THE POST-MILITARY WEST: GLOBALIZATION’S IMPACT ON U.S. STRATEGIC CULTURE

BY

CAPTAIN THOMAS W. LUSCHER
United States Navy

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USAWC CLASS OF 2009

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U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050
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Among sociologists, a commonly discussed aspect of globalization, beyond an inevitable clash of cultures, is the rise of a homogeneous or heterogeneous world culture. If such a phenomenon is occurring, the American strategic leader should be concerned with the influence of this common culture on the strategic culture of the United States. This Strategic Research Project examines the possible rise of a common Western political culture, its influence on U.S. strategic culture, and the issues and concerns it poses for American military leaders.
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Captain Thomas W. Luscher
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Dr. Breena Coates
Project Adviser

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Globalization has been heralded by its proponents as a force for positive change in the world and, by its detractors, as a cause of many of its current conflicts. One of the most researched aspects of globalization is how it influences culture. While this may be of general interest to sociologists and other academics, knowledge of general culture shifts caused by globalization may not be of great interest to strategic leaders. However, if globalization were to affect change in the strategic leader’s own culture, or in an adversary’s strategic culture, it is an important condition to monitor, since strategic culture shapes policy-making and influences how a country fights its wars.¹

This SRP examines the possible impact on American strategic culture through the lens of world cultural change as a result of globalization.

Globalization

Globalization has created varying effects all over the globe, both positive and negative. While it brings technology, medicine and modern conveniences to underdeveloped or remote areas, it has also enabled environmental destruction. Hitherto pristine wilderness areas are stripped of their trees and minerals by international conglomerates in their quests to secure the shrinking reserves of the world’s resources. These effects are profound, but not germane to the subject of this paper. This essay considers globalization’s cultural effects on the United States in particular, and the rest of Western civilization in general. It argues that the United States’ strategic culture is trending back to its classic liberal roots, and perhaps further toward a post-military culture.
For the purpose of this study, globalization needs to be defined in terms of strategic leadership, and not via cultural or sociological lenses. For the strategic leader, globalization is defined well by Robert Cooper, a senior British diplomat, when he writes “The essence of globalization is that it erodes the distinction between domestic and foreign events.” Cooper is describing the opening or blurring of borders that has occurred in the modern era. The blurring of borders is both physical, through modern transportation and open-borders institutions and trade agreements like the European Union or NAFTA, and invisible or psychological, through mass communications and the internet. The result is greater awareness of the societies, culture and politics of other countries. Due to this interconnectedness, crises anywhere in the world can affect security everywhere else, creating the impetus for prosperous nations to attempt to intervene and restore order and balance to the system. A classic example is the affect of crises in the Middle East on global oil supplies and the frequent diplomatic and military interventions attempted by the U.S. and Europe. Thus foreign problems become domestic ones.

Another effect of the opening of borders is the increase in migration, mainly from East to West. People from Third World countries, seeking a way out of poverty, head west to join relatives and friends who emigrated before them. Compared with European immigrants to the U.S. in the 19th century, who fully assimilated to the political culture in America, Middle Eastern and African immigrants in Europe assimilate to their new society’s culture to varying degrees, without ever fully losing their indigenous culture. Over time, these immigrants will impact the culture of their adopted countries if they
continue to resist assimilation. So far, Middle Eastern immigrants in the U.S. have assimilated to a high degree.\(^5\)

The main strategic effect of globalization on the United States is the result of the effective shrinking or “flattening” of the world, as Thomas Friedman so famously declared.\(^6\) For centuries, the U.S. was geographically isolated from the rest of the world powers. Its security was ensured, giving it the option to intervene in international affairs. With the advent of non-state actors pursuing weapons of mass destruction to employ against American cities, the U.S. has lost its geographic isolation.\(^7\) How this loss of isolation affects the values and culture of American society should be of great interest to a strategic leader.

A generally positive aspect of globalization to Westerners is cultural. As we become more interconnected, more cultural exchanges take place, usually to the benefit of greater understanding on both sides. The vast increase in types of communication enabled by globalization has advanced a continuous debate among world societies on every possible topic. Through the debating process, it is plausible to assume that the vast majority of the world’s literate are being exposed to certain desirable common ideas- individual rights, certain freedoms, personal security, and access to education and healthcare. It follows, then, that murder, theft, tyranny and poverty are being universally exposed as undesirable. To what degree this vast global cultural exchange is creating a common world culture should also be of interest to the strategic leader.

