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Directors of Central Intelligence, 1946–2005

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Issues for the Intelligence Community

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The Center for the Study of Intelligence (CSI) was founded in 1974 in response to DCI James Schlesinger's desire to create within CIA an organization that could "think through the functions of intelligence and bring the best intellects available to bear on intelligence problems." The Center, comprising both professional historians and experienced practitioners, attempts to document lessons learned from past operations, to explore the needs and expectations of intelligence consumers, and to stimulate serious debate on current and future intelligence challenges.

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The Editorial Board welcomes readers' nominations for awards but reserves exclusive prerogative in the decision.
A Long Look Back

Directors of Central Intelligence, 1946–2005

David S. Robarge

For nearly six decades, the director of central intelligence (DCI) headed the world’s most important intelligence agency and oversaw the largest, most sophisticated, and most productive set of intelligence services ever known. From 1946 to 2005, 19 DCIs served through 10 changes in president; scores of major and minor wars, civil wars, military incursions, and other armed conflicts; two energy crises; a global recession; the specter of nuclear holocaust and the pursuit of arms control; the raising of the Berlin Wall and the fall of the Iron Curtain; the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and the arrival of international terrorism on the shores of America and the war against it overseas. During that time, the DCIs participated in or oversaw several vital contributions that intelligence made to US national security: strategic warning, clandestine collection, independent analysis, overhead reconnaissance, support to warfighters and peacekeepers, arms control verification, encouragement of democracy, and counter-terrorism.

The responsibilities of the DCI grew logarithmically after January 1946, when President Harry Truman whimsically presented the first DCI, Sidney Souers, with a black hat, black cloak, and wooden dagger and declared him the “Director of Centralized Snooping.”1 At that time, the DCI had no CIA to run, no independent budget or personnel to manage, no authority to collect foreign secrets, and no power to bring about a consensus among agencies. Maybe that is why Souers, when asked not long after his appointment, “What do you want to do?” replied, “I want to go home.”2

Then came the National Security Act of 1947, which set forth a description of the DCI’s job:

There is a Director of Central Intelligence who shall . . . serve as head of the United States intelligence community . . . act as the principal adviser to the President for intelligence matters related to the national security; and . . . serve as head of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Two years later, the Central Intelligence Agency Act laid down the DCIs and the Agency’s administrative rubrics. Over the next several decades, the DCI would directly manage thousands of employees and billions of dollars, and would have an important part in guiding many thousands and many billions more.

1 Christopher Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the Presidency from Washington to Bush (New York: HarperCollins, 1995), 164.
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<td>George John Tenet</td>
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<td>Porter Johnston Goss</td>
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*On this date, John Negroponte assumed leadership of the US Intelligence Community as the first director of national intelligence. Mr. Goss, retitled “Director of the Central Intelligence Agency,” continued to head CIA.*
“It’s a Very Hard Job”

After John McCone was sworn in as DCI in November 1961, President John Kennedy shook his hand and gently warned him that he was “now living on the bull's eye, and I welcome you to that spot.” The bull’s eye seems an appropriate metaphor, considering how often DCIs were the targets of recrimination and attack. George H. W. Bush called the job “the best . . . in Washington,” but arguably it also was the toughest.

The DCI really did not “direct” something called “central intelligence.” He was responsible for coordinating national collection and analysis, but he lacked the authority to do so, faced formidable competitors in other agencies, and had no constituency to support him. He had to walk the knife’s edge between politics and politicization, and was the handy scapegoat for intelligence missteps often committed or set in train years before. And he had to deal with the reality that, as Allen Dulles wrote, “Intelligence is probably the least understood and most misrepresented of the professions.”

With no political, military, or industrial base, the DCI was ‘the easiest man in Washington to fire.’

The purpose for establishing the position of DCI and the CIA under law in 1947 was to help avoid another Pearl Harbor surprise by taking strategic intelligence functions from the confines of separate departments and elevating them to the national level. The DCI was to have been the only adviser to the president with even a chance of presenting him with unbiased, nondepartmental intelligence. The seemingly straightforward phrases in the National Security Act, however, only gave the DCI the potential to be a leader of the Intelligence Community. Whether a given DCI came close to being one was a result of the interplay of personalities, politics, and world events. With line authority only over the CIA, the DCI depended on his powers of bureaucratic persuasion and, most vitally, his political clout at the White House to be heard and heeded. Richard Helms often noted that the secretary of defense was the second most powerful person in Washington—except, perhaps for a few first ladies—whereas the DCI was “the easiest man in Washington to fire. I have no political, military, or industrial base.”

Moreover, the DCI’s showcase product—national-level analysis—often carried the implicit message, “Mr. President, your policy is not working.” Presidents often have unrealistic expectations about what the CIA’s espionage and covert action capabilities can achieve, and they usually did not appreciate hearing from their DCIs that the world was complicated and uncertain. No wonder R. James Woolsey said his version of the job’s description could be written very simply: “Not to be liked.”

DCIs in Profile

Allen Dulles once told Congress that the CIA “should be directed by a relatively small but elite corps of men with a passion for anonymity and a willingness to stick at that particular job.” While Dulles’s advice may be applicable to the heads of the Agency’s directorates and offices, hardly any part of his statement was borne out over the history of the DCI’s position. Elite, yes; but neither small in number nor anonymous—many were well known in their various pursuits when they were nominated. And even if they were willing to stay for the long haul, few did. In late 1945, an interdepartmental committee that was developing a plan for a national-level intelligence agency recommended that its director be appointed for a

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The average time DCIs served was just over three years.

Who were the DCIs? President Eisenhower called the CIA “one of the most peculiar types of operation[s] any government can have” and said “it probably takes a strange kind of genius to run it.” Whatever the validity of that characterization, these are the salient demographic facts about the 19 DCIs:

11 Lathrop, 110.
13 Most of the following biographic data comes from Directors and Deputy Directors of Central Intelligence (Washington: CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1998).
They were born in 14 different states. Most hailed from the Midwest (nine) and the Northeast (seven). One was born in the Southwest, one in the West, and one overseas.

They attended 21 different colleges, universities, and graduate or professional schools. Eight finished college, and ten others went on for postgraduate degrees. One, “Bee- tle” Smith, completed only high school. Considering that he ended his public service with four stars and an ambassadorship, he could be called the Horatio Alger of DCIs.

Before their appointments, the DCIs came from a variety of walks of life, some from more than one. Six were from the military, eight had been government officials and/or lawyers, three had been businessmen, and four came from politics, academe, or journalism. All three branches of government were represented, as were three of five military services.

Two-thirds of the DCIs had direct experience with intelligence in military or civilian life before their appointments. One served in the OSS (William Casey), two in the CIA (Robert Gates and Porter Goss), and three in both (Dulles, Helms, and William Colby).

The DCIs’ average age at the time of their appointment was slightly under 55. The youngest was 43 (James Schlesinger); the oldest was 67 (Casey).

Historians and DCIs

An inconsistency exists between the fairly extensive bibliography on DCIs and historians’ evaluation of their personal contribution to US national security. Nearly as many biographies have been written about DCIs as about comparable members of the American foreign policy community—the secretaries of state and defense, the presidents’ national security advisers, and the chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. However, the 19 heads of the largest agglomeration of secret services in what used to be called the Free World generally have not been perceived as being nearly as influential as most of their counterparts.

Historians have regarded a number of secretaries of state and defense—notably George Marshall, Dean Acheson, John Foster Dulles, Dean Rusk, Robert McNamara, and Henry Kissinger—as major players in the diplomatic and military developments of their times, as is at least one national security adviser, Kissinger. The DCIs are another matter. Only two, Dulles and Casey, usually are considered to have had an impact rivaling that of the other top foreign policy officials in the administrations in which they served. The rest rarely get mentioned in most foreign affairs surveys (although Helms and Colby may come up when the Agency’s “time of troubles” in the 1970s is discussed). Even in overviews of the CIA and the Intelligence Community, only a handful—Hoyt Vandenberg, Smith, Dulles, McCon, Casey, and possibly Helms—are portrayed as making noteworthy contributions to the way the US government conducts intelligence activity.

That consensus may derive from conceptions of the proper place of intelligence practitioners in the foreign policy process. Intelligence, the premise goes, should be detached from policy so as to avoid cross-corruption of either. If intelligence services have a stake in policy, they may skew their analyses or become aggressive advocates of covert action. The Intelligence Community must remain a source of objective assessment and not become a politicized instrument of the incumbent administration. As heads of the Community, DCIs should be “intellocrats” who administer specialized secret functions, not to benefit any departmental interests but to advance policies set elsewhere in the executive branch—specifically, the White House.

The DCIs reported to the National Security Council and truly served at the pleasure of the president. Indeed, much of every DCI’s influence was directly proportional to his personal relationship with the chief executive. At the same time, and somewhat paradoxically, after incoming presidents began choosing “their” DCIs in 1977, the nonpartisan stature of the DCI diminished and, along with it, his independence. The general rule of “new president, new DCI” did not always translate into greater...
influence. The president’s national security adviser and the secretaries of state and defense usually still had more access to the Oval Office.

The situation was not much different at Langley. Directors came and went, but bureaucracies stayed. When DCIs tried to “clean house” (Schlesinger and Stansfield Turner) or manage through loyalists from previous jobs (Turner and John Deutch), the result was administrative disarray and low morale. For these reasons and more, no DCI ever had a chance to become as autonomous as J. Edgar Hoover at the FBI, or to be assessed as having more than an episodic impact on US foreign policy achievements.

A Leadership Typology

Can DCIs, then, be regarded as leaders, as opposed to heads of organizations or chief administrators? Was US intelligence noticeably different because a certain individual served as DCI? Did DCIs have—could they have had—a leadership role commensurate with that of their counterparts at the Departments of State and Defense? One way to begin answering those questions is through serial biography and group analysis. In contrast to clandestine services officers, however, DCIs have not been examined in such a fashion. They do not fit into categories like “prudent professionals” and “bold easterners,” and they lack the sociological homogeneity needed to be thought of, or to think of themselves as, a network of “old boys” or, in William Colby’s words, “the cream of the academic and social aristocracy.” Biographers attached those labels largely to former operators in the Office of Strategic Services who joined the early CIA and then stayed on—a situation that applies to only three DCIs (Dulles, Helms, and Colby).14

This heterogeneity does not mean, however, that the DCIs cannot be analyzed collectively. At least some aspects of the many models applied to political and corporate leaders can be used with the DCIs, although empiricism or utility may suffer—complex personalities and complicated situations are sometimes made less square to fit more easily into the models’ round holes, or so many different holes are created that comparisons among individuals become too hard to draw.

A straightforward approach to the DCIs would take into account the institutional and political limitations on their authority, the objectives they were appointed to accomplish, and the personality traits they exhibited and managerial methods they used during their tenures. What were the directors told to do (mission) and how did they go about doing it (style)? With those questions addressed, an evaluation of their effectiveness can be made. How well did the DCIs do what they were expected to do, given their authorities, resources, and access (record)? What “types” of DCIs, if any, have been most successful (patterns)?

Using this perspective, five varieties of DCIs are evident. The first is the administrator-custodian or administrator-technocrat, charged with implementing, fine-tuning, or reorienting intelligence activities under close direction from the White House. Examples of this type have been Souers, Roscoe Hillenkoetter, William Raborn, Woolsey, Deutch, and George Tenet. Usually appointed at a time of uncertainty about the Intelligence Community’s roles and capabilities (the late 1940s and the mid-1990s), these DCIs tried to maintain stability in the CIA’s relationships with other Community

agencies, Congress, and the public. Their main goal was to do better with what they already had, and to avoid distractions and scandals. Except for Raborn, all of these administrators had experience with intelligence affairs, but they were not intelligence careerists. Some had a very low-key style, almost to the point of acting like placeholders and time-servers (Hillenkoetter, Raborn). Others energetically pursued administrative changes designed to make the CIA and the Community more responsive to policymakers and better adapted to a new political environment (Deutch, Tenet).

The next type is the intelligence operator—DCIs who were current or former professional intelligence officers tasked with devising, undertaking, and overseeing an extensive array of covert action, espionage, and counterintelligence programs in aggressive pursuit of US national security policy. Three DCIs fit this category: Dulles, Helms, and Casey. The presidents they served had no qualms about using all of the US government’s clandestine capabilities against America’s adversaries, and they relied on their DCIs’ knowledge of and experience with operations to help them accomplish that end. The DCI as intelligence operator may have emphasized different secret activities depending on individual backgrounds and predilections, and the targets they worked against. For example, Dulles and Casey were devotees of covert action, while Helms preferred to work with espionage and counterintelligence. Because of the prominent place clandestine affairs had in American foreign policy when they served, this type of DCI generally served longer by far—seven years on average—than any other type.

The high level of secret activity during those long tenures recurrently produced operational mishaps, revelations of “flaps,” and other intelligence failures that hurt the CIA’s public reputation and damaged its relations with the White House and Congress. The Bay of Pigs disaster under Dulles, the ineffective covert action in Chile under Helms, and the Iran-Contra scandal under Casey are prominent examples. As journalist James Reston noted during the Agency’s dark days in the mid-1970s, DCIs who came up through the ranks might have known more about what CIA should be doing than outsiders, “but they are not likely to be the best men at knowing what it should not be doing.”

Failures, indiscretions, and other such controversies in turn have led to the departures of those intelligence-operator DCIs and their replacement by manager-reformers charged with “cleaning up the mess” and preventing similar problems from happening again. There have been two kinds of manager-reformer DCIs. One is the insider—a career intelligence officer who used his experience at the CIA to reorganize its bureaucracy and redirect its activities during or after a time of political controversy and lack of certitude about its direction. Two DCIs functioned as manager-reformer insiders: Colby and Gates. Colby, an operations veteran with a career dating back to the OSS, sought to rescue the CIA from the political tempests of the mid-1970s and to regain some of the Agency’s lost prestige through his policy of controlled cooperation with congressional investigators and targeted termination of questionable activities. Gates, a long-time Soviet analyst who had worked on the NSC in two administrations and also served as deputy director for intelligence, moved the Agency into the post-Cold War era after a period of undynamic leadership.

The other type of manager-reformer is the outsider, who was chosen because of his experience in the military, business, government, or politics to implement a major reorganization of the CIA and the Intelligence Community, or to regroup and redirect the Agency, especially after major operational setbacks or public conflicts over secret activities. Six DCIs were manager-reformer outsiders: Vandenberg, Smith, McCone, Schlesinger, Turner, and Porter Goss. Collectively, they were responsible for more major changes at the CIA (or its predecessor, the Central Intelligence Group [CIG]) than any other category of director. For example, under Vandenberg, the CIG

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acquired its own budgetary and personnel authority, received responsibility for collecting all foreign intelligence (including atomic secrets) and preparing national intelligence analyses, and coordinated all interdepartmental intelligence activities. Smith—in response to intelligence failures before the Korean War and to infighting among operations officers—centralized espionage and covert actions, analysis, and administration by rearranging the CIA into three directorates and creating the Office of National Estimates. In effect, he organized the Agency into the shape it has today.

Schlesinger and Turner facilitated the departure of hundreds of clandestine services veterans in their quests to streamline the Agency’s bureaucracy, lower the profile of covert action, and move the CIA more toward analysis and technical collection. Goss was the only one in the group who had previously worked at the Agency, but he was selected because he headed the intelligence oversight committee in the House of Representatives. Taking over during imbroglios over collection and analytic failures connected with the 9/11 terrorist attacks and assessments of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, he set about revamping the Agency’s work on international terrorism. Most DCIs in this category were far more concerned about achieving their objectives quickly than about angering bureaucratic rivals or fostering ill will among subordinates. Largely because they accomplished so much—or tried to—and did not worry about whom they antagonized along the way, some of them were among the most disliked or hardest to get along with DCIs.

Finally, there are the restorers: George Bush and William Webster. Like the manager-reformer outsiders, they became DCIs after the Agency went through difficult times—they succeeded Colby and Casey, respectively—but they were not charged with making significant changes in the way the CIA did business. Instead, they used their “people skills” and public reputations to raise morale, repair political damage, and burnish the Agency’s reputation. Bush, a prominent figure in Republican Party politics, went to Langley to mend the CIA’s relations with Congress and use his amiability to improve esprit de corps and put a more benign face on the Agency. Webster, a director of the FBI and former federal judge, brought a quality of rectitude to an Agency mired in scandal and helped raise its stature in the Community and with the public.

Some DCIs gave early, strong signals about how they intended to run the Agency, as when Casey brought in Max Hugel—a street-savvy, by-the-bootstraps businessman from Brooklyn with no intelligence experience—to shake up the Directorate of Operations. Sometimes, DCIs gave smaller, but no less telling, signs. On one of his early trips overseas, McCone was in a European capital when an Agency duty officer called late at night to say that a “FLASH/DCI EYES ONLY” cable had just arrived. The message’s contents were so sensitive that whoever delivered the printed copy had to retrieve it and destroy it. The duty officer took the cable to McCone at the hotel where he was staying. The DCI, wearing a bathrobe, read the contents and put the paper in his pocket. The duty officer asked for it back, saying he was supposed to retrieve it for disposal. McCone unfolded the cable, held it up, and asked the officer to tell him who sent it. Reading the “From” line, the officer replied, “Director.” “Right,” McCone said, “and I’m the Director.” He put the cable back in his pocket and said good night.16

Some DCIs were affable; some were bland; some were blunt. “Beetle” Smith greeted the attendees at his first staff meeting with these words: “It’s interesting to see all you fellows here. It’ll be even more interesting to see how many of you are here a few months from now.” Schlesinger informed Agency veteran John McMahon and his superior, Director of Science and Technology Carl Duckett, at 9:30 one morning that he had just appointed McMahon to head the Office of Technical Service. Thinking of the time needed for a smooth transition, Duckett suggested, “How about if he starts at the first of the month?” Schlesinger answered, “How about at 10:00?”17

16 Author’s conversation with Harold Bean, 30 October 2001.
And the contrasts continue. Some DCIs tried hard to be true directors of the Intelligence Community, even though the jobs of the DCI as Community manager and head of the CIA historically were competing, not complementary, roles. Others chose to run the Agency primarily and went about their Community functions as an aside. Some DCIs emphasized analysis over operations and intensely scrutinized the Directorate of Intelligence's products. Others placed operations over analysis and reveled in war stories rather than estimates. According to Richard Lehman, a senior officer in the Directorate of Intelligence, Allen Dulles “had a habit of assessing estimates by weight. He would heft them and decide, without reading them, whether or not to accept them.”

Some directors were hard charging, strong willed, and ambitious, with mandates and agendas for change; others went about their work in a quieter, nonconfrontational fashion; and a few barely left a mark. Some DCIs tried to resolve the Agency’s “culture wars” between the “spooks” and the scholars, and the “cowboys” who did covert action—but most left that internal sociology alone. Some sought a policymaking role; others spurned it. And while some DCIs were inclined to convey perils and forebodings to their customers, others were more helpful at clarifying ambiguities and assessing alternatives.

Out of the Shadows

One defining characteristic of the DCIs was that they were the most unsecret heads of any secret agency in the world. DCIs lived in the nebulous zone between secrecy and democracy, clandestinity and openness. They headed the world’s first publicly acknowledged intelligence service. While some countries guard the identities of their intelligence chiefs, the DCIs were public figures, held to account for what the CIA, and to some extent the Community, did and did not do. The whole process of vetting a prospective DCI was uniquely transparent among intelligence services. His confirmation hearings usually were open, and more than a few times were used for partisan purposes and political theater. That phenomenon is not recent. The first controversial confirmation was John McCone’s in 1962—the first in which any senators voted against a DCI nominee. After that, two other nominations received significant numbers of “no” votes (Colby and Gates), and four had to be withdrawn (Theodore Sorensen, Gates, Michael Carns, and Anthony Lake).

The contrast between the two worlds in which DCIs existed—secret and public—fell into stark relief from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s, when the relationship between intelligence and democracy in the United States underwent a sea change. Statements from two DCIs of that period capture the magnitude of the change. After he was appointed DCI in 1966, Helms said, “I think there’s a tradition that the CIA is a silent service, and it’s a good one. I think the silence ought to begin with me.” In 1978, Colby, looking back on the “time of troubles” he had recently suffered through, said that such a “supersecretive style of operation had . . . become incompatible with the one I believed essential.”

After that, pragmatic openness became the DCIs’ watchword in dealing with their political monitors. As the Cold War foreign policy consensus shattered for good, DCIs increasingly had to contend with all the various organs of accountability: special commissions, watchdog groups, the courts, and the courts.
DCIs were the most unsecret heads of any secret agency in the world.

The era of congressional benign neglect ended during the period 1974-80, with the adoption of the Hughes-Ryan Amendment requiring a presidential finding for covert actions; the Church and Pike Committee investigations; the establishment of the House and Senate permanent oversight committees; and the passage of the Intelligence Accountability Act mandating that Congress be “promptly and fully informed” of covert actions. After that flurry, the DCI relationship with Congress was altered forever. For a few eventful years, Casey tried to stand as the immovable object against the irresistible force. As Robert Gates observed, Casey “was guilty of contempt of Congress from the day he was sworn in.”

Presidents’ relations with their DCIs often followed a similarly erratic course. Some began by regarding the DCI as their senior intelligence adviser and saw him regularly. Occasionally that degree of contact continued; more often, it did not. Other presidents

preferred from the start to have their national security advisers function as their principal intelligence officers. A few presidents at least made a bow toward giving their DCIs authority over other Community departments, but in most cases the Community’s center of gravity meandered between CIA Headquarters, the Pentagon, Foggy Bottom, and the West Wing.

A few DCIs were close to their presidents; some had cordial, businesslike relationships; some had only infrequent contact; and some had no relationships to speak of. From the start, DCIs had to overcome assorted barriers—physical, administrative, psychological—in their interaction with the presidents. Lawrence “Red” White, the Agency’s longtime director of administration, recalled the time when Dulles told Eisenhower about a possible location for the headquarters building. “We’re thinking of tearing down that old brewery [where the Kennedy Center is now] and building it right there.’ Eisenhower went through the roof. He said, ‘You are not going to build that building in the District of Columbia. This town is so cluttered up now, you can’t get from one end to the other, and you are going to get out of town.”26 Then there were the ways presidents chose to run their White Houses: Eisenhower with his rigid military staff structure; John Kennedy and his loose agglomeration of ad hoc working groups and catch-as-catch-can meetings with advisers; Lyndon Johnson’s congressional cloakroom approach, in which the “real deals” were made in informal settings outside the National Security Council; and Richard Nixon’s notorious “Berlin Wall” of advisers—Henry Kissinger, H. R. Haldeman, and John Ehrlichman—who controlled access to the Oval Office.

DCIs sometimes could work around those kinds of obstacles, most notably by changing the look and content of the daily briefing product—the Central Intelligence Bulletin, the President’s Intelligence Checklist, and the President’s Daily Brief—and developing more flexible and responsive methods for providing current intelligence and answers to taskings. But even with those improvements, DCIs found it extremely hard to surmount the psychological barriers some presidents erected. What was a DCI to do when Johnson said that “the CIA is made up of boys whose families sent them to Princeton but wouldn’t let them into the family brokerage business,” and told Helms, “Dick, I need a paper on Vietnam, and I’ll tell you what I want included in it?”27 Or when Nixon returned a thick package of PDBs given to him during the transition period unopened, called Agency officers “clowns,” and asked, “What use are they? They’ve got 40,000 people over there reading newspapers.”28

The DCI often served at the clear displeasure of the president, who directed him to act and then often tried to deny—not very plausibly—that he had anything to do with the outcome. Bill Clinton remarked that cutting the intelligence budget during peacetime was like canceling your health insurance when you felt good.29 But chief executives have not always been the best stewards of the resources of the Agency they have so often called on to help implement—and, in more than a few cases, salvage—their foreign policies.

It should be noted, however, that closeness was not an absolute good for the DCIs or a solution to some of these difficulties. Some DCIs paid a cost for being too close, or trying to be. They wore out their welcomes, or became too committed to the success of

27 Lathrop, 174, 339.
29 Lathrop, 344.
Throughout, the DCIs were ‘honorable men, devoted to [the nation’s] service.’

In war, nothing is more important to a commander than the facts concerning the strength, dispositions, and intentions of his opponent, and the proper interpretation of those facts. In peacetime, the necessary facts . . . and their interpretation are essential to the development of policy to further our long-term national security . . . . To provide information of this kind is the task of the organization of which you are a part. No task could be more important.

For almost 60 years, the DCIs carried out that task in war and peace, in flush times and lean, amid accolades and scorn. No one of their various leadership styles insured success. Their standing and accomplishments depended on circumstances they could not influence: presidential agendas, world events, and domestic politics. On occasion, with the right conjunction of circumstances and personalities, DCIs reached the inner circle of the national security apparatus; more often, they did not. Throughout, however, they were—in Richard Helms’s famous phrase—“honorable men, devoted to [the nation’s] service.”

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30 Kovar, 36.


A fresh look at the case of Julius Rosenberg, executed in 1953 for conspiracy to commit espionage, in the light of new information about two of his lesser known associates, Joel Barr and Alfred Sarant, reveals disturbing parallels to some contemporary intelligence issues.

The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, also known as the 9/11 Commission, concluded in 2004 that the “most important failure” that left America vulnerable to attack was “one of imagination.” The cases of Rosenberg, Barr, and Sarant demonstrate that the responses of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the US Army to communist penetration during World War II were characterized by a similar lack of imagination. The FBI aggressively identified communists who held sensitive positions in government, including jobs that afforded communists routine access to classified military information. But the Bureau and the army treated communists as potential subversives, not as spies acting on behalf of the Soviet Union.

In contrast to Rosenberg, Barr and Sarant evaded detection and slipped out of the United States. Their subsequent careers behind the Iron Curtain, where they became pioneers of Soviet high technology, are evocative of another contemporary concern: the transfer of trained personnel from the former Soviet Union to rogue states.

The Rosenberg Ring

Joel Barr was one of the original members of a group of engineers—civilian employees of the US military and its contractors—whom Julius Rosenberg recruited to spy for the Soviet Union. From the time they joined the Young Communist League in 1936, Barr and Rosenberg viewed the United States government as a fascist regime little better than Nazi Germany.
Later, Barr recruited Alfred Sarant, the only known member of the Rosenberg ring who was neither Jewish nor a graduate of City College of New York. Barr and Sarant were talented electrical engineers who found technical advances in radar and electronics as compelling and important as class struggle. This dual set of interests made them remarkably successful, first as spies for the USSR and later as senior figures in the Soviet defense industry.

Controversy over the value of the atomic secrets that Rosenberg helped transmit to the USSR has obscured the tremendous value of the information about conventional weapons systems that he and his comrades stole. They provided detailed specifications for some of the most important military technologies developed during World War II and, in the process, helped the Soviet Union lay the foundation for a defense industry that maintained rough parity with the United States throughout the Cold War.

Barr, Sarant, and Rosenberg held low-level positions during World War II helping to design manufacturing processes and performing quality assurance inspections. In contrast to more senior scientists and engineers, who typically were aware of the details of only a few specific projects and who were subject to intense security precautions, the Rosenberg group had jobs that provided unfettered access to a wide range of sensitive technologies.

Military security officials attempted to compartmentalize R&D—for example by assigning the design of the various components in a weapons system to teams at different institutions. At some point, however, all the pieces had to be assembled and tested by people who understood how they fit together and what they were supposed to do. As manufacturing engineers, Barr and Sarant were exactly at that point. In order to help design and optimize manufacturing processes, they had to comprehend the basic principles underlying a particular weapon and to have detailed knowledge of all of its components. Men assigned to figure out how to mass produce advanced technologies were in an excellent position to teach the Soviets how to do the same.

