Evolutionary Game Framework for Behavior Dynamics in Cooperative Spectrum Sensing

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Abstract—Cooperative spectrum sensing has been shown to greatly improve the sensing performance in cognitive radio networks. However, if the cognitive users belong to different service providers, they tend to contribute less in sensing in order to achieve a higher throughput. In this paper, we propose an evolutionary game framework to study the interactions between selfish users in cooperative sensing. We derive the behavior dynamics and the stationary strategy of the secondary users, and further propose a distributed learning algorithm that helps the secondary users approach the Nash equilibrium with only local payoff observation. Simulation results show that the average throughput achieved in the cooperative sensing game with more than two secondary users is higher than that when the secondary users sense the primary user individually without cooperation.

I. INTRODUCTION

With the emergence of new wireless applications and devices, the last decade has witnessed a dramatic increase in the demand for radio spectrum, which has forced government regulatory bodies, such as the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), to review their policies. Since the allocated frequency bands to some licensed spectrum holders experience very low utilization [1], the FCC has been considering opening the under-utilized licensed bands to secondary users on an opportunistic basis with the aid of cognitive radio technology [2].

In order to protect the primary users from interference due to secondary users’ operation, spectrum sensing has become an essential function of cognitive radio devices [3]. Recently, cooperative spectrum sensing with relay nodes’ help and multi-user collaborative sensing has been shown to greatly improve the sensing performance [4]-[10]. In [4], the authors proposed collaborative spectrum sensing so as to reserve more time for their own data transmission.

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In order to study the interactions between the selfish users and their stationary strategy in the long run, in this paper we propose to model the cooperative spectrum sensing as an evolutionary game. If some secondary users agree to cooperate in sensing, the cost can be equally shared among them, while the users who do not take part in cooperative sensing can enjoy a free ride. However, if no user senses the primary user, then all of them will be punished by a very low payoff. By using replicator dynamics [14], we obtain the equations that govern the users’ behavior dynamics, and further derive the equilibrium strategy when all secondary users are homogeneous in their individual data rates and the received SNRs of the primary user (e.g., the secondary users are located far away from the primary base station and clustering together). Moreover, we develop a distributed learning algorithm that can help the users to find their optimal strategy with only their own payoff history. Simulation results show that as the number of secondary users increases, the users tend to have less incentive to contribute to the cooperative sensing. However, they can still achieve a higher average throughput in the spectrum sensing game than that of the single-user sensing, if there are more than two secondary users in the cognitive radio network.

The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The system model is presented in Section II. In Section III, we formulate the cooperative spectrum sensing as an evolutionary game, analyze the behavior dynamics of the secondary users, and develop a distributed learning algorithm that approaches equi-
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librium. Simulation results are shown in Section IV. Finally, Section V concludes the paper.

II. SYSTEM MODEL

A. Hypothesis of Channel Sensing

When a secondary user is sensing the licensed spectrum channel in a cognitive radio network, the received signal $r(t)$ from the detection has two hypotheses when the primary user is present or absent, denoted by $H_1$ and $H_0$, respectively. Then, $r(t)$ can be written as

$$r(t) = \begin{cases} h s(t) + w(t), & \text{if } H_1; \\ w(t), & \text{if } H_0. \end{cases}$$

(1)

In (1), $h$ is the gain of the channel from the primary user’s transmitter to the secondary user’s receiver; $s(t)$ is the signal of the primary user, which is assumed to be an i.i.d. random process with mean zero and variance $\sigma^2_w$; $w(t)$ is an additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) with mean zero and variance $\sigma^2_w$. $s(t)$ and $w(t)$ are assumed to be mutually independent.

Assume we use an energy detector to sense the licensed spectrum, then the test statistics $T(r)$ is defined as

$$T(r) = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{t=1}^{N} |r(t)|^2,$$

(2)

where $N$ is the number of collected samples.