Rise of a Common World Culture

Several sociologists have explored the rise of a common world culture, while in fact, what they are referring to is a common Western culture. The vast majority of
political scientists, including Samuel Huntington, agree that many non-modern, traditional societies are not culturally adapting to the Western model and are actively resisting the Western influence in their societies.\(^8\)

Political scientist Martha Van Der Bly studied the impact of globalization on the culture of a small Irish town and produced several insights.\(^9\) First, states are beginning to change their modes of behavior to match perceived common world cultural norms. Second, the majority of sociologists do not predict that a singular homogeneous world culture will evolve. Instead, Van Der Bly found that locally, “The result is a multi-layered, heterogeneous culture, uniquely created within global context as a gesamt-[translation: entire] creation of state, enterprise and civil society.”\(^10\) David Rothkop, writing about the effects of globalization on world culture, predicts that “…the decline of cultural distinctions may be a measure of the progress of civilization, a tangible sign of enhanced communications and understanding.”\(^11\) Rothkop believes that successful multicultural societies exist in the European Union, India, South Africa and the United States. These societies promote those aspects of culture that enrich human lives through diversity, like food, music, and holidays, while suppressing those aspects of cultural diversity that are harmful to society, like separate languages, racism, and incompatible political beliefs.\(^12\) But what does this common Western culture look like? What are its values and norms that are of interest to the strategic leader?

In the West, the common social culture that remains is based on “…the liberal creed of individualism, rationalism and progress.”\(^13\) Politically, the common Western culture is ingrained with two centuries of liberal democracy, but modified by globalization’s blurring of borders, which has caused an increase in the power of non-
governmental organizations like the World Trade Organization, World Bank, and International Red Cross. This has effectively reduced the sovereignty of Western nation-states. As the economy, climate change, terrorism, and health risks are considered to be global issues with global solutions, individual nation-states must cede some sovereignty if they agree to multilateral solutions brokered by the NGOs at meetings of the G-7, United Nations, or elsewhere. Further, these NGOs act outside of any domestic political system, and are not responsible to any voting public. Their political ideologies, most of which are uniformly liberal, act as cultural influences on Western society, nonetheless.

Of importance to the strategic leader is the notion that the common Western culture taking shape today is also post-military. Colin Gray, in Another Bloody Century, describes the effect of globalization on Western culture:

Culture changes, albeit usually slowly. Attitudes toward war alter with demographics, particularly when single-child families become normal rather than exceptional. Add to demographics the slow but inexorable effect of the revolution in women’s rights, and society is on course to regard war somewhat differently than it did even in the recent past. To the factors of demography and gender we must blend in the emergence of a highly individualistic, hedonistic, popular culture. As if those elements were not sufficient to trigger cultural change, we need to take account of a globalized mass media that reveals some of the seamier side of high policy and strategic behavior. Elements such as those just cited plainly are effecting a change, even a radical change, in the social and cultural context of war, in the West at least.

According to Gray, Western Europe “…enters the future as an all but post-military zone” Having been afforded the luxury of Cold War military security supplied by the United States since World War II, Western Europe has invested in expensive social welfare programs, and consciously discarded military power while depending on diplomatic and economic power to pursue its foreign policy. Due to looming domestic
and foreign policy constraints, in the near future the United States may face a choice of joining the post-military culture.

**American Strategic Culture**

Strategic culture as an academic theory is relatively young, having gained acceptance only in the past few decades. Thomas Mahnken, in an essay for the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, offers one of the few coherent definitions of strategic culture for the military professional:

> Strategic culture is that set of shared beliefs, assumptions, and modes of behavior, derived from common experiences and accepted narratives (both oral and written), that shape collective identity and relationships to other groups, and which determine appropriate ends and means for achieving security objectives.  

