurgency. Under the Chapultepec Accords, the FMLN’s transition from an outlaw organization to a legal political party has borne this out: opposition to economic injustice has proven far more important than adherence to ideology.

Despite the peaceful political transition, however, El Salvador has yet to realize true political reintegration. By forming coalitions with tangential political entities, ARENA has dominated the legislature and the presidency and continues to maintain a steady grip on political leadership. The party has been known to control its coalitions using patently corrupt measures. The FMLN, which is excluded from these coalitions, lacks any true measure of power on the national level. Thus, while El Salvador maintains the trappings of democracy, real political competition at the national level has proven elusive. Flawed implementation of the Chapultepec Accords has done virtually nothing to mend the economic fractures and political discontent that gave rise to the FMLN and the war; the process simply established structural avenues by which the FMLN could espouse and legally seek political support for its views. It legitimized the opposition, but could not empower it. As a result, political reconciliation in El Salvador has not led to the birth of any true spirit of democracy. This failure was apparent in 2004, when the FMLN boycotted President Antonio Saca’s inauguration.

Such circumstances should come as no surprise to those familiar with El Salvador. The country’s history resonates with examples of power brokers using the political process to defend their selfish interests at the expense of mutually beneficial policies issuing from a more enlightened self-interest. Their narrow agendas inevitably involve hoarding political power in order to accumulate wealth.

Economic Dimension

Economic exploitation lay at the root of the El Salvadoran conflict, and it continues to limit reconciliation. Historically, the country’s rich elite manipulated the economic and political dimensions of society for their own benefit while using the army for protection. Elizabeth Wood described the pre-1992 Salvadoran government as “coalitions of economic elites and military hardliners [defending] labor-repressive institutions and practices until the civil war.” Moderating influences have been slow to gain traction in the Salvadoran government.

These conditions originated in the oligarchic politics of the colonial era, when a few Salvadorans were very rich, a multitude were very poor, and there was virtually no middle class. Although similar class strata had developed in other Latin American countries, El Salvador by the mid-80s became known as the region’s poorest country. As late as 2002, 48 percent of the populace still lived in poverty. Economic improvement, like political progress, has been slow in coming.

Today, El Salvador has the second-highest GDP in Central America, but that testifies less to its economic health than to the moribund economic conditions of the region’s other, similarly exploitative, economies. Another failure of the Chapultepec Accords was land reform. In the 1930s, coffee became El Salvador’s major export. Economic dependence on the crop created intense competition for land in a country with little arable turf. Consequently, the rich few—10 percent of the population—bought up or otherwise acquired all the land. Land-reform movements prior to the civil war sought to rectify this inequity with a constitutional amendment that limited private landowners to 245 hectares. Unfortunately, though predictably, government leaders ignored this provision, since enforcing it would have adversely affected their own wealth and power base. After the Chapultepec Accords,
land reformers (led primarily by FMLN leaders) sought to implement the constitutional restriction. Mass protests eventually forced the government to partially comply with the constitution, but movement leaders shifted emphasis: having obtained land for themselves in exchange for assuming debt, they dropped land redistribution as an issue in favor of debt relief. Land reform essentially halted.35

The reform that did occur caused havoc with the fragile economy. In many cases, the new landowners became subsistence farmers, something for which the government had failed to plan. The economy’s perpetual heavy reliance on coffee exports therefore compounded and encouraged continuing poverty, even after dilatory attempts at economic reform.

From a macroeconomic standpoint, land that once contributed to the nation’s overall wealth and indirectly fed many, now fed only those who farmed it. The percentage of agriculturally productive land dropped precipitously. Only then did the government modify its conservative economic policies to account for the new reality.36

Fortunately, by the time these marginally progressive land reforms and overdue, relatively meager economic measures were enacted, the security and political dimensions had changed enough to ensure stability that could withstand prolonged economic recalcitrance. On the downside, there was little impetus from those dimensions to push through with timely and serious economic reform.

From the viewpoint of the AR2 framework, security assurances came first; the most visible political reforms then followed (at a leisurely pace). Political restructuring created just enough space for confrontation over pertinent economic issues. In lieu of effective economic reform, however, an unprogressive stagnation ensued. El Salvador still faces obstinate political and economic challenges, many of them due to the quick, immoderate amnesty that short-circuited the overall reconciliation effort. That all parties to the agreement were so quick to meet the letter of the law and then act so slowly in implementing meaningful change toward reconciliation reveals volumes about their self-interested, inherently flawed approach to AR2.

**Conclusion**

Analysis of the AR2 process in El Salvador suggests that certain salient factors affected outcomes:

- The lack of a real mechanism to enforce the findings of a truth commission or other such investigative body derailed real reconciliation and reform. In El Salvador, ONUSAL was mandated only to oversee, not enforce, reforms—it was basically an impotent spectator whose recommendations were opposed by entrenched parties. ONUSAL’s need to appear neutral further weakened its effectiveness. When the mission confronted a societal context that actually favored a strong central government, its limitations became insurmountable. An armed reconciler is probably a necessity for effective AR2.

- The government’s linear algebra of sustained selfishness consistently frustrated attempts at reform. AR2 is more art than science, and it requires an integrating calculus of enlightened self-interest, not the defense of entrenched interests. A government’s performance in AR2 depends almost entirely upon its raison d’être. The Salvadoran case demonstrated a need not only for structural reformation of a narrowly self-interested government, but also for a shift in philosophy that would enable the intended spirit of the reform to be realized along with the letter. This moral epiphany did not occur in El Salvador.

- The government’s quick amnesty put the AR2 process on a bad footing from the outset. Although this amnesty applied only to government misdeeds—the FMLN’s misdeeds were never even brought to light—the inherent unfairness of this prospect still does not absolve the government from enacting amnesty in a socially conscious fashion. Amnesty cannot be viewed in isolation; it must be considered within the context of the overall AR2 objectives. Amnesty may be a prerequisite for reintegration, and both may be necessary to achieve genuine societal reconciliation, but a full and properly pragmatic consideration must be given to what each step entails. How amnesty is applied remains as important a decision to the end of the AR2 process as it is to its inception. In the Salvadoran example,
blanket amnesty may have created the conditions for reintegration, but it covered guilty tracks and clouded the transparent process of reconciliation. In doing so, it adversely affected the degree to which real reconciliation was possible. Even wholesale reintegration could not overcome the lingering resentment born of an immoderately quick and pervasive amnesty.

- Placing the onus of change upon parties complicit in the original conflict—effectively leaving the former combatants to their own devices—is not the most efficacious way to proceed. The fact that there was no decisive winner in this conflict further highlights the issue. This point is a corollary of the need for a potent, armed reconciler.

- The heart of conflict resolution involves adequate redress of grievances. In this case, the driving grievances, or root causes, involved economic inequity. To the extent El Salvador does not maintain an economic balance, there exists a chance for resumption of violence.

If nothing else, the Salvadoran case study shows that reconciliation is an ongoing process, dependent on the effective application of amnesty and reintegration across the security, political, and economic dimensions. **MR**

### NOTES

5. Ibid., 218-19.
6. Nicole Hertvik, “El Salvador: Effecting Change From Within,” *United Nations Chronicle Online Edition* (September-November 2002): The government of El Salvador had for the most part disassociated itself with right-wing death squads by the time of the peace accords, but it still had to account for the practices of previous administrations. Discussed in an email on 17 December 2007 with Ambassador David Passage, charge d’affaires with the U.S. Embassy, El Salvador, regarding the Salvadoran civil war.
13. The amnesty law covered only those offenses attributed to government action. The peace process was never designed to obtain redress for FMLN victims, making amnesty a moot issue. Email with Ambassador Passage.
15. Up until his death, Archbishop Romero was an outspoken defender of the poor and a vehement activist who publicly criticized the government’s oppressive tactics. During a mass celebrating the life of a radical journalist’s mother, an assassin stepped into the center aisle and shot him through the heart with a high-powered rifle. The assassin was never found, but later investigations attributed the murder to the activities of a right-wing element within the government. For more information regarding the government’s role in this murder, see Krauss.
16. Stahler-Sholk, 12.
18. Ibid.
22. Ibid., 16.
23. Passage.
27. Ibid., 80.
28. The FMLN has met with moderate success in sub-national elections.
35. Ibid., 301.
IN JUNE 2006, the United States dispatched military forces to its southern border to help stem the tide of illegal immigration from Mexico. The tempestuous historical relationship between the United States and Mexico meant that this was hardly the first time the Army went south to effect security along the border. The issues along that frontier have always been complex, and bringing in trained (or untrained) soldiers means inserting them into a very difficult and potentially violent situation. At no time was that made more apparent than in the mid-1910s, when the Army on the border found itself caught up in a mishmash of border security, local violence, guerrilla warfare, racial politics, and state diplomacy.

Background

By the turn of the 20th century, the traditional hostility between the United States and Mexico had cooled, due in no small part to the relative stability afforded Mexico by the long reign of Porfirio Diaz. That peace came at a price: Diaz was a military officer who seized power and ruled as a de facto dictator for most of the years between 1876 and 1911. Mexico began to modernize under the Diaz regime, but his heavy-handed tactics, Mexico’s heavy dependence on foreign investment, and the poor condition of the country’s lower classes led to a loss of popular support for the aging general. When Diaz backtracked on his promise to step down from power and allow a fair election in 1910, a new revolution and struggle for power began. Among the prominent Mexican leaders who emerged from that struggle were Francisco Madero, Victoriano Huerta, Venustiano Carranza, Francisco “Pancho” Villa, and Emiliano Zapata.¹

The instability created by the Mexican revolution led to an increased Army role on the border. In the spring and summer of 1911, the War Department placed several understaffed Regular Army units near the frontier, based in the towns of San Antonio and Galveston, Texas, and San Diego, California. The troops withdrew in the latter part of the year, but smaller Army units remained and ran patrols along the border to keep an eye on the situation to the south.² In 1913, the War Department reorganized the military in the continental United States into a series of departments and districts. The new Southern Department, headquartered at Fort Sam Houston, Texas, encompassed Louisiana,
Arkansas, Oklahoma, and the border states of Texas, Arizona, and New Mexico. Brigadier General Tasker Bliss became the first commander of the department, and had the unwelcome task of trying to patrol the border with three undermanned cavalry units.3

Across the border, Francisco Madero came to power when he was elected president in 1911, but forces led by General Huerta deposed and murdered the new president the next year. Huerta set up a new dictatorial regime, and Carranza, Villa, and Zapata launched a rebellion against the general. President William Howard Taft, nearing the end of his term in 1913, once again moved troops south to Texas to help stabilize the frontier, but diplomatic events soon overtook this precaution.

The manner of Madero’s removal from power so displeased new American president Woodrow Wilson that he felt compelled to intervene in Mexican affairs. In February 1914, he allowed the shipment of arms to anti-Huerta forces in Mexico. When Mexican Huertista soldiers arrested a group of American sailors at the port city of Tampico in April, Wilson reacted by ordering the bombardment and partial occupation of the city of Veracruz—an occupation that would last until November.4 Huerta resigned the presidency under pressure from forces inside and out of Mexico, and Carranza emerged as the most likely candidate for leadership of Mexico.5

But even the fall of Huerta did not entirely please President Wilson, who did not formally recognize Carranza as Mexico’s new leader.6 Villa and Zapata almost immediately turned against Carranza, which led to a widespread civil war and the most violent period of the Mexican Revolution. Wilson, hoping for a coalition government in Mexico to prevent any one actor from wielding too much power, did not offer strong support for or opposition against anyone in the conflict. The occupation of Veracruz and Wilson’s picayune objections alienated the Mexican people and their leaders, and helped set the stage for a series of violent disputes along the border between Mexico and the United States.7

The Plan of San Diego

Even Diaz’s relatively stable reign had barely concealed the discontent among the people along the border between the United States and Mexico. The conflicts between the two countries involved more than politics at the national level. The shifting frontier meant that Americans and Mexicans with different priorities, loyalties, and prejudices found themselves living side by side. Even though Mexicans and Mexican Americans outnumbered Anglo Americans on and across the border, the Anglo Americans dominated the political and economic landscape. Mexicans and Mexican Americans in these border regions faced the difficult question of how to deal with the institutions and culture of their new neighbors. As one historian has written, they embraced “four basic tactics: withdrawal, accommodation, assimilation, and resistance.”8 The majority withdrew, accommodated, or assimilated, but some did resist, and some resisted with violence. As a result, the 19th and early 20th centuries saw the outbreak of countless fights along the border and in the border states.9

The Mexican Revolution made the situation worse. Unrest along the border, especially in the Lower Rio Grande, opened the door for lawbreakers to engage in criminal activities, especially livestock rustling. In the first half of 1915, raids and attacks on farms and ranches all along the border increased markedly.10 But there was more going on than just banditry.

In January, a group of Mexicans and Mexican Americans devised the Plan of San Diego, so-called because it had allegedly originated in the town of San Diego, Texas (although it more likely came from Monterrey, Mexico). The plan called for the reclamation of the southwest United States for Mexico through race war, promising that “every North American over 16 years of age shall be put
to death, and only the aged men, the women and children shall be respected; and on no account shall the traitors to our race be spared or respected.” Mexicans and Mexican Americans were not to be alone in the fight—the plan counted on an alliance with Indians, African Americans, and Japanese. Once the revolutionaries had achieved victory, they would set up a new independent republic and arrange to create a separate republic for the blacks who participated.

The creators of the plot had little success in the early part of 1915, and their followers took months to get organized. Two American citizens from the Brownsville, Texas area, Luis de la Rosa and Aniceto Pizaña, played the key role in putting the plan to work. In the early summer of 1915, they went to Mexico and began to recruit troops. They organized the recruits, many of whom had once fought for Carranza, into units of 25 to 100 men and, in July 1915, started launching attacks. At first, the raids looked like a continuation of the earlier, homegrown banditry. As such, the new commander of the Southern Department, Major General Frederick Funston, believed that the responsibility for policing the bandits belonged to the local authorities, not the Army.

The nature of the raids and the raiders indicated why Funston might be so confused. The attacks blended in with criminal activities, and it was unclear who was responsible for anything. The instability in Mexico meant that the leaders who controlled the border regions—Carranza in northeast Mexico and Villa in northwest Mexico—did so only nominally. The Carrancistas along the border with Texas came under the more direct control of General Emiliano Nafarrate, who was not particularly obedient to Carranza. Some of the bandits were Mexican citizens living both in Mexico and the United States; others were Mexican Americans who lived on either side of the border. Some were motivated by revenge against the prejudice of Anglos in the United States. Others acted under orders from Carrancista officials in Mexico. A few were simply robbers out to make money in the chaos. Historian James Sandos correctly warned against giving any one group total responsibility for the attacks:

The Plan began with followers of Huerta, then was taken over by Germans, who later shared their control with Carranza. But this point must be underscored—the backers did not make the Plan work; they served only as a catalyst. The instability and unpleasantness of border life gave the Plan a semi-independent existence and the backers exploited this situation in rendering support.

As a result of all of this confusion, it took some time before the Army and federal officials recognized the depth of the problem.

The raids picked up in frequency and intensity throughout July. As one historian has written, Plan of San Diego “followers attacked Anglos; attacked symbols of change in the valley such as equipment associated with the railroad, telegraph, automobile and irrigation; and visited reprisals on Mexicans and Tejanos who helped Americans.” On 4 July 1915, roughly 40 Mexican bandits entered the United States and killed 2 men during a raid on a ranch near Lyford, Texas. On 9 July, a foreman of a large ranch killed a bandit in an attack. Historian Charles Cumberland described what happened next:

The following week another raid in the same vicinity emptied a country store and post office; on 17 July marauders killed a youth near Raymondville; and that same night a posse fought a pitched battle with another band. Eight days later, south of Sebastian, raiders numbering approximately 30 burned a bridge; on 31 July, Rancho de los Indios suffered the death of an employee through a raid; on 3 August raiders burned another railroad bridge; and 3 days later, after robbing a store and seizing firearms from individuals, a small band of raiders deliberately executed 2 men.

On 3 August, at Los Tulitos Ranch, 18 miles north of Brownsville, troopers from the 12th Cavalry fought a heated battle with 25 to 50 bandits, only to have the Mexicans escape after nightfall. Five days later, 60 raiders attacked the Norias Ranch 70 miles north of the border, which was defended by a
handful of employees and a small detachment from the 12th Cavalry. The defenders held on and killed several Mexicans in the process.19

As July went into August, U.S. Army commanders and public officials began to recognize that they faced a bigger problem than homegrown criminal stealing or rustling.20 The Plan of San Diego, which had seemed like a fanatical delusion only a few months earlier, now appeared to be gaining momentum. The bandits had broad support in Mexico. Carrancista newspapers throughout the country reprinted the text of the plan and openly encouraged the attacks as a sign of a growing revolution.21 Most troubling was the fact that the bandits were clearly using Mexico as a refuge and staging point for the raids. In the raid on the Norias Ranch, the bandits had kidnapped 75-year old Manuel Rincones and forced him to act as a guide. After the battle, Rincones informed the authorities, including General Funston, that about half of the raiders had come from Mexico.22 By 10 August 1915, Funston grasped the problem, “It is impossible for detachments of United States troops when pursuing a particular band of outlaws to determine whether they are all residents of the United States or whether all or some of them are armed marauding bands who have crossed the border into United States territory.” Funston believed that the Army should play a more aggressive role in stopping the raids: “This being the case, I have deemed it my duty to continue using military to pursue and capture these bandits . . . Any other course would render troops practically useless . . . and would limit their activity to the duty of acting as guards for certain localities.”23

Even after Army commanders and national politicians recognized the nature of the difficulty, they were not equipped to respond. Army commanders at every level along the southern border had too few troops to deal with the raids. Brigadier General James Parker, commander of the 1st Cavalry Brigade based at Fort Sam Houston, had to spread 3 cavalry regiments into 16 posts over a 900-mile border. Parker later described his situation:

In view of the 900-miles front, I jocularly claimed that I had the biggest brigade in the world!
It was composed of 3 regiments—the 2d Cavalry, the 3d Cavalry and the 14th Cavalry. Each regiment was composed of 12 troops and a machine-gun platoon, numbering about 1,000 men; thus I had about 3,000 men and horses. The detachments along the Rio Grande numbered 16. There were also 30 small camps of patrol detachments or outposts. As there is much heat, dust and alkali water in the desert country along the Rio Grande great hardship was experienced in these camps by both men and horses.

The main camps were some distance from the river. Each maintained two or three outposts of 10 men each near the river, these outposts, by means of small patrols, maintaining communication with each other and with the main camp. Despite these vigorous efforts, Parker continued, “it was difficult to prevent the Mexican bandits from breaking through the line of outposts.”

The specific area where most of the Plan of San Diego raids occurred covered nearly 300 miles of border, and had only 1,100 troops to patrol it, mostly infantry. When the 26th Infantry Regiment arrived in Brownsville in August 1915, its commander, Colonel Robert Bullard, found that he had the regiment plus 3 squadrons of cavalry and 2 field artillery batteries to protect an area that stretched along 100 miles of the Rio Grande and 150 miles north of the border. With the troops so spread out, all they could do was wait for reports of attacks and try to react as quickly as possible. The bandits had all of the initiative. Funston’s desperation could be seen in a telegram sent to Washington, D.C. on 30 August:

If an uprising should occur without sufficient troops to put it down it will mean the murder of hundreds of defenseless people, the destruction of millions in property and a loss of prestige. These things we cannot afford to risk. The measures I wish to take are largely those of prevention . . . If I do not have an adequate force ready for instant use a single act of indiscretion by a subordinate commander on either side may start a conflagration that will extend along the entire border and result in an international crisis . . . A reference to my official reports and recommendations will show that I have heretofore been very conservative in regard to calling for more troops largely because I wished to avoid unnecessary expense. The time for economy has passed, more troops should be supplied regardless of expense.

In addition to trying to stop the border raids, the Army had to deal with local authorities and vigilante groups. In the hysteria that followed the raids of July and August, Texas Rangers, local law enforcement, and countless private citizens took it upon themselves to use brutal tactics against anyone, usually Mexican American men, they perceived to be potential bandits. The racial antagonism that helped trigger the violence was described by one early observer: “On one side of the river the slogan was ‘Kill the Gringos’; on the other it was ‘Kill the Greasers.’”

The Texas Rangers had the ostensible responsibility for keeping order in the state, but a corrupt and inefficient governor had hobbled the organization. Just as the situation on the border grew worse, the force became inexperienced and inept, and Rangers participated and even led attacks against Mexican Americans. In August, civilians in Texas organized the Law and Order League, one of several vigilante groups. These groups confiscated weapons and property, threatened Mexican Americans, and beat, shot, and lynched suspected bandits. In September, one of the groups shot and killed 14 Mexican Americans near Donna, Texas, and left the bodies in a row as a warning to the bandits. In October, vigilantes responded to a raid by hanging or shooting 10 “suspicious Mexicans.” Even conservative estimates put the number of Mexican Americans killed at over 100. Funston estimated that state and local officers “did execute by hanging or shooting approximately 300 suspected Mexicans on [the] American side of [the] river.” The violence cleared out the valley. As many as half of the 70,000
residents of the Lower Rio Grande fled in fear of attacks from Mexican bandits or the reprisals of the Anglo Americans. The Army had the responsibility of trying to stop the worst excesses of vigilantes and local law enforcement run amok, all while trying to stop the raids from across the border.

It seemed everything was working against the Army’s efforts to catch the raiders. The terrain made it difficult to track the Mexicans, because “despite the large tracts cleared for commercial agriculture most of Cameron and Hidalgo counties had an abundance of chaparral, mesquite thickets, prickly pear and giant cactus.” Then, in 1915, the Wilson administration forbade the U.S. Army from crossing the border, even to protect American interests in Mexico or in hot pursuit of bandits who had crossed into the United States. Historians Charles Harris and Louis Sadler explained how such a policy made the terrain even more favorable to the raiders: “The Rio Grande was a meandering river with banks covered by heavy underbrush, and at the time South Texas was suffering from a severe drought; the flow of the Rio Grande was much reduced, and attackers could pick and choose where to cross into Texas” and, it should be added, back into Mexico.

Predictably, the border restriction frustrated Army commanders. Funston’s predecessor as commander of the Southern Department, General Bliss, had insisted that the only way to ensure border security during the Mexican revolution was to occupy Mexican border towns and create a buffer zone between the countries. Army officers on the border, like General Parker, repeatedly expressed their dissatisfaction with not being allowed to pursue raiders over the river. Even as the raids grew worse in July 1915, Funston received a telegram from Washington that explicitly restricted him to reactive tactics:

The War Department realizes perfectly the undesirability from a military standpoint of the restriction that is placed upon you in not giving you permission to cross the Mexican border in case it should become necessary to use force to protect American life and property on the American side of the line. But this restriction is imposed on account of the necessity of retaining in the hands of the authorities at Washington the final discretion of authorizing a matter of such importance as an invasion of Mexican territory. Under all circumstances the only thing to do is to meet the facts as they arise.

To make matters worse, more and more reports came in that American outposts, soldiers, and even patrol planes were being fired on from the Mexican side of the river, and Army commanders believed that Mexican Carrancista commanders were not doing anything to stop the attacks.

The War Department did provide Funston with more troops. By September, more than half of the Army’s mobile units were stationed between Laredo and Brownsville. Still, the attacks kept coming. On 2 September, a series of assaults hit Brownsville, San Benito, and Ojo de Aqua. Between 4 and 6 September, Mexicans and Americans exchanged fire at several crossings along the Rio Grande. The bandits ambushed an Army patrol at Los Indios on 13 September, killing two Americans. On 17 September, the Mexicans and Americans once again exchanged heavy fire over the river, this time at Brownsville. One week later, 80 bandits attacked Progreso and fought a brief but heated battle with the small cavalry detachment in the town. The Mexicans were driven off, but they captured one of the Americans, a Private Richard J. Johnson. At some point during or after their retreat across the river, the raiders killed Johnson, cut off his ears, decapitated him, and put his head on a pike on the south side of the river in full view of the Americans.

The next few weeks were relatively peaceful. Then, on the night of 18 October, De la Rosa and his...
followers pulled off one of their most spectacular attacks seven miles north of Brownsville at Tandy Station on the St. Louis, Brownsville and Mexico Railroad. There the bandits had removed the spikes holding down the rails and attached a wire to the tracks. As the train approached, they pulled the wire, causing the engine to overturn. The engineer died in the wreck. De la Rosa and his men boarded the train, began looting, and went after the Anglo passengers. They shot three soldiers, killing one, and killed another civilian passenger. The raiders fled the scene and made their way back over the river before the Army or any local posse could catch them. Three days later, bandits struck a 15-man Signal Corps detachment at Ojo de Aqua on the Rio Grande. Three Americans and five raiders died in the fight.

The raid at Tandy Station and the attack at Ojo de Aqua pushed Funston to more drastic conclusions. He wrote to the War Department requesting authorization to cross the border in pursuit of the bandits and permission to order no quarter during battles and pursuits. “The American inhabitants of the lower border have about reached the limits of their patience in the matter of the border raids and it will not take many more outrages like the recent wreck of a train and the murder of its defenseless passengers to send them over the border,” he wrote. “There is but only one way to end it and that is to make it almost certain death to engage in one of those raids.” The War Department, though sympathetic to Funston’s situation, denied these requests, warning Funston that such actions would do more harm than good. Historian Charles Cumberland summarized the War Department’s telegram:  “The use of the proposed tactics would be disastrous for the military establishment; press sensationalists would seize the opportunity to accuse the Army of lapsing into barbarism and, no matter how true the charges or how great the need, public reaction would be bitter.” The continued raids and Funston’s frustrated request made it clear that even with thousands of troops in the lower Rio Grande valley, the Army could not bring order to the frontier region.

Other events stopped the attacks of 1915. By late September, the Americans began to lean toward recognizing Carranza as the de facto leader of Mexico. Several factors influenced this trend. Carranza had clearly seized the advantage in the fighting and controlled most of Mexico’s vital natural resources. The Mexican leader promised to initiate some democratic reforms and to protect American lives and American-owned property in Mexico. President Wilson also desired a more stable situation on the southern border so that he could focus his efforts on the war in Europe. Secretary of State Robert Lansing explained the thinking of the Americans in his diary on 10 October 1915:

> Germany desires to keep up the turmoil in Mexico until the United States is forced to intervene; therefore, we must not intervene. Germany does not wish to have any one faction dominant in Mexico; therefore, we must recognize one faction as dominant in Mexico. . . .

> It comes down to this: Our possible relations with Germany must be our first consideration; and all our intercourse with Mexico must be regulated accordingly. The fact that the Germans repeatedly acted to keep Mexico unstable gave further encouragement to the Wilson administration. If the United States was to play a larger part in World War I, it would not do to have to worry about fighting an irregular war with Mexican forces in the American southwest. At the same time, Carranza began to act to improve the situation. In late September, he replaced General Nafarrate and ordered Mexican officials to crack down on bandits south of the border.

With those considerations in mind, the unrest created by the low-level insurgency no doubt helped push Wilson toward recognition of Carranza. On 19 October 1915, the Americans officially gave de facto recognition to the “First Chief.” On 24 October, the raiders attacked near Tandy Station. It was the last raid of the year. Carrancista officials cracked down or bought off the rest of the followers of the Plan of San Diego. The fact that Carranza could shut down the raids so quickly indicated that he may not have ordered the attacks, but he most likely allowed them and used them to his benefit.

The response of the Army to the border raids of 1915 was haphazard at best. General Funston could not cross the border in pursuit of the bandits and could not control local authorities and vigilantes. The presence of the majority of American troops on the border did not stop the raids, and Funston’s
suggestion that the Army be given a free hand in dealing with bandits only indicated the depth of his frustration. And although the attacks of 1915 had been most frequent in the Lower Rio Grande, that did not mean that the rest of the border was secure. At various times throughout the year, Mexican bandits made raids into all of the border states. These attacks in 1915 made national politicians and Army officers all too aware of the problem of border instability. When the issue came up again the next year, their experiences led them to try a new solution to the problem that led to more violence and the potential for all-out war.

The Columbus Raid and Punitive Expeditions

By the time the United States decided to recognize Carranza, Pancho Villa’s fortunes had long since turned for the worse. A series of military defeats at the hands of Carrancista forces had reduced his army to a ragged, demoralized group. But Villa’s base of support had always been in the north, and he assumed that he was invincible in the northern states of Chihuahua and Sonora. That confidence led him to attack the Carrancista troops at Agua Prieta in November 1915. He was completely unaware that the Americans had given a few thousand Carrancista troops free passage through southern Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona so that they might reinforce the besieged outpost. Villa’s men walked right into a hail of fire. The battle at Agua Prieta and the follow-up campaign scattered what was left of the Villa’s army and forced Villa to turn to guerrilla warfare.

Up until the events of the summer and fall of 1915, Villa had tried to maintain positive relations with the United States, but his attitude shifted dramatically after Agua Prieta. That said, the specific motivation for the raid on Columbus, New Mexico, has never been exactly clear—not has Villa’s actual role in planning and executing the attack. What is clear is that on 9 March 1916, Villa led a force of nearly 500 men on an attack of the small town and its U.S. Army outpost, manned by the 13th Cavalry. The Villistas took the town by surprise, but the American troops quickly recovered and fought back. The Mexicans retreated over the border. Seventeen Americans and over 100 Mexicans died during the raid.

Citizen outrage and natural instincts suggested that Villa himself be brought to justice for the attack. Public pronouncements from the Wilson administration indicated as much by announcing that they were sending Brigadier General John J. Pershing on a “punitive” expedition with the mission to capture or kill Villa. However, for the Army, the Columbus raid and punitive expedition were very much a continuation of the previous attacks along the border, and therefore any response had to focus on border security. Stationing more troops in the border region and reacting to raids had not worked the year before, so they took a more direct approach.

After the Columbus raid, Secretary of War Newton Baker went to Army Chief of Staff General Hugh Scott to request “an expedition into Mexico...on 9 March 1916, [Pancho] Villa led a force of nearly 500 men on an attack of the small town and its U.S. Army outpost...
to catch Villa.” Scott replied, “Mr. Secretary, do you want the United States to make war on one man? Suppose he should get on the train and go to Guatemala, Yucatan, or South America; are you going to go after him?” The general convinced Baker that a more realistic and useful goal was to capture or destroy Villa’s band. General Funston came to a similar conclusion about what had to be done in response to Columbus: “Unless Villa is relentlessly pursued and his forces scattered he will continue raids . . . If we fritter away the whole command guarding towns, ranches and railroads it will accomplish nothing if he can find safe refuge across the line after every raid.”

The War Department’s March 1916 orders to Funston confirmed the Army’s concerns:

You will promptly organize an adequate military force of troops from your department under the command of Brigadier General John J. Pershing and will direct him to proceed promptly across the border in pursuit of the Mexican band which attacked the town of Columbus, New Mexico, and the troops there on the morning of the ninth . . . In any event the work of these troops will be regarded as finished as soon as Villa’s band or bands are known to be broken up.

Three days later, the War Department repeated the orders to Funston in order to avoid any confusion: “The President desires that your attention be especially and earnestly called to his determination that the expedition into Mexico is limited to the purposes originally stated, namely the pursuit and dispersion of the band or bands that attacked Columbus, N.M.”

The War Department did more than order the punitive expedition. The Villa raid gave the Army the opportunity to expand its tactics all along the border, and the Army meant to take advantage of that chance. The 10 March orders to Funston continued:

You will instruct the commanders of your troops on the border opposite of the state of Chihuahua and Sonora, or, roughly, within the field of possible operations by Villa and not under the control of the force of the de facto government, that they are authorized to use the same tactics of defense and pursuit in the event of similar raids across the border and into the United States.

The militarization of the frontier region had degenerated into direct conflict. American troops were crossing over the border on raids of their own.

On 15 March, Pershing led thousands of American troops into Mexico, beginning a campaign that would take him hundreds of miles through the state of Chihuahua in pursuit of Villa and his band. But Pershing’s was not the only crossborder raid of 1916. As American troops chased Villa across the Mexican countryside, the issue of border security became even more prominent in the minds of the Americans. They had reason to be concerned. De la Rosa, one of the leaders of the Plan of San Diego, believed that the trouble with Villa offered an opportunity to renew his efforts, so he began reconstituting his force. He and several other Mexican leaders reorganized the military wing of the Plan of San Diego. For a time, this force worked with elements of the Carranza government to threaten the United States with invasion as a method for driving out Pershing’s force. The Mexican government ultimately decided not to back this effort, but that did not stop a renewal of raids.