Because practical “how-to” experience from related projects was often relevant to their own work, manufacturing engineers were encouraged to study weapons systems that they were not specifically assigned to work on. Barr and the other engineers working in his department “had complete freedom of the plant and were permitted to go into any other sections,” one of his former supervisors at Western Electric later told the FBI.¹

¹ Declassified FBI file, serial 65-159392-120, available in FBI Reading Room, Washington, DC.
Barr and Sarant worked on, or had access to, detailed specifications for most of the US air- and ground-based radars; the Norden bombsight; analog fire-control computers; friend-or-foe identification systems; and a variety of other technologies. Working from a makeshift microfilm studio in a Greenwich Village apartment, they copied and turned over to Soviet intelligence more than 9,000 pages of secret documents relating to more than 100 weapons programs during World War II, according to Alexander Feklisov, one of their case officers. In addition to Feklisov’s memoir, some details of the secrets Barr and Sarant stole are mentioned in the “Venona” decrypts, decoded diplomatic cable traffic between Moscow and Soviet intelligence officers in New York. For example, a December 1944 cable noted that Sarant had “handed over 17 authentic drawings” of the AN/APQ-7 radar.

According to Feklisov, Barr turned over blueprints for the SCR-584, a microwave radar system designed at MIT’s radiation lab that the army hailed as one of the most important technological breakthroughs of the war. He also passed plans for the M-9 gun director, an analog computer that predicted a moving object’s future position based on radar input and then automatically aimed and fired artillery.

While the Rosenberg group’s technology transfer probably did not have a decisive impact during World War II—the USSR had great difficulty keeping up with the demand for basic weapons systems and was in a poor position to absorb high technology—it was extraordinarily useful in the immediate postwar period when Russia quickly brought its armaments up to American levels of sophistication.

Much of the information Barr and Sarant borrowed from Western Electric’s filing cabinets ended up in the hands of Adm. Axel Berg, the man Stalin assigned during World War II to create a Soviet radar industry. Detailed information about American R&D helped Berg take Soviet radar production from zero in 1940 to a level in 1955 that equaled or exceeded the United States’ output in quantity and capabilities. Russian radar bore a striking resemblance to American designs, particularly the radar sets manufactured at Western Electric. In 1949, for example, the USSR started mass-producing replicas of the SCR-584, as well as clones of the AN/APQ-13 radar, a close cousin of the AN/APQ-7.

In addition to data on radars, analog computers, and the proximity fuse, the Rosenberg group turned over a treasure trove of secret information about jet engine design and radio and computing technologies. The group’s total contribution amounted to over 20,000 pages of technical documents, plus the entire 12,000-page design manual for the first US jet fighter, the P-80 “Shooting Star.” In addition to designs for specific weapons systems, the data gave Soviet scientists and planners invaluable insights into America’s development strategies. In technology development, information about a rival’s mistakes and dead ends is almost as valuable as details of its accomplishments.

Flawed Counterintelligence

The success of Barr and his comrades in gaining access to highly classified information and

4 Feklisov, 135.
6 Feklisov, 160.
Their ability to operate unmolested can only be attributed to stunningly incompetent American counterintelligence.

being a Russian spy and the FBI briefly put him under surveillance. The attention did not prevent Golos from personally meeting with Rosenberg and running an extensive espionage network, or from helping coordinate the August 1940 assassination in Mexico of Lev Trotsky, Lenin’s second in command and ardent foe of Stalin.7

In addition to failing to keep its eyes on Golos, the FBI and its counterparts in army counterintelligence made poor use of information that could have shut down Rosenberg’s operation long before any important secrets were stolen. The FBI had an active program to identify and weed out communists in government, especially those with access to sensitive or classified information. In the spring of 1941, the Bureau gave the army a dossier on Rosenberg. His wife, Ethel, had signed a nominating petition for Peter Cacchione, a communist candidate for New York City Council, and the Rosenbergs had shared an apartment with a couple who were members of the Communist Party of the United States (CPUSA). The army immediately moved to fire Rosenberg from his position as an inspector in military weapons plants, but his histrionic defense convinced a civil service review panel that the charges were untrue. Rosenberg, who had headed a Young Communist League chapter at college, claimed he had no connection to or sympathy for communism.

A few months later, following up on signatures on the nominating petitions that led to Ethel Rosenberg, the FBI discovered that Barr’s ex-roommate and fellow Signal Corps engineer Samuel Sack was a communist. The roommate was fired, but neither the army nor the FBI made enquiries about his close associates.

The FBI finally caught up with Barr in December 1941, matching his signature on a Cacchione nominating petition to one on his civil service application. On 23 February 1942, the Signal Corps fired Barr and placed his name on a list of undesirable employees who were ineligible for employment by the army. More than 100 of Barr’s colleagues at the Signal Corps laboratory signed petitions requesting that the army reconsider the action; many of them scratched their names off or ripped up the petitions when they learned that he had been fired because he was a communist.8


Up to this point, Barr had provided little information to the KGB. Being fired from the Signal Corps should have been the end of Barr's careers in military electronics and as a Soviet spy. And it would have been, if the FBI, army, or military contractors had implemented even rudimentary procedures for vetting individuals who had access to classified information.

Within two weeks of his termination, Barr applied for work at Western Electric, one of the Signal Corps’ major suppliers. The company failed to contact the Signal Corps to confirm Barr's claim that he had voluntarily quit to seek a better position. Less than a month after the army fired him, Barr began working at Western Electric on airborne radar systems that incorporated some of the most highly classified sensitive technologies in the American arsenal.

Although the army had apparently forgotten about Barr, paperwork on his case drifted through the FBI for months. Headquarters was sufficiently concerned to ask the New York field office to consider placing him on a list of individuals targeted for custodial detention. New York responded to Washington's inquiries with a flurry of correspondence, but it never put a shoe on the ground or lifted a telephone receiver to investigate Barr. In July 1942, when the FBI's New York field office suspended its investigation of Barr, the FBI did not have a clue that he was working at Western Electric.

Rosenberg was finally fired in February 1945, 11 months after the FBI received unambiguous evidence of his communist party membership. As with Barr, however, termination as a security risk did not have a detrimental effect on Rosenberg’s career. Putting out the word that his dismissal was motivated by anti-Semitism, Rosenberg was almost immediately hired by Emerson Radio and Phonograph Corporation. Ironically, this was the firm from which Rosenberg, working as a Signal Corps inspector, had stolen the proximity fuse.

Worried that the FBI might have Rosenberg under surveillance, Soviet intelligence quickly moved to isolate him. It need not have worried: Neither the Army nor the FBI made any effort to track Rosenberg's activities after he was fired.

Barr's past finally caught up with him more than five years after the FBI first identified him as a security risk and three years after it received definite information that he was a communist party member. In June 1947, a security official at Sperry Gyroscope Company, which hired Barr in October 1946 to work on a classified missile defense project, contacted the FBI to ask about a security clearance for their new employee. The Bureau quickly noted that he had been fired from the army as a subversive and that he was on a list of communist party members. Nonetheless, it spent months collecting documents from the army, interviewing Barr's neighbors, and peering into his bank accounts. In the first week of October 1947, the Bureau sent a summary of its investigation to Sperry, which fired him a week later.

The FBI's success in finally ending Barr's espionage career was marred by its failure to exploit the leads generated by his case. The Bureau treated Barr as a security risk but did not seriously investigate the possibility that he was a Soviet spy. On his job application, which Sperry had turned over to the FBI, Barr had listed three personal references. FBI agents interviewed two of
them, but inexplicably ignored the third: Julius Rosenberg. If the agents who reviewed Barr’s file had looked, they would have seen that the Bureau had an extensive file on Rosenberg.

The FBI turned its attention to Barr again in the summer of 1948, when it investigated the possibility that he was the engineer described in Venona decrypts as “Liberal” (the codename was actually assigned to Rosenberg). After learning from Barr’s mother that he was studying electronics in Sweden, the FBI asked the CIA to locate him and monitored the Barr family correspondence. Barr wrote a letter to his mother when he moved to Paris to study music, and the FBI obtained his address from the envelope.

Meanwhile, the Venona decrypts sparked investigations that culminated in the arrests in December 1949 and February 1950, respectively, of atomic spy Klaus Fuchs and his courier, Harry Gold. Gold provided information that led the FBI to David Greenglass, who fingered his brother-in-law, Julius Rosenberg. The spy network unraveled.

Evading Capture

The day after Greenglass’s arrest was announced in American newspapers, the Soviets sent Barr from Paris to Prague. On his arrival in the Czech capital, the KGB cloaked Barr in a new identity. For the next four decades he was known as “Joseph Berg,” the son of Jewish immigrants to South Africa. The name was a KGB joke: Joe Berg from Joburg. But Barr took it seriously. His wife, whom he met in Czechoslovakia, did not learn that he had been born in America until 20 years after their marriage. The Russians continued to act as if Barr was in a hostile environment, meeting with him clandestinely and keeping the Czech authorities in the dark about his real identity.

On 17 July 1950, in an effort to substantiate his assertions to the FBI that Julius Rosenberg was the head of an espionage ring, Greenglass recalled a conversation in which his brother-in-law urged him to flee with his wife and their children to Mexico, where the Russians would arrange their safe transport to Czechoslovakia. Greenglass said that when he expressed incredulity that anyone under FBI investigation could get out of the United States, Julius replied: “Oh, they let other people out who are more important than you are...they let Barr out, Joel Barr, and he was a member of our espionage ring.”

Greenglass’s statement lit a fire under the FBI’s dormant investigation of Barr, prompting it to attempt to determine if the US government could lay its hands on him.

On 25 July, a week after Julius Rosenberg was taken into custody, the FBI sent an urgent message to the US legal attaché in Paris requesting that he track down Barr. The attaché visited Barr’s last known address and quickly learned that he was a month too late.

Two weeks after the FBI arrested Greenglass, army security agency cryptanalysts gave their FBI liaison a more complete version of a previously decrypted 5 May 1944 KGB cable. The new version filled in critical blanks in previous iterations, for the first time

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9 Author’s interview with Barr’s ex-wife, Vera Bergova, August 2002.

10 David Greenglass’s 17 July 1950 statement to the FBI.
identifying Sarant in clear text as an espionage recruit. Prompted by the cable, as well as an investigation of Barr that revealed his friendship with Sarant, two FBI agents knocked on Sarant’s door on the afternoon of 19 July 1950. He agreed to answer the agents’ questions and allowed them to search his house.

During the intense weeklong interrogation that followed, Sarant denied that he was a spy. Correctly surmising that the FBI planned to arrest him, Sarant slipped through its surveillance and crossed the Mexican border in the company of his next-door neighbor’s wife, Carol Dayton. The couple eluded Mexican police and contacted Polish intelligence officers in Mexico City. Acting on Soviet orders, the Poles hid Sarant and Dayton for six months before smuggling them across the border to Guatemala, where they boarded a cargo ship headed to Casablanca. The couple took another ship to Spain, where they were put on a flight to Warsaw. Given the new name “Staros,” they were stashed in a luxury apartment in Warsaw for six months, before being reunited with Barr in Moscow.11

In a move that undoubtedly saved their lives, after six weeks in Moscow, Barr, Sarant, and Dayton were sent to Prague. They rode out some of the most dangerous years of Stalinist paranoia in the relative safety of Czechoslovakia.

Dedicating Their Talents to Moscow

While Barr had recruited Sarant into espionage and was viewed by their American friends as the dominant figure in the partnership, the roles were reversed behind the Iron Curtain. Sarant became the front man and leader for the rest of his life.

Barr had already learned Czech and Sarant picked up the language quickly. They were put in charge of a team of 30 engineers at a military R&D institute. Overcoming difficult technical obstacles—basic electronic components were unavailable, so they had to make their own—as well as the distrust of security officials who thought they were foreign spies, Barr and Sarant designed and built a prototype of a computerized anti-aircraft weapon.12 Based on designs they

had worked with in the United States, they created an analog computer that received input from radar and controlled the aiming and firing of artillery. The system, with some minor improvements, was still defending Czechoslovakian air space as late as the 1980s, according to Barr.

Impressed by their accomplishments, the head of the Soviet State Committee on Aviation Technology, Pyotr V. Dementyev, recruited Sarant and Barr to apply their talents for the benefit of the USSR.13 They moved with their families to Leningrad in January 1956. Sarant and Barr quickly learned enough Russian to operate without translators. Placed in charge of a secret laboratory that was identified on official correspondence by a fictitious mailbox address, they were given a free hand to recruit employees. The laboratory’s first project was commissioned by Adm. Berg, the man who had received information that Barr and Sarant had stolen from Western Electric during World War II. They designed a critical component for the radar that tracked the first Sputnik and subsequent satellites. In February 1958, Sarant and Barr were awarded the Order of the Red Banner, one of the Soviet Union’s most prestigious medals.

11 Author’s interviews with Carol Dayton, April 1992, and her daughter, Kristina Staros, October 2003.

12 Documents obtained by the author from the Czech Ministry of Interior archives describe several investigations of Barr and Sarant that were squelched by the personal intervention of Antonin Novotny, the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, suggesting that the KGB worked behind the scenes to protect its agents.

They were awarded the Soviet Order of the Red Banner.

Microelectronics

The two men then turned their attention to designing and building microelectronic components, primarily for military applications. Their work won rave reviews from Andrei Tupolev, the Soviet Union’s leading aircraft designer. An evangelist for microelectronics, Sarant lectured at universities and made presentations to government and party officials starting in the late 1950s. He predicted the development and widespread adoption of digital computers and the integration of electronic intelligence into every aspect of modern life. Public discussion of cybernetics had been banned under Stalin, and there was still a great deal of skepticism among Soviet scientists about the value of computers. The Soviet computer establishment advocated the construction of complex, room-sized behemoths, not the small, mass-produced, easily programmable machines Sarant envisioned.

In July 1959, Sarant and Barr attracted attention at the highest levels of the Soviet military when they completed a working prototype of a digital computer based on off-the-shelf components, including germanium transistors. The UM-1, intended as an airborne computer to control navigation and weapons systems, was small enough to fit on a kitchen table, was light enough for one person to lift, and required about the same power as a light bulb. Dmitri Ustinov (then chairman of the Military-Industrial Commission and later defense minister), the head of the Soviet Air Force, and other top military officers visited Sarant for demonstrations of the UM-1. Although the UM-1 was never put into production, it helped Sarant secure personal backing from Ustinov, who for decades was second only to premiers Nikita Khrushchev and Leonid Brezhnev regarding military industry issues. Support from Ustinov and his network, combined with Sarant and Barr’s continuing ability to deliver impressive technological accomplishments, fueled a meteoric ascent through the ranks of industry that would have been extraordinary for Russians and was unprecedented for foreigners.

The two Americans received the ultimate stamp of approval on 4 May 1962 when Khrushchev visited their design bureau. Sarant showed the Soviet leader how his team assembled tiny electronic components and demonstrated a new computer, the UM-2. Sarant lectured Khrushchev on the potential for microelectronics—a word he had introduced into the Russian language—to transform industry. The new science would make it possible for networks of military satellites to spy on the United States, for the USSR to protect

Khrushchev agreed on the spot. A new research city was turned over to Sarant.

Khrushchev agreed on the spot. A new city that was already under construction on the outskirts of Moscow was turned over to Sarant. He was made a Soviet citizen and Khrushchev personally signed papers inducting him into the communist party.

Sarant drove the first symbolic stake into the ground at an August 1962 ceremony marking the start of construction work on the scientific center, the heart of the new city of Zelenograd (Greentown). From the beginning, the project did not work out as Sarant and Barr had hoped. The idea of putting foreigners in charge of a massive, high-profile project was unacceptable to powerful party bosses; Sarant reluctantly had to accept a position as second in command. Although he was bitterly disappointed, the position put him in charge of institutes at Zelenograd employing over 20,000 researchers with advanced degrees. Even if progress was not as rapid or dramatic as the Americans had hoped, the enterprises at Zelenograd quickly made significant advances in Soviet technology, especially in the design and manufacturing of semiconductors, primarily for military applications.

In addition to their roles at Zelenograd, Sarant and Barr retained control over a design bureau in Leningrad. Their team created a computer, the UM-1NKh, which became a mainstay of civilian industry. The UM-1NKh was promoted as a major advance in the

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16 Author’s interview with Joel Barr, April 1992.
glossy propaganda magazine *Soviet Union*, although the identities of its designers were carefully hidden. The computer also received favorable reviews in an American technical journal and in a classified CIA report that ranked it among the “most important” special purpose computers disclosed in Soviet open publications. It earned “Staros” and “Berg” the State Prize, formerly called the Stalin Prize, the second-highest award in the Soviet Union.

**Sudden Eclipse**

Technical success did not shield the ambitious foreigners from the harsh realities of Soviet politics. Sarant and Barr’s fall from grace, precipitated by the ouster of their champion, Nikita Khrushchev, was even quicker and more spectacular than their ascent. Within months of Khrushchev’s forced retirement, powerful men whom Sarant and Barr had antagonized struck back. Accused of everything from wasting scarce resources to participating in a Zionist anti-Soviet conspiracy, the American engineers feared that they might end their days in prison. Instead, Sarant was fired as scientific director of the Center for Microelectronics, but he and Barr were permitted to return to their design bureau in Leningrad.


Uzels can be found today lurking under the Indian Ocean, the Mediterranean and Black Seas, and the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans in the fleets of a half-dozen navies, including those of several potential adversaries of the United States. If Iran decides to send oil tankers to the bottom of the Persian Gulf, if Chinese submarines attack Taiwanese destroyers, or if India opts to scuttle Pakistani cargo ships, the torpedoes will probably be aimed by Uzels. Each of these nations, along with Poland, Algeria, and Romania, has purchased Kilo-class submarines equipped with Uzel fire-control systems from the Soviet Union or Russia.

Final Years

The Uzel was Sarant and Barr’s last major success, and, along with Zelenograd, is the longest-lasting legacy of their careers in Soviet industry. In 1972, a few months before the Uzel passed the Red Navy’s final tests and was accepted for use, their operation was merged into a huge conglomerate. Unable to tolerate his reduced stature, Sarant quit in May 1973. He moved to Vladivostok to serve as the head a new artificial intelligence institute that was part of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. Barr remained in Leningrad, where he continued to receive a salary on par with a deputy minister but he had few official duties.

When Sarant died in March 1979 from a massive heart attack, Izvestia lauded him as “a tireless scientist, a talented organizer who for many years gave all his strength and bright talent to the development of Soviet science and technology.” The obituary noted that he “made a large contribution to the establishment and the development of domestic microelectronics.” It did not, of course, mention that he was an American.

Barr rose to prominence in the Soviet electronics industry again in the 1980s when officials at Zelenograd agreed to support development of his proposed innovative integrated circuit manufacturing technology.

Funding for the project dried up as the Soviet Union fell apart, however, and Barr decided to look in an unlikely place for investors: the United States.

Barr returned to the United States in October 1990, traveling as Joseph Berg on a Soviet passport. To his astonishment, neither the FBI nor any other government agency approached him or took any apparent interest. Barr was even more surprised when he returned a year later to receive a new US passport and Social Security Administration benefits. He divided the remaining years of his life between Russia and the United States.

In April 1992, Barr voted in the New York primary election for Jerry Brown. Four years later, using his Soviet name, he cast a ballot in Leningrad for Gennadii Zhuganov, the communist party presidential candidate.

Joel Barr remained an ardent communist. He died in a Moscow hospital of complications from a throat infection on 1 August 1998.
Effective Interagency Collaboration

Intelligence Liaison between the FBI and State, 1940–44

G. Gregg Webb

The post-9/11 debate over intelligence reform has been framed as a response to the intelligence “failures” that led to that infamous day. Many commentators and policymakers have compared America’s current intelligence shortcomings to past disasters, such as Pearl Harbor in 1941 or the Bay of Pigs in 1961. The impulse to identify common errors in individual judgment and interagency action between the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington in September 2001 and previous tragedies cannot be ignored. Yet, dissecting mistakes should be only part of this nation’s strategy to retool its Intelligence Community for the fight against international terrorism.

Another important perspective for planning intelligence reforms comes from past instances of effective cooperation among agencies. Just as America stands to benefit from coolly analyzing intelligence missteps, careful consideration of intelligence successes also can be constructive. This article surveys one of the earliest, most extensive, and most successful examples of interdepartmental intelligence collaboration in American history. In a community famous for its deep fissures and debilitating rivalries, the working relationship forged between the Department of State and the Special Intelligence Service of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in Latin America during World War II is both unique and instructive.

What limited scholarly attention the FBI’s Special Intelligence Service (SIS) has received over the past 60 years has, quite deservedly, been focused on the agency’s successes in the field. These ranged from high-level penetrations of foreign governments to dogged hunts for smugglers and spies throughout the Western Hemisphere. SIS agents, in concert with State Department and armed services personnel, quashed virtually all Axis intelligence operations in Central and South America during World War II. The numbers are impressive. Between 1 July 1940 and 31 December 1945, the SIS identified 832 Axis “espionage agents,” apprehended 336 of these, and ultimately gained convictions against 105 individuals for a total of more than 1,340 years in prison. The SIS further identified 222 “smugglers of strategic materials” in the Western Hemisphere and captured 75 of them. SIS employees conducted 641 separate investigations at the request of other US government agencies and shut down 24 clandestine radio stations used by Axis agents to communicate with their handlers and each other.¹

This work explores the largely unexamined bond between policymakers at the FBI and the

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Department of State that acted as the foundation for the SIS’s impressive accomplishments. Central to this spirit of interdepartmental cooperation was the cordial relationship between FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover and Assistant Secretary of State Adolf A. Berle, the wartime intelligence liaison at the Department of State. Through patience and mutual conciliation, these two bureaucratic heavyweights ensured the effectiveness of US intelligence and counterintelligence efforts in Latin America.

**Interagency Rivalry**

That members of the FBI and Department of State were capable of forming a successful foreign-intelligence union during World War II is remarkable given the competition and ill will that plagued their pre-war interactions over domestic counterintelligence work. During the late 1930s, the FBI and State were important players in the US government’s counterintelligence program, competing with each other for presidential favor and scarce funding. This odd bureaucratic division, in which the de facto national police force had to battle the government’s foreign-policy arm for control over *domestic* counterintelligence operations, originated in a legislative quirk.

The FBI’s original authority emanated from an 1871 appropriations statute that limited Department of Justice investigations to “the detection and prosecution of crimes against the United States.” In 1916, German espionage agents and saboteurs threatened both America’s national security and her highly valued neutrality in World War I. To counter this threat, Attorney General Thomas Gregory obtained an obscure amendment to the Department of Justice appropriations statute authorizing the Bureau to pursue “such other investigations regarding official matters under the control of the Department of Justice or the Department of State as may be directed by the Attorney General.” Thus, without public fanfare or debate, the Bureau of Investigation gained legal authority to conduct non-criminal inquiries—such as those involving suspected intelligence breaches—with the catch being the addition of the Secretary of State’s permission.

This potentially awkward arrangement remained benign through the gauntlets of World War I and the subsequent “Red Scare.” By the mid-1930s, federal counterintelligence activity had been temporarily stopped due to the embarrassing excesses of the Palmer Raids, which had featured unlawful detentions of individuals based on their nationality and political affiliation and instilled fear and skepticism of federal law enforcement agencies among large portions of America’s immigrant community. The FBI, in particular, was under strict orders to observe its original, narrow mandate and avoid investigations of “subversive” organizations “inasmuch as it does not appear that there is any violation of a Federal Penal Statute involved.”

In August 1936, President Franklin Roosevelt ended this counterintelligence calm by requesting that FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover provide him with “a broad picture’ of the effects of Communism and Fascism on ‘the economic and political life of the country as a whole ...’” Given this clear order for an intelligence report and his fear of further civil
liberties complications, Hoover informed Roosevelt that, pursuant to the appropriations statute, he would need the Secretary of State’s authorization to proceed. Secretary of State Cordell Hull gave his blessing on 1 September 1936; thereafter, State-FBI relations deteriorated rapidly.

The rivalry between the Bureau and the Department of State over domestic security work between 1936 and 1939 flowed from two sources: stark policy differences and hopelessly blurred lines of authority. On the policy front, neither J. Edgar Hoover nor his chief adversary at State, Assistant Secretary George S. Messersmith, could agree on how the United States should organize its response to German, Russian, and other foreign infiltrations. For Hoover, the answer lay in consolidation of all civilian counterintelligence responsibility, investigations, and funding in his FBI. Hoover recognized the rights of the two service intelligence agencies—the Military Intelligence Division (MID) and the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI)—to conduct independent investigations where their respective personnel and installations were concerned. In return, he received steady support from both MID and ONI in his fight against Messersmith.

On the other side, Messersmith and State were bent on preserving the more decentralized status quo, in which responsibility for counterintelligence investigations was divided among several agencies and the Department of State served as the chief facilitator for interdepartmental activity. Additionally, the 1916 amendment to the Justice appropriations statute had given State a virtual veto over FBI counterintelligence activities. Not only did the FBI and State deadlock on policy grounds, but also their relationship, as delineated by the 1916 amendment, was violated repeatedly by the president and other high officials. For example, in October 1938, President Roosevelt had become so alarmed by the threat from Axis agents and the dysfunction in America’s counterintelligence community that he created a “Committee to inquire into the so-called espionage situation” and to identify needed reforms and funding requirements. Roosevelt named Hoover’s immediate superior, Attorney General Homer Cummings, chairman of this new committee, but limited its participants to a fraction of the agencies then conducting counterintelligence investigations. Both the Department of State and the Treasury Department’s Secret Service were left off the Cummings Committee. Not surprisingly, the Committee found that its restricted membership could manage the security burden of the US government without outside help.

The President soon added more confusion to the jurisdictional melee. In the spring of 1939, he directed Assistant Secretary Messersmith to lead a second counterintelligence panel made up of representatives from the War, Navy, Treasury, Post Office and Justice Departments. Messersmith’s job was to coordinate the individual and joint efforts of these agencies against foreign forces inside the United States. According to one account, no FBI representative was included in this group, although a member from the FBI’s parent Department of Justice was.

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7 Memorandum from Hoover to Edward Tamm, 10 September 1936, as cited in the Church Committee Report, Book III, 396.
10 Batvinis, 45, and Troy, 12.
11 Batvinis, 45, and Troy, 12.
12 The Cummings Committee was limited to representatives from the FBI, MID, and ONI. This and the previous sentence extend from Batvinis, 37, and the Church Committee Report, Book III, 397–98.
13 This sentence draws from similar statements in Don Whitehead, The FBI Story, 165, as cited in Troy, 12, and the Church Committee Report, Book III, 402.
Interagency Collaboration

Convoluted and conflicting divisions of authority were a hallmark of Roosevelt’s executive leadership style. Yet, on 26 June 1939, the president finally settled the pre-war power struggle between the FBI and Department of State. In a secret directive, he expressed his “desire that the investigation of all espionage, counter-espionage, and sabotage matters” be centered in the FBI, MID, and ONI alone. Roosevelt’s decision was a clear bureaucratic defeat for the Department of State in the short-term, but the long-term impact of this move far outweighed any immediate loss of face for the Department. The president’s June 1939 Directive freed State from its nominal leadership role in domestic counterintelligence and helped clarify the overall intelligence relationship between the FBI and State. Thus, when war broke out in earnest the next year, the Department of State was able to focus on building a foreign-intelligence alliance with the FBI’s Special Intelligence Service.

From Improvisation to Organization

Messersmith’s extended competition with Hoover for control over America’s internal security provided clear proof that the Department of State had no qualms about conducting domestic counterintelligence work. During the inter-war years, the Department’s attitude towards clandestine foreign-intelligence collection, or espionage, was very different. Many American diplomats did not regard espionage work as an appropriate method for fulfilling their duty to keep the American government informed about regimes and developments abroad. Even State’s intelligence czar, Messersmith, called the espionage work of German agents “un-American” in a 1938 letter to a friend about America’s tenuous domestic security situation. In addition to moralistic arguments against secret intelligence work, the high cost in money and manpower required to obtain such information, as well as the potential for geopolitical embarrassment should such activity be discovered, added to the general distaste for espionage in the pre-war Department of State. Consequently, though State acted as the official eyes, ears, and voice of the US government around the world, the Department did not possess any covert intelligence organizations or responsibilities during the late 1930s.

