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THE DISAM JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE MANAGEMENT

I do not know if things around your house are like they are at mine – every year we are inundated with subscription requests for ourselves or others (as gifts) from a variety of publications. At DISAM we do not beat the bushes, but we are glad you are on one of approximately 1500 that we send printed copies of the Journal. I hope that you get something out of each edition and we are proud of this.

Our feature articles this edition focus on the five Department of Defense Regional Centers for Security Studies. We have an overview article and then individual articles provided by each center. It will not take you long to read each of them, and I know most will focus on the one more that may be most applicable to you if you have a particular area of responsibility of interest. In addition to those, there is a variety of regional articles in our Legislation and Policy section that provide policy inputs from the Department of State, addressing the Americas, Middle East, East Asia and Pacific, and South and Central Asia. Also, country-specific topics addressing Japan, Korea, and Taiwan further develop Pacific regional issues.

Our Perspectives section contains articles from one of DISAM’s guest instructors, Mr. Roland Trope who looks at the importance and relevance of technology transfer rules in dealing with “Immaterial Transfers with Material Consequences” as well as two of DISAM’s full-time faculty. Major Hank Kron presents a paper he recently presented at an Army conference dealing with Middle Cross-Cultural issues.

The Army Security Assistance Training Management Organization’s provides their thoughts on the importance of a team training concept in developing the capabilities of our friends and allies. Similarly, you can see how Medical Civic Assistance Programs (MEDCAPs) are also contributing to host country capabilities.

Mr. Gary Taphorn looks at the planning function within the security assistance office in-country and the flow from the planning guidance and processes for the Mission Performance Plan, Theater Security Cooperation Plan, Combined Education and Training Program Plan, and the Foreign Military Financing and International Military Education and Training Budget tools. We follow that article with an “Introduction to Theater Strategy and Regional Security” supplied by Lieutenant Colonel Clarence Bouchat, the Army War College’s Director of Theater Operations Studies.

Two of DISAM’s experts in distance learning, Mr. Rick Rempes and Mr. Bill Rempo collaborate to give you an update of DISAM’s on-line programs. What a growing environment throughout the Department of Defense. It is both exciting and amazing to see how far the quality and diversity of on-line education and training have come in such a relatively short time.

This Journal captures a number of articles via other channels, but more than normal, also provides more input from the core security cooperation community. Thanks to all for their inputs that make this edition a true “keeper”. Best wishes to all for a blessed holiday season and a terrific 2007. Know that DISAM looks forward to the coming year and the opportunity to support all of you in your security cooperation efforts!

RONALD H. REYNOLDS
Commandant
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Feature Articles
“The Department of Defense Regional Centers for Security Assistance Studies” .......... 1
“The George C. Marshall Center European Center for Security Studies” ..................... 5
“Asian Pacific Center for Security Studies” .............................................................. 11
“The Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies” ...................................................... 15
“The Africa Center for Strategic Studies” .............................................................. 19
“Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies” .............................................. 23

Legislation and Policy
Thomas A. Shannon, Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs
“Why the Americas Matter” .................................................................................... 25
Robert G. Joseph, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security
“Broadening and Deepening Our Proliferation Security Initiative Cooperation” ...... 32
C. David Welch, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs
“Middle East Region at Critical Crossroads” ......................................................... 36
Ambassador Randall L. Tobias, Director of United States Foreign Assistance and
United States Agency for International Development Administrator
“The United States and Japan: Partners in Hope” ................................................... 39
Christopher Hill, Assistance Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
“The United States and the Republic of Korea Alliance” ......................................... 42
Clifford A. Hart, Jr., Director, Office of Taiwan Coordination
“The United States Policy Toward Taiwan” ............................................................. 48
Richard A. Boucher, Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asia
“South and Central Asia Update” ........................................................................... 51

Perspectives
“The Global Master of Arts Program: A Graduate’s Perspective” ......................... 53
Colonel Steward Kowall, USAF, Chief of International Training and Education for
Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force for International Affairs
“How to Request and Get Those Exclusive Flying Training Quotas” ....................... 55
Roland L. Trope, Trope and Schramm LLP
“Immaterial Transfers with Material Consequences” .............................................. 57
Richard N. Helfer, Colonel, USA and Jon D. Jones, United States Army Security
Assistance Training Management Organization
“Strengthening Our Allies, One Soldier at a Time” ................................................ 64
Lieutenant Colonel Douglas Lougee, USA, Brooke Army Medical Center
“Can We Build a Better Medical Civic Assistance Program? Making the Most of Medical Humanitarian Civic Assistance Funding” .................................................... 68

Henry “Hank” Kron, Major, USA, Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management
“Cross-Cultural Considerations for the United States Security Cooperation in the Middle East” .................................................................................................................. 74

Gary Taphorn, Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management
“Planning for the Security Assistance Organization: Or How Do We Get There From Here?” ................................................................................................................... 88

Lieutenant Colonel Clarence J. Bouchat, Director, Theater Operations Studies
U.S. Army War College
“An Introduction to Theater Strategy and Regional Security” ........................................ 99

Education and Training
Richard Rempes and Bill Rimpo, Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management
“Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management: Distance Learning Updates and Initiatives” ...................................................................................................... 123
Providing international venues for bilateral and multilateral study, communication, and exchange of ideas. The Department of Defense (DoD) Regional Centers for Security Studies are:

- The George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies
- The Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies
- The Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies
- The Africa Center for Strategic Studies
- The Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies

The regional centers are the principal strategic communications tools for creating a regional dialogue on U.S. security policy for the Secretary of Defense. They provide international venues for bilateral and multilateral study, communication, and exchange of ideas involving military and civilian participants. Consistent with the Secretary’s new vision for the centers, their core objectives are to:

- Counter ideological support for terrorism
- Harmonize views on common security challenges
- Educate on the role of defense in civil societies

The Secretary of Defense charged each of the Directors to transform the regional centers to meet the challenges of the post-September 11, 2001 world. In addition to articulating the three core objectives areas listed above, the new vision includes the following guidance for the centers:
Focus on improving alumni outreach programs to better communicate with and influence foreign security elites.

Maximize collaboration with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) to ensure that center programs are consistent with U.S. government policy and that policymakers are informed by the centers’ wealth of expertise.

Increase coordination among the centers.

A collaborative set of centers with a coherent message exceeds the sum of their individual contributions.

Strive to become test beds for interagency jointness by strengthening ties with the Department of State (DoS) and other agencies.

Help lead the Department’s efforts to improve cooperation with non-government organizations, particularly humanitarian organizations, to information U.S. government decision-making in crises.

Expand participation to include more non-government elites who shape opinions and inform decisions on security issues in the region.

Create a common information technology network to improve alumni outreach efforts and strengthen collaboration among centers, other DoD educational institutions, and OSD policy.

Cooperate on the transition to the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) as the unified executive agent for all centers.

