BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER: CAN DEFENSE AND STATE COMMUNICATE?

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL CHRISTOPHER W. STOCKEL
United States Army Reserve

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U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050
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Before, During, and After: Can Defense and State Communicate?

Lieutenant Colonel Christopher W. Stockel

Dr. Robin Dorff
Strategic Studies Institute

U.S. Army War College
122 Forbes Avenue
Carlisle, PA 17013

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Today’s Long War requires, even demands, that all elements of America’s national power be focused on victory. With Department of Defense (DoD) the lead for the military element and Department of State (DoS) the lead for the diplomatic element, will these two departments be able to communicate and synchronize their pieces of the complex victory formula? Only through a closely coordinated and synchronized total war effort relying on the National Security Strategy (NSS) as the fundamental planning document will victory be possible. This joint effort will require a fundamental change in the interagency process, including a substantial reprogramming of budgets and staffs.

Indeed, recent Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) speeches and testimony assert that civilian personnel are now full partners in the Long War and must step up and fulfill their role. To make this happen, DoS must build the training float, to promote school-trained/battle-tested strategic/operational/tactical planners and implementers. Moreover, DoS and DoD must change their cultures to accommodate a constructive partnership. This Strategic Research Paper (SRP) proposes ways for DoD and DoS to cooperate as a winning team in the Long War through a unifying NSS.

Reconstruction, Budget, Post-conflict, Phase IV, Nation Building
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Lieutenant Colonel Christopher W. Stockel
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Project Adviser

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U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013
ABSTRACT

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BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER: CAN DEFENSE AND STATE COMMUNICATE?

The military and civilian elements of the United States' national security apparatus have responded unevenly and have grown increasingly out of balance. The problem is not will; it is capacity. In many ways, the country's national security capabilities are still coping with the consequences of the 1990s, when, with the complicity of both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue, key instruments of U.S. power abroad were reduced or allowed to wither on the bureaucratic vine.

—Robert Gates Foreign Affairs

Today’s era of persistent conflict requires, even demands, that all elements of America’s national power be focused on obtaining the nation’s objectives. The Department of Defense (DoD) leads the military element, and the Department of State (DoS) leads the diplomatic element. This SRP argues that only when these two mammoth bureaucracies communicate, plan, coordinate, and synchronize their contributions to the complex national security policy will the U.S. Government (USG) successfully and effectively deliver tangible, improved results in current and future conflicts.

In fact, the U.S. has four elements of power, referred to as instruments of National Power in Joint Publication 1. However, emerging doctrine now labels them as elements of National Power, designated by the acronym DIME: diplomatic, information, military, and economic. The President and Secretary of Defense, with support from the National Security Council (NSC), determine the appropriate level of interaction among these powers and integration of the military element with the other three elements. The diplomatic element is primarily concerned with foreign affairs and policy. It is often called “soft power.” The information element engages the multi-media communications networks in the 24-hour news cycle and informs the world of America’s story. The
military element is the “hard power,” the professional men and women of our Armed Forces and their enormous array of military equipment. Lastly, the economic element resides in a combination of USG agencies (Treasury and Commerce) and business corporations. Of course the “I” and “E” in DIME are also important. But this SRP will focus principally on the “D” and “M.”

Only through a closely coordinated and synchronized military and diplomatic effort, relying on the National Security Strategy (NSS) as the fundamental planning document, will obtaining the nation’s objectives be possible. Achieving this extraordinary level of collaboration will require a fundamental change in the interagency process, including a substantial reprogramming of budget and staff allocations.

Because of recent changes in the political landscape in Washington, new policies will be articulated and new strategies will be developed. This SRP frames current dilemmas and challenges within the last set of documents produced by President George W. Bush and his national security team. It therefore serves as a backdrop for anticipated new policies and strategies.