As the Department of State was taking a back seat to the FBI and others on the domestic counterintelligence front in the fall of 1939, a few US diplomats and service attachés around Latin America attempted to organize clandestine collection of intelligence in their host countries. The reports these pioneers sent back to their superiors in Washington played a vital role in alerting policymakers.

14 Don Whitehead, The FBI Story, 165, as cited in Troy, 12. The circumstances of Messersmith’s intervention remain unclear. After World War II, Messersmith maintained that President Roosevelt had compelled him to undertake coordination of the counterintelligence field. However, some historical accounts have portrayed Messersmith as assuming this role for himself. Likewise, Messersmith argued that Hoover refused to participate in his initiative until forced by the president; whereas, Whitehead’s Hoover-sanctioned account asserts that Messersmith shut the FBI out. What is clear is that Messersmith, likely with Roosevelt’s knowledge, sought to coordinate the counterintelligence field soon after the Cummings Committee had set out on the same mission. Neither effort succeeded, and both heightened the general confusion and interdepartmental rancor.

15 Mediating rivalries was one mechanism Roosevelt used to control subordinates, hence the president’s apparent duplicity in assigning both Justice and State coordinating roles in the counterintelligence field. These statements are based on the author’s unpublished senior thesis at Princeton University entitled “Conflict and Creation: A Comparative Study of the US and British Joint Intelligence Committees in the Second World War” (2003).

16 Presidential Directive, 26 June 1939, Section 2, File 64-4104, Administrative Records of the SIS, RG 65, NACP.

17 This account relies on a description of a letter from Messersmith to Geist dated 19 May 1938 as cited in Batvinis, 32. Though Messersmith may have considered espionage work unsavory, he was not as reluctant to use aggressive foreign intelligence means as other diplomats at State. Before World War II, he sought to limit the use of local informants by members of the US legation in Mexico, but as wartime Ambassador to Mexico, he presided over an active and successful State-SIS intelligence collaboration that maintained extensive secret contacts throughout Mexico.

18 This statement is based on the author’s research and writing for an unpublished senior thesis at Princeton University (supra note 15).
In December 1939, Boal wrote to Messersmith in Washington summarizing the lessons he was learning about interdepartmental intelligence cooperation and asking for money and personnel to enlarge his and Dillon’s activities. Messersmith refused Boal’s request. In an internal memorandum to other Department managers, Messersmith laid out his opposition, citing diplomacy (“we should not in any case engage in such work on such a scale without the knowledge and consent of the government concerned”) and finances (“even if it were desirable to go ahead … we do not have the money and could not do it”) as reasons not to devote more resources to foreign-intelligence work in America’s next door neighbor. The official reply Messersmith sent Boal explicitly stated that leaders at State did not then believe the ends of investigating German and other anti-American activities in Mexico justified the clandestine collection means that Boal sought to expand. However, Messersmith did authorize Boal to continue the activities of his intelligence coordinating committee.

In the six months after Messersmith’s reining in of Boal and Dillon, both world affairs and the Department of State’s foreign-intelligence landscape changed dramatically. On the international stage, Germany’s invasions of Denmark, Norway, Belgium, the Netherlands, and France during the first half of 1940 bolstered the threat from an increasing number of Axis agents in Central and South America. At the Department of State, Messersmith was dispatched to Cuba as US ambassador in February 1940. His replacement as the assistant secretary of state responsible for intelligence affairs was Columbia Law School professor and Roosevelt brain-truster Adolf A. Berle. Berle quickly recognized the burgeoning threat to American political and financial interests from Axis intrigue in Latin America and, during the spring of 1940, began to press for a comprehensive interdepartmental response.

The Berle-Hoover Connection

On 24 June 1940, President Roosevelt issued a directive by telephone making the Federal Bureau of Investigation

24 Memorandum from Messersmith to Warren, Duggan, and Chapin, 28 December 1939, as reprinted in Mendelsohn, Covert Warfare: Covert Warfare in Latin America (New York: Garland, 1989), vol. 10.
25 Memorandum for the Files from W. M. Crane, 3 June 1940, 810.20 Defense/20, Box 3375, State Department General Decimal File, 1940–1944, RG 59, NACP.
26 Memorandum for the Files from W. M. Crane, 3 June 1940, 810.20 Defense/20, Box 3375, State Department General Decimal File, 1940–1944, RG 59, NACP.
“responsible for foreign intelligence work in the Western Hemisphere, on the request of the State Department.” By 1 July 1940, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover had established a “Special Intelligence Service” within his Bureau and had embarked on the colossal task of creating from scratch a foreign-intelligence capability in the FBI.27 The president’s stipulation that this new agency—the first foreign-intelligence bureaucracy in US history—should conduct its activities in Latin America at the behest of the Department of State forced two longtime adversaries into common cause.

Fortunately, the two men tasked to direct this State-FBI intelligence union proved anything but adversarial towards one another. Adolf Berle, as the assistant secretary of state with intelligence liaison duties, and J. Edgar Hoover, as FBI director, were involved in every phase of the SIS project, from cultivating its roots in the pre-war Interdepartmental Intelligence Committee—established as a result of President Roosevelt’s 1939 counterintelligence delimitation directive—to resolving delicate administrative challenges in the Service’s wartime work.28 Operating in tandem, the two men instilled several of the bedrock measures on which the SIS’s indispensable intelligence network in Latin America rested.

Among their most important collaborative successes was securing the assignment of ‘legal attachés’ in US missions throughout Central and South America.29 By October 1942, 77 FBI legal attachés, with diplomatic status, worked out of US embassies in 18 nations in the region.30 These officers coordinated secret intelligence operations in their assigned countries, collecting information and investigative leads from indigenous contacts and undercover SIS agents.31 The legal attachés passed these data on to FBI headquarters in Washington and sometimes used them to formulate local actions with embassy diplomats and armed services attachés. To implement this centerpiece of SIS organization, Berle played the role of intermediary between the FBI Director and skeptical ambassadors and bureaucrats at State. The pair also teamed up against opposition to a FBI-proposed courier system for SIS communications.32 Such a system never developed, but SIS personnel did gain the ability to send correspondence back to Bureau headquarters through the Department of State’s official diplomatic pouches.33

Diverse Backgrounds

Little in the backgrounds of Berle or Hoover suggested that they would become such close partners.
Notwithstanding their differences, the cooperation of Hoover and Berle on the SIS proved exceptionally functional.

Notwithstanding their differences, the cooperation of Hoover and Berle on the SIS proved exceptionally functional. Berle was a passionate internationalist; Hoover was wary of all things foreign. In personality, Berle was an intellectual, though not unskilled in policy administration; Hoover, as a master bureaucrat, was deeply practical, though highly intelligent. Notwithstanding these differences, their cooperation on the SIS proved exceptionally functional.

Personal Dynamics

Several personal and institutional circumstances contributed to the general harmony between Adolf Berle and J. Edgar Hoover. On a personal level, Berle did not try to battle the director for administrative control over the Special Intelligence Service. Instead, he willingly left day-to-day management to Hoover and his subordinates, only intervening at the request of the Bureau or when FBI personnel and actions aroused the Department of State's ire. Concerning the “big picture” policies of US intelligence in Latin America, Berle consistently sought, and for the most part obtained, frank communication with J. Edgar Hoover.

Berle’s approach contrasted sharply with that of his predecessor, George Messersmith. Hoover and Messersmith’s acrimonious relationship during the late 1930s distracted both the FBI and the Department of State from their shared responsibility to track down German and
Berle could afford to be conciliatory with Hoover for two reasons. First, Berle, unlike Messersmith, was not a career diplomat. He did not feel obliged to obstruct Hoover out of interdepartmental jealousy or spite. In fact, Berle repeatedly defended the SIS and Hoover from the machinations of others, including MID, OSS, and several factions within State itself. Second, Berle had far too many other duties within the Department of State to micro-manage SIS affairs. He effected his liaison with Hoover through State’s Division of Foreign Activity Correlation (FC). In addition to managing the relatively small FC staff, by 1944 Berle was directing State’s Passport Division, Visa Division, and Special War Problems Division (which dealt with American prisoners-of-war), plus State’s Office of Transportation and Communication, which included Divisions for Aviation, Shipping, and Telecommunications. Berle also frequently drafted speeches for Secretary of State Cordell Hull and played a key role in the Department’s Latin America policymaking.

The best evidence that Berle’s laissez faire handling of Hoover facilitated constructive cooperation between State and the SIS comes from Hoover himself. The famously sensitive FBI Director was prone to curtailing communication with any government agency or individual that he considered a threat to his own or his Bureau’s authority. Yet, Hoover conscientiously kept Berle updated on SIS activities throughout his tenure as State’s intelligence liaison from 1940 to 1944. During this period, Hoover sent Berle reams of documents concerning the SIS, ranging from elaborate color maps with the disposition of secret, Bureau-run radio stations in Latin America to requests to send FBI agents on special assignments abroad. Most of the information provided to Berle and his FC staff by Hoover were reports on intelligence operations and counterintelligence investigations.

Berle’s unobtrusive attitude proved useful as Hoover molded the nascent SIS. Atop the director’s list of professional pet peeves were indistinct lines of

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41 In their pioneering book on the SIS, Rout and Bratzel write that “As early as the fall of 1939, Assistant Secretary of State George Messersmith … had denounced Hoover as a glory hound and difficult to work with except on his own terms” (37). George S. Messersmith Papers, University of Delaware Library, Newark, Delaware, file 2018/5, n.d., 3–5, as cited in Leslie B. Rout, Jr., and John F. Bratzel, The Shadow War: German Espionage and United States Counterespionage in Latin America during World War II (Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, 1986), 37.

42 Batvinis, 63.

43 Undated notes from Box 32; Entry 718; Working Papers and Source Materials for Histories of Organizational Units, 1938–1949, Records of the War History Branch, General Records of the Department of State, RG 59, NACP.

44 Ibid., and Dept. of State Organizational Chart and Table, 15 January 1944, Folder “Chapter II Office Departmental Administration,” Box 2, Entry 714, Drafts of Chapters for an Overall History of the Department of State during World War II, Records of the War History Branch, General Records of the Department of State, RG 59, NACP.

45 One indication of the assistant secretary’s overflowing administrative platter appeared in 1943. Dismissing a critical letter sent to the Bureau under his signature, Berle admitted to Hoover’s lieutenant, Edward Tamm, that he had “to handle as much as 250 pieces of mail a day” and “naturally [could not] devote as much time to each individual piece as might be desirable.” Berle comments quoted by Tamm in Memorandum for the Director, 17 November 1943, Folder 4, File 64-4104, Administrative Records of the SIS, General Records of the FBI, RG 65, NACP.

46 Letter from Hoover to Berle, 10 March 1943, 102.313-1043, Box 52, Department of State Central Decimal File, RG 59, NACP (radio “order of battle”); letter from Hoover to Berle, 27 September 1940, 811.20237/9-2740, Box 3728, Department of State Central Decimal File, 1940–1944, RG 59, NACP; and letter from Berle to Hoover, 4 October 1940, 811.20237/9-2740, Box 3728, Department of State Central Decimal File, 1940–1944, RG 59, NACP (investigation authorization).
administrative authority and nebulous or conflicting agency mandates. Hoover faced several threats to his power as sole collector of secret intelligence in the Western Hemisphere. MID launched one such an assault in late 1940 and early 1941. During this period, Hoover and MID chief Gen. Sherman Miles fought an increasingly bitter battle over intelligence collection authority in the New York area. On 12 February 1941, the Interdepartmental Intelligence Committee—with Hoover, Miles, and Berle all present—held a lengthy meeting to resolve the dispute. The FBI Director expressed his position on the New York conundrum as an ultimatum: either the FBI was in charge, or he would hand over SIS coverage to the military. This all-or-nothing approach to resolving a bureaucratic tangle was classic Hoover. Throughout the meeting, Berle worked to pacify the warring parties.

Hoover’s obsession with strict divisions of authority extended into his relations with the Department of State. Although Berle labored to keep ambassadors and State personnel from meddling in the administrative affairs of the SIS, a certain amount of unsolicited input and criticism slipped into the FBI chain of command. For example, in November 1943, Ambassador to Peru R. Henry Norweb’s contacts at the State Department made inquiries at FBI Headquarters in Washington to see if the wife of a particular SIS agent could join him abroad. Hoover’s reaction to this feeler was immediate and severe. He fired off a memorandum to his lieutenants declaring that he thought “it [was] rather presumptuous for the State Department or an Ambassador to inject himself into an administrative policy of this

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Batvinis makes a similar point, 50. For more on Hoover’s disgust for unclear mandates and commitment to direct divisions of responsibility, see Webb, “The FBI and Foreign Intelligence,” 51–56, 58.


Army intelligence had established a New York City office to obtain information on Latin America from firms based in the city that conducted business in the region. Friction developed because the SIS also operated an undercover outlet in New York whose staff sought information from the same international businesses. See Troy, 46–49.

Department of State. Although Berle labored to keep ambassadors and State personnel from meddling in the administrative affairs of the SIS, a certain amount of unsolicited input and criticism slipped into the FBI chain of command. For example, in November 1943, Ambassador to Peru R. Henry Norweb’s contacts at the State Department made inquiries at FBI Headquarters in Washington to see if the wife of a particular SIS agent could join him abroad. Hoover’s reaction to this feeler was immediate and severe. He fired off a memorandum to his lieutenants declaring that he thought “it [was] rather presumptuous for the State Department or an Ambassador to inject himself into an administrative policy of this

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50 Minutes of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Committee, 12 February 1941, 811.2020003-2741, Box 3728, Department of State Central Decimal File, 1940–1944, RG 59, NACP, 7, 9. Despite Berle’s exertions and the Committee’s extended discussion, the IIC failed to adjudicate this jurisdictional dispute, and the matter wound up in President Roosevelt’s lap. The president attempted to solve the problem by bypassing Hoover and Miles and appointing his wealthy friend and confidante Vincent Astor as “Area Controller for the New York Area,” with authority to mediate jurisdictional disputes (Troy, 47, 49). For more on Astor’s amateur intelligence adventures, see Christopher Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush (New York: HarperPerennial, 1995), Ch. 3.


52 Ibid.

53 Ibid.

Just as Adolf Berle’s impressive discretion in dealing with Hoover can only be appreciated in light of Hoover’s strict bureaucratic principles, the FBI director’s respect for Berle must be measured relative to Hoover’s other contacts in Washington. Hoover had a close personal relationship with President Roosevelt and many of his successors. He often used this ace to circumvent his immediate superiors in the attorney general’s office when he had something to communicate to the president, whether it was a FBI operational success or a jurisdictional complaint. With such high access, Hoover rarely acknowledged FBI inadequacies raised by anyone outside his agency and not inside the Oval Office. One indication of his personal respect for Adolf Berle was manifest in his promptly addressing criticism of the SIS delivered by the assistant secretary in a conversation with FBI Special Agent Jerome Doyle on 3 January 1942.

According to a summary of this meeting prepared for the director, Berle had expressed concern that intelligence collection was not adequately covering the lower classes in South America. In the margin next to this account, Hoover scribbled, “Take steps at once to cover this aspect.”

54 Ibid.

55 Ibid.
Hoover’s rapid response to Berle’s criticism illustrates the quality of their personal relationship.

Two considerations dominated Hoover’s calculation. First, the director had not pursued a major foreign-intelligence assignment; rather, the FBI’s presence in the field was a product of President Roosevelt’s organizational creativity. The Interdepartmental Intelligence Committee had considered placing the FBI in charge of clandestine work in Latin America, but no decision had been reached by the time the president divided the intelligence pie himself in June 1940. Consequently, while Hoover and Berle built the SIS, the director checked his ambition and regarded it as a genuine “service agency,” collecting secret intelligence and conducting counterintelligence investigations for the benefit of others.

Hoover’s initial lack of interest in aggrandizing his and the Bureau’s foreign intelligence role was expressed at the same IIC meeting in which intelligence jurisdictions in New York City were so hotly debated. He continued to see the Special Intelligence Service as an unsolicited and unwieldy burden until word of the unit’s spy-hunting success spread late in World War II, at which point he began seeking to expand the FBI’s post-war intelligence powers.

A second reason why Hoover willingly cooperated with Berle and the Department of State, even as he tried to shed the SIS responsibility, was his fear of bad publicity. After devoting much of the previous decade to blowing hot air into public perceptions of himself, his “G-men,” and their crime fighting abilities, Hoover was intensely reluctant to see his or the Bureau’s reputation sullied by embarrassing intrigues abroad.

To avoid being disowned in a pinch, Hoover welcomed a record of close association between his FBI and the Department of State over SIS affairs. He expressed this anxiety over the FBI’s image openly during the IIC’s long debate on intelligence contacts in New York City.

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54 Memorandum for the Director from Ladd, 4 February 1942, Folder 2, File 64-4104, Administrative Records of the SIS, General Records of the FBI, RG 65, NACP, 1.
55 Letter from Hoover to Berle, 26 February 1942, Folder 2, File 64-4104, Administrative Records of the SIS, General Records of the FBI, RG 65, NACP.
56 SIS suitors included the Office of Naval Intelligence in early 1941, “Wild Bill” Donovan’s Office of the Coordinator of Information (COI) later in 1941, and the Military Intelligence Division in mid-1942.
57 Troy, 17.
58 Minutes of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Committee, 12 February 1941, 811.20200/3-2741, Box 3728, Department of State Central Decimal File, 1940–1944, RG 59, NACP, 8.
59 In December 1944, Hoover submitted a proposal for a “world-wide intelligence system” to be run after the war by the FBI and modeled on the SIS. Webb, “The FBI and Foreign Intelligence,” 57–58.
60 For more on Hoover's public relations endeavors during the 1930s, see Kenneth O'Reilly, “A New Deal for the FBI: The Roosevelt Administration, Crime Control, and National Security,” The Journal of American History 69 (December 1982): 3. For references to Hoover's publicity concerns regarding the SIS, see Batvinis, 63, 317.
61 Minutes of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Committee, 12 February 1941, 811.20200/3-2741, Box 3728, Department of State Central Decimal File, 1940–1944, RG 59, NACP, 5.
With Hoover skittish about his image and eager to cast off the SIS, one of Berle’s most consistent challenges was keeping the Special Intelligence Service in the FBI, and thus under the nominal control of the Department of State. No aspect of the Berle-Hoover liaison provides clearer proof of its exceptional nature than this one. Incredibly, between 1940 and 1942, Berle found himself several times either defending J. Edgar Hoover’s institutional interests for him or reminding the famously competitive bureaucrat why his presence in the foreign-intelligence field was necessary.

Berle’s most desperate defense of the SIS came in September 1941 during a push by Coordinator of Information William Donovan to assume responsibility for covert intelligence work in Latin America. Upon learning of Donovan’s ambition, Hoover feared the FBI would end up working under or alongside a Donovan-led unit. The director ordered his subordinate, Edward Tamm, to visit Berle at State and inform him that, as Tamm put it, “the Bureau … had no feeling one way or the other as to whether this transfer should be made.”62 Berle dismissed this sentiment outright to Tamm, declaring that the Bureau had done “an excellent job” with the SIS and “that he would be opposed to having it transferred into untried hands.”63 Berle’s forceful opposition to Donovan’s proposal at the next IIC meeting ensured that the Service stayed within the FBI.

When Donovan made a second stab at the SIS in December 1941, Berle once again was instrumental in protecting the FBI-State status quo from Donovan’s sticky fingers. In a January 1942 strategy session with Tamm, the assistant secretary professed that “he was more than ever convinced of the absolute necessity for so handling this situation as to insure the continuation of … SIS operations in the Western Hemisphere solely and exclusively by the Bureau.”64

The relationship between Adolf Berle and J. Edgar Hoover was not the only reason for the SIS’s resounding success in Latin America. The organization also benefited from the help of friendly governments and populations throughout the region. As the conflict progressed, the failing fortunes of the Axis states and the gathering strength of the Allied war effort also helped the SIS outmaneuver enemy agents and harvest political, economic, financial, and industrial intelligence.65 Even so, the Berle-Hoover connection was an indispensable part of SIS dominance. The potent bond between the two—growing out of their respectful treatment of one another and complementary institutional interests—shielded the Special Intelligence Service from the debilitating discord that plagued other wartime intelligence organizations, such as Donovan’s Office of the Coordinator of Information (later OSS) and the US Joint Intelligence Committee. Nevertheless, the State-FBI relationship was far from perfect.

### Limits to State-FBI Cooperation

Whenever possible, Berle indulged the FBI director’s penchant for administrative control. Likewise, Hoover made a sincere effort to keep the assistant secretary abreast of the activities and requirements of the SIS. Unfortunately, this spirit of accommodation did not trickle down to all levels of the State-FBI partnership. Considerable tension between the two agencies arose at State from individuals who either mistrusted or were jealous of the FBI and its foreign-intelligence mandate.

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62 Memorandum for the Director from Tamm, 2 September 1941, Folder 1, File 64-4104, Administrative Records of the SIS, General Records of the FBI, RG 65, NACP, 1. For a fuller description of this and other takeover bids involving the SIS, see Webb, “The FBI and Foreign Intelligence,” 51–56.

63 Memorandum for the Director from Tamm, 2 September 1941, 2

64 Memorandum for the Director from Tamm, 12 January 1942, Folder 2, File 64-4104, Administrative Records of the SIS, General Records of the FBI, RG 65, NACP.

65 Letter from Hoover to Miles, 3 August 1940, Section 1, File 64-4104, Administrative Records of the SIS, General Records of the FBI, RG 65, NACP.
Interagency Collaboration

US ambassadors stationed in Latin America were the most frequent antagonists of the SIS. Ambassadors existed outside the bureaucratic hierarchy at State. They served, instead, as the president’s personal envoys to foreign governments; as a group, they constituted a third party in the relationship between State and the FBI.66 The most widespread friction between ambassadors and the Bureau during World War II erupted with the dispatch of undercover SIS agents to Latin America. In the first months of the project, all agents sent abroad by the FBI went in a clandestine capacity. The Bureau believed that keeping its agents’ identities secret from local American legations was essential for both the safety of SIS personnel and the security of their mission. Not surprisingly, US ambassadors rejected having an indeterminate number of FBI agents conducting investigations and running networks of informants in their zones of responsibility.67 They feverishly set about discerning the identity and location of every SIS agent in the field.68 British intelligence, likely feeling threatened by the Service’s presence in the region and perhaps looking for some fun, enjoyed identifying fresh American agents and reporting their arrival to unsuspecting ambassadors.69 The anger and distraction this undercover policy created subsided with the assignment of legal attachés to most Latin American embassies by late 1942.

Among the critics of the Special Intelligence Service was Hoover’s former nemesis and wartime ambassador to Mexico, George Messersmith. While serving in Mexico from 1941 to 1946, Messersmith assumed two distinct attitudes towards the Service. On one hand, he supported SIS counterintelligence investigations and engendered close ties with the FBI’s legal attachés—called civil attachés in Mexico. The ambassador sent several messages back to Washington praising the FBI men under his jurisdiction.70 In a December 1942 letter to Berle, Messersmith gushed, “I am very much pleased with the work which Mr. Jones (Civil Attaché in Mexico) is doing here with his associates. They are showing good judgment and discretion and zeal ....”71

On the other hand, even as he fostered friendships with individual SIS agents, Ambassador Messersmith lobbied hard to limit the Bureau’s intelligence footprint. For example, Secretary of State Cordell Hull asked Messersmith’s opinion in August 1942 about having a short-wave radio set installed at the US embassy in Mexico City, with a FBI operator acting under Messersmith’s control to man it, saying that such radio units had already been set up in several other embassies around Latin America.72 Messersmith argued against a radio in Mexico City, citing the delicacy of obtaining permission from the Mexican government.73 Messersmith’s argument reflected his divided feelings. He stated, “The F.B.I. representative in this Embassy is a very good man … but I do not like the idea of communications between the [State] Department and this Embassy on all sorts of matters passing through the F.B.I. representative.”74

66 This description of ambassadorial status draws on similar accounts in Memorandum for the Director from Ladd, 23 April 1942, Folder 4, File 64-4104, Administrative Records of the SIS, General Records of the FBI, RG 65, NACP, 2, and Memorandum for Ladd from F. C. Holloman, 14 January 1942, Folder 2, File 64-4104, Administrative Records of the SIS, General Records of the FBI, RG 65, NACP, 2.
68 Ibid., and Memorandum for the Director from Ladd, 23 April 1942, Folder 4, File 64-4104, Administrative Records of the SIS, General Records of the FBI, RG 65, NACP, 8–9.
69 Memorandum for the Director from Ladd, 23 April 1942, 9.
70 List of praise for the SIS from various US government officials, Folder 11, File 64-4104, Administrative Records of the SIS, General Records of the FBI, RG 65, NACP.
71 Ibid., 8.
72 Airgram from Hull to Messersmith, 12 August 1942, Box 3728, Department of State Central Decimal File, 1940–1944, RG 59, NACP.
73 Letter from Messersmith to Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles, 18 August 1942, 811.20200/R/8-1842, Box 3728, Department of State General Decimal File, 1940–1944, RG 59, NACP, 1.
74 Ibid., 2.
Back in Washington, interest in the SIS and opposition to its FBI management increased steadily during World War II. Before 1940, most diplomats at Foggy Bottom, like their peers in the field, cared little for intelligence work. As the SIS grew in size and stature, bureaucrats at State took covetous notice. Berle recorded this transition in his diary on 7 November 1940. Referencing his efforts to construct an Intelligence Division for the Department, Berle noted how “Intelligence is beginning to be interesting in the [State] Department now, so everybody wants to be in on it.”

By September 1944, a determined opposition had coalesced at State against FBI involvement in the foreign-intelligence field. These anti-FBI forces helped shut J. Edgar Hoover out of the post-war intelligence picture, but they failed in their bid to become the Bureau’s sole replacement. Instead, State shared worldwide intelligence authority with several other agencies, including the new Central Intelligence Group, MID, and ONI.

Conclusion

On 28 October 1943, Department of State administrator Rowena B. Rommel produced a long memorandum entitled “Relations of the Department of State to Other Federal Agencies.”

Rommel’s piece laid down conceptual guidelines for the Department’s wartime “role in the administration of government programs in the international field.” In one section, she considered the best technique for administering “those areas of activity where other agencies have operating responsibilities and the State Department a coordinating, advisory responsibility.”

This described perfectly the relative positions of the FBI and State in their SIS liaison. According to Rommel, “a conscious differentiation should be made between the kind of administrative methods and staff needed” in such collaborative arrangements in contrast to those used in ... direct operations.”

Her list included:

• “Breadth of intellectual grasp”—Professor Berle was considered among the brightest minds of his generation;

• “Willingness to understand another point of view”—Berle’s efforts to empathize with Hoover and defer to his administrative judgment were extensive and sustained;

• “Planning ahead to give guidance and keep abreast of emerging problems”—Hoover’s efforts to keep Berle informed about SIS troubles and triumphs kept the assistant secretary on the organization’s administrative front lines;

• “Decisiveness so all officials know where they stand and business moves along”—Berle maintained frequent and substantive contact with Hoover and several of his FBI subordinates and US ambassadors throughout Latin America;

• “Delegation of authority to lower officials and backing of those officials so there is not a continuous appealing to higher courts”—most of the day-to-day contact between State and the FBI ran between Berle’s Assistant Fletcher Warren and the rest of the FC staff and several of Hoover’s lieutenants. Berle and Hoover never allowed a

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75 Berle and Jacobs, 351.
76 According to Berle’s assistant Fletcher Warren, individuals at State compiled a list of “mistakes” in FBI political reports distributed to Berle and US ambassadors in Latin America. In retaliation, Hoover ordered the SIS to “Stop sending Political Information] to State and Ambassadors and retrench in SIS coverage.” Though Hoover dug in and fought for a post-war role in foreign intelligence, he failed to gain President Harry Truman’s support and was elbowed out of the field. For quotation and details on State’s late-war opposition to the SIS, see Memorandum to Ladd from R. R. Roach, 20 September 1944, Folder 9, File 64-4104, Administrative Records of the SIS, General Records of the FBI, RG 65, NACP. For more on interdepartmental struggles over the post-war intelligence field, see C. Thomas Thorne, Jr., and David S. Patterson, eds., “Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment.”