On 29 September 2005, the Deputy Secretary of Defense signed the memorandum establishing the DSCA as the executive agent for the regional centers effective 1 October 2005. As the executive agent, the Director, DSCA, subject to the policy oversight of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) is responsible for programming, budgeting, and execution for all resources necessary to support the operation of the regional centers, to include all operation and maintenance costs (including personnel costs and base operations support costs), except that the Secretary of the Army shall remain responsible for base operations and personnel support for the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies in accordance with DoD Directive 5100.3.

In addition to their relationship with DSCA, the directors of the regional centers, also subject to the policy oversight of the USD(P), report to, and are currently under the authority, direction, and control of, commanders of the combatant commands, as follows:

- U.S. European Command: George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies
- U.S. European Command: Africa Center for Strategic Studies
- U.S. Pacific Command: Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies
- U.S. Southern Command: Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies
- U.S. Central Command: Near East-South Asia Center for Strategic Studies

In fiscal year 2006, the regional centers were the Department’s primary asset for regional outreach and network-building efforts, extending programs and events to more than 7,000 representatives from over 160 different countries. The regional centers programs target foreign military officers, civilian security and defense policy officials, and key non-government influencers with:

- Resident programs conducted at the regional centers
- Regional in-theater programs
• Outreach opportunities in conjunction with a permanent regional presence

Each of the RC’s utilizes sophisticated pre- and post-attendance surveys to gage the effectiveness of the program material and reinforce continued communication with the participant.

Resident programs conducted at the centers not only provide academic instruction, they leverage the opportunity for participants to gain an American cultural experience at the same time. The centers in the Washington D.C. area also target representatives of the diplomatic corps. For fiscal year 2006, almost 60 percent of the programs offered were resident programs. That ratio will decrease to the 30-40 percent range by fiscal year 2009 as funding becomes available to increase regional in-theater programs.

Regional in-theater programs provide unique “outreach” opportunities to understand regional challenges and concerns and tailor the content of seminars, courses and workshops. Due to the flat budget projections from fiscal years 2007 to 2008 the regional centers will concentrate on revising and expanding their regional in-theatre program offerings focusing on realigning their priorities to meet the Quadrennial Defense Review objectives. The in-theater programs provide the foundation for initiating and developing relationships with key influences within the various countries.

The regional centers continue to redesign their programs in response to Presidential and DoD directives, placing renewed emphasis on countering ideological support for terrorism. For example, in fiscal year 2007 each of the centers will pursue a diverse group of regional center partners to offer real-world, case study-oriented courses that leverage existing, regional military, governmental and non-governmental educational institutions. All five centers propose adding programs or content on understanding and responding to terrorism, and will continue to refine content. A key example is the Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Course that is being designed to develop and enhance security practitioner knowledge of and skill in planning, preparing, and responding to the myriad of complex challenges of an SSTR scenario. Overall, in fiscal year 2007 the centers will include counter terrorism modules in almost 80 percent of all program offerings.

The regional centers are also placing additional emphasis on new programs designed to build relationships with former participants, creating valuable in-roads to key regional leaders. Beginning in fiscal year 2009, the centers will increase outreach offerings by 25 percent, including in-region courses, in-region conferences, in-region workshops, in-region seminars, and former participant activities. The centers will also increase their leverage of communication products through multimedia, distance learning, newsletters, e-bulletins, and web casts to synchronize outreach efforts, reaching a larger group in less time.

In-region presence is seen as essential to building a network to leverage former participant as a mechanism to influence

• Military organizations
• Governments
• Academics
• Key civil society actors
• Representatives of international organizations
• Non-governmental organizations
• Private sector entities important to U.S. government and DoD goals and objectives in the region

Beginning in fiscal year 2007 the centers will expend significant efforts to establish a permanent footprint in the Middle East and African regions. Additionally, all of the centers will increase their
engagement with regional military war colleges and civilian universities to partner on programs, developing additional relationships to facilitate strategic communications in their regions.

Combatant commanders have reported they consider the regional centers to be among their most effective security cooperation programs. Key partners also recognize the value of participation in the centers:

- One center alone counts among its alumni two ministers of defense
- One minister of foreign affairs
- Eight chiefs or deputy chiefs of defense
- Twelve chiefs or deputy chiefs of service
- Twenty-five ambassadors

The articles on the following pages highlight the uniqueness of each Center and their impressive contributions to their regions.
There exists an underutilized tool, as far as security assistance is concerned, in the combatant commanders’ arsenal for furthering U.S. interests, their regional security centers. The George C. Marshall Center activities include education, research, and outreach through a combination of in-residence and in-region courses, seminars, and conferences. Until now the centers have played only a minor role in areas of security assistance. However, due to the need to ensure organizations which enable our collective security efforts present a unified front, the coordination between organizations which traditionally plan and execute security assistance and the centers can and should increase or fundamentally change.

In the past, there was little motivation for the regional security centers to involve themselves in security assistance processes. On 1 October 2005, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) took administrative responsibility which includes planning, programming, and budgeting, of the regional centers. The Regional Combatant Commands (RCC) have maintained operational control. In light of DSCA’s role, this should obligle the centers to become bigger players in security assistance, including the close planning and coordination of events to ensure congruency with the overarching security cooperation requirements of the Office of Secretary of Defense and the RCC. In view of other nations and multinational organizations, the regional centers benefit from a traditional association with academia rather than the military. They are also a better resource for furthering themes associated with U.S. security assistance enabled strategic communications efforts, as well as other areas related to the day-to-day execution of security assistance.

This article will provide a brief understanding of what constitute the major elements of security assistance, also referred to as military assistance by the Department of State and the agencies responsible for its execution. I will make specific recommendations for greater regional security center involvement to enhance security assistance processes.

The Elements of Security Assistance

According to the Department of State (DoS), foreign assistance programs fall into nineteen types of accounts in five major categories. Military assistance is one category. All the DoS foreign assistance programs have the goal of advancing U.S. foreign policy, each with slightly different approaches and different programs but ultimately focused on the same purpose. According to the Foreign Assistance Act:

The Congress hereby finds that the efforts of the United States and other friendly countries to promote peace and security continue to require measures of support based upon the principle of effective self-help and mutual aid [through] measures in the common defense against internal and external aggression, including the furnishing of military assistance, upon request, to friendly countries and international organizations.”


Military assistance aid includes foreign military financing (FMF) and international military education and training (IMET).