On 5 May 1916, a group of roughly 80 men raided the towns of Glenn Springs and Boquillas, Texas, destroying property and kidnapping 2 Americans. Funston quickly identified the threat as coming from the renewed efforts of the proponents of the Plan of San Diego and worried about the reaction of the civilian population: “I feel I should state frankly that a resumption of these raids marked
with all the savage cruelties and barbarities of the lower border raids of last fall will rouse the people of that region to fury and cause them to cross the river in large numbers regardless of wishes of the Government and take drastic action." As they had the year before, Army commanders requested more troops to stop the raids and avert vigilantism. After the Glenn Springs raid, Generals Funston and Scott sent a telegram to the War Department:

We expect many attacks along the whole border similar to the latest attack in Big Bend Rio Grande.

Our line is thin and weak everywhere and inadequate to protect border anywhere if attacked in force... we think the border should at once be supported by at least 150,000 additional troops... In order to give some added protection to border points exposed to raids it is recommended militia of Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona be called out at once.64

The Wilson administration complied, sending much of the Regular Army to the southwest, and federalizing the Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas National Guards on 9 May 1916.65

But in 1916, the United States did more than send additional troops to the border. Much to the surprise of the bandits who attacked Glenn Springs and Boquillas, the retreat across the Rio Grande did not give them refuge. Major George T. Langhorne, driving his own Cadillac, led 5 cavalry troops of the 8 and 14th Cavalry in the initial pursuit across the border, declaring “I am clear of red tape, and I know no Rio Grande.”66 A few days later, Colonel Frederick W. Sibley led another unit after the Glenn Springs raiders. The Sibley and Langhorne force, dubbed by some “the little punitive expedition,” traveled more than 100 miles into Mexico, suffered no casualties, dispersed the bandits, rescued the captives, and even recovered some of the stolen property.67

When a party of Mexicans attempted to burn bridges above Laredo on the night of 11-12 June, American forces tracked them over the river, killing three, including the leader.68 Likewise, an attack on an Army unit at San Ignacio, Texas, on the night of 15 June led to a firefight that saw eight bandits killed, “and the rest pursued as they sought the sanctuary of Mexican territory.”69 A similar course of events occurred in mid-June, when a group of Mexicans made an attack near San Benito, Texas. This time Colonel Robert Bullard led a mixed group of cavalry and infantry in automobiles over the border and dispersed the raiders.70

The situation had become so tense that on 18 June, the Wilson administration federalized the rest of the country’s National Guard units and sent them to the border.71 These new troops were so untrained and unprepared that many of the regular officers thought they detracted from the mission of border security and made it nearly impossible to launch any more raids into Mexico.72 As these Guard units prepared for battle, some of the commanders on the border believed that they had a chance to launch a major campaign into Mexico and shut down the raids once and for all. Funston suggested to his superiors that the only way to truly stop the raids would be to have the Army move south of the border in large numbers to create a buffer area by occupying “strategic points.”73

But just as the training began to take hold, orders came down prohibiting American forces from crossing the border.74 The Wilson administration once again found itself questioning just how much time, energy, and resources it wanted to spend in Mexico with the war on in Europe. Likewise, Carranza really did not want to risk an open war with the United States that could lead to him being thrown from power. As Wilson began to limit Army reaction to raids, Carranza began to crack down on the raids on his side of the border. He ordered his commanders on the border to cooperate with the Americans in stopping the raids. A good example of these new efforts could be seen in the aftermath of the San Benito raid. After Bullard and the Americans withdrew, the Mexican commander in the region, General Alfredo Ricaut, pursued the bandits, eventually capturing 40 men. With his plan...
in tatters, De la Rosa went to Monterrey. There, the local authorities held him under a sort of house arrest, but refused to hand him over to the United States. Nevertheless, by July, the Plan of San Diego was dead.

The issue of border security dominated the diplomatic discussions between the United States and Mexico, so much so that the withdrawal of the punitive expedition became predicated on the stabilization of the border. In July 1916, Secretary of State Lansing proposed a joint American-Mexican peace commission to settle the Mexican troubles. The commission was to come to agreements on all manner of issues, but among these issues, border security and stability clearly took precedence.

Indeed, the commission first met in September 1916 and spent the next four and a half months jockeying over questions of border passage, hot pursuit, and U.S.-Mexican cooperation in border security. It was in this context that when Pershing’s forces finally withdrew in January 1917 without capturing or killing Villa, the Americans declared the expedition a success. Secretary of War Newton Baker wrote in his 1917 annual report:

The expedition was in no sense punitive, but rather defensive. Its objective, of course, was the capture of Villa if that could be accomplished, but its real purpose was the extension of the power of the United States into a country disturbed beyond control of the constituted authorities of the Republic of Mexico, as a means of controlling lawless aggregations of bandits and preventing attacks by them across the international frontier. This purpose it fully and finally accomplished.

Chief of Staff General Hugh Scott agreed, “Pershing made a complete success in the accomplishment of his orders from the War Department point of view but the State Department, by putting out erroneous information, spoiled the effect in the minds of the public.”

Perhaps this post-expedition insistence that the mission had always been to achieve border security was merely a justification for not capturing Villa. Pershing certainly felt that he could have done more if only the Wilson administration had given him more freedom to act. But in light of the border disputes of 1915 and 1916 and the correspondence from Army commanders on the ground, there can be little doubt that they viewed the pursuit of Mexican bandits across the Rio Grande as an essential tactic in the effort to preserve American border security. That tactic nearly led to open war.

Conclusions

Soon thereafter, the cross-border raids tapered off, and the situation stabilized. Some Army units stayed in the Southern Department—which was renamed the VIII Corps Area in 1920—but most returned to their stations across the United States. The next decades saw renewed tensions along the border from time to time, but nothing that rose to the levels of the 1910s. The United States and Mexico solved most of the rest of the border disputes of the 20th century by treaties. However, for that time in the 1910s when the Army played the key role in trying to provide stability and security along the border, the situation became very messy and nearly degenerated into war.

Obviously, the current situation along the United States-Mexico border is a far cry from the dark, violent days of the 1910s. There is no contemporary equivalent to the Plan of San Diego, and the Mexican government is far more stable than it was during the revolution. That said, there are important analogues, and the circumstances on the frontier are every bit as complex today as they were 90 years ago. In particular, by the 1980s, two problems had emerged: illegal immigration and the cross-border transport of illicit drugs. Mexican immigrants come across the border by the millions every year, using well-developed systems to bypass American border patrols. At the same time, and similar to the cross-border cattle rustlers of the 1910s, drug traffickers use this chaotic human exchange and the long, relatively open borders to send a flood of narcotics from Central and South America into the United States. The primary responsibility for border security is in the hands of the Border Patrol, run by Immigration and Naturalization Services. Like the Army in the 1910s, they are woefully undermanned, with not enough agents to cover all the miles of border.

What is more, much like the 1910s, those responsible for border security have to consider complicated ethnic politics and national-level diplomatic considerations. Rightly or wrongly, some Mexican American interest groups and civil rights activists take exception to policies that appear to target specific
ethnic groups for exclusion from the United States. National, state, and local American political leaders who depend on votes from such groups are wary of taking strong positions on border security.

In the 1990s, the United States, Canada, and Mexico joined together in the North American Free Trade Agreement, which further opened the borders within North America to business, and made it that much more difficult to exclude illegal immigrants and illicit narcotics. As a result of these trends, Border Patrol agents followed highly circumscribed rules of engagement to prevent outbreaks of violence that might upset the delicate political balance.81

The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 complicated this already tendentious issue. All of the terrorists had come from overseas, and even though none had come from across the southern border, it was not too much of a stretch to imagine that the terrorists would eventually try to hide within the steady flow of illegal traffic from Mexico. For this reason, a number of private citizens pooled together to help aid the authorities in resisting illegal immigration. Calling themselves “Minutemen Civil Defense Corps,” they set up watch stations along the border to report sightings of illegal crossborder activities to the Border Patrol. Thus far, they have not engaged in any known acts of violence, but they nevertheless have taken on the appearance of an anti-immigrant vigilante group.82

In the summer of 2006, the pressure to deal with the southern border led to the deployment of 6,000 National Guard troops to the southern border in Operation Jump Start—a mission intended to support existing border authorities while the Border Patrol recruited thousands more agents to handle security on their own. American political and military leaders made clear their intent not to militarize the border or invade Mexico, and the soldiers operated under strict orders to observe and report but not engage with illegal immigration or narcotics smuggling.83

Where then in this situation is the major area of concern for the military? The same place as it was in the 1910s: escalation. The border region is peopled with individuals of varying nationalities and national allegiances, and those allegiances can fuel intense emotions. Local authorities have their own agendas, which can be at cross purposes with the concerns of the national government, and volunteer law enforcement or vigilante groups might choose to act outside of local official policies. The presence of international boundaries means that local authorities must work with national-level diplomats to find solutions to disputes. The danger only grows when the military moves into the area.

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, military forces on the border in support of the war against drugs got caught up in a few high-profile incidents when they used force against perceived and real threats. In one case of mistaken identity and misunderstood intentions, a Marine patrol killed an American citizen.84 Since the 2006 deployment to the border, National Guard units have had to hold fire on several occasions, including when a group of armed bandits overran a military outpost in early 2007.85 At the same time, there has been a significant increase in violence directed at Border Patrol agents—the men and women with whom the military works everyday.86

The American military, even the more streamlined and nuanced force of today, is still an instrument of war. Its natural inclination is to use force, and it is unrealistic to expect that trained military forces
will forever resist the urge to fight back to defend themselves and their friends.\(^7\)
Nor is it likely that state and national political leaders can or will allow their charges to be attacked perpetually without allowing some sort of response. When the military is involved, there is a great temptation to use force, as everyone discovered in the 1910s. But as everyone also discovered in that tumultuous decade, the use of force along the border can have dramatic and very negative effects.

What to do? The decision to restrain the National Guard has by and large worked to prevent escalation on the border in the short term. But it is predicated on a decisive increase in Border Patrol agents in the near future. If that happens, then the military can withdraw. But if it does not happen, and the chances look somewhat dim, then American policymakers must make a choice.\(^8\) Either the military must be empowered to enforce border security by all means available, which will in effect militarize the border, or the military must be withdrawn to allow the undermined Border Patrol and local authorities to handle the job. The toothless military presence on the border cannot last forever. The U.S. military has enough on its plate fighting the nation’s conventional and unconventional wars; it cannot and must not become a permanent southern border neighborhood watch association.\(^9\)


\(^{11}\) Ibid., 391.


\(^{15}\) Closed in September 1915, the San Antonio branch of the National Guard was commanded by the bandit leader Pancho Villa.

\(^{16}\) Ibid., 10, fn. 9.

\(^{17}\) Ibid., 268.


\(^{19}\) Ibid., 48.

\(^{20}\) Ibid., 261.

\(^{21}\) Ibid., 261.

\(^{22}\) Ibid., 261.

\(^{23}\) Ibid., 261.

\(^{24}\) Ibid., 261.

\(^{25}\) Ibid., 261.

\(^{26}\) Ibid., 261.

\(^{27}\) Ibid., 261.

\(^{28}\) Ibid., 261.

\(^{29}\) Ibid., 261.

\(^{30}\) Ibid., 261.

\(^{31}\) Ibid., 261.

\(^{32}\) Ibid., 261.

\(^{33}\) Ibid., 261.

\(^{34}\) Ibid., 261.

\(^{35}\) Ibid., 261.

\(^{36}\) Ibid., 261.

\(^{37}\) Ibid., 261.

\(^{38}\) Ibid., 261.

\(^{39}\) Ibid., 261.
Carranza had made a deal with the Wilson administration that surrendered Mexican territory to the United States in return for US support in the Mexican Revolution. Villa believed had wronged him. The most prominent Villa biographer maintains that Villa's relationship with the US government was complex and that he sought to use the US in his war against the Mexican government. 

The German involvement in the Mexican Revolution was significant, as evidenced by the Zimmermann Telegram, which was sent in February 1917. The telegram proposed that Germany would aid Mexico in the event of war with the United States, and that Mexico would encourage the US to enter the war against Germany. The telegram was widely known in early 1917, when German Foreign Minister Arthur Zimmermann sent his famous telegram to the German representative in Mexico City encouraging the Mexicans to attack the American southwest in the event of open war between the United States and Germany. Zimmermann's telegram was a significant factor in the American decision to enter World War I in 1917.

The American Punitive Expedition against Mexico in 1916 was a response to Villa's attacks on American border towns. The expedition was led by General John J. Pershing, who was given the task of capturing Villa. Pershing's forces encountered resistance from Villa and his followers, and the expedition was eventually called off in 1917 due to the outbreak of World War I.

The American intervention in the Mexican Revolution was a result of the US government's belief that Mexico was a potential ally against Germany. The US government's decision to support the revolution was based on the belief that a stronger Mexico would be less likely to attack the United States.

The American Punitive Expedition of 1916 was a significant event in the history of the United States and Mexico. The expedition marked a new era of military cooperation between the two countries, and it set the stage for future conflicts over immigration and border security.

The American Punitive Expedition of 1916 was a significant event in the history of the United States and Mexico. The expedition marked a new era of military cooperation between the two countries, and it set the stage for future conflicts over immigration and border security.
Andrew J. Birtle, Ph.D.

"IT IS EVIDENT," remarked Secretary of War Elihu Root at the end of the Philippine War, "that the insurrection has been brought to an end both by making a war distressing and hopeless on the one hand and by making peace attractive." Root’s appraisal holds true for much of the U.S. Army’s experience in waging irregular wars. Nevertheless, there remains much confusion over the roles that persuasion and coercion play in rebellions and other internal conflicts. Having recently concluded the second in a two-volume study on the U.S. Army’s experience in waging counterinsurgency warfare, I’d like to explore the relationship between force and politics by examining three conflicts that the United States Army was involved in during the 19th and 20th centuries: the War of the Rebellion (the U.S. Civil War, 1861-1865), the Philippine War (1899-1902), and the Vietnam War (1954-1975).

The War of the Rebellion

President Abraham Lincoln understood the importance of political factors when he set out to defeat the Southern rebellion against the U.S. government. During the early stages of the conflict, he charted a moderate course, both to pave the way for reconciliation and to mollify opinion in the Border States. He avoided attacking the South’s “peculiar institution” (slavery), offered amnesty, commuted sentences, released civilian prisoners, and tried to restore normal civil life to occupied areas as soon as possible. Most of his commanders embraced these policies, and when they did not, he rebuked or removed them.

Lincoln’s moderation failed to persuade Southerners to lay down their arms, however, and over time the president accepted sterner measures to control and, if necessary, to punish rebellious civilians. He suspended habeas corpus and imposed loyalty oaths, while his commanders relocated people, levied fines, and confiscated property.

Major General William T. Sherman epitomized this less tolerant approach. Believing that the government was “not only fighting hostile armies, but a hostile people,” Sherman decided that it “must make old and young, rich and poor, feel the hard hand of war.” He therefore directed that “in districts and neighborhoods where the army is unmolested, no destruction of property should be permitted; but should guerrillas or bush whackers molest our march, or should the inhabitants... otherwise manifest local hostility,
then army commanders should order and enforce a devastation more or less relentless, according to the measure of hostility.”

Devastation, not indiscriminate but directed at the disloyal, was meant to weaken the rebels’ ability to fight as well as their will to do so.

The growing use of collective punitive measures did not mean that Lincoln had abandoned moderation. In 1863, for example, he unveiled a generous process through which rebellious states could rejoin the Union. He likewise signed General Orders 100, *Instructions for the Government of the Armies of the United States in the Field*, which reminded Soldiers that “the ultimate object of all modern war is a renewed state of peace,” and that “men who take up arms against one another in public war do not cease on this account to be moral beings, responsible to one another and to God.” The document admonished Soldiers to respect the personal and property rights of civilians as well as their social customs and religious beliefs. It likewise forbade wanton destruction, looting, cruelty, and torture. Nevertheless, benevolence was not a one-way street, and should the citizenry spurn the hand of reconciliation, General Orders 100 permitted commanders to take stern measures. Among the punishments it prescribed for civilians who aided the enemy were fines, expulsion, relocation, imprisonment, and death. The orders also authorized commanders to use calculated and proportional retaliation; to deny quarter for those who gave none; and to dispense summary punishments to guerrillas, spies, and traitors.

Throughout the remainder of the rebellion, Lincoln continued to wield inducements in one hand and punishments in the other. He diminished chances for peace, however, after he issued the Emancipation Proclamation. Although the proclamation helped solidify support in the North and abroad, it alienated Southerners by demonstrating that the U.S. government meant to destroy the foundation of Southern socioeconomic life. With little room for compromise after that point, the war truly became, if it had not always been, what William H. Seward called an “irrepressible conflict.” Ultimately, force of arms, not political inducements, would determine the outcome of the most serious internal conflict in American history. Politics would continue to play an important supporting role, however, for by adhering to moderate policies as much as possible, the government helped reconcile Southerners to their defeat in 1865.

Such was not the case when after the war Congress launched an ill-conceived effort to revolutionize Southern society. The government’s attempt to “reconstruct” the South alienated the majority of the region’s white population. Even Sherman, the apostle of coercion and violence during the rebellion, conceded afterwards that “no matter what change we may desire in the feelings and thoughts of the people [in the] South, we cannot accomplish it by force.” Bayonets could compel compliance, but they could not change a culture. As the government and public grew tired of wading through the tar pit of Southern politics and withdrew federal troops, one “reconstructed” state government after another fell to a combination of political maneuver, intimidation, and terror. The nation thus emerged from its civil war reunited and slave-free, but encumbered by a persistent culture of racism that would keep the African-American population in social subordination for another hundred years.

**Ultimately, force of arms, not political inducements, would determine the outcome of the most serious internal conflict in American history.**
The Philippine War

Thirty years after the demise of Reconstruction, President William McKinley confronted an insurgency when the Philippine Islands refused to accept American sovereignty at the end of the Spanish-American War. Aware of Filipino suspicions about U.S. intentions, McKinley promised the Filipino people a “benevolent assimilation,” instructing the commander in the islands, Major General Elwell S. Otis, to make every effort to “win the confidence, respect, and admiration of the inhabitants.” Otis complied, but as in the Civil War, the desire of regional leaders for independence proved irreconcilable with the U.S. government’s determination to assert colonial authority. Violence was the inevitable result.

During the ensuing conflict, the United States used political means extensively. It negotiated with Filipino leaders, offered generous terms of amnesty, and established civilian governments, first at the town and later at the provincial and “national” levels. It built and staffed schools, engaged in public works, and imposed other progressive measures designed to improve government institutions. Throughout the archipelago, officers directed their troops to be on good behavior and to respect cultural norms so as not to alienate the man on the street. Brigadier General J. Franklin Bell summarized U.S. policy when he reminded his subordinates that—

Government by force alone cannot be satisfactory to Americans. It is desirable that a government be established in time which is based upon the will of the governed. This can be accomplished satisfactorily only by obtaining and retaining the good will of the people . . . . Our policy heretofore was calculated to prevent the birth of undying resentment and hatred. This policy has earned for us the respect and approval of a large majority of the more intelligent and influential portion of the community. We cannot lose their support by now adopting such measures as may be necessary to suppress the irreconcilable and disorderly.

This approach helped to win acceptance of American rule and to fragment the insurgency—so much so that some areas offered very little resistance. Persuasion and benevolence were not, however, able to end the war by themselves. Part of the reason was that initiatives cherished by Americans, such as introducing more democratic institutions or modern sanitary practices, either had little impact on the common man or violated cultural norms. A more sinister factor was the insurgents’ use of terror to keep people in line, for as Brigadier General Samuel S. Sumner admitted, “Nothing that we can offer in the way of peace or prosperity weighs against their fear of assassination which is prosecuted with relentless vigor against anyone giving aid or information to the government.”

Finally, there existed a hard core of rebels determined to continue to fight until compelled to give in. Unless the Army could bring these elements to heel, pacification would be uneven at best and impossible at worst. Thus, military actions to defeat the enemy in battle, police activities to protect the people from intimidation and to punish those guilty of criminal behavior, and coercive measures to cut the insurgents off from their sources of support and to control the behavior of the population proved as essential as they had during the Civil War. When the Filipino insurgency dragged on, the U.S. Army did what it had done during the War of the Rebellion: it resorted to increasingly stern measures.
General Bell’s actions reflected the change in policy. Acting on the premise underlying General Orders 100 that “a short and severe war creates, in the aggregate, less loss and suffering than a benevolent war indefinitely prolonged,” Bell’s troops herded people into detention camps, imposed fines, and burnt freely so as to keep “the minds of the people in such a state of anxiety and apprehension that living under such conditions will soon become unbearable.” The results were sometimes unpleasant. Excesses occurred, but Bell’s approach proved decisive in breaking the back of the insurgency. Moreover, just as in the Civil War, once the enemy was no longer willing to endure the suffering the conflict engendered, America’s benevolent policies played an important role by helping the insurgents accept their defeat.

The Army thus won the war in the Philippines by following both the precepts of General Orders 100 and the example of General Sherman, enticing some insurgents into surrender while beating others into submission.

The FM further echoed General Orders 100 in permitting government forces to take strong actions...
against insurgents and their civilian supporters. Among these measures were restrictions in the movement of people and goods, the taking of hostages, and infliction of punishments and reprisals, although the manual cautioned that security forces should be careful to target only the guilty. Subsequent manuals toned down the punitive language while emphasizing the importance of positive programs to win the hearts and minds of a restive populace. Nevertheless, persuasion and coercion remained inextricably linked in U.S. doctrine since, in the words of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Economic and political progress are dependent upon reasonable internal security, and internal security cannot be permanently effective without complementing non-military action.” During the 1960s, the Army made extensive efforts to inculcate this dual doctrine through education and training programs at every level.

The Vietnam War

This was the state of affairs when the U.S. Army entered the Vietnam War. The new conflict differed in several key respects from the Philippine War and the War of the Rebellion. First, the two earlier insurrections had for the most part been conservative independence movements in which the rebels wanted to preserve rather than change their societies. The war in Vietnam, however, incorporated aspects of a revolutionary class struggle. This, combined with the highly organized and conspiratorial nature of the Communist Party, made it impossible to find acceptable solutions through reform or compromise.

A second difference was that the conflict was not just internal; it was an international war in which South Vietnam’s indigenous opposition was organized, controlled, supplied, and reinforced by a foreign power bent on redressing social grievances but on conquering the South and absorbing it into its territory. The “insurgency” was essentially manufactured by the North and, over time, it was increasingly waged by regular North Vietnamese soldiers. Consequently, even complete success in redressing the internal causes of unrest could not guarantee either peace or the survival of South Vietnam.

A final key difference between the Vietnam War and the two earlier conflicts was that it occurred not on U.S. territory but in a sovereign foreign country whose weak, corrupt, and often recalcitrant government the United States could sometimes influence but never control. Something that is difficult under the best of circumstances—formulating and executing an integrated politico-military effort—became a Herculean task.

From the start of America’s involvement in Vietnam, U.S. Soldiers preached political action as a key ingredient in the counterinsurgency effort. For example, in 1954, Army Chief of Staff General Matthew B. Ridgway recommended that a precondition for giving military assistance to Vietnam should be the existence of “a reasonably strong, stable, civil government in control,” because “it is hopeless to expect a U.S. military training mission to achieve success unless the nation concerned is able to effectively perform governmental functions.” The following year, the senior U.S. military representative in South Vietnam, Lieutenant General Samuel T. Williams, cautioned Vietnam’s leaders that “military operations alone are not sufficient for success,” and that military actions must be conducted “in harmony with . . . political, psychological, and economic policies.” Every top U.S. commander in Vietnam after Williams reiterated this advice. Together with U.S. diplomatic personnel, American Soldiers also pressed the Vietnamese to make socioeconomic, political, and administrative reforms to strengthen the government’s standing with the population and to undermine support for the insurgents. These principles, however, proved easier to understand than to execute, given the complexities of American bureaucracy, Vietnamese politics, and the enemy’s political and military strength. Meanwhile, the United States took what unilateral actions it could, pouring millions of dollars into a wide variety of aid and development programs and performing innumerable civic actions, from providing free medical care to building schools and digging wells.

As in previous wars, these actions had positive effects, but they could not win the conflict. Poor conception, flawed execution, bureaucratic wrangling, resource shortages, and various other political impediments contributed to the disappointing result. Just as important, however, was the fact that the United States had formed unrealistic expectations about what political action could achieve given the conditions in Vietnam. In the words of one 1966 Army report—
Socio-economic programs must be closely tied to the pace of the security effort. Attempts to win allegiance from the population or to induce from it a willingness to bear arms against Viet Cong harassment by the distribution of commodities or services without reasonable assurance of continued physical security are invitations to failure. An early U.S. assistance concept espoused socio-economic good works which, by themselves and preceding security, were expected to galvanize the peasant into making a military commitment against the Viet Cong. Programs executed under this concept were dramatically unsuccessful: bags of bulgur wheat have never been known to kill an insurgent.17

Americans rediscovered in Vietnam what their forebears had learned in the War of the Rebellion and the Philippine War, and what Army doctrine had foretold—that political and military measures were equally necessary and that they had to be carefully coordinated to have a positive effect. Furthermore, until the security forces could protect people from insurgent intimidation and control, little of significance could be expected from political programs designed to wean the population from the insurgency. Should the government gain the upper hand militarily, demonstrations of benevolence could indeed persuade guerrillas to surrender and civilians to openly side with the apparent victors. As in the American South and the Philippines, therefore, successful applications of military force and restrictive measures would be essential for success. Given that by 1966 the enemy had approximately a quarter of a million troops, guerrillas, and cadre in and around South Vietnam, allied forces faced the daunting task of keeping the enemy in check while providing the sort of security necessary to persuade people either to support the government or to stop aiding the enemy.

Military victories over enemy forces in 1968 finally gave the allies the opportunity they needed to make headway on pacification. Aided by a revitalized effort on the part of the South Vietnamese government, an improved system of politico-military coordination through the recently created office of Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development (CORDS), and a major military and paramilitary buildup fueled by importing vast quantities of additional war materiel, the allies were able to make significant gains in spreading their influence over the countryside. Programs of persuasion, development, and political mobilization played a role, but as a National Security Council study group concluded in 1970, public “support tends to follow rather than lead control. Most rural people have no strong commitment to either side, and they accept the governance of whichever side appears to be winning.”18 (Emphasis added.)

“We have achieved our project, now let’s join hands to maintain it and protect it,” reads a sign erected by villagers after government forces cleared communist insurgents from their area (in Vietnam, 1970).

Photograph VA001161, 1970, Douglas Pike Photograph Collection, The Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University
While political progress was both desirable and necessary to solidify the government’s gains, the group acknowledged that improvement had come only after “the allies were able clearly to gain the upper hand in the main force war, destroying, dispersing, or pushing back the enemy main force units.” This was no surprise to CORDS, which devoted the lion’s share of its personnel, activities, and funds to security and intelligence efforts to protect and control the population rather than to socioeconomic betterment programs. Population resettlement and police measures to restrict the movement of people and goods likewise contributed to weakening the Viet Cong.

The South Vietnamese government would have been far stronger had it been able to win the support of its people more through persuasion than by coercion, but political, social, and security conditions in the country made such an achievement problematic. Still, enough progress occurred that the South could have survived the insurgency had it not been for North Vietnam’s immutable determination to conquer the South. Given the North’s attitude, South Vietnam was always going to live or die by the sword. Even if it had been entirely successful in winning the support of its people, South Vietnam could only have survived if it had had sufficient military power of its own or the direct military backing of the United States. Without these, it fell easily to North Vietnam in 1975.

Carrots and Sticks

This brief review of America’s experience in waging internal conflicts has demonstrated that the U.S. government and its Army have always used a combination of positive and negative measures to suppress rebellions. Much to the frustration of theorist and practitioner alike, history has shown that there is no simple formula for combining these two essential yet volatile ingredients. Rather, counterinsurgency warfare has proved to be more alchemy than science, with each situation requiring a different proportion of ingredients, depending upon the social, political, cultural, and military nature of the conflict.

This truth notwithstanding, individuals writing about counterinsurgency warfare most emphasize the unusual degree to which political considerations permeate what in conventional conflicts would be purely administrative, technical, or military decisions. This is understandable, but it can become counterproductive when taken to extremes. All too often, people reduce counterinsurgency’s complex nature to slogans declaring that political considerations are primary, that nation building is a viable war-winning strategy, and that the only road to victory is to win the “hearts and minds” of a population. As with many clichés, these promote one truth at the expense of another.

There are several reasons why such slogans tend to obscure more than they illuminate. To begin with, simplistic catch phrases do not convey the reality that some political differences are irreconcilable—which, of course, may be why the parties to a dispute have resorted to arms in the first place. Neither do such phrases help policymakers navigate the labyrinth of political considerations incumbent in any internal conflict. Just as political and military concerns will sometimes clash, so too will choices have to be made between competing political imperatives.

Slogans such as “winning hearts and minds” can also lead to a misapprehension that counterinsurgencies are popularity contests. Sometimes unpopular actions such as the Army’s relocation of civilians during the Philippine War may be necessary. In the same way, worthy actions such as the liberation of a previously repressed class may fan the flames of resistance among a nation’s traditional elite, while promoting democratic reforms, as the United States did in Vietnam, can backfire by increasing instability.

Moreover, clichés meant to illuminate the importance of politics can build unrealistic expectations within the American public that only serve to thwart the government’s ability to resolve insurgencies successfully. There is a tendency on the part of many Americans, for example, to believe that economic capitalism and political democracy are sure remedies for resolving internal conflicts. This belief, a reflection of our culture, has always been present, but it gained particular virulence in the 1960s when nation building and counterinsurgency theorist Walt W. Rostow postulated that a thirst for a more prosperous life had created a “revolution of rising expectations” that was driving people to rebel in less prosperous areas of the world.20 Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker reflected this philosophy...
when he told South Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Cao Ky that “people are drifting toward communism because they are poor. If you give the people everything they want—television sets, automobiles, and so on—none of them will go over to communism.” The rhetoric proved naïve. Economics and materialism were not as deterministic as many had thought, and even Rostow eventually admitted that “as for the linkage between economic development and the emergence of stable political democracies, we may, in retrospect, have been a bit too hopeful.”

Unrealistic expectations about the power of material changes have been matched on the political front. As historian Daniel Boorstin warned in 1953, “If we rely on the ‘philosophy of American democracy’ as a weapon in the world-wide struggle, we are relying on a weapon which may prove to be a dud.” This was because democratic institutions “always grow out-of-doors in a particular climate and cannot be carried about in a flower pot.” Experience has demonstrated the truth of Boorstin’s observation, for time and again, U.S. nation builders have seen transplanted American institutions wither in the infertile soils and inhospitable climates of foreign countries. Counterinsurgency and nation building theorists have all too often ignored this reality and have fallen into the culturally insensitive trap of trying to radically transform foreign societies—a task that is extremely difficult under the best of circumstances, if it is possible at all. Such a tack can also alienate the very country we are trying to help, as occurred often in Vietnam. U.S. leaders should have heeded diplomat George Kennan, who had observed in 1954 that “even benevolence, when addressed to a foreign people, represents a form of intervention into their internal affairs, and always receives, at best, a divided reception.”

In all three of the wars discussed in this article, the U.S. government underestimated the challenges posed by the rebellions and overestimated the impact that moderate polices and persuasive actions would have in quelling them. Initial optimism eventually gave way to disenchantment on the part of the American public and a more sober calculus on the part of the Nation’s Soldiers and statesmen. These and other experiences led counterinsurgency author and Vietnam veteran Lieutenant Colonel Boyd T. Bashore to observe somberly in 1968 that success in internal wars “seems most often to have been effectively accomplished by an all-out police-military effort and not by pushing freedom like a wet noodle from the top down into the countryside. . . . The people of a nation under attack must accept discipline and put off or give up many of the rights and privileges that we may hold dear in our democracy. This fact of life, as unpalatable as it may seem, must be fully understood. A counterinsurgency doctrine that does not recognize the primacy of the military forces in providing security is doomed to failure.”

The reality, of course, is that politics and force are inextricably linked in a dynamic, symbiotic relationship, and both are necessary to win. The great challenge is to find the right blend for a particular situation—a formulation that may well be different from that used at another time or place, even during the same conflict. Slogans like “politics are primary” are useful if they remind us that, in counterinsurgency as in all forms of war, military means must be subordinated to political ends, and that political and persuasive arts play a vital role in waging and resolving internal conflicts. They are less useful if they lead us into the mistaken belief that political considerations must trump military and security concerns at every turn, that coercion is necessarily antithetical to success, or that we must significantly rework a struggling society into one that is a mirror image of our own.
Nearly a century ago, in writing about his experiences in the Philippines and Cuba, Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. Bullard reminded his fellow officers that pacification “is not mere force; it is a judicious mixture of force and persuasion, of severity and moderation... and this complexity is what makes pacification difficult.”26 Benevolent policies designed to win “the consent of the governed” were essential, he wrote. Repression alone was incompatible with the American character. Yet coercive and forceful measures were equally necessary, for “without them there is no pacification.” Although we may wish it otherwise, the fact of the matter, Bullard observed, was that “when peoples have really differed, persuasion has prevailed only when backed by adequate strength to enforce.”27 Bullard’s reminder does not make the counterinsurgency enigma any easier to solve, but we ignore it at our peril. 