77 Memorandum entitled “Relations of the Department of State to Other Federal Agencies,” from Rowena B. Rommel, 28 October 1943, Box 33, Entry 718, Working Papers and Source Materials for Histories of Organizational Units, 1938–1949, Records of the War History Branch, General Records of the Department of State, RG 59, NACP.
78 Ibid., 5.
SIS-related dispute between them to travel up the chain of command. In contrast, fights between Hoover and Miles at MID and Donovan at COI shot to the Cabinet level, and even into the Oval Office.

The relationship that Adolf Berle and J. Edgar Hoover constructed was as close to Rommel’s theoretical ideal as the stresses of war and reality could be expected to allow.

The Berle-Hoover partnership was not the only instance in World War II where close personal relations among intelligence chieftains generated interdepartmental, and even international, cooperation. J. Edgar Hoover fostered a productive relationship with at least two wartime heads of ONI, Rear Adm. Walter S. Anderson and Capt. (later Vice Adm.) Alan G. Kirk, as well as their organization. Anderson worked with Hoover and Berle in establishing the SIS during the summer of 1940 and witnessed the Service’s initial progress.79 Kirk, as ONI commander in 1941, refused Hoover’s offer to transfer all SIS responsibilities in Mexico to Naval Intelligence, insisting that such a move would be counter to the government’s “best interests.”80

However, Berle and Hoover’s collaboration was unique, and all the more impressive because it reversed years of dysfunction between State and the FBI over intelligence. The two men accomplished this feat through patience, deference, open communication, and by pursuing common interests. Berle himself provided the best summary of his relationship with Hoover when he wrote in his diary on 28 February 1942, “This [SIS] is one case where cooperation between State and FBI is working out beautifully.”81

Before creating new intelligence agencies or overhauling old ones, contemporary intelligence reformers should consider the deeply personal dynamics that made the Berle-Hoover connection so formidable. Effective liaisons like theirs serve as compelling reminders that intelligence cooperation is, at its most basic level, a matter of individual, and not institutional, interaction.

79 Minutes of IIC Meeting, 3 June 1940, 811.202006-1040, Box 3728, Department of State Central Decimal File, 1940–1944, RG 59, NACP, and Troy, 17. See also Batvinis, 62.
80 Memorandum for the Director from Tamm, 11 August 1941, Folder 1, File 64-4104, Administrative Records of the SIS, General Records of FBI, RG 65, NACP. See also G. Webb, “The FBI and Foreign Intelligence,” 52–53.
81 Berle and Jacobs, 404.
Two Steps Backward

The Collapse of Intelligence Support for Air Power, 1944–52

Michael Warner

Historians of American intelligence must be tempted at times to follow a modified form of what scholars have dubbed the “Whig theory of history.” The English Whigs, or their camp-following historians, supposedly viewed the course of political evolution in Britain and America as a gradual (if sometimes bumpy) progress from premodern and autocratic rule to broader and deeper forms of democratic participation. In short, from worse to better, in a sort of cosmically preordained pattern. Similarly, students of American intelligence have sometimes viewed developments from World War I through the Cold War as an evolution from simple to complex organizational forms, from uncoordinated and amateurish attempts to more collaborative efforts by dedicated, professional officers, and from ad hoc control arrangements to codified systems of oversight and accountability.1 Again, from worse to better, in a providential way.

This Whiggish interpretation of American intelligence history may be true in the main, but new scholarship is revealing serious retrograde digressions in the overall march of progress toward integration and professionalization. Scholars such as James D. Marchio and Jeffrey M. Moore, for example, are showing the degree to which the American military in World War II made great strides in producing “joint” combat intelligence in support of theater commanders.2 Marchio has also dropped the other shoe in this story of progress by noting that the US military soon unlearned these lessons of joint intelligence after the war ended.3 Strategic intelligence was transformed after World War II, to be sure, but inter-service military intelligence at the theater or operational level was sadly neglected and actually


2 Theater commanders themselves marked something of an innovation in American military practice. Imposed upon the services after Pearl Harbor, they controlled all forces operating in their respective areas of responsibility and thus (in theory) made the separate services fight as a team.


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lost certain capabilities that it had acquired in wartime. It is little short of astonishing to note, for example, that American theater commanders between 1945 and 1991, with insignificant exceptions, did not control organic joint-service intelligence staffs to help them conduct joint operations.

Scholars like Marchio and Moore have only scratched the surface of this topic. A quick look at theater-level intelligence for air power from the closing of World War II through the Korean conflict provides ample corroborating evidence for an argument that American military intelligence lost, rather than gained, organizational sophistication and analytic proficiency at the beginning of the Cold War. The military’s wartime progress in command and control—for instance, the creation of theater commanders and the subsequent Unified Command Plan—was not matched by progress in intelligence capabilities. The decline was particularly jarring in air intelligence. Indeed, a survey of recent findings and published sources suggests that, in the very years when strategic airpower was being advocated and recognized as a key component of national security, intelligence to guide strategic bombing campaigns, especially at the operational-level, faced institutional jeopardy and professional stagnation.

Wartime Experience

World War II saw three innovations for the US military. First, strategic bombing became a centerpiece of the American arsenal and a constitutive component of the nation’s thinking about how it might deal with foreign threats. Second, Washington learned at Pearl Harbor that one man had to be in charge in each active theater of war and that unity of effort required a unity of command that transcended the individual services and fighting arms. Hence the appointment of theater commanders (most famously Eisenhower in Europe, Nimitz in the Central Pacific, and MacArthur in the South Pacific), and their assembling of inter-allied support staffs. Third, in Europe and to a lesser extent in the Pacific, these theater staffs included large intelligence elements to support strategic bombing efforts by charting the course of the air campaign and gauging its impact on enemy intentions and capabilities. The first two of these lessons proved enduring, but the third had serious troubles when the shooting stopped.

A key component of the intelligence for strategic bombing was the interpretation of evidence gleaned from overhead photography. Imagery analysis had won a place as its own discipline in World War II. By 1942, Allied bombers were growing so large and long-ranged that they promised to make a reality of pre-war forecasts of the power of strategic bombing. In so doing, aircraft technology briefly outstripped the crude reconnaissance capabilities of the Allies to guide targeting and damage assessment. Aerial photography long pre-dated World War II, of course, and it was hardly clandestine, but what made it “intelligence” was the tightly guarded sophistication of the analysis that interpreted the pictures in light of other sources to maximize the strategic impact of air power. Theater commanders needed such intelligence to understand both the effects that their efforts were having on the enemy and the best ways to allocate scarce resources.

Britain, out of necessity, had pioneered this field, creating an inter-service photo intelligence center in late 1940. The British taught their newly acquired skills to the Americans, who had gone to war with crude intelligence capabilities. The Army Air Forces (AAF) appreciated the value of integrating all available sources in an organization employing teams of expert photo-interpreters supported by analysts like those of the Enemy Objectives Unit of the Office of Strategic Services. Indeed, by the end of the war, imagery processed by theater photo interpretation centers—like the one at Medmenham, England—was providing large portions of the tactical and strategic intelligence that Allied commanders employed.

4 For example, the 12th Air Force went to North Africa in November 1942 with no trained photo-interpreters to analyze aerial photographs. Its commander, Brig. Gen. James Doolittle, analyzed the pictures from its first photoreconnaissance mission himself. See James Doolittle, with Carroll V. Glines, I Could Never Be So Lucky Again (New York: Bantam, 1991), 332.
against the Axis, and was a key to the bombers’ success in crippling the German economy.5

AAF commanders in Europe understood their dependence on the British and disliked it, but there was not much they could do. They had unintentionally developed a system to provide what would later be called “national-level” imagery support to theater-level operations, but the national system providing that support was owned by Great Britain. “We have built up the only really competent Intelligence service that exists or has existed in the Air Forces of the United States,” reflected one of the American commanders of the Combined Bomber Offensive in October 1944. Nevertheless, he continued, “if it would become necessary for us to break off from British sources of Intelligence at short notice we would be lost.”6

Less than a year later, senior AAF commanders in Europe were concerned enough about the decline of US intelligence proficiency to complain to Secretary of State James Byrnes when he visited them.7

Only in Europe, however, was this degree of sophistication, based on backstopping by the

British, achieved. Perhaps the closest analogue to it in the war against Japan was the Joint Intelligence Center Pacific Ocean Area, a Navy and Marine Corps-staff that collated imagery, signals intelligence, and human source reporting to support Adm. Nimitz’s island-hopping campaign across the Central Pacific.8

In the last year of the war, the AAF’s intelligence staff also established a Joint Target Group

6 The officer was Maj. Gen. Frederick Anderson, deputy commanding general for operations for the US Strategic Air Forces in Europe (USSTAF); see “Conference held in the Office of the Deputy Commander, Operations, USSTAF,” 9 October 1944, in the Library of Congress, Carl Spaatz Papers, USSTAF Files, Intelligence, Box 297. See also the memorandum on this topic prepared for Gen. Carl C. Spaatz, commander of the US Strategic Air Forces in Europe, by his director of intelligence, Brig. Gen. George C. MacDonald, on 7 November 1944. Concern over the dependency may also have influenced USSTAF’s relocation of much of its intelligence organization from Widewing, Bushey Park, England, to the new Main Headquarters in St. Germain, France, in late 1944—a move that may have contributed significantly to the decline in the AAF’s post-war intelligence capabilities. See Lt. Col. Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Chief, Operational Intelligence Division, to Brig. Gen. McDonald, “Notes on Operational Intelligence Division of Directorate of Intelligence, USSTAF,” 9 June 1945, 20. I am grateful to John Ferris of the University of Calgary for copies of these documents, which are held in the MacDonald Research Material, Special Collection, US Air Force Academy Library.

Postwar Changes

Victory in World War II made strategic air power a cornerstone of American defense policy, but it also showed, for the observant few, that strategic air operations depended for their success on vast quantities of accurate and timely intelligence reports.10 The operative word here is “few.”

The rout for the Army Air Forces began just after V-J Day. Victorious over the Axis, the AAF now collapsed from within. It fell from


According to H. F. Matthews, “Mr. Byrnes also heard a number of our Air Corps [sic] officers complain of a lack of adequate American intelligence and praise the high quality of British intelligence.” See “Minutes of Meeting” [of the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy], 16 October 1945, in Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1996), 64.


10 See, for instance, former Treasury Department economic analyst and Amherst College professor George S. Pettee’s The Future of American Secret Intelligence (Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1946), 35.
When the war ended, the better the officer, the faster he left.

who would inevitably be lost to civilian life when the war ended. That seems to be exactly what happened. The War Department’s “point system” gave demobilization priority to overseas veterans with the longest service (and thus the most expertise). Intelligence was no exception: The better the officer, the faster he left.

Military intelligence capabilities were swept away in the haste of demobilization. Soon the combat intelligence centers built during the war were all but gone, dismantled like the joint intelligence centers established to help theater commanders in the Pacific and Mediterranean.

Sophisticated inter-allied systems to provide air targeting intelligence through exploiting imagery and all available sources were being disbanded, their personnel demobilized, and their equipment presumably sold. Few of the AAF’s leaders understood how dependent these efforts had been on British expertise, signals intelligence, and inter-service coordination; thus little was done to preserve in Air Force hands the capability that had been so painfully won in wartime. Indeed, the “Eberstadt Report” on military unification prepared for Navy Secretary James Forrestal in the summer of 1945 had praised joint photointelligence and target analysis, but it said nothing about whether that intelligence was provided at

12 Moody, 52.
14 These numbers are derived from a quick and unscientific survey of the lists in “Air Force Combat Units of World War II,” published by the US Air Force’s historical office in 1961, and revised and reprinted in 1986. The lists are available on-line at http://libraryautomation.com/nymas/usaaf. The 1946 numbers roughly match the totals of operational AAF reconnaissance units in mid-1947: two tactical reconnaissance groups, one long-range photo-reconnaissance group, and one long-range mapping group. See also Wolk, 215.
15 Spaatz is quoted in the transcript of the “Committee for the Reorganization of the National Defense,” a conference of AAF officers held at Spaatz’s headquarters at St. Germain, France, on 6 November 1944. My thanks to John Ferris of the University of Calgary for this document.
16 Moody, 50.
the tactical, operational, or strategic levels—or whether and how to provide it in the future.  

President Truman wanted intelligence reform in late 1945, but as yet he had little time or training to understand the subtleties of what was being done in its name. By the time he examined proposals for a new director of central intelligence (DCI) to guide and coordinate activities at the national level, much of the damage had been done. The president agreed with the Army and Navy that “every department required its own intelligence”—a concession that in effect ratified the wholesale scrapping of wartime intelligence capabilities.  

Truman’s order establishing the post of DCI in January 1946 accordingly stipulated that the “existing intelligence agencies … shall continue to collect, evaluate, correlate, and disseminate departmental intelligence” (outside the purview of the DCI).  

This concession, while necessary to win military assent in the creation of the DCI and an organization to serve him, would be


...codified in the National Security Act of 1947—the same legislation that gave statutory standing to unified and specified commands, thus making permanent the wartime innovation in America’s conduct of the operational level of war. But while these theater commanders would reign relatively supreme in their areas of responsibility, nothing in the 1947 Act provided for them to have their own organic intelligence capabilities. This oversight would soon have unintended consequences.

With no secretary of defense powerful enough to coordinate a joint, all-source combat intelligence capability, and the DCI implicitly barred from this field, the military services concentrated on their own concerns and had little authority or inclination to re-create joint intelligence staffs. A blue-ribbon panel appointed by Congress to study the organization of the government flagged some of the danger signals in its January 1949 report. Its subcommittee to study intelligence, headed by Ferdinand Eberstadt, warned that the military intelligence arms had lost most of the “skilled and experienced personnel of wartime,” and that those who remained had seen “their organizations and their systems ruined by superior officers with no experience, little capacity, and no imagination.”  

This neglect devastated the nation’s ability to provide intelligence support to a strategic air campaign. AAF leaders after World War II were busy developing the potential of jet aircraft, winning independence from the Army, and then establishing the institutions of an independent US Air Force. In the spring of 1949, the Air Force deactivated several more of its tactical reconnaissance units, leaving only three squadrons in active status. Its strategic reconnaissance units seemed to have fared better only by comparison; economy measures had hampered their modernization since the war.  

The problems of developing and fielding jet-age reconnaissance aircraft—and the improved cameras for them to carry—were daunting enough, but still worse was the decay in the human and organizational assets for imagery intelligence. What time and energy they had for air intelligence seems to have been  


23 The larger panel was chaired by former president Herbert Hoover and titled the Commission on the Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government. Its national security team, headed by Eberstadt, reported to Congress in January 1949. The intelligence sections of its final report closely tracked a then-classified chapter of the team’s report titled “The Central Intelligence Agency: National and Service Intelligence,” which was declassified by the CIA in the 1990s. See CIA Management of Officially Released Information (MORI) system document 400637; the quotations are from that chapter, 39–40.


devoted to a scramble for data on targets in the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, by 1950 bomber crews still had “target materials” on only about half of their prospective targets in the USSR. On the eve of the Korean War, a draft “Handbook for Air Intelligence Officers” distributed by the Air Training Command described World War II-vintage procedures for organizing and running photo interpretation units because there was nothing else to describe. The booklet sheepishly explained that “the organization of units engaged in Air Force photo interpretation is being modified” and promised to update the section at a later date.

Consequences in Korea

The Truman administration’s decision to allow the “departments” to provide their own intelligence thus abetted, in practice, a situation in which a single service, through simple inattention, could deprive the nation of a valuable asset. In Korea, a surprised US Air Force had to reconstruct, almost from scratch, the sort of intelligence support for strategic air operations it had enjoyed in 1945. For the first two months of the conflict, a single reconnaissance technical squadron in Yokota, Japan, had to handle all photo interpretation work for the US Army and Air Force in Korea. The Army had pledged in a series of deals dating from 1946 to handle much of the interpretation of photos of the frontlines, but the Eighth Army had no photo-interpreters at all until February 1951, by which time United Nations forces had twice been threatened with eviction from the Korean peninsula. When Lt. Gen. Matthew Ridgway took over the Eighth Army in late December 1950, he found that his command literally did not know the sizes and locations of the Chinese formations facing it. To add insult to injury, an urgent reconnaissance campaign to locate those forces found little or nothing, largely because the harried photo-interpreters were relying in most cases on imagery alone to spot camouflaged Chinese positions, without the aid of other intelligence sources.

Something seemed to have gone seriously wrong. Indeed, the chief of the Far East Air Force, Lt. Gen. Otto Weyland, complained that “it appears that these lessons [of World War II] either were forgotten or never were documented.” Not until mid-1952—two years into the conflict—did theater command have at its call an all-source imagery intelligence, targeting, and battle-damage assessment capability. By the end of the war, imagery support was once again competent and robust, but recouping that capability had been expensive in time, money, and lives—and there was still little understanding that the job was perhaps too big for any one service.

James Marchio’s research adds an interesting side note. Early in the Korean war, the several commanders-in-chief of the unified and specified commands endorsed a director of naval intelligence proposal to fashion joint intelligence centers in each of their commands—an idea that was soon forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. For some still undetermined reason, the Joint Secretariat in 1951 returned the proposal with the cryptic explanation that it had been “withdrawn from consideration by the JCS.” That is roughly where matters would stand until the implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, almost four decades later.

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25 Moody, 140.
26 Ibid., 333.
29 Ibid., 272–73.
32 Ibid., 545–46.
The problem of harnessing national-level means to operational-level needs was too difficult.

Thus, a “Whig interpretation” of the history of American intelligence must be used with caution, if at all. Indeed, historians might profit from reexamining certain developments during the Cold War—such as the growth of the analytic capabilities of the Central Intelligence Agency and the creations of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Photographic Interpretation Center, and the National Reconnaissance Office—not as progress toward a higher intelligence synthesis, but as ad hoc and partial remedies for certain chronic weaknesses and problems created in the rush to demobilize after World War II.
Collection and Analysis on Iraq

Issues for the US Intelligence Community

Richard Kerr, Thomas Wolfe, Rebecca Donegan, and Aris Pappas

Editor’s Note: This is the third in a series of reports supporting the Director of Central Intelligence’s evaluation and critique of intelligence and analysis associated with the war in Iraq. It was prepared on contract by the Kerr Group, a team of former senior intelligence officers. The Group’s first report, a classified study, was a documentation of the Intelligence Community’s judgments before the war. It characterized the intelligence process, product content, and analytic shortcomings but was not a commentary on the accuracy of those judgments. The second report, also classified, reviewed the intelligence used to support judgments regarding weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. Specifically, it reviewed the reporting used to develop the National Intelligence Estimate “Iraq’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction,” published in October 2002. The third report, which follows, was an unclassified study presented in July 2004. In it, the team presents an assessment of the performance of the Intelligence Community from a broad perspective, focusing on systemic issues that channeled analysts’ evaluations and analyses. Its observations and recommendations continue to have relevance as the Community evolves.

The Intelligence Community’s uneven performance on Iraq from 2002–4 raised significant questions concerning the condition of intelligence collection, analysis, and policy support. The discussion of shortcomings and failures that follows is not meant to imply that all surprises can be prevented by even good intelligence. There are too many targets and too many ways of attacking them for even the best intelligence agencies to discover all threats in time to prevent them from happening. Nonetheless, improving performance requires an acknowledgement of past mistakes and a willingness to change.

This report was prepared at a time of a great rush to reorganize and give the leader of the Intelligence Community new authorities. That probably was a necessary activity. However, to move the organizational boxes and to offer new authorities are not the only answers or perhaps even the best answers. Based on our experience and what we learned during this review, the Group believes that the quality of intelligence will be improved only by fundamental changes at the grass roots level. That is, changes in collection, analysis, the nature of the product, and interaction with policymakers and other customers.

The Intelligence Community itself has made some useful changes and recommended oth-
The national intelligence produced on the technical and cultural/political areas, however, remained largely distinct and separate. Little or no attempt was made to examine or explain the impact of each area on the other. Thus, perspective and a comprehensive sense of understanding of the Iraqi target were lacking. This independent preparation of intelligence products in these distinct but interrelated areas raises significant questions about how intelligence supports policy. In an ironic twist, the policy community was receptive to technical intelligence (the weapons program), where the analysis was wrong, but apparently paid little attention to intelligence on cultural and political issues (post-Saddam Iraq), where the analysis was right.

With respect to the weapons programs, some critics have argued that the off-the-mark judgments resulted largely from reinforcement of the Community's assumptions by an audience that was predisposed to believe them. This, however, seems to have been less a case of policy reinforcing “helpful” intelligence judgments than a case of policy deliberations deferring to the Community in an area where classified information and technical analysis were seen as giving it unique expertise.

On the other hand, the Intelligence Community's analysis of post-Saddam Iraq rested on little hard information, was informed largely by strong regional and country expertise developed over time, and yet was on the mark. Intelligence projections in this area, however, although largely accurate, had little or no impact on policy deliberations.

The bifurcation of analysis between the technical and the cultural/political in the analytic product and the resulting implications for policy indicates systemic problems in collection and analysis. Equally important, it raises questions about how best to construct intelligence products to effectively and accurately inform policy deliberations.

The policy community was receptive to technical intelligence on WMD, where the analysis was wrong, but paid little attention to analysis on post-Saddam Iraq, which was right.
The Context

Any examination of the Intelligence Community must acknowledge the impact of more than 10 years of turmoil that adversely affected all collection and analytic efforts, including those on Iraq. The Intelligence Community was designed to focus on the Soviet Union. It had developed a single-minded rigor and attention to detail that enriched its analysis, particularly with respect to Soviet military issues. The end of the Cold War, however, brought to a close that “stable” bipolar world and left the United States without a principal enemy. Although never perfect, the Intelligence Community’s analytic efforts against the Soviet threat were generally insightful and its collection largely effective, reflecting the accumulation of deep understanding developed over many years.

Absent this singular focus, in the post-Cold War environment the Intelligence Community struggled to reestablish its identity and purpose in what had become a world of multiple crises and transient threats. The effort to define its priorities was further complicated as policymakers and others raised questions not only about the role of but even the need for intelligence. Accordingly, intelligence came to be seen as an area where the government could reap resource savings. The resulting cutbacks in collection (technical and HUMINT) and analytic resources had a significant adverse impact on Intelligence Community capabilities.

Nonetheless, during the 1990s the Intelligence Community confronted numerous crises in which to demonstrate the relevance of intelligence analysis to policy deliberations. Regional conflicts, such as the first Gulf War and follow-on sanctions against Iraq, the breakup of Yugoslavia, and emerging threats from North Korea and Iran provided tests for intelligence. The Community’s collection and analysis performance over this period, however, was seen as inconsistent and sometimes faulty, leaving important customers still wondering about the relevance of the intelligence input to policy deliberations.

A significant contributor to this uneven performance was, and still is, the Community’s tendency to establish single-issue centers and crisis-response task forces. By stripping expertise from regional offices, they diminish the overall ability to provide perspective and context for those issues. The resources seldom get returned to the line offices, which historically have been better equipped to provide complete perspectives on country and regional issues.

Although resources increased marginally over the decade, they were not as robust or focused as the capabilities devoted to the Soviet Union and were seen by the Intelligence Community as inadequate to deal conclusively with the multiplicity of threats. Accordingly, the Community in critical situations has faltered in its analyses and failed to collect pertinent information. This has occurred over a length of time and across crises sufficient in number, quite apart from Iraq, to indicate systemic issues rather than just occasional missteps.

Collection Impeded and Misdirected

Intelligence collection against Iraq fell far short of the mark. The intelligence base for collection and analysis was thin and sketchy. The Intelligence Community had nothing like the richness, density, and detail that it worked hard to develop and became accustomed to having on Soviet issues during the Cold War. To a significant extent this resulted from the reduction over the past decade of the professional collection management cadre capable of integrating HUMINT, imagery, and signals intelligence capabilities into coherent strategies. This development was compounded by the increased separation of collection professionals from the analytic cadre who had been intimately involved in identifying collection gaps, needs, and priorities and developing collection strategies.

Placing these developments in a broader context, however, is important. Iraq was not the only significant intelligence problem facing the Community in the years immediately preceding the
Postmortem

Counterterrorism and counterproliferation were given higher priority and absorbed much of the clandestine service’s capability and leadership attention. Weapons programs in both North Korea and Iran received higher priority than those in Iraq until late 2002. In Iraq, technical collection priorities emphasized coverage of the Iraqi air defense system in southern Iraq in support of US military operations and prevented collection on other important targets in Iraq.

A number of other factors added to the difficulty of clandestine collection on the Iraq target. The Iraqis took pains to carefully hide their WMD programs. People and operations were protected from US intelligence by a variety of methods, including isolating scientists and technicians involved in the programs and employing effective camouflage, concealment, and deception efforts. The Iraqis had learned well about US intelligence during more than 10 years of confrontation and war.

Nevertheless, collection of information on difficult targets is the core mission of intelligence and in the Iraq case it did not measure up. Many of the more sophisticated clandestine technical collection techniques did not produce results. The Iraq WMD target was given a high priority over more than a decade, even if not the highest. Still, the Intelligence Community did not have conclusive evidence on what the Iraqis were working on, what they had achieved, which programs were ongoing, who was working them, or what the doctrines for use might be. Conversely, the Community saw no evidence that WMD programs were slowed, put on hold, or even nonexistent. Nor did it understand why Saddam’s devious and obstructionist behavior continued if, as he claimed, he had no stockpiles of banned weapons.

US intelligence collection strategies contributed to the problem. Looking for information on a particular subject with a preconception of what is needed is almost certain to result in data that reinforces existing assumptions. The Community directed its collection capabilities to filling in what it thought were gaps in information about WMD programs, monitoring progress, looking for new developments in weapons and delivery systems, and identifying efforts to acquire materiel and technology abroad. Based on the hard information collected by US military forces and UN inspectors during and following the first Gulf war, reinforced by subsequent bits of information, the Intelligence Community and the US defense establishment had little doubt that Iraq was continuing development of WMD.

Collection was not focused or conceptually driven to answer questions about the validity of the premise that the WMD programs were continuing apace. This problem is well illustrated by a comprehensive collection support brief describing intelligence needs published by the DCI Center for Weapons Intelligence, Nonproliferation, and Arms Control. It was published contemporaneously with the 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on WMD. The brief describes in great detail the information required to support analysis of Iraq’s weapons programs. The intent of the brief was to expose gaps in knowledge about what was believed to be aggressive, ongoing Iraqi weapons programs. The revealed gaps in knowledge were not, however, raised as requirements to address what was not known nor did such gaps raise doubts about prevailing intelligence judgments.

Discussing largely space-based collection systems at an unclassified level is difficult, but a few observations are possible. Despite a wide variety of technical capabilities available to the US, these systems were able to provide accurate information on relatively few critical issues. Monitoring Iraqi reactions to inspections was informative as was reporting on Iraqi acquisition efforts. Technical collection lends itself to monitoring large-scale, widespread targets, a condition not met in the Iraqi case. Analysis of Iraq’s WMD programs, therefore, provides an excellent case study for an assessment of the limitations of relying too heavily on technical collection systems with little acknowledgement of the political/cultural context in which such programs exist.

Accordingly, surprisingly little collection was directed against several key issues. Neglected topics for collection included the
social, cultural, and economic impacts on Iraq of nearly 20 years of war and 10 years of sanctions and isolation. Little attention appears to have been paid, for example, to collecting information on the oil-for-food program. Considerable speculation was voiced that several countries and individuals were profiting from this program. Despite the fact that many of the targets for this subject were outside Iraq, it received only sporadic attention.

