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400 Army Navy Drive (Room 801)
Arlington, VA 22202-4704

Acronyms and Abbreviations
CENTCOM   U.S. Central Command
CTC       Combat Training Center
FORSCOM   U.S. Army Forces Command
HMMWV     High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle
JRTC      Joint Readiness Training Center
NTC       National Training Center
OIF       Operation Iraqi Freedom
SINCGARS  Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System
MEMORANDUM FOR ARMY, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, G-8
COMMANDER, U.S. ARMY FORCES COMMAND


We are providing this report for your information and use. We considered your comments in preparing the final report.

As requested by the Deputy Commanding General/Chief of Staff, U.S. Army Forces Command, we revised our recommendation to appropriately reflect responsibilities in the equipping process and clarify actions needed in response to the recommendation. Comments on the draft of this report conformed to the requirements of DoD Directive 7650.3 and left no unresolved issues. Therefore, we do not require any additional comments.

We appreciate the courtesies extended to the staff. Please direct questions to Mr. Timothy M. Wimette at (703) 604-8876 (DSN 664-8876) or Ms. Melissa M. Quealy at (703) 604-9283 (DSN 664-9283). The team members are listed inside the back cover.

Joseph R. Oliva, CPA
Assistant Inspector General
Readiness and Operations Support
Results in Brief: Status of Training Vehicles for U.S. Ground Forces Deploying in Support of Operation Iraqi Freedom

What We Did
Our overall audit objective was to determine whether U.S. ground forces supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom were receiving the training necessary to meet operational requirements. Specifically for this project, we determined whether the training equipment at Combat Training Centers was sufficient for ground forces training in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

What We Found
Competing requirements for equipment in theater as well as units being reset for redeployment have created challenges for Combat Training Centers. The National Training Center and the Joint Readiness Training Center have encountered challenges in obtaining theater-specific equipment such as High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles for training. Despite these challenges, the Combat Training Centers have maintained equipment and have taken additional steps to make substitutions or have units bring their own equipment from home stations to ensure that levels of equipment were sufficient for training.

The Army has recognized issues with outdated equipment, and it has taken steps to modernize the prepositioned fleet of High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles at the National Training Center and Joint Readiness Training Center. The Army completed modernization of the prepositioned fleet at the National Training Center in April 2008. To ensure the most realistic and effective training for units deploying in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Army must complete the modernization of the prepositioned fleet at the Joint Readiness Training Center as it has done at the National Training Center.

What We Recommend
We recommend that the Commander, U.S. Army Forces Command, in coordination with the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-8, obtain and deliver the remaining up-armored High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles to the Joint Readiness Training Center to ensure the fleet of prepositioned vehicles is modernized for units training to deploy in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Client Comments and Our Response
The Deputy Commander, U.S. Army Forces Command concurred with our recommendation and asked for clarification. Based on these comments, we revised our recommendation to appropriately reflect the responsibilities of the Army organizations and to clarify the actions needed. Although not required to comment, the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-8, also concurred with the recommendation. We do not require any additional comments.
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Introduction

Objectives
Our overall audit objective was to determine whether U.S. ground forces supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) were receiving the training necessary to meet operational requirements. Specifically for this project, we determined whether levels of training equipment at Combat Training Centers (CTCs) were sufficient for ground forces training in support of OIF. See Appendix A for a discussion of the scope and methodology. See Appendix B for prior coverage related to the objectives.

Background
The Army has four CTCs to provide combined arms training in a realistic training environment. They are the Battle Command Training Program at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; Joint Multinational Readiness Center\(^1\) at Hohenfels, Germany; Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Polk, Louisiana; and the National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, California. We limited our scope to NTC and JRTC because Army units made up the majority of ground forces deploying in support of OIF. The Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) is responsible for commanding, operating, and maintaining NTC and JRTC. FORSCOM must provide the required materiel for the NTC and JRTC operations.