The *Foreign Assistance Act* states:

The President is authorized to furnish military assistance, on such terms and conditions as he may determine, to any friendly country or international organization, the assisting of which the President finds will strengthen the security of the United States and promote world peace and which is otherwise eligible to receive such assistance, by acquiring from any source and providing (by loan or grant) any defense article or defense service.\(^3\)

In relation to IMET, it also states the following:

The President is authorized to furnish, on such terms and conditions consistent with this Act as the President may determine military education and training to military and related civilian personnel of foreign countries.” One stated objective of the FMF program is to promote bilateral, regional and multilateral coalition efforts, notably in the Global War on Terrorism.\(^5\)

The purpose of IMET is to provide training to students from allied and friendly nations. IMET students primarily consist of foreign military personnel, but in some instances can include civilians as well. An assumption made about IMET is that due to the exposure to U.S. professional military organizations in a democracy (under civilian control), similar values or desire for a like-minded and organized military will be transferred to the IMET student and propagated upon their return to their home country. A key objective of IMET is to encourage effective and mutually beneficial relations and increased understanding between the United States and foreign countries in furtherance of the goals of international peace and security.\(^6\)

**The Execution of security assistance - Department of State**

Within the DoS, the Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security leads the interagency policy process and provides policy direction for security assistance. The Under Secretary has policy oversight for the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. The Bureau of Political-Military Affairs bridges the gap between DoS and the Department of Defense (DoD) and also provides policy direction in security assistance matters. The Under Secretary for Political Affairs manages the day-to-day affairs of regional policy issues and their bureaus, Africa, East Asia and Pacific, Europe and Eurasia, Near East, South Asia, Western Hemisphere, International Organizations, and International Narcotics and Law Enforcement. The assistant secretaries of the geographic bureaus, through the Under Secretary, guide the operations of the various U.S. missions.

**The Execution of Security Assistance - Department of Defense**

According to the DoD, when measured in man-years, it expends the greatest level of effort in the day-to-day management of security assistance an estimated 20,000 man-years.\(^7\) The *Foreign Assistance Act* charges the Secretary of Defense with many aspects of security assistance, to include

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4. Ibid., pp. 251, 252.


The establishment of priorities in the procurement, delivery, and allocation of military equipment and identification of requirements. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy is the center of gravity within DoD for security assistance matters. The Under Secretary serves as the principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense for all matters concerned with the integration of departmental plans and policies with overall national security objectives, and exercises overall direction, authority, and control over security assistance matters through the various assistant secretaries of defense and departments. The DoD-level agency managing the day-to-day direction and execution of security assistance for DoD is the Defense security cooperation Agency, a subordinate to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.

The combatant commanders are responsible for making recommendations to the Secretary of Defense on all matters related to security assistance, to include programs, policies, and projections. Each combatant command integrates elements of security assistance and its component U.S. foreign policy goals and objectives into broad theater engagement strategies. These strategies build upon guidance in the Secretary of Defense security cooperation Guidance. A primary difference between the secretary’s guidance and that of the combatant commands is whereas the secretary’s guidance may not mention every region or country in a combatant commands area of responsibility (AOR), the commands strategy normally contains a country-by-country rundown of objectives and desired end-states.

Within the combatant commands, the single face to the customer is typically the security assistance organization (SAO), which is part of the embassy and country team. The combatant commanders command, supervise, and support the various SAOs within their AOR. The functions are normally done with close coordination and cooperation with the respective Chiefs of Mission. The legislated functions of SAOs are:

- Foreign military sales case management
- IMET program management
- Security assistance program monitoring, evaluation, and planning of the host country’s military capabilities and requirements
- Administrative support
- Promoting international cooperative programs
- Other liaison functions

Recommendations for Change

Since many combatant commands have responsibilities associated with security assistance spread among more than one directorate, the regional centers, with the requisite staffing and resources, are in a position to ensure these efforts are consolidated and focused by assisting the combatant command level planning, execution and oversight of security assistance. Likewise, the regional centers can help unify the efforts of the other security assistance organizations as they relate to our security cooperation end-states and objectives as well as provide consistency of message to our foreign counterparts.


10. Ibid.
Involvement by the regional centers would provide dimensions and focus other organizations may not with regard to security assistance. The centers’ involvement in the security assistance process could allow for greater consistency and coordination of national and RCC level Strategic Communications themes to be integrated. Even with the legislated restriction on who can be trained under IMET, centers still provide a larger and more diverse audience base since the centers draw upon not only military leadership, but civilian leaders, members of the legislature, and members of the international media. The entire audience could be exposed to the purposes and results of our security assistance and other aid programs, and centers could provide a larger and better pool of metric data to bolster funding decisions and any strategy changes.

As an academic institution, in order to extend the contact and exposure to U.S. messages, the centers could develop and cultivate a sort of alumni association of IMET students as they do for their course attendees. An alumni association would provide and enhance the execution of security assistance in the following manner:

- A better mechanism for developing and maintaining a RCC specific database of attendees to U.S. sourced education and training and the means of constant contact through the life and service of the individual.
- A forum to reinforce training and further develop themes instilled during training – democracy, rule of law, and so forth.
- A sense of belonging to an organization of elites among their fellow countrymen and peers.
- The SAO can utilize this pool to identify current and future “movers and shakers” who should be systematically identified for further development through IMET.
- A pool of potential advocates to forward certain U.S. positions or policies.
- A forum for contact on a more social rather than official or military level, one from which, taking a cultural viewpoint, the U.S. could derive strategic dividends.

As centers of academic excellence, the regional centers are well-placed and equipped to enhance the theater, regional, and country understanding for military and civilian personnel to include foreign service nationals involved in security assistance. This includes those assigned to the regional commands, the components of that command, and any other associated unit involved in security assistance and cooperation strategy. The centers can provide initial and continuing region and country-specific education and orientation prior to these individuals’ arrival at their assignments. The purpose and overall benefit to this proposal is an equal level of understanding regarding country, region, and AOR specific security issues and plan toward attainment of the RCCs’ security cooperation objectives and end-states. The regional centers are distinct, such as the Marshall Center being a bilateral U.S. and German organization, so eventually some hybrid of the previous recommendations may emerge, but the ultimate result would be the same.

It is apparent the regional centers are unique organizations with unique missions, ones which could enhance the execution of security assistance and the RCCs’ security cooperation efforts. They possess the necessary tools, well-qualified faculty, and background to bring this paper’s recommendations to fruition; it is up to the RCCs to tap into and make efficient use of these tools. This will necessitate

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11. Similar recommendations for an IMET-related association can be found in John Cope’s International Military Education and Training: An Assessment”, however the recommendations in this paper differ in scope, scale, and who best to oversee them.
the coordination of all the players, such as DSCA, the RCCs, and the regional centers, to set these changes in motion.

Bibliography


15. Foreign Assistance Act, Section 644 (reference [b]) and AECA, Section 21 (reference [c]) establish the legal basis for a multi-tier pricing structure for training provided under the U.S. security assistance authorities.

16. Department of Defense, Financial Management Regulation, Volume 15 7000.14-R, Chapter 7 addresses training rates and pricing procedures. When a case is fully funded with MAP funds and/or FMS Credit (non-repayable), the FMS rate is adjusted to exclude military pay and entitlements in accordance with FAA Section 503(a).