Strategic culture can be understood as a subset of national culture. While national culture describes the general proclivity of a society for certain modes of living, such as consumerism or the love of baseball in America, strategic culture more narrowly describes the cultural environment of the nation’s policy-making community. The policy elites control the reigns of national power. They are the political class, including those serving in government, policy institutions, or academia, and, in an advisory role by law, the professional officer corps. These elites are responsible to the voting public, and create unpopular policy at their political peril. As Colin Gray states:

> All policy and strategy is made at home. It will be influenced, perhaps triggered, sometimes dominated, by external considerations, but the making, administration, and execution of policy and strategy is a process embedded in the culture of a domestic context.  

Thus domestic culture influences strategic culture. Strategic culture is most evident in a society’s proclivity for war, and in the way it prosecutes war. But it also includes the manner in which a nation conducts foreign policy, and how it balances its use of all
forms of national power. Foreign policy and the use of national power are also influenced by external events, but are a secondary influence on domestic strategic culture.

When chronicling American strategic culture, the two most prescient factors are geography and history. Unlike its Western European cultural cousins, the United States was strategically isolated from the world’s other major powers for over two centuries, safe from the threat of sudden invasion. This engendered a culture with a sense of security, and afforded policy-makers the luxury of opting to engage militarily in international conflicts or remain isolationist.

Since the end of the Federalist era in the early nineteenth century, American strategic culture has been dominated by liberal democratic idealism. This has imbued the American psyche with a love-hate relationship about war. Samuel Huntington states that

This extremism is required by the nature of the liberal ideology. Since liberalism deprecates the moral validity of the interests of the state in security, war must be either condemned as incompatible with liberal goals or justified as an ideological movement in support of those goals. American thought has not viewed war in the conservative-military sense as an instrument of national policy.

According to Huntington, when America does go to war, it is to advance or defend ideals like freedom or democracy. It is not culturally inclined to wage war to advance U.S. national security interests. Nor does American strategic culture consider war as a continuation of policy, as Clausewitz would. Despite having a history of occasional warfare separated by long periods of peace, and despite the current period of American military adventurism, classic American strategic culture actually discourages using military force as a policy tool.
Classic liberalism finds war to be a failure of policy, not an extension of policy. Huntington writes “The total rejection of war accords with the liberal view that men are rational and that consequently they should be able to arrive at a peaceable solution of differences.” When America does use military force, it does so to spread democracy, in order to end the need for future war. As Thomas Mahnken posits, “The impulse to transform the international system in the service of liberal democratic ideals forms a strand that runs throughout American history.”

Classic American liberalism considers even the existence of a large military force a threat to the state, which is vulnerable to takeover by a military coup. According to Huntington, the liberal believes that “Large military forces are a threat to peace.” They encourage corresponding arms races, which can lead to miscalculation or misunderstanding, and possible conflict. Thus, after both world wars, and to a degree, after Viet Nam and Desert Storm, American policy makers drastically reduced the size and power of all branches of the military. Additionally, a pacifist influence resides in America’s strategic culture, which further discourages the use of military power. According to Huntington, this is mostly a middle class phenomenon. The United States has a prolific middle class which amplifies the pacifist influence on its strategic culture.

What has kept the liberal idealists from disarming America’s military and foreign policy to the point of national destruction is the professional officer corps. This is the thesis of Samuel Huntington’s The Soldier and the State. Historian Robert Kaplan, while chronicling Huntington’s unrivaled contributions to the understanding of American society, its military, and foreign policy, summarizes the point:
America’s liberal society, Huntington argued, required the protection of a professional military establishment steeped in conservative realism. In order to keep the peace, military leaders had to take for granted-and anticipate-the “irrationality, weakness, and evil in human nature.” Liberals were good at reform, not at national security.\footnote{32}

Huntington’s thesis argues that liberal democracy is a sound framework for a modern domestic society and the best protection against oligarchy, fascism and tyranny. But liberal ideology, when applied exclusively to foreign policy, which is dependent on all forms of national power, invites unnecessary risk to the nation’s survival by its disdain for military power. Therefore Huntington argues for the existence within the liberal society of a strong military and a conservative professional officer corps, unaffected by idealism, to protect the national ideal.\footnote{33}