Training at the Army CTCs is governed by DoD Directive 1322.18, “Military Training,” September 3, 2004, and Army Regulation 350-50, “Combat Training Center Program,” January 24, 2003. The Directive 1322.18 states that all personnel and components are to train on their mission-essential tasks to provide the capabilities that support the Combatant Commanders. It also requires that training resemble the conditions of actual operations to the maximum extent possible.

Army Regulation 350-50 further outlines policies, procedures, and responsibilities for Army-wide management of the CTC program. The regulation requires that CTCs provide realistic battle training to support wartime operations and that CTC training focus on wartime mission-essential tasks in a realistic, tactical environment. It also states that during CTC training, commanders are to fight with the equipment they would expect to take to war.

U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) has also issued guidance for all personnel deploying to the CENTCOM area of responsibility. This guidance, “USCENTCOM FY08 Joint Sourced Training Requirement,” dated September 15, 2007, specifies individual and collective training requirements that must be accomplished no more than 6 months before deployment.

\(^1\)Previously called the Combat Maneuver Training Center.
**Combat-Related Equipment**

From the CENTCOM requirements, we identified three types of combat-related equipment necessary to complete the CENTCOM unit training requirements: wheeled vehicles, crew-served weapons, and the Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS). For a complete listing of the equipment included in the scope of this audit, see Appendix A.

High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs) are tactical vehicles that can be configured in numerous ways to carry troops, armament, or shelter. Several variations of the HMMWVs include unarmored, armored, and up-armored models. For our audit, we reviewed unarmored models, such as the M998 and M1097; armored models, such as the M1025 and M1026; and up-armored models, such as the M1114 and M1151. Up-armored HMMWVs have increased armor plus blast protection. Because of its blast protection, the up-armored HMMWV is a key asset in the ongoing security and stabilization operations in OIF.

Other armored wheeled vehicles include improvised explosive device-resistant or ambush-protected vehicles and mine detection vehicles, such as the Buffalo (or Mine Protection Clearance Vehicle), Cougar, Husky, and Meerkat vehicles. For example, the Buffalos are considered counter-improvised explosive device equipment because they can identify, detect, and remove live ordnance, using robotic arms and iron claws. Both NTC and JRTC maintain prepositioned fleets of wheeled vehicles for training. FORSCOM regulations require units training at the CTCs to use the prepositioned fleet when possible.

Crew-served weapons are various lightweight and heavy weapons used during combat operations. They include machine guns, grenade launchers, sniper systems, and remote weapon systems. Army regulations do not require NTC or JRTC to maintain a prepositioned stock of crew-served weapons for training. Although NTC maintains a pool of crew-served weapons, units generally brought their own crew-served weapons to NTC in order to train on the same weapons they would use in theater. Therefore, we did not evaluate whether units had enough crew-served weapons for training.

SINCGARS are secure, reliable radio systems with voice and data capability that are used to support command and control operations. SINCGARS have jam-resistant features and provide interoperable communications between surface and airborne command and control assets. SINCGARS sets include radio mounts, antennas, radio kits, and speakers. Army policy does not address SINCGARS for NTC, but for JRTC, it states that HMMWVs in the prepositioned fleet at JRTC are to be equipped with mounts for the SINCGARS. Units, however, are required to bring their own radios. Neither JRTC nor NTC maintains a prepositioned stock of complete SINCGARS sets. Therefore, we did not evaluate whether units had enough SINCGARS for training.
Status of Training Vehicles for Operation Iraqi Freedom Deployments

Competing requirements for equipment in theater as well as units being reset 2 for redeployment have created challenges for CTCs in obtaining critical theater-specific equipment for training, specifically HMMWVs. The CTCs overcame some challenges by modifying and substituting HMMWVs to ensure enough vehicles for training. In addition, the Army recognized issues with outdated HMMWVs, and it has taken steps to modernize the prepositioned fleets at NTC and JRTC. Although the Army completed modernization of the prepositioned fleet at NTC in April 2008, it still must complete the modernization at JRTC to ensure the most realistic and effective training for units deploying in support of OIF.