The performance of licensed spectrum sensing is characterized by two probabilities, the probability of detection, $P_D$, and the probability of false alarm, $P_F$. If the noise term $w(t)$ is assumed to be circularly symmetric complex Gaussian (CSCG), the probability of false alarm $P_F$ is given by [12]

$$P_F(\lambda) = Q \left( \frac{\lambda}{\sigma^2_w} - 1 \right) \sqrt{N},$$

(3)

where $\lambda$ is the threshold of the energy detector, and $Q(\cdot)$ denotes the complementary distribution function of the standard Gaussian. Similarly, if we assume the primary signal is a complex PSK signal, then the probability of detection $P_D$ can be approximated by [12]

$$P_D(\lambda) = Q \left( \frac{\lambda}{\sigma^2_w} - \gamma - 1 \right) \sqrt{N} \frac{1}{\lambda},$$

(4)

where $\gamma = \frac{|h|^2}{\sigma^2_w}$ denotes the received signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of the primary user under $H_1$.

Given a target detection probability $\bar{P}_D$, the threshold $\lambda$ can be derived, and the probability of false alarm $P_F$ can be further rewritten as

$$P_F(\bar{P}_D, N, \gamma) = Q \left( \sqrt{2\gamma + 1} Q^{-1}(\bar{P}_D) + \sqrt{N} \gamma \right),$$

(5)

where $Q^{-1}(\cdot)$ denotes the inverse function of $Q(\cdot)$.

B. Throughput of a Secondary User

When sensing the primary user’s activity, the secondary users cannot perform data transmission at the same time. If we denote the sampling frequency by $f_s$ and the frame duration by $T$, then the time duration for data transmission is given by $T - \delta(N)$, where $\delta(N) = \frac{N}{T}$ represents the time spent in sensing. When the primary user is absent and no false alarm is generated, the average throughput of the secondary user is

$$R_{H_0}(N) = \frac{T - \delta(N)}{T} (1 - P_F) C_{H_0},$$

(6)

where $C_{H_0}$ represents the data rate of the secondary user under $H_0$. When the primary user is present while not detected by the secondary user, the average throughput of the secondary user is

$$R_{H_1}(N) = \frac{T - \delta(N)}{T} (1 - P_D) C_{H_1},$$

(7)

where $C_{H_1}$ represents the data rate of the secondary user under $H_1$.

If we denote $P_{H_0}$ as the probability that the primary user is absent, then the total throughput of the secondary user is

$$\bar{R}(N) = P_{H_0} R_{H_0}(N) + (1 - P_{H_0}) R_{H_1}(N).$$

(8)

Then, from the secondary user’s perspective, he/she wants to maximize his/her total throughput (8), given that $P_D \geq \bar{P}_D$. As mentioned in [8], in practice the target detection probability $\bar{P}_D$ are required by the primary user to be close to 1; moreover, we usually have $P_{H_0}$ close to 1 and $C_{H_1} < C_{H_0}$ (due to the interference from the primary user to the secondary user). Therefore, (8) can be approximated by

$$\bar{R}(N) = P_{H_0} R_{H_0}(N) + P_{H_0} \frac{T - \delta(N)}{T} (1 - P_F) C_{H_0}.$$  

(9)

We know from (9) that there is a tradeoff for a secondary user to choose an optimal $N$ that maximizes the throughput $\bar{R}(N)$. In order to keep a low $P_F$ with a smaller $N$, a good choice is cooperative spectrum sensing with the other secondary users in the same licensed band.

III. SPECTRUM SENSING GAME

A. Problem Formulation

A snapshot of a cognitive radio network is shown in Fig. 1, where the secondary users are clustering together, but far away from the primary base station. The cooperative spectrum sensing is shown in Fig. 2. We assume that the entire licensed band is divided into $K$ sub-bands, and each secondary user operates exclusively in one of the $K$ sub-bands when the primary user is absent. The transmission time is slotted into intervals of length $T$. Before each data transmission, the secondary users need to sense the primary user’s activity. The secondary users can jointly sense the primary user’s presence, and exchange their sensing results via a narrow-band signalling channel, as shown in Fig. 2. In this way, each of them can spend less time detecting while enjoying a low false alarm probability $P_F$ via some decision fusion rule [11], and the
The decision fusion rule can be selected from the logical-OR rule, logical-AND rule, and majority rule [8]. In this paper, we mainly focus on the logical-OR rule to derive the $P_{D,s}^C$, but the other fusion rules could be similarly analyzed. Denote the detection and false alarm probability for a contributor $s_j \in S_c$ by $P_{D,s_j}$ and $P_{F,s_j}$, respectively. Then, under OR rule we have the following
\begin{equation}
P_D = 1 - \prod_{s_j \in S_c} (1 - P_{D,s_j}),
\end{equation}
and
\begin{equation}
P_F = 1 - \prod_{s_j \in S_c} (1 - P_{F,s_j}).
\end{equation}