**NOTES**

3. Ibid., 39.
5. Birtle, 57.
9. Ibid., 134.
11. Ibid., 71.
12. Ibid., 72.
13. Ibid., 20, 61, 84-85, 99.
24. Ibid., 349.
27. Ibid., 5 (first quotation), 17 (second quotation), 18 (third quotation).

*CSI Publications are provided free of charge to military organizations.*
While Americans are widely distributed across the political spectrum and are closely divided between the Republican and Democratic parties, our all-volunteer military is more politically conservative and more Republican. Regardless of which party Americans endorse, their attitudes toward U.S. military members are more favorable now than they have been in modern memory. Public approval and appreciation of the U.S. armed forces has increased as military service has become the exclusive province of volunteers. However, the differences between military and civilian society may be cause for concern when the war in Iraq winds down. This discussion explores how competing post-Iraq narratives may lead to a broadening of divisions between military professionals and the civil society they defend.

The differing perspectives of Samuel Huntington and Morris Janowitz have framed thinking about civil-military relations for the last four decades. Huntington saw the professional military as a national institution entrusted with the power to apply lethal force on a nation’s behalf. He saw it as a warrior caste that could and should differ from civilian society in certain important respects. Huntington considered this difference as instrumental to achieving the military’s goals and argued that an effective military’s officer corps should stand apart from the society that it is meant to protect.

Janowitz, on the other hand, favored a conception of civil-military relations that integrated military and civilian institutions. In his view, civilians and members of the military interact with one another extensively. Here the prototype of the senior military leader is the warrior-scholar-statesman well versed in the contingencies of both war and national politics. Further, Janowitz considered military service a key responsibility of male citizens and one that provided a vital crucible of common experience similar to that in classical Greek city-states’ citizen armies. Concerned that the bonds between military and civil society might weaken, Janowitz questioned the wisdom of moving to an all-volunteer force when the United States abolished the draft in 1973. Such a force could make the loyalties of Soldiers eventually diverge from the society they protected.

It is now clear that what Huntington advocated and Janowitz feared has happened: the military has indeed become different from civilian society in many respects, including politically.

Competing Narratives

Within the military, the U.S. struggle in Iraq has provoked searching appraisals and examinations of preparations for the war and its conduct. This
is especially true of the Army and Marine Corps, who are finding that understanding and assimilating the lessons of the Iraq war will be as complicated and controversial as was coming to grips with the lessons of Vietnam. For example, Greg Jaffe of the Wall Street Journal has described what he calls “failure narratives,” or potential explanations, for our difficulties in Iraq that reflect nascent analyses internal to the military. As military institutions grapple with the lessons of Iraq, a parallel process is taking place in the political arena. Those outside the military, especially politicians responsible for national policy, are also constructing narratives, and this process, too, has potentially far-reaching implications for the U.S. military.

In addition to the failure narratives, a competing “success narrative” is also under construction. The decline in casualties and improved stability in Iraq, which are attributed to General David Petraeus’s troop surge and shift in strategy, have encouraged a sense of vindication among many of the war’s most vocal advocates. Increasingly, the surge’s success is cited as evidence of the wisdom of the administration and the weakness (or worse) of its critics. Just as assessments on progress in the war became a matter of partisan dispute, the surge and its long-term effects will become controversial, especially when questions about future courses of action in Iraq return to the front burner.

As the public debate about Iraq unfolds, there is a risk that the currently cordial relations between civil and military society may be threatened. One cannot yet know exactly how or when the war will end, or how most Americans will eventually judge the venture, but one can speculate about the future. The blame game is well underway, and it does not bode well. Many who have not yet taken the field in this contest of competing narratives are warming up on the sidelines.

**The Blame Game**

Discussions and debates about the conduct of the war will have a greater impact on civil-military relations over the next several months. The mistakes the U.S. made in the run-up to war are shared, by commission or omission, broadly across the political spectrum. However, ending the war will more clearly be the responsibility of the victors in the 2008 elections (or their successors). America will have to make important decisions about its future role in Iraq over the next several months, as the strains on its forces build and as American expectations of the Iraqi government increase. The United States will make these decisions against the backdrop of a presidential election campaign during which some politicians may attempt to use the military to legitimize their policies or candidacies (at least rhetorically).

At issue will be who to blame for what has gone wrong up to that point, and who to blame if things go wrong in the future. The question, “Who gets the blame for mistakes made in prosecuting the war in Iraq?” has shifted focus since the surge. The 2007 increase in the number of boots on the ground and the new counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy in Iraq mark an important transition in public perceptions of the war. The administration’s decision to surge additional troops to Iraq despite congressional and public opposition provoked an acrimonious debate that foreshadows the next phase of the blame game. Congress debated the inclusion of timelines for withdrawal from Iraq in legislation and the administration’s plan to surge additional troops to Iraq. The administration and its supporters attacked those who advocated timelines for troop withdrawals or reductions (mainly congressional Democrats) by portraying them as opponents of our troops in the field, determined to cut off funding for Soldiers in harm’s way, to “cut and run,” and to offer our enemies easy victory by setting a “surrender date,” thus throwing away our chances for “victory.”

The administration also worked hard to identify the surge as the preferred strategy of respected, competent military authorities, not politicians. They frequently invoked the views of commanders on the ground to justify the policy and praised General David Petraeus’ COIN expertise, academic credentials, and earlier successes in Iraq. As a result, the public’s perception of the military (particularly...
its leaders) is now linked to the success or failure of the surge (and the war). The post-surge blame game will implicate senior military leaders far more directly than they have been thus far.

**Of Endings Bad and Less Bad**

The focus of the blame game is now shifting to exit strategies. The manner, timing, and consequences of the inevitable withdrawal from Iraq will be the ultimate points of contention over which blame will be assigned. It seems likely that when this war concludes, it will not be widely seen as a decisive victory for the United States. According to a December 2007 poll, a majority of Americans think historians will eventually judge the Iraq war to have been a failure.

Surprisingly, a survey of military families in the fall of 2007 found that 60 percent of them thought that the war had not been worth the cost. Even the attitudes of active-duty military members reflect substantial skepticism about the prospects for success in Iraq, although active-duty military members are more optimistic about the outcome than is society as a whole. Approval of Bush’s administration among service members is surprisingly low, despite the strong Republican Party leanings of many service members (although it is still higher than the Bush administration’s approval rating among civilians). As the prospects for clear military victory have slipped away, the political focus has shifted to the contest over perceptions. How will the cultural legacy of this conflict be shaped?

**Stab in the Back?**

The German Imperial General Staff consoled itself with the “stab-in-the-back” myth after Germany’s capitulation in World War I. It viewed Germany’s surrender as wholly political and not justified by military circumstances. This idea resonated powerfully with ultranationalist groups throughout the Weimar era and contributed to Hitler’s rise to power in 1933.

The Vietnam War was a social and cultural watershed for America. Many Vietnam veterans felt betrayed when they returned home amid controversy over the war. Today some feel the U.S. accorded them little of the respect and gratitude now so generously given to veterans of current operations. Some Americans and many veterans believe “stab-in-the-back” antiwar protests at home led to restrictions on the use of military power that tied the hands of the military and caused South Vietnam to fall to the Communists. Others point to misguided policies that top civilian and military leaders pursued at the time. In the coming months, variations of these two failure narratives about Iraq will likely surface.

When the inevitable drawdown begins in Iraq, the battle to interpret the war will begin anew. Thus far, respect for the troops in the field has somewhat muted partisan conflicts over the war. However, divisive, destructive instances of social conflict have occurred. Some compare those who question current administration policy in Iraq with participants in the Vietnam antiwar movement and counterculture. Others on the political right seek to lay exclusive claim to the loyalty of military members by asserting that the media, “liberal elites,” and others who oppose administration policy have anti-military, antiwar, and anti-American tendencies. Similarly echoing policy disagreements in the Vietnam era, many on the left summarily dismiss the administration’s vision of an achievable and sustainable political-military solution in Iraq.

**Military Attitudes**

As the war ends, the military community may become much more vocal in this debate. Many people who have served in Iraq or in the military want to help shape the war’s historical legacy, as do family members, veterans’ groups, and advocacy groups. The nature of military opinion depends on who is in the military. The Vietnam era military brought career Soldiers and volunteers together

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*The focus of the blame game is now shifting to exit strategies… a majority of Americans think historians will eventually judge the Iraq war to have been a failure.*
with draftees. (Approximately 25 percent of those who served in Vietnam were draftees; in World War II, 66 percent were draftees.) Soldiers in Vietnam were younger than today’s are, almost exclusively male, less likely to be married, and generally served for shorter periods than in Iraq.5 Another important shift in the military is in its geographic and ideological demographics: the members of our volunteer military come disproportionately from the South, tend to be politically and religiously conservative, and are more politically aware and active than previously. Between 1976 and 1996, the percentage of military officers who described themselves as non-partisan or politically independent dropped from more than 50 percent to less than 20 percent, and the percentage that identify themselves as liberals or Democrats is a fraction of that in the larger population.6 Hence, the military today appears to be more politically and religiously conservative than ever before.7

That said, some question the extent of the divergence between military and civilian political leanings.8 However, Admiral Mike Mullen’s recent letter to service members reminding them of the importance of the military’s staying outside politics bespeaks a certain degree of concern about political attitudes within the military.9 According to Thom Shanker of the New York Times, “Admiral Mullen said he was inspired to write the essay after receiving a constant stream of legitimate, if troubling, questions while visiting military personnel around the world. He said their questions included, “What if a Democrat wins?” and, “What will that do to the mission in Iraq?” and, “Do you think it’s better for one party or another to have the White House?”

What ultimately matters is not just demographics, but the respective cultures of the two groups. As we consider the end game in Iraq, some characteristics of contemporary military culture are also worth considering. The view among some service members that the military is not only different from civilian society but also morally and culturally superior to it is especially pernicious.10 Some in the military envision a culture war pitting conservative, often religious-based beliefs, argued to be more compatible with military life, against the liberal, permissive views allegedly rampant in U.S. society.11

Because service members are volunteers, and civilians do not share the hardships service members accept, many in the military are not especially receptive to civilian opinions. Some are tempted to ask the illogical but emotionally charged question, “If I’m in Iraq, and you’re at the mall, which of our views has more moral authority?” There is also a strong sense among military members that average Americans simply do not know what is going on in Iraq because they are too far removed from the military experience or because the media distort news reports from Iraq, focusing only on sensational, negative events while ignoring good news.

In spite of the substantial skepticism about the war’s costs within the military, service members also view the Iraq war as a success in a way that civilians do not or cannot. The repeated, lengthy deployments, the hardships of service members and their families, and of course, the casualties, motivate many service members to see the sacrifices they and their families have made in an unerringly positive light. American Soldiers are willing to sacrifice, but for a noble purpose—no one wants to waste their lives and livelihoods on a moral mistake. In this case, while critics repeatedly suggest, “the war has been lost,” the only acceptable narrative for sacrifice is the administration’s rhetoric about noble victory. Even though these critics do not blame the
military for this predicament—the administration is at fault—service members find it nearly psychologically impossible to agree with them. Civilians have less of a personal stake in seeing things the administration’s way.

Such views suggest that as the end game unfolds, military members’ opinions are not likely to conform to external ideas, opinions, or interpretations of the war, or coincide with those of the body politic. Because the military appears demographically different from civilian society and the interests of service members and civilians do not completely overlap, military opinion in the blame game may reflect a more insular perspective derived from the conservative institutions that serve as many members’ emotional and intellectual homes.

Yet, although its politics are far from representative of American society, the military is also far from politically monolithic. Beliefs and attitudes of military members vary across different services, ranks, positions, specialties, and experiences. Strong conservative voices in the military community tend to squelch those that are less hidebound (e.g., consider the ostentatiously religious shift that has occurred in the military over the last several years). A countervailing belief held by many service members is that allegiance to the Constitution of the United States supersedes political party affiliation and religious ideology. Furthermore, the strains of the last five years have probably altered the cultures of the services (especially the Army’s) in ways not yet fully appreciated. Therefore, the ultimate shape and form of the military’s contribution to the end game discourse can only be a guess.

Veterans’ Attitudes

A wider range of considerations than those dominant during the war may determine the military community’s attitudes after the war ends. During the war, the focus is on security and defense policy. With troops in harm’s way, the military’s main concern is wise stewardship of our armed forces. Is the mission a reasonable one? Are we giving our troops the resources they need to accomplish it? These considerations have helped produce the conservative views of many service members. After the war, though, increasing numbers of service members who served in Iraq will transition into the veteran community. The Iraq war’s scale and duration ensure that the veteran community will be a sizeable one.

The interests and attitudes of veterans will be more diverse than those of the military community during the war and may even conflict with them. Estimates of the costs of caring for the Iraq war veterans range into the hundreds of billions of dollars. Competition for federal budget dollars is always intense, but veterans will be eager to secure benefits for their service in the war. Post-traumatic stress disorder and traumatic brain injury are difficult to diagnose and expensive to treat, a combination that, like Agent Orange after Vietnam or Gulf War Syndrome in the 1990s, has the potential to alienate some veterans from the government if they perceive that the country is breaking faith with them, for example, by inadequate funding of research and treatment programs.

How will veterans respond as the veteran community begins to coalesce in the aftermath of the war? Perhaps we can find the best clue to what lies ahead in the groups that have already come together. One such group, Iraq and Afghanistan Veterans of America (IAVA), has staked out a centrist/left of center position on war policy, but it is staunchly pro-troops in its fundamental orientation. In contrast, the focus of the Iraq Vets against the War is on resisting and ending the war. Another group, VoteVets, is a registered political action committee with the goal of electing Iraq veterans to public office. Still another group, Vets for Freedom, takes an ideologically conservative, staunchly pro-administration line. The existence of these groups illustrates the political complexity within the veteran community. Which voice will become the “official” voice of Iraq and Afghanistan vets?

A crucial factor here is the refusal of any of these groups to yield the moral high ground with regard to patriotism. In the 1960s and 1970s, Vietnam Veterans against the War advanced critiques of the Johnson and Nixon administrations’ conduct of the war that many Americans perceived as anti-American, disrespectful to the military, and insulting to the sacrifices made by veterans. The Vietnam antiwar movement’s willingness to concede the American flag to supporters of the war sharpened this perception. Indeed, the burning of the American flag remains an enduring symbol of opposition to Vietnam War policy. Today, Paul Rieckhoff of IAVA
and others oppose Bush administration policies but have thus far been successful in speaking for veterans without being attacked as left-wing bomb-throwers. More than anything else, the veterans’ refusal to be proxies in a larger cultural and political struggle offers hope for positive civil-military relations as the blame game begins.

The View from the Top

In his 30 May 2007 commencement address at the United States Air Force Academy, Defense Secretary Robert Gates reminded the graduating class that the Congress and the press are “two pillars of our freedom under the Constitution,” that “members of both parties now serving in Congress have long been strong supporters of the Department of Defense and of our men and women in uniform,” and that “as the Founding Fathers wisely understood, the Congress and a free press, as with a non-political military, assure a free country.”

Four days earlier, Vice President Richard Cheney had addressed the graduating class at West Point at their commencement. The vice president alluded to the political disagreement and controversy that had raged over Iraq policy: “Last night, President Bush signed into law the war supplemental that we worked hard to achieve. Whatever lies ahead, the United States Army will have all the equipment, supplies, manpower, training, and support essential to victory. I give you this assurance on behalf of the President. You Soldier for him, and he will Soldier for you.”

Secretary Gates reminded freshly minted military officers of the strong connection between the military and the society it serves, by identifying the Constitution, the Congress, and the press as bulwarks of our freedom. This perspective contrasts, at least in emphasis, with the vice president’s invocation of a bitter partisan fight in Congress over a funding measure that a Republican president won against Democratic opposition, an invocation that concluded with an affirmation of mutual loyalty between the Army and a man: the President.

This is the fulcrum on which the prospects for good civil-military relations will likely turn in the immediate future: however asymmetric the respective demographic profiles of the military and civil society may be, so long as the tradition of a non-political military is honored and respected, cordial and stable relations between our military and society can be maintained. The wild card that may trump the traditions established over two centuries is the conjunction of a politically imbalanced professional military with aggressive partisan attempts to exploit that imbalance during a time of great turmoil and uncertainty.

Discussions of civil-military affairs nearly 40 years after the force became an all-volunteer force and a half-century after Huntington’s book The Soldier and the State must embrace new realities: the force is different from the society it serves, and national leaders are attempting to exploit those differences in service of their political objectives. Moreover, we stand on the threshold of an uncertain but probably unsatisfying conclusion to a grinding, unpopular war. What lies ahead for civil military relations?
Discussion

The failure narratives described by Jaffe currently focus on the military itself. To be sure, there are different perspectives and competing interests represented: those of the military services, senior and junior officers, and officers with different views on the right way to do counterinsurgency, but none of the narratives focus on the role of civil society. In the future, the political right may find it expedient to deflect blame for what has happened or what might happen away from the Bush administration and onto the next administration, the media, or the majority of Americans skeptical of the war. They may try to do this by articulating a new “stab-in-the-back” theory that focuses on the news media, liberal elites, and a permissive and decadent civilian society as the source of the rot.

While it is too early to tell what the long-term effects of the strategic shift associated with the surge will be for stability in Iraq, the surge’s effects on domestic discussions of the war are now plain. Media coverage of the war has taken on a more muted, if not positive, tone in the last few months, and is likely to remain so for the next several months, barring any dramatic change in the situation (such as an Iraqi Tet Offensive).

The lull at home resulting from the surge in Iraq will ensure that however we began the Iraq war and conducted it, the administration that takes office in January 2009 will manage its resolution. Those who see the Iraq glass as half full now may later see it as half empty (or worse) if there is a partisan shift in control of the government this fall.

Tensions between the public and the military may grow after the war. The new administration may be Republican, and if so, a “stay-the-course” strategy will conflict with the weight of public opinion and the realities of an increasingly strained defense establishment. The ensuing disputes over Iraq policy will rekindle the debates that erupted over the surge. If the new administration is Democratic, right-wingers will probably attack its new Iraq policies as evidence of a lack of concern, support, and respect for military members and their sacrifices. Members of the military may be politically disposed to respond to such representations by adopting attitudes consistent with the seductive “stab-in-the-back” way of thinking. Such a development would be both divisive and destructive of the great progress in civil-military relations that has taken place since the Vietnam War.

As the end game unfolds, there is every reason to think that the blame game will intensify. Once the war is over, the stakes will be the historical and cultural interpretation of what happened, an interpretation that has the potential to shape American political fortunes for years to come. On the surface, civil-military relations have never been better, but the underlying structural asymmetries between military and civil society could be crucial under certain conditions. Let us hope that our politicians and generals will resist the temptation to make good relations between our citizens and our Soldiers the last casualty of the Iraq war.

NOTES

2. Greg Jaffe, “Critiques of Iraq War Reveal Rifts among Army Officers,” Wall Street Journal, 29 June 2007. These narratives include an institutional failure to internalize the proper counterinsurgency lessons from Vietnam, overuse of large conventional formations instead of special operators and precision munitions, and an institutional leadership culture that is straining relationships between junior and senior officers and preventing adaptation to new conditions.
7. Military leaders do not appear to be dramatically different from civilian leaders demographically when it comes to religious identification, but there are substantial differences in attitudes between military leaders and civilians on many issues that are religiously charged. In authoritarian institutions, numbers do not tell the whole story, as the influence of a few increases, if they are in high positions. (See Ole Holsti, “Of Chasms and Convergences: Attitudes and Beliefs of Civilians and Military Elites at the Start of a New Millennium,” in Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil-Military Gap and American National Security, Peter D. Feaver and Richard H. Kohn, eds. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001).
10. See, for example, Thomas E. Ricks, Making the Corps (New York: Scribner, 1991).
11. The finding recently that seven officers (four of whom were generals) improperly participated in a fundraising video for a Christian evangelical organization in the Pentagon illustrates the point. Air Force Major General Jack Catton, one of the officers singled out for criticism, stated, “I’m an old-fashioned American, and my first priority is my faith in God, then my family, and then country.” Catton contended that the Christian Embassy, which reportedly has held prayer meetings with the military for 25 years, was a “quasi-federal entity.” (Cited in Josh White, “Officers’ Roles in Christian Video Are Called Ethics Breach,” Washington Post, 4 August 2007). Many Americans may be surprised to learn that some of their generals hold such attitudes.

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LEGITIMACY and MILITARY OPERATIONS

Lieutenant Colonel James W. Hammond, Canadian Forces

America is at war...We have kept on the offensive against terrorist networks, leaving our enemy weakened, but not yet defeated...The struggle against this enemy...has been difficult. And our work is far from over.

—President George W. Bush, 16 March 2006

ALTHOUGH OVER TWO YEARS have passed since the president wrote these remarks, his words still ring true. While the United States has remained on the offensive, the enemy is not yet defeated. In Iraq alone, the United States has lost over 4,000 servicemen and women, while another division’s worth of personnel have been medically evacuated from that theater of operations. The vast majority were killed, wounded, injured or became sick in the years after major combat operations ended in May 2003. In Afghanistan, coalition casualties are increasing, and Taliban fighters are as numerous as at any time in the past six years. Globally, Al-Qaeda seems as effective as ever in spawning its terrorist ideology. The pace of operations against this threat is straining western nations, none more so than the United States, which continues to do almost all of the “heavy lifting.” Despite a defense budget that amounts to over 48 percent of total world defense spending, the U.S. military could be ready to break at the seams under the strain. Even with supplemental congressional appropriations, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) will be hard-pressed to sustain current operations, let alone be ready for another regional challenge. If, as so many have claimed, we are only in the early stages of a “long war,” then we had all better learn some serious lessons, and fast, or in the president’s words, our work will be far from over for years to come.

The pressures of the current security environment have resulted in a drive to define, dissect, understand, and meet these challenges. Although reviews of the war have been productive, they have not yet produced an epiphany. On the plus side, experienced officers like U.S. Army General David H. Petraeus and Marine Lieutenant General James Mattis have sparked a renewed interest in counterinsurgency (COIN) experts like David Galula, T.E. Lawrence, Robert Thompson, and Frank Kitson. The search for solutions has also resulted in an in-depth review of key U.S. doctrinal tenets and a complete rewrite of U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps counterinsurgency doctrine.
Among the significant changes to U.S. doctrine has been the increased attention paid to “legitimacy,” particularly during COIN operations. Legitimacy has become a defining principle for most COIN theorists, and the conflict itself, in Galula’s words, a “battle for the population,” where “the exercise of political power depends on the tacit or explicit agreement of the population.”

U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine now states clearly, “Victory is achieved when the populace consents to the government’s legitimacy and stops actively and passively supporting the insurgency.” In fact, the term “legitimacy” is so pervasive that it appears 131 times in the new COIn field manual, FM 3-24. Even more significantly, the keystone operations doctrine of the U.S. services, Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations, has been rewritten to include legitimacy (and the concepts of restraint and perseverance) as “Other Principles” to join the nine traditional “Principles of War” in a new list of 12 “Principles of Joint Operations.”

We should consider the potential impact of this change carefully because the principles of war have been the bedrock of military operations in one form or another since the era of Baron Antoine de Jomini.

**Five Aspects of Legitimacy**

*No state can survive for very long exclusively through its power to coerce. . . . [A]cross time, the maintenance of social order is negotiated.*

—Christopher Pierson

While Joint Publication (JP) 3-0 introduces the concept of legitimacy, it does not define the term. The word “legitimacy” comes from the Latin *legitimare*, to declare lawful; it therefore connotes rightfulness and legality. In political science, legitimacy refers to the population’s acceptance of a set of rules or an authority. In addition, through their consent, they acknowledge a duty of obedience to that authority. Legitimacy differs from legality because it implies that the citizenry respects or consents to the authority irrespective of the existence of a legal justification of it. This is a notably important distinction, particularly in international relations, where overarching legal authority is nonexistent. While legitimacy is a complex and contested concept in political theory, it has five important aspects that have a direct impact on military operations.

**Sources of legitimacy.** German sociologist Max Weber posited three sources for legitimacy: the legal-rational source, which most Western governments enjoy, based on a framework of legal rules (e.g. the government elected in accordance with a legal framework and constitution); traditional authority, based on custom, upbringing, and birth (e.g. the governing family or clan); and charismatic authority, based on the power of personality of an individual or group.

The importance of Weber’s observation on charismatic leadership is clear to anyone who considers Osama bin-Laden’s status in certain parts of Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas, and in fact, all three sources of legitimacy are at play today in both Iraq and in Afghanistan.

**Legitimacy and obligation.** Legitimacy and obligation are two sides of the same coin. At the very least, accepting some authority as legitimate implies some level of consent on the part of the population to the actions of that authority. This further implies the obligation to accept that authority’s decisions, even if some decisions are undesirable. The implication for emerging governments or military forces operating in an area is that local populations will accept even significant infringements on their rights and freedoms if the demands come from an authority they view as legitimate. The inverse, of course, also applies: the people will resist even the slightest imposition from an authority they view as illegitimate.

**Legitimacy and force.** The ability to apply force does not confer legitimacy. Weber identified one of the most salient features of the state as “a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.” While Marxist theory suggested that the surreptitious threat to exercise this monopoly on violence was what kept capitalist governments in power, even neo-Marxists today accept that “without some level of legitimacy, it is hard to see that any state could be sustained.”

Political philosopher Hannah Arendt observed, “Since authority...
always demands obedience, it is commonly mistaken for some form of power or violence. Yet authority precludes the use of external means of coercion; where force is used, authority itself has failed...If authority is to be defined at all, then, it must be in contradistinction to...force.”16 Military officers implicitly understand this when tasked to support civil authorities at home. Any actual use of force implies that authority has already failed to some extent, at least with some sector of the population. Interestingly, studies of police forces in the United States suggest that increased police violence erodes police legitimacy. In fact, studies show that reducing police use of force has a positive effect in reducing violent crime.17 The findings of further research into police legitimacy show that it “changes the basis on which people decide whether to cooperate with legal authorities” and has a “significant influence on the degree to which people [obey] the law”; it also shows that police “fairness and effectiveness are not mutually exclusive, but mutually reinforcing.”18

In short, using force unnecessarily, inappropriately, or out of proportion to the requirement to do so undermines police legitimacy and effectiveness. If that is the case with peaceful populations at home in North America, surely the relationship between force and legitimacy is something military forces should carefully consider when operating in foreign theaters where legitimacy is more tenuous.

**Perceptions and legitimacy.** The fourth aspect of legitimacy that military commanders must understand is that the legitimacy is relative to the audience. For example, a military force operating in Iraq must primarily be concerned about the local Iraqi population’s perception of Iraqi government legitimacy. The less legitimate an operation seems, the less support it can expect. If the people regard it as legitimate, a U.S.-led operation to track an IED cell that killed hundreds of civilians can elicit local assistance. On the other hand, the people may regard a cordon-and-search operation in an area where insurgents have harmed few locals as unnecessary and less legitimate. In the same vein, the international community will be less supportive of actions deemed arbitrary, if the force has intervened illegitimately in a territory or conducted overly aggressive operations. In addition, the domestic audience is also critical to success, as the United States learned during the Vietnam era. Once the people viewed that war as illegitimate back at home, the likelihood of a successful conclusion to it became more remote. Finally, the men and women of the deployed military force make up an important audience that questions the force’s legitimacy as rigorously as any other audience does. Once the mission loses legitimacy in their eyes, whether due to immoral or excessive action, regaining effectiveness will take a complete overhaul of trust, which may well be impossible. Forced obedience in such circumstances will never compensate for willing obedience lost with squandered legitimacy.

**Contested legitimacy.** A final characteristic of legitimacy is that it applies to both sides in a conflict. Often, coalition officers will point out that the enemy targets innocent civilians, tortures hostages, and refuses to observe any rules of combat. We know from experience that all of this is true, but we must also consider whether such conduct is an effective strategy for the enemy in the long run. General David H. Petraeus notes, “Al-Qaeda’s indiscriminate attacks... have finally started to turn a substantial proportion of the Iraqi
population against it.”19 James Fallows adds: “What they have done is to follow the terrorist’s logic of steadily escalating the degree of carnage and violence—which has meant violating the guerrilla warrior’s logic of bringing the civilian population to your side . . . [I]nsurgents have slaughtered civilians daily . . . But since American troops are also assumed to be killing civilians, the anti-insurgent backlash is muddied.”20

Al-Qaeda leaders at the highest levels recognize the negative impact of violence on their strategy. According to Peter Bergen, “It was Al-Zawahiri who wrote a letter to Al-Qaeda’s leader in Iraq, Abu Mousab Al-Zarqawi, gently suggesting that he stop his habit of beheading hostages because it was turning off many Muslims.”21 Similar negative responses occurred in the fall of 2005 after bombs exploded in Amman, Jordan, and in Bali, Indonesia. In the day-to-day struggle for legitimacy, both insurgents and counterinsurgents wrestle on the fulcrum of the relationship between force and legitimacy.

Strategic and Operational Legitimacy

If you just look at how we are perceived in the world and the kind of criticism we have taken over Guantanamo, Abu Ghraib and renditions, whether we believe it or not, people are now starting to question whether we’re following our own high standards.

—Colin Powell, 200722

Before examining legitimacy’s role during military operations overseas, we must ask how the legitimacy of the strategic decision to deploy a military force affects the legitimacy of the force itself. Traditional just war theory examines the justness of a war on two scales: *jus ad bellum*, the justness of the decision to go to war; and *jus in bello*, the justness of how military forces prosecute it. *Jus ad bellum* considerations ask if the cause for war is just, if the good toward which the war aims is greater than the evil the fighting causes, if a legitimate authority made the decision to go to war, if war was the last resort, and if there is a reasonable chance of success.23 All of these questions arose during the debates over the U.S. administration’s decision to go to war against Iraq in 2003.24

A war’s legitimacy, or *strategic legitimacy*, is not something a Soldier can influence; we should not hold him responsible for the justness of the decision to go to war. He or she must simply follow orders and make the best moral choices during the ensuing operations. Under international law, the military commander is protected by what Francisco de Vitoria described five centuries ago as “invincible ignorance” to distinguish between the justness of the war itself and the justness of specific military actions during the war.25 Nevertheless, military commanders would be foolish not to understand the context in which they operate, including the perceived legitimacy of their cause.

Commanders on the ground sometimes see legitimacy as water in a bucket. Both strategic and operational decisions affect the volume of the water. If the decision to deploy is suspect, the commander starts his operation with a reduced volume of water (or none). How the force conducts the operation will define how quickly he uses it up (or whether the force can regain greater legitimacy through operationally effective and morally virtuous actions on the ground).
Military leaders can do little about the legitimacy of the decision to go to war, but they can assert and protect the legitimacy of operations, or operational legitimacy. Overzealous use of force can undermine even the most legitimate intervention. Actions on the ground should demonstrate jus in bello considerations of proportionality. Quite simply, all military operations should discriminate clearly between combatants and non-combatants and any use of force should be proportional only to the military end and avoid unnecessary collateral damage. Both concepts are difficult to apply in what General Rupert Smith called “war amongst the people,” in which combatants wear no uniforms and operate from population centers. Even so, restraint and focused application of force are critical to sustaining the support of both local and U.S. populations. I will now turn to the conduct of recent military operations to examine their impact on operational legitimacy.

Operational Legitimacy in Iraq and Afghanistan

This I realized, now watching Dienekes rally and tend to his men, was the role of the officer… To fire their valour when it flagged and rein in their fury when it threatened to take them out of hand.

—Steven Pressfield, Gates of Fire

Security actions must be balanced with legitimacy concerns. . . . Restricting the use of force, restructuring the type of forces employed, and ensuring the disciplined conduct of the forces involved may reinforce legitimacy.