Competing Requirements for Theater-Specific Equipment

In June 2007, the Deputy Commanding General, FORSCOM identified in a memorandum to the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7, challenges with training at the CTCs. The greatest challenge has been their ability to replicate operational capabilities of the specific equipment that soldiers would use in theater. This was because of competing requirements for the same equipment needed in theater and by units being reset for redeployment. The units training at the CTCs did not have the critical equipment, specifically armored HMMWVs, necessary to support a full mission rehearsal exercise because either it was not available in the prepositioned fleets at the CTCs or the units did not have it at home stations to bring with them.

While FORSCOM provides the required materiel to support NTC and JRTC operations, Army, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3 (Army G-3) establishes resources requirements and priorities for the distribution of equipment to meet mission requirements for the CTCs. Army, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-8 (Army G-8), as the primary distributor of Army equipment, is responsible for ensuring the right equipment is fielded to enable units to train before deployment to Iraq. Army G-8 provides equipment to FORSCOM based on Army G-3 priorities.

Ensuring Availability of HMMWVs for Ground Forces Training at Army CTCs

While units brought some HMMWVs for training from their home stations, the CTCs modified and substituted different models of HMMWVs to resemble those used in theater. This helped ensure that training for ground forces was as realistic as possible.

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2Reset is a set of actions that restores equipment to a desired level of combat capability commensurate with a unit’s future mission. It restores readiness of equipment that has been damaged or worn out and replaces equipment that has been destroyed.
Using Home Station HMMWVs

Some units brought their HMMWVs to training rather than use the vehicles in the CTC prepositioned fleet. This was partly because some of the HMMWVs at the CTCs may not have the equipment necessary to meet the unit’s needs. For example, some units had special HMMWV requirements for their mission. One digitized infantry unit training at NTC brought more than 300 HMMWVs from the home station instead of using those in the NTC prepositioned fleet. This was because their HMMWVs were better equipped with communications equipment, which was not installed in the HMMWVs at NTC.

Although using HMMWVs from home stations helped the units train on theater-specific equipment, it was not ideal. FORSCOM incurred costs to ship HMMWVs to the training centers and risked damaging equipment prior to deployment. The CTCs should have a prepositioned fleet of HMMWVs that resembles equipment used in theater for units to use when training for deployment. This would help reduce transportation costs for the units and help them ensure that their equipment was fully mission-capable at the time of deployment.

Modification and Substitution of Wheeled Vehicles

To create more realistic training conditions, the Army CTCs modified existing unarmored wheeled vehicles and used surrogates for up-armored wheeled vehicles. Unarmored wheeled vehicles have limited training value to deploying units because they have different handling characteristics and seating configurations than the armored and up-armored wheeled vehicles used in theater.

The CTCs maintained some up-armored HMMWVs in their prepositioned fleet. As of January 2008, NTC had 97 M1151s and JRTC had 86. The CTCs also modified existing unarmored HMMWVs to ensure that there were enough armored HMMWVs for units to train on before deployment. For example, in FY 2007, NTC modified 144 unarmored M1097s, an unarmored, soft-top, HMMWV, by adding a hard top, armor, and additional seating so it would more closely resemble the up-armored M1114 used in theater. By modifying and substituting HMMWVs for those used in theater, the CTCs were able to more closely replicate realistic conditions that units would face when deployed in support of OIF.

For training, in 2006, the CTCs used surrogate Buffalos, which are heavily armored vehicles used for point, route, and area clearance of mines and explosive devices. The Buffalo is designed with a V-shaped hull constructed to deflect the force of an explosion away from the vehicle and reduce vehicle rollover. Surrogate Buffalos are cargo trucks which are modified to simulate a Buffalo. Both NTC and JRTC used two surrogate Buffalos for actual ones because no Buffalos were available.
Modernizing the Prepositioned Fleets of HMMWVs at Army CTCs

The Army recognized issues with outdated HMMWVs at Army CTCs, and it has taken actions to modernize the prepositioned fleet of HMMWVs at NTC and JRTC. FORSCOM, at the direction of the Army G-3, initiated an assessment of the prepositioned fleet and developed a two-phased implementation plan to restructure the NTC prepositioned fleet to best support future training rotations at the NTC. The plan included eliminating the tracked vehicles from the NTC fleet and rebuilding or recapitalizing the existing equipment.