24. Title 22 of the USC.


Asian Pacific Center for Security Studies

History of the Asian Pacific Center for Security Studies

On September 30, 1994, President Clinton signed H.R. 4650, which included $3 million for the start-up of the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, patterned after the European Center for Security Studies (the Marshall Center).

The Center officially opened on September 4, 1995, with a ribbon-cutting ceremony attended by the Honorable William J. Perry, then-Secretary of Defense and General John M. Shalikashvili, then Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Also, ninety attendees from thirty-three countries participated, including several ministers of defense and key international representatives.

The Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS) is a Department of Defense academic institute that addresses regional and global security issues using a multilateral and multi-dimensional approach to defining and addressing regional security issues and concerns. Established in Honolulu on Sept. 4, 1995, the most beneficial result is building relationships of trust and confidence among future leaders and decision-makers within the region.

The Center was created to build on the strong bilateral relationships between the U.S. Pacific Command and the armed forces of the nations in the Asia-Pacific region, by focusing on the broader multilateral approach to addressing regional security issues and concerns.

The Official Seal of the Asian Pacific Center for Security Studies

The Lamp of Knowledge represents the academic focus of the center and signifies the desire to foster understanding, cooperation and the study of regional security issues. The laurel branches form a Wreath of Peace that emphasize the Center’s non-warfighting approach to addressing regional security issues. The visible portion of the world globe depicts the U.S. Pacific Command’s area of responsibility. The continuous ribbon symbolizes the strong interrelationship among the six geographic regions of the Asia-Pacific theater. (The Seal was created by Dr. Jimmie R. Lackey, who was then an Army colonel, and now the Center’s executive director.)

The Asian Pacific Center for Security Studies Mission

APCSS educates and develops leaders to advance strategic communications and security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region.

The APCSS is a Department of Defense academic institute that addresses regional and global security issues using a multilateral and multi-dimensional approach to defining and addressing regional security issues and concerns. The most beneficial result is building relationships of trust and confidence among future leaders and decision-makers within the region.

The center has a strong focus on executive education via both resident and regional events. These academic events include resident courses and outreach events including mini-courses, conferences and research. They are intertwined to produce a dynamic, integrated program of study, conferences and research to support the center’s mission.
The APCSS has set as a top priority to provide professional and personal relationships to the students by being:

- Adaptive, innovative and flexible
- Asking why not?
- Keeping up to date using state-of-the-art in use of technology and methods
- Focused on most important and emerging security challenges
- Promoting prevention of conflicts and peaceful resolution of dispute
- Seeking long-term and near-term returns on investment
- Committed to teaming regionally and globally

**Our Vision**

The Asian Pacific Center for Security Studies adds unique value as a:

- Venue of choice for security-cooperation education
- Trusted strategic communications facilitator
- Sought-after security-challenge counselor catalyst for capacity-building (e.g., leader, interagency);
- Foundation for communities of influence

**The Asian Pacific Center Offers Four Security Oriented Courses**

The one-week Senior Executive Course (SEC) is an intensive program for current leaders. It is designed for military officers at the two-and three star level, and civilian equivalents from the Asia-Pacific Region. The curriculum emphasizes the impact of change in the region and evolving security roles, capabilities, and opportunities. The six-week Executive Course (EC) focus is on building relationships among mid-career leaders and decision makers within the region. Its curriculum emphasizes the non-warfighting aspects of security and international relations, and challenges fellows to develop regional and transnational perspectives. Security is examined as a comprehensive mix of political, economic, social, military, diplomatic, information and ecological dimensions.

The two-week Junior Executive Course (JEC) is designed to provide mid-grade Asia-Pacific specialists with graduate-level instruction on trends and current issues shaping the Asia-Pacific security environment. The course focuses on U.S. security policy and provides an introduction to culture, politics, protocols and challenges of key countries in the region.

The three-week Comprehensive Security Responses to Terrorism (CSRT) Course provides focused knowledge and skills practiced at the operational and strategic level, all designed to enhance Fellows ability to work together to counter ideological support for and combat terrorism cooperatively for the long term. The course facilitates relationships among current and future counter-terrorism practitioners. It also helps engender trust necessary for increased information sharing, and identify ways to reduce cultural obstacles to cooperation in the international struggle against terrorism.

The three-week Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) operations and activities course focuses on three broad topic areas:

- Pre-conflict/complex emergency condition setting
- Post-conflict/complex emergency transitions
- Post-conflict/complex emergency reconstruction
In addition, the course also addresses the following basic definitions and types of stability operations.

- Coalition building,
- Interagency coordination
- Interventions and occupations
- Post-conflict and complex emergency reconstruction steps
- Transition planning
- Strategic communications

The following are a list of facts of accomplishments since the official opening of the school on September 4, 1995.

**College of Security Studies Executive Course.**

- Completed 28 classes
- Included 1833 fellows from forty-five countries
- Included 165 general officers and senior civilians
  - Course participants included the following:
    - Future leaders and practitioners
    - Lieutenant Colonels, Colonels, Brigadier Generals and civilian equivalent
    - Held classes of 80/20 mix of international and U.S. students
    - Held classes of 60/40 mix of military and civilian students

**Senior Executive Course. Transnational security cooperation**

- Completed 13 Courses
- Included 249 Fellows from thirty-one countries
  - Course participants:
    - Current leaders and practitioners
    - General officer and vice-ministerial level
    - 90/10 mix of international and U.S. students
    - 60/40 mix of military and civilian students

**Junior Executive Course (JEC) first course held in October 2004. Asia-Pacific Security Foundations**

- Completed 5 Courses
- Included 100 Fellows from four countries
  - Course participants:
    - Included mid level Asia-Pacific specialists
    - Senior Lieutenants and Captains
    - Held classes of 10/90 mix of international and U.S. students
    - Held classes of 85/15 mix of military and civilian students
Comprehensive Security Response to Terrorism (CSRT), first class held in April 2004.

- Completed 5 courses
- 272 Fellows from 44 countries
  - Course Participants
    - MAJ/LTC/COL/civilian equivalent
- 80/20 Mix of international and U.S.
- 60/40 Mix of military and civilian

Alumni associations has participants from the following countries:

- Bangladesh
- Philippines
- Mongolia
- Madagascar
- Thailand

Alumni already occupying senior positions within their country:

- Minister of Defense (3)
- Minister of Foreign Affairs (3)
- Chief or Deputy Chief of Defense (14)
- Ambassador (32)
- Chief or Deputy Chief of Service (18)
- Cabinet or Parliament appointment (12)

**Asian Pacific Center for Security Studies Total Alumni = 2,473.**

The Asian Pacific Center has held 107 conferences since June of 1995. The total attendees of the conferences since 1995 equals 6,700 from 66 countries.
Twenty years ago, during Argentina’s turbulent transition to democracy, a retired U.S. army colonel was loyally assisting the civilian government of then President Raul Alfonsin. The retired army colonel was working as an advisor in the Defense Ministry and was asked by a journalist how many civilians were employed in policy making positions there. “Sir,” came the dry response, “we have citizens who are perfectly capable of running the Ministry of Defense. They are called military men.”