The deep-rooted liberal American strategic culture may not be self evident to the current generation of American military strategic leaders. This is a result of the relatively heavy influence of military personalities on United States culture following World War II and continuing throughout the Cold War. During that period, many members of Congress were veterans, and several Presidents, most notably Eisenhower and Kennedy, were veterans. Veterans were also in positions of great influence in the expanding American industrial society, a key area of growing American power from 1946 up to the present.\footnote{34} Further, the Cold War era, with its maintenance of deployed forces in Europe and Korea, and the parallel foreign policy of détente, with occasional bellicose exchanges between American and Soviet leaders, was the backdrop for the formative years of current strategic leaders. In fact, most of the current military leadership was commissioned during President Reagan’s tenure, when the United States embarked on a strategy of bankrupting the Soviet communist system by pursuing a massive American military buildup.
Current military leaders, and the civilian conservative class, may assume that American strategic culture values a strong military, but historically, it does not. Huntington explored this phenomenon in the mid-1950’s, and found a slight rise in American public support for the conservative military’s role in balancing its liberal ideology during the Cold War. Certainly, the conservative administrations of Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush added a concurrent degree of moral weight to the conservative military influence in American foreign policy, and the strategic culture of the United States may indeed have seemed to be more conservative and military-centric during those presidents’ regimes. But those eras may have simply been the result of those president’s personalities and their use of presidential powers, without regard to public culture or opinion. So, while historically significant, President Reagan’s and President G.W. Bush’s legacies did not substantially alter the centuries-old American liberal strategic culture that values civilian control over a relatively weak military.

Evidence of the current strength of America’s liberal strategic culture is shown by the disdain for President G.W. Bush’s foreign policy record by the relative majority of the American public and elites. His doctrine of preemptive war against Iraq, the stern treatment of enemy combatants in Guantanamo Bay, and his foreign policy pronouncements that occasionally invoked an uncomfortable good-versus-evil rhetoric, are cited as reasons for Bush’s low public approval ratings.

The relatively recent concept of United States hegemony and sole superpower status does not nest easily within the historic American strategic culture of isolationism and a liberal democratic foreign policy. The risks of imperial overreach and provoking an
arms race are too great and run contrary to the liberal preference for strong diplomacy backed by military force. Hegemony and sole superpower status allows a strong military to overshadow and emasculate the diplomatic power of the liberal state. As Robert Cooper argues, “There is some truth in the proposition that to a man who has only a hammer every problem looks like a nail.” Further, in the modern, globalized era, a single hegemonic superpower invites global resentment from states and non-state actors alike. The result can be seen in world-wide anti-American protests and terrorist attacks against United States interests, both at home and abroad.

The concept of Total War, as mentioned above, is an anathema to the liberal mind, a failure of policy. In a liberal strategic culture, the nation’s leaders are expected to spread democratic ideals through reasoned diplomacy. A nation’s culture winds through the public debate about the use of diplomacy and force. As Huntington notes, “Yet in the long run the nature of the decisions on these issues is determined by the institutional pattern through which the decisions are made.” Huntington’s “institutional pattern” is another way of describing how strategic culture affects the nation-state’s use of power.

The question that needs to be answered—beyond “So what?”—is, can strategic culture change? If so, what effect will the globalizing forces that are shrinking the world, and blurring its borders, have on the liberal strategic culture of the United States?

The Impact of Globalization on U.S. Strategic Culture

Strategic culture can change. As civilizations and societies evolve, relatively slow cultural change is a constant. Paradoxically, globalization represents relatively rapid change, in the West at least, so it is logical that it would affect the strategic culture
of Western nation-states, perhaps more quickly than domestic culture. Strategic leaders’ environmental assessments should focus on the strategic effects of globalization on American interests as well as its impact on the United States’ diplomatic, informational, military and economic power.

As mentioned above, the strategic effects of globalization on Western nations include the opening or blurring of borders and the effective shrinking of the distance between civilizations. One result, to a Western strategic leader, is to see policy issues in a different way. Where once there were separate domestic and foreign policy concerns, now, on formerly domestic topics, including the economy, environment, and population, there are simply global concerns. To treat them as domestic is to miss half of the problem and most likely half of the solution. One can no longer pursue policies based solely on national interests. Many challenges are global and demand global solutions. When pursuing global solutions, strategic leaders may find themselves in a difficult position of having to cede American power or sovereignty in the pursuit of the greater global good. This would betray the traditional ideal of American exceptionalism and the liberal ideology of the American strategic culture may be muted by this phenomenon.