—Joint Publication 3-0, Operations

The story of current coalition operations is generally a story of heroism, courage, and self-sacrifice. During the initial stages of Operation Iraqi Freedom in particular, there were many daring acts that should take their place in the annals of military history. One of those actions occurred on the night of 31 March 2003 near the town of Haditha in west-central Iraq. After an overland infiltration across unproven territory, B Company of 3rd Ranger Battalion of the 75th Ranger Regiment secured objective Lynx, which was critical to ensuring that Saddam Hussein’s regime could not sabotage the Haditha Dam and unleash a humanitarian disaster on the Iraqi citizens of the Tigris and Euphrates valleys. Operating with adequate but incomplete intelligence, the Rangers secured the dam after a four-hour firefight. Over the next six days, this lightly armed Ranger company, with air force combat controllers and later reinforced by two M1 tanks, fought off a series of uncertain counterattacks to secure the dam and destroy 29 enemy tanks and over 65 artillery, air defense, and mortar pieces. This small operation is a fine example of light forces demonstrating agility, courage, and determination in an honorable cause against a numerically superior enemy while respecting the rules of engagement and laws of armed conflict. As such, it deserves to be remembered.

Only four years later, however, the historical record of Haditha reads very differently. In the public imagination, the events at the dam have long been overshadowed by the actions of a small number of other U.S. servicemen, who, it is alleged, murdered 24 Iraqi civilians, including women and children, during a vengeful rampage after an improvised explosive device (IED) killed a 20-year-old lance corporal on the morning of 19 November 2005. The initial press release about the incident gave a plausible explanation, which suited the expectations of military personnel: “a U.S. Marine and 15 civilians were killed yesterday from the blast of a roadside bomb in Haditha. Immediately following the bombing, gunmen attacked the convoy with small arms fire. Iraqi army soldiers and [U.S.] Marines returned fire, killing eight insurgents and wounding another.”

An Iraqi human rights organization began to investigate almost immediately, but it was not until Time obtained a video in January 2006 and subsequently gave it to U.S. authorities for comment that the U.S. launched significant military investigations. The evidence is damning. The video shows blood spattered on walls inside family bedrooms; there was testimony from a survivor whose family members (but for one sibling) were killed in their night clothes in their rooms; while some adult males
were killed, many of the deceased were women and children ranging from 2 to 14 years of age. There was no evidence of bomb fragments on any of the civilian bodies and no evidence of crossfire outside the houses. The director of the local hospital stated that “no organs were slashed by shrapnel . . . . Most of the victims were shot in the chest and head—from close range.” Undeniably, something went terribly wrong in Haditha.

While the legal process brought against accused murderers will demonstrate U.S. determination to apply U.S. values and the rule of law to its own citizens, it will not in itself address the event’s broader implications. Criminals may exist in any military force, but the killings at Haditha require more basic self-examination by a military force that dedicates itself to promoting security and the rule of law and protecting innocents. When innocent civilians die during stabilization, humanitarian, or combat operations, we must ask hard questions. How could highly trained, disciplined, and selected personnel commit such an act? How could authorities not discover and deal with the criminal nature of the incident for four months? How could a chain of command fail to ask more questions in the days immediately after the events?

To answer these questions, Major General Eldon A. Bargewell examined the broader issues related to the killings. His report, completed in June 2006, focused on the reporting of the incident as well as the command climate within the Marine Corps’ leadership in western Iraq. While the Bargewell Report did not find direct evidence of an orchestrated effort above squad level to cover up the incident, he found complicity from platoon to division level to ignore indications of serious misconduct and “an unwillingness, bordering on denial, on the part of the battalion commander to examine an incident that might prove harmful to him and his Marines.” The Marine Corps relieved the battalion commander and three other officers of their duties and charged them with violation of a lawful order, dereliction of duty, and making a false statement.

These failings, like the killings themselves, are individual acts of commission or omission, and Bargewell could therefore deal with them on an individual basis, but he discovered a systemic problem with the collective attitudes of the chain of command:

All levels of command tended to view civilian casualties, even in significant numbers, as routine and as the natural result of insurgent tactics . . . . Statements made by the chain of command during interviews for this investigation . . . . suggest that Iraqi civilian lives are not as important as U.S. lives, their deaths are just the cost of doing business, and that the Marines need to ‘get the job done’ no matter what it takes. These comments had the potential to desensitize the Marines to concern for the Iraqi populace and portray them all as the enemy even if they are noncombatants.

Bargewell further noted that the regimental combat team commander “expressed only mild concern over the potential negative ramifications of indiscriminate killing based on his stated view that the Iraqis and insurgents respect strength and power over righteousness.” While Bargewell does not suggest that the chain of command directly condoned any of the actions at Haditha, he reported some fault with the command climate within the 2d Marine Division at the time.

As an isolated event, Haditha is a tragedy and potentially a crime that tarnishes the reputation of all who serve. It was the culmination of a number of factors, triggered by the death of a U.S. Marine by an IED and stoked by the tensions of operations and a command climate that seems to have implicitly condoned the attitude that Iraqi civilians are different from U.S. civilians and suspect. The real problem, however, is that Haditha was not an isolated incident.

On 26 April 2006, a group of U.S. Marines reportedly took Hashim Ibrahim Awad, a disabled father of 11 children, out of his home, beat him, and then shot him to death. Authorities charged seven Marines and a navy hospital corpsman with crimes ranging from murder and kidnapping to conspiracy, making false official statements, and larceny. Again, this incident is clearly a criminal act, perhaps as some suggest, the act of a few “bad apples” that does not reflect the conduct of the vast majority of coalition Soldiers in Iraq.

Nevertheless, like most such events, it resulted from multiple factors, including a command climate that either condoned mistreatment of Iraqi civilians or at the very least, was unable to enforce the Marine
Corps’ commitment to its core values. As they collected evidence, they discovered other unrelated assaults, some weeks before the Awad murder. In one case, Second Lieutenant Nathan P. Phan allegedly beat, choked, and threatened detainees in Hamdani earlier in 2006. Phan acknowledged ordering his men to choke a detainee because he believed it was necessary to gather information from suspected insurgents. He also pressed an unloaded pistol against the mouth of another detainee to frighten him. In an unsubstantiated but telling admission intended to justify the assault, Phan’s attorney stated that “the information [Phan] gained from these terrorists was highly important and valuable in saving Marines’ lives.” Not only can this justification not be proven, but also such acts are contrary to the Uniform Code of Military Justice, The Law of Land Warfare (FM 27-10), the Geneva and Hague Conventions, the U.S. Constitution that officers swear to defend, and, significantly, the core values of the U.S. Marine Corps. Such actions supplied subordinates with a leadership example that would have tragic consequences for all concerned.

Some suggest that the attitudes displayed toward Iraqi civilians in the above incidents are simply the tip of an iceberg. In his book Assassin’s Gate, George Packer describes the detention of two suspected insurgents at a U.S. airfield in Iraq. After witnessing the verbal abuse heaped on two detainees, Packer wrote, “It wasn’t Abu Ghraib, just the ugliness of a bored and probably sadistic young man in a position of temporary power. But I left the airfield . . . with an uneasy feeling. I’d had a glimpse under the rock of the occupation; there was bound to be much more there.” While it may be that the two detainees were insurgents, the unprofessional handling techniques Packer observed did nothing to gain the detainees cooperation or conversion. The acts simply added to their disdain for America and the U.S. military.

Thomas Ricks provides further evidence of the attitudes displayed toward Iraqi civilians in the above incidents are simply the tip of an iceberg. In his book Assassin’s Gate, George Packer describes the detention of two suspected insurgents at a U.S. airfield in Iraq. After witnessing the verbal abuse heaped on two detainees, Packer wrote, “It wasn’t Abu Ghraib, just the ugliness of a bored and probably sadistic young man in a position of temporary power. But I left the airfield . . . with an uneasy feeling. I’d had a glimpse under the rock of the occupation; there was bound to be much more there.” While it may be that the two detainees were insurgents, the unprofessional handling techniques Packer observed did nothing to gain the detainees cooperation or conversion. The acts simply added to their disdain for America and the U.S. military.

While one can argue that strategic legitimacy in Afghanistan was more persuasive than in Iraq, both theaters have experienced varying levels of success in maintaining operational legitimacy. The response to the Marine’s actions in Nangahar Province was predictably hostile locally where anti-coalition sentiment runs high, but the national response was rather muted. In Iraq, where U.S. strategic legitimacy was weak from the start, overcoming such incidents has been challenging. Efforts to buttress U.S. legitimacy through humanitarian and reconstruction operations have not been successful, and
The shocking revelations at Abu Ghraib exacerbated the situation.

The handling of detainees has done more damage to U.S. strategic and operational legitimacy in the past few years than any other single issue. American and world public opinion has been harshly critical of the handling of detainees since Seymour Hersh first broke the story of the Abu Ghraib photos in April 2004. The furor and rioting sparked in May 2005 after Newsweek reported that the Qur’an had been mishandled at Guantanamo demonstrates that the implications of abuse go far beyond issues of internal military discipline. The August 2004 Schlesinger Report was damning in its criticisms of the policy, command, and disciplinary failures that contributed to the shocking level of abuse of detainees that occurred. On 6 May 2005, through a report to the UN Committee Against Torture, the United States formally explained the results of its nine detainee investigations to the world and said it is dealing with over 300 recommendations to improve detainee handling, accountability, investigation, supervision, and coordination. The detainee issues are by now well-known, and the effect on U.S. legitimacy has been devastating. Sheik Mohammed Bashir summed up Iraqi frustrations at Friday prayers in Um al-Oura, Baghdad, on 11 June 2004: “Freedom in this land is not ours. It is the freedom of the occupying Soldiers in doing what they like...abusing women, children, and the old men and women whom they arrested randomly and without any guilt. No one can ask them what they are doing because they are protected by their freedom. No one can punish them.”

The real impact of Abu Ghraib, Haditha, Hamdani, and other de-legitimizing incidents is not just a reduction in local cooperation for U.S. efforts, censure by the international community, and fading U.S. domestic support for the operations. The real impact is to strengthen the enemy. RAND researcher David Gompert has suggested that “careless COIN violence, indiscriminate arrests, nonjudicial detention, and cruel interrogation can delegitimize the governing power, validate the jihadist story, legitimize terrorism, and spawn new martyrs.” From January to September 2006, Iraqi approval rates for attacks on U.S. forces grew from 47 percent to 61 percent. Among Sunnis, support for targeting U.S. troops has dropped significantly from its high of 92 percent only because U.S. force commanders under General Petraeus finally started getting the message. Based on polling results, Gompert notes, “When more than a third of American Muslims—known for their moderation—believe that their own government is ‘fighting a war on Islam,’ one can begin to fathom the difficulty of persuading non-American Muslims that this is not the case.”

Rebuilding Legitimacy

Military action can address the symptoms of a loss of legitimacy. In some cases, it can eliminate substantial numbers of insurgents. However, success in the form of a durable peace requires restoring legitimacy, which... requires the use of
all instruments of national power. A COIN effort cannot achieve lasting success without the HN [host nation] government achieving legitimacy.

—FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency55

Rebuilding U.S. legitimacy for current operations will require a long-term, multi-agency effort at the strategic and operational levels, but there are already signs that the effort may be worthwhile.

First, although U.S. legitimacy in Iraq remains weak, Muslim support for the Taliban or Al-Qaeda’s vision of the world is at less than 10 percent. As one observer put it, “Many people would like to see Bin-Laden and Zarqawi hurt America. But they do not want Bin-Laden to rule their children.”56

While we have not won the war, we are far from losing it. Improving the perceived legitimacy for the Iraqi government and the U.S.-led effort in Iraq will save Iraqi and coalition lives, as well as serve to undermine insurgent and Al-Qaeda recruiting efforts.

The second note of optimism is the genuine effort we are making to correct the situation. Whether in determined pursuit of justice against wrongdoings, thorough doctrinal review, or selection of commanders with proven counterinsurgency experience, the U.S. military has taken the first steps in recognizing and correcting the problem. To complete the process, six important strategies are prerequisites for success.

Create a truly integrated list of principles of joint operations. The recent changes to U.S. doctrine have renamed the military operations other than war principles—legitimacy, restraint, and perseverance—as “other principles” and made them subordinate to the traditional principles of war as if to suggest that one should not consider legitimacy until some magic moment when it is time to replace one set of principles with another. Suggesting that a shift in mentality will occur on demand brings to mind the comments an officer made as the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment arrived in Iraq in 2003: “Their attitude in terms of rules of engagement suggested to me that they had not made the change from combat operations to stability operations.”57 Officers cannot begin thinking about legitimacy, restraint, and perseverance in Phase IV. During modern combat operations, we must consider these principles long before Phase IV begins. A mind-set that still views high-intensity combat as the only real work for Soldiers will result in confusion. Serving the Nation can take on many forms, all of which require professionalism and reflection on bedrock principles, among which legitimacy must urgently take its place. Soldiers need to learn that reinforcing legitimacy is a core business of all combat forces.

Recognize that professional officers are protectors of legitimacy. The administration’s decision to support harsher interrogation methods may have produced some information of intelligence value, but its negative impact has far outweighed any value gained. Many, particularly in the judge advocate branch, saw the crisis looming, but were marginalized by non-military advisors suggesting that “the new paradigm rendered the Geneva Convention obsolete” and “rendered quaint some of its provisions.”58 The reality was, however, that senior officers requested, accepted, and implemented these provisions, often with insufficient oversight given the risks involved. Senior officers must consider their organization’s long-term legitimacy when requesting or implementing such extraordinary measures.

State the unstated clearly. Leaders at every level must recognize that they could have prevented many actions that eroded legitimacy were it not for the tacit approval that the troops assumed their senior leaders had given for such actions. Second Lieutenant Phan’s example of poor leadership in Hamdani reflects an attitude of implicit justification. The Schlesinger Report’s observation that “leaders conveyed a sense of tacit approval of abusive behaviors towards prisoners” verbalizes what many in the military could feel—a command climate where restraint was not a clear concern. Comments about complacency in the Bargewell Report on Haditha also reinforce conclusions that leaders at all levels clearly failed to state how legitimacy fit into the concept of the operation.59

Consider a tactical operation’s impact on legitimacy. Soldiers like kicking in doors. It gives them an adrenaline rush and a sense of accomplishment

Soldiers need to learn that reinforcing legitimacy is a core business of all combat forces.
and cuts the boredom. Unfortunately, it also creates new enemies. Hard intelligence must guide cordon-and-search operations and 0200 hours takedowns. If the local police could ring the doorbell the next morning with the same effect, should a platoon have to break its way in? Can we leave the small fish behind until after we catch the big fish in order to ensure the locals understand our intent? Can special operations forces (SOF) deal with this target? Are SOF too focused on direct-action missions instead of the more subtle paths to victory? As the staff war games all options, it must consider the longer-term results of the tactical actions.

Take a lesson from American history. As police forces in the United States increased in professionalism, they learned hard lessons about legitimacy. In 1965, two years before some of the worst riots in Detroit history, Detroit Police Commissioner George Edwards wrote the following: “Although local [white] police forces generally regard themselves as public servants with the responsibility of maintaining law and order, they tend to minimize this attitude when they are patrolling areas that are heavily populated with Negro citizens. There, they tend to view each person on the streets as a potential criminal or enemy, and all too often that attitude is reciprocated . . . It has been a major cause of all recent race riots.”

The tendency to view most citizens as potential enemies is often the default setting for coalition forces. While no Soldier should be naïve, the assumption that most people in the streets just want to get on with their lives peacefully is probably correct. The respect Soldiers show to those citizens should be similar to the respect they show to U.S. citizens during responses to domestic crisis.

Recognize that legitimacy in a single operation is influential and enduring. U.S. legitimacy in Iraq affects how people in Afghanistan, Yemen, and the Philippines view U.S. operations. The Abu Ghraib revelations had a direct impact on attitudes around the world. The success of the U.S. in regaining legitimacy in Iraq will have an impact on some future operation in another region of the world. A single operation will have an affect on all future operations in the region because local memories
tend to last longer than the institutional memories of deployed forces. In 1979, the anger of Iranian students who took 54 citizens of “the Great Satan” hostage shocked the U.S. In fact, a long-term view of U.S. legitimacy in the region influenced Iranian students who used the phrase. From the local perspective, the hostage taking was a form of insurance against a repeat of the clandestine U.S. intervention of 1953 that overthrew a popular prime minister in favor of the pro-U.S. and authoritarian shah. Whatever reputation one sets today in a region will have second- and third-order effects years from now.

NOTES


2. Official DOD casualty totals are available at <www.defenselink.mil/news/casualty.pdf>. The most useful reference for running totals including coalition and (tentative) Iraqi totals is at <icasualties.org/>. It includes both security force and civilian deaths, including those of non-Iraqi or Afghani forces, fatalities among coalition troops in 2006 totaled 191, far in excess of the 12 killed in 2001 and the 68 killed in 2002. The sites noted above give up-to-date figures. For official DOD reports, see <www.defenselink.mil/news/casualty.pdf>. More complete reporting of coalition casualties is available at <www.icasualties.org/efoc/>.</p>

4. While there is much debate over what constitutes a defense expenditure, the 48 percent figure comes from Stockhammer International Peace Research Institute’s Yearbook 2005. While the cost of military operations is not an International Security, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), chapter 8. Extracts are available at <http://yearbook2006.sipri.org/chap/chap8>. The United States has taken on an immense burden. Were it a national defense budget, the budget supplemental request alone (in addition to the departmental request) would rank as the second largest national defense budget in the world (approximately $30 billion more than China’s). For current budget requests, see <www.whitehouse.gov/moc/nss/20060316.pdf>.

5. Too many useful references on counterinsurgency exist to provide a full list here. Full bibliographical references as well as reviews can be found at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in Fort Leavenworth website at <www.cgsc.army.mil/cas/res/cbc/counterinsurgency.asp> or at the very useful Small Wars Journal website at <http://smallwarsjournal.com/journal-reading/list>. 6. Quotes are from David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (New York: Praeger, 1964), 8.


10. For discussions on legitimacy as a political concept, see Andrew Heywood, Politics: Theory and Practice (New York: Penguin Books, 2006), 16-17.


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tions appears in Michael R. Gorden and General Bernard E. Trainor, Cobra II: The
inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq, (New York: Pantheon books,
2006), 331-35.

30. Martin Asser, “What happened at Haditha?” BBC News Report, 21 De-
with references is also available at Wikipedia.org under the title of “Haditha Killings.”

31. See Tim McGrath, “Collateral Damage or Civilian Massacre in Haditha?”
hp>, Also see Asser.

32. A preliminary investigation began on 14 February 2006 and a criminal investiga-
tion three weeks later. Those investigations have resulted in 15 broad charges and 44
specific charges against 8 marines, including murder charges against 4 of them.

33. Asser.

34. Josh White, “Report on Haditha Condemns Marines: Signs of Misconduct were
content/article/2007/04/20/AR2007042002308.html.

35. “Simple Failures” and ‘Disastrous Results’: Excerpts from MG Eldon A.
post.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/04/20/AR2007042002308.html>

36. ibid., A13, and Josh White, A13.

37. ibid., A13.

a list of detailed charges in this case and the Haditha incident, see U.S. Marine Corps
website, “Iraq Investigations,” < www.usmc.mil/iraq/iraq-investigations.htm> Note that
five of the eight have now accepted plea bargains of various forms to receive lesser
sentences in exchange for testimony against three of the accused.

39. In response to these events, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General M.W.
mc/icp/ethical CORE/ethroot.htm> Note that

40. See a quick summary of related news articles and links to those articles in a
incident>.


42. George Packer, The Assassin’s Gate: America in Iraq (New York: Farrar,

43. Thomas E. Ricks, Fiasco: the American Military Adventure in Iraq (New York:

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newyorker.com/printables/fac040510a1a_fact> For responses, see, for example, Human
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Abuse of Detainees, April 2005, Vol. 17, No 1(G), <www.hrw.org/reports/2005/us0405/g>

48. For a short encapsulated version of the Newsweek allegations, retractions, and
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51. The Brookings Institution, Iraq Index: Tracking Reconstruction and Security in

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port.pdf>.

53. FM 3-24/MCPW 3-33.5, 1-22, Para. 1-120.

54. Failows. Failows quotes Shirley Tealhimi before U.S. forces killed al-Zarqawi
in 2006.

55. Packard, 223.

56. Quotations are from a 2002 memo written by then White House Counsel
Alberto Gonzales. See extracts at Dan Froomkin, More Ambiguity about Torture,”

57. The Brookings Institution, Iraq Index: Tracking Reconstruction and Security in

58. For a sobering, but very readable account of U.S. small wars and the enduring
effects on legitimacy, see Stephen Kinzer, Overthrow: America’s Century of Regime

59. From a famous John Winthrop sermon reportedly given the Puritans of Mas-

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TEN URGENT STEPS for the Advisor Mission in Afghanistan

Captain Daniel Helmer, U.S. Army

THE ATTACKS OF 9/11 originated from Afghanistan, where a decade of international neglect after the fall of the communist government allowed Islamic extremists to train and thrive. Today, the mission to resurrect the failed Afghan state stands at “a strategic fork in the road.” Squabbling within the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), including threats by the Canadians and Dutch to withdraw forces in 2009, makes government and coalition victory seem far from inevitable in the eyes of the Afghan people. Their confidence in the coalition and their government has decreased, even as there has been some modest improvement in feelings about the Afghan National Police and Afghan National Army. Frustration with the state of affairs in Afghanistan has been compounded by the coldest winter on record and fast-rising food prices, which generated relatively slow responses both from the government and international community.

Over the course of the six-year international presence in Afghanistan, the country has become the largest narcotic-producing nation in the history of the world. Moreover, civilian deaths reached an apogee in the past year. Suicide bombings, rare prior to 2005, have increased and have become more deadly. Widely publicized suicide and kidnapping attacks against foreign civilian targets have made international agencies reluctant to work throughout significant portions of Afghanistan. Meanwhile, coalition forces failed to convince the people that they were more discriminating in their use of violence than the insurgents, while casualty rates among coalition and Afghan forces are the highest they have been since the start of the conflict. In the economic realm, instability cut direct foreign investment in half over the past year, after five years of gains. Afghans living in the once quiet center, west, and north of the country have grown increasingly frustrated with the central government’s and international community’s focus on the south and east. In the words of one political correspondent in Mazar-I Sharif, a city in the north, “Our people are today living in a state of disappointment.”

In the wake of such bad news, ISAF and the separate U.S.-led Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) have sought, with limited success, to increase the number of ISAF and U.S. advisors in the country so they can more quickly and effectively transfer security responsibility to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). This plan, however, is not working. Without the following 12 major and rapid changes to its structure and execution, the advisory effort will fail to arrest the growing insurgencies in Afghanistan.

Prepare Advisors for Afghanistan, Not Iraq

Currently, the lead U.S. unit at Fort Riley charged with training advisors for Afghanistan and Iraq uses the same trainers for both missions. While
Riley has made extensive efforts to prepare teams to operate effectively in Afghanistan, the major differences between the theaters make it very difficult for those who have only been to Iraq to develop an appropriate frame of reference for Afghanistan and prepare teams accordingly. The unit should consolidate all of its trainers with Afghanistan experience into one group focused on training for counterinsurgency (COIN) warfare in the mountains, deserts, and jungles of Afghanistan.

Additionally, while Fort Riley has the lead in training combat advisors, many other centers around the United States and Europe also provide training. The coalition and the U.S. military should standardize and consolidate Afghan training to the greatest degree possible. Consolidation will facilitate agreement on what advisors should do and how best to train them. Importantly, once the functions and training of advisors are agreed upon, ISAF commanders in Afghanistan will understand better how to engage and employ the advisors in their areas.

**End District Hopping**

Fighting in Afghanistan is like trying to respond to a mass-casualty disaster with two doctors, then measuring how many patients they treat, not how many they save. The impulse to spread advisors thinly over a wide area has resulted in police mentor teams responsible for mentoring in several districts at one time. Advisors for the Afghan Army, meanwhile, are often responsible for mentoring multiple units or several echelons of the Afghan Army at the same time (e.g., company commanders and battalion staff officers at the same time).

For CSTC-A, the advisor command in Afghanistan, this broad allocation of personnel increases the total number of districts and units in which it can claim to have advisors. Such claims, however, say nothing about the quality or effectiveness of the assistance advisors provide to Afghan forces. It is difficult to demonstrate credibility, and build rapport—the bedrock of effective advising—if you are here today and gone tomorrow.

A good emergency responder knows that a major disaster requires triage: identifying patients who are beyond assistance, those who can be saved by immediate assistance, and those whose cases can wait for another day. Unfortunately, because of ineffective intelligence, CSTC-A lacks the information to know which of the more than 300 districts would benefit most from advisor teams. The current assignment of advisors to the ANSF has not been matched adequately against the insurgent threat. Focused District Development, a recent plan to identify important districts and completely retrain their police forces, does not deal with the continued assignment of advisors to districts of little import outside of the plan. Advisor placement and the placement of the Afghan forces they advise seems to many advisor teams to verge on randomness. On a district-by-district basis, CSTC-A should determine quickly where to assign advisor teams given its very limited resources, and then do so one team per unit.

**Live, Work, and Fight with Mentored Units**

According to the U.S. Army’s COIN doctrine in Field Manual (FM) 3-24, advisors should “live, work, and (when necessary) fight with their HN [Host Nation] units. Segregation is kept at an absolute minimum.” In Afghanistan, advisor teams generally live apart from their Afghan units. Even when they don’t, they are often segregated from the Afghans by massive walls. Fewer key districts will fall to insurgents and mentoring will become more effective if we adopt FM 3-24’s prescription as the rule rather than the exception. Fewer ANSF members will die unnecessarily at poorly defended district centers and outposts if the key districts are identified, mentors are pushed out to them on a permanent basis, and CSTC-A provides the logistics necessary to support them and the overall COIN effort. Also, fewer mentors will be exposed to roadside bombs if they are not required to travel constantly from their bases to police stations on the limited and predictable road network.
An Afghan unit should not be considered covered by advisor capabilities until an advisor team is embedded with it. Embedding will not only enable more effective mentoring and combat advising, it will also give coalition units greater access to human intelligence where it counts.

End the Individual Replacement System

The commands in Afghanistan have adopted a de facto individual replacement system that rotates individuals rather than units into theater. Such systems have been discredited in the past, and the U.S. Army specifically seeks to identify and deploy teams rather than individuals. Mission turbulence will inevitably result in some advisors being sent to different areas than originally planned; however, the current helter-skelter method of not telling an advisor where he will serve until the last minute dramatically slows down the learning process and doesn’t develop effective, cohesive teams trained and conditioned to operate together in a difficult environment.

While constituting and training advisor teams need to happen immediately, larger regional unit deployments should replace team deployments as soon as possible. In other words, an entire regional advisor command should be trained and deployed together. A continuous unit chain of command throughout training and deployment would ensure that commanders know their subordinates and vice-versa, and it would assuage some of the feelings advisor units often get of having been abandoned. It would also allow better planning and staffing at the regional level because staffs and commanders would have trained together. While executing a regional unit rotation policy will be difficult, such detailed personnel coordination is not impossible. The advisor command should cut this Gordian knot now. Regional unit rotation could make advisory efforts more effective and improve long-term institutional capabilities, enabling us to turn over the fight to the Afghan government more quickly.

Identify Key Skills Among Advisors

Effective counterinsurgents not only take on the population’s security, but also provide basic economic needs, essential services, community sustainment, and social institutions, all of which contribute to an acceptable quality of life. These areas of responsibility require the advisor command to identify people with unique skills and put them in the proper staff or mentor positions. Even in the security realm, the command needs greater expertise in areas such as computer technology; logistics; engineering; policing; and information, psychological, and media operations. Counterinsurgency theorists have often held that complex counterinsurgency is beyond the realm of reservists’ skills or ability. Yet, National Guard and Reserve Soldiers have proven in their service in Afghanistan and Iraq that their unique civilian skills prepare them not only for combat operations, but also for governance and economic development. No concerted effort has been made, however, to tap this advantage by identifying unique skills of the Soldiers within CSTC-A and applying them accordingly. Given the likelihood of continued Guard and Reserve participation in the advisor campaign, the Guard command should identify individuals with critical skills, regardless of their branch, rank, and time in service, and place them in teams and units and on staffs where they can contribute the most.

Develop a COIN Intelligence Capability

Key capability gaps exist today in the collection, analysis, and distribution of intelligence across coalition and Afghan forces.

Collection. Advisor teams are the most dispersed forces in Afghanistan, and they have the most consistent contact with Afghan security forces. They have ready access to more human intelligence than any other set of non-Afghan soldiers in Afghanistan. Yet there is no effective advisor chain for intelligence collection and no widely understood obligation for advisors to collect intelligence. Once CSTC-A is able to determine the composition of teams prior to their arrival in Afghanistan, intelligence officers should be identified and trained for every team. CSTC-A must develop easy, widely dispersed systems—analog, digital, or even cell phone—to facilitate collection across its force. Immediately, even before these changes are implemented, CSTC-A and its regional commands should develop and disseminate the key questions that they need teams to answer (i.e.,
their priority intelligence requirements). Every mentor should be aware of these requirements and understand how to report relevant information in a timely manner.

**Analysis.** Any collection from CSTC-A currently goes into a black hole. Without a collection system, the command is limited to developing intelligence based on sources on its own secure intranet. These intelligence products serve little purpose, because there is no functional distribution system for advisor teams.

Collection from ANSF and National Directorate of Security (the Afghan intelligence service) sources gets pieced together with ISAF intelligence to a limited extent at the national level and, below that, barely at all. Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan is a valley-by-valley fight. Yet we have only the most trivial understanding at the local level of who the insurgents are and what their narratives, networks, motivations, demands, and support structures are. We have an even poorer understanding of the human terrain, such as tribes and other networks, and their dynamics. The newly employed human terrain teams provide little actionable information to mentors on the ground because they are in a separate chain of command. Likewise, they receive little information from the mentors themselves. While we possess some national-level understanding of the insurgency, we know little about how various pieces of the puzzle fit from one region into another. We have not been able to predict what the enemy will do, nor have we been able to disrupt his decision cycle.

At times it is easy to see why. If you look to the small city of Gardez as an example, separate intelligence cells live and work at six independent Afghan and coalition headquarters. It does not require years of intelligence experience to guess how poorly this operates.

Intelligence assets should be reorganized to include, in a single cell, intelligence officers from the Afghan Police and Army, Afghan National Directorate of Security, and coalition forces. These cells should operate at all levels in Afghanistan. In these cells, intelligence officers from the different groups would jointly receive reports and conduct analysis, which they could forward up and disseminate down the chains of command. Colocating analysts would likely result in greater intelligence sharing and better analysis. With improved intelligence, we could target both the insurgents and the underlying causes of the insurgency much more effectively.

**Distribution.** Today, many advisor teams have little or no access to intelligence and secure intelligence systems. In a COIN fight, intelligence is vital, but...
many advisor teams remain in the dark. Current off-the-shelf solutions could solve the problem of providing secure network access to advisor teams. Months or even years should no longer pass between emplacing a remote team and providing connectivity to intelligence networks. In Kunar and Nuristan provinces, 1-32 Infantry operated through much of 2006 and 2007 with Secret Internet Protocol Router Network access down to the platoon and even sub-platoon level. Their example is a good one for the advisor command, particularly if the command is (as professed) the Army’s “number one priority.”

Distribution of intelligence is further hampered because too few intelligence products are releasable to the ANSF. This makes it very difficult to operate cohesively with our Afghan partners. Much intelligence can and should be shared with Afghan officers; in fact, virtually every intelligence product should be produced in a form that can be shared with Afghans. At the very least, U.S. and ISAF intelligence officers need to be trained on what can and cannot be shared, and how to best facilitate the sharing.

Give Advisor Teams Access to Nonlethal Effects

A natural tension exists between successful ISAF commanders and CSTC-A advisors. ISAF commanders seek to accomplish the greatest good they can in a 4- to 15-month tour. The best advisors seek to create Afghan units that can sustain and win combat operations for a protracted conflict with no ready end in sight. The advisor, however, is often forced to rely on ISAF units for his own support and, at times, protection. Also, depending on his location, he may receive his orders from the ISAF commander. When conflicts arise between the ISAF commander’s short-term goals and the advisor’s long-term objectives, the ISAF commander really has no need to consider the advisor’s viewpoint. This disconnect in vision can be counterproductive; for example, using Afghan soldiers as unit auxiliaries rather than conducting joint planning with the Afghan commander undermines the Afghans’ progress toward autonomous operations.

To even the playing field and spur collaborative efforts, the Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP)—a fund for short-term humanitarian assistance projects such as wells—should become the sole province of advisor teams. This would provide, for the first time, direct access for Afghan commanders through their mentors to significant nonlethal effects. Access to such effects would enable Afghan Police and Army commanders to conduct planning and operations across all counter-insurgency lines of operation while helping to ensure that the ISAF commander supported the Afghan commander’s operations in the Afghan commander’s area of operations rather than the other way around. As with intelligence, one member of every advisor team should be trained to do civil affairs. This training requirement, too, would encourage CSTC-A to identify teams prior to their arrival in Afghanistan.