In the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean, many of whom were experiencing transitions to democratic rule, what civilian inputs there were during the 1980s and early 1990s focused mostly on civil and military relations. The goal was to ensure that elected officials maintain control of the armed forces in the context of mutual respect and collaboration. Meanwhile, the “nuts and bolts” issues of administration of military and security forces, and overall questions of strategy, were still left largely in the hands of the armed forces.

Even in 1995 by the time of the first Defense Ministerial (DMA) in Williamsburg, Virginia, most countries in the region had transitioned to representative democracy, but few civilians had acquired experience in directing and managing defense and security forces. Authoritarian governments had seen no need for civilian officials who would influence the defense and security sector. Not only had the circumstances of authoritarian rule not exposed military leaders to the normally stressful practices of a vibrant democratic society, such as processing demands, resolving disputes, decision-making, allocating resources, and developing and implementing policies. But also, those civilian professionals who had no opportunity to manage the security sector logically avoided defense studies. Clearly, both civilian and military leaders had much to learn about how to achieve national objectives in a democratic system.

At the first DMA, some of the civilian defense ministers from the region raised the need for an institution to help educate civilians on the management of defense and security with then Secretary of Defense William Perry. In 1996 during the DMA in Bariloche, Argentina, the establishment of the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies (CHDS) was announced. Its purpose is to raise the understanding of civilians and military personnel about their shared roles in the management and implementation of defense and security to meet national security requirements.

Less than ten years later, more than 13,000 individuals have participated in CHDS seminars, conferences and workshops and more than 2,500 alumni from throughout the region have graduated from its longer (three-week) courses. Three quarters of whom are civilians and one fourth military. A growing number of CHDS alumni have gone on to be cabinet ministers, heads of national legislatures, presidential/ministerial advisors, and general and flag officers in governments around the region. Many are key players in formulating security strategies and defense policies. The “Declaration of Santiago,” issued at the Fourth DMA in 2002, specifically recognized the role of CHDS and its relevance for the Hemisphere. Increasingly, U.S. embassies are relying on CHDS regional and subject matter expertise to provide needed “connective tissue” with regional policy makers whose governments are not always in line with Washington’s policies.

Since September 11, 2001, CHDS which calls itself a policy tool for enhancing civilian and military relations has focused on providing educational outreach support to increase regional
understanding about the need for effective programs to combat violent fundamentalist ideologies, promoting increased inter-agency and regional cooperation, and building support for defense and security policies among key civilian decision-makers. Working closely with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the National Defense University and the senior leadership at SOUTHCOM, NORTHCOM, and CHDS has been able to foster trust relationships and frank dialogue with people representing a broad range of political beliefs and affiliations from around the region.

One highly successful outreach effort has been CHDS’s National Security Planning Workshops (NSPWs). The workshops bring together senior national-level decision makers to address strategic policy and strategy formulation and implementation. The NSPWs foster interagency coordination of civil and military cooperation, and provides unique opportunities for U.S. and host country national dialogue. The first NSPW was held in August 2004 in Panama for the incoming administration of President Martin Torrijos. Six months later, a CHDS graduate who heads Peru’s congressional security and defense commission was instrumental in arranging for a planning workshop in his country. As a result of a specific request by Paraguayan Vice President Luis Castiglioni to his U.S. counterpart, Vice President Richard Cheney, in September 2005 CHDS held an NSPW on integral security in Asuncion. In May of 2006, the Center was invited by the new Honduran government to conduct an NSPW for senior officials led by Vice President Elvin Santos and Minister of Defense Aristides Mejia Carranza. Finally, from July 28 through July 30, 2006, CHDS conducted a well-received NSPW for senior Costa Rican officials at the invitation of the new government headed by President (and Nobel laureate) Oscar Arias.

Dennis F. Caffrey, CHDS dean of students and administration, stated the following:

The NSPWs have provided priceless venues for the trusted exchange of information, ideas and new perspectives on issues that affect all of us. Because we try to hold them early in the term of a new government in the region, they feel they are supported with hands-on help, and the United States gets a hearing for its concerns from people who matter.

More recently, attention has been focused on the Center’s Interagency Coordination and Counterterrorism (ICCT) course, which addresses intra-interagency and international coordination with a focus on the long war against terrorist violence. Participants, mostly middle managers from military, law enforcement, civilian agencies, international and non-governmental organizations, receive up-to-the-minute information on global trends on the war on terror, and how national governments around the world are organizing to meet the threat.

In June 2006, the ICCT brought Joaquin Villalobos, former commander of the Salvadoran Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) guerrilla group, together with Ambassador (retired) David Passage, the U.S. deputy chief of mission to San Salvador (1984-1986), and Ambassador (retired) William Walker, who served as the U.S. envoy to El Salvador as peace negotiations in that country finally bore fruit. The former senior vice president of NDU and one of the founders of CHDS also attended to help discuss the applicability of lessons learned from the Central American insurgencies to today’s challenges. The 71 students from seventeen countries in the region, plus Spain and Morocco, taking part in the three-week course were treated to insights and analysis never before given by three of that conflict’s most important protagonists.

Center Director Richard D. Downie stated the following:

I think some of the greatest values CHDS brings to its students are intellectual clarity and the opportunity to share perspectives across national boundaries, regions and cultures. Because of the types of people we are able to call upon for example, senior officials from DoD, Homeland Security, Department of State, the best and the brightest from NDU and members of our own academic staff, as well as a broad array of other
experts we are privileged to call friends, the Center literally vibrates with relevance for both Washington’s need for engagement and the region’s thirst for expertise.

Kenneth LaPlante, CHDS deputy director stated the following:

In the past, U.S. military education in the region was stove piped into one area, where certainly there were dividends in terms of influence, but it suffered from sometimes being an echo chamber rather than a place where an honest expression of differences can and does lead to new ideas and new perspectives, as well as consensus. CHDS’ role has been to do just that to open up communication with people who maybe even a decade ago, probably would not have given security studies, or even engagement with the U.S. government, a second thought.

Former students, including educators, academic researchers, journalists, non-government organizations, a think tank staff, along with military and police officers, report that several other CHDS offerings have also proved to be of significant benefit both for their education and to their careers. For example, its Advanced Policy Making Seminar (APS), a sustainment activity designed to nurture CHDS alumni by enhancing their existing knowledge of security and defense issues and processes, offers them the opportunity for professional development and continued interaction and networking with their counterparts from other countries.

The Center’s Senior Executive Dialogue (SED), provides a unique opportunity for the hemisphere’s senior leaders to discuss policy issues and interact in person with U.S. counterparts in Washington, D.C., and the combatant commands. The SED is organized by sub-region and provides another opportunity to promote increased regional cooperation on security and defense concerns. The participants, ministerial-level decision makers, have reported that their discussions held during the SED have had direct impact on how critical issues are addressed back in their own countries.