According to FORSCOM personnel, FORSCOM G-3 updated the implementation plan for NTC fleet modernization and added up-armored HMMWVs and counter-improvised explosive device vehicles to the prepositioned fleet to more closely resemble vehicles used in theater. Additionally, FORSCOM personnel said that, in February 2007, the FORSCOM G-3 approved a plan to restructure, reduce, or modernize the JRTC prepositioned fleet to meet the Army training requirements.

In April 2008, NTC received 203 up-armored HMMWVs, and it currently maintains 300 up-armored HMMWVs along with other HMMWVs. Furthermore, JRTC expects to receive 214 up-armored HMMWVs, but does not have a delivery date for these vehicles. To ensure modernization of the JRTC prepositioned fleet, FORSCOM must ensure delivery of the remaining up-armored HMMWVs for units training for OIF.

Summary

DoD policy states that training on mission-essential tasks to support the Combatant Commanders must resemble the conditions of actual operations to the maximum extent possible. To that end, equipment used in training must resemble that used in theater to ensure that ground forces are adequately trained to support OIF. However, because of competing equipment requirements in theater and by units being reset for redeployment, the CTCs encountered challenges in obtaining theater-specific equipment for training, specifically armored HMMWVs.

Although the CTCs maintained some armored HMMWVs in their prepositioned fleets, they had to modify unarmored HMMWVs and use them during theater-specific training. Unarmored HMMWVs have limited training value because they have different handling characteristics and seating configurations from the up-armored HMMWVs used in theater. Although modifying these HMMWVs helped the CTCs ensure that units trained on equipment that was as close to theater equipment as possible, the fleets of prepositioned HMMWVs should more closely resemble those in theater.
The Army recognized that critical equipment at NTC and JRTC was outdated, and it has implemented a two-phased modernization plan to ensure that the prepositioned fleets of HMMWVs at NTC and JRTC better resemble the operational capabilities needed in theater. Although the Army has completed modernization of HMMWVs at NTC, it must complete the modernization at JRTC to ensure the most realistic and effective training for units deploying in support of OIF.

Recommendation, Client Comments, and Our Response

Revised Recommendation. As a result of comments from the Deputy Commanding General/Chief of Staff, U.S. Forces Command, we revised the recommendation to appropriately reflect the responsibilities of the Army organizations and to clarify the actions needed to ensure the fleet of up-armored HMMWVs at JRTC is modernized.

We recommend that the Commander, U.S. Army Forces Command, in coordination with the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-8, obtain and deliver the remaining up-armored High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles to the Joint Readiness Training Center to ensure that the fleet of prepositioned vehicles is modernized for units training to deploy in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

U.S. Army Forces Command Comments. The Deputy Commanding General/Chief of Staff, FORSCOM concurred with comment. He concurred with the report’s conclusion and the recommended action; however, he stated that FORSCOM does not have the equipment or the authority to achieve the recommended action. Rather, the Army G-3/5/7 prioritizes new equipment allocations, and based on these priorities, Army G-8 provides equipment to FORSCOM for distribution to the Army CTCs.

Our Response. The Deputy Commanding General/Chief of Staff’s comments were responsive to the recommendation. We added the words “in coordination with the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-8,” and “obtain” to the recommendation because Army G-8 provides equipment to FORSCOM for distribution to the Army CTCs; therefore, FORSCOM coordination with Army G-8 should ensure the remaining HMMWVs are obtained and delivered to JRTC.

Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-8 Comments. Although not required to comment, the Army G-8 concurred with the draft report. The Deputy, Directorate of Integration, Army G-8, identified the positive actions taken to field up-armored HMMWVs to NTC and JRTC. The Deputy stated that, since July 2007, the Army G-8 has provided FORSCOM a total of 1,406 M1151 and 360 M1114 up-armored HMMWVs to units to enable training on the equipment soldiers will use when deployed. Furthermore, the Deputy stated that FORSCOM increased the allocation of up-armored HMMWVs at JRTC and NTC, and that NTC currently has 300 up-armored HMMWVs and JRTC has 86. The Deputy stated that the Army G-8 Fielding/Distribution Plan identifies the planned delivery of 1,730 M1151 up-armored HMMWVs to FORSCOM in FY 2008, and that Army G-8 projects deliveries of the remaining up-armored HMMWVs as soon as quality control inspections on the wheel hub assembly are completed.
Our Response. We consider the Army G-8 comments to be responsive to the revised recommendation. We agree that the Army G-8 and FORSCOM have taken actions to deliver up-armored HMMWVs to NTC and JRTC. The Deputy, Directorate of Integration, Army G-8, indicated that the Headquarters, Department of the Army G-8 Fielding/Distribution Plan reflects the planned delivery of HMMWVs to FORSCOM in FY 2008, and that the distribution of HMMWVs needed to complete the modernization at JRTC are in production and scheduled for delivery. Coordination between FORSCOM and Army G-8 on delivery of the remaining HMMWVs to JRTC should ensure the modernization of the prepositioned fleet of HMMWVs is completed. No additional comments are required.
Appendix A. Scope and Methodology

We conducted this performance audit from January 2007 through May 2008 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Our audit scope encompasses FY 2007 training. We limited our scope to Army Combat Training Centers, specifically NTC and JRTC, because Army units made up the majority of ground forces deploying in support of OIF during FY 2007. We reviewed documentation, including DoD, CENTCOM, FORSCOM, and Military Service regulations, memorandums, and other training guidance. Publication dates of these documents ranged from June 1998 through September 2007. We also reviewed inventories of equipment provided by FORSCOM and the CTCs. We interviewed officials from the following locations:

U.S. Army Forces Command
First Army Headquarters
First Army Division East Headquarters
First Army Division West Headquarters
Fort Bliss
Fort Dix
U.S. Army Reserve Command
U.S. Army National Guard
U.S. Army, European Command
Joint Multinational Training Command

Joint Multinational Readiness Center
Combat Training Center Program Office
National Training Center
Joint Readiness Training Center
Combined Arms Center
Marine Air-Ground Task Force Training Command
Twentynine Palms
Marine Corps Forces Command
Marine Corps Training and Education Command

We narrowed our scope to theater-specific equipment that is required for CENTCOM training. Using the FY 2008 USCENTCOM training requirements, we identified combat-related equipment necessary for unit training, specifically wheeled vehicles, crew-served weapons, and SINCGARS. See Figure 1 for specific models of the three types of equipment required for CENTCOM mission rehearsal training.
### Figure 1. Equipment Included in the Audit Scope

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<th>Equipment</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Wheeled Vehicles</strong></td>
<td>M998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M1025*</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M1026*</td>
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<td>M1097</td>
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<td>M1114*</td>
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<td>M1151*</td>
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<td>Buffalo*</td>
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<td>Husky*</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Meerkat*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cougar*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Crew-Served Weapons</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MK46 Squad Automatic Weapon</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cal .50 XM312 Lightweight Machine Gun</td>
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<td></td>
<td>M60 Medium Machine Gun</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MK43 Medium Machine Gun</td>
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<td>M240B Medium Machine Gun</td>
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<td></td>
<td>MK44/GAU16/M134 Medium Machine Gun</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Cal .50 M2 Heavy Machine Gun</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cal .50 XM218 Heavy Machine Gun</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MK19-3 Grenade Machine Gun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MK47 Grenade Machine Gun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M203/M203A1 Grenade Launcher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System</strong></td>
<td>Includes radios, mounts, antennas, and installation kits.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Denotes armored vehicles

### Review of Internal Controls

We determined that the internal controls over the equipment used for OIF mission rehearsal training at the Army CTCs were sufficient to ensure that units had adequate equipment at the time of training. The Army CTCs had adequate processes and procedures in place to ensure that CENTCOM-specific training equipment was available for units training in support of OIF.

incorporated mandatory CENTCOM training into their predeployment and annual training requirements. The report also identified that, due to effective information collection and regularly updated training, the Services provided realistic, theater-inspired training for ground force units.