Due to the effective shrinking of a globalized world, crises abroad can affect the physical or economic security at home. Also, the advent of weapons of mass destruction in the hands of non-state actors renders moot the concept of deterrence and threatens the physical security of nation-states. This loss of geographic isolation strikes at the heart of classic American isolationism. It is likely that the isolationist aspect of American strategic culture is gone forever. Without the option of retreat in the face of external threats, and without the feeling of security that America’s geographic position
once afforded it, the United States’ strategic culture will be in ideological conflict with its past. It may remain stubbornly isolationist, waiting for a future development, like an unlikely end of terrorism, hoping to return to isolationism. Or, America’s strategic culture may alter itself to accommodate the end of isolationism, and become a more closed, protectionist society that monitors its population, as the British have in response to home-grown terror, and allocate resources to close and monitor American borders.

America’s current hegemonic status, while enticing in the face of the loss of its physical security, is at odds with its strategic culture and is the cause of much friction throughout the world. Liberals believe that American hegemony creates more problems than it solves. Robert Cooper proposes a new security posture for Europe and the West that discards American hegemony and fits within the classic American strategic culture. He calls it postmodern security. Cooper writes

"Today, finally, we have a choice between nationalism and integration: balance or openness. Chaos is tamed by empire; empires are broken up by nationalism; nationalism gives way, we must hope, to internationalism. At the end of the process is the freedom of the individual; first protected by the state and later protected from the state." 41

Cooper’s internationalism describes the hope for an ever-expanding Western alliance of open, yet relatively weak, liberal democratic societies, enabled and connected by globalization, and so large that it is able to muster enough collective military power to counter threats from the east, even as it tries to convince nations from the East to join the global community of peaceful societies. This post-American, post-military idea would be well received in Europe and anywhere else that America’s hegemony is resisted. Its main risks are assuming that China will rise peacefully, terrorist or state nuclear proliferation does not destroy the earth, and Russia does not aspire to violently remake the Soviet Union. 42 If the United States joined such a multilateral Western alliance, with
a smaller American military and a newly robust foreign policy apparatus, it would remain true to its historic liberal strategic culture.

What helps make this strategic culture shift back to liberalism possible is demographics. In *Inevitable Surprises*, Peter Schwartz writes:

In the United States, English-speaking descendants of Western Europeans will find their majority yet more reduced- which means American laws, institutions, and culture is about to undergo a sea change.\(^{43}\)

The mass immigration to the West, an effect of globalization that is buoying American birth rates, is increasing the American population of ideological liberals. For the foreseeable future, American policy makers will make generally liberal decisions to satisfy a domestic electorate and allied Western global culture that is decidedly liberal.

Yet the future of globalization is unpredictable. A shock occurrence could accelerate, set back, or even derail globalization’s progress. A severe terror strike on the U.S. homeland or a global economic collapse could temporarily sway the American strategic culture toward isolation and conservative militarism.\(^{44}\) However, a current strategic environmental assessment should point toward different trends.

The current United States federal budget trend is unsustainable. The federal deficit is projected to top $1.2 trillion in 2009. This figure does not include the February 2009 economic stimulus bill which adds $789 billion to that figure.\(^{45}\) In the longer term, the United States has looming Social Security and Medicare outlay shortfalls totaling up to $100 trillion.\(^{46}\) These deficits must be funded by foreign investment in U. S. Treasury bills. However, foreigners may not be willing or able to finance much more of the United States’ debt. It is both illogical and strategically unwise to assume that the United States military budget will not come under intense scrutiny in the near future. Liberal policy-
makers may be forced by their interest groups to consider adopting a post-military strategic culture.