Two new academic initiatives are about to be launched at the Center. The Faculty Outreach Program will bring one or two members of the faculty to those countries with active CHDS alumni associations to conduct a number of events. Beyond bringing the alumni up to date on the latest initiatives in the Center, the CHDS envoys will present the latest thinking at the Center on the major topics of the day, ranging from the Global War on Terrorism and Countering Ideological Support for Terrorism, to Stability Operations, Defense Transformation, and National Security Strategy formulation.

The second initiative is a long-anticipated Advanced Course, geared to those “who remain decisively, actively, and enthusiastically engaged in the defense and security sector,” reports Dr. Craig Deare, CHDS dean of academics. He also states the following:

Although career defense ministry officials represent the ideal candidate, we will welcome those who exercise their influence in the fields of academics, media, legislatures, or other executive branch areas, such as presidential staff, planning, treasury, and so forth.

The first two of the fourteen-week distance learning and three-week in-residence courses, to be presented in March 2007. The course will focus on Terrorism and Stability Operations. And, for the first time ever, NDU will be granting three credit hours for successful completion of the course.

Strategic communication with the region is also conducted in a number of other ways at the Center. CHDS has completed two Department of Defense sponsored research projects:

- The first on Peacekeeping in Latin America and the Caribbean
- The second on Gaining Regional Support to confront the ideological support of terrorism
In addition, in February of this year, the Center, in cooperation with NDU’s Center for Technology and National Security Policy (CTNSP), hosted a workshop on Bolivia’s future under the leadership of its new President, Evo Morales. The 2 1/2-day event brought together nearly a dozen Bolivian participants to better understand the challenges and opportunities presented by Bolivia’s new administration. A debate series, called “Face-to-Face Encounters,” also regularly engages experts in a point-counterpoint approach to provide insight on topics of increasing concern in the hemisphere. The encounter between former FMLN Commander Villalobos and ex-U.S. Ambassador Walker was the latest in these friendly, but no holds barred, exchanges.

Individual research by CHDS faculty, students and alumni is also a cornerstone of Center efforts to contribute to a cooperative international security environment and mutual understanding of U.S. and regional defense and security issues. The Security and Defense Studies Review offers an array of timely articles by regional specialists, and CHDS faculty are frequently asked to speak at U.S. and international conferences, as well as to write books and scholarly articles.

Dr. Herb Huser, editor of the Security and Defense Studies Review stated the following:

We have been blessed with the kind of articles from our contributors that lend themselves naturally to book-length collaborations. That interest, by NDU Press and others, is what helps affirm that we are breaking new ground.

Recently CHDS Professor John T. Fishel recently published, together with Dr. Max Manwaring of the Strategic Studies Institute at the U.S. Army War College, a critically-acclaimed book, *Uncomfortable Wars Revisited*. In July, Dr. Jaime Garcia Covarrubias, professor of national security affairs, presented a paper on “Nationalisms, fundamentalisms and security” in Madrid at the III Atlantic Forum on Liberty and Democracy in Europe and America, organized by the Fundación Internacional para la Libertad headed by Peruvian novelist Mario Vargas Llosa. (The event was inaugurated by former Salvadoran President Fernando Flores and closed by former Spanish President Jose Maria Aznar.)

CHDS ambitious mission does not end with providing education and advancing research on security and defense issues. The Center also insists on the promotion of activities that are possible only through the establishment of a permanent and dynamic network throughout the hemisphere. Five active CHDS Alumni Associations in the region in Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay are part of that robust network of security-minded professionals, and help ensure a strong interaction not only between CHDS and its alumni, but also among the alumni themselves.

Dr. Luis Bitencourt, CHDS professor and alumni coordinator stated the following:

Security and defense are themes that are constantly changing, and require consistent attention and a multiplicity of perspectives that promote broader and better understanding. The alumni associations are the more effective way to mobilize alumni and convey this mission.

Dr. Downie, Director Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies stated the following:

Globalization has not only shortened the distances between people; it has also changed the nature of the security and defense challenges we all face. Security and defense paradigms are changing, a new premium is being placed on alternative views and a democratization and expansion of the community in which solutions are found.

Fortunately for us and for future generations, today’s defense and security graduates around the region form part of a growing regional/international community. We at CHDS are delighted to be expanding our activities to offer greater opportunities to learn together and from each other.
Africa’s security is of great interest to the United States, both because of its impact on the continent and its global implications. While this seems like an obvious statement to those who have worked with Africans in the security arena, historically Africa has not always received appropriate attention from Washington DC; and even today, there are many in the U.S. who under-estimate its importance.

The Africa Center for Strategic Studies is Secretary of Defense’s primary asset for outreach and network-building to Africa. By offering academic programs and networking opportunities, the Africa Center creates, maintains, and supports “communities of influence” with an interest in African security. These efforts focus on these core objectives:

• Counter ideological support for terrorism
• Harmonize views on common security challenges
• Educate on the role of security in civil societies

Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld has often noted the need for more aggressive, swift and nontraditional information campaigns to counter the messages of extremist and terrorist groups. This philosophy is incorporated into many U.S. policy documents and strategies including the updated National Strategy for Combating Terrorism released in September 2006 which states, “In the long run, winning the war on terror means winning the battle of ideas.”

Similarly, the Pentagon’s Quadrennial Defense Review released earlier this year notes that, “The United States will not win the war on terrorism or achieve other crucial national security objectives discussed in this Report by military means alone. Victory in the long war ultimately depends on strategic communication.” By building networks of trust and communications that bridge the gaps between individuals with an interest in Africa, the Africa Center for Strategic Studies is an integral part of this effort.

The Africa Center “Community”

The Africa Center Community is the network of leading professionals in African security who have taken part in Africa Center programs. Members, numbering more than 2500, include program participants, guest speakers, adjunct faculty, distinguished visitors, stakeholders, and full-time staff from Africa, Europe and the United States. While other institutions use terms like students and alumni, the Africa Center refers to these individuals as participants and community members to illustrate that the Africa Center does not teach but instead provides a forum for dialogue among equals.

One of the Community’s strengths is its incredible diversity. Members include civilian, military, parliamentarian, law enforcement, and civil society officials from across the United States, Europe, and Africa. Members also range from senior leaders (including several current and former African Heads of State) to individuals who are just starting their careers.

Separated by geography, culture, language, and many other factors, most community members would have no other way to meet each other, much less maintain an on-going dialogue on security issues.
Programs

Africa Center programs are as diverse as the people worldwide that the organization reaches, spanning topics from counter-terrorism to health and its impact on security.