Although collection itself was a problem, analysts were led to rely on reporting whose sourcing was misleading and even unreliable. In the case of US clandestine reporting, it too often used different descriptions for the same source, leading analysts to believe they had more corroborative information from more sources than was actually the case. In addition, some critical judgments were made on the basis of intelligence provided by foreign intelligence services. Some of those liaison sources were not available to the US, and some key information obtained from liaison proved to be false.

The Intelligence Community knows how to collect secret information, even though in the Iraq situation it did not perform this function well. On the other hand, the acquisition of “softer” intelligence on societal issues, personalities, and elites presents an even greater challenge. This latter information can be found in databases, but they are too often only accessible indirectly and with considerable effort. It may also reside in the minds of groups of people who are accessible but not easily approachable and who do not fall into the category of controlled agents. Although there is a strong argument that the clandestine service should not divert its attention away from collecting “secrets,” information on the stresses and strains of society may be equally, if not more, important. This type of information, however, does not fit with the reward system in the collection world and can be difficult to fully assess and to integrate with other information.

In the case of Iraq, collection strategies were weak and unimaginative and failed to get the richness and density of information required. A careful examination might have addressed the long-neglected question of the value added by the different types of intelligence—e.g., SIGINT and IMINT—relative to the resources devoted to them. Collection on Iraq also was the victim of inadequate funding and too intense competition between top priority targets. Finally, Iraq demonstrates that collection strategies must take into account that the absence of dangerous activity in a targeted country cannot be convincingly demonstrated in the presence of a secretive and devious regime. Or, put differently, collection strategies should recognize the extreme difficulty of requiring such a regime to prove the negative in the face of assumptions that it is dissembling. Overall, the Intelligence Community did not acquit itself well in developing collection strategies on Iraq.

Analysis Adversely Affected

No single act of omission or commission accounts for the inconsistent analytic performance of the Intelligence Community with regard to Iraq. It appears to be the result of decisions made, and not made, since the fall of the Soviet Union, which had an impact on the analytical environment analogous to the effect of the meteor strikes on the dinosaurs. Nothing was the same afterwards. In response to changed priorities and decreased resources, the Intelligence Community’s analytic cadre underwent changes in both its organization and its methodological orientation. Perhaps the most significant change was the shift away from long-term, in-depth analysis in favor of more short-term products intended to provide direct support to policy. Done with the best of intentions, this shift seems to have had the result of weakening elements of the analytic discipline and rigor that characterized Intelligence Community products through the Cold War.

The kind of intellectual-capital-intensive analysis that traditionally and effectively preceded policy deliberations was unavailable because of the shift away from
research-oriented analytic investments. In reviewing the national intelligence products associated with Iraq, we found that they too often dealt, seriatim, with a broad range of subjects but without extensive cross-reference, and with no attempt to synthesize a broader understanding of Iraq out of the many detailed pieces that were prepared. The absence of such a contextual effort contributed to assessments that failed to recognize the significance of gaps in collection that may have been more evident when viewed from a larger perspective.

The absence of a unifying analysis was also disguised by the rapidity and volume of interactions between intelligence and policy deliberations. Eagerly responsive to quickly developed policy requirements, the quick and assured response gave the appearance of both knowledge and confidence that, in retrospect, was too high.

Of all the methodological elements that contributed, positively and negatively, to the Intelligence Community’s performance, the most important seems to be an uncritical acceptance of established positions and assumptions. Gaps in knowledge were left undiscovered or unattended, which to some degree is explainable by the absence of pervasive, intrusive, and effective collection in Iraq. Although many products were appropriately caveated, the growing need to caveat judgments to explain the absence of direct intelligence did not seem to provoke internal review within the Intelligence Community. Indeed, although certain gaps were acknowledged, no product or thread within the intelligence provided called into question the quality of basic assumptions, hastening the conversion of heavily qualified judgments into accepted fact.

As noted earlier, the growing use of centers also contributed to what was at best a problematic result. The Intelligence Community has generally considered centers a useful organizational concept to concentrate analytic and collection capabilities against a carefully defined target set or issue. They also have the effect, however, of drawing resources away from more broadly based organizations. The post-Cold War reductions throughout the Intelligence Community made this a critical but insidious factor. Analysis of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction thus became the purview of technically competent analysts, but as has been described elsewhere, their efforts were not leavened through review by more broadly based colleagues.

Finally, quality control was weakened. The extensive layers of critical management review that traditionally served to ensure both the validity and standing of finished intelligence products seem to have been ineffective in identifying key issues affecting collection and analysis. Allowing for a satisfying sense of voluminous production, and reflecting the approval of receptive consumers, the policy-heavy process provided positive feedback, while the narrowly focused internal architecture lacked the self-awareness that could otherwise have raised serious and timely warnings.

**Interaction with the Policy Community**

Few issues have engaged greater policymaker interest in intelligence than those concerning Iraq—particularly the questions of weapons of mass destruction and Saddam’s links to al-Qa’ida. The demands for intelligence in the months leading up to the war were numerous and intense. The Intelligence Community responded to the overwhelming consumer demand with an ever-increasing stream of analysis—both written and oral. Neither means of communication, however, served the policy community as well as it might have.

In periods of crisis, when demands are high and response time is short, most written intelligence production is in the form of policy-driven memos and briefs and pieces written for daily publications. The result of this narrowly focused and piecemeal intelligence flow is that it neither fosters continuity of analysis nor provides a context within
Too close association with policy deliberations can be troublesome.

which to place seemingly unrelated information. In the case of Iraq, national intelligence did not provide a comprehensive picture of how the country functioned as a whole. The Intelligence Community has made substantial, although sporadic, efforts over the past decade and a half to explore better and more technologically advanced methods of communicating with consumers. The results, however, have been modest at best. The requirement to have background and contextual information available at the policymaker’s fingertips in a timely fashion remains unfulfilled.

The policy community was also ill served by the national intelligence estimate (NIE) process. NIEs rarely represent new analysis or bring to bear more expertise than already exists in analytic offices; indeed, drafters of NIEs are usually the same analysts from whose work the NIE is drawn. Little independent knowledge or informed outside opinion is incorporated in estimative products. The preparation of an NIE therefore consists primarily of compiling judgments from previous products and debating points of disagreement. The Iraqi WMD estimate of October 2002 was characterized by all of these weaknesses and more. It was done under an unusually tight time constraint—three weeks—to meet a deadline for congressional debate. And it was the product of three separate drafters, each responsible for independent sections, drawing from a mixed bag of analytic product. Consistent application of analytic or evidentiary standards became next to impossible.

The fundamental question is whether national intelligence estimates add value to the existing body of analytic work. Historically, with few exceptions, NIEs have not carried great weight in policy deliberations, although customers have often used them to promote their own agendas. The time may have come to reassess the value of NIEs and the process used to produce them.

Oral communications have their own set of problems. While direct engagement with the policy community is essential for intelligence to have an impact, too close association with policy deliberations can be troublesome. In the case of Iraq, daily briefings and other contacts at the highest levels undoubtedly influenced policy in ways that went beyond the coordinated analysis contained in the written product. Close and continuing personal contact, unfettered by the formal caveats that usually accompany written production, probably imparted a greater sense of certainty to analytic conclusions than the facts would bear.

Some in the Intelligence Community and elsewhere hold the view that intense policymaker demands in the run-up to the war constituted inappropriate pressure on intelligence analysts. Although viewed in that context as a problem, serious pressure from policymakers almost always accompanies serious issues. The more relevant issue is how the Intelligence Community responded to the climate of policy-level pressure and expectations. Whether or not this climate contributed to the problem of inconsistent analytic performance, however, remains an open question.

The cases of WMD and Iraq’s links to al-Qa’ida illustrate two different responses to policy pressure. In the case of al-Qa’ida, the constant stream of questions aimed at finding links between Saddam and the terrorist network caused analysts to take what they termed a “purposely aggressive approach” in conducting exhaustive and repetitive searches for such links. Despite the pressure, however, the Intelligence Community remained firm in its assessment that no operational or collaborative relationship existed. In the case of Iraq’s possession of WMD, on the other hand, analytic judgments and policy views were in accord, so that the impact of pressure, if any, was more nuanced and may have been considered reinforcing. Although it is possible that in the absence of strong policy interest, analysts would have been more inclined to examine their underlying assumptions, it is unlikely that such examination would have changed judgments that were longstanding and firmly held.
Final Thoughts

The intelligence world is one of ambiguity, nuance, and complexity. Dealing with these elements is difficult in the world intelligence serves, where success or failure is the uncomplicated measure by which the Intelligence Community is judged. The controversies over Iraq intelligence can be expressed in the contrast between these two worlds: carefully crafted national intelligence that ultimately failed in its singular mission to accurately inform policy deliberations. This report, the result of over two years of review and consideration, reflects the same contrast. On the one hand, it recognizes the enormous efforts undertaken, the long hours and the intense debate. On the other hand, it describes failures and weaknesses that cannot be ignored or mitigated.

Failures of collection, uncritical analytical assumptions, and inadequate management reviews were the result of years of well-intentioned attempts to do the best job with the resources provided. Decisions were made and their potential risks weighed, but the outcome on important issues proved badly flawed. Recognition of these problems must bring a rapid response.

US intelligence is a robust, highly capable, and thoroughly motivated community that represents an invaluable asset to the nation and its citizens. It must reveal itself as sufficiently mature to both adapt to changing circumstances and counteract the evolutionary processes that have conspired to threaten its reputation and its ability to successfully perform its assigned mission. The alternative is unacceptable and unthinkable.
Connecting the Virtual Dots

How the Web Can Relieve Our Information Glut and Get Us Talking to Each Other

Matthew S. Burton

In June 2005, the Director of National Intelligence issued a call for submissions for the second Galileo Awards contest. Intelligence professionals are invited to offer innovative ideas to shape the future of US intelligence. The program is designed to tap into the wealth of talent and ideas that reside at all levels of seniority and responsibility in the Intelligence Community.

Two articles from among the top entries in last year's inaugural running of the program—modified slightly and updated—are included in this issue of Studies, beginning here.

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When I joined the Defense Intelligence Agency as an analyst in January 2003, what excited me most was the opportunity to use the Intelligence Community's proprietary technology tools. If the public has access to the amazing capabilities of the World Wide Web, I thought, the Intelligence Community (IC) must be a wonderland: search engines that could read my mind, desktop video conferencing with teammates around the world . . .

The reality was a colossal letdown. Intelink—the network that was designed to negate the physical distance that separates intelligence agencies and their customers—seems anachronistic in comparison to the Web we use at home. As a technology enthusiast with seven years of Web development experience, I was appalled that the rest of the world had access to better online tools than did the US national security structure—the very creator of “online.” Our search engines return results reminiscent of the pre-Google Web. Our online personnel directories are useless. Agencies and combatant commands use a hodgepodge of incompatible discussion and chat tools, furthering our tendency to speak only with those in our own buildings.

Why is the Web so much more user-friendly than Intelink? Did the late-1990s Silicon Valley boom propel private industry ahead of the government? Do our unique security requirements make great tools inaccessible to us?

The answer is much simpler. The Web is user-friendly because its users control its content. Intelink's pages are published by technicians who neither use the system for research nor understand its content. The Web's 900 million users can instantly say whatever they like in their own personal publishing space; on Intelink, content is restricted to what our agencies call “official products,” and several layers of supervisors, systems administrators, and Web programmers.

A former Defense Intelligence Agency analyst, Matthew S. Burton is currently pursuing a graduate degree.
The Web makes geography meaningless . . . But geography is everything on Intelink.

We should not replace the existing method of online publication, but rather supplement it with a community of users. Giving Intelink users the push-button publishing technology they have at home would bring them together and also organize the system’s information more neatly. There is no reason why our at-home information services should surpass those in our offices. We can make Intelink just like the Web. All we need is permission.

Intelink’s Impersonal Touch

Interagency cooperation is probably the IC’s most talked-about deficiency. I believe that most of us want to work with one another. Intelligence analysts, while introverted, aren’t incapable of building trusting relationships with coworkers. Those relationships, however, are predominantly with people down the hall, while the people we should be talking to most are either across the Beltway or on the other side of the world. The physical distance between us makes cross-community communication too difficult.

The Web makes geography meaningless—users can quickly find and meet new people who share their interests, regardless of their location. But geography is everything on Intelink. Intelink is more like an oligarchy of agencies than a community of individuals with shared interests. Our documents are presented as the products of agencies and offices, not of the people who wrote them. Corporate logos and office symbols are much more common than authors’ phone numbers and e-mail addresses. Our electronic personnel directories are so cumbersome and outdated that it sometimes seems as if their keepers don’t want us to speak to one another. Is the goal of our intranet to keep intelligence officers as anonymous as possible?

It is true that in our work, anonymity can be imperative. But it is possible to preserve our anonymity while maintaining a personal online presence. Anonymity has not kept the Web from establishing incredibly close-knit communities, where many members never show their faces or use their real names. Some of these communities are more congenial and cooperative than are the neighborhoods we live in. Why? Because people behave on the Web as people—the electronic buffer zone allows for an honesty that is hard to find in the physical world. With fewer inhibitions, people write in their own voice about their own ideas. Communication on the Web has a personal touch. Instead of formal documents with generic e-mail addresses, readers get unfiltered words written in natural language. Wouldn’t we all rather write to Jim or Patty—even if those aren’t their real names—than to an indecipherable office acronym or a generic e-mail address? I know I would. But, if given more choices, I would largely avoid e-mail, which is fast becoming as passé as a dial-up modem.

E-mail is Dead

While the IC has slowly incorporated e-mail over the past decade, it is approaching obsolescence in the outside world. Ever since the Defense Department gave the Internet to the public, its outside-world users have run circles around us, creating countless new tools while we slowly lurch forward. It is a shame that US security structures—which used to be the gold standard of electronic communication with inventions like e-mail (in 1971)—are now lagging behind the latest innovations.

Aside from spam—a crippling problem that does not threaten Intelink—e-mail has several deficiencies that restrict communication:

- It is clumsily organized and difficult to search.
- It makes group discussions cumbersome.
- It comes across too much like official communication and too little like personal dialogue.
- It restrains the raw thoughts of corporate users. Since e-mail is a written, recorded, and
traceable medium, users too often treat messages as official communication instead of personal dialogue, for fear of retribution.

- It shuts out interested parties from discussions that are not necessarily private. When we send an e-mail, we make the assumption that the recipients care what we have to say and that nobody else does.

E-mail has its place. When correspondence is truly private, it is the best electronic option. But many times, broadcasting a message is better than point-to-point communication.

If Not E-mail, Then What?

If I had arrived in the IC two years ago to find no e-mail access, I would have been appalled. But in a few years, our new employees will think of e-mail as an outdated technology. They'll be asking: “Where's my blog?”

A blog lets ordinary computer users with average technical knowledge instantly publish on the Web. Since blogs came along two years ago, 9 million people have started their own, many of them at no cost. Most authors are just looking to keep friends and family updated without overloading their inboxes.

This nonintrusive publication method lets writers say what they really think. We all have that uncle who forwards every terrible joke he finds online. We usually groan when it shows up in our inbox. How dare he waste my time and hard-disk space with this? We victims of poor e-mail etiquette don't want to be seen as the annoying uncle, so before we send e-mails, we self censor, taking into account our addressee's possible reaction: “Will he think I'm stupid? Will he delete this in disgust? Maybe I should remove this sentence.”

A blog is different. It's our own space. Readers have the option of viewing it every day or completely ignoring it, but whatever they do, we're not necessarily liable for their reaction. We're not telling them that they have to read it, so if they don't like it, we aren't to blame. This gives us freedom to speak our minds.

The IC desperately needs this kind of attitude. There are multiple cases in which it would have been useful for customers to hear analysts’ unfiltered opinions, which are often substantially diluted by the time they finally make it to Intelink.

Broadcasting a blog has another big advantage over a point-to-point e-mail conversation: It lets previously unknown people participate in the dialogue. After two years in the IC, I have probably met fewer than half of the dozens of people who share my analytical focus, mainly due to our poor directories and the scarcity of personal information on official products. If we all had our own homes on Intelink—blog sites—we would be much more visible to people trying to reach us.

And visitors to our blogs wouldn't just read. Blogs allow readers to contribute to the discussion by adding their own comments to a writer's posts. Do you have a question to which someone out there is bound to know the answer? Blog the question and wait for someone to come across it and post an answer. Do you have thoughts on an intelligence product? Write them down and let the rest of your community know what you think; then watch as your counterparts contribute their own opinions.

If the IC used blogs, analysts, collectors, and customers could hold impromptu discussions at any time, instead of having to schedule meetings weeks in advance.
And when the time came for such meetings, those present would already have a solid foundation for discussion instead of having to spend time learning the names, roles, and interests of those involved. Intelink has the potential to be a place where groups of intelligence officers from around the world can speak freely and substantively on a daily basis. Such continuous, candid dialogue is the only way to forge relationships of trust in an industry where people are trained to be distrustful.

The Google World

The reason the Web feels comfortable to its users is the same reason that its search engines are so efficient. Back in the mid-1990s, Yahoo! was the place to find Web pages. Yahoo! sorted the Web into categories. The Web had about 100-million pages then, and most of them were on massive sites like those of media organizations and corporations. Over half of all Web traffic went to the top 1,000 sites. Any site that mattered fit neatly into a Yahoo! category.

As individual users started making their own pages, however, the amount of Web content ballooned, and Yahoo! fell behind. The Web began to cover a seemingly infinite number of topics.

Google changed all that in 1998. Instead of looking only at a page's content, Google judges a page by the company it keeps, so to speak. It does this through link analysis. When Site A links to Site B, Site A is essentially vouching for the quality of Site B. As more pages link to Site B, its reputation is improved in the eyes of Google. The content on the linking pages also matters. If NBA.com links to your site with the word “basketball,” Google will forever associate your site with basketball—and because NBA.com is considered authoritative, its link to your site will do wonders for your “PageRank,” Google’s value-rating of your page.

The Web is so named because the 8 billion pages that link to one another form a massive web of connected dots. But what looks like a mess has logic to it: Pages with similar content link to one

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1 The statistic is from an internet data firm called Alexa Internet. It was cited in Internet World on 31 August 1998. See: http://www.netvalley.com/intvalstat.html.
Google has faith that when Web-page authors make links, they're connecting them to sites similar to their own. And, in general, they do. Google can therefore make extremely accurate estimates of which sites are related to one another and which sites provide reliable information.

Intelink is No Google

Intelink is different. As I mentioned earlier, intelligence products are presented for customers rather than for analysts conducting research. While pages on the public Web lead you from one resource to the next via links to related content, Intelink products do not. You will not find a CIA assessment that links to source documents from NSA, even though the assessment makes multiple references, implicit or explicit, to those sources. Instead, most links simply move up or down within a hierarchy. For example, a product links to the page of the office that produced it, which in turn links to the directorate it lies under, which links to other directorate offices and the parent agency. The lack of cross-Community links makes Intelink look much like our individual agencies' organizational charts. There is nothing inherent in Intelink that makes it this way. The Intelink Management Office (IMO) does not dictate content. This is just the way things are done.

The lack of substantive linkages has obvious human implications. If we question a product’s assessment, we cannot delve into the sources that it is based upon. We are forced to take the author’s word for it. If there is any industry that should make its sources readily available to readers, it is ours. Instances where such information would have averted disaster are numerous—the most recent and embarrassing case coming two years ago, when the claims of multiple sources regarding Iraq’s weapons programs turned out to be those of a single person.

But while poor linking practices make Web browsing hard for humans, they pose an even bigger problem for search engines. Remember how Google associated an aforementioned page with basketball simply based on links from other pages? Cross-Community links would allow our search engines to find relationships between documents and to understand the content and quality of those documents. But we have very few of these links. Instead, Intelink is more of a tree than a web: Similar pages lie at opposite edges of the tree, separated by a thicket of trunk and limbs. Search engines read this as a lack of similarity between the pages. Without more direct links between similar pages, Intelink’s search engines will continue to deliver poor results.

Blogs Can Change Things

How will giving individual users their own posting space change the linkage problem? First, giving us free rein over content would rid Intelink of its hierarchical structure. The mess you see in Figure 1 is a good thing. Second, because users are the same people who write the content, they are in a unique position to give it a good online...
Logical dots are easier to connect if the virtual ones are already connected.

In the opening paragraph of this article, I mentioned that I had expected “search engines that could read my mind.” This probably elicited some laughs. But it is not far-fetched. Many e-commerce sites do this already. Amazon.com, for example, customizes its home page for each person depending on his or her past purchases. One of Google's stated goals is to know what users are looking for before they start typing. How can they do this? By gathering information on their users’ interests. This is hard to do in the public world.

Corporate intranets like Intelink, however, have an advantage. All IC employees consent to having their computer actions monitored. This means that every Web page we read and every e-mail we write could be used to create a profile of our interests. Intelink search engines would then be able to automatically weed out reams of information they knew we didn’t want, helping to ease the information overload that has burdened the IC in recent years.

Conclusion

Stronger professional relationships and better search capabilities would be the two greatest rewards of personal home pages,

Three Cheap, Simple Technologies Intelink Needs Now

**del.icio.us** (pronounced "delicious"): Among the WMD Commission’s recommendations was an IC-wide directory of personnel and their skills and clearances. But the details of an intelligence officer’s responsibilities are much too granular to be confined to a phone book entry. A better way to learn about a person's job is to look at what he’s been reading and writing. **del.icio.us** lets you maintain a public list of bookmarks so that others can see what your interests are. Similarly, you can discover who has bookmarked a given page, making it easy to find people who share your interests. The site is maintained by a single person and has about 30,000 users. See: http://del.icio.us.

**RSS**: **RSS** is a public standard for tracking your favorite blogs. Because entries are published on the Web instead of delivered like e-mails, you have to periodically check those blogs for new entries. This is very time-consuming. **RSS** "readers" track your favorite blogs and automatically retrieve new messages for display in an Outlook-like interface. The Intelink Management Office has deployed a Web-based **RSS** reader, but it is relatively unknown, and its existence as Web-based software makes it difficult for some agencies’ systems to run properly.

**Technorati**: With 9 million blogs on the Web, the "blogosphere" is messy. **Technorati** sorts out the good from the bad for you. Because blogs have a built-in referral system, **Technorati** can instantly show you the most authoritative bloggers on a given subject. During the next crisis in a lesser-known country, search for the country name at technorati.com and you'll be shown the blogs of expatriots giving up-to-the-minute, on-the-ground updates. **Technorati** also points you to the day’s most blogged-about topics.
Managers should not see blogging as haphazard intelligence or dilly-dallying.

Managers should not see blogging as haphazard intelligence or dilly-dallying. Both of which would take time to realize. But there would be smaller, more immediate benefits as well. Analysts would be able to provide supporting documentation for their products—something that is usually lost in the editing process—giving counterparts and customers as much backup information as they want. Authors of assessments whose information has become outdated could amend those assessments as situations change. Veteran officers could use their space to archive their thoughts before they retire, preserving institutional knowledge.

Finally, intelligence officers would no longer be bound by definitions of what is and what is not an intelligence product. Right now, the contents of Intelink represent only a small fraction of the IC’s collective knowledge. Our brains are full of hunches and half-formed ideas that, while unsuitable for finished intelligence, could have an impact on the thinking of other analysts and policymakers if we were given soapboxes. This article is drawn from a paper submitted to last year’s inaugural Galileo Awards program, which solicited innovative ideas from the Community. Before then, many brilliant ideas were probably lost due to the lack of an audience. Why let good ideas vanish?

The Intelink Management Office is now testing Weblogging tools, but success is not guaranteed. The IMO must choose a tool that early adopters will find familiar. Some tech-savvy intelligence officers already use such software at home, and the best way to gain their support is by giving them something they’re already used to. Once a decision is made, systems managers across the IC must fully support the chosen software. Too many technology tools designed to increase cross-Community communication have failed due to competing standards and incompatibility with agency-level network configurations.

Once blogs have been deployed, managers must encourage their employees to use the new technologies. They should not see blogging as a waste of time, dilly-dallying, or haphazard intelligence. Instead, they should view it as a venue for brainstorming and relationship building. Active offices will see the benefits. Their staffs will be in the vanguard of establishing strong working relationships with other agencies and offices, reaping the benefits of increased contacts and access to information. Their intelligence products will accommodate customers’ desire for details. And their work areas will become more vibrant atmospheres that buzz with new ideas.

Finally, users must embrace the new technology. Early adopters who love experimenting with technology are key. If you are one of these people, you have the chance to become the envy of your colleagues by radically increasing your visibility and productivity. Your success will be this program’s best marketing tool.

Over the past four years, policymakers and the press have endlessly underscored the need for Intelligence Community agencies to work more closely together. Few of us in the IC can say they are wrong. But even fewer of us can say we have the
necessary tools for doing so. The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction understood this problem and recommended the creation of new technologies to aid IC communication. What it did not understand is that such tools already exist on our home computers. If these tools are good enough to help a whole world of people communicate—everyone from hermitic techies to senior citizens—then they are good enough for us. We should see what everyone is raving about.²

² The author can be reached at: matt@alumni.duke.edu.
US policymakers, war-fighters, and law-enforcers now operate in a real-time, worldwide decision and implementation environment. Information about a new development in Baghdad is known in Washington within minutes. Decisions about a response are made in Washington within minutes. These decisions are implemented in Baghdad within minutes. The total “intelligence-decision-implementation” cycle time can be as short as 15 minutes. While this is an extreme example, it highlights the tremendous compression of the response time required by all involved compared to previous generations. This severe compression not only affects the highest priority issues, but also ripples back into the most routine intelligence, decision, and implementation processes.

It does so for good reason. The compressed response cycle gives the United States significant strategic and tactical superiority over our adversaries. Our national security is best protected when we operate more quickly than those who would do harm to our people and our freedom. This compressed response time allows us to disrupt, interdict, preempt, and respond to injurious efforts before our adversaries can achieve their goals against us. This compression is not just a preferred work style within the US national security community. It is characteristic of the way the world works in the 21st century. Thus, not only do we respond more quickly, but also the circumstances to which we respond—in and of themselves—develop more quickly. These rapidly changing circumstances take on lives of their own, which are difficult or impossible to anticipate or predict. The US national security community—and the Intelligence Community (IC) within it—is faced with the question of how to operate in a security environment that, by its nature, is changing rapidly in ways we cannot predict. A simple answer is that the Intelligence Community, by its nature, must change rapidly in ways we cannot predict.

Wrong Way, Right Way

What was that? How can we change ourselves in ways we cannot predict? More directly, how do we modify our nature to enable such unpredictable changes? Before giving the right answer, there is a wrong answer that can be dismissed up front—reorganization. Any reorganization by its nature is both predictable and slow. By the time any particular reorganization has taken effect, the causes that spawned it will have been replaced by new and
different causes. The reorganization is thus not suited to address these new and different causes. All major restructurings are based on the assumption that we can take the recent past and predict the future. Such assumptions may have been reasonable in previous centuries, but not in this one.

The only way to meet the continuously unpredictable challenges ahead of us is to match them with continuously unpredictable changes of our own. We must transform the Intelligence Community into a community that dynamically reinvents itself by continuously learning and adapting as the national security environment changes. Unless we, in the IC, allow ourselves this ability to change, we cannot hope to fulfill our mission to insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, and secure the blessings of liberty for our fellow citizens from those who aim to deprive us of these values.

Complexity Theory

To describe a community that “dynamically reinvents itself by continuously learning and adapting” in response to environmental changes harks to theoretical developments in the philosophy of science that matured in the 1990s collectively known as Complexity Theory. Systems that exhibit the characteristics described by Complexity Theory are known as complex adaptive systems. The six critical components of a complex adaptive system are:

Self-organization. Individuals (people, ants, chemicals) decide to act in similar ways in proximity to and in concert with each other, for their own reasons. For example, two boys independently shooting hoops decide to go one-on-one to 20 points. A critical mass of individuals is required for self-organization to happen.

Emergence. The whole is greater than the sum of the parts. For example, 12 canadian geese flying in a “V” is more than just 12 individual geese flying. The group behavior is distinct from the individual behavior.