This SRP will be divided into four parts and a conclusion. First, historical background reveals that the interagency challenge is not new. This SRP describes Germany in post-World War II and discusses interagency cooperation during the Vietnam War. Second, it then shows that the interagency efforts during the past two presidential terms were inadequate in terms of strategy, coordination, personnel, and funding. Although both presidents recognized the complexity of the interagency, they attempted to address the issues by means of Presidential Directives. Third, this SRP then argues that emerging processes have great potential: For example, recent
changes to the National Security Council (NSC), the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), and the Interagency Management System (IMS) all show potential for building unity of effort and unity of command in the Long War. This SRP concludes with recommendations for changes to the National Security Strategy (NSS), interagency doctrine, and interagency training. These changes will synergize the whole-of-government approach. They should be incorporated into the new administration’s inaugural NSS to assure that promising new processes are able to mature and strengthen our interagency.

Historical Background

During the planning for post-war Germany, five major focus areas were agreed upon by the Allies: security, humanitarian issues, civil administration, democratization, and reconstruction. These areas were not easily selected. They were designated after several meetings during which the Allies started the long and arduous planning process for Germany’s reconstruction. A coordination group called the European Advisory Commission in November 1943 was tasked to oversee the reconstruction. This group conducted business mostly in London. In July 1945, it was replaced by the Council of Foreign Ministers. In addition, a Control Council was formed to conduct:

…appropriate uniformity of action by the Commanders-in-Chief in their respective zones of occupation and [to] reach agreed decisions on the chief questions affecting Germany as a whole.

The lesson that applies to today’s situation is that early detailed planning is a prerequisite for yielding the best chance for post-conflict reconstruction.

But we must always remember that the military is but a single element of DIME. Security is of course a paramount consideration in occupation operations. On May 8,
1945, there were 61 U.S. divisions or 1,622,000 troops in Germany. However, just over 18 months later that number would be reduced to approximately 200,000. Just like today, intense pressure to bring troops home will almost always surface as the armed conflict winds down. In spite of all the troop draw-downs, Germany did provide an important lesson:

The most important lesson from the U.S. occupation of Germany is that military force and political capital can, at least in some circumstances, be successfully employed to underpin democratic and societal transformation.

Vietnam also provides some valuable lessons. The single most important lesson from Vietnam is that successful operations in a complex counterinsurgency environment require unity of effort. However, the efforts of U.S. military and civilians assigned to the war were not sufficiently synchronized or coordinated. Therefore, under direct pressure from President Lyndon Johnson a group designated Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS) was formed in 1967. Initially, this organization consisted of approximately 1,000 advisers with an annual budget of $582 million. In 1969, CORDS matured into 7,600 advisors and an annual budget of $1.5 billion.

As history proves, there is nothing new about the requirement for a plan to provide stability, security, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR) operations. These historical examples reveal that the nation’s current conflicts are not the first to present Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational (JIIM) challenges.

Weakness in Today’s Interagency

While the NSS is the primary national policy document, other relevant government agencies develop their own strategic plans to support the NSS. Specifically, DoD recently produced its 2008 National Defense Strategy and DoS produced its
Strategic Plan Fiscal Years 2007-2012. These documents adhere to the guidance outlined in the 2006 NSS:

We must extend and enhance the transformation of key institutions, both domestically and abroad.

At home, we will pursue three priorities:

*Sustaining the transformation already under way in the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, and Justice; the Federal Bureau of Investigation; and the Intelligence Community.*

*Continuing to reorient the Department of State towards transformational diplomacy,* which promotes effective democracy and responsible sovereignty. Our diplomats must be able to step outside their traditional role to become more involved with the challenges within other societies, helping them directly, channeling assistance, and learning from their experience.⁸

Improving the capacity of agencies to plan, prepare, coordinate, integrate, and execute responses covering the full range of crisis contingencies and long-term challenges.⁹

Both DoD and DoS have made admirable attempts to address transformation and to develop greater capabilities to respond to a full range of contingencies. However, progress towards these goals is slow. Often it does not make a timely impact on tactical or operational levels where the conflict plays out. Our current weak, vague, and nebulous NSS has not facilitated effective conduct of the Long War, particularly the ongoing conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Although all agencies cultivate their strategies to align with the NSS, they devise stove-piped, non-integrated strategies. For example, the DoD mission acknowledges responsibility for providing the military forces needed to deter war and protect the security of our country.¹⁰ Then *JP-1* acknowledges that:

When the United States undertakes military operations, the Armed Forces of the United States are only one component of a national-level effort
involving the various instruments of national power: economic, diplomatic, informational, and military. Instilling unity of effort at the national level is necessarily a cooperative endeavor involving a variety of Federal departments and agencies.\\(^{11}\)

The DoS details its mission to “Create a more secure, democratic, and prosperous world for the benefit of the American people and the international community.”\\(^{12}\) But neither of these mammoth U.S. departments refers to the teamwork required to succeed in today's JIIM environment.

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**Figure 1: Phasing Model**\\(^{13}\)

In order to better understand the complexities of SSTR in a JIIM environment, it is useful to describe briefly the phasing model (Figure 1 above). The model depicts six phases, numbered 0 to V. Phase 0, SHAPE, is primarily a joint, multinational, and interagency phase with the purpose of deterring enemies, current and future, and strengthening the bonds between partners. Another critical Phase 0 objective could be to develop or strengthen the host nation's military. The overall intent of Phase 0 is to
provide regional and international support for a specific strategy, hence the shaping phase.  

Phase I, DETER, designates the requirement to dissuade the adversary from unfavorable actions. It is similar to Phase 0, but “it is largely characterized by preparatory actions that specifically support or facilitate the execution of subsequent phases of the operation/campaign.” As in Phase 0, many Phase I details are pre-planned in security cooperation plans (SCPs). As the crisis develops, certain enemy assets may begin to enter into the theater. In Phase I, liaisons officers (LNOs) conduct a detailed planning process based on the current situation, including all necessary government agencies as well as non-governmental organizations (NGOs).  

During Phase II, SEIZE INITIATIVE, actual combat begins. When the Joint Force Commander (JFC) is ready to initiate military action or enemy actions have triggered an armed response, Phase II is underway. The JFC will move to offensive operations as quickly as possible. A major consideration is the ability to utilize theater and local infrastructure to ensure friendly movement. During this phase, the JFC must set conditions for the next phase.  

Phase III, DOMINATE, is generally the most intensive military activity. While it usually involves a force-on-force scenario, it is not always the case. *JP-03* describes the Phase III military objective that “normally concludes with decisive operations that drive an enemy to culmination and achieve the JFC’s operational objectives.” In addition, *JP-03* offers descriptions of culmination in the fight against an unconventional force:  

Against unconventional enemies, decisive operations are characterized by dominating and controlling the operational environment through a
combination of conventional/unconventional, information, and stability operations.\textsuperscript{19}

Of course winning the war is important. But we cannot lose the peace in Phase IV, STABILIZE. Unfortunately, there are no steadfast rules for planning Phase IV. However, there are some guidelines that assist during the planning process. This phase will be of a short duration if there is a recognized civil government ready to assume its role at the end of hostilities. But if there is no governing body that is ready to take the reins, then U.S. or coalition forces will need to perform some governance. This governance could be as simple as facilitating NGO assistance or as difficult as actually governing parts of a country until local civilians are ready to undertake their municipal responsibilities.\textsuperscript{20}

Lastly, Phase V, ENABLE CIVIL AUTHORITY, evolves when a country has a recognized government and the JFC’s primary role is in supporting this government. Security, legitimacy, essential services, and commerce all characterize Phase V. Combat units then begin retrograde operations and remaining forces work closely with other organizations and host nation forces. These organizations will most likely include NGOs, other U.S. agencies, and regional partners seeking to establish peace and security.\textsuperscript{21}