Academics

Since the Africa Center’s inception in 1999, more than 2500 participants have taken part in its academic programs. Many Africa Center programs take place in Africa, and all operate under the umbrellas of academic freedom and non-attribution which allow participants to speak freely and candidly. This creates a unique environment full of lively debate and discussion, and allows innovative and practical ideas to come forward. In addition to plenary presentations and breakout discussion groups, most academic programs also include a capstone exercise which allows participants to put ideas into practice in a simulated Africa environment.

The flagship academic program is the Senior Leader Seminar. Held once per year in rotating locations, this program includes nearly every African country as well as Europe and U.S. Its curriculum is also the most expansive, covering content on counter-terrorism, civil-military relations, defense economics, conflict management, and security studies. Smaller Sub-regional Seminars and Topical Seminars allow participants to more closely examine the unique challenges of a single topic or sub-region. Previous programs in these categories have included:

- The Security Challenge of Small Arms and Light Weapons Proliferation in Africa (Uganda, 2004)
- Towards Enhanced Conflict Management in Central Africa (Cameroon, 2004)

The Africa Center also organizes recurring academic courses such as its African Defense Attaché Course and Next Generation of African Military Leaders Program.

Community Chapters

Community Chapters are the Africa Center’s major tool for maintaining its network in Africa. By forming national associations devoted to promoting security debate and networking, former Africa Center program participants maintain communications with the Africa Center, keep in touch with each other, and even develop independent programs that build on their Africa Center experiences. To date, there are fifteen chapters that span the continent. Within a general framework set up by the Africa Center, chapter members choose for themselves how they want their chapter to function. Some are only seeking a chance to network, while others are interested in more formalized projects. The Africa Center Burkina Faso Chapter has organized two seminars since 2005 on peace and security with several hundred participants, and is currently conducting a European Union funded, train the trainer project to offer instruction to security professionals.

Strategic Communications

The Africa Center provides its community members with free access to a series of communications initiatives focusing on African security. The Africa Center’s web site is the following: www.africacenter.org, monthly electronic publication, and quarterly print newsletter provide information on current events on the continent, U.S. policy statements towards Africa, analysis of security issues, and information on Africa Center events. They also allow community members to maintain communications by providing contact information, news about promotions and current projects, and articles written by community members. A book focusing on counter-terrorism and Africa is currently being produced.
Collaborative Projects and Support Programs

The Africa Center seeks to support the programs of other U.S. government agencies and find ways to work with other organizations around the globe. The Maritime Safety and Security in the Gulf of Guinea series of events, for example, are collaborations with the U.S. European Command and U.S. Naval Forces Europe. The Golden Spear Symposium Series is a U.S. CENTCOM program designed to facilitate open discussion on regional cooperation and capacity building to prevent and respond to natural and humanitarian disasters in the Horn of Africa. The Africa Center also collaborates with non-U.S. organizations, including a series of events working with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and war colleges in Africa.

The Future of the Africa Center

The Africa Center is constantly evolving to meet the changing needs of the security environment in Africa and the growing importance of Africa to the United States government and Department of Defense.

Africa Center Regional Office; U.S. Embassy, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

In October 2006, the Africa Center opened its first permanent office on the continent. This on-the-ground presence will allow the Africa Center to increase its influence and support U.S. security interests in the region by strengthening relationships with governments, regional and sub-regional organizations, civil society, non-government organizations, U.S. missions in the sub-region, leading academic institutions, and Africa Center community chapters. In time, the Africa Center plans to open annexes in each African sub-region.

Online Learning and Content

For the past two years, the Africa Center has experimented with offering portions of its course content online. The Africa Center recognizes that online learning and communications will continue to grow in importance. Video teleconference, interactive uses of the internet, and other technological innovations could allow the Africa Center to dramatically expand its audience and facilitate more communication among its community members.

Research

The Africa Center plans to conduct original research in its fields of expertise. The capability will allow the Africa Center to provide additional resources to its community and other U.S. government agencies and other partners, as well as improve the content of its own programs.

Why Africa Matters

Experts agree that Africa’s strategic importance to the U.S. will increase substantially in the future.

• War on Terror

Africa has been and will remain a crucial front in the global war on terror. Radical Islamism has largely failed to take hold in sub-Saharan Africa, but poverty and other threats to Africa’s stability offer terrorist organizations with potential recruitment grounds, and Africa’s under-governed spaces could offer safe havens. These areas include the vast tracks in and around the Sahara, Somalia, and marine areas such as Gulf of Guinea and parts of the Indian Ocean along Africa’s coast.

• Energy

Estimates vary, but as much as 18 percent of the petroleum used in the United States is imported from Africa, and this figure is estimated to grow to at least 25 percent in the near future. Freedom from the dependence on Mid-East oil is fundamental to
U.S. economic development and the Bush Administration’s energy strategy. African nations have been and will continue to be invaluable partners in this regard, but oil exploration and production expansion is threatened by instability.

- Growing Markets

Recent gross domestic product productivity increases in sub-Saharan Africa are greater than other regions. For example, developing countries as a whole experienced a 0.5 percent increase in gross domestic product from 2003 to 2004, but Africa’s gross domestic product increased by four times as much in the same period. Africa’s population, currently 800 million, is predicted to grow to more than 2 billion by 2050, and approximately 44 percent of the population is under the age of fifteen, representing the world’s youngest population.

- Human Immunodeficiency Virus and Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome and Other Diseases

One of the greatest threats to security and stability in Africa is infectious diseases, particularly human immunodeficiency virus and acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (HIV/AIDS). Estimates state that approximately 25.8 million African are currently living with HIV/AIDS. In addition to the instability to the general population this can cause, these countries also have high infection rates among their soldiers presenting obvious challenges. The Bush Administration’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, an unprecedented five-year, $15 billion effort, illustrates the importance of this issue to the U.S.

In addition to these issues, there are a number of additional factors that impact Africa’s security. Poverty, displacement, natural disasters, climate change, and others have critical impacts on Africa security and U.S. policy towards Africa.

As U.S. priorities and the security challenges in Africa change, the Africa Center for Strategic Studies will continue to be a conduit among interested individuals around the world as they work together towards a free, peaceful, and prosperous Africa.
The mission of the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies (NESA) Center is to enhance stability in the Near East and in South Asia by providing an academic environment where strategic issues can be addressed, understanding deepened, partnerships fostered, defense-related decision-making improved, and cooperation strengthened among military and civilian leaders from the region and the United States. As of April 2006, David W. Barno, Lieutenant General, USA (Retired), former Commander of the Combined Forces Command Afghanistan, became the NESA Center Director.

Launched in October 2000, the Center builds on the strong bilateral relationships between the United States and countries in the NESA region by focusing on a multilateral approach to addressing regional security concerns and issues. It is designed to meet the knowledge needs of national security professionals by providing a forum for rigorous examination of the challenges that shape the security environment of the region. The Center provides a focal point where national decision makers can gather to exchange ideas and explore tools for cooperative problem solving.