Relationships. Individuals look at their nearest neighbors to try to figure out what is happening so they can make decisions. For example, House Speaker “Tip” O’Neil declared, “All politics is local.” By this, he meant that people vote for national leaders on the basis of what is happening in and around their homes. It doesn’t matter what the national unemployment rate is; it only matters what the local unemployment rate is.

Feedback. Information circulates, is modified by others, and then comes back to influence the

behavior of the originator either as a positive (amplified) or negative (dampened) influence. For example, an ant crosses a pheromone trail it previously laid down. The ant says to itself, “I’ve already been here, so I’d better wander somewhere else.” It is also important that the historical memory of the system be part of the feedback (amplifying or dampening) loop.

Adaptability. The system is open so that information (and/or energy) flows in and out. New information enters into the feedback loops and influences the behavior of the individuals, and thus the overall behavior of the system adapts to the external environment. For example, think of a group of kids engaged in unsupervised play in the basement as a self-organized system. When the dad opens the basement door and yells “everyone gets an ice cream cone when the toys are picked up” and closes the door, he adds new external information into the system. The kids adapt to the external influence by stopping play and putting the toys away. Systems that are continuously open to new information from the environment and circulate the information within the system will continuously change in response.

Non-Linearity. Small changes in the initial conditions or external environment have large (unpredictable) consequences in the outcomes of the system—also known as the “butterfly effect.” For example, when the dad yells down the stairs for ice cream, the kids adapt by fighting over who made which mess. In the ruckus, they knock over a shelf that breaks one child’s arm. The dad did not predict that he would be going to the emergency room by offering ice cream to the children.

Application to Intelligence

The objective that was identified at the outset of this article was that the Intelligence Community must be able to dynamically reinvent itself by continuously learning and adapting as the national security environment changes. Complexity Theory tells us that we can only achieve this objective if several conditions exist. Enabling these conditions will be a big change for the IC, but if we are serious about succeeding in improving ourselves, it is imperative that these changes be made.

Intelligence officers must be enabled to act more on their own. Just as people in a market are empowered to make their own purchases, individual ants in a colony can decide which task to perform, and military units are able to choose battlefield tactics in real-time, so, too, intelligence officers must be allowed to react—in independent, self-organized ways—to developments in the national security environment.

Intelligence officers must be more expert in tradecraft. It is this expertise that engenders the trust required for independent action. Military units know the rules of engagement and are thus entrusted to engage in battle. Ants have a hardwired rule set, which enables the colony. Cities are built on the rules that govern property deeds, titles, and liens. Expertise in tradecraft for each intelligence discipline must become a constant quest for each officer.

Intelligence officers must share much more information. Just as military units in the field must know where other units are located in geographic space, intelligence analysts must know where their colleagues across the Community are located in intellectual space. This knowledge results from sharing information. Information-sharing among individuals allows market niches to be filled, ants to fend off predator attacks, and plants to distribute themselves in the ecosystem. Increased information-sharing among individuals allows market niches to be filled, ants to fend off predator attacks, and plants to distribute themselves in the ecosystem. Increased information-sharing among intelligence officers will allow these officers to self-organize to respond in near-real-time to national security concerns.

2 Edward N. Lorenz, “Predictability: Does the Flap of a Butterfly’s Wings in Brazil Set off a Tornado in Texas?” A talk given in 1972 to the 139th meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, as found in Lorenz, The Essence of Chaos (Seattle: The University of Washington Press, 1993), 181–84.
Intelligence officers must receive more feedback from the national security environment. The only way to learn from and adapt to the changing national security environment is to be in constant receipt of feedback from that environment. Just as zoo-raised animals cannot compete in the wild, intelligence officers cloistered in the Intelligence Community are not adapted to or fitted for the national security environment.

Intelligence managers must be more persuasive about strategic objectives. Quadrennial strategic directions are good, but these directions must become part of the everyday dialog at all levels in the Community. Many intelligence officers, with their noses to the grindstone, know little about the overall strategic intelligence objectives. One must know how one’s own piece of work fits into the overall intelligence mosaic, because the intelligence mosaic is constantly changing and, thus, one’s own piece must constantly change to remain well fitted. Intelligence managers must be constantly communicating their constantly changing objectives. Intelligence officers will, in turn, adapt.

From intelligence officers who are allowed to share information and act upon it within a simple tradecraft regime will emerge an Intelligence Community that continuously and dynamically renews itself in response to the needs of the national security environment.

“A new generation of Internet tools allows people to self-organize around shared knowledge.”

Self-organizing Tools: The Wiki

At first blush—and in the context of how the Intelligence Community now operates—the five prescriptions seem almost ridiculous, especially the two most important ones about information-sharing and independent, self-organized action. The good news is that technology advances in the last four years make implementing such prescriptions easier than one might initially think.

There is a new generation of Internet tools that enable people to self-organize around shared knowledge. The first of these self-organizing tools is known as “wiki.” It is named after the Hawaiian term *wiki wiki*, which means fast. Wiki tools allow any person to add content to a Web site and any other person to edit the content. The most famous implementation of wiki is the *Wikipedia* (www.wikipedia.com). This is an encyclopedia created and edited by Internet users. It has been in existence since 2001 and now has over 1 million entries in over 100 different languages. By comparison, the 2004 edition of the 32-volume *Encyclopedia Britannica* contains just over 65,000 entries (store.britannica.com). Other wikis include dictionaries (en.wiktionary.org), books (en.wikibooks.org), quotations (en.wikiquotes.org), and document collections (wikisource.org).

The *Wikipedia* has an interesting and innovative “tradecraft,” or rule set, by which contributors and editors must abide. All content contributions are self-initiated. There is no editor-in-chief. Because all contributors are also editors, when a person notices an article that needs content revisions or does not abide by the rules, that person makes the edit. All previous versions of the article are available and all changes are attributable. Another wiki rule for the encyclopedia is that contributions must be facts; explicit or implicit points of view are out of bounds. They are edited out quickly.

Beyond the normal contributor, there are privileged contributors with administrative powers. They can adjudicate disputes among contributors. The existing administrators confer such powers to a person on the basis of the quantity and quality of that person’s contributions. If a person disengages from performing administrative duties, the privileges are revoked.

The rules themselves are also subject to the wiki process. Any person can introduce changes at any time. Disputes over the rules can be escalated to a board of administrators.

In the blogosphere, the IC will ride along the edge of chaos.

In sum, from the little bits of work by many, many people following simple rules of content contribution and editing, the most comprehensive, authoritative, and bias-free encyclopedia in the world has been produced in four years. This is an encyclopedia that is dynamically and constantly changing in response to the world as the world itself is changing. The lists of medals received in the 2004 Athens Olympics were updated as the events concluded. No manager made the assignment. No editor-in-chief reviewed the accuracy. It happened, as if by magic. A person took the initiative to update the entries and hundreds (or possibly thousands) of others reviewed the content for quality.

One of the Wikipedia’s strengths is also a weakness—no points of view. Much of the self-corrective knowledge in the Intelligence Community resides in personal points of view. Currently, almost no official outlet exists for points of view in the IC. A healthy market of debatable ideas emerges from the sharing of points of view. From the ideas that prosper in a market will arise theadaptive behaviors the Intelligence Community must adopt in order to respond to the changing national security environment. Not all good ideas originate at the top.

Self-organizing Tools: The Blog

A second self-organizing, information-sharing tool has matured in the last few years. It is called “blogging.” The term comes from “Web log,” shortened to “blog.” A blog is a journal or diary that is kept in the public space of the Internet. Individuals maintain personal blogs on an hourly, daily, weekly, or some other periodic basis. They are their own editors. Current technology makes it easy to manage one’s blog—see www.blogger.com, for example. Most blogs take the form of citing a current event and offering a point of view about it. Often one blog will cite a comment in another blog and comment on it. The “blogosphere” is truly a marketplace of ideas.

Enabling intelligence officers across the Community to express and share opinions may be one of the largest paradigm shifts ever for the IC. It will be uncomfortable for some because it will be in the blogosphere where the Community will ride along the edge of chaos. The blogosphere probably will obey the 99-to-1 Edison rule: “Genius is one percent inspiration and ninety-nine percent perspiration”—from wikiquotes.com. For every 99 mediocre ideas, there will likely only be one brilliant idea. A few brilliant ideas, however, are worth the investment of many mediocre (and chaotic) ones. It is these few brilliant ideas that will provide the direction for the Community to adapt to the changing national security environment. The few brilliant ideas will survive in the marketplace of ideas. As individual blogs comment on each other’s ideas, the brilliant ideas will spread as feedback throughout the Community. Individuals, recognizing the brilliance, will respond. From this self-organized response will emerge the adaptive behavior required of the Intelligence Community.

A Sharing-Space

We need a space for change that is not organization dependent (remember, reorganizations are not part of the solution set). We need an independent space to begin implementing the five mission changes. To allow sharing and feedback, we need a space that is open not just to the Intelligence Community but also to non-intelligence national security elements. We need a space with a large critical mass of intelligence officers. We need a space that is neither organizationally nor geographically nor temporally bound. We need a secure space that can host a corporate knowledge repository. We need a space in which tradecraft procedures can be implemented. In short, we need a space that is always on, ubiquitously distributed, and secure. We need an electronic network. We need SIPRNet.
SIPRNet (Secret Internet Protocol Router Network) is managed by the Defense Information Systems Agency (www.disa.mil). It is widely accessible by intelligence officers and other national security officers alike. It has been deployed to every embassy and every military command. It is a more attractive experimental sharing-space than the Top Secret Community Network (JWICS), because more intelligence officers access it, policy community officials access it, the tradecraft (security) rules are simpler, and it reaches more organizations and geographic locations. Moreover, SIPRNet is designed to host the Internet-based tools outlined above. Once the wiki and blog processes and content mature on SIPRNet—that is, once the IC embraces the mission changes and becomes proficient in the use of the technology—the wiki and blog could be replicated on the Top Secret network.

**Effecting the Transformation**

Robert Metcalfe, inventor of the Ethernet protocol and founder of 3Com, asserted that the value of a communication system grows as approximately the square of the number of nodes of the system. This assertion has become known as Metcalfe’s Law. A single telephone or a single fax machine has no communication value. Two phones have a little value. Two thousand phones have some value. Two hundred million interconnected phones are a system that has incredible communication value.4

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I suggest a corollary to Metcalfe’s Law. The value of a knowledge-sharing Web space (wiki and blog) grows as the square of the number of links created in the Web space. There is knowledge not just in content items (an intelligence cable, for example), but also in the *link between* one content item and another—a link, for example, from a comment in a blog to an intelligence cable. Think of the value of a blog that links a human source cable to an intercept cable to an image cable to an open source document to an analytic comment within the context of a national security issue. When such links are preserved for subsequent officers to consider, the value of the knowledge-sharing Web space increases dramatically. When 10,000 intelligence and national security officers are preserving such links on a daily basis, a wiki and blog system has incredible intelligence value.5

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At some point in the accelerating value along the Metcalfe curve, a critical mass is reached and the way we work begins to change. Two phones do not change society. Nor do 2,000 phones. Two hundred million phones, however, change society forever. The way the human world works is qualitatively different in the era of 200 million phones than in the era of no phones. This technology-driven societal change is what authors
Larry Downes and Chunka Mui call the Law of Disruption.6 Once the Intelligence Community has a robust and mature wiki and blog knowledge-sharing Web space, the nature of intelligence will change forever. This is precisely the prescription we are looking for as laid out at the beginning of this article. The Community will be able to adapt rapidly to the dynamic national security environment by creating and sharing Web links and insights through wikis and blogs.

In Sum

This article identifies a pressing Intelligence Community issue—namely, that the IC must transform itself into a community that dynamically reinvents itself by continuously learning and adapting as the national security environment changes. It has elucidated the principles from an exceptionally rich and exceedingly deep theory (Complexity Theory) about how the world works and has shown how these principles apply to the Intelligence Community. These principles include self-organization, information sharing, feedback, tradecraft, and leadership. The article argues that from intelligence officers who are allowed to share information and act upon it within a simple tradecraft regime

will emerge an IC that continuously and dynamically reinvents itself in response to the needs of the national security environment.

Jessica Lipnack and Jeffrey Stamps make a case that a successful virtual community is 90 percent culture and 10 percent technology.7 The most profound cultural change will be for IC managers to let go of their officers. Managers must trust their officers to share directly with each other and with the policy community. A manager’s role will become less command and control and more teacher of tradecraft and communicator of purpose and objectives. The IC will need to put into place powerful incentives and rewards for managers to change. Intelligence officers must feel encouraged by their managers to spend their workday engaged in sharing activities. These changes will allow the dynamic learning community to emerge.

Recognizing that these changes in attitude and work processes will be challenging to implement, I have recommended some first steps. I have suggested that recent self-organizing and information-sharing tools from the Internet, the wiki and the blog, be deployed on SIPRNet. As these tools and processes become robust and mature, a critical mass will emerge that will change the IC’s nature so that it can adapt to the rapidly changing national security environment.

The Intelligence Community is under extreme political pressure in the wake of the 9/11 Commission Report, the Senate’s report on pre-war intelligence, and the WMD Commission’s report.8 If ever there was a time for the Community to reexamine its modus operandi it is now. Our political leaders are demanding these changes from us.9 The changes in mindset suggested in this article are significant. Enabling intelligence officers to express their points of view independently in a Community-wide setting is groundbreaking.

We must overcome inertia and act, or we will continue to be acted upon.


Equally avant-garde is letting intelligence officers create a body of intelligence knowledge without an editor-in-chief. Moreover, inviting our policy community counterparts—at State, Homeland Security, the military commands, and elsewhere—to be full participants in these information-sharing activities is breathtaking. If anything, however, these changes are timid compared to the changes required to bring the Community into the 21st century. We must overcome our inertia and act, or we will certainly continue to be acted upon.
Spy Handler

Reviewed by John Ehrman

Spy Handler is an unusual example of a cold war espionage memoir. Victor Cherkashin, a retired KGB counterintelligence (CI) officer, at first appears to have written a straightforward, unexceptional account of his life in the Soviet service, with little of the score-settling in which authors of such books often indulge. But it soon becomes apparent that Cherkashin has much more to offer. With his co-author, journalist Gregory Feifer, Cherkashin not only tells a fascinating story but also provides numerous insights—some of them probably unintended—into the world of the KGB that make this a rewarding book for specialists and general readers alike.

Cherkashin had a long career in the KGB. The son of an NKVD officer, Cherkashin was born in 1932 and vividly recalls growing up amid the horrible conditions of World War II. After graduating from a railway engineering school in 1952, he accepted a job offer from the MGB, the NKVD’s successor organization. After training, he was assigned to the Second Chief Directorate of what was by then the KGB, and sent to work CI against the British in Moscow. In 1963, Cherkashin was moved to the First Chief Directorate, the KGB’s external intelligence organization, and became a foreign CI officer. Postings to Australia, Lebanon, and India followed, along with assignments in Moscow, before he was sent to Washington, where he served from 1979 until 1986.

Washington was, by any standard, a remarkable tour for Cherkashin. He oversaw the recruitment of Ronald Pelton, a former NSA employee who volunteered in 1980 to spy for Moscow; the recruitment in 1985 and running of Rick Ames, the CIA turncoat; and the handling of Robert Hanssen, after the FBI agent resumed his espionage in 1986. In addition, Cherkashin identified a spy for the FBI at the KGB’s Washington rezidentura, Valery Martynov, and, by assigning him as an escort for returning defector Vitaly Yurchenko, tricked Martynov into flying to Moscow, where he was arrested.

Cherkashin’s career peaked in Washington. After he returned to KGB headquarters in 1986, he was given unsatisfactory assignments. In his telling, he was a victim of his own success—the KGB leadership was embarrassed when Ames and Hanssen’s betrayals revealed the large numbers of US agents in the Soviet service and so, instead of rewarding Cherkashin for helping to uncover the spies, they shunted him aside. Finally, as the Soviet Union fell apart in late 1991, he retired from the KGB rather than be present for what he expected to be the collapse of the service.

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Cherkashin comes across, no doubt unintentionally, as an unattractive figure. While he portrays himself as an honest, hardworking CI officer who tried to avoid bureaucratic politics, he freely admits to having been a true believer in communism and the Soviet system until the bitter end. Indeed, his reference to the communist party’s “illustrious past” and disparaging remarks about former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and the fate of Russia since the Soviet collapse make it clear that he still longs for the old days (279).

Other aspects of Cherkashin’s memoir are even more disturbing than his nostalgia for Soviet power. He says little about his father’s career in the NKVD, for example, but what he mentions—joining the Bolsheviks in 1917, overseeing collectivization before his assignment to the Ukraine in the late 1930s, and having been away “fighting counterrevolutionaries” in the days before Germany invaded the Soviet Union in 1941—strongly suggests that the elder Cherkashin had a great deal of blood on his hands. Nor does Cherkashin seem bothered by the character of the post-Stalin system he served or of the service in which he worked. He claims, unconvincingly, to regret that spies he helped uncover, like Martynov, were executed rather than given long prison terms, but he makes no comments about the KGB’s role in the Gulag or other Soviet crimes. Indeed, in the few spots where he considers the morality of his profession and service, Cherkashin asserts a simplistic argument of moral equivalence between the Soviet and Western services. Many of the operational activities of intelligence services, he claims, are pointless games—“thieves stealing from thieves,” as he puts it (109).

For the reader who is willing to tolerate Cherkashin’s moral obtuseness, however, Spy Handler has much to offer. The book is especially useful for its insights into the inner world of the KGB. Cherkashin does not provide a single, discrete description of life in the KGB or its performance; instead, he scatters details throughout the book that, taken together, portray a bureaucratic institution that was, in many ways, unimpressive. For example, he describes his arrival in Beirut in 1965, where he was assigned to carry out CI operations against the CIA. The Soviets had “no agents, operations, or contacts to go up against the Americans;” the “other operations officer in the anti-CIA group was inexperienced and too timid to do his job properly;” and the Beirut rezident was in his last posting before retirement and showed little interest in aggressive CI operations (80). Similarly, when he arrived in India in 1971, Cherkashin says he found CI operations directed at American targets to be badly disorganized—“officers scattered all over the country ran a myriad of badly connected sources and agents” (103). In both cases, he describes how he set about recruiting assets, organizing networks, and collecting information that in some cases proved to be useful years later in other countries. The overall impression, however, is that the KGB’s performance often was uneven, to say the least.

Cherkashin also paints an unflattering portrait of KGB headquarters. Moscow Center, according to Cherkashin, was a place of constant intrigue, where patronage was vital to a career. A fortunate relationship or alliance could advance or protect a career, but an officer unfortunate enough to be the protégé—real or imagined—of someone whose star had fallen could see his career ended. Other
writers, especially Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, have touched on this in passing, but Cherkashin provides useful details of how internal political maneuvering damaged the KGB.¹

The portrait of the KGB that emerges from Spy Handler is of an organization that had little trust in its officers, an institutional trait that made fear of betrayal self-fulfilling. An unusual event could end a career, and being pitched by an opposition service was viewed as especially suspicious—“fear of losing their jobs inevitably led some to work for US intelligence,” says Cherkashin as he relates the story of Sergei Motorin, a KGB officer recruited by the FBI after he tried to trade vodka for stereo equipment in a Washington store (13). Cherkashin believes that the pervasive suspicion and intrigue made the KGB blind to its counterintelligence vulnerabilities. While accepting defections and betrayals by lower-level officers as a fact of life, he asserts that few in the leadership would consider the possibility that a hostile service could run a long-term penetration of the KGB. Doing so, claims Cherkashin, would have been an unacceptable admission of weakness (218).

Much of what Cherkashin has to say is not new but still is worth considering. That the KGB, like many intelligence services, simultaneously was capable of brilliant successes and colossal incompetence has long been understood. So, too, are the facts that CI operations often take many years to pay dividends; service leaders are loathe to face up to the possibility of treason in their ranks; and patronage and bureaucratic politics probably play larger roles in the inner workings of intelligence agencies than other bureaucracies, if only because they tend to be closed societies. The KGB, however, seems to have suffered from exaggerated cases of these problems, probably because they were compounded by the suspicious nature of Soviet society and the importance of ideological correctness. The resulting heightened vulnerabilities are not unique to the KGB; they can be found in the intelligence services of similar social and political systems, such as those of China, Cuba, and North Korea.

Cherkashin also makes a number of worthwhile observations, both general and individual, about spies. He has no sentimentality about the people recruited by the KGB or any other service. In fact, he notes that services actually recruit very few agents—most are volunteers who recruit themselves when they get the chance. He also points out that almost every spy signs on for personal, selfish reasons—a need for money, a desire for revenge, or just the thrill of espionage—and that it is rare for a spy to volunteer for ideological reasons, despite the efforts of almost all services to portray their assets as brave people fighting for noble causes.

His discussions of Ames and Hanssen reflect this point of view. As much as he appreciates their efforts, Cherkashin has no illusions about either man or case. Ames, he admits, fell into his lap—“it was unimaginable, but true,” that someone came along who had valuable information and was willing and able to provide it (30). The same was true with Hanssen. This acknowledgement leads Cherkashin

to make some points well worth remembering. He cautions that the US desire to view both Ames and Hanssen as losers who turned to treason to escape their failures obscures an important truth about their cases. Both men, he points out, performed well as spies and Hanssen—who took control of his case and, Cherkashin claims, successfully hid his identity from the Russians—was especially clever in his tradecraft. Some of this may be chest-thumping, but Cherkashin's basic point is a good one: A reflexive dismissal of our traitors as contemptible quislings can skew the analyses of their cases and obscure some of the lessons to be learned and applied later.

Spy Handler is a solid addition to the growing number of KGB memoirs. It is a subtle, complex book—in this, it is a good reflection of the counterintelligence world in which Cherkashin spent so many years—but one that offers useful insights and lessons. For these reasons, it is worth the time of anyone interested in the craft and politics of espionage.
Richard W. Cutler’s *Counterspy: Memoirs of a Counterintelligence Officer in World War II and the Cold War* is an invigorating account of his military service with X-2 (Counterintelligence) in the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and the Strategic Services Unit (SSU). Drawing from a wealth of letters that he wrote home between 1942 and 1947, coupled with declassified documents released by the CIA since the 1980s, Cutler’s book is not only good reading, but also perhaps the only firsthand account of X-2 operations in Berlin at the dawn of the Cold War.

A Yale-educated-lawyer, turned Army Air Forces (AAF) officer, Cutler found himself in OSS under rather unusual circumstances. While on leave from the army in the summer of 1944 before deploying to the Pacific Theater, 2nd Lt. Cutler was in a Pentagon hallway when a major whom he had met previously in connection with an interview for OSS spied him. Cutler, in fact, had applied twice to join OSS, but had heard nothing. This time, the major told him to report to a building in Georgetown. Doing what he was told, Cutler proceeded to Georgetown but arrived after the office had closed. Thinking that the major’s information was outdated, he departed for his parents’ house in Connecticut for the remainder of his leave.

While at home, Cutler received an urgent telegram to return to his unit in Kansas, as the movement orders had been advanced. Upon his arrival, he dashed off to his quarters to get his gear when he received a phone call. The adjutant thundered that Cutler needed to report to the commanding officer immediately. As it turned out, the War Department had just ordered 2nd Lt. Cutler to Washington. His commanding officer in Kansas was furious, believing that Cutler had procured a new job to avoid overseas deployment. Cutler pleaded that there must have been a mistake in Washington.

Cutler soon learned that he owed his transfer to OSS to disagreements over intelligence assessments in the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In the summer of 1944, Gen. Henry ‘Hap’ Arnold, AAF chief of staff, had complained that OSS had not yet discovered the location of German factories producing jet fighters. Arnold wanted to destroy these factories before German jets could wreak havoc among propeller-driven American and British aircraft, which were bombing Germany around the clock in

**Kevin Ruffner** served in the CIA Directorate of Operations.
the summer of 1944. Brig. Gen. William Donovan, the Director of Strategic Services, protested that OSS was hindered in its ability to perform its intelligence missions in Europe because the military would not provide him with trained manpower. Supporting his case, Donovan noted that the AAF was sending 11 lieutenants versed in European languages to the Pacific Theater where their language skills would go to waste. Thus, 2nd Lt. Cutler, one of the 11 officers, found himself transferred to OSS at the eleventh hour.

After initial OSS training in Virginia, Cutler enjoyed the remainder of the summer of 1944 in Washington. Expecting to deploy as a member of a three-man team to be dropped behind enemy lines to link up with the underground, he brushed up on his French. The rapid advancement of Allied forces in France that summer cancelled the need for this battlefield assignment.

Instead, Cutler arrived in London in the fall of 1944 to join X-2’s secret efforts with Britain’s MI6 to construct an order-of-battle for German forces, using a wide variety of sources, but most importantly the ULTRA intercepts. In addition, MI6 and X-2 concentrated on identifying German intelligence officers, agents, and operations. Cutler set to work tracing German stay-behind agents in France, utilizing information from signals intelligence. He and his team assisted Special Counter Intelligence (SCI) teams in France to track down an estimated 3,500 German agents, destroying the enemy spy networks and turning some members into double agents.

By early 1945, Cutler had become an expert in the arcane art of “vetting”—that is, checking the bona fides of purportedly friendly agents. This task was time consuming and difficult in the age before computers. And it was complicated by internal rivalry—OSS’s Secret Intelligence (SI) group resisted X-2’s efforts to oversee its agent recruitment operations. These turf battles had an impact on work with the British because MI6 distrusted the ability of the Americans to ensure operational security.

Norman Holmes Pearson, a Yale University professor and the head of X-2 in London, directed Cutler to build up X-2’s vetting section. Soon he was working 100 hours a week vetting OSS’s growing roster of agents. Drawing from the British system, Cutler developed the procedures in Europe that were later used by OSS worldwide for testing its agents. Cutler’s work was an early step in the professionalization of American intelligence, forming the basis of the modern asset validation system.

Lack of resources and the relentless pressure not to delay operations took a toll on Cutler’s health. In March 1945, he collapsed and was taken to the hospital, where he was diagnosed with exhaustion. The doctors prescribed immediate leave, which he spent in Cornwall as the war drew to a close. He recalls with considerable pride the role that he played in the war’s successful conclusion in Europe.

Cutler did not rest on his laurels for long. With the occupation of Germany, the need for intelligence grew as Allied forces rooted out Nazis. In the summer of 1945,
OSS consolidated many of its elements at its new headquarters in the confiscated Henkel champagne factory in Biebrich, a small town near Wiesbaden. The new German mission, under the former SI chief in Switzerland, Allen Dulles, brought together a wide array of new agents, including many of Dulles’s special sources—his so-called “Crown Jewels.”

The situation, however, was chaotic. X-2 in Germany was responsible not only for vetting the prospective agents for all OSS branches, but also for sorting out the identifications of those who claimed to have worked for American intelligence during the war. X-2 performed security background checks on new staff members as well as on all foreign nationals hired by OSS. With the US Army’s rapid demobilization in Germany, and the disbandment of OSS and formation of its successor, the Strategic Services Unit, the job of the vetting section only increased.

Cutler grew tired of vetting—a “redundant double-check on the operating officers’ judgment”—and sought more action. He soon found it as a new X-2 officer posted to Berlin in late September 1945. Cutler lived a lifetime of experiences in the war-ravaged German capital.

As an X-2 officer in the small SSU outpost, Cutler handled a mixed bag of agents, most of whom had once worked for the Nazis but now earned their keep from a new master. Initially, these assets were used to spot signs of an underground Nazi resistance movement and to ferret out war criminals in hiding. Slowly but surely, these same agents became useful to the Americans for their knowledge of the Soviet Union. As tensions mounted between East and West, these former enemies became partners in a new and different struggle for the future of Europe.