While providing the bulk of U.S personnel to almost all operations, DoD is currently the only department that can provide a rapid nation-building force. Our military must understand that as it transitions from Phase III to Phase IV, it is the only force capable of providing vast portions of reconstruction and security. No other organization has the capability and structure to effect this transition. Thus, the military can always expect to do some portion of Phase IV. It can no longer simply focus on the fight.
However, Defense and State must bridge the planning, coordination, and execution gap during all phases. Special consideration is required during Phases III and IV. This level of detailed interagency interaction is a prerequisite for success in SSTR operations. As shown in the chart depicting Notional Operation Plan Phases versus Level of Military Effort (Figure 2 below), all activities are present during all phases. But the military is dominant in Phase III, where as DoS’s “Stabilizing Activities” dominate Phase IV. Too often planners attempt to produce a list of activities or obtained objectives that “prove” that an operation has moved from one phase to the next. Today’s complex operations often no longer provide clear-cut evidence of such transitions. In addition, there is now almost no way to predict the time required to successfully complete a given phase.

Figure 2: Notional Operation Plan Phase versus Level of Military Effort
Acknowledging this complex transition task, the Army has designed the core U.S. military missions of Offense, Defense, and Stability operations as co-equals. On November 26, 2007, Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates energized the interagency process like no previous Secretary of Defense in the modern era. He confirmed what every national security professional in all U.S. departments already knew: The interagency process is broken and needs immediate attention for us to achieve victory in Iraq, Afghanistan, and in all US security endeavors.

Secretary Gates delivered his message in a simple and matter-of-fact manner. He warned that if the US is to defeat “the myriad challenges around the world in the coming decades,” all elements of national power must be strengthened. These elements must be strengthened both institutionally and financially. They must learn to integrate their efforts in order to meet the nation’s global challenges. His speech was simply about how to smartly utilize “soft” power as a partner of “hard” power. He continued to stress that the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have provided military victories, but these victories have not resolved larger problems. The U.S. government must develop its institutions into a complete expeditionary team with the required depth and flexibility to deploy as needed to meet today’s challenges.

After describing the National Security Act of 1947, Secretary Gates asked, “If there was a National Security Act of 2007, what would it contain?” He noted that many national security agencies were created over 60 years ago, but today all elements and instruments of national power must be applied in a concerted effort to achieve national security objectives. Only through creative partnerships and a continuing development of the interagency process can we bring the nation’s full might against our enemies. This
process will require more civilian experts who can deploy alongside the military. Further, non-military funding since 2001 has been inadequate. For example, in 2007 the non-supplemental military budget was about 500 billion, but the State Department received only approximately 36 billion. The entire State Department is served by only 6,600 Foreign Service Officers – fewer than the staff of a Carrier Strike Group.

Simply stated, Secretary Gates’ historic speech strongly advocated more staffing and funding for all U.S. civilian agencies, especially the DoS. The new Secretary brilliantly transcended years of government in-fighting and bureaucratic stagnation. But was anyone other than the audience in the auditorium listening? If they were, will they act? As the Secretary stated, now is the time to balance the elements of national power.

The challenges are colossal. Time is passing, and the enemy is constantly probing for a weakness. Specific threats, especially from terrorists, persist. Also, traditional state actors are probing our defenses and testing our resolve. In addition, non-state actors continue their assaults from ungoverned spaces and persist in making matters worse by challenging world norms. Iran and North Korea now present a threat of nuclear proliferation; regional stability and security in Central Asia, Africa, and the Middle East are still unachieved.

Everyone knows that the real-world events do not always unfold as neatly and tidily as planners would like. Today’s operating environment has been accurately described in terms of its volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity (VUCA). Thus to prepare for uncertain and chaotic situations, we need larger reserves of personnel and funds. War is not a business, endeavor, or operation conducted on a
cost-benefit basis. Reserves are required. This is best illustrated by a Brookings Institute report on the interagency process:

Shift the strategic emphasis from offense to defense military operations, but go on the offense in the political and economic realms...Create a unified command structure fully integrating civilian and military operations. Only a fully-integrated approach is likely to produce success.28

But can DoD and DoS claim in their various statements that they are working towards an integrated and complementary process? Absolutely! But it is the speed and comprehensiveness of this process that continue to move too slowly in this era of persistent conflict. Presently, the FY09 Defense budget request is $515.4 billion29 and the State appropriation is only $36.62 billion30. So State’s budget is just over 7.1% of Defense’s—and these figures do not include the emergency supplementals that have recently become routine.