In this scenario, the current state of globalization, combined with the results of the 2008 election and the disdain by liberals of the current American hegemonic position, could create a perfect storm that shifts American strategic culture in a post-military direction. Citing severe fiscal economic challenges, post-military proponents could attempt to seize the decision space. As the argument goes, globalization's effective blurring of borders also blurs the notion of nation-state sovereignty. If a state is sufficiently entwined in multilateral agreements, it may unwittingly cede its ability, or legitimacy, to employ military force. The result would push the United States fully to multilateralism, emphasizing the State Department's role in United States foreign policy with a concurrent de-emphasis on defense. Secretary of State Clinton has spoken of the new American “Smart Power”, which calls for more use of soft power and less use of military power.\textsuperscript{47} President Obama echoed the classic liberal enthusiasm for multilateralism and diplomacy in his inaugural address:

\begin{quote}
Recall that earlier generations faced down fascism and communism not just with missiles and tanks, but with sturdy alliances and enduring convictions. They understood that our power alone cannot protect us, nor does it entitle us to do as we please. Instead, they knew that our power grows through its prudent use; our security emanates from the justness of our cause, the force of our example, the tempering qualities of humility and restraint.\textsuperscript{48}
\end{quote}

In such a scenario, the need for employment of American military power would be confined to coalition warfare within Limited War. President Obama’s foreign policy team includes many personalities from the Clinton administration of the 1990’s that pursued Limited War in Bosnia and Kosovo, and treated terrorism as a law enforcement issue.
With the public tired of war, the liberal policy and academic elites should be able, with the aid of a sympathetic domestic media establishment, to shift the strategic culture of the United States to a liberal, post-military culture. Critics of such a scenario should be reminded that this is merely a return to the roots of American strategic culture, within the reality of a globalized world.

Further, as the argument proceeds, the current generations of Americans have been reminded that Total War is horrific and expensive. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have temporarily emptied the American public’s reservoir of will for war, and, barring catastrophic attack on the homeland, it may be another generation before the public could support preventative or preemptive war again. Americans are currently more concerned with improving the economy. Their cultural attitudes align with the presumed progressive liberal strategic culture of an Obama administration.

It is possible that a liberal, globalized democracy facing competing domestic and foreign policy issues and controlled by a liberal administration and liberal Congress, with sympathetic U.S. and world media (who are tired of U.S. hegemony) could convince themselves and the public that the pursuit of a post-military strategic culture does not represent greater risk than reward. Colin Gray states that “…the liberal optimists argue that humankind can either unlearn the ways of war, or so reorganize itself that war becomes obsolete”49 and that American society is ingrained with “A continuing faith in progress, that somehow international politics could evolve toward a condition of greater security.”50 The American condition of hoping for a better future, despite the possibility of failure, might make the post-military Western ideal too appealing to resist.
A post-military strategic culture fits the liberal mindset. The principal homeland security threat is terrorism; the liberal regards domestic terrorism as a law enforcement issue, not a military issue. It follows, then, that the U.S. military need not be more than a smaller, deployable quick reaction force. Its primary mission would be to lead multinational anti-terror raids against non-state actors and perform peacekeeping and nation building missions in concert with newly robust State Department teams. Major Combat Operations as a core mission could be considered to be a future risk, since the United States does not currently have any peer competitors. The United States could theoretically rely on a reduced nuclear deterrent capability and robust diplomacy to reduce that risk while focusing on domestic economic issues. To the liberal, the rise of Chinese military might, or the resurgence of Russian power, can be kept in check with smart diplomacy and economic partnerships. Both China and Russia could be seen to have more common interests than conflicts with a post-military America. All three countries can ally against terrorism, work to solve global economic problems, and pursue treaties for sharing the world’s dwindling resources.

There is a significant problem with the notion of a post-military strategic culture. As noted earlier, Samuel Huntington, the liberal political science professor, wrote of the critical balancing role that a relatively strong military with a conservative professional officer corps plays in countering the national security risks posed by strict adherence to a liberal democratic ideology. The key problem posed by the globalization-enabled ideal of a post-military culture is the loss of that balancing force on foreign policy. If the American military is restructured to a smaller, weaker, quick reaction force, and it loses the critical mass of its professional officer corps, or if its strategic leaders are selected
based on their adherence to the administration’s ideology instead of on their professional merits, it could lose its balancing influence on national security policy. This could create an ineffectual foreign policy architecture that favors the diplomatic, informational and economic aspects of power but lacks the military power that grants the nation-state its legitimacy in foreign affairs. Colin Gray considers this possibility in his latest work, Another Bloody Century:

Finally, are the pressures of globalization fatally undermining the national and tribal loyalties….a development with profound implications for the willingness of people to fight, or even pay for war, how widespread is the phenomenon? If it is very uneven across the globe, how perilous might that be for Western societies and cultures that are notably post-military?