Between 1945 and 1947, OSS and SSU laid the foundation for the CIA’s later recruitments during the first half of the Cold War. American intelligence regarded Germans (including former army intelligence and internal security officers and their wartime collaborators) as natural resources. Cutler’s agent pool in Berlin clearly reflected this selection. Six decades later, we are left with the uncomfortable question: Was the gain worth the price? For over 30 years, the CIA has been haunted by the ghosts of its past. Recruitments of agents with unsavory backgrounds in the dark days of 1946 or 1947 appear less valid in light of the countless US government investigations that have uncovered ignorance of, and in some cases complicity in, the recruitment of Nazi war criminals by American intelligence.

Under public pressure and congressional scrutiny, the CIA is slowly releasing its long-secret files on many of its sources, including some of those with whom Cutler worked in Berlin.

Cutler’s descriptions of these agents, both male and female, are especially illuminating because they offer personal insights that are not necessarily found in the sanitized declassified material. In several cases, he established a real personal rapport with his sources, in part because they worked so closely together in Berlin. He even lived in the same house as some of his agents.
Cutler remains uncharacteristically vague about the identity of one of his assets, “Gabriel,” who was one of his most important sources as the focus shifted to collecting information on the Soviets. He notes that she “had amazing powers over others, especially men. A resourceful linguist who had worked for German intelligence during the war, she was also well read in history, philosophy, theater, and politics and, unlike many intellectuals, she was street smart.” As Cutler observes, “Gabriel was perfectly suited for counterespionage,” and she played a key role in one of the most intriguing German-Italian and later American intelligence plots of World War II. Although Cutler talks about her in some detail, and although her name is available in declassified records and other sources,¹ she is not identified in the book, perhaps out of sensitivity to her prominence in Germany in later years.

Cutler’s Counterspy is an excellent introduction to this confusing period. A keen observer during his travels throughout Europe, he provides insights into life during and after the war and how the local population reacted to the American presence. Counterspy nicely complements Battleground Berlin: CIA vs. KGB in the Cold War, the landmark study of the intelligence war in divided Berlin.² Friendly with numerous intelligence officers who later rose to senior positions in the CIA, Cutler offers a personal angle on these men who made history. His letters and photographs are excellent primary sources on X-2 in London, Biebrich, and Berlin. One hopes that he will make his collection available to researchers at a public institution to enhance understanding of counterintelligence in those early days.

Cutler clearly regards his wartime and immediate postwar intelligence work as a defining period in his life. Drawn to intelligence but suffering health problems as a result, he debated long and hard about making it a career. In the end, he left the military as a captain, resumed his law practice, married, and moved to Milwaukee. But his final comments on the problems that the CIA faces today show that Richard Cutler is still hooked on intelligence.

² David E. Murphy, Sergei A. Kondrashev, and George Bailey, Battleground Berlin: CIA vs. KGB in the Cold War (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997).


Intelligence in Recent Public Literature

Denial and Deception: An Insider’s View of the CIA from Iran-Contra to 9/11

Blowing My Cover: My Life as a C.I.A. Spy

A Spy’s Journey: A CIA Memoir

Reviewed by John Hollister Hedley

As New York Times reporter Tim Weiner said in a review appearing in his paper, “only in America could the intelligence memoir become a literary genre.” Well, make room on your bookshelf, because the genre is growing before our very eyes.

Three recent additions have benefited remarkably from media attention, good reviews, and enviable sales. Together they are illustrative of what we will see more of, unless and until the novelty wears off and the news media are less captivated with the subject of what in the world is wrong with intelligence. Inquiries, commission reports, reform legislation, hearings, and headlines have helped put a spotlight on these publications and their authors that is not likely to continue indefinitely.

There is nothing inherently wrong with authors capitalizing on publicity. What is somewhat curious is that publication has bestowed a degree of expertise on these authors that largely stems from their books appearing at a propitious time. (It is pertinent, if unkind, to observe that this also is known as luck.) For example, Lindsay Moran, with the briefest career experience of any memoir writer in memory, soon after her book was published appeared in the New York Times as an op-ed author critiquing reform of the clandestine service. This is after a “career” that many a veteran CIA officer would consider a cup of coffee with the Agency: five years and one overseas assignment. Melissa Boyle Mahle abbreviated her career before 15 years with an “operational mistake,” best left at that. Only Floyd Paseman stayed for a career of normal duration, culminating in a highly successful stint as a CIA officer-in-residence teaching intelligence at Marquette University.

2 Ibid., 12 April 2005, A23.

John Hollister Hedley served more than three decades with the CIA.
What is annoying about the attention given these books is the suspicion that they owe it to some degree to publishers’ persistence in pandering to (and therefore perpetuating) stereotypes about the CIA. A pet peeve of this reviewer is the apparent conviction on the part of the media, which of course include book publishers, that the CIA must appear sinister, stupid, or scandalous for someone to read about it. On occasion (the Rick Ames story comes notably to mind), the CIA serves up a tri- festa on its own. But it should not follow that a CIA memoir will sell only if it suggests an inside revelation of something sinister, stupid, or scandalous.

Publishers cannot resist a titillating (never mind misleading) title, sometimes over the author’s objections. John Ranelagh claimed that calling his seminal history of the Agency’s first 40 years *The Rise and Decline of the CIA* was strictly the publisher’s idea, which he argued against in vain. The catchy title of *Fixing the Spy Machine* required its author, Arthur Hulnick, to devote the first part of his book to explaining that intelligence really isn’t a machine, really isn’t broken, and really doesn’t need to be fixed. The title of the recent *Why Secret Intelligence Fails* obliged author Michael Turner to explain that it really doesn’t fail.

Moran may well have conceived or delighted in the catchy/sexy title *Blowing My Cover*, but Mahle insists that her publisher pressed her for the title *Denial and Deception* as well as for rewrites that would make the book less about intelligence and more about her. Even the *New York Times Book Review* could not resist adorning a review of CIA memoirs with a curious illustration of a head that was half face/half bomb with a fuse protruding from the back and a pistol tucked beside the face and into a fedora from which a presumably poison pen stuck out. Such sales gimmicks, if all too predictable, are regrettable because they detract from serious content. Together with a publisher’s pressure on an author, they may even distort the content and thus lessen the value of writing that can in fact make a meaningful contribution to intelligence literature and to public understanding of intelligence.

Lindsay Moran probably needed no prodding. Evidently more interested in profit than perspective, her *Blowing My Cover* illustrates how a clever ex-employee can capitalize on the CIA’s undeniable mystique. One looks in vain for a serious message in her one-dimensional put-down of the Agency’s operational training. Moran doubtless will not endear herself to her erstwhile colleagues, but for a general readership she is a facile writer who comes across as a breezy romantic. Fresh from Harvard, she decided that joining the CIA would be really cool. Before long, she decided it was even more cool to find a boyfriend. When she did, she decided to throw over the Agency and get married. She did both. End of story. Moran’s cheeky style and brisk prose makes for a good read, but don’t look for her book in the libraries at CIA training sites.

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3 Conversation with the author at CIA Headquarters in 1990.
5 Conversation with the author, Tyson’s Corner, VA, 29 April 2005.
Floyd Paseman’s *A Spy’s Journey* is a personal retrospective by a consummate nice guy, a straight arrow who recounts a life that offers helpful introductory reading for someone considering a career in the operations directorate. It contains precious little that is prescriptive, devoting only six pages out of nearly 300 to “what’s wrong and what’s right with the CIA.” The shortcomings he cites are neither original nor surprising: To operate effectively in an overseas environment, you need to know the language and the culture and be there. What’s right is “a lot,” including good leadership, an analytic capability second to none, and continuing recruitment of the best and brightest from college campuses. Paseman’s criticism is gentle and conventional: Noting the adverse impact of the operations directorate’s dwindling numbers, foreign language deficiency, risk aversion, and cutbacks in case officers overseas before 9/11 no longer constitutes a news bulletin, no matter how accurate.

Melissa Boyle Mahle’s *Denial and Deception* is the most substantive and useful memoir of the three, being a balanced mix of personal story and thoughtful, well-researched perspective on the Agency and its leadership. She, too, laments risk aversion and draw-downs in the field, plus the lack of language competence and, at least by implication, the Agency’s xenophobia that results in failing to utilize the linguistic skill and cultural understanding that hyphenated-Americans have to offer. Mahle, herself a summa-cum-laude graduate of the University of California/Berkeley in Near Eastern studies—with fluency in Arabic; knowledge of Middle Eastern culture, traditions, and religions; and a fascination for archaeology—went from an archaeological dig in Israel to being courted as a CIA intern after beginning graduate work at Columbia.

Mahle spent fewer than 15 years at the CIA—well short of the normal career duration. Before her regrettable “operational mistake” brought separation from the Agency, she served a stint as a recruiter of would-be operations officers—an assignment that featured encounters with bright university students interested in possible careers in intelligence but understandably curious about what it is that an operations officer actually does. She shares with Paseman a desire to help satisfy this curiosity. Purely for insight into a career in operations, neither effort equals Dick Holm’s *The American Agent*. But Mahle does render an educational service with a book that is at once autobiography, primer, and commentary on the Agency and its tribulations, traced by the tenure of its recent directors.

Agency readers, especially, may wonder if this burgeoning genre of intelligence memoirs is a good thing. Do such memoirs help or harm the Agency’s reputation and mission? To be sure, ex-CIA authors publish memoirs at varying levels of seriousness and competence. Some are bent on sharing insights into a career in what must be acknowledged to be a closed world that is a mystery to anyone who has not worked within it. Many have a reformer’s zeal: “I’ve been there, and I can tell you where it’s gone astray and how it could be set straight.” It must be especially hard for the reading public to gauge the authority of such an author. What’s more,  

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it would appear to be difficult for some former CIA authors to gauge how limited their own knowledge of intelligence is. They may have seen the organization and its work through a very narrow prism and have a very limited perspective.

The result can be somewhat like the fable of the blind men describing an elephant. Where you touch it—and where the Agency touches you—not only forms your perception of it, but also, perhaps less obviously, limits your ability to characterize it. It is a generalization, but it seems a fair one, that the broader a CIA officer’s career experience and the more perspectives gathered from inside and outside, the more balanced is the view that that author can provide. Having done only one type of work in one directorate makes characterizing the entire Agency more difficult and probably somewhat skewed by the particular prism through which the author experienced it and recalls it.

All three of these books are by former operations officers. This does not say that former operations officers are more inclined to go public with a grievance, or even that they are more likely to have a grievance. What it may say is simply that an operations career fits more readily with the public conception of the CIA as a place of mystique, romance, danger, and excitement. The operations officer commands an audience simply by having been an operations officer. Too bad there aren’t books about what analysts do, but try interesting a publisher in the adrenalin rush that comes with having too little solid information to work with but needing to meet an impossible deadline anyway.

With respect to CIA memoirs generally, this reviewer has a bias—but a bias built on an experiential base as one-time chairman of the CIA’s Publications Review Board, reading scores of autobiographical efforts and thousands of pages of manuscript. The result is a conviction that we ought not bog down in finding flaws and being dismissive of this genre. For one thing, this reviewer does not know of a single recruitment pitch, operational plan, or liaison relationship that was ruined or precluded by the publication of a book.

This is not the place to discuss declassification policy at length (a subject separate from publication review), but it is worth noting that the CIA is hardly blameless for the fact that perhaps the three best-known initials in the world are weighted down by an aura of the sinister and suspicious. Would that CIA declassifiers could see that there are good-news stories yet to be told that could be and should be told without compromising sources or truly sensitive collection methods—something long since demonstrated by the landmark memoirs of Duane (“Dewey”) Clarridge and Tony and Jonna Mendez.8

Evidence abounds—bound and on bookshelves in growing number—that former CIA officers can offer pertinent and valuable insights without damaging national security in the slightest. Indeed, they can enhance it. Memoirs can help clear the

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air. They can illuminate and inform. They can correct misconceptions. They can contribute expert opinions on current issues. They provide insight into what kind of people work for the CIA—people with intellect and integrity. The authors of most intelligence memoirs clearly are smart people who obviously have ethical standards and who are concerned about how things are done and why they are done, not merely because they want them done well but because they want them to serve a high purpose.

So we members of the Agency club, past and present, ought not to be thin-skinned. Maybe a Lindsay Moran has a point. Whether she does or not, it speaks well for the Agency that she is allowed to express her view. The writing and publishing of candid CIA memoirs speaks well for our democracy. And if we are going to plant it around the globe—something this country has yearned to do since at least the days of Woodrow Wilson—we darn well better be willing to practice it. Secret organization or no, the first amendment is the cost of doing business in a free society. Honoring by exercising this freedom is why the writing of a CIA memoir is not a bad thing.
This section contains brief reviews of recent books of interest to intelligence professionals and to students of intelligence.


Anthologies of academic articles on the need to define and study intelligence have appeared with regularity since the groundbreaking work of Roy Godson at Georgetown University and Christopher Andrew and David Dilks at Cambridge in the 1980s. The topics covered in the present volume are not new, but each one of the thoughtful papers conveys a need for wider understanding and study within academia and the public in the post-9/11 world, where terms like threat and globalization place increased demands on intelligence agencies to get it right the first time.

The first chapter, “Journeys in Shadows,” summarizes the 12 that follow. Christopher Andrew then provides a historical analysis of the need for better understanding of what intelligence is supposed to do—the so-called “under-theorization” of the topic. Here he points out, inter alia, the need for better defined criteria for success and failure. Wolfgang Kriefer discusses what he calls the scant attention intelligence history received in Germany—as opposed to press coverage of spy scandals, which is prevalent. He sees a need for greater public understanding in Germany that can only come from serious historical study in the universities, and he explains why that has not yet occurred. Military historian John Ferris describes the concepts of “netcentric warfare” and C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance), that comprise the “infosphere” (the total information pertaining to an event). Put another way, these terms indicate how the military collects, analyzes, and acts on information. He points out the many benefits, as well as the risks associated when four-star generals use high-tech networking to pick targets a continent away.

In the area of security and personal freedoms, Gary Marx considers the definition and dimensions of human surveillance, comparing what he calls “traditional” with “new surveillance” practices. He develops some elaborate theories and adds an ethical dimension. But in the end, common sense will lead most thoughtful people to the same conclusions.

*Hayden B. Peake* is the curator of the CIA’s Historical Intelligence Collection.
Michael Smith provides a common-sense historical analysis of the charge, made by Prof. Richard Breitman in his book *Official Secrets*, that Winston Churchill knew from Bletchley Park intercepts that the Nazis were murdering thousands of Jews and should have made that fact known at the time. Breitman argues that Churchill acted immorally; Smith makes a powerful argument that he is wrong.

Intelligence historian Nigel West contributes an article that documents the paradoxical point that in Britain, with all its prohibition against unauthorized disclosures of intelligence by members of the profession, more intelligence disclosures have been produced “than anywhere else in the world.” This article is followed by Jeremy Black’s “Geopolitics of James Bond,” which shows how the fictional world of the Fleming character has had serious influence on public attitudes toward the intelligence profession.

In the only article to focus on the specific features and functions of intelligence in the 21st century—“Hunters, Not Gatherers”—former CIA officer Charles Cogan, now senior research associate at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard, argues that the Intelligence Community in the United States is not “properly centralized” to meet the intelligence needs of the post-9/11 world. Furthermore, he suggests, existing internal security organizations are weak and ineffective. With the changed world, what is needed is a return to a risk-oriented culture usually associated with wartime, coupled with an “offensive hunt strategy” (156) against terrorists, an aggressive approach that was not policy in the pre-9/11 era.

Len Scott, professor of international politics at the University of Wales, contributes a paper on clandestine diplomacy and covert action in the 21st century. The former involves talking secretly to adversaries; the latter involves operations designed to influence events in a given country. Scott looks at the possibility that 9/11 may have given the former more credibility than it enjoyed during the Cold War.

The final two chapters evaluate the question of ethics in intelligence. In “Ethics and Intelligence after September 2001,” Michael Herman begins by noting that “Perhaps there is no need to mix intelligence and ethics.” But while his admirable objectivity forces him to consider the idea in principle, he is not a believer. After discussions of why ethics are essential to operations, he suggests that “perhaps what is needed is a new paradigm,” although he acknowledges that this issue is “not society’s greatest problem.” A somewhat different view is found in Toni Erskine’s “As Rays of Light to the Human Soul?” Moral Agents and Intelligence Gathering.” The title comes from comments on intelligence made by Thomas Hobbes in 1647. Erskine reviews them in light of what she terms the realist, consequentialist, and deontological approaches advocated by

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others (210). The practical distinctions among these “vitaly important endeavours” are not made clear and thus it is not surprising that she concludes “further investigation into ethics and intelligence is essential.”

*Understanding Intelligence in the Twenty-First Century* is a thought-provoking, valuable collection of ideas. There is much here for doctoral dissertations and today’s intelligence practitioners.


In at least 165 books on intelligence, an author promises an *inside* story in the title. Most disappoint. Ivian Charles Smith is the exception. He gives us a genuine inside look at the FBI and his own life. Both make absorbing reading.

Born in Louisiana during World War II and raised by his paternal grandparents, I. C. grew up in an era when youngsters were respectful of authority and polite to teachers, attributes that remained with him. Graduating from high school in 1960, he tried college briefly before joining the navy where he saw the world while serving aboard the USS Razorback, a submarine that had once had convicted spy John Walker among her crew. Four years later, I. C. returned to Louisiana and college, joined the police force, married, and became a detective. His police duties sometimes brought him into contact with FBI agents and they encouraged him to apply to the Bureau when he graduated from college in 1971. In May 1973, I. C. Smith began his own FBI career.

*Inside* is a roughly chronological summary of Smith’s FBI career, which took him from St. Louis to Washington via most major countries of the world. He worked routine criminal cases, congressional corruption investigations, and, while in charge in Little Rock, Arkansas, the controversial Whitewater case, involving real estate irregularities. But intelligence professionals will be even more interested in his insights into the familiar counterintelligence cases of the era. In this category, he adds details about Larry Wu-tai Chin, the Chinese mole at the CIA; recounts the FBI side of the Aldrich Ames spy case, including the Bureau’s self-serving cooperation with author Peter Maas; discusses the Parlor Maid, or Katrina Leung case; and is harshly critical of the Bureau’s handling of putative Chinese agent Wen Ho Lee. Although the Robert Hanssen espionage case came to a close after Smith retired, he knew Hanssen and is not reticent about contradicting Director Louis Freeh’s assertion that the case was a “counterintelligence coup” (303). He also takes issue with those who thought Hanssen was anything but a mediocre special agent motivated by greed. “Had the Soviets not paid him,” says Smith, “he would not have continued to spy for them.”

There are several themes running through the book that have added value because they are discussed by one who has paid his dues. The first is Smith’s very candid comments about the directors under whom he served. He leaves no doubt that many of the Bureau’s problems follow from their excessive egotism
and poor leadership. A second theme concerns the working relationship between the Bureau and the Department of Justice. Examples can be found in the discussions of CAMPCON (the charges of Chinese campaign financing irregularities in the 1990s); the Whitewater investigation; the handling of the Waco and Ruby Ridge incidents involving extremists; and the author’s comments on inaccurate affidavits (281). A third theme concerns the subtle ways in which the Bureau protects its public image. Of interest here is the Bureau’s tendency toward intolerance of dissenting views, its hesitancy to assign responsibility for failure, the rationale for its pre-9/11 policies, and its anti-terrorism record in general. In the book’s epilogue, Smith looks at the latter topic in some detail.

After 25 years with the FBI, Smith became a former special-agent-in-charge on 31 July 1998. In writing this book, he has added to recent critical, although constructive, assessments of the Bureau. Inside is a valuable contribution to current intelligence issues and to the literature of the profession.


Professor Carlisle’s earlier book, The Complete Idiot’s Guide to Spies and Espionage, was reviewed in Studies in Intelligence 47, no. 3 (2003). The current work is a much improved, more scholarly effort, whose entries have greater scope and depth, are more informative, and are still easy to read. Each of the 72 mostly academic contributors has, for the most part, used multiple reliable sources that are indicated at the end of the more than 400 entries—see, for example, those of former DCIs Richard Helms, James Woolsey, and George Tenet, by State Department officer Laurie West Van Hook. Equally well crafted is the Allen Dulles entry by James J. F. Forest at West Point. While the principal focus is on all aspects—operational, technical, political, analytical—of American intelligence, the encyclopedia covers other countries and their services as well. For example, the entry for Canada, written by Michael Butt of Dalhousie University, is a discussion of the history of Canadian intelligence. Entries under other country names follow the same format. The appendix contains excerpts from the 9/11 Commission Report, without analytical comment.

One might well ask how this encyclopedia compares with the revised edition of Spy Book: The Encyclopedia of Espionage. While the present work has fewer entries than Spy Book, there is greater detail in many of them, and each entry lists recommended sources (Spy Book does not cite sources for each article). The topic coverage is close, but not a complete overlap. For example, Carlisle has

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entries for Italy and Ivan the Terrible, while *Spy Book* does not. The *Encyclopedia of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* is hardbound and sells for about $200 for both volumes; *Spy Book* costs about $22 (softcover).

When it comes to accuracy, the *Encyclopedia* has, with one exception, about the same number and type of errors as *Spy Book*. The exception is the unrivaled collection of misstatements in Carlisle’s entry for Cambridge spy Donald Maclean. Maclean was not identified by the FBI—the Brits did that—and Maclean learned of it not from Philby, but from Burgess. Furthermore, the clue to Maclean’s guilt was not that he went to London to visit his pregnant wife, but to New York where she was living with her mother. Maclean did not attend Eton or Oxford, nor was he a classmate of Cairncross—Maclean and Philby had graduated by the time Cairncross entered Cambridge. And Maclean was not recruited on a channel ferry or any other boat—that happened while he was still in London before he went overseas. As for Krivitsky (mentioned in the Maclean entry), he did not “seek refuge” with the British—they asked him to come and be debriefed, and he did. Soviet agent Kitty Harris was, *first*, Maclean’s handler-courier and, *second*, his lover. Maclean wed Melinda in Paris, not London. And Philby did not join Maclean “on his escape to Russia”—Burgess did that. Finally, John Cairncross did not live out his life in England, though he died there after a brief residency (406).

A few other relatively minor discrepancies were found, as, for example, the assertion that the so-called *Lucy Ring* was a conduit for Bletchley Park (402). This has been debunked by Hinsley, et al. 4 Similarly, Elizabeth Bentley’s testimony did not lead “to the arrests and eventual convictions of noted atomic spies Harry Gold, David Greenglass, and Julius and Ethel Rosenberg”—VENONA deserves the credit for that. Lastly, the concept that “the defector remains the best source of invaluable information whether in place or a one-time crossover” is nonsense on its face. In the long run, a defector ranks second to an agent-in-place or mole since by definition a defector cannot remain in place.

Professor Carlisle’s *Encyclopedia of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* is a good place to start when readers, students, or analysts look for historical background. Nevertheless, as a matter of prudence, check other sources where particular facts are important to the case at hand—intelligence requires multiple source validation whenever possible.

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4 F. H. Hinsley, *British Intelligence in the Second World War*, Vol. 2 (London: HMSO, 1981), 60. The so-called Lucy Ring is a journalistic fiction; the net that is meant was the Rote Drei.

In December 1996, 14 masked Cuban Marxist guerrillas invaded the Japanese ambassador's residence during a reception in Lima, Peru, taking several hundred hostages. President Alberto Fujimori acted decisively but cautiously. Over the next four months, all but 72 hostages were released. In April 1996, after tunnels had been dug under the residence and listening devices placed in the building, all but one hostage was successfully rescued and the terrorists shot dead. Fujimori’s point man for the rescue operation was his de facto national security advisor, Vladimiro Montesinos.

*The Imperfect Spy* tells the story of this ambitious, amoral man, whose rise to great power was as unusual as his descent to prison, where he now resides. He began his spying by informing on classmates and perfected his skills in a military career, where he first came to the attention of the CIA in the 1970s. Between then and 1990 when he gained real power with Fujimori, he spent a year in jail, assisted Colombian drug dealers while banking a fortune, obtained a law degree, built a personal security force, married, and acquired several mistresses. As head of the National Intelligence Service, or “SIN” (Servicio de Inteligencia Nacional), Montesinos also collected information, converted it to power and solved problems for the powerful, often eliminating those unwise enough to oppose him. Throughout his career, he had official contacts with the CIA and occasionally the FBI. Both kept him at arms length.

British journalists Sally Bowen and Jane Holligan have lived and worked in Peru for many years. They have done a splendid job telling the often gruesome, but always interesting, story of Montesinos and the secret police he created, so appropriately called SIN. The lack of source notes is largely compensated for by the chronology and references to known people, dates, and events. The authors have provided an important exemplar of how a corrupt security service can influence an entire country.


In his book *Strangers On A Bridge*, James Donovan tells the story of KGB illegal, Col. Rudolf Abel, who was betrayed by a KGB defector to the CIA. Arrested by the FBI in 1957, Abel was sentenced to 30 years in prison. In February 1962, he was exchanged for U-2 pilot Francis Gary Powers.

Several books were written about the case. One, by Abel’s friend Kyrill Khenkin, published only in Russian, had a real surprise. Reviewed by scholar-author Walter Laqueur in 1983, Khenkin’s book claimed that Rudolf Abel was really Willi Fisher, born in Newcastle, England, in 1903. Years later while
working as a television producer in Newcastle, author Vin Arthey learned about the Willi Fisher story and decided to determine whether Khenkin was right. *Like Father Like Son* makes it clear that he was.5

The book has two parts. The first focuses on Willi’s growing up in England. His German father and Russian mother were both active communist organizers working clandestinely for the party. The Russian revolution was motivation to return to Russia, where they were given quarters in the Kremlin. After finishing his education and serving a tour in the Red Army, Willi married and had his only child, a daughter, Evelyn. His knowledge of English got him a job as a translator-interpreter, first with the KOMSOMOL (Young Communists) and later with OGPU (a predecessor of the KGB).

Building on his language skills, Fisher was trained as an illegal; his first assignment was to Scandinavia. In 1935, he was sent to London to work with another illegal, Alexander Orlov, who, along with Arnold Deutsch, was busy recruiting the Cambridge ring, a fact Fisher never revealed that is acknowledged for the first time publicly in this book. After Orlov’s defection in late 1938, Fisher was sacked. Although he survived the purges, he was forced to work in an aircraft factory until recalled by the NKVD (successor to the OGPU) in September 1941 as a radio operator. He was assigned to train illegals—for example, Kitty Harris, who became Donald Maclean’s handler. At some point, he went to work for Pavel Sudaplatov, who directed the NKVD Special Tasks directorate, and ended the war a hero, having run successful radio deception operations, Operation MONASTERY among them.6 Nevertheless, he was then dismissed from the NKVD for a second time, before being rehired again and sent to the United States in 1948 as Willie Martens—just one of his cover names—where his English could be put to use.

Arthey adds considerable detail to Fisher’s stay in the United States, where he worked as an artist while supporting the Rosenberg network, atomic spy Ted Hall, and Morris and Leona Cohen. (The latter escaped just before the Rosenbergs were caught and eventually became KGB illegals in Britain.) When arrested, Fisher adopted the name of another KGB colonel, then dead, so that his masters in Lubyanka would not acknowledge him by any of his cover names. Abel never revealed his true identity or the details of his work to the FBI.

After his return to the Soviet Union, despite his adherence to the KGB code of silence during interrogation—protecting his knowledge of Philby and the Cambridge agents—Fisher was never again accepted as an active intelligence officer. He was involved with training young officers but was never fully

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trusted. When he was hospitalized in October 1971, the suspicious KGB had his room bugged. He died a month later. His tombstone reads Willi Fisher and Rudolph Abel.

During his research for this book, Arthey contacted Fisher's daughter and from her learned the details of his final years. His book adds much to the story of one of the KGB's most famous illegals, who suffered the sad fate of official obscurity in the final five years of his life.


The late professor John Erickson learned Russian in grammar school; served in the British Army Intelligence Corps, where he studied Serbo-Croatian, German, and other European languages; and was an interpreter for the Allied War Crimes Commission. He then went to Cambridge before joining St. Antony's College, Oxford, where he became the world's leading military historian specializing in the Soviet Union. In 1968, he accepted a post at the University of Edinburgh, where he remained until his death in 2002. His writings on the Red Army, especially The Soviet High Command (1962), became standard works, and he was respected and trusted by the Soviet High Command as no other Western historian. He is a figure familiar to any student of Soviet military history.