If DoD is going rely on DoS to play a larger role in future operations, then a closer examination of budget submission is essential. Currently, DoD operates with a five-year budget cycle. Unfortunately, DoS operates on a one-year appropriation process. Recently, Congress permitted DoD to transfer up to $100 million dollars in “Section 1207,” security and stabilization assistance funding.31 Sadly, it appears that this transfer was an ad hoc arrangement between Secretary Rumsfeld and Secretary Rice, because it was deemed to be less difficult to acquire funding for DoD than for DoS. In FY2006, $10 million was transferred for DoS assistance to Lebanon. In FY2007, $99.5 million was transferred for use in seven other countries. In FY2008, the legal limit of $100 million was transferred, with half going to the country of Georgia. This is a clear example of interagency cooperation, for which the new buzz phrase is now “whole-of-government” approach. While this cooperation must be the way of the future, Section
1207 funding transfers are only a stop-gap. Until the whole government adopts a five-year budgeting system similar to DoD’s, resourcing complex national security strategies will be problematic and the benefits of whole-of-government synergy will not be maximized.

Of course, some agencies require substantial lead time because of complex equipment purchases. Their needs differ from an agency that is just a regulatory oversight group. However, without a whole-of-government approach to all facets of the bureaucracy, the system will never achieve synergy. Congress, as the appropriators, must resource the nation’s strategy.

One other key improvement, albeit minute, is the increase in Foreign Policy Advisors (POLADs) that State provides to the military. In 2006, there were 18 POLADs. Currently, State’s website reports a total of 20 POLADs. While the transfer of Section 1207 funding is an excellent example of cooperation with tangible results, the increase from 18 POLADs to 20 is a clear example of stagnation. While it is a small and important advancement in the right direction, it is not proportional to the current strategic challenge.

Emerging Interagency Process

The NSC was formed when the Security Act of 1947 became law. An early idea was to have the Council’s paramount mission to coordinate and synchronize national security policy and to formulate a national strategy; however the final version of the law failed to specifically provide for these provisions. But it does provide the President with a national security advisor who chairs the Council and serves as the National Security
Advisor or Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Each president has a unique understanding of and vision for the NSC.

Another key participant in the national security arena is the newly created S/CRS, which was formed in July 2004. On November 28, 2005, the DoD released DoD Directive 3000.05 elevating stability operations to a core U.S. mission equal to combat operations. National Security Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD-44), signed on December 7, 2005, assigned the Secretary of State (SECSTATE) as the lead agent to coordinate and integrate all USG endeavors with respect to preparation, planning, and executing reconstruction and stabilization (R&S) activities. However, if S/CRS is to really coordinate R&S, then it will need real resources, including a meaningful budget and people. Its functions and activities cannot be relegated to irregular supplemental funds. It needs more than its current bare-bones office overhead and a vague operating concept of “coordinating other agency assets” absent any authority to secure commitments for those assets.

In charge of this daunting task is Ambassador John E. Herbst, a Career-Minister, and the second Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization. However, he is only a coordinator. He succeeded Ambassador Carlos Pasquel on May 26, 2006. This nascent office needs permanent staffing and a permanent budget commensurate with the level of responsibility to this office. S/CRS is currently too small to execute their mission requirements. Ambassador Herbst is spearheading two transformational projects, the Interagency Management System (IMS) and the Civilian Response Corps (CRC). These two endeavors are currently included under the new whole-of-government approach to R&S operations.
In March 2007, senior leaders agreed on the IMS for reconstruction and stabilization. The Principles of the USG Planning Framework for Reconstruction, Stabilization and Conflict Transformation was then released on May 13, 2008. The IMS does have limits. Thus it is not designed for natural disasters or humanitarian emergencies. Rather, it provides for systematic unity of effort in the roles, responsibilities, and processes of “expeditionary” R&S operations. The IMS in not a standing body, rather it is tailored for each required mission.