Ensuring that CERP funded projects are selected in collaboration with ANSF leaders could increase the legitimacy of government action in an area. ISAF commanders would retain access to other types of civil affairs funding through provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) and other sources.

...one member of every advisor team should be trained to do civil affairs.

Improve and Decentralize Information Operations

If the mentor command in Afghanistan has developed information operations (IO) guidance, messages, or themes, the guidance is unknown to most mentors. A booklet containing standard themes passed out to some mentor teams seems to have been developed in a vacuum and has not evolved significantly over the course of time.

ISAF remains an IO dinosaur, with response times stretching into days and weeks and no delegation of authority to the battalion level and below. It is far easier for the media to get information from the insurgents, who respond in minutes, than from CSTC-A, ISAF, or the government, which respond well outside the window of the 24-hour news cycle. Nor does the command at times realize the problem. (One regional advisor commander told his senior IO mentor this year that he really did not see the need to develop information operations within his planning.) In a campaign for influence over the Afghan people, this state of affairs is a losing proposition.
CSTC-A has access to the most vital IO resource in the country: the soldiers and police of the ANSF. CSTC-A ought to develop an informed and effective campaign in conjunction with the Afghan government to successfully influence the people. Advisor units should be constantly reminded of the importance of IO and be given the necessary authority to implement IO initiatives (in accordance with national themes) through and in conjunction with their counterparts. To enhance the teams’ IO capabilities, one member should receive in-depth IO training.

Beyond specific training for a single team member, culturally appropriate IO training needs to be a focal component of all advisor team pre-deployment training. The enemy regards IO as a decisive element in his campaign. We cannot afford to cede that fight to him.

Improve Logistics and Engineering Support

CSTC-A has not properly employed its most effective weapon in Afghanistan: its money. This shortcoming is apparent in the lack of adequate planning and strategic thought behind the provision of logistics and engineering support to advisor teams and the ANSF. At the best of times, such planning has been done poorly. One advisor assigned to a remote area told me that in order to survive, his team and the unit they were mentoring were forced to sell fuel for food between monthly or longer aerial resupply missions. Some teams are immobile for weeks as they await truck parts or ammunition. Meanwhile, separate logistics systems are being used to supply ISAF and other forces in theater. At times, two different logistics convoys will conduct separate resupply missions for CSTC-A and ISAF units along dangerous routes, even though the customers units are located at the same base. Both the planning and effectiveness of logistics support must transform drastically.

CSTC-A, ISAF, the Afghan forces, and other forces in theater need to develop a combined logistical and construction task force that
evaluates two key issues: how to support and sustain the force, and how to support economic development, reconstruction, governance, and information operations.

There is much room for improvement in procurement, movement, and construction. Formation of a combined task force, in lieu of the current independent logistics fiefdoms, will provide greater efficiency. Simultaneously, it will broaden consideration of logistical efforts as integral components of the overall COIN effort. This task force should work in conjunction with the United Nations Assistance Mission Afghanistan and the Afghan National Development Strategy to balance sustainability, building capacity, critical needs, and local needs with national imperatives. On the other hand, a new combined task force will not immediately meet the supply and construction needs of advisor teams. In the short term it may actually exacerbate some of the issues as we use more local contracting, local procurement, and Afghan-sustainable construction methods (e.g., mud brick or tamped earth instead of imported concrete block from Pakistan). In the end, though, more effective planning in the logistics and engineering realms could enable us to support the fight more effectively in key districts while simultaneously driving both long-term development and the exchange of guns for shovels.

Give All Leaders Standardized COIN Training

Knowledge of COIN principles and imperatives and how to apply them varies within CSTC-A, across ISAF, and throughout the Afghan security forces and government. Leaders in the field lack a common vision of both campaign objectives and their commanders’ intents on how to achieve those objectives. Advisors, ISAF maneuver units, PRTs, and Afghan security forces can only function as part of a single campaign to defeat the insurgency if they have a baseline knowledge of the Afghan insurgency, COIN doctrine, the current campaign, the lethal and nonlethal tools at their disposal, and know how their area of responsibility fits into the whole.

The Counterinsurgency Academy in Kabul is a small step toward realizing unity of effort and a comprehensive approach to defeating the insurgency; yet it remains an ad hoc organization attended often by low-level players with little clout, and it has little buy-in from the advisor, ISAF, or Afghan chains of command. The academy, or a similar initiative, should be properly resourced and supported. Relevant, contemporary instruction must be provided in-theater to ISAF and Afghan commanders and staffs, key PRT personnel, advisor leaders, and relevant civilian leaders to ensure greater adherence to tested COIN doctrine.
and a common understanding of what needs to be done in Afghanistan.

Learn the Right Lessons from the Right Places

After too long a time, CSTC-A is finally beginning to incorporate some lessons from our big-brother operation to the west, but it is time to ask if Iraq really is the best place to look for guidance. While our mistakes in Iraq and Afghanistan do share a number of similarities, there are enough differences in the two situations to give us pause. Iraq is a resource-rich, relatively educated country with access to the sea. Landlocked Afghanistan is one of the earth’s poorest countries. It has never had a strong, stable, long-lasting central government; it has experienced nothing but war for three decades; it has one of the lowest literacy rates in the world; it has virtually no infrastructure or industry; and it has multiple ethnicities crossing nearly arbitrary international boundaries. In short, Afghanistan more closely resembles a post-conflict state in sub-Saharan Africa than it does Iraq. It is a state-building experiment being conducted in the midst of an insurgency, and the command needs to bring in assistance for the Afghan Army and Police from those who have worked in similar situations. Instead, it has brought in, at huge expense, civilian advisors on expensive contracts who have moved full steam ahead in creating systems, doctrine, and training appropriate for a developed Western army guarding the Fulda Gap and for police in the U.S. Midwest. Under this tutelage, the Afghan Army is now well on its way to having dozens of military occupational specialties and thousands of pages of word-for-word translated U.S. doctrine for a force that is barely literate. It is time to entirely reevaluate contracted civilian advisors, to fire those who are incapable of advising a non-Western force, and to hire personnel with experience in advising security forces and designing systems in the world’s least developed post-conflict countries.

Simplify the Advisor Chain of Command

The current structure of the advisory mission in Afghanistan is best described as confusing, impenetrable, and top-heavy. It is often unclear who is in charge. Even if an advisor team has been told who is in charge of it on a particular day, the unit can use the opaqueness of authority to ignore one set of orders for another, more agreeable set. Orders, even from general officers, are regularly ignored. Similarly, staff officers at all levels routinely pass work back and forth because it is rarely clear who has responsibility for making a decision. Often, this back-and-forth staff work simply provides a way to avoid making a difficult decision.

The structure is so confusing that it is almost painful to describe. Theoretically, at the top lies the U.S.-led CSTC-A, which is not part of the ISAF coalition and so functions independently of the overall international military effort in Afghanistan. Underneath CSTC-A is a single subordinate unit, Task Force Phoenix, headed by the National Guard. The function of a single subordinate unit with a virtually identical mission has never been sufficiently explained. The staffs of both units regularly pass work in circles, and subordinate units regularly play one staff off against the other. Oftentimes, direction to subordinate units comes directly from CSTC-A rather than Phoenix, further confounding the units. Clear lanes of responsibility for the staffs are not well defined, and so each staff regularly describes the other as inept.

Phoenix theoretically controls five regional advisor commands throughout the country that are responsible for advising both the Afghan Army and Police. Non-American advisors, however, come from ISAF, not from CSTC-A; thus, Phoenix has no authority over them. Some of these mentors are further inhibited by national caveats, which make it impossible to devise a coordinated advisory campaign for the ANSF. In addition, many U.S. advisors come from the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps. They come with their own service caveats, which are as pernicious to the overall mentor effort as national caveats are to the ISAF effort, e.g., limitations on how Air Force personnel can be utilized. This lack of unity is particularly problematic with Marine advisors, who, recognizing the shortcomings of the reporting structure, have tended to act on their own rather than as members of a joint-combined team. Finally, in southeast and east Afghanistan, Phoenix has ceded control of its U.S. advisors to the U.S.-led ISAF task force responsible for those regions. In many cases, this means that a U.S. battalion commander has U.S. advisors of equivalent rank reporting to him—and these advisors must still report to Phoenix. If this all sounds very confusing, that’s because it is.
For the advisor mission to succeed in Afghanistan, its chain of command must be clarified and streamlined immediately. To start with, Task Force Phoenix should be folded into CSTC-A. This would eliminate inefficient redundancies and clarify who is in charge of U.S. personnel. Several senior staff officers in both commands have told me privately that the overall advisory mission would be far more efficient and effective if the staffs, particularly those involved in operations, future planning, civil affairs, IO, and logistics, were colocated and functioned as a single entity.

Next, there must be an effort to lower overall rank within the advisor units. The current top-heaviness of CSTC-A and Phoenix inhibits effective command and control of the advisor mission. For instance, approximately 10 percent of all CSTC-A headquarters personnel are colonels or general officers, while each regional command has three colonels in its command structure. Staffs at CSTC-A need to be headed by one, and only one, colonel. The regional advisor commands should have only one colonel. Rank structure should also be pushed down on the advisor teams, so that a U.S. officer works with a unit one or two levels higher in the Afghan Army or Police than the officer would command in the U.S. military. This would be consistent with successful Marine Corps constabulary models from the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The end result would be a more manageable organization that yields more boots on the ground.

Finally, advisor teams drawn from ISAF need to receive their orders from CSTC-A. While particular countries have reasons for not wanting their teams to be controlled by CSTC-A, their reluctance makes the advisory mission virtually incoherent. The best means to accomplish unity of command within the advisor mission would be to fold CSTC-A into ISAF rather than maintain an independent command in Afghanistan. Short of that, CSTC-A and ISAF must reject advisor teams offered by countries unwilling to place them under CSTC-A’s control. A good place to start would be to ensure that no U.S. units in CSTC-A be allowed to operate under their own procedures and independent of the chain of command. Finally, we must clarify when advisors become subordinate to the ISAF commanders. Doing so will help ensure that advisor teams facilitate COIN operations when their Afghan units are partnered with ISAF forces.

Conclusion

Afghanistan is still winnable, but it is on a downward and possibly terminal spiral if we continue to operate as we are. Urgent action is needed now to repair the advisory mission to the Afghan Army and Police. Many of these changes will be politically difficult to undertake. Many others, however, are necessary because of the structure of CSTC-A, and are more easily fixed. While repairing the advisory mission alone will be insufficient for victory in Afghanistan, it will be a major start. Rapidly adopting the 12 changes discussed above would be both an effective beginning and a bold statement that the effort to build, train, and sustain Afghan National Security Forces is truly our number one priority.

Notes

3. United Nation Office on Drugs and Crime, Afghanistan: Opium Survey 2007. Measured on a per capita and population density basis. In absolute terms, only 19th Century China may have produced more total narcotics with a population 15 times as large and a much larger land mass. All of South America produces less coca than Afghanistan opium, and Helmand province alone produces more opium than Colombia produces cocaine.
8. In fact, Fort Riley trains “teams” to go to Afghanistan. However, rarely are these teams kept intact. They are used mostly by the command as augmentees to fill personnel gaps created by personnel rotating out of theater or by increased demands for advisors in new areas.
9. Task Force Phoenix, the sole subordinate command of CSTC-A.
10. These are the ARSIC S2, PRT S2, Regional Police Headquarters S2, National Directorate of Security (NDS) Headquarters, Provincial Police Headquarters S2, and the ANA 203d Corps S2.
11. Oftentimes, as was the case for my team in Kabul, the original personnel on a team are long gone from the theater when some mode of secure network communications arrives.
13. I saw this in my regular duties establishing the Counterinsurgency Academy and discussed it on several occasions with TF Phoenix and CSTC-A staff. Leaders who passed through the COIN academy regularly commented on the difficulty of drawing any decision out of these staffs, and our team at the academy on several occasions exploited divisions in order to obtain logistics and other support from one command or the other.
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PHOTO: Troops from the U.S. Army’s 1st Armored Division listen to U.S. General John Abizaid, the commander of the U.S. Central Command, inside the tactical operations center, in a former palace of Saddam Hussein in Tikrit, Iraq, 4 May 2004. (AP Photo/Mandatory Credit: Christopher Morris/VII)

COMMANDERS SHOULD PROACTIVELY take initiative to mitigate the conditions that cause their staffs to lose their peak effectiveness. Rejuvenating the staff through imaginative management can help prevent the erosion of effectiveness that systemic staff exhaustion and the current operational conditions encourage.

During my rotation for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) 06-08, CNN and other media outlets reported ongoing debate about the number and length of U.S. troop deployments. When the Army extended my unit’s deployment to 15 months, my initial thoughts were, “Soldiers in World War II were deployed for three years or more. We do not sleep in the mud in the pouring rain, and we get 15 to 18 days of leave stateside. Life isn’t that bad.” The Army houses most Soldiers in Iraq in climate-controlled buildings with electricity, heat, and air conditioning, usually two Soldiers to a containerized housing unit with a bath and shower with hot and cold running water within 100 feet. Soldiers are not in constant contact with the enemy for extended periods as in World War II. Most get one or more days of rest a week with minimal duties and no combat patrols.

However, although Soldiers in World War II did not have the creature comforts our Soldiers have today, few spent 12 to 15 months at a time in a combat environment. Most participated in 90 to 100 days of operations and were then pulled off the line for refit and reconstitution (R&R) for two weeks to two months or more. Soldiers and staff officers alike rested. The Army’s current 15 to 18-day environmental leave program offers leave only to individuals and does not address collective staff exhaustion due to prolonged employment. This practice presents real dangers associated with degraded teamwork.

As a young lieutenant in the early 1990s, I often saw Army posters in division, brigade, and battalion headquarters depicting a tired, dirty Soldier and displaying the sentences, “Staff Officer, do your job well. His life depends on it.” The War on Terrorism in Iraq and Afghanistan drives this point home.

Echeloned staff officers produce mission orders with strategic and operational objectives that make their way down to platoons, sections, and sometimes even individual Soldiers. Hence, some argue that we are waging the War on Terrorism almost exclusively at the company level and below. I do not necessarily disagree. Division, brigade combat team (BCT), and battalion commanders do not just arrive and turn the battle’s tide by mere presence and force of will. In the dusty streets and deserts of Iraq and Afghanistan, squad leaders’ actions can have significant, often enduring operational and even strategic impact.
For these very reasons, the staff is more important than ever before. They need to use well-reasoned analysis, intellect, and experience to capture a commander’s intent and guidance and transform them into coordinated, synchronized, resourced, and executable plans and orders for the company, platoon, and squad.

Information Overload and the Next Meeting

Our units, particularly our staffs, enjoy unprecedented communications capabilities today. The Joint Network Transport Capability (JnTC) suite provides a full range of secure and non-secure voice and data links, interfaced common operational picture tools, and near real-time information transmission. Commanders and staff officers can access information about their areas of operations or interest at the click of a mouse. Collaboration tools abound. Staffs can access (or be force fed) so much information that they experience information overload.

As an example, when I was in Iraq on the staff of the 4th BCT, 1st Cavalry Division, on my desk I had a secure voice over internet protocol (VOIP) phone and a Secret Internet Protocol Router Network laptop plus a non-secure VOIP phone and an unclassified Sensitive Internet Protocol Router Network laptop. As the BCT engineer, I sent and received an average of about 60 emails a day on the two systems. When I was a battalion executive officer, that number was around 100. Primary staff officers on the BCT staff averaged over 150 per day. This email barrage can easily overwhelm staff officers, sap the staff’s energy, and focus everyone inward instead of outward. Oral communication can be rare because staff members are too busy pushing the “send” key. Meaningful dialogue becomes the exception, and their listening skills diminish over time.

The average BCT or battalion staff officer in Iraq attends 10 to 12 routine meetings every week, half of which or more involve the commander. This routine reflects the ubiquitous staff battle rhythm the Army has used for decades. These meetings include staff synchronization and coordination, working groups, operations and intelligence, commander updates, and maintenance meetings. In addition, nonrecurring meetings include operations order briefings, Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) sessions, or the ever popular distinguished visitor briefings, which occur an average of two times a month. Such a schedule gives us little time to think about, analyze, or discuss problems with other staff members. We are always preparing for the next meeting or briefing.

“I Know What the Boss Wants”

What does this never-ending battle rhythm, unprecedented information availability, and extended work schedule produce? The answer is simple—staff exhaustion. Exhaustion negatively affects our ability to understand the commander’s guidance and create effective plans and orders, which degrades subordinate unit effectiveness. There are three almost universal phenomena in today’s information-laden deployment environment—

- Complacency.
- Loss of creative energy.
- Taking short cuts.

Ultimately, the Soldier on the ground pays the price for our exhaustion.

An early symptom of staff exhaustion is what many refer to as the “next slide” syndrome, which comes from our insatiable appetite for “visual” products that we can easily brief, package, and transport on the JnTC systems’ backbone. Staffs reach a point where they think they have identified the format and content the commander wants with near absolute formulaic certainty. Working group and other preparatory meetings prior to briefing the commander become slide-review meetings. This procedural tyranny has become a norm on army operational staffs over the years and is new only in
the medium employed. Readers will recognize its form-over-substance quality. The chair of the meeting reviews the slide packet and repeatedly says “next slide” until the meeting is over. There is little discussion, thought, or analysis of the substance of the problem at hand. The person or section providing the slides has the answers, so there is no need to discuss the subject any further.

The “next slide” syndrome causes complacency, the first adverse effect of overwork in today’s information-laden deployment environment. If a staff member has the energy to see past the information on the slide and identify questions that require answers or discussion, he soon stops doing so because deputy commanders, executive officers, and S3s invariably ignore or marginalize him. Complacency grows. The staff member with an essential piece of information may well be a private first class intelligence analyst participating in the meeting, but he will not speak up when he sees captains and majors saying nothing or being marginalized on a regular basis.

If this situation persists, over time the staff loses its creative energy, stops conducting analysis, and just passes information to the commander. It does not make recommendations to the commander; it expects him to provide the recommendations or courses of action. Staff members under such conditions do not think; they react to the next crisis or the next bit of targetable information. If the staff executes the MDMP, it becomes a check-the-block exercise that lacks creativity and is risk-adverse and devoid of planning. The creative energy of the staff virtually disappears. This is the second adverse effect of overwork in today’s deployment environment.

Commanders often extol “thinking outside the box.” However, at this point in a staff’s life cycle, staff members and staff sections soon prefer to remain in a “comfort box” to cope with the mind-numbing repetition of meetings and briefings. Each officer’s “comfort box” is only as big as the computer screen in front of him. “Thinking outside the box” requires making the effort to look at the computer screen of the staff officer to one’s left or right. There is little or no creative thought at the individual level and no collective creativity. Staff members or sections provide their formulaic input to the current crisis action plan and move to the next task. All staff officers can fall into this spiritless tedium at some point. I am just as guilty of this as are my peers at BCT and the battalion level.

The last phenomenon and perhaps the most perilous result of staff exhaustion is taking short cuts. Habit and ennui can make form seem more important than substance, and shortcuts inevitably result. Staffs abandon the MDMP or abbreviate it to such a degree that it does not begin to achieve the planning described in FM 5-0. The most egregious mistake inabbreviating the MDMP is designating one staff officer to come up with a plan. As FM 5-0 describes it, “Planning is a dynamic process of several interrelated activities.” One staff officer may be the action officer, but he or she should not provide the sole input to the plan. Our Army today has a wealth of intelligent and experienced officers; however, few have the knowledge to develop an acceptable, feasible, and complete plan without assistance from other staff members.

Given the rapid operations the Army must conduct in the current operational environment, staffs seek shortcuts to produce concept of operation plans rapidly while executing the MDMP in a time-constrained environment. FM 5-0 recommends that a staff only shorten the MDMP when it understands every step in the process and the requirement to produce the necessary products. FM 5-0 notes that “omitting steps of the MDMP is not a solution” to planning in a time-constrained environment. Key to planning in such an environment is a commander’s direct involvement and the guidance and direction he provides. Without critical input from commanders, staff shortcuts often result in three or four slide presentations of an execution order. Such presentations lack the rigor of a written order and the detail required for coordination and synchronization of myriad assets and capabilities now available on the connected, modern battlefield.

As I composed this article, I sought insights from some wise sages at Fort Leavenworth. One such sage, a Marine Vietnam veteran, summarized the importance of the staff as follows: “The key assets of a good staff are the keenness of its processes, acuity of its insights, its clear and precise articulation of issues and solutions, its boldness and pro-risk-taking orientation appropriate to the situation at hand.” However, when a staff is exhausted, it loses its acuity of insight. It becomes risk adverse...
because it has lost the acumen to assess risk. All boldness and pride in the job are gone. The Soldier on the battlefield pays.

Rejuvenating the Staff

What can commanders, staff leaders, and individual staff members do to mitigate or overcome staff exhaustion? The solutions will vary with the staff’s composition, the personalities of its members, and unit missions.

Individual staff members have a role in mitigating and overcoming staff exhaustion. Staff members should devise some type of mental, physical, and spiritual fitness plan to help relieve stress and maintain alertness and stamina. Although staff work is not physically exhausting, stress brings on exhaustion that eventually leads to fatigue and illness. Exhaustion in one or two key members of the staff can lower the morale of the entire staff. Making and taking personal time to read a book, watch a movie, or even take a nap can sustain individuals for the “long fight.” Attending a religious service can be a reprieve. Each person is different; he must find his own relief and personal recharge mechanism. I found writing this article helped restore some of my creative energy.

Staffs are more than just groups of individuals, however. A staff is a team and must combat staff exhaustion as a team. This might be as simple as a “foot-in-mouth award day,” movie night, or extended dinners during periods of lower operational tempo. Building a staff team to participate in athletic events or participating in team sports as part of group physical training offers relief from stress and tedium and are team-building tools. Chaplains can help the staff with stress management. Inspirational messages or “thoughts of the day” can be useful. Staff members should be willing to try something different, such as changing the means or delivery method of briefing the boss. Doing so may help a staff member see something that requires a change “in his lane” or even help energize the entire staff. Leaders should assess risk and mitigate it.

Ultimately, commanders are instrumental in preventing or identifying and overcoming staff exhaustion. Staff exhaustion is a genuine risk, and commanders should have the imagination to implement measures to control or reduce inherent risks rather than take a myopic and shortsighted attitude toward it. Commanders should self-interestedly take the initiative to prevent staff exhaustion from occurring. If it does occur, commanders should recognize it quickly and take action to rectify conditions. They should identify which key staff members are the most susceptible to staff exhaustion and give them some relief. Giving such key staff members a day off will enable them to relax instead of hovering in energy-sapping anticipation of the commander’s summons.

Proactively managing the R&R leave of the staff during extended deployments can minimize their exhaustion at work, but balancing mission needs takes a creative commander. It would not be feasible to authorize all key staff members to take R&R leave at the same time so they could all return to
work rejuvenated. The commander must sequence the leave of his key staff officers with that of his own to ensure the command continues to function and sustain operations during the deployment. Moreover, if the commander sends key staff officers on leave too early, they will become exhausted at the end of the deployment; if he sends them too late, they will lose their creative energy in the middle of the deployment. Commanders must assess the situation with foresight, make a decision, publish it early, and stick with it, even when events on the battlefield evolve, trusting that predictability will minimize the diminishing returns of exhaustion. Army units usually have depth in critical staff sections, and staff members will appreciate the predictability of their leave, be able to manage their expectations and those of their families, and prepare themselves mentally and physically for the duration of the deployment.

Commanders can also overcome staff exhaustion by rotating staff members where possible. At the BCT and battalion levels, public affairs, IO, PSYOP, aviation, military police, personnel, chaplains, and other staff members in select fields are skill-specific and one-deep, so there is no option of rotating these staffers. But commanders can rotate the XO, S3, S4, ECOORD/FSO, and some branch-immaterial staff members such as those in the plans section. Commanders should weigh the advantages of bringing new energy to the staff against the disadvantages of diluting institutional memory of staff functions and command interests. Is this new energy worth the risk of a steeper learning curve for a short time? From the staff officer’s perspective, the answer is a resounding yes! The energy gains would far outweigh the loss of expertise, given the team environment it would foster. A BCT commander can rotate staff officers across the BCT, but must consider the impact at the battalion level when electing to do so. During my deployment, I saw this work with varying degrees of success.

Commanders should also consider changing briefing methods. Some commanders abhor slide presentations. Some prefer using the old-fashioned map and pointer system, talking through the challenges and articulating the operation. This older method has advantages and disadvantages. On the plus side, staffers will spend more time analyzing and discussing the information, which could generate additional courses of action. Furthermore, the staff will be more thorough, because it will have to produce written products such as a complete operations order or minutes. On the negative side, this method is time consuming, doesn’t take advantage of the digital systems’ capabilities, and the products cannot be transmitted to others as rapidly as the digitized briefing.

Commanders can also halt the tedium of daily work by spending time teaching, coaching, and mentoring their staffs. Sacrificing a meeting or briefing to conduct an after-action review to identify areas for improvement and techniques to do so is a calculated risk worth taking. A commander teaching, coaching, and mentoring the staff might be the silver bullet to overcome staff exhaustion. Commanders should never fear going back over ground already covered if the staff has forgotten the lessons learned while crossing it. Sometimes, to get the staff moving again, it takes personal involvement and an attitude adjustment in the form of a paternalistic reminder.

Conclusion

Warfighting is a dangerous venture. It requires diligence, creativity, intelligence, and perseverance. Success demands synchronizing assets, disseminating intelligence rapidly, and executing orders. The staff plays a greater part than it ever has in the history of combined arms. Prolonged tedium from the barrage of minutia during extended deployments in an information-laden environment can cause systemic staff exhaustion and failure, sometimes with dangerous results.

The three phenomena that occur almost universally due to staff exhaustion—complacency, loss of creative energy, and taking short cuts—introduce risk to the unit’s mission. Together and without abatement, the three can be calamitous. Staff members can help identify, prevent, and overcome staff exhaustion, but commanders ultimately have to take the initiative in mitigating this risk, rejuvenating the staff, and providing guidance for subordinate unit plans and orders. Commanders and staffs should work together to achieve synergistic results; they must not fail the young Soldiers who walk point for them. MR
SINCE THE BEGINNING of combat operations in Iraq in March 2003, the media have disseminated countless war-related stories and articles of interest, reaching not only American citizens and military families in the United States but also an international community interested in gauging the coalition’s progress. The public’s desire for information about the war wavers, but bad news consistently generates attention. The American media embedded with military units strives to capture and portray events as they occur. Although sensational events arouse public interest, those less dramatic, but potentially more important, go mostly unnoticed. Such neglected stories do not involve spectacular insurgent attacks, human suffering, or infrastructure degradation. According to CNN international correspondent Nic Robertson, “There is an awful lot of what might be construed as bad news here [in Iraq], but it is the dominant information. It is the prevailing information.” However, in many cases, “less-than-worthy-of-attention” events have a profound effect on the perceptions, attitudes, behavior, and allegiances of the most influential audience involved in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), the Iraqi people. Iraqi citizens are closest to the truth at the proverbial “tip-of-the-spear” of unfolding events. In their eyes, the government of Iraq (GOI) and the coalition are either making improvements and progress or destroying what little the Iraqis had.

Influencing Iraqis is central to managing a favorable outcome in this war. Putting an Iraqi face on news to help counter anti-GOI or anti-coalition propaganda will ultimately be necessary to attain the best outcomes. Having Iraqis produce and report news stories is the best vehicle for eliminating culture and language barriers in communication. News important to improving a public spirit thereby gains a measure of instant credibility that coalition information operations and reporting cannot impart. Using native news reporters will increase chances of acceptance by the Iraqi population by relaying credible stories of progress that can resonate favorably through communities. Media communication to Iraqis by Iraqis thus has the potential to sway even the most stubborn of anti-GOI and anti-coalition critics, strengthening resolve and commitment to resist terrorism.

Unfortunately, other than using limited psychological operations (PSYOP) resources and capabilities, the GOI and the coalition have allotted scant attention, effort, and capital to communicating with Iraqis. To make progress in the
information war, the coalition needs to involve the Iraqi media. In this regard, two central issues must be addressed: providing security to the Iraqi media and, more important, facilitating their access to the most relevant stories of interest. If the coalition continues to overlook these two fundamental issues, the insurgents will remain the most influential group affecting Iraqi beliefs and behavior.

**Breaking the Paradigm**

Although pundits could debate whether Iraqi reporters have the same status as international media, the country’s credentialed correspondents clearly lack the clout and respect their international or American counterparts possess. All too often, Iraqi media are an afterthought.

Importantly, most coalition commanders have no appreciation for the potential benefits of including Iraqi reporters in daily battlefield circulations. They also probably do not feel comfortable doing so. The language barrier and the resource-intensive need for media escorts and translators make it easier to exclude Iraqis when planning media operations. Thus, Iraqi media have had little opportunity to provide relevant news about coalition and GoI actions. Altering this situation requires careful thought and changes to the status quo.

How is the coalition communicating with local Iraqis? For the most part, the coalition uses PSYOP assets to deliver its messages; however, information distribution is surgical, limited in duration and scope. The coalition often disperses printed media such as leaflets, posters, handbills, and billboards using tactical-level face-to-face engagements. It also uses radio broadcasts. Although these means are adequate to get a message out, Iraqi citizens know the information’s origin and often question its legitimacy, credibility, and intent. This natural skepticism especially affects Iraqis who are ambivalent toward the coalition and GOI and who have not denounced foreign influences, sectarian militias, and other groups opposed to the occupation.

Using PSYOP assets to reach this more skeptical audience raises the issue of credibility. Public Affairs (PA) ideally would be the primary way of reaching this sector because it focuses primarily on informing audiences, not manipulating them. Units use PSYOP themes and messages, on the other hand, to achieve—euphemistically speaking—a specific influencing effect. Psychological operations target selected audiences with information, whether the audiences are insurgents, local nationals, or others. Unlike public affairs, PSYOP is a sales pitch by definition, designed to induce or reinforce specific favorable attitudes and behavior. Thus, its effectiveness depends on how well its purveyors finesse it and on the audience’s willingness to buy into a message easily recognized as tendentious. The inherently manipulative PSYOP process, over time, reaches a point of diminishing returns. Inducement requires not just a persuasive message but also a credible source.

Moreover, repetitive exhortations limit PSYOP ability to influence the population at large. After five years of PSYOP in Iraq, Iraqi citizens have become desensitized to repeated themes and messages advocating GOI unity, reconciliation, no safe haven for insurgents, and intelligence reporting. Today, the coalition’s PSYOP avowals have become so cloying they no longer possess any credibility. One wonders at what point they actually become counterproductive.

Meanwhile, Iraqis are frustrated by the lack of timely and accurate information. They want immediate access to news, not coalition sales pitches. They find it aggravating to have outdated information foisted on them from Iraqi media sources, especially when it merely recaps American or international news already reported. The best way to break this paradigm is for the coalition to support and use the Iraqi media.

**Challenges Facing the Iraqi Media**

The perception of Iraqi media ineffectiveness comes not from poor media skills. Their problems are more a matter of their past and present status and the conditions under which they operate today. During Saddam’s reign, few news outlets existed, and those that did were government sanctioned, funded, and operated. The news they reported was all pro-government, and attempts to disseminate any facts or images contrary to the government’s version of events could mean early and final retirement.

Once the coalition removed these barriers, a plethora of free media outlets emerged to produce abundant information, some of it unbiased. The counterinsurgency became the sole focus of these
newly formed media outlets. However, as Iraq’s security environment deteriorated, working for an Iraqi media outlet became one of the most dangerous jobs in the world. Estimates indicate 118 media deaths and over 300 media casualties in Iraq since March 2003, many the result of assassinations.

Despite recent coalition and Iraqi security forces (ISF) successes, working for the Iraqi media remains dangerous. Terrorists target Iraqi media correspondents solely because they report stories of hope and progress inimical to insurgent purposes. If an Iraqi reporter were supporting the insurgency, he would simply make up stories in the safety of his dwelling, but any correspondent braving danger to work a story opposing the insurgency and terror tactics is at risk. Most Iraqi reporters die trying to convey to the world the rampant suffering of their people. Fox News Channel’s Jerry Burke notes the ordinary dangers facing all correspondents: “The media has a very difficult job. We have to cover some aspect of the story so we cover what we can cover without getting our anchors and our reporters blown up.”

In addition to the danger, Iraqis face coalition discrimination. In discussions with Iraqi journalists, Task Force Marne PAOs learned that many are perturbed over experiences they have had working with the coalition. They perceive that they are not given the same opportunities as American or international media correspondents. Native correspondents have difficulties registering and obtaining media credentials. Furthermore, the coalition has done very little to include Iraqi media in its daily battle rhythm. The amount of attention and access the coalition gives to American and international media operating in Iraq on any given day far exceeds that given the Iraqi media. U.S. and international journalists, though fewer in number, possess better funding, logistics, and reach-back capability to their home stations. Iraqi media crews cannot compete in these areas.