Hence, given a $\hat{P}_D$ for set $S_c$, each individual user's target detection probability can be expressed as
\begin{equation}
P_{D,s_j} = 1 - (1 - \hat{P}_D)^{|S_c|/|S_c|},
\end{equation}
and can further obtain $P_{F,s_j}^C$ by substituting (16) in (14).

B. Analysis of the Game

Since the data transmission for each secondary user is continuous, the spectrum sensing game is played repeatedly and will evolve over time. Therefore, we can use evolutionary game theory to analyze the evolutionary dynamics of the players and further derive the equilibrium [14].

1) Evolution Dynamics of the Sensing Game: The development of evolutionary game theory is a major contribution of biology to competitive decision making. The key concept of evolutionary game is replicator dynamics, which describes the evolution of strategies in time. Specifically, consider a large population of homogeneous individuals who are programmed to the same set of pure strategies $A$ in a symmetric game with payoff function $U$. At time $t$, let $p_{a_i}(t) \geq 0$ be the number of individuals who are currently programmed to pure strategy $a_i \in A$, and let $p(t) = \sum_{a_i \in A} p_{a_i}(t) > 0$ be the total population. Then the associated population state is defined as the vector $x(t) = (x_{a_1}(t), \ldots, x_{a_i}(t))$, where $x_{a_i}(t)$ is defined as the population share $x_{a_i}(t) = p_{a_i}(t)/p(t)$. By replicator dynamics, the evolution dynamics of $x_{a_i}(t)$ is given by the following differential equation
\begin{equation}
x_{a_i}(t) = \epsilon (\hat{U}(a_i, x_{-a_i}) - \hat{U}(x))x_{a_i},
\end{equation}
where $\hat{U}(a_i, x_{-a_i})$ is the instantaneous average payoff of the individuals using $a_i$, $\hat{U}(x)$ is the instantaneous average payoff of the whole population, and $\epsilon$ is some positive number representing the time scale. The intuition behind (17) is as follows: if strategy $a_i$ results in a higher payoff than the average level, the population share using $a_i$ will grow, and the growth rate $x_{a_i}/x_{a_i}$ is proportional to the difference between strategy $a_i$'s current payoff and the current average payoff in the entire population. By analogy, we can view $x_{a_i}(t)$ as the probability that one player in a symmetric game adopts pure strategy $a_i$, and $x(t)$ can be equivalently viewed as a mixed strategy for that player.

Then, we can generalize (17) to the spectrum sensing game with heterogeneous players, as $C_{a_i}$ may vary among different
users. Denote the probability that user \( s_j \) adopts strategy \( h \in \mathcal{A} \) at time \( t \) by \( x_{h,s_j}(t) \), then the time evolution of \( x_{h,s_j}(t) \) is governed by the following differential equation:

\[
\dot{x}_{h,s_j} = \frac{1}{U_{s_j}(x)} \left[ \bar{U}_{s_j}(h,x_{-s_j}) - \bar{U}_{s_j}(x) \right] x_{h,s_j}, \tag{18}
\]

where \( \bar{U}_{s_j}(h,x_{-s_j}) \) is the average payoff for player \( s_j \) using pure strategy \( h \), and \( \bar{U}_{s_j}(x) \) is \( s_j \)'s average payoff using mixed strategy \( x_{s_j} \).