The IMS systematically provides R&S unity of effort by utilizing the whole-of-government approach, so it can provide assistance across the spectrum of conflict. At the strategic level, the IMS provides a Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group (CRSG). Based in Washington, it works at the Policy Coordination Committee (PCC) level. At the operational level, the IMS provides an Integration Planning Cell (IPC), which consists of civilian planners that can deploy to a Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) or to multinational headquarters. At the tactical level, the IMS provides an Advance Civilian Team (ACT), an interagency field team that can act with or without military involvement. ACTs lack organic security, so their security must be provided by contractors, military, or local embassies. Generally, they work for the Chief of Mission (COM). If required by the situation or by the COM, the ACT can stand up Field Advance Civilian Teams (FACTs).36

The activated IMS provides a coherent and nested system from the PCC level in Washington to the FACTs working the ground in a country. The teams at each level are tailored to meet the specific mission as required. However, teams complement current staffing at each level. So IMS must be implemented and involved early to prevent
duplication of effort. The IPC and ACT must deploy once the contingency is identified. The IMS, with S/CRS, has contacts with non-governmental agencies and thus provides potential access to capabilities that can augment the GCC capabilities. IMS provides a single-source solution for interagency integration; it streamlines complex coordination issues.

Once fully resourced, this new unified operating system should facilitate unity of effort throughout all phases of planning, executing, and monitoring. It will provide clear guidance regarding roles and responsibilities. Additionally, it will offer an effective system for mobilizing and supporting the complex interagency R&S operations in today’s intricate, often nuanced security environment.  

The CRC is another essential improvement. CRC has three components: active, standby, and reserve. The active element is composed of federal government employees who are assigned or who work directly for S/CRS. They are deployable within 48 hours of notification. The standby element also consists of full-time federal employees who are deployable within 30 to 45 days following notification. Lastly, the reserve component is composed of U.S. Citizens who are ready for deployment in 45 to 60 days after alert. The reserves provide skills that are generally not available in large numbers in the federal government.

Required Changes

The first and most important change must be in the form of a stronger and more robust NSS. The document must clearly specify guidance to DoD and DoS. The NSS can no longer be a lowest-common-denominator document. It must provide sufficient details to direct that DoD and DoS forge a formal cooperative policy that can provide
strategists with a shared starting point. Policy makers (senior leaders) must then “crack the code” on how they formulate policy to how we implement it.

Another noteworthy consideration in this complex, nebulous national security formula is the substantially different cultures that affect the NSS. Congress has a bureaucratic culture that is part of the legislative branch with constitutional responsibilities. Of the three branches of government, it is the lone branch with monetary appropriation power. The President and the executive branch exercise the power of the pulpit, the threat of a veto of congressional legislation, and the appointment of cabinet positions. Additionally, the executive branch crafts important national security policies. Of course, DoD has a culture of planning and executing complex operations. Lastly, a key player is DoS, but with limited resources it must negotiate complex arrangements with foreign governments and international organizations. Even when the nation is at war, bureaucratic processes are how things are done in a democracy. This is how democracy works. Each branch has its own culture and its means to achieve the nation’s strategic objectives. But this government needs a more efficient method to provide unity of effort in the increasingly complex business of national security. Systems that have served this country adequately in the past, mostly in peace-time, cannot serve a nation at war, especially persistent hybrid conflicts.

Consider the multiple audiences of the NSS. The external target audiences are other countries—allies and enemies—as well as large international corporations or organizations such as the United Nations or the World Bank. Domestic audiences include U.S. citizens, government agencies, the Congress, and the media. Even though
the NSS has multiple audiences, it must be sufficiently detailed to provide a common vision for Defense and State. Once the nation’s leaders effectively articulate their detailed policy, the nation’s agencies are able to effectively detail their strategies that serve to implement the national strategy. In fact, a detailed NSS could nearly close the coordination gap. For example, the NSS could designate lead agencies and clarify questions of legal authority. A recent Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) publication reported:

> Everyone wants coordination, but no one wants to be coordinated. Whatever the value of coordination, which is generally recognized as a good thing, it means giving up some degree of autonomy to others, which also generally involves limits on what one can do unilaterally – that is, coordination can reduce the efficiency of an individual agency to carry out task-specific, agency-specific objectives.\(^4\)

Therefore, we have the concept of “lead agency” which, under its current state, usually fails to find the win-win outcome. Moreover, there are legal reasons why agencies do not provide full disclosure. But to gain more popular support, we must operate more transparently. Understanding that coordination through a lead agency will mean ceding some power to the lead, but if we can knock down these bureaucratic silos our interagency process will be stronger and more robust. We must use our elements of power more wisely.

In December 2006, the Army and Marine Corps cooperatively produced *FM 3-24* also known as *MCWP 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency*.\(^4\) This publication was precisely what was needed to send a clear message to commanders and planners. These two services are synchronized in conducting counterinsurgency operations. Then in October 2008 the Army released *FM 3-07, Stability Operations*.\(^4\) However, for some reason this time it was exclusively an Army only manual. While it included interagency inputs, no other
service signed the manual. While speed of publication is important, so too is unity of effort and inter-service buy-in.

This stovepipe method of operation is exactly what is wrong with today’s interagency process. Just as the Army and Marine Corps have started to develop publications together, so must the other agencies of the USG begin to work collectively. Yes, there are designated lead agencies; yes, there are Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) and Memorandums of Agreement (MoAs). But there must also be interagency doctrine. Just as DoD doctrine has matured from service-specific to joint doctrine, so too will this new interagency doctrine develop, mature, and change as the years progress. But the services and the government agencies must start to develop doctrine in tandem, now. This means DoD must find the balance between offense, defense, and stability operations. DoS must find the proper distribution of roles and responsibilities in defense, diplomacy, and development.

Further, our agencies must determine the proper balance and constructive overlap. The need for interagency training and doctrine must come to the forefront of national security. We must develop and vigorously support interagency field training exercises (FTXs) and staff training exercises (STXs). This kind of collaboration is not a growth in government, but a prudent allocation of interagency resources.

Some immediate actions are to provide State with military-trained planners, develop a training and school float at State, and initiate a deep and lasting exchange program between the two agencies. Currently, only the military has a professional education program that develops leaders to plan and execute complex operations.
To build on these initiatives, personnel from both organizations should develop increasing professional and educational relationships and produce interagency doctrine and professional journal articles. Noting that SSTR operations are only the middle ground, Defense and State must start training as partners especially at DoD Joint Readiness Centers. Perhaps this could lead to a true interagency training center.

**Conclusion**

This SRP has discussed several critical areas that require immediate attention for national security strategy success in today’s VUCA environment. First, history has shown that the interagency challenge is not new and has provided examples of success. Second, the interagency efforts during the past two presidential terms were inadequate in terms of strategy, coordination, personnel, and funding. Third, emerging processes have great potential, specifically recent changes to the NSC, S/CRS, CRC, and IMS. Lastly, changes to the NSS, doctrine, and training are now required to synergize the whole-of-government approach, there by truly making the whole greater than the sum of its parts.

As America seeks to develop a strategy for the current era of persistent conflict, it must achieve a balance of its strategic ends, ways, and means. It must continue to balance the missions between DoD and DoS. America must look to a properly detailed NSS, then DoD and DoS must develop their first ever interagency doctrine. Defense Secretary Gates said it best:

> The defining principle of the Pentagon’s new National Defense Strategy is balance. The United States cannot expect to eliminate national security risks through higher defense budgets, to do everything and buy everything. The Department of Defense must set priorities and consider inescapable tradeoffs and opportunity costs.  

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Endnotes


4 Ibid., 8.

5 Ibid., 12.

6 Ibid., 21.


9 Ibid., 45.


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15 Ibid.

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17 Ibid., IV28 – IV29.

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20 Ibid.
21 Ibid., IV29 - IV30.

22 Ibid., IV26.


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