Although Iraqi correspondents are under appreciated, Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) has resourced a staff section in the international zone to fulfill coalition requests for Iraqi media embeds. The section, the Iraqi media engagement team (IMET), is the operational link between Iraqi media and coalition forces. The three-person team is a component of MNF-I’s larger Combined Press Information Center, which supports American and international media. The IMET supports every unit below corps level requesting embedded Iraqi media. However, fulfilling such requests is often problematic. With priority of support primarily to MNF-I and Multi-National Corps-Iraq, scheduling events for multiple multi-national division-level customers remains difficult.

**Task Force Marne’s Media Initiatives**

Task Force Marne established an Iraqi media section (IMS) to capitalize on Iraqi media capabilities and the advantages of using them. The section consists of 11 personnel working in three departments—battlefield circulation, articles and press releases, and media monitoring (see figure). In a departure from current Joint and Army doctrine, the IMS does not work for the public affairs officer. Instead, it falls under the direction and oversight of the effects coordinator (ECOORD).
non-doctrinal alignment allows the public affairs detachment to focus on internal and American audiences, and gives the effects staff responsible for PSYOP another influencing tool. However, having staff coordination responsibility for IMS relations with the Iraqi media does not entail a PSYOP mission role. This relationship creates the potential to moderate PSYOP with better coordination and synchronization of themes and messages. The IMS link to PSYOP is based strictly on the fact that it has the same target audience. It bears repeating that the IMS mission remains the core public affairs mission—informing.

**Staff separation and effectiveness.** Having the effects and PA elements concentrate on separate audiences better focuses the command’s influencing and informing efforts to support the strategic communications plan as well as the non-lethal targeting process. During non-lethal targeting working group sessions, the ECOORD prioritizes and synchronizes the Iraqi media section’s efforts with those of all other non-lethal contributors, including information operations, public affairs, civil military operations (governance and economics), Iraqi advisory task force, and the staff judge advocate (rule of law).

During a division strategic communications conference, the commanding general of Task Force Marne, Major General Rick Lynch, noted, “Targeting the American audience is a PA responsibility, and targeting the Iraqi audience is an effects responsibility.” Having worked as the MNF-I strategic effects coordinator for General George W. Casey during OIF III, Lynch experienced the benefits of partnering effects with Iraqi media. By separating the Iraqi media from PA, Lynch established clear lanes of responsibility based on his experiences working with these different audiences. Moreover, because current Army doctrine emphasizes that the decisive counter-insurgency battle is for the people’s minds, having effects staff responsible for coordinating engagement with Iraqi media greatly enhances PSYOP thematic relevance.

This novel, non-doctrinal approach has worked well for Task Force Marne. As of this writing, the IMS has conducted 38 battlefield circulations with Iraqi media crews, and it has translated over 300 “good-news” articles into Arabic and disseminated them. Market penetration for IMS-translated articles remains at just over 50 percent. Battlefield circulations average over 98 percent.

Although the IMS is separate from PA, the same standards apply; relationships between the IMS and the Iraqi media depend on professionalism, credibility, and trust.

**Battlefield interaction and monitoring.** The IMS began as a two-person operation that focused solely on Pan-Arab media monitoring, also referred to as open source intelligence. Army military occupational specialty 09L Soldiers handled the media monitoring function to obtain atmospherics (information on what the media was reporting on the coalition) and to identify any particular trends. Having current insights on Pan-Arab and Iraqi sentiments and perceptions of the coalition helps commanders validate or adjust the division’s strategic communications plan.

With the addition of two personnel, the IMS expanded its mission to include developing, translating, and disseminating coalition-related stories to Iraqi media outlets. Starting with seven radio stations, eight television stations, and 13 newspaper...
outlets, the media section quickly established itself as a credible source for timely articles and information. As it continued to disseminate its stories to its Iraqi media contacts, more journalists became aware of the value of the information the IMS provided. Today, the IMS has contacts with 11 radio stations, 13 television stations, 27 newspaper outlets, and a host of media websites. In addition, the media section signed an exclusive contract with the popular Al-Sabah newspaper. The contract guarantees that “high priority” Task Force Marne stories of tactical and operational importance are disseminated to a large segment of the public. The IMS regularly receives requests for interviews, military information, updates to developing stories of interest, and occasional thank-you notes. Articles are published with full Task Force Marne attribution, leading to frequent unsolicited tips from concerned citizens on insurgent activity. Although the IMS currently does not have the staff or equipment to accommodate television interviews, cross-talk and the leveraging of the division’s organic PA capabilities adequately accomplishes the mission.

To interact with the Iraqi media effectively, the IMS had to understand local organizational dynamics. Significant cultural and language barriers were only two of many challenges. Iraqi media personnel are no less demanding than American or international media. They expect the same level of professionalism, cooperation, treatment, and courtesies. Knowing their concerns and quickly handling any issues that arise can make the difference between a good media event and a complaint. To lessen the likelihood of mishap during a media event, the IMS employs military escorts and linguists to accompany Iraqi media crews to ensure coalition forces treat the crews fairly and with respect and keep them on schedule, focused on the mission, and out of harm’s way.

Coordinating the logistics of battlefield circulations is another major IMS challenge. Battlefield circulations are resource-intensive; however, the payoff in media penetration is tremendous. Freedom of movement is currently limited throughout most of Iraq, and getting Iraqi media crews out to stories that the coalition wants highlighted is no small feat. Aircraft delays and tight security measures at the International Zone, last minute changes to missions, and occasional media cancellations frustrate and inconvenience Iraqi journalists and IMS escorts. Using rotary-wing assets is the preferred and safest method for transporting media crews on battlefield circulations; however, at times, ground convoys become a necessity. In either case, having detailed back-up plans usually alleviates much of the stress of change while on the go. A typical battlefield circulation entails IMS escorts and translators flying from Camp Victory to the International Zone in Baghdad to link up with the Iraqi media crew. From there, the team continues air travel to the forward operating base closest to the event. The requesting maneuver unit sends a personal security detachment to provide ground movement to the event. The mission is not complete until the IMS safely escorts the media crew back to the International Zone and they return to Camp Victory.

For example, the IMS conducted a successful battlefield circulation in al-Rashida, a small town southwest of Baghdad, which had been an Al-Qaeda safe...
has grown tired of Al-Qaeda militants roaming the area, attacking coalition forces along Route Malibu, intimidating peaceful citizens, and committing heinous crimes. The townspeople banded together and formed a concerned citizens’ group that operated checkpoints at several key intersections and kept watch over their neighborhoods day and night. Within a short period, the citizens’ group forced Al-Qaeda out of the area. Since then, Al-Qaeda has had no significant presence or activity in al-Rashida or along that portion of Route Malibu. The IMS felt it important to capture this “good-news” story because it highlighted the positive effect that citizens’ groups had on preventing terrorism and securing neighborhoods. The battlefield circulation also allayed Shia neighbors’ fears that the coalition was arming Sunni concerned citizens’ groups. Task Force Marne also felt this story would encourage the Shia population to develop its own groups to help fight Shia extremism. Having Iraqi reporters tell this “success” story underscored the importance of having an Iraqi face on important messages supporting coalition efforts.

The IMS escorted al-Iraqiya and al-Fayhaa television crews to the site, where they conducted interviews with group leaders and citizens. The segments aired for several days on Iraqi television. The stories depicted Iraqi citizens taking a stand against criminals and securing their neighborhoods. The battlefield circulation was so influential that al-Fayhaa produced a 15-minute special program on concerned citizens’ groups, which aired the following week. To keep the momentum going in the press, the IMS published several articles on the event and disseminated them to its Iraqi media contacts. Numerous Iraqi print and Internet outlets picked up the stories, indicating a significant public interest in such groups. Since the airing of the special segment, other citizens’ groups around al-Rashida have sprouted. Today, concerned citizens’ group membership totals 8,000 persons. Leaders from 2d Brigade, 10th Mountain Division, happily reported a dramatic decrease in insurgent-type activity as a result of the citizen’s actions within its operating environment.

One of the greatest benefits of a battlefield circulation is putting an Iraqi face on the story; an Iraqi reporter talking to fellow Iraqis has a much greater effect on the Iraqi psyche than if a coalition reporter told the story. Having local government ministers or representatives present during the planning of the media event and during the event itself dramatically increases the interview’s impact. To ensure success, a goal of the IMS is to establish relationships of trust with the Iraqi media; however, this is a slow and long-term process. The vast majority of first-time Iraqi media journalists with whom the media section works have little experience interacting with coalition forces. Iraqis are constantly forming and refining their opinions of the coalition and its interaction with the populace. For this reason, the IMS and its escorts have to do whatever is necessary to make the Iraqi media representative’s initial experience a positive one. Maintaining a media crew’s level of enthusiasm, optimism, and dedication about providing a valuable service to Iraq is paramount to winning the war of images.

Another important factor during the coordination phase is providing the designated media crews with as
much information about the upcoming mission as possible. Of course, operations security (OPSEC) measures are part of each media event to ensure the safety of both Iraqi journalists and coalition Soldiers. When the IMS informs Iraqi media representatives what to expect, they are less likely to get upset if the mission’s parameters change. The key to success is to remain optimistic and flexible in communicating and developing the battlefield circulation plan.

**Enlisting the experts’ help.** The IMS could not function without the dedicated support of its four O9 Lima translators. These Soldiers are the workhorses of the section and support all three IMS departments. At times, the O9 Limas perform multiple tasks simultaneously, serving as translators on a battlefield circulation in the morning, spending the afternoon coordinating events by phone with the Iraqi media, and translating articles in the evening. Their insights into streamlining processes have contributed immeasurably to the IMS’s overall success.

In addition, the IMS acquired an Iraqi cultural advisor to help members better understand cultural, religious, and ethnic differences that affect working relationships. The cultural advisor interacts directly with the various media outlets, acts as the IMS’s initial face, and reviews all stories and transcripts for proper translation and cultural sensitivities. Having an Iraqi cultural advisor communicating directly with the Iraqi media establishes the IMS’s credibility and increases the media’s willingness to partner on future events.

In addition to the cultural advisor and the four Army O9 Limas, the IMS hired two bi-lingual, bi-cultural advisors to write and translate articles and serve as media analysts. The advisors ensure that the tone and substance of articles resonate acceptably with the target audience.

Some English words, phrases, and titles simply do not translate into Arabic. Failure to recognize these subtle linguistic nuances has caused friction and misunderstanding in the past. As an example, the term “foreign fighters” generated considerable negative feedback from the IMS’s readership because the vast majority of Iraqis think the term refers to the coalition as well as to cross-border insurgents. Hence the obvious friction. Storywriters and the cultural advisor have helped limit such linguistic imprecision and have ameliorated effects of the coalition’s idiosyncratic expressions.

The IMS staff is also adept at preparing articles so the audience better understands a story’s intent. By emphasizing what Iraqis find most interesting, the IMS increases market penetration and acceptance. Although many coalition operations revolve around rebuilding and providing essential services, the IMS does not overly publicize these acts. Iraqis understand the coalition is here to assist the GOI and its population, but they do not necessarily want the U.S. to remind them about it repeatedly. The fine point of this relationship is that the core PA function of informing enhances the core PSYOP function of influencing. The IMS sensitivity to informing thereby helps moderate the PSYOP mission of influencing. Such sensitivity does not cynically mask the heavy hand of PSYOP. Rather, it makes the honest effort to make the truth known.

In addition, when PA articles mention units and Soldiers by name, the IMS filters that information for better meaningful translation and simplicity. Given the target audience, providing specific details pertinent to Soldiers and their backgrounds is extraneous to IMS focus. The U.S. military’s goals are to portray accurately the coalition’s efforts. Extraordinary detail can only muddle that effort.

**Teamwork and communication.** The IMS does not operate autonomously from within the division headquarters. It works with each of the brigade combat team (BCT) ECOORDs to identify events worthy of media coverage. However, the IMS sometimes plans events based on division-level input. This practice remains an exception, not the norm. The BCT ECOORDs synchronize planning efforts with each of their maneuver battalions and nominate events for Iraqi media coverage. Once approved by the BCT commander, ECOORDs develop a detailed concept of the operation plan (CONOP) and submit it to the IMS for scheduling. Typical events planned for and covered by Iraqi media include school openings, combined medical engagements, civil project completions, and community leader interviews. If the IMS receives multiple CONOPs that request media for the same day, it prioritizes the requests based on significance and supportability. The IMS carefully reviews each BCT’s battlefield circulation request because the process to allocate media to particular events is
complicated. With careful coordination, Iraqi media crews are able to capitalize on other newsworthy opportunities, interview concerned citizens and tribal leaders, and cover extemporaneous community events. Currently, the IMS can support two battlefield circulations per day.\textsuperscript{22}

**Cultural and political limiting factors.** Working closely with the Iraqi media engagement team, the IMS has to consider religious factors before assigning Iraqi media crews. Sunni reporters may not feel comfortable entering a Shia community or covering a Shia event and vice versa. Security requirements do not allow disclosure of exact locations prior to the events, and the IMS works diligently with the engagement team to accommodate religious sensitivities and concerns. Iraqi correspondents with opposing religious affiliations sometimes choose to cancel the day of an event if they find it coincides with a religious holiday or observance. This forbearance prevents potential friction. Such scheduling changes occur especially during Islamic religious holidays, including the month of Ramadan.\textsuperscript{23} In addition, some journalists perceive some areas as simply too dangerous and will not support certain missions under any circumstances. Examples of areas that have frightened off Iraqi media are former Al-Qaeda sanctuaries, areas with high levels of criminal activities, and areas with high numbers of extremist militias.

**Continuing Progress**

The future holds much promise for continued growth for the IMS. However, its expansion depends largely on two factors: changing coalition perceptions of Iraqi media at the company through brigade-level, and increasing the fidelity of deliberate media planning. Commanders should embrace the reality that Iraqi media are a powerful, influential tool because they have inherent credibility as informing agents possessing sincere motives.

Commanders need to consciously avoid jaundiced perceptions of the Iraqi media as a second-rate, unfriendly, or uneconomical presence. Iraqi media can be a force-multiplier. Coalition forces should treat Iraqi media crews with respect on a par with American or international counterparts. Once the coalition recognizes the value and potential of the Iraqi media, the IMS can better use and align its limited resources to support high-yield events.

The IMS is currently considering hiring independent Iraqi correspondents and developing a sustainable network of informed journalists. Using informal media facilitators will significantly reduce the expenditure of IMS resources for translators and escorts and decrease the time required to provide Iraqi media coverage on the battlefield.

Developing an external IMS webpage is another initiative that has merit. The IMS hopes to create an online venue and repository for all its articles and media alerts on a par with many Arab media online sites. Public access to articles will allow the Iraqi populace to gauge forward momentum in Iraq.

The IMS also plans to offer a mobile media-credentialing program to expedite vetting and registering of potential Iraqi journalists. Currently, only the Combined Press Information Center provides this service, which is often problematic and time-consuming. Having the IMS take on this function will reduce information center’s involvement and spare Iraqi reporters the long traveling distances to the International Zone. Moreover, the IMS will have more Iraqi media contacts to dispatch on future battlefield circulations.

As the coalition shifts its focus from security to governance and economics, the need to cooperate with the Iraqi media will acquire new importance. Having a credible, capable mechanism that publicizes GOI and coalition force successes with media authenticity will enhance rebuilding efforts. The IMS has demonstrated the benefit of partnering with the Iraqi media to this end. Reaching the populace with credible information has led to results that would be impossible to achieve via PSYOP assets alone.

Market penetration and continuous dissemination of stories by the Iraqi media will enhance the local population’s awareness of the GOI and coalition’s labors. Stories of reconstruction, partnership, and progress show Iraqis that there is more transpiring in Iraq than combating insurgents. Through continued partnership with the Iraqi media, the IMS is increasing the level of optimism throughout Task Force Marne’s area of operations.\textsuperscript{24} MR
For more information, visit www.cgsfc.org
THE U.S. MILITARY should address gender issues when designing counterterrorism strategies aimed at winning hearts and minds. As governments and development organizations around the world have already discovered, the “gendering” of policies, programs, and activities can improve the effectiveness of long-term strategies. Unfortunately, terrorist organizations are also discovering the benefits of selectively forgetting gender prejudices and abandoning traditional assumptions. During the first quarter of 2008, there were seven women suicide bombers in Iraq compared to only six in all of 2007.1 And in January 2008, British authorities warned of an increasing threat from radicalized Muslim women.2

There is a direct link between the perception of economic inequity and violence. Economic disparity leads to feelings of dissatisfaction, inferiority, and alienation. As unemployment rates in many areas of the world fail to improve, discontent among those who feel deprived or economically exploited creates an environment ripe for ideological exploitation. Sociological research suggests that when economic disparity aligns with existing social cleavages (alienation based on religion, politics, race, ethnicity, caste, or region), the ensuing resentment kindles rancor, extremism, and militancy. In such circumstances, people become vulnerable to terrorist recruitment. What is typically overlooked in this societal dynamic is the relationship among gender, socioeconomic inequity, resentment, and alienation.

Women and the Attractions of Extremism

Dr. Meir Litvak of Tel Aviv University claims that Islamic terrorists are “exploiting the personal frustrations and grievances of . . . [disadvantaged] women for their own political goals, while they continue to limit the role of women in other aspects of life.”3 These terrorists capitalize on the feeling of inferiority and the limited choices that undeveloped societies often foist upon women.

A society that offers most women little opportunity to employ their intellectual talents arouses in them great frustration and an urgent need to prove their usefulness to society.4 Such women, especially in impoverished communities, often feel that they can only achieve equality in death. For them, the primary attraction to terrorist organizations is the opportunity for heroic self-sacrifice and martyrdom.5

A woman who succumbs to this attraction invests in fantasies of moral worth, deriving imaginary justification from her extremist coterie and

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PHOTO: A woman and child seek care from a USAID-funded mobile women’s-health work team in Tewala Village, Iraq. (USAID, Debbi Morello)
reciprocating with her support. As fanatics (of both sexes) always have, she clings to dogma and a menacing enmity to lift her from dire mediocrity to an elevated identity. In extremism, her exclusionary hatred becomes the vessel of her self-worth. The oppressive weight of economic disadvantage, alienation, and cultural inferiority vanishes in an aura of imagined noble purpose.

The more deeply pronounced a woman’s sense of alienation and helplessness, the more it feeds her need for noble purpose with a tragic internal consistency. The more inferior she feels, the more she requires validation from her male extremist manipulators. In submission to self-sacrifice, she finds self-respect. She may turn to devotedly indoctrinating the next generation with her religiously sanctified rancor, encouraging in her children perhaps a fate of glorious self-immolation, or she may aggrandize herself further by fulfilling her sacrificial fantasy in a murderous spasm of spiritually fulfilling violence.

Tellingly, one of the most controversial groups in Britain, Hizb u-Tahrir, has asserted that it doesn’t need to practice terrorist tactics if it can radicalize women: “Hizb u-Tahrir’s goal is to promote a global Islam, cleansed of all ethnic or cultural traditions. And women are an essential tool.” Women adherents will ensure that their extremist ideology continues into future generations. As bewildered functionaries of an exploitative misogynistic ideology, women indeed are merely tragic tools.

Improving the economic lot of women in societies vulnerable to terrorist influence could help ameliorate their sense of low self-worth and their resentment, and thereby possibly dull their attraction to extremism and terrorism. During stability operations, the military should take measures to encourage women to act in their own economic self-interest, helping them to avoid succumbing to the seductive psychological allure of extremism and terrorism.

Lessons from Women and Development

Poverty afflicts women and children disproportionately. The majority of the world’s poor are women and their children. According to the U.S. Agency for International Development’s (USAID’s) Office of Women in Development—

- 70 percent of the people living in poverty around the world are women and children.
- Two-thirds of the 876 million illiterate adults worldwide are women.
- Two-thirds of the 125 million school-aged children who do not attend school worldwide are girls, and girls who do go to school are less likely to complete school than boys are.
- More than three-quarters of the world’s 27 million refugees are women and children.
- Every day, 1,600 women (mostly poor) die needlessly during pregnancy and childbirth.7

Societal effects of economic inequity. Women are less likely to receive health care and education in poor countries. Lacking as well any rights to property, business ownership, or credit, they tend to be the most marginalized group within such societies. Women earn less money than their male counterparts do, and if they are single parents, they tend to suffer the vicious cycle of poverty more.8

Although gender disparity appears to harm women the most, studies have shown that “the full costs of gender inequality ultimately harm everyone.”9 Gender inequality directly and indirectly limits overall economic growth. When societies marginalize women, the community as a whole loses essentially 50 percent of its possible productivity. In backward areas of the world, gender and poverty create mutually reinforcing barriers to socioeconomic development. Educational attainment and the future financial status of children are much more likely to reflect those of the mother than the father. According to the World Bank, “Mothers’ illiteracy and lack of schooling directly disadvantage their
young children. Low schooling translates into poor quality of care for children and then higher infant and child mortality and malnutrition.”

Investing in women. When women are educated, there is a high probability that their children will be educated. In addition, educated women tend to meet their families’ nutrition and health needs. As Stephen C. Smith and Michael Todaro have found, “Increasing women’s education not only increases their productivity on the farm and in the factory but also results in greater labor force participation, later marriage, lower fertility, and greatly improved child health and nutrition.” In fact, “studies from around the developing world consistently show that expanding basic education for girls earns among the very highest rates of return of any investment—much larger, for example, than most public infrastructure projects.” As if that weren’t enough, World Bank and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) studies indicate that projects targeting women realize higher returns on investment than any other developmental program.

Integrating women into a nation’s growth process helps ensure that investments in human capital are more likely to pass to future generations. Human capital—the knowledge and skill resident in the population of an economy—is perhaps the most important prerequisite for sustainable growth, education, and enhanced economic status. Women are critical to a country’s ability to achieve its long-term development objectives: “Research findings suggest that countries that take steps to increase women’s access to education, health care, employment, and credit, thereby narrowing the differences between men and women in terms of access to economic opportunities, increase their pace of economic development and reduce poverty.” In sum, the way a society treats its women is directly related to its political viability and its moral and economic potential.

Mainstreaming gender. According to development experts, women are the most important agents in a nation’s development process. Their natural role as the first-in-line caretakers and teachers of children make them so. Accordingly, in many parts of the world today, enlightened countries leverage women’s roles to spur development. A 2005 World Bank study of Uganda suggests that the country could gain as much as two percent in annual GDP growth by eliminating gender inequality. A 2001 World Bank study showed a correlation between the increased influence of women in public life and a lower level of corruption within the government. This correlation suggests that women pursuing economic parity have a moral influence that affects rule of law and good governance.

Women have always mattered in human development, even when largely relegated to semi-slave status as domestic laborers. They were crucial to the survival of America’s colonies because they shaped communal life and economic development. In the West today, the level of female involvement in commerce, politics, higher education, and the professions is striking given the relatively small numbers of women active in those areas. (Even in progressive Western societies, gender norms dictate that women and girls take primary responsibility for household maintenance and care activities—the legacy, in developed nations, of their slave-like status).

In the past, when leaders in developed and developing countries pondered ways to boost growth, reduce inequality, and improve living standards, the last thing on their minds was empowering women. Now, they are beginning to understand how gender differences in behaviors and roles can have significant macroeconomic consequences. Public policies
have different effects on men and women, and these differences may lead to unintended outcomes. Thus, "economists are now taking a much stronger interest in how gender affects aggregate income as well as key components of overall economic demand, focusing on household decision making." Since the 1995 Beijing World Conference on Women, systematic examination of the impact budget programs and policies have on women (the "mainstreaming" of gender into government policies) has gained prominence:

Mainstreaming [does not mean] to analyze only programs that are specifically targeted to females or to produce a separate "women’s" budget. Rather, it is intended to examine the gender effects of all government programs and policies. For instance, cutting back on clean water spending may disproportionately harm women and girls because they typically bear the time and physical burden of providing clean water to households when it is not readily available. Just as reducing a tax credit for child-care expenses may disproportionately burden women, who are responsible for the greater share of child-rearing activities [sic].

Empowering women through microfinance. The microfinance industry is leading the move to leverage the economic power of women in the poorest parts of the world. Bestowal of the 2006 Nobel Peace Prize on Dr. Mohammad Yunus, founder of Bangladesh’s Grameen Bank and a champion of microfinance, attests to the efficacy of developing micro-credit into an effective tool for fighting poverty. Dr. Yunus revolutionized the microfinance sector by lending primarily to women—the heart of the Grameen Bank’s winning strategy. Experience has shown that women tend to pay back loans at a higher rate than men do. In addition, women tend to help the whole community when they have access to micro loans. The Grameen bank has concluded that “annual household consumption expenditure increases 18 taka for every additional 100 taka borrowed by women from credit programs, compared with just 11 taka for men.”

Why the Military Should Care

Terrorists are recruiting women as a pragmatic move to regain the strategic advantage. In an increasingly tighter security environment, female recruitment is a logical next step, since society and security forces at large view women as less likely to be violent (even though history warns against such complacency). According to Jessica Stern, a lecturer on terrorism at Harvard University, “The perception that women are less prone to violence, the Islamic dress code, and the reluctance to carry out body searches on Muslim women [make] them the ‘perfect demographic’” for terrorists.

Put simply, it is easier for female terrorists to get through security checkpoints.

Fighting vertical transmission. As aforementioned, even if women do not participate directly in terrorist activities, they often support their men’s militancy by nurturing families committed to violent extremism. Since women in most societies are traditionally responsible for passing on the cultural expectations of their communities to their children, women become vehicles for transmitting norms of violence, radicalism, and martyrdom. Cultural transmission theorists refer to this dynamic as “vertical transmission.” Women perform this function in societies as “the vanguard of social transformation.” Individuals and societies continuously reshape, repackage, and reuse cultural traits. As first caregivers and teachers, women serve as a key node for influencing and spreading cultural traits to the next generation. Historically, military conflicts needed women’s support for sustainability, and today that phenomenon applies to terrorists/terrorism and insurgents/insurgency.

To affect the collective mindset of a community, counterinsurgents and counterterrorism measures should address this critical node of influence. According to Narmin Othman, Iraq’s acting minister for women’s affairs, there are as many as two million widows in Iraq today. These women should be the prime target population for organized economic assistance during stability operations. Not only are women the primary transmitters of cultural traits, but as the past has shown, they can also serve as an important force in conflict mitigation and reconciliation. Thus, military planners should war game the different effects actions have on men and...women become vehicles for transmitting norms of violence, radicalism, and martyrdom.
women in the same way they currently war-game second- and third-order effects.

**Gendering doctrine.** The Army’s Field Manual (FM) 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, stresses the importance of civil considerations during mission analysis. However, the FM’s social structure section should explicitly recommend gender consideration as one of the items planners address. It pertains to roughly 50 percent of the local populace and is the most likely category of civil considerations to be neglected.

For example, if a unit is planning to dig a well for a community, planners should consider how the distance between the well and the community might affect women and girls. If the well is too far away, the girls will spend more time fetching water, which may encroach on other productive activities such as attending school. Similarly, if women and girls are the primary providers of water for the households in a community, then unit information operations activities near and en route to water wells must be sensitive to their needs in order to be effective.

**Leveraging USAID**

The Percy Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act, signed into law in 1973, requires that gender issues be incorporated into the government’s overall development efforts. Since then, USAID has been integrating gender concerns throughout its portfolio in the developing world. Women received 63 percent of the micro-loans issued through USAID-supported programs in 2004. In the past three decades, the agency has gained tremendous insight into the significant roles women play in developing societies. Its office of Women in Development (WID) testifies to the great attention USAID is paying to the role of gender in nation building.

By collaborating with USAID and using WID’s expertise on gender integration as part of a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy, the military can more effectively address the negative socioeconomic conditions that make areas ripe for terrorist exploitation.

The recent trend of increasing women suicide bombers from Chechnya to Gaza and to Iraq may be just the tip of the iceberg. It is likely an indicator of the underlying current of increased radicalization of women. Since women naturally hold the critical node for passing down cultural norms and beliefs in societies, they serve as the proliferators of radical and militant ideology for future generations. Therefore, long-term countermeasures and counterterrorism strategy must seriously consider the affects of gender to be effective. *MR*
GENDERING COIN

5. Ibid.
6. Poggioli.
10. King and Mason, 8.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid., 227.
16. King and Mason, 12.
17. Stotsky.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. Todaro and Smith, 245.
27. Eltahaway.
29. Ibid, 176.
31. ODIHR, 10.

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KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT by the Generating Force

Lieutenant Colonel (P) E.J. Degen, U.S. Army

THE COLD WAR lulled the Army into the complacency of a deliberate, methodical, and time-consuming doctrinal process. Today, however, the accelerated operational tempo of the War on Terrorism has forced us to take an honest, in-depth look at how we collect, analyze, debate, codify, write, and disseminate doctrine. We now find that we must alter our approach to provide timely, accurate, and relevant doctrine to the field and the schoolhouses.

As the proponent for the generating force, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) must be proactive and innovative in its approach to knowledge management to provide the best possible support to the operating force—those units deployed, preparing for deployment, or returning from deployment. The current wars exacerbate the challenges of knowledge management, and as the demand to do more with less increases, the job gets even tougher. However, the history of doctrine reveals that the community has faced significant adversity in the past. Today’s challenges are nothing new.

Historical Perspective

Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations, defines Army doctrine as “a body of thought on how Army forces intend to operate as an integral part of a joint force. Doctrine focuses on how to think—not what to think.” Army doctrine complements joint doctrine. It describes the Army’s approach and contributions to full-spectrum operations on land. Army doctrine is authoritative but not prescriptive. Where conflicts between Army and joint doctrine arise, joint doctrine takes precedence. Doctrine shapes the way the Army thinks, prepares, and conducts warfare. “Think” and “prepare” equate to “educate” and “train.” Doctrine is the heart of our professional competence. FM 3-0 explains that doctrine establishes common approaches to military tasks, promotes mutual understanding, facilitates communication among Soldiers, and serves as the basis for training and leader development. Useful doctrine must be widely known and easily understood. It must have a philosophical and intellectual foundation as well as a practical purpose.

Although this sophisticated view of doctrine dates from the 1960s, the Army only recently began to give it credence. For a long time, “doctrine” had a different meaning to the Army. From the time of the American Revolution to the late 19th century, “doctrine” meant “drill.” Up through the Civil War, the U.S. Army used Baron von Steuben’s revised Prussian manual (“the Blue Book”) and Winfield Scott’s Infantry Tactics to train troops to move and maneuver on the battlefield. These works were valuable in their day,
but became obsolete when the era of Napoleonic warfare ended.

Until the beginning of the twentieth century, doctrine was an individual endeavor, as there were few published doctrinal manuscripts to facilitate training either the individual or the unit. In 1905 the War Department published its first Field Service Regulations, outlining the organization of the division and how it operated. “Doctrine” now meant “organization and tactics” rather than “drill.” It stayed that way until the 1962 version of FM 100-5, *Operations*, moved away from discussing arms and services to discussing the nature of war and the operational environment.

In 1973, as the U.S. Army completed its withdrawal from Vietnam, TRADOC emerged from the break-up of the old Continental Army Command. For the first time in its history, the Army had an organization dedicated to the formulation of doctrine. TRADOC soon made its mark. The next versions of FM 100-5 refocused on the operational level of war and brought us AirLand Battle, a doctrine aimed at defeating massed Soviet armor formations. The Soviet Union fell in 1991, but that same year the Army employed AirLand Battle doctrine masterfully in Iraq, during Operation Desert Storm.

Unfortunately, the end of the Soviet Union and the successful conclusion of the Gulf War did not usher in an era of peace and stability. Terrorist attacks on U.S. embassies, barracks, and naval vessels overseas, as well as an attack on the Pentagon and two attacks on the World Trade Center, made it evident that the United States faced a deadly enemy that it could only defeat with a combination of conventional and counterinsurgency operations. Doctrine had to change to reflect the new situation.

The Army’s concept of doctrine has thus changed from “drill” to “organization and tactics” to an overview for worldwide operations; but this process has not been a smooth one. Doctrine based solely on theory seldom works. Only with experimentation and constant study of actual operations can the Army expect to keep abreast of developments in a world threatened by an increasingly lethal, decentralized, and unconventional enemy.

Some would say, “We are too busy for doctrine.” The facts on the ground argue otherwise. Leaders preparing for missions or actively involved in current missions thirst for information and relevant, up-to-date doctrine. One of our clear challenges is to be able to gather, process, and disseminate knowledge fast enough to make it useable and readily available to those leaders. We must strive for efficiencies without compromising effectiveness, yet still produce accurate, useable, and reliable knowledge products.