2) Equilibrium Analysis: If each user \( s_j \) maximizes his/her total payoff by choosing the optimal probability of being a contributor (or a denier), \( x_{h,s_j} \), where \( h = C \) (or \( D \)), the outcome of the game can be characterized by the Nash Equilibrium [14]. In Nash equilibria (NE), no player can gain a higher payoff value by unilaterally deviating from the equilibrium strategy, given that the other players adopt their equilibrium strategies.

The steady-state solution to (18) given any initial condition is defined as the evolutionary stable strategy (ESS). It is shown [14] that the ESS is a refinement of NE. It is generally difficult to solve equation (18) and obtain the equilibrium of the game if the number of users is large. Therefore, in this section, we first analyze a special symmetric sensing game to get some insight, and next develop a distributed learning algorithm for the players to achieve the NE in the long run.

As shown in Fig. 1, all the secondary users are assumed to be located far away from the primary base station and clustering together, so the received \( \gamma_{s_j} \)'s are very low and similar to each other. In order to guarantee low \( P_F \) given a target \( P_D \), the number of sampled signals \( N \) should be large. Under these assumptions, we can approximately view \( P_F^{S_k} \) as the same for different \( S_k \)'s, denoted by \( P_F \). Further assume that all users have the same data rate, i.e. \( C_{s_j} = C \), for all \( s_j \in S \). Then, the payoff functions defined in (10)-(12) become

\[
U_C(J) = U_0 \left( 1 - \frac{T}{\tau} \right), \quad \text{if } J \in [1, K], \tag{19}
\]

and

\[
U_D(J) = \begin{cases} U_0, & \text{if } J \in [1, K-1]; \\ 0, & \text{if } J = 0, \end{cases} \tag{20}
\]

where \( U_0 = P_{H_0}(1 - \bar{P}_F)C, \) \( J = |S_c| \), and \( \tau = \frac{\delta(N)}{T} \).

According to the symmetric setting, (17) can be applied to the special case as all players have the same evolution dynamics and equilibrium strategy. Denote \( x \) as the probability that one secondary user contributes to spectrum sensing, then the average payoff for pure strategy \( C \) can be obtained as

\[
\bar{U}_C = \sum_{j=0}^{K-1} \binom{K-1}{j} x^j(1-x)^{K-1-j} U_C(j+1), \tag{21}
\]

where \( \binom{K-1}{j} x^j(1-x)^{K-1-j} \) is the probability that \( J+1 \) users contributes to cooperative sensing. Similarly, the average payoff for pure strategy \( D \) is given by

\[
\bar{U}_D = \sum_{j=0}^{K-1} \binom{K-1}{j} x^j(1-x)^{K-1-j} U_D(j). \tag{22}
\]

Fig. 3: Probability of being a contributor vs. \( \tau \)

Since the average payoff \( \bar{U} = x\bar{U}_C + (1-x)\bar{U}_D \), then (17) becomes

\[
\dot{x} = cx(1-x)(\bar{U}_C - \bar{U}_D). \tag{23}
\]

In equilibrium \( x^* \), any player will not deviate from the optimal strategy, indicating \( \dot{x} = 0 \), or \( \bar{U}_C^* = \bar{U}_D \). Then, by equating (21) and (22), we can have the following \( K \)-th order equation

\[
\tau(1-x^*) + Kx^*(1-x^*)^{K-1} - \tau = 0, \tag{24}
\]

and further solve the equilibrium.

3) Learning Algorithm for Nash Equilibrium: From (18), we can derive the strategy adjustment for the secondary user as follows. Denote the pure strategy taken by user \( s_j \) at time \( t \) by \( A_{s_j}(t) \). Define an indicator function \( 1^{h,s_j}_t(t) \) as

\[
1^{h,s_j}_t(t) = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if } A_{s_j}(t) = h; \\ 0, & \text{if } A_{s_j}(t) \neq h. \end{cases} \tag{25}
\]