**Use of Computer-Processed Data**

We did not use computer-processed data to perform this audit.
Appendix B. Prior Coverage

Prior Coverage
During the last 5 years, the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the Department of Defense Inspector General (DoD IG), and the U.S. Army Audit Agency have issued 10 reports discussing military training and training requirements. Unrestricted GAO reports can be accessed over the Internet at http://www.gao.gov. Unrestricted DoD IG reports can be accessed at http://www.dodig.mil/audit/reports. Unrestricted Army Audit Agency reports can be accessed at https://www.aaa.army.mil/reports.htm.

GAO


GAO-05-548, “Military Training: Actions Needed to Enhance DoD’s Program to Transform Joint Training,” June 2005

GAO-04-547, “Military Operations: Recent Campaigns Benefited from Improved Communications and Technology, but Barriers to Continued Progress Remain,” June 2004

DoDIG


Army


MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General, Department of Defense, 400 Army Navy Drive, Arlington, VA 22202-4704


2. Forces Command (FORSCOM) has reviewed the subject report and appreciates its insight on ways to improve the Army's training capability at the Joint Readiness Training Center. Forces Command concurs with the report's conclusion; however, this Command recommends the report's recommendation be revised for reasons stated in paragraph 3.

3. Forces Command provides the following comments to the recommendation.

Recommendation: We recommend that the Commander, U.S. Army Forces Command deliver the remaining up-armored High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles to the Joint Readiness Training Center to ensure that the fleet of prepositioned vehicles is modernized for units training to deploy in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Command Comments. Concur with the recommended end state; however, Forces Command (FORSCOM) recommends that it be rewritten as follows: "We recommend that the Commander, U.S. Army Forces Command, in coordination with the Department of the Army Staff, obtain and deliver the remaining up-armored High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles to the Joint Readiness Training Center to ensure that the fleet of prepositioned vehicles is modernized for units training to deploy in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom."

Rationale: Forces Command concurs with the recommended end state but does not have the equipment or the authority to achieve it as indicated by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Department of the Army (DA) G-3/5/7 prioritizes new equipment allocations and DA G-8 provides equipment to Army Forces Command based on these priorities for distribution to the Army Combat Training Centers.
AFDCG-IR

4. The Internal Review point of contact is Mr. David Mitchell at (404) 464-5404.

JOSEPH F. PETERSON
Lieutenant General, USA
Deputy Commanding General/
Chief of Staff
MEMORANDUM FOR Department of Defense Inspector General

SUBJECT: Modernization of High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles at Joint Readiness Training Center and National Training Center, Department of Defense Inspector General Project #D2007-D000LH-0108.000, Audit of Department of Defense Training to United States Ground Forces Supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom

The Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-8, concurs with the draft report with comment.

Request that you consider the addition of the positive actions Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), G-8, and U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) have taken to field Up-Armored-High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV) (UAH) to the Maneuver Combat Training Centers (MCTC): National Training Center (NTC) and Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC).

Specifically, HQDA G-8 has provided FORSCOM a total of 1,406 M1151 UAH and 360 M1114 UAH since July 2007 to resource units and enable the training of Soldiers on the equipment they will use when deployed. Further, the HQDA G-8 Fielding/Distribution Plan reflects the planned delivery to FORSCOM of a total of 1,730 M1151 newer version UAH in fiscal year 2008.

FORSCOM has recently increased the UAH allocation for NTC and JRTC to a total of 300 M1151 UAH, the newest version. This increase was instituted to facilitate training on the UAH quantities used by Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) in the Iraqi theater of operations. The NTC currently has 300 UAH on-hand; JRTC has 86 UAH on-hand. Complete deliveries of UAH to JRTC are projected within the next 30-45 days as soon as the wheel hub assembly quality control inspections are completed at the factory.

Your consideration of this information is appreciated.

[Signature]

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