### Doctrine as the Driving Force

Doctrine enables the Army to operate as part of a joint or multinational team. It applies to all operations across the spectrum of conflict in the present, and it will continue to do so in the near future. Doctrine tells us how to think about training and operations as opposed to what to think. Effective doctrine fosters initiative and creative thinking among our Soldiers and their leaders.

Doctrine also establishes a foundation for thinking that allows our Soldiers and leaders to solve complex problems. It offers a menu of choices based on experiences, and it provides standards and measures to accomplish military tasks across the full spectrum of operations. Doctrine provides a common language for military professionals that enables clear, succinct, and articulate communications. Joint Publication 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, states that doctrine constitutes the “fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative, but requires judgment in application.”

The Army definition is similar to the joint one. Finally, and quite possibly most important, doctrine forms the basis for military curricula in the formal education process and establishes standards for training. Doctrine is a result of our analysis of linkages between history, theory, experimentation, and practice.

TRADOC will continue to develop the Army’s doctrinal theories in its 525 series of pamphlets, which forecast land-power requirements up to 20 years in the future. The command will also

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**Doctrine tells us how to think about training and operations as opposed to what to think.**
continue to validate theory with experimentation. Once TRADOC validates and codifies information gleaned from experiments, it derives the fundamental, enduring principles that comprise doctrine and guide forces to achieve national objectives. These principles reflect the Army’s collective wisdom regarding past, present, and future operations. Contained in the apex of Army doctrinal FMs, these principles are the philosophical underpinning of all we do and are. By themselves, however, the principles are not sufficient to guide successful operations. Tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) provide more specific guidance, including both descriptive and prescriptive methods to support implementation of the principles of higher level doctrine.

JP 1-02 defines “tactics” as “the employment and ordered arrangement of forces in relation to each other.” Army doctrine concurs, but adds that tactics are “primarily descriptive; tactics vary with terrain and other circumstances; they change frequently as the enemy reacts and friendly forces explore new approaches.” Normally, tactics require the application of techniques and procedures, which vary according to the situation.

Both joint and Army doctrine state that techniques are “non-prescriptive ways or methods used to perform assigned missions and functions or tasks.” Techniques are the primary method of conveying the wisdom that successful units accumulate in operations. More than one technique may be applicable to accomplishing a specific mission or task. Commanders may use the techniques they deem necessary based on their assessment of the current situation.

Joint and Army doctrine also agree that procedures are “standard, detailed steps that prescribe how to perform specific tasks.” They are prescriptive and normally consist of a series of steps to be accomplished in a set order. Checklists are a good example of procedures: Soldiers execute them the same way at all times, regardless of circumstances. Techniques and procedures make up the lowest level of our doctrinal hierarchy. They often depend on the type of unit, equipment, mission, geographical location, and numerous other factors.

There is another body of knowledge as well. “Best practices” are not doctrinal concepts, but Soldiers use them throughout the Army. They are similar to techniques, except that proponents have not formally vetted them and codified them into doctrine. The Army must understand and define best practices and publish them. They bring clarity to the field, and they give leaders’ access to potentially useful information, even if that information has not been fully validated.

The publication of doctrine and best practices—common knowledge—establishes a common philosophy and language for Army operations. In doing so, it facilitates unity of effort and joint interoperability. The philosophy appears in fundamental principles that apply across a broad spectrum of operations. The language consists of doctrinal terms describing how the Army operates and the symbols it uses to portray its operations. Well-understood doctrine facilitates the rapid team building, tailoring, and task organizing among units and Soldiers required for today’s fast-paced operations. It aids readiness by establishing common ways of accomplishing military tasks. Well-established terms and symbols and commonly accepted practices allow for shorter orders and their rapid production, dissemination, and understanding.

The Army is a learning organization. Its doctrine cannot afford to be static. The Army must continuously revise its doctrine based on history, evolving theory, experimentation, and an ever-changing security environment.

The Army is a learning organization. Its doctrine cannot afford to be static.

Doctrine Hierarchy

We have clear echelons of knowledge in the Army, and they have joint counterparts. As figure 1 depicts, tier-1 manuals correspond to above-the-line joint publications and tier-2 manuals correspond to below-the-line publications in the joint library. Tier 1 has three categories of knowledge: capstone, keystone, and supporting doctrine.

Capstone doctrine contains the fundamental principles from which keystone doctrine derives tactics and techniques, and tier-2 manuals establish techniques and procedures. FM 1, The Army, and FM 3-0, Operations, are the two capstone field
manuals. They link Army doctrine with the National Security Strategy and the National Military Strategy and serve as the primary links between joint and Army doctrine.

Keystone doctrine is organized around the fundamental principles outlined in FM 1 and FM 3-0. Keystone manuals address the subjects that form the framework for conducting full-spectrum operations. The themes and subjects described in keystone manuals link to joint and Army capstone doctrine. Many keystone manuals establish the doctrinal base for a series of subordinate manuals. In many cases, these subordinate manuals comprise supporting doctrine.

Supporting doctrine addresses subjects that significantly affect the conduct of full-spectrum operations. Doctrine at this level focuses on coordinating and synchronizing forces across the full spectrum of conflict. Like keystone doctrine, supporting doctrine can establish the foundation for an entire series of subordinate FMs.

Tier-2 publications include FMs not designated as tier 1 due to the nature or narrow focus of their content. Because tier-2 manuals are concerned only with techniques and procedures, they can be much more descriptive and prescriptive than the higher echelon documents. We normally associate tier-2 FMs with specific Army branches and functional areas.

The process used to produce capstone and keystone doctrine is adequate, but it would be more efficient if TRADOC used collaborative forums for staffing the manuals. Because the manuals establish the foundation from which all else emanates, it is critical that their development remain formal and rigorous enough to infuse the proper intellectual energy in operations, both present and future. The capstone manuals must continue to tie theory, experimentation, history, and practice together. While doctrine must be up-to-date for the current fight—it cannot afford to be mired down and must remain forward thinking—doctrine production continues to require the involvement of seasoned, experienced senior Army leaders.

Those who are involved in the current fight are thinking about the close fight; they do not necessarily have the time or inclination to think about the distant warfighting future—that is TRADOC’s responsibility. The Combined Arms Center (CAC) at Fort Leavenworth continues to lead this effort for TRADOC and the Army by staffing and coordinating doctrinal and best-practices publications throughout the Army and with the sister services. TRADOC will continue to host quarterly doctrine and concepts conferences for Army senior leaders to develop the contents of these publications further. (Unfortunately, supporting and tier-2 manuals, which emanate from and nest in the capstone and keystone manuals, are lagging far behind as the higher echelons of doctrine undergo major change.)

An entire echelon of publications seeks to capture what we deem best practices. The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) is at the forefront of this effort for the Army, while the Air Land Sea Application Center conducts a similar function for the joint force. A plethora of handbooks, smart cards, bulletins, circulars, digital newsletters, and other products produce a quick return on information before it is rendered irrelevant.

The Only Constant is Change

The ever-changing security environment and the greater speed with which the Army transmits information absolutely require that we change how we manage the knowledge at our disposal. The Army’s interim FMs have a shelf life of two years, but best practices and lessons learned are replacing some of our TTP documents. The number of forums and sources for best practices and lessons learned is staggering. This is not necessarily a bad
thing because Soldiers and leaders actively engaged in different missions throughout the world have a thirst for the knowledge these forums provide. In fact, the forums have been critical to mission success, and Army leaders should continue to encourage them. But, how do we manage the avalanche of knowledge that advancing global technologies bring us?

Information, regardless of its source, can translate into an advantage on the battlefield. We believe that the tools of the information age are key to tactical or operational adaptation on today’s battlefield. These tools, however, can also be dangerous. They can misinform us or overload our ability to synthesize available data. Therefore, Army leaders must ensure that the best practices available are accurate and vetted.

Many factors affect how we manage knowledge. Nearly every leader in the Army has an information-rich database readily available. Unfortunately, much of that information becomes dated and obsolete quickly. The question arises, “Who is managing this data to ensure that the obsolete is discarded and the useful is captured and integrated into the doctrinal hierarchy?” As the target in figure 2 depicts, TRADOC’s charge is to extract and distill what is important from collected data and inject it into the doctrinal hierarchy to help shape current and future operations. In many cases, this mission has become very difficult. While TRADOC endures cutbacks in personnel and resources, technology floods its systems with increased information.

Information about best practices is emerging from many joint, Army, sister-service, and civilian sources. Much of it comes from the bottom up. Blogs posted on the Internet convey unfiltered information quickly. Communities of practice such as PlatoonLeader Net, CompanyCommand Net, S3-XO Net, and CAVNET are just a few of the sites that allow operators in the field to contribute immediate information and knowledge to the system.

The Center for Army Lessons Learned heads the TRADOC initiative to collect best practices through their observations-insights-lessons (OIL) program. In conjunction with other Army proponents, CALL examines OILs and determines their validity, relevance, and implications for Army doctrine. Many OILs eventually find their way into a CALL product of one type or another. With its added filters,
this more formal process makes the information more reliable than that appearing in communities of practice.

The fast pace of operations, the enemy’s constant adaptation, and the speed with which information moves from one point to another make it imperative that TRADOC evaluate its best practices and optimize them to support the operating force. What was good enough during the Cold War may not meet today’s requirements or tomorrow’s.

**Knowledge Management and Improving Efficiencies**

TRADOC faces a major knowledge management challenge. An abundance of best-practice information is floating around that may or may not be useful to the supporting manuals, but TRADOC has only limited resources to gather, process, validate and codify it, let alone write it into doctrine and disseminate it to the user in a timely fashion.

TRADOC must take advantage of knowledge initiatives to increase its efficiency and effectiveness in knowledge management. Multi-service projects like those that the U.S. Army Field Artillery Center has co-produced with the Marines are fine examples of leveraging the knowledge and resources of both services for the good of all. While co-producing a higher level manual such as FM 3-0 in a multi-service forum would not be practicable (the Army’s fundamental operating principles and Title 10 responsibilities differ from the Marines’), producing a multi-service manual of TTP on “Attacking a Built-up Area” makes good sense. Every TRADOC component should explore multi-service collaboration where logical and feasible.

CALL’s Lessons-Learned Integration (L2I) initiative is a start. Although it currently does nothing to codify information and formulate it into doctrine, L2I can help improve the efficiency and effectiveness of collection and validation. A collaborative process, L2I places liaisons in nearly all agencies that have a hand in the doctrine process. (See figure 3.) For implementation, the program depends on command emphasis at Army schools and centers and in field units. Besides enhancing collection and validation, L2I has another superb benefit: it pushes data to TRADOC as opposed to TRADOC having to pull data from its points of origin. With L2I, the abundance of sources producing

Strength lies with collocation and in the “solid” C2 lines back to CALL

Figure 3. CAC L2I collaboration network.
and posting data critical to knowledge-management will ensure that we capture enduring knowledge in our publications.

The Army’s centers of excellence (CoEs) and its branch schools now have standardized doctrine and training divisions that are better prepared to update best-practices knowledge in Army classrooms and manuals. CALL will establish an L2I liaison in these cells. Each COE commander should remember that the reward is fleeting if he only solves the warfighter’s immediate need without documenting appropriate changes for future doctrine. Only a cell robust enough to process knowledge and include it in the doctrinal staffing process can capture changes that will endure.

As the modular force evolves with its Strykers and Future Combat System (FCS), so will doctrine—if the Army continues to leverage the capabilities of the organizations that support the force. The Warrior Training and Leader Development Center at Fort Lewis, Washington, is a great resource for developing the requirements for Stryker units and helping Army schools and agencies develop doctrine to support these new formations. Forces Command may soon follow with similar efforts for the infantry brigade combat team and the heavy brigade combat team. The involvement of the COEs, the Combined Arms Center, and TRADOC Capability Manager-Stryker are critical to ensuring that Stryker doctrine is sound and nested in present principles. To ensure uniformity and compliance across the force, the COEs and CAC must maintain approval authority over the doctrine produced by these efforts.

The emerging Future Force Integration Division and army Evaluation Task Force at Fort Bliss, Texas, can gain great efficiencies by mirroring the Stryker efforts as the Army introduces FCS into the force. The Warrior Training and Leader Development Center at Fort Lewis, Washington, is a great resource for developing the requirements for Stryker units and helping Army schools and agencies develop doctrine to support these new formations. Forces Command may soon follow with similar efforts for the infantry brigade combat team and the heavy brigade combat team. The involvement of the COEs, the Combined Arms Center, and TRADOC Capability Manager-Stryker are critical to ensuring that Stryker doctrine is sound and nested in present principles. To ensure uniformity and compliance across the force, the COEs and CAC must maintain approval authority over the doctrine produced by these efforts.

The Battle Command knowledge System (BCkS) (figure 4) is another initiative that supports generating, applying, managing, and exploiting Army knowledge online. BCkS fosters collaboration between the field and the Army’s institutional base and among the institutions in the base. Although virtual, BCkS offers targeted, personalized forums that can greatly enhance the speed with which TRADOC codifies and validates information. Initial results of BCkS’s electronic staffing process are very promising. Using the process, TRADOC cut several months off the production of a keystone document that normally would have taken two years to complete. This process will only become more efficient as the force becomes more aware of its capabilities and more comfortable employing them. By using electronic notifications to concerned parties via Army Knowledge Online (AKO), the Army could nearly eliminate mailing all draft documents and greatly decrease the time between the collection and dissemination of knowledge. As with L2I, however, we can only realize the promise of this collaborative tool if the chain of command requires, utilizes, and monitors it.

Object-based publishing (OBP) is another new knowledge-management initiative. OBP breaks knowledge into stand-alone objects (called “chunks”), tags and classifies them for easy retrieval, and stores them in a repository of knowledge the generating or operating force can easily access. Not only is the data simple to retrieve, but the user can tailor his query to get as much or as little as he needs. If required, the user can extract and print an entire manual. OBP postures these chunks of knowledge for the next generation of
technology and allows for rapid staffing and updating via a collaborative process, such as BCKS. After a proponent updates a knowledge chunk, it becomes published doctrine stored in the digital repository. There is no lengthy staffing and publication process, thus saving critical time. OBP already resides behind the AKO portal, and it benefits from existing search and information-security technology.

The Army has nested OBP concepts in the Army Knowledge Management Strategy, which is transforming the Army into a network-centric, knowledge-based force. The future vision is to have a force with agile capabilities and adaptive processes powered by world-class network-centric access to knowledge, systems, and services—all interoperable in the joint environment. OBP has great potential for tier-2 issues, and possibly even supporting doctrine, but it may be of limited use for capstone and keystone documents because of the intertwined themes that spread from start to finish through these documents.

In the near future, Army leaders will be able to empower the entire doctrinal system, from capstone through tier 2, by putting it all into an interactive, linked environment similar to TRADOC’s “Road to Deployment” site (Secret Internet Protocol Router Net access only). The site could contain the doctrinal principles in chunks, complete digital manuals, links to after-action reviews, footage of actual operations or training, interviews, training aids, historical vignettes, and more. Right now, this data is spread across numerous sites. The synergy we build will enable us to improve our products and our timelines.

To ensure reliability and security and to keep the repository current, an appropriate proponent should control each piece of doctrinal information. Collecting data simply to have a large repository will not help the warfighter or the trainer. The great work that CALL does now on the restricted side of its Non-classified Internet Protocol Router site is an example of how this can work: experts in each topic area ensure the quality and validity of information contained within the site.

Program Executive Office-Soldier has fielded the first installment of Land Warrior to a unit that will

Figure 4. KM/BCKS concept and objectives.
actually deploy with it to a theater of war. We should all take notice of this event and study the potential this system has for the future of information gathering and dissemination. Although the Army has not funded Land Warrior, we will eventually see the Soldier tied continuously to a network. Not only will this increase situational understanding on the battlefield, but it will also grant the leader nearly instantaneous access to knowledge anywhere and anytime.

Someday leaders may have a commander’s digital assistant (CDA) in their hands that ties them to the network and can draw on information databases to better prepare them for missions. Interactive video and virtual scenarios built into this repository of knowledge will also be instantaneously accessible. Information overload will not be a concern because the leader can set filters on his CDA to access and receive only what he needs at any given time. The continuous network connectivity Soldiers have will help disseminate data to the warfighter, and it should aid collectors of best practices. As our Soldiers use the CDA for after action reviews, collaborative planning sessions, and information exchanges, the collectors can also reap this data for study.

We must also consider human factors. Leaders at all levels should discuss, debate, write about, and publish their thoughts on warfighting, especially after they return from a mission with their experiences still fresh in their minds. The Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, does a great job assigning meaningful monograph topics to students in graduate programs. The Army should implement the practice from the ranks of captain through colonel. Just as we choose advanced education programs that develop the Soldier and thereby help the Army, we should never let a Soldier write a meaningless monograph or thesis for educational credit in an Army program. We must challenge leaders to study and write in ways that help their profession and challenge our military faculties to review, edit, debate, and write about knowledge and doctrine. This is too important to leave to only a few people in doctrine and training cells within our schools.

**Conclusion**

The challenges we face today in knowledge management pale in comparison to those we will face in the future if we do not adapt our systems and our practices to take advantage of existing technologies. TRADOC will have to continue to do more with less, and it will only be successful if it casts away its old methods of doctrine generation, especially at the tier-2 level. Optimizing current information technologies and continuing to develop future ones is a clear way to improve. Challenging established timelines by employing collaborative tools for the staffing and approving process shows great promise. Object-based publishing enhances this effort to speed a quality product to the operating force.

As the “architect of the Army,” TRADOC must ensure that doctrine remains relevant and is responsive to the needs of the warfighter. It must support the operating force with responsive processes that provide the knowledge our operators need to overcome an adaptive enemy. The training baseline begins with doctrine, and the proper implementation of the Soldier in the operating force depends on it.

History has demonstrated repeatedly that success now and in the next war may depend on how well we capture the best practices from the current fight, harvest the durable knowledge, and integrate it into our doctrine. TRADOC is studying all of our knowledge systems to improve its ability to serve the operating force now and in the future. To paraphrase S.L.A. Marshall, knowledge does not do much good when we hold it to ourselves. TRADOC must work to improve its knowledge management skills, and in that vein, it is proactively seeking to make the great work it does even better in the future. **Victory Starts Here! MR**

**NOTES**

2. Ibid.
4. Ibid., 534.
5. FM 3-0, D-2.
6. JP 1-02, 541.
7. Ibid., 432.
8. FM 3-09.31, Marine Corps Reference Publication (MCRP) 3-16C, Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Fire Support for Combined Arms Commander, dated October 2002 and FM 9-09.12, MCRP 3-16.1A, Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Field Artillery Target Acquisition, published in June 2002, are just two fine examples of service coordination and doctrine of mutual interest.
9. Interview via email with General (Retired) Frederick M. Franks Jr., 22 September 2006. General Franks was the eighth TRADOC commander (August 1991 to October 1994). He has stayed involved with Army and joint operations and concepts since his retirement.
The Sole Superpower in Decline: The Rise of a Multipolar World

Shri Dilip Hiro

With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the United States stood tall—militarily invincible, economically unrivalled, diplomatically uncontestable, and the dominating force on information channels worldwide. The next century was to be the true “American century,” with the rest of the world moulding itself in the image of the sole superpower.

Yet, with not even a decade of this century behind us, we are already witnessing the rise of a multipolar world in which new powers are challenging different aspects of American supremacy—Russia and China in the forefront, with regional powers Venezuela and Iran forming the second rank. These emergent powers are primed to erode American hegemony, not confront it singly or jointly.

How and why has the world evolved in this way so soon? The Bush administration’s debacle in Iraq is certainly a major factor in this transformation, a classic example of an imperialist power, brimming with hubris, over-extending itself. To the relief of many—in the U.S. and elsewhere—the Iraq fiasco has demonstrated the striking limitations of power for the globe’s highest-tech, most destructive military machine. Regarding Iraq, Brent Scowcroft, National Security Adviser to two U.S. Presidents, concedes in a recent op-ed, “We are being wrestled to a draw by opponents who are not even an organized state adversary.”

The invasion and subsequent disastrous occupation of Iraq and the mismanaged military campaign in Afghanistan have crippled the credibility of the United States. The scandals at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq and Guantanamo in Cuba, along with the widely publicized murders of Iraqi civilians in Haditha, have badly tarnished America’s moral self-image. In the latest opinion poll, even in a secular state and member of NATO like Turkey, only 9 percent of Turks have a “favorable view” of the U.S. (down from 52 percent just five years ago).

Yet there are other explanations—unrelated to Washington’s glaring misadventures—for the current transformation in international affairs.
These include, above all, the tightening market in oil and natural gas, which has enhanced the power of hydrocarbon-rich nations as never before; the rapid economic expansion of the mega-nations China and India; the transformation of China into the globe’s leading manufacturing base; and the end of the Anglo-American duopoly in international television news.

**Many Channels, Diverse Perceptions**

During the 1991 Gulf War, only CNN and the BBC had correspondents in Baghdad. So the international TV audience, irrespective of its location, saw the conflict through their lenses. Twelve years later, when the Bush administration, backed by British Prime Minister Tony Blair, invaded Iraq, Al Jazeera Arabic broke this duopoly. It relayed images—and facts—that contradicted the Pentagon’s presentation. For the first time in history, the world witnessed two versions of an ongoing war in real time. So credible was the Al Jazeera Arabic version that many television companies outside the Arabic-speaking world—in Europe, Asia and Latin America—showed its clips.

Though, in theory, the growth of cable television worldwide raised the prospect of ending the Anglo-American duopoly in 24-hour TV news, not much had happened due to the exorbitant cost of gathering and editing TV news. It was only the arrival of Al Jazeera English, funded by the hydrocarbon-rich emirate of Qatar—with its declared policy of offering a global perspective from an Arab and Muslim angle—that, in 2006, finally broke the long-established mould.

Soon France 24 came on the air, broadcasting in English and French from a French viewpoint, followed in mid-2007 by the English-language Press TV, which aimed to provide an Iranian perspective. Russia was next in line for 24-hour TV news in English, with its effective renationalizing the energy industry through state-controlled corporations, he began deploying its economic clout to further Russia’s foreign policy interests.

In 2005, Russia overtook the United States, becoming the second largest oil producer in the world. Its oil income now amounts to $679 billion a day. European countries dependent on imported Russian oil now include Hungary, Poland, Germany, and even Britain.

Russia is also the largest producer of natural gas on the planet, with three-fifths of its gas exports going to the 27-member European Union (EU). Bulgaria, Estonia, Finland, and Slovakia get 100 percent of their natural gas from Russia; Turkey, 66 percent; Poland, 58 percent; Germany, 41 percent; and France, 25 percent. Gazprom, the biggest natural gas enterprise on Earth, has established stakes in 16 EU countries. In 2006, the Kremlin’s foreign reserves stood at $315 billion, up from a paltry $12 billion in 1999. Little wonder that, in July 2006 on the eve of the G8 summit in St Petersburg, Putin rejected an energy charter proposed by the Western leaders.

Soaring foreign-exchange reserves, new ballistic missiles, and closer links with a prospering China—with which it conducted joint military exercises on China’s Shandong Peninsula in August 2005—enabled Putin to deal with his American counterpart, President George W. Bush, as an equal, not mincing his words when appraising American policies.

“One country, the United States, has overstepped its national boundaries in every way,” Putin told the 43rd Munich Trans-Atlantic conference on security policy in February 2007. “This is visible in the economic, political, cultural and educational policies it imposes on other nations . . . This is very dangerous.”

Condemning the concept of a “unipolar world,” he added: “However one might embellish this term, at the end of the day it describes a scenario in which there is one centre of authority, one centre of force, one centre of decision-making. It is a world in which there is one master, one sovereign. And this is pernicious.”

His views fell on receptive ears in the capitals of most Asian, African, and Latin American countries.
The changing relationship between Moscow and Washington was noted, among others, by analysts and policy-makers in the hydrocarbon-rich Persian Gulf region. Commenting on the visit that Putin paid to long-time U.S. allies Saudi Arabia and Qatar after the Munich conference, Abdel Aziz Sagar, chairman of the Gulf Research Centre, wrote in the Doha-based newspaper *The Peninsula* that Russia and Gulf Arab countries, once rivals from opposite ideological camps, had found a common agenda of oil, anti-terrorism, and arms sales. “The altered focus takes place in a milieu where the Gulf countries are signaling their keenness to keep all geopolitical options open, reviewing the utility of the United States as the sole security guarantor, and contemplating a collective security mechanism that involves a host of international players.”

In April 2007, the Kremlin issued a major foreign policy document. “The myth about the unipolar world fell apart once and for all in Iraq,” it stated. “A strong, more self-confident Russia has become an integral part of positive changes in the world.”

The Kremlin’s increasingly tense relations with Washington were in tune with Russian popular opinion. A poll taken during the run-up to the 2006 G8 summit revealed that 58 percent of Russians regarded America as an “unfriendly country.” It has proved to be a trend. This July, for instance, Major General Alexandr Vladimirov told the mass circulation newspaper *Komsolskya Pravada* that war with the United States was a “possibility” in the next 10 to 15 years.

Chavez Rides High

Such sentiments resonated with Hugo Chavez. While visiting Moscow in June 2007, he urged Russians to return to the ideas of Vladimir Lenin, especially his anti-imperialism. “The Americans don’t want Russia to keep rising,” he said. “But Russia has risen again as a centre of power, and we the people of the world need Russia to become stronger.”

Chavez finalized a $1 billion deal to purchase five diesel submarines to defend Venezuela’s oil-rich undersea shelf and thwart any possible future economic embargo imposed by Washington. By then, Venezuela had become the second largest buyer of Russian weaponry. (Algeria topped the list, another indication of a growing multipolarity in world affairs.) Venezuela acquired the distinction of being the first country to receive a license from Russia to manufacture the famed AK-47 assault rifle.

By channeling some of his country’s oil money to needy Venezuelans, Chavez broadened his base of support. Much to the chagrin of the Bush White House, he trounced his sole political rival, Manuel Rosales, in a December 2006 presidential contest with 61 percent of the vote. Equally humiliating to the Bush administration, Venezuela was, by then, giving more foreign aid to needy Latin American states than it was.

Following his re-election, Chavez vigorously pursued the concept of forming an anti-imperialist alliance in Latin America as well as globally. He strengthened Venezuela’s ties not only with such Latin countries as Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and debt-ridden Argentina, but also with Iran and Belarus.

By the time he arrived in Tehran from Moscow (via Minsk) in June 2007, the 180 economic and political accords his government had signed with Tehran were already yielding tangible results. Iranian-designed cars and tractors were coming off assembly lines in Venezuela. “The cooperation of independent countries like Iran and Venezuela has an effective role in defeating the policies of imperialism and saving nations,” Chavez declared in Tehran.

Stuck in the quagmire of Iraq and lashed by the gusty winds of rocketing oil prices, the Bush administration finds its area of manoeuvre woefully limited when dealing with a rising hydrocarbon power. To the insults that Chavez keeps hurling at Bush, the American response has been vapid. The reason is the crippling dependence of the United States on imported petroleum which accounts for 60 percent of its total consumed. Venezuela is the fourth largest source of U.S. imported oil after Canada, Mexico, and Saudi Arabia; and some
refineries in the U.S. are designed specifically to refine heavy Venezuelan oil.

In Chavez’s scheme to undermine the “sole superpower,” China has an important role. During an August 2006 visit to Beijing, his fourth in seven years, he announced that Venezuela would triple its oil exports to China to 500,000 barrels per day in three years, a jump that suited both sides. Chavez wants to diversify Venezuela’s buyer base to reduce its reliance on exports to the U.S., and China’s leaders are keen to diversify their hydrocarbon imports away from the Middle East, where American influence remains strong.

“The support of China is very important [to us] from the political and moral point of view,” Chavez declared. Along with a joint refinery project, China agreed to build 13 oil drilling platforms, supply 18 oil tankers, and collaborate with the state-owned company, Petroleos de Venezuela S.A. (PDVSA), in exploring a new oilfield in the Orinoco Basin.

China on a Stratospheric Trajectory

So dramatic has been the growth of the state-run company Petro China that, in mid-2007, it was second only to Exxon Mobil in its market value among energy corporations. Indeed, that year three Chinese companies made it onto the list of the world’s most highly valued corporations. Only the U.S. had more with five. China’s foreign reserves of over $1 trillion have now surpassed Japan’s. With its gross domestic product soaring past Germany’s, China ranks number three in the world economy.

In the diplomatic arena, Chinese leaders broke new ground in 1996 by sponsoring the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), consisting of four adjoining countries: Russia and the three former Soviet socialist republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. The SCO started as a cooperative organization with a focus on countering drug-smuggling and terrorism. Later, the SCO invited Uzbekistan to join, even though it does not abut China. In 2003, the SCO broadened its scope by including regional economic cooperation in its charter. That, in turn, led it to grant observer status to Pakistan, India, and Mongolia—all adjoining China—and Iran, which does not. When the U.S. applied for observer status, it was rejected, an embarrassing setback for Washington, which enjoys such status at the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN).

In early August 2007, on the eve of an SCO summit in the Kyrgyz capital of Bishkek, the group conducted its first joint military exercises, code named Peace Mission 2007, in the Russian Ural region of Chelyabinsk. “The SCO is destined to play a vital role in ensuring international security,” said Ednan Karabayev, foreign minister of Kyrgyzstan.

In late 2006, as the host of a China-Africa Forum in Beijing attended by leaders of 48 of 53 African nations, China left the U.S. woefully behind in the diplomatic race for that continent (and its hydrocarbon and other resources). In return for Africa’s oil, iron ore, copper, and cotton, China sold low-priced goods to Africans, and assisted African countries in building or improving roads, railways, ports, hydro-electric dams, telecommunications systems, and schools. “The western approach of imposing its values and political system on other countries is not acceptable to China,” said Africa specialist Wang Hongyi of the China Institute of International Studies. “We focus on mutual development.”

To reduce the cost of transporting petroleum from Africa and the Middle East, China began constructing a trans-Burma oil pipeline from the Bay of Bengal to its southern province of Yunnan, thereby shortening the delivery distance now travelled by tankers. This undermined Washington’s campaign to isolate Myanmar. (Earlier, Sudan, boycotted by Washington, had emerged as a leading supplier of African oil to China.) In addition, Chinese oil companies were competing fiercely with their Western counterparts in getting access to hydrocarbon reserves in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.

“China’s oil diplomacy is putting the country on a collision course with the U.S. and Western Europe, which have imposed sanctions on some of the countries where China is doing business,”
comments William Mellor of Bloomberg News. The sentiment is echoed by the other side. “I see China and the U.S. coming into conflict over energy in the years ahead,” says Jin Riguang, an oil-and-gas advisor to the Chinese government and a member of the Standing Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Council.

China’s industrialization and modernization has spurred the modernization of its military as well. The test-firing of the country’s first anti-satellite missile, which successfully destroyed a defunct Chinese weather satellite in January 2007, dramatically demonstrated its growing technological prowess. An alarmed Washington had already noted an 18 percent increase in China’s 2007 defence budget. Attributing the rise to extra spending on missiles, electronic warfare, and other high-tech items, Liao Xilong, Commander of the People’s Liberation Army’s general logistics department, said: “The present day world is no longer peaceful, and to protect national security, stability, and territorial integrity we must suitably increase spending on military modernization.”

China’s declared budget of $45 billion was a tiny fraction of the Pentagon’s $459 billion one. Yet, in May 2007, a Pentagon report noted China’s “rapid rise as a regional and economic power with global aspirations” and claimed that it was planning to project military force farther afield from the Taiwan Straits into the Asia-Pacific region in preparation for possible conflicts over territory or resources.

The Sole Superpower in the Sweep of History

This disparate challenge to American global primacy stems as much from sharpening conflicts over natural resources, particularly oil and natural gas, as from ideological differences over democracy, American style, or human rights, as conceived and promoted by Western policymakers. Perceptions about national (and imperial) identity and history are at stake as well.

It is noteworthy that Russian officials applauding the swift rise of post-Soviet Russia refer fondly to the pre-Bolshevik Revolution era when, according to them, Tsarist Russia was a Great Power. Equally, Chinese leaders remain proud of their country’s long imperial past as unique among nations.

When viewed globally and in the great stretch of history, the notion of American exceptionalism that drove the neo-conservatives to proclaim the Project for the New American Century in the late 20th century—adopted so wholeheartedly by the Bush administration in this one—is nothing new. Other superpowers have been there before and they, too, have witnessed the loss of their prime position to rising powers.