Erickson's colleagues, students, and friends contributed the 20 essays in this festschrift. Eighteen deal with military history: Several discuss the Soviet and German armies; two cover the research Erickson did for his books on Stalingrad; another looks at the lesser known battles of the Soviet-German war; and one discusses Jomini versus Clausewitz. Two are on military intelligence: One by John Chapman is on “Russia, Germany and Anglo-Japanese Collaboration, 1989–1906;” the other, by Donald Cameron Watt, is a provocative piece typical of the author, titled “Rumours as Evidence.” The final chapter, by former US Air Force officer Lynn Hansen who studied with Prof. Erickson at the University of Edinburgh, recounts the “Edinburgh Conversations” that Erickson held with senior officials of the Soviet government.

John Erickson set the standard for history with work that was always thoroughly researched, well argued, and well written. He would be proud of this collection in his honor.


As part of the planning that led to NATO after World War II, the Western European nations decided that they should prepare and equip stay-behind networks for use in the event of a Soviet invasion. Agents would be trained to operate much as their World War II resistance predecessors. Their mission
would be to provide intelligence, perform sabotage, and disrupt communications. This time, however, initial supplies would come not from hastily organized, often inaccurate, air drops, but from prepositioned caches for use by the secretly trained teams.

The existence of such stay-behind networks remained “Europe's best kept secret” until 1990. About the same time, then Italian Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti acknowledged that Italy had established what Ganser calls “a secret army” coordinated by NATO (1). The response to Andreotti’s disclosures included a series of newspaper stories that labeled the Italian role in the secret NATO network as Operation GLADIO, although other participating nations had different codenames.

Swiss scholar Daniele Ganser has written the first book on this subject. In it, he asserts that the CIA and MI6 were the prime movers behind the networks, unknown to “parliaments and populations” (1). He goes on to charge that the CIA in particular, with its covert action policies that are by definition terrorist in nature, used the networks for political terrorism.

After acknowledging the validity of the stay-behind networks, Ganser quickly clarifies his argument. He alleges that, since the Soviets never invaded, some GLADIO members became right-wing terrorists in Italy. In the 1970s and 1980s, using the explosives and other supplies in the prepositioned caches, they were responsible for hundreds of terrorist attacks whose real purpose was to discredit the communists. Although Ganser’s sourcing is largely secondary—newspapers and the like—his argument is convincing to the extent that both things happened. What is in doubt is the relationship between the attacks and government policy. Were the caches made available officially to terrorists, and were the terrorist attacks part of Operation GLADIO? Or were they separate acts by groups whose members had been trained as part of the now defunct stay-behind networks and knew the location of some of the caches? Ganser takes the former position, charging the CIA—and to some extent MI6—with responsibility for the terrorist acts. (14)

But proof is a problem for Ganser. He complains at the outset that he was unable to find any official sources to support his charges of the CIA's or any Western European government’s involvement with Gladio. Nevertheless, his book devotes 14 chapters to the “secret war” in various Western nations on his list. Much of the narrative is historical. The chapter on Portugal, for example, begins with background in 1926; the chapter on Spain, with the Spanish Civil War. The history of how relationships were established among Western nations after World War II is interesting and valuable, as is the survey of pubic reaction to Operation GLADIO. But Ganser fails to document his thesis that the CIA, MI6, and NATO and its friends turned GLADIO into a terrorist organization.

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In *The Craft of Intelligence* (1963), Allen Dulles alludes to but does not name the man whom he later called his most productive agent in Switzerland during World War II. Three years later, in *The Secret Surrender* (1966), Dulles identifies him by his codename, George Wood. In his 1968 anthology, *Great True Spy Stories*, he gives even more details about his agent’s life, but not his true name. Others did their best to learn Wood’s identity and, in 1971, author Ladislas Farago came close when he identified a “Fritz Kople” in his book *Game of the Foxes*. Official acknowledgement of Wood as Fritz Kolbe, the former Nazi Foreign Office senior clerk, came when OSS files were declassified in June 2000. Then, in September 2001, the German magazine *Der Spiegel* published an article on Kolbe describing him as an “anonymous hero of the Second World War.” Until this article, Kolbe was largely unknown in Germany—he had not been mentioned in the official history of the Federal Republic of Germany, which did credit others who had acted against Hitler and the Nazis. Lucas Delattre, a journalist with *Le Monde*, decided to look into the case and *A Spy At The Heart of the Third Reich* is the result.

Although Fritz Kolbe was never a member of the Nazi party, he performed his administrative duties in the Foreign Office so well that he survived several purges and retained access to sensitive classified material throughout World War II. A truly closet anti-Nazi, he arranged a trip to Switzerland in 1943 to try to pass documents to the British—but he was rebuffed. He next went to OSS station chief Allen Dulles, who cautiously accepted him. In the end, after many more trips, his services earned the sobriquet “prize intelligence source of the war.”

Delattre conveys admiration for Kolbe’s contribution and is perplexed that he did not get more credit at the time. He nudges the British for downplaying some of Kolbe’s reports. Subsequent events, however, show that they had good reason for doing so. For example, the secret transmitter in Dublin that Kolbe revealed was already known to the British because they were breaking the German code. Making a fuss about the new intelligence might have alerted the Germans that London knew about the transmitter, if a leak were to have occurred. Similarly, Delattre tells how Kolbe alerted OSS to the German penetration of the British embassy in Ankara. He is concerned that here, too, the British response was less than enthusiastic when told about it. What he does not realize is that the British already knew what the situation was from their code-breaking efforts at Bletchley Park. Moreover, though the British did not tell OSS, the penetration, code-named CICERO, was not the only mole in the embassy. One was never caught; the other, the ambassador’s chauffeur, was only identified after the war.8 When Kolbe reported about CICERO, it was

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obvious there was a leak and London therefore discouraged discussion of the penetration so as not to alert the Germans they were on to them while they continued to hunt for the other moles.

As for the United States, the skeptical War Department intelligence staffs only reluctantly accepted the Kolbe material late in the war, further diminishing its utility. At one point, they refused to send it to the president, and Delattre describes the ensuing inter-organizational battles. There is no doubt that Fritz Kolbe took many personal risks and delivered much order-of-battle and other data—2,600 Foreign Office documents in all. But this material tended to confirm sources unknown to Dulles.

Kolbe's espionage for the Allies was known by some trusted friends who helped him with accommodation addresses and the like during the war. After the war, using the name George Wood, he permitted an interview that resulted in a sketchy biographical story in *True Magazine* (1950). Dulles tried but was unable to stop its publication in Germany, so a much wider audience became aware of Kolbe's wartime activities. Many viewed him as a traitor, and he did not live to see his vindication in the *Der Spiegel* article mentioned above. Delattre's chapter “Disgrace” tells how Kolbe's efforts to find a meaningful existence in Germany failed.

Despite the irritating absence of specific source notes and an index, this is a worthwhile book on an important case. Delattre is right when he ends with the thought that “Fritz Kolbe was without any question democratic and pro-Western. His only mistake was to have been those things before everyone else” in Germany (223).

The book concludes with a remembrance of Kolbe by OSS and CIA veteran Peter Sichel, who helped handle Kolbe after the war. His firsthand account adds much to the image of a true German patriot.


During the 1976 budget crisis in New York, classes at City College were cancelled and graduate student Ruth Price used the free time to read a semi-autobiographical novel, *Daughter of Earth*, by the controversial author Agnes Smedley. Thus began an interest that simmered until the mid-1980s when then-professor Price turned her full attention to Smedley's life and made the decision to write this biography.

Born in Missouri on 23 February 1892, Agnes Smedley was the daughter of a failed cattle broker and sometime farmer and his part-Indian wife. Her birthplace was a two-room cabin without plumbing or electricity. In the early 1900s, the Smedleys moved to Trinidad, Colorado, the first of several towns where Agnes went to school and worked washing clothes after classes. It was a period of labor unrest and economic depression, but she managed to get part
way though grade school, supplementing her formal education with voluminous reading. At 17, Agnes passed exams for a one-year secondary school teaching certificate, and began teaching for $40 a month. When her certificate expired, she accepted an offer to study in Phoenix, and with that she was on her way to becoming a progressive, a communist, and a writer. She would write mostly about China, teach at Berlin University, and later lecture at Harvard. 

Price examines Smedley’s life in great detail, explaining how she became involved in the radical movement of the times and describing the many communists who played important parts in her life. Smedley traveled widely. In Germany, she worked for the COMINTERN under chief propagandist Willi Muenzenberg. In India, she participated actively in the left wing movement before going to China, where she met and was captivated by Mao and other communist leaders. It was her activity in China—working for Soviet military intelligence agent Richard Sorge—that brought her to the attention of the post-World War II anti-communist movement in the United States. Smedley denied US Army charges that she was or had been a Soviet agent, and she threatened to sue for libel if the army did not admit it was wrong and did not apologize. And that is what the army did. She had worked against the Nazis and the Japanese, not directly against the United States, they rationalized.

Nevertheless, in 1950, the House Committee on Un-American Activities, using the same evidence available to the army—supplied by Maj. Gen. Charles Willoughby, Gen. Douglas Macarthur’s G-2—upheld the charges and planned to have her testify. In London at the time, Smedley died after an operation for ulcers before she had to decide whether to return. For 50 years, Price notes, the political right maintained her guilt, charging that she was indeed a communist and had spied for China and the Soviet Union. With at least equal vigor, the “left has maintained that Smedley was an unblemished heroine, the tragic victim of a McCarthyite smear” (even though Smedley died before McCarthy began his crusade). Price writes that “as a self-identified leftist, I, too, initially dismissed the accusations against Smedley. My Smedley was an uncompromising liberal.”

Then, as her research progressed, Price discovered the Smedley archives in Moscow; interviewed her former colleagues in China, India, and the United States; examined contemporaneous FBI interviews with communists who worked with Smedley, including her Soviet case officer; and found Smedley’s arrest records in Germany. Furthermore, she came across statements by Sorge that she had been his agent. That is not all. When the British released the MASK decrypts of communist party pre-war message traffic, Smedley was mentioned frequently. All these sources supported the fact that Smedley has been Sorge’s agent and a COMINTERN agent, and had worked in the Chinese Bureau of Information as well. The right in this case was correct. Smedley had had a clandestine life and, to Price’s great credit, she documents it wonderfully, although she admits that “this was the last thing I wanted to establish.”
By the start of World War I, flying ace Jules Védrines was 33 and too old for frontline service in the French air force (Aviation Militaire). However, experienced at flying by moonlight, he was soon a special-missions pilot taking agents behind enemy lines in airframes made of wood. A new solution to the perennial problem of insertion had been implemented. Special-mission flying continued during the interwar period in the Far East, the Soviet Union, Italy, Germany, and Spain, in anticipation of another conflict. World War II became the glory days of what the Allies called Special Duty (SD) Squadrons. In *Airborne Espionage*, David Oliver tells the story of the special pilots, their aircraft, and the agents they inserted behind enemy lines.

Some of the pilots and their passengers became well known. Capt. George Hill, a British Russian-speaking military intelligence officer, learned to fly in the Balkans so he could insert his own agents behind enemy lines. He would go on to author two books and to work with Sidney (“Ace of Spies”) Reilly in Moscow. T. E. Lawrence (of Arabia) employed special-mission flights in the Middle East. Australian Sidney Cotton, who would later support OSS, pioneered clandestine aerial-photography flights covering many of the denied areas in Europe, including Berlin.

During World War II, over 100 of the agents inserted were women, like Noor Inayat Khan, a British wireless operator who had lived in France. These already high risk operations were made even more dangerous because the Gestapo had penetrated many of the resistance networks the SD squadrons were supporting. The SDs also played a part in the British DOUBLE CROSS (XX) operation and worked with OSS and various allied elements throughout the world. For balance, Oliver includes many of the Nazi and Japanese operations against the Allies and also describes their aircraft.

In a postscript, Oliver reviews the postwar life of some of the SD pilots, agents, and opponents who survived. A few were ignored and fell on hard times. Some went into politics. Others, especially the female agents, wrote books. They had filled a need that still exists, albeit the aircraft and communications equipment have changed. *Airborne Espionage* documents their contribution for the first time.

*Not all readers agree with Price’s judgment. One from George Mason University writes: “I’m sorry to see that Price has acquiesced, to some extent, to cold-war anti-communism in failing to affirm Smedley’s hard and dangerous work for anti-imperialism in India and in favor of the Comintern which, whatever its manifold failings, was at least on the right side—the side of those who opposed class exploitation and imperialism—as the US, UK, et al. were not (http://hnn.us/readcomment/). For another look at *The Lives of Agnes Smedley*, see the review by Prof. Harvey Klehr in *The Weekly Standard*, 31 January 2005.

Service with Lord Kitchener in the Sudan campaign of 1898 convinced cavalry Sgt. Maj. Edward Baker that troops wounded in the field needed skilled medical attention before the ambulance arrived. He envisioned “women riding sidesaddle round the fringes of a traditional battlefield dressed in vivid scarlet tunics and voluminous skirts” tending the wounded and freeing soldiers for combat (2). He finally launched his all volunteer organization—although with a different dress code—in England in 1907, where the headquarters of the First Aid Nursing Yeomanry (FANY) Corps is still located today.

In the British army, the yeomanry initially consisted of non-combat support troops. A yeoman in the royal household, on the other hand, was a highly qualified servant or aide. Baker had both concepts in mind when he recruited for his unorthodox unit in the local newspapers. Qualifications included education, horsemanship skills, and foreign language ability. Training in first aid, map reading, and radio communications would be provided. Enrollment cost the applicants 10 shillings. The women had to provide their own uniforms and horse, and commit for one year’s service.

The initial response was positive although the Corps was to have its difficult times. The FANYs, as they are called, have since served in both peace and war, and author Hugh Popham reviews their entire history while telling how the tasks they performed soon departed from nursing to ambulance driving, eventually focusing on communications support.

A principal point of interest for the intelligence professional is the FANY’s service in the Special Operations Executive (SOE) during World War II and their operations with the resistance in occupied France. Some 73 were trained as agents and 39 went to France. Several were caught by the Gestapo and ended their lives in Dachau and other camps.

At a time when women in the intelligence services was not an everyday occurrence, the FANYs established a powerful precedent. Popham summarizes their story well, and the bibliography provides sources where more detail can be acquired. In this regard, Leo Marks’s *Silk and Cyanide* (HarperCollins, 1998) is to be recommended.


In 1901, with its ship-building program well underway, the German Admiralty created a naval intelligence department (designated “N”), a first for Germany, to keep track of foreign navies in general, and Britain’s Royal Navy in particular. Agents were recruited and dispatched to Britain to report on naval
order-of-battle and make damage assessments after the anticipated naval engagements, which never materialized. It was just as well, because the German agents were too few in number and poorly trained, and they consequently produced little of value. Thomas Boghardt is the first to write about the role of “N” in World War I.

*Spies of the Kaiser* also examines British counterintelligence capabilities before and during the war. At the outset, from the British perspective, the German espionage threat was muddled to put it politely. In 1903, Erskine Childers published his novel *Riddle of the Sands* with the aim of increasing public awareness of the threat of a German invasion. Although the British Admiralty was not convinced, the public was indeed aroused (23). In 1906, capitalizing on the public mood, British journalist William Le Queux published his *The Invasion of 1910*, which sold over 1 million copies. The battle was joined. Despite the lack of evidence to support the novelist’s claims, the government responded to public pressure by forming a subcommittee of the Committee of Imperial Defence to reexamine the threat of invasion. Although not a direct consequence of the subcommittee’s actions, by 1907 there were calls for a department to collect foreign intelligence to establish the nature of the threat. But the War Department resisted. Then in 1909, Le Queux published his masterpiece of fiction, *Spies of the Kaiser*, with claimed that 5,000 German spies were operating in Britain. Adding fuel to the fire, he stated that his novel was based on fact. That same year, the War Office established new intelligence elements that would become what is known today as MI5 and MI6.

In contrasting the development and operations of MI5 and “N,” Boghardt shows how the former, created on the basis of faulty intelligence, was a public relations winner and, despite parsimonious resources, had a reasonable record of success. There were in fact German agents in Britain, although nowhere near the number proffered by Le Queux and his supporters. MI5’s task was hampered from the start, in part because before the war there were more German agents than MI5 intelligence officers. The situation was further complicated because the public responded to the spy scare with hundreds of reported sightings of German spies, which had to be investigated. Nevertheless, all the important agents were identified and arrested or neutralized. “N,” on the other hand, while formed for the right reasons, failed to develop the professional capabilities to do the job and in the end never posed a serious threat to British security.

When war was declared, the press claimed that all German agents in Britain had been arrested. Many historians have accepted this view as accurate. But because Boghardt had access to recently released German and British archival documents, he was able to correct that conventional wisdom and show that MI5 manipulated the record to reflect that position. Several spies had indeed been arrested, but some were never found. During the war, “at least 120 agents operated in Britain” and MI5, with Special Branch, arrested 31 of them (105). The principal method of detection was mail monitoring, although a number were caught because the agents they attempted to recruit turned them in.
Spies of the Kaiser provides summaries of the major wartime cases of “N” espionage operations in Great Britain and discusses several that involved agents operating in the United States. The latter include instances of biological warfare in which “N” agents in Washington created anthrax to infect the horses being shipped to Britain—they were unsuccessful.

Boghardt finds little to suggest that either service made a difference in the war. After the war, “N” was disbanded along with the Imperial Navy. MI5, however, survived with its reputation enhanced and many lessons learned and went on to be exceptionally successful in World War II.
Gary Kern’s piece, “How ‘Uncle Joe’ Bugged FDR”—published in Studies in Intelligence, vol. 47, no. 1 (2003)—nicely summarizes what we know about electronic eavesdropping done by Soviet intelligence at the Teheran and Yalta conferences. The story Kern tells is well known, although he has dug up some excellent atmospherics from recent memoirs and Russian literature. There is no question that Roosevelt was bugged at Teheran and Yalta, as the sources published over the years that I cite below indicate. Kern concludes that FDR’s failure to react stemmed from a combination of “profound ignorance of the Bolshevik dictatorship … and wishful thinking,” a resuscitation of the hoary FDR-as-naif argument that has been around since the Second World War.

One of the traps inherent in secret intelligence gathering is the they-know-that-we-know phenomenon. Intelligence libraries are filled with tales of double-, triple-, and quadruple-crosses. During meetings with Stalin, both the British and the American delegations knew their quarters were bugged. Anna Roosevelt, the president’s daughter, recalled the secret service agents finding listening devices at Yalta. Stalin was correct to wonder, as noted by Kern, if the Anglo-Americans “know we are listening to them” and, presumably, misleading their Soviet eavesdroppers. Mike Reilly, chief of the Secret Service detail that guarded Roosevelt, waited to debug Livadia Palace, FDR’s residence during the Yalta conference, until it would be too late for the Russians to replace the devices. At the same time, he warned that no matter how many they found, they would fail to find them all.1

According to Kern’s references, Sergo Beria, who was one of the “listeners” at the Teheran Conference, said Stalin had him listen to Roosevelt’s conversations to determine the president’s attitude regarding opening a second front, since Churchill “was against it.” But what are Beria’s recollections of what FDR had to say? “During his conversations with his collaborators [advisors] Roosevelt always expressed a high opinion of Stalin ….” They know we are listening, commented Stalin, “yet they speak openly!” When Beria claimed that the microphones were too well hidden to be spotted, Stalin marveled: “It’s bizarre. They say everything in fullest detail ….”2 One can read that as FDR-the-naive or as FDR-the-shrewd, who knew full well that his words were heard and used the opportunity to try to convince the Soviet leader that the West was not dedicated to the overthrow of his government.

1 Jim Bishop, FDR’s Last Year: April 1944–April 1945 (New York: Pocket Books, 1975), 346.

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Few accuse Winston Churchill of naivety, especially about the Soviet Union, yet his quarters, at Yalta and during previous meetings with Stalin, were also wired by the Soviets. In August 1942, during the prime minister’s first stay in Moscow for meetings with Stalin, Churchill received warnings that his rooms were bugged. He was skeptical, but he played to the secret listeners by calling the Russians “lower in the scale of nature than the orang-outang,” intending that they knew that—he-knew.¹ I have found no record of the British telling the Americans of the eavesdropping that took place in Moscow in 1942, but a nation that shared the ULTRA secret would certainly have shared its knowledge of Soviet electronic eavesdropping. Since the so-called servants at Teheran were clearly carrying side-arms under their uniforms, as Kern points out, it was obvious to all that service was not their primary task.

At the Yalta conference, Churchill wrote in his memoirs that his Russian hosts gave “kindly attention” to “every chance remark.” When a British official commented that a large fish tank had no fish in it, goldfish quickly appeared. When another complained that they had no lemon peel to use in their drinks, “a lemon tree loaded with fruit” materialized the next day.⁴ Perhaps this was eavesdropping by nearby “servants,” but the more likely listener was a microphone with a tape recorder, and British officials were well aware of what had happened in the past.

I am dubious about Kern’s material gathered in interviews and correspondence with Valentin Berezhkov, who was an unabashed self-promoter. Kern accepts Berezhkov’s claim of being Stalin’s translator at the Teheran and Yalta conferences. Berezhkov was at Teheran, and may have done some translating for Stalin in both German and English (German being his better language). But Berezhkov was not Stalin’s translator at Yalta, nor can I find any evidence that he was even there. His wartime memoir neither claims nor indicates that he was at Yalta. Vladimir Pavlov was the primary English language translator for Stalin at both meetings. The official records of meetings at Yalta invariably list “Mr. Pavlov,” but make no mention of Berezhkov. Berezhkov is not mentioned in Sergo Beria’s memoir even though Beria was one of the “listeners” at Teheran. But then neither is Pavlov. One historian has commented that Berezhkov “peddled his story about

¹ Sergo Beria, Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin’s Kremlin, Françoise Thom, ed., Brian Pearce, transl. (London: Duckworth, 2001), 92–93. Beria’s recollections are, to say the least, suspect. As the editor of the volume points out, Beria was raised “in a world of lies and half-truths, lies that were all the more inextricable because the truth was unbearable” (viii). The editor makes no mention of notes or records used by Sergo Beria to write his memoirs, making specific quotations attributed to Stalin dubious at best. That said, Beria’s depiction of Stalin’s reaction to the product of Soviet eavesdropping at Teheran and Yalta contradicts no other evidence and, in the context of that era, is plausible.

² David Reynolds, In Command of History: Churchill Fighting and Writing the Second World War (London: Allen Lane, 2004), 326. Reynolds and others speculate that Churchill was too naive throughout the war about the dangers of Soviet listeners during conferences. Perhaps, but that assumes he said things privately that were greatly different from what he was telling Stalin—a difficult case to prove. See Reynolds, note 12, 611.

being Stalin's interpreter assiduously in the 1980s, while Pavlov was seriously ill and therefore silent.” But that does not change the fact that, as a matter of course, Soviet listening devices were installed, and understood by the Anglo-Americans to be installed, when they came to meet with Stalin and, presumably, with other Soviet leaders.5

Perhaps, as Kern asserts, the eavesdropping permitted Stalin to learn of “moods” and “attitudes of his diplomatic counterparts,” although the value of such psychological intelligence is questionable, especially with Churchill’s volatile mood swings. Perhaps it provided key information about Anglo-American strategies for such later litmus-test issues as the postwar political fate of eastern Europe. But there is no evidence that such was the case, and what happened in 1945 had already been decided by prior political arrangements and military events (read that as Churchill and Roosevelt recognizing the need to have the Soviet Union as an ally in order to defeat Hitler and his Nazis, followed by the reality, as of summer 1944, of the Red Army’s rapid advance across the central European plains). Historians need to be careful about “reading backward” interpretations by the new perfectionists who insist that Churchill and Roosevelt should have become Cold Warriors even before the Grand Alliance defeated Hitler.6

The fact is that, probably at Teheran and definitely at Yalta, both Churchill and Roosevelt and their advisers assumed that the Russians had bugged their quarters.7 That makes it persuasive, based on evidence and actions, to argue that neither Churchill nor Roosevelt said (or intended to say) anything that Stalin could not hear. One historian of the Teheran Conference has argued that “Roosevelt would probably not have been unduly concerned” about having his conversations overheard. After all, one reason FDR had come to Teheran was to demonstrate to the Russians that he could be trusted.8 The same attitude characterized both Churchill and Roosevelt at Yalta. The private strategies of Churchill and Roosevelt were their public positions, at least to Stalin. Neither was plotting to overthrow the Stalinist regime or to “cheat” the Soviet Union of the fruits of vic-

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5 Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield (New York: Basic Books, 1999), 175–76, mentions Soviet eavesdropping of Churchill and Roosevelt at Teheran. They provide no details and imply that such intelligence was not used by Stalin. I have seen no allegation of such “bugs” of the quarters of British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden and US Secretary of State Cordell Hull during the meeting of foreign ministers in Moscow a few weeks prior to the Teheran talks, but it seems reasonable to assume that such was the case. It seems equally reasonable to assume that both men were warned of such espionage, given the British experience a year earlier. The official records of the Yalta Conference are found in US Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1955).


7 Beria also refers to planting bugs in gifts presented to Averell Harriman, presumably when he was US ambassador in Moscow during the war. Beria, 100.

8 Keith Eubank, Summit at Teheran (New York: William Morrow, 1985), 196–97. See also Cadogan Diaries, 579.
tory. As for the postwar political structure, both Churchill and Stalin had observed that, in the Russian leader’s oft-quoted phrase, “whoever occupies a territory imposes on it his own social system.”9 The Anglo-Americans had their secrets, particularly about the atomic bomb project, but there is not a shred of evidence or even rumor that Churchill and Roosevelt discussed the Manhattan project, privately or at the conference table, with each other or anyone else, when they met with the Soviet leader.10

Most American and British leaders and officials believed Germany, not the Soviet Union, was the enemy. Criticize both Roosevelt and Churchill, if you wish, for adopting negotiating and long-term strategies regarding Stalin and the Soviet Union that, after the Cold War experience, seem to many to have been misguided. Condemn them both for thinking they could trust Stalin. “Poor Neville Chamberlain believed he could trust Hitler. He was wrong,” said Churchill. “But I don’t think I’m wrong about Stalin.”11 But understand that while Roosevelt (and Churchill) may have twice walked “willingly” and knowingly into a surveillance trap, as Kern states, neither of the Anglo-American leaders failed to understand that the so-called trap could serve their own purposes.

So where does this leave us? Either Winston Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt, the two men who led their nations to victory in the Second World War, were stupidly careless and cavalier, or they just did not care if conversations in their quarters were overheard and passed on to Stalin and his cohorts. Readers’ choice.12

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9 Churchill used a more flowery phrase—“the right to guide the course of history is the noblest prize of victory”—but the meaning was the same as Stalin’s. Warren F. Kimball, Forged in War (New York: Morrow, 1997), 209.
10 The atomic bomb project is again an example of the we-know-that-they-know (and perhaps they-know-that-we-know-that-they-know) syndrome. FDR knew about Soviet espionage at the Manhattan Project no later than September 1943. Given reports of Soviet intelligence collection, is it not likely that Stalin knew that the Americans knew that he knew? Ah, the web we weave. For a discussion of this, see Forged in War, 220–21, 279–80, 329–30.
11 Quoted from the diary of Hugh Dalton by David Reynolds, In Command of History, 469. Christopher Andrew, the dean of British intelligence historians, depicts Roosevelt as disinterested when confronted with reports of Soviet spying in the United States. Andrew and Mitrokhin, 107.
12 I am reminded of the claim in the 1950s and early 1960s made by Democratic-leaning pundits that Dwight Eisenhower was little more than a bland grandfather figure who was not very bright. It seems not to have occurred to the critics that this kindly dolt had, with great skill and success, managed the Anglo-American victory against Hitler.