At some interval \( mT \), we can approximate \( \hat{U}_{s_j}(h,x_{-s_j}) \) by

\[
\hat{U}_{s_j}(h,x_{-s_j}) = \frac{\sum_{t \leq mT} \hat{U}_{s_j}(A_{s_j}(t),A_{-s_j}(t)) 1^{h,s_j}_t(t)}{\sum_{t \leq mT} 1^{h,s_j}_t(t)}, \tag{26}
\]

where \( \hat{U}_{s_j}(A_{s_j}(t),A_{-s_j}(t)) \) is the payoff value for \( s_j \) as determined by (10)-(12). Similarly, \( \hat{U}_{s_j}(x) \) is approximated by

\[
\hat{U}_{s_j}(x) = \frac{1}{mT} \sum_{t \leq mT} \hat{U}_{s_j}(A_{s_j}(t),A_{-s_j}(t)). \tag{27}
\]

Then, the derivative \( \dot{x}_{h,s_j}(mT) \) can be approximated by substituting (26) and (27) into (18). Therefore, the probability of user \( s_j \) taking action \( h \) can be adjusted by

\[
x_{h,s_j}((m+1)T) = x_{h,s_j}(mT) + \eta_{s_j} \dot{x}_{h,s_j}(mT), \tag{28}
\]

with \( \eta_{s_j} \) being the step size of adjustment chosen by \( s_j \). We will demonstrate the convergence of the learning algorithm in the next section.

IV. Simulation Results and Analysis

The parameters used in the simulation are as follows. We assume that the primary signal is a baseband QPSK modulated signal, the sampling frequency is \( f_s = 4 \) MHz, and the frame duration is \( T = 5 \) ms. The probability that the primary user is inactive is set as \( P_{H_0} = 0.9 \), and the required target detection

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probability $\bar{P}_D$ is 0.95. The noise is assumed to be a zero-mean CSCG process. The received $\gamma_j$’s are in the low SNR regime, with an average value of $-12$ dB.

We first illustrate the optimal equilibrium strategy for the secondary users assuming a homogeneous setting as in Section III-B2, where the data rate is $C = 1$ Mbps. In Fig. 3, we show the optimal probability of being a contributor $x^*$ for a network with different number of secondary users. The x-axis represents $\tau = \frac{\delta N}{\gamma}$, the ratio of sensing time duration over the frame duration. From Fig. 3, we can see that $x^*$ decreases as $\tau$ increases. For the same $\tau$, $x^*$ decreases as the number of secondary users increases. This indicates that the incentive of contributing to the cooperative sensing drops as the cost of sensing increases and more users exist in the network. This is because the players tend to wait for someone else to sense the spectrum and can then enjoy a free ride, when they are faced with a high sensing cost and more counterpart players.

In Fig. 4, we show the average throughput per user when all users adopt the equilibrium strategy. We see that there is a tradeoff between the cost of sensing and the throughput. The optimal value of $\tau$ is around 0.15, and will slightly increase as the number of user increases. This is because the false alarm probability $P_F$ tends to increase as the number of user increases. In order to have a low $P_F$, the users need to collect more samples for better detection. Although the cost of sensing increases, as more users share the sensing cost, the optimal average throughput per user still increases. We also plot the optimal throughput for the single-user sensing (dotted line “single”) for comparison. It is interesting that the average throughput values for games with more than 2 users are all higher than that of the single-user sensing, while the throughput for the 2-user game is not. The reason is that when there are more than 2 users in the game, the chance that no user contributes to sensing is smaller; it is more likely that neither user senses the spectrum in the 2-user game.

We finally show the learning curve for the probability of being a contributor in a 3-player game in Fig. 5, with $\tau = 0.5$, the step-size of learning $\eta_{\gamma_j} = 0.002$, $\gamma_1 = -13$ dB, $\gamma_2 = -12$ dB, and $\gamma_1 = -11$ dB. We see that in the long run, all three users can gradually reach the equilibrium strategy, which is about 0.44.

V. CONCLUSION

In this paper, we propose an evolutionary game-theoretical framework for distributed cooperative sensing over cognitive radio networks. By employing the theory of replicator dynamics, we study the behavior dynamics of secondary users, and further propose a distributed learning algorithm that gradually converges to the Nash equilibrium. From the simulation results, the average throughput per user in a $K$-user sensing game ($K > 2$) is still higher than that in the single-user sensing.

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