It seems anathema to believe that Iran’s mullahs would respond to any American diplomatic overtures that were not backed by the threat of credible military force. As tempting as it may be to grant globalization the power to make military power a relic of the past, Gray and others caution that the time has not yet arrived. There are vast areas of the world that have not yet modernized, and especially in Muslim societies, there is still an instinctive cultural resistance to globalization. Western cultures may feel regionally secure, but the effect of globalization can quickly bring previously obscure security threats to their immediate vicinity via international criminal gangs, rogue states or terrorists armed with weapons of mass destruction.

The military strategic leader’s main role is to give sound advice on military matters to policy makers. He or she must be prepared for the coming clash between social and military funding requirements. As the economic pressure mounts, the "globalists” will argue that a large, powerful American military is unaffordable, a threat to peace, and, due to the progression of civilization, no longer relevant. As the calls to dismantle the American military grow louder, military leaders must counter the post-
military argument and remind the public that within and beyond the West, there exist many cultures that do not share a progressive liberal idealism, and threaten the progression to a future which can possibly be truly post-military.

Conclusion

For the strategic leader, globalization is best described as a force that opens or blurs the borders of nation-states and effectively shrinks the distance between regions and cultures. The effects of globalization, within the strategic sphere, include the loss of geographic isolation, an increase in migration from East to West, increased cultural exchanges and an atmosphere where foreign and domestic issues blend into global issues.

Some experts argue that globalization is creating a single homogeneous or heterogeneous world culture. Upon further study, there is evidence of a rising global culture, but it exists mainly in modern Western civilization, most notably in Europe. This common culture is heterogeneous, and adheres to the classic liberal ideals of democracy, individualism, and rationalism. Compared to non-globalized cultures, it is more influenced by non-governmental organizations that take advantage of the blurring of borders and force each nation to cede some sovereignty in order to exist within its framework. The common Western globalized culture is also referred to as post-military. It perceives military power as archaic, dangerous and superfluous.

Strategic culture is the set of beliefs, assumptions and modes of behavior that shape national policy. It is historical and can change over time. American strategic culture is based on liberal democracy, individualism, rationalism, and the option of isolationism but balanced by the conservative militarism of the professional officer
corps. Despite the recent militarism of American foreign policy, throughout history American strategic culture engendered multilateralism and diplomacy. It discourages war and a large American military, which is seen as a threat to the state and the stability of the world.

Globalization has affected American strategic culture. It blurs the distinction between domestic and foreign issues, creating global policy issues. The blurring of borders has caused a loss of geographic isolation and a new questioning of the need for American hegemony, which causes friction throughout the world. If America were to join the Western post-military globalized culture and drastically reduce its military forces, as liberals will demand, it would remain true to its strategic culture roots. However, in a world that is not uniformly modernized or globalized, a post-military American strategic culture presents grave security risks for America and its western allies. American military leaders must continue to remind their civilian masters of Samuel Huntington’s call for a strong professional military to balance and ensure the survival of American liberal democracy.

Endnotes

3 Ibid., 83.
5 Ibid., 254.


10Ibid.


12Ibid.


16Ibid., 94.

17Ibid., 95.


20Mahnken, “United States Strategic Culture,” 5.

21Ibid.


23Ibid., 151.

24Ibid., 152.

25Ibid., 151.

26Ibid.


28Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, 156.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid., 151-52.


33 Ibid.
34 Huntington, The Soldier and the State, 354.
35 Ibid., 457.
37 Cooper, The Breaking of Nations, 159.
38 Ibid., 163.
39 Huntington, The Soldier and the State, 2.
40 Gray, Modern Strategy, 142.
41 Ibid., 76.
42 Ibid., 45.
44 Gray, Another Bloody Century, 95.


49 Gray, Another Bloody Century, 87.
51 Gray, Another Bloody Century, 97.