No superpower in modern times has maintained its supremacy for more than several generations. And, however exceptional its leaders may have thought themselves, the United States, already clearly past its zenith, has no chance of becoming an exception to this age-old pattern of history. MR

Benazir Bhutto’s Reconciliation is a reasoned and impassioned plea for support for an open and democratic Pakistan. Bhutto’s book, completed shortly before her death, places Pakistan squarely in the center of an Islamic world under siege from internal forces that seek to “exploit religion for their own political agenda.” She aims to “trace the roots, causes, and potential solutions to the crisis within the Muslim world and the crisis between the Muslim world and the West.” Bhutto argues forcefully that Samuel Huntington’s oft referred to “clash of civilizations” (The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order; Simon and Schuster, New York, 1997), particularly between Islamic and Western nations, is not inevitable; instead, she highlights “the need for an enlightened renaissance both within Islam and between Islam and the rest of the world.” Her work describes the tensions inherent in the current dialogue between Muslim scholars and militant fundamentalists, explains the challenges leaders faced to establish an independent Pakistan freed from colonialism and other Western interventions, and proposes new initiatives to improve the future.

Bhutto maintains that to achieve durable reconciliation, both Islamic and Western nations must acknowledge their contributions to current trends, commit themselves to achieving mutual understanding, support political and social reforms, and contribute to programs that will promote economic and intellectual development in Pakistan. For their part, followers of Islam must separate the central tenets of the religion found in the Qur’an from tribal traditions such as “the wearing of the burqa, the isolation of women in their homes, female circumcision, and the banning of girls’ education.” The latter, Bhutto claims, has “no basis in Islam.” The Prophet Mohammad, she explains, called for tolerance and respect for all monotheistic religions, valued justice and equality, and advocated military action only in the context of justified defensive war. Islam, Bhutto argues, is not incompatible with democracy, women’s equality, science, or education; indeed, the Qur’an fails to establish clerics as the exclusive interpreters of the religion. She states unequivocally, “Suicide-murder is specifically and unambiguously prohibited.” Islamic scholars must address the challenge of reinterpreting the principles of the Islamic faith from within the context of modern society. Bhutto documents the fledgling effort of scholars to do so and urges non-Muslims not only to support this dialogue, but also to promote greater tolerance and education regarding the faith.

For their part, Western nations must acknowledge their contributions to the current problems within the Islamic world. Bhutto claims that most non-Muslims fundamentally misunderstand the religion; moreover, Western support for colonialism and authoritarian rulers in support of larger strategic objectives—noncommunist dictators during the Cold War, for example—contributed significantly to the growing crises. Bhutto calls for economic development plans, personnel, and material exchanges that promote understanding, tolerance and freedom, and greater involvement from nongovernmental organizations and women’s groups as possible solutions. These initiatives, Bhutto acknowledges, should generate not only from within Pakistan itself, but also from the larger community of Islamic Gulf States and democratic Western nations. Thus, the road to a more stable Pakistan and a better life for its citizens runs directly through democracy.

Bhutto’s tragic death reminds us of what is at stake if the issues she identifies are left unresolved or are clouded by misunderstanding, prejudice, and poverty. If the primary function of the state in the 21st century is, as some scholars have noted, to enable economic opportunity and consumer market power through incentives, a democratic Pakistan represents a viable option that Americans can readily support (see Phillip Bobbitt’s The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace and the Course of History, Alfred A. Knopf, 2003). Bhutto’s discussion of the reinterpretation of Islam would almost certainly have made her a target of religious extremists had she survived. The programs she describes would be expensive, she reminds us, but so are the costs of political instability, poverty, and persistent military conflict.

Deborah Kidwell, Ph.D., Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


The author’s title tells us much about his view of the future. Colin Gray believes that the more that war changes, the more it seems to stay the same. He believes that those who think the 21st century will see a dramatic change in the nature of war will be disappointed, and he predicts a similar disappointment for those who predict an end to war. War will endure and the best guide, in fact the only reliable guide, to its future course is history. From this starting premise, Another Bloody Century...
represents Gray’s attempt to reconcile the enduring truths of organized violence with those features of war that are entirely new, such as the terrorist pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and the military exploitation of cyberspace.

Though the author is respectful of history, he is not a historian. Gray identifies himself, instead, as a strategist. And, though he currently serves as a professor of international politics at the University of Reading in Berkshire, he is not an academic standing aloof from the messy world of public policy. Over the last several decades, Gray has served on a variety of advisory positions within the U.S. government. This experience, along with his command of the relevant historical record and impressive writing skills, help us understand why this book won a recent Royal United Services Institute award for excellence in military literature.

Gray is especially emphatic in emphasizing what will not change. In the 19th century, Clausewitz was correct in identifying war as a political act. Though we tend to forget it, the Prussian theorist is still right. The war of the future will take place in new social and cultural contexts and will feature new technology; nevertheless, war will take place in new social and still right. The war of the future

Instead, it is a bracing and well-written challenge to those who would ignore war’s past when predicting its future.

Scott Stephenson, Ph.D., Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


Martin Wayne delivers much more than the book’s title implies. The work is well organized, meticulously documented, and succinct, providing a thorough background on China’s challenges in Xinjiang, its westernmost province, and placing China’s insurgencies in the context of today’s global jihad and War on Terrorism. The book begins by viewing China’s “bottom-up” approach to countering Xinjiang’s Uyghur minority insurgency and follows with an outline of the insurgent/threats group in western China. Wayne also provides a detailed overview of Chinese counterinsurgency (COIN) from both theoretical and historical perspectives.

The book illuminates the genesis of Uyghur terrorism in the Afghan-Soviet War of the 1980s and Al-Qaeda’s rise to power. It discusses China’s role in supplying Soviet-style weaponry and, most importantly, mules to the mujahedeen efforts in Afghanistan, bringing to light an area unknown to many. Wayne is critical of Beijing’s assertion that all terrorist activities are simply a phenomenon of radical and militant Islam, arguing that Uyghur terrorism is a unique and indigenous movement. He asserts the Uyghur insurgency is based on multiple reasons, not only radical Islam but separatism and Han Chinese oppression and exploitation of Xinjiang’s natural resources.

Perhaps the most salient point of Wayne’s treatise is his discussion of China’s bottom-up approach to counter the insurgency in Xinjiang. He argues that China has been successful, whereas the American heavy-handed “top-down” approach in Iraq, which favors military action, may be counterproductive. He discusses interrelated categories of targets pursued as part of a Chinese “society-centric action” to COIN operations. These targets are (1) individuals, (2) organizations and groups, (3) insurgent organizations abroad, and (4) ideas and ideology detrimental to Chinese control and security.

Wayne questions official Chinese sources that raise the specter of Al-Qaeda and terrorism in connection with all Uyghur attempts to redress grievances. He questions whether China is witnessing a nascent rebellion with aims of secession and if Chinese repression is smothering legitimate dissent. The veracity of Chinese claims is hard to determine as all media is state-controlled by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Nonetheless, society’s demand for stability has allowed the communist regime’s free approach in handling unrest in Xinjiang.

Is Xinjiang a theater of Al-Qaeda’s influence? Wayne posits that though there are Al-Qaeda ties between insurgent activities in Xinjiang, they are only a portion of the “terror-social unrest-separatism” spectrum present in the country. Al-Qaeda connections should be viewed in the entirety of terror attacks elsewhere in China growing from wide-spread unrest associated with rapid industrialization and social change.

One shortfall of Wayne’s book is his lack of discussion on China’s organized “sinicization” program. The state, through various mechanisms, has imported Han Chinese cadres loyal to the CCP to regain control of local political institutions. Through this transmigration process, the once dominant Uyghur minority has lost its dominance. (A similar process has occurred in China’s restive Tibet province.)

Uyghurs loyal to the CCP remain ensconced in the party while those overtly practicing Islam are ushered out. Purges were and are common; however authorities have to be careful to legitimize the communist presence by employing Uyghur and other minority cadres in the local level leadership.
An insurgent and real terrorist threat with links to the global jihad exists in Xinjiang. However, China’s bottom-up approach, or what Wayne terms “society-centric warfare,” has kept the insurgency to a manageable level and has even turned society against it. Indeed China’s ability to penetrate and effectively operate within Xinjiang society has hindered the insurgency’s growth. It is the responsibility of society to police itself and for families and neighbors to inform on one another. This bottom-up approach to COIN strategy has been very successful for China.

Wayne’s book is authoritative—he has researched in Xinjiang, witnessing firsthand the Uyghur insurgency and Chinese reaction. This is a relevant and timely, albeit pricey, book. Those wishing to expand their knowledge on the War on Terrorism will find it professionally interesting. Although we cannot draw too many parallels between the U.S. efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan and the Chinese War on Terrorism, Wayne does offer insights that bear consideration as we pursue operations in Iraq Freedom and Enduring Freedom.

**LTC Steven Oluic, Ph.D., West Point, New York**

**HOW WE MISSED THE STORY:**

Osama bin Laden, the Taliban, and the Hijacking of Afghanistan, Roy Gutman, United States Institute of Peace, 2008, 304 pages, $26.00.

The story of Afghanistan from the Soviet invasion in 1979 through the rise of the Taliban and their post 9/11 removal from power is an exciting tale that includes shifting clan loyalties, historic ethnic enmity, larger-than-life personalities, and good old-fashioned, bare-knuckle politics. Roy Gutman’s *How We Missed the Story* is a comprehensive account of each of these elements. Gutman specifically asks the question, why did the U.S. miss Osama bin-Laden’s hijacking of the Afghanistan government and acquisition of the freedom of action to plan and conduct terrorist attacks?

The book is well organized with good footnotes and a chronology of events that helps the reader follow the myriad shifting alliances and countervailing war crimes. The author’s first-hand interviews and good documentation lend authenticity to the account and provide insight into the perspective of key players both internal and external to Afghanistan.

Where the book falls short is in its failure to remember the world as it was. Gutman specifically states that the attack on 9/11 was not an intelligence or military failure. Rather, it was a strategic policy failure. Gutman holds the National Command Authority, the State Department, and the CIA responsible for failing to recognize that Osama bin-Laden had hijacked Afghanistan, that Bin-Laden’s declaration of war against the U.S. was real, and that Pakistan was complicit in supporting the Taliban (and, by proxy, Bin-Laden himself). Gutman argues that had we recognized these facts we would have supported Mousud or invaded Afghanistan in the 1998-2000 time period.

These assertions reflect pre-9/11 amnesia. As Gutman correctly points out, it was the potential dissolution of NATO that forced U.S. engagement in the Balkans, where our distaste for supporting either side’s war criminals had kept us neutral for a prolonged period. The events in Afghanistan (Mazar-i-sharif’s massacre of at least 2000 Taliban, and the numerous massacres by the Taliban) would have required that the U.S. possess the ability to distinguish between war criminals and warlords. We still do not have this ability.

Finally, there is a qualitative difference between “missing” the story and getting it wrong. Zalmay Khalilzad did not miss the story but he did get it wrong. Michael Sheehan, Secretary Madeleine Albright’s counterterrorism aide, did not miss the story but got it wrong. The notion of a sovereign state turning over both domestic and international policy to a foreign national and leader of a terrorist organization was simply not imaginable prior to 9/11.

Nonetheless, *How We Missed the Story* presents an eminently readable account of the events transitioning Southwest Asia from a backwater of U.S. policy to the centerpiece of our War on Terrorism.

**Steven W. Rotkoff, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**


With his book *Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop*, Antonio Giustozzi has produced the definitive volume on the resurgent Taliban for policymakers, diplomats, and military leaders involved in the ongoing Afghanistan conflict. It is a must-read given its insights into the workings of this resilient and dangerous insurgent force.

Giustozzi provides an in-depth look at Neo-Taliban insurgents—their strategy, organization, tactics, and the reasons for their successful revival. He details the role Pakistan plays with the Taliban and in Afghan politics, and highlights the efforts and shortcomings of the Afghan government and its foreign allies. Buttressed by impeccable research and analysis, largely done on the ground in Afghanistan with personal interviews, Giustozzi demonstrates that the return of the Taliban has as much to do with its own efforts as it does with the policy failures of the Afghan regime and its U.S. and foreign allies.

Giustozzi posits that the weakness of state administration is a key factor in the delegitimization of the Karzai government in the eyes of the local population. This failing, coupled with excessive tribal-based government patronage and intense corruption among the Afghan police and military forces, has alienated large segments of the population and provided a breach for the Taliban to penetrate. Equally, U.S. and NATO forces have conducted a weak psychological operations and public relations campaign directed at the
Afghan populace. Coalition military operations have compounded this deficiency through over-reliance on firepower, lack of attention to developing local understanding and familiarity, and excessive rotation of personnel—particularly at the command level, which makes continuity of policy and knowledge almost impossible.

The author illustrates that the Taliban has overcome a number of internal and external organizational challenges while at the same time developing a real strategy to prosecute its insurgency in the face of a more powerful military foe. It has slowly become a learning organization, and this adaptability has enabled it to gain the upper hand among the population in a number of key provinces.

Giustozzi has excellent credentials for this book. He is a member of the Crisis States Research Center at the London School of Economics with over 10 years of research and practitioner experience with Afghanistan. With superb notes, an index and bibliography, and excellent maps, this well-researched book should be required reading for all U.S. Army field grade officers and senior diplomats.

Kevin D. Stringer, Ph.D., Zurich, Switzerland


How does one become a great leader, and what does that really mean? Jack Broughton provides superb examples of what it means to lead, and how one learns to lead. His bottom line: to be a great leader, pay attention to and learn from great examples. His perspective of leaders and leadership has little to do with rank, and a great deal to do with character. Although discussion of his combat experiences are numerous, the leadership lessons that stand out in the book have more to do with moral courage than with physical courage.

Broughton has been a personal hero of mine ever since I read Thud Ridge. Unlike his previous writing (Going Downtown was published in 1988), Rupert Red Two examines the periods before and after the Vietnam conflict in some detail, from 1941 when he first entered the U.S. Military Academy, to the turn of the 21st century. The real meat of this book is the period from 1945 to about 1965. You don’t have to be an aviation history buff to appreciate Broughton’s personal, behind-the-scenes perspective on the rush to demobilize immediately after World War II, and the abysmal state of readiness for the Korean War. As a Thunderbird Leader from 1954 to 1957, and as an F-106 Squadron Commander on the northern tier of fighter interceptor bases at the height of the Cold War, Broughton amassed a personal treasure trove of experiences to draw from.

Broughton’s accounts of air combat in Korea and Vietnam are gripping, but his accounts of everyday peacetime leadership challenges are truly exceptional. He learned from leaders who shielded him from potentially career-ending consequences of neophyte mistakes, and also learned hard personal lessons from a few who were willing to sacrifice him and his subordinates for the sake of bureaucratic expediency. He also struggled with the all too common and challenging leadership question: “When do I cut this guy some slack, and when do I simply cut him off?” By his own account, he didn’t always get it right, but the experiences he describes are superb case studies in leadership. His experiences with the F-106, its maintenance challenges, and its ejection seat hazards in particular, stand out as superb examples of exceptional moral courage that occasionally requires officers to “bet their oak leaves.”

This is a fun read, and it also provides a superb study of practical leadership, both good and bad. I highly recommend it, especially to aspiring young leaders—of any branch of service.

Thomas E. Ward, II, Ph.D., Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


This exceptionally well researched and documented history provides an overview of the growth and development of U.S. nuclear intelligence from World War II until early 2007. The straightforward text transforms deep technical details of atomic weapons manufacture into easily comprehensible language that reads like a spy novel revealing the actual story of America’s secret quest for information about the nuclear capabilities of other nations. This is an important addition to the unclassified record of the ultra-secret world of atomic intelligence and counterintelligence. It achieves its greatest value by collecting virtually all publicly available information on America’s atomic spying in one concise location.

The book explains the exigent challenges and unique solutions that America’s intelligence services faced in gathering and analyzing the atomic information that other countries did not want to reveal. Before the end of World War II, U.S. leadership enhanced and focused its spy network to determine if Nazi Germany could develop nuclear weapons. At the end of the war, the U.S. further improved and then re-directed its espionage capability at the Soviet Union. As the number of nations seeking atomic weapons grew, the U.S. increased its ability to identify atomic bomb building and detonation by using a variety of technical advances, including satellites, high altitude spy planes, atomic particle collectors, sound detectors, and seismic monitors. This richly detailed account also presents the decisions and influence of the politicians and scientists involved in developing and containing nuclear weapons.

However, this history provides no central thesis beyond a comprehensive, yet basic, story of atomic spying. Richelson does not provide an argument or attempt to persuade,
and he ends the discussion without an explicit conclusion. This informative technique powerfully impels the reader to draw conclusions free of tendentious authorial implications. Moreover, his text provides an excellent introduction to the subject and is a superb resource for additional research. For anyone interested in a pure history, unadulterated by a particular point of view, this book is a real joy. William K. Jakola, Baghdad, Iraq


In Bankrupting the Enemy, Edward Miller painstakingly details the economic strategy the U.S. employed against Japan prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor in retaliation for its aggression in Manchuria, China, and Indochina. Miller proposes that the most devastating American action against Japan was a financial freeze, which ultimately led to the war. He uncovers and examines government records to bring to life the government leaders and their evolving decision process that led to the freeze.

Before Japanese aggression in Manchuria, Japan was America’s second largest supplier of goods (primarily raw silk) and third largest international customer (primarily oil and other natural resources). Raw silk, in fact, comprised 25 percent of all Japanese exports outside the Japanese Empire, with the majority destined for the U.S. Because the Japanese yen was convertible outside the Japanese Empire, as Miller notes, the flow and commercial use of these commodities held great significance for Japan.

Standing in the extraordinary position of controlling nearly all the world’s negotiable currency while systematically barring exports of commodities for its own defense, including—later—those needed by the Japanese military, the U.S. government went about financially isolating Japan to drive it into bankruptcy.

The instrument for such a strategy was a relic from World War I known as Section 1(b) of the Trading with the Enemy Act—a single paragraph that empowered the president to freeze dollars owned by foreign countries, enemy or not. The intent was to deny Japan the means to wage war, bring it to its senses, and convince it to relinquish conquered territories. Economic victory was preferable to armed conflict.

Japan, however, was not about to forego its decade of conquests by withdrawing from Indochina, China, or Manchuria. Leaving would have meant giving up hard-fought gains that had cost the lives of 200,000 Japanese soldiers and huge expenditures of money, and had required significant sacrifices by the Japanese people.

Anticipating U.S. restrictions on vital commodity exports and the likelihood of a financial freeze on Japanese-held U.S. dollars and gold, Japan initiated clever schemes to either hide its dollars and gold reserves or spend it to purchase and stockpile strategic defense-related resources. Miller explores similarly cagey U.S. efforts to deny Japan vital resources such as oil. Without imposing an embargo, the U.S. claimed shortages in meeting domestic needs to justify withholding exports to Japan, a claim that was later proven false.

Many U.S. government experts had calculated that Japan was already heading toward absolute depletion of its gold reserves and hard currency foreign assets. Several dates were boldly projected suggesting when this might occur and, by inference, when the war in China would be over. The first date uttered was September 1939, later pushed forward to March 1941. Both were wrong. Japan had secretly secured enough U.S. dollar and gold reserves to fund a long war against China and to prepare for a possible war against the U.S.

It was to counter this possibility that U.S. leaders decided to freeze Japan’s dollar assets. An asset freeze had to be done all at one time to be effective, and it happened on 26 July 1941. By then, however, Japan had already succeeded in withdrawing most of its dollars from U.S. banks. Nevertheless, the freeze essentially bankrupted Japan, and, even though it had over $200 million by the end of 1941, it could buy nothing.

The historical insights provided in this book are intriguing and astonishing. Certainly, this is the most detailed American account on the subject to date. Miller explains the complexities of international economics and finance in such a way that novices on the subject will have no difficulty understanding the impact U.S. economic policies had on Japan.

My only criticism is that the book falls short in detailing Japan’s perspective. Nonetheless, I would recommend Bankrupting the Enemy to anyone seeking insight into how the economic instrument of national power was used against Japan, what lessons were learned from that experience, and how those lessons might be used in the future.

LTC David A. Anderson, USMC, Ph.D., Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


In Victory Girls, Khaki-Wackies, and Patriotutes, historian Marilyn Hegarty offers a fresh perspective on the construction of gender roles during wartime by examining the experience of women who performed morale-maintaining, or as she terms them, “sexualized services” during World War II. Hegarty’s subject is Rosie the Riveter’s more disconcerting counterpart, the “patriotute,” as she was labeled by a prominent public health official. Just as there existed a generalized cultural anxiety that the women who worked at munitions factories and joined the Women’s Army Corps would become overly masculine, so too...
the military establishment and the culture at large worried that women who traded on their sex appeal in morale-boosting roles might become overly promiscuous. These women were viewed as at once necessary to the war effort and potentially detrimental to it, as they posed a threat to the health and fighting ability of our troops through the spread of sexually transmitted disease.

The armed services’ need for a morale-boosting program dovetailed with a more general public campaign to repress prostitution in order to maintain national health by controlling the spread of sexually transmitted disease in the wartime state. In this climate the civilian women who volunteered to attend dances and other organized recreational activities at military bases, or those who worked in the service industries that supported military facilities, found themselves in a precarious and suspect position.

The May Act of 1941 made prostitution in proximity to an Army or Navy base a federal crime, and by 1944 the perception was that the “noncommercial girl,” in the words of the then U.S. Surgeon General, was supplanting “the prostitute as the main source of venereal infection.” In Hegarty’s view, in a coordinated and systematic effort to control the female sexuality that had been unleashed in the service of the war, the civilian female population came under the surveillance of local, state, and federal social agencies and law enforcement. FBI statistics show a 100-percent increase in the number of women under the age of 20 who were arrested on sex-related offenses between 1941 and 1942, and tens of thousands of women were incarcerated on morals charges during the war years. Some of them were held in detention facilities acquired by the federal government from the Army for the specific purpose of quarantineing sexually diseased and promiscuous women. A lack of testimonials from detainees and “partial statistics” leave us with many questions left unanswered. In the absence of hard numbers, Hegarty relies on anecdotal evidence, which, while intriguing, does not convince the reader of her charge that the U.S. government was waging a secondary “war against women” on the home front.

Anne Taranto, Ph.D., Manlius, New York


More than 40 years after his death, Douglas MacArthur can still stir strong emotions. While Clayton James’s three-volume biography portrays him in all his complexity, briefer treatments have characterized him as either America’s greatest 20th-century military commander or a dangerous megalomaniac. In this brief, shrewd, and fair biography, Frank shows us that MacArthur was brilliant, deeply flawed, and endlessly fascinating. From his days at West Point, MacArthur exhibited great talents and an ego that made it difficult for him to cooperate with fellow commanders or civilian superiors. The latter led President Harry Truman to end MacArthur’s career in 1951, 52 years after he entered the Army.

Frank addresses MacArthur’s origins, his motivations, strengths, and failings. One can argue his greatest accomplishments spanned his whole career before and after World War II: his heroism and leadership in World War I, his service as West Point superintendent and as Army chief of staff, his vision as ruler of occupied Japan, and his daring Inchon landing in the Korean War.

As the chief of staff, MacArthur presided over Army experiments in mechanization that were curtailed by the Great Depression. Frank correctly identifies one of MacArthur’s great achievements as keeping the Army’s education system intact and not letting the officer corps disappear under the budgetary axe. His success in the 1930s allowed the Army to expand to 44 times its 1939 strength by 1945. Frank identifies the nadir of MacArthur’s generalship as the Philippine campaign of 1941-1942 and the initial battles for Buna in 1942. He equaled these low points in his panic after the Chinese intervention in Korea in 1950. His repeated instances of public insubordination that began in the Philippines brought his dismissal in April 1951.

In examining his wartime generalship, Frank explores the idea that MacArthur’s casualties were less than those of the Navy and Marine Corps in the Central Pacific.

First promoted by the Hearst press during the war and perpetuated by historians afterward, Frank investigates the records and concludes that MacArthur’s forces suffered more casualties than the forces under Admiral Nimitz’s command. He also states that American forces had proportionally fewer casualties overall: for every American who died fighting Japan about nine Japanese perished.

Frank stresses that MacArthur’s powerful charisma and command presence prevented nearly all his superiors from managing him after 1941. His insubordination was overlooked until it became impossible to ignore. One reason for MacArthur’s influence and power was the length of his career. By 1941, he was senior to all of his erstwhile military superiors. It is important to note that in 1950 MacArthur had been a general since 1917, while Generals Omar Bradley and James Lawton Collins Jr. (the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff and the Army chief of staff respectively) had been junior officers in 1917. The only comparable military figure to parallel MacArthur’s career and longevity was George Marshall (Army Chief of Staff, Secretary of State, and Secretary of Defense).

Ultimately, Frank demonstrates MacArthur could not accept that men he thought inferior to himself were in charge of the Army and the government. Although MacArthur’s political insensitivity did not prevent him from practicing a high level of statesmanship in the U.S. occupation of Japan, the policies he instituted were devised in Washington or on his Tokyo staff without his counsel. As Frank shows, when he was good, he was indispensable; when he was
bad, he made colleagues and superiors think of firing squads.

Lewis Bernstein,
Seoul, Korea

MIDWAY INQUEST: Why the Japanese Lost the Battle of Midway, Dallas Woodbury Isom, Indian University Press, Bloomington, 2007, 408 pages, $29.95.

Dallas Woodbury Isom’s Midway Inquest: Why the Japanese Lost the Battle of Midway attempts to answer the question of why Japanese Admiral Chuichi Nagumo failed to launch his ready aircraft against U.S. carriers on the morning of 4 June 1942. Long a controversial issue, the failure to launch a second strike, either against the island of Midway or against the U.S. carriers, made the four Japanese carriers vulnerable. When dive bombers from the Yorktown and Enterprise attacked the Japanese carriers, the carriers had torpedo bombers and some dive bombers in the hangar decks. Three were damaged beyond repair, turning the tide in the Pacific War. When read in conjunction with another book on Midway, Shattered Sword: the Untold Story of the Battle of Midway by Jonathan B. Parshall and Anthony P. Tully, Isom’s book provides some tantalizing answers to this critical question.

Isom concludes that the launch of the second strike was delayed due to mechanical issues involving unloading bombs and loading torpedoes on the Nakajima B5N2 Kate torpedo planes. After extensive interviews with aircraft mechanics, Isom believes the procedure, frequently assumed to be only 40 minutes in duration, was at least 1 hour long. With this assessment, Nagumo could not have launched a strike with torpedo planes any time before the fatal attack by U.S. carrier aviation at 1030 that morning.

Isom also conducts an interesting counter-factual analysis of the battle, speculating what would have happened if the Japanese attack had been launched against the U.S. carriers.

However, Parshall and Tully’s Shattered Sword remains the more complete of the two books. When Isom’s account is added to the detailed analysis of the entire battle offered by Parshall and Tully, the two books together finally appear to have answered the question of why the Japanese carriers were so vulnerable that June morning. The details of analysis presented by Isom, added to the more comprehensive analysis by Parshall and Tully, offer a cautionary note to anyone who fails to account for the details of any military engagement. Without careful and comprehensive analysis, understanding of any military engagement is likely to depend on myth and legend. These authors deserve credit for their careful analyses of this critical battle of World War II.

Peter J. Schifferle, Ph.D.,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


Harry Yeide and Mark Stout’s First to the Rhine: The 6th Army Group in World War II provides a deeply factual and objective history of one of the lesser known aspects of the War in Europe—the 6th Army Group’s campaign from the invasion of Southern France through VE Day. Yeide and Stout seek to redress the short shrift typically given to this important aspect of the war, especially given the logistic and strategic importance of Marseilles and the Rhone River valley. At least 40 fully supplied American and French combat divisions were able to enter the fight against German forces in the west through the southern French ports liberated by the French 1st and American 7th Armies. Furthermore, the authors use the larger setting of the 6th Army Group’s operations to provide the backdrop for some of the war’s most notable episodes, particularly the personal experiences and exploits of men such as Audie Murphy, the most decorated soldier of the war.

To detail this usually neglected and often-misunderstood aspect of the war, authors Yeide and Stout relied heavily on a wide array of primary sources that include after-action reports, award citations, unit operations journals, and personal diaries. Key secondary sources were also utilized and include unit histories and biographies of important individuals to provide pertinent background information to command decisions. The authors used a mix of the sources to present a well-balanced chronological history of the Army group’s operations from the initial stages of the Dragoon landings in August 1944 up through the German counteroffensive, Operation Nordwind, during the bitter cold of January 1945, to the final campaigns along the Danube and into Austria in April 1945.

Neither the French nor the American contributions to the campaigns are neglected and the authors even provide ample information on the German dispositions, plans, and personalities that figured prominently in the campaigns as well. Key allied command personalities, such as Generals Jacob Devers, Jean de Lattre, Alexander Patch, and Lucian Truscott, are all included but so too are the common soldiers’ contributions down to the squad level to provide a comprehensive understanding of the nature of the fighting on the southern edge of Eisenhower’s Great Crusade.

While meticulously researched, the authors do not get bogged down in unnecessary details; Yeide and Stout use a crisp narrative style that takes readers into the strategic and operational command decisions and yet also makes them feel the agonies and sacrifices endured by the common soldiers of both sides. The authors also take great care to place the southern operations into the larger picture of the war in Europe so that the reader understands the 6th Army Group’s purpose and contributions without taking anything away from their better known counterparts in Bradley’s 12th or Montgomery’s 21st Army Groups. First to the Rhine fills a long-felt void in the European

In the contemporary context of financial fraud and abuse cases plaguing the Department of Defense, it is instructive to be reminded that unethical practices and self-serving crooks in uniform are not a modern invention. This is exactly what John K. Driscoll does in his compact biography of West Point alumnus Justus McKinstry, who eventually rose to the temporary rank of brigadier general of volunteers in the Union Army.

In the modern vernacular, to be a “rogue” most often means an underdog fighting the good fight (think Marcinko’s Rogue Warrior series, for instance, or political references to John McCain’s roguish streak). The author intends no such flattery in detailing the life of a dishonest knave, incapable of adhering to the duty-honor-country values of his alma mater.

After a tough road to graduation from the U.S. Military Academy in 1838 (he entered as a plebe in 1832), McKinstry followed a typical career for his generation that took him from Florida to Mexico to California, ending in 1861 with a final posting at St. Louis serving under another infamous rogue, 1856 Republican presidential candidate John Charles Fremont.

The author delivers a well-documented chronology of quartermaster McKinstry’s unseemly career of patronage and fraud at the taxpayers’ expense. Driscoll sprinkles his story with background and anecdotes on such topics as frontier business practices in California and the chaotic mobilization for war against the South in St. Louis. These add context and color to the otherwise unhappy story of a life ruined by greed and poor moral choices. Although the author occasionally takes a prosecutorial tone, I commend the story to anyone interested in the ethical stewardship of public resources.

COL Sean M. Callahan, Kaneohe, Hawaii

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On 1 July 2008, Military Review’s public website will change its look. BCKS, CALL, CSI, Military Review, and CADD are now part of the Combined Arms Center-Knowledge Command (CAC-K). You will find Military Review listed under the Knowledge link in the list of subordinate organizations on the CAC-K website.

Another new feature of the Military Review website is our blog. On our blog you will be able to finally discuss in real time the articles and issues that matter most to you. You can subscribe to the RSS feed available on the blog to know when new items are posted and what new content is available.
With this edition, *Military Review* bids farewell to LTC Arthur Bilodeau who was our best managing editor in recent memory. His rare blend of infantry toughness, English literature expertise, and intelligence brought dignity to the publication with refreshing style. For authors lucky enough to be published under his watch, his fine touch made them all shine well beyond their own merits. Whatever his virtues, though, they were all surpassed by his uncanny ability to slice fat from turgid prose. And in our business, that ability means the world. After a 27 year military career, LTC Bilodeau is retiring to Louisville, KY.

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Defenseless under the night
Our world in stupor lies;
Yet, dotted everywhere,
Ironic points of light
Flash out wherever the Just
Exchange their messages:
May I, composed like them
Of Eros and of dust,
Beleaguered by the same
Negation and despair,
Show an affirming flame.
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—W.H. Auden  (last stanza of the poem, “September 1st 1939”)

How do you say goodbye to an Icon? How do you say thank you to a mentor, guide, and friend? Patricia Wilson has been with the *Military Review* staff for over 26 years and at the end of July will retire with 40 years of civilian service. As *MR*’s administrative assistant, she has logged thousands of manuscripts, kept track of *MR*’s writing contests, ensured we were all paid, mailed magazines to authors, and all the while kept our computers up-to-date and answered our innumerable computer-related questions. Always a source of steadiness, she kept the journal on an even keel through thick and thin. We’ll miss you, Pat.

—*the Military Review* crew