The core curriculum examines four broad themes: the impact of globalization on regional strategic issues; the changing strategic environment - including an assessment of the campaign against terrorism and the implications of initiatives such as missile defense and military transformation; elements of strategic planning; and concepts for enhancing regional security.

The Center’s annual core activities include:

- Four three-week Executive Seminars (mid-to-upper level military and civilian professionals)
- One eight-day Senior Executive Seminar (upper-level military and civilian professionals)
- Two two-week Counter-Terrorism Seminars (mid- and upper-level military and civilian professionals)
• Several one- to three-day topical seminars for the Washington, D.C.-based NESA region community

Additional activities for future implementation include mission-relevant research fellowships, alumni activities, and distance education programs.

Executive, senior executive, and counter-terrorism seminars are held in Washington, D.C. Thematic regional and sub-regional conferences are held in Washington, D.C. or in the region. Participation is open to military and official civilian representatives from all countries in the NESA region with which the U.S. government maintains formal diplomatic relations, non-NESA countries that have strategic interests in the region, U.S. military, and federal government officials. Participants are nominated by their governments. The twenty-four participating nations from the region include:

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Funded by the Department of Defense, the NESA Center, comprised of nearly forty faculty and staff, is associated with the National Defense University in Washington, D.C. The purview of the NESA Center extends from the Atlas Mountains in the west to the Himalayas in the east to Marrakech to Bangladesh.

The countries with which the United States has diplomatic relations will participate in the Center’s programs, as well as countries with a strategic interest in the region.

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Participation in the Center’s programs is not limited to these nations. We are actively soliciting the participation of neighboring countries with security interests relevant to the states of the region.
I think this is an appropriate moment to talk about North America but also more broadly about the hemisphere. For those of you who are not familiar with the North American Forum, it sprang up as a parallel structure to the security and prosperity partnership of North America. It was originally an effort to bring opinion makers, private sector leaders, university professors and presidents, and leaders of non-government organizations together with government officials from the three countries of North America. The intent was to begin to see if there was some way that the governments working with the private sector, universities and non-government organizations could begin to create a vision for North America. An understanding of what North America is as an entity and then how governments could be working to fashion a more productive cooperation and address the kinds of problems we saw in the immediate aftermath of September 11, 2001.

There are three convenors or co-convenors for this. On the U.S. side it is former Secretary of State Schultz, on the Mexican side it is former Finance Minister Pedro Aspe and on the Canadian side it is the former Premier of Alberta Peter Lougheed. The first session was held last year in Sonoma. This year it is held in Banff. Next year it will be held in Mexico.

I thought it particularly appropriate that the events in Halifax were followed immediately by the conference in Banff because it linked the tragic events of September 11, 2001 to what has come out of it. I think is a real examination of what North America is and an effort to understand how we, as different as we are in our identities and as different as we are in our national sovereignty, Canada, the United States, and Mexico do share a common place, do share a common market and increasingly are connected demographically and culturally. By understanding this and looking for ways to enhance that degree of connectedness are we going to remain competitive in the world and we going to be in a position to protect our open societies against threats which are not going away. For that reason, I thought it useful to come here today.

I think there is a lot of opportunity out there. This might not be immediately evident when you read the press or look at what is presented in television programs and analyses, but my own view is that this is the hemisphere that has made incredible strides and progress over the last several decades and really is positioned to do tremendous things and North America is going to be a very important part of that. I would like to do is start by talking about what I think the central issue in the hemisphere is and why this is important for the rest of the world. Let us talk about how the hemisphere has sought to create a common agenda among democratic nations and how the United States has engaged in it, and finally, how North America relates to it.
I chose the title “Why the America’s matter” simply because the news so often focuses on events in Iraq or events in Afghanistan. Because of the larger war on terror we sometimes forget that we live in a hemisphere that is:

- Democratic
- Committed to free markets
- Committed to economic integration
- Committed to developing the individual capacity

All the above are necessary to take advantage of the economic opportunities that are being presented through the kind of economic growth we have been able to achieve in the region more broadly. In many ways this hemisphere has already gone through what we would call the first generation of transformational challenges by committing itself to democracy, by committing itself to fundamental human rights and by building a consensus however debated it is, but it is still a consensus around an economic model and an approach to economic growth.

What we are looking at right now in this hemisphere really is a second generation problem or second generation issues of governmental and societal transformation. This is really, in the western hemisphere, about how you link democracy and development. It is about how you show that democracy is not a conservative form of government designed to protect the privileges of elites but is actually a revolutionary form of government that is designed to break open societies. It is designed to create opportunities not only for political participation but for economic and social participation and that as we think about democracy we need to think about it in much larger terms than just voting or electoral mechanisms or machineries. We need to think about it in terms of a democratic state, not just a democratic government, and this includes political citizenship, economic citizenship and social citizenship. In a region which has become democratic, and has committed itself to a certain economic model, we obviously face big problems, big social problems, in relationship to the following:

- Poverty
- Inequality
- Political exclusion and social exclusion

One of the striking things over the last few years is how this region has sought to deal with all the problems.

I would like to start by taking you all back to April of 2001, to Quebec City, where the Summit of the Americas met in difficult and contentious circumstances. Although Quebec City has the fame of being a fortress, it was even more so in April of 2001. You will recall that this came after Seattle and Genoa and a period of kind of anti-globalization demonstrations which were quite dramatic and intense. The Summit of the Americas was seen as a perfect opportunity for these forces to kind of appear on the steps of Quebec City and try to break through and disrupt the Summit of the Americas, which so many assumed was just going to kind of repeat the chant of globalization. The irony is of course that as the demonstrators outside were expressing their concern about what was happening inside. Inside was something quite remarkable in the sense that the democratic leaders who were participating in that event for the first time committed the western hemisphere to democracy. The second was a broad commitment to free markets and economic integration through establishing a timetable for free trade over the Americas. Now, we all know that timetable has not been met. We all know that, especially with the suspension of talks in Doha and the inability to come to terms on agricultural issues, our ability to actually close a larger free trade over the America’s in the near term is limited. What was important then and is important still is that there was a commitment to free trade
and a recognition that it is through economic integration that democratic governments have the means to break down economic elites and oligarchies. We continue to look for new ways so that prosperity does not just trickle through society it courses through society.

The other item which I think coming out of Quebec was important was a commitment to create a new hemispheric security agenda. For the longest time our security agenda has been defined by the Rio Treaty and by confidence building measures between states, the assumption being that the essential vulnerability or threat in the hemisphere was state on state violence. What the leaders again instructed their foreign ministers to do was to take another look at the security agenda and to adjust it to a reality in which the real threats to states were not other states in a hemisphere that had committed itself to democracy but instead the threats were terrorism, drug trafficking, natural disasters, environmental disasters and pandemics and in so doing created an opening for state dialogue about security which was new and unique and fresh. It actually took a lot of that dialogue out of defence ministries and put it in law enforcement agencies and intelligence agencies, in crisis and emergency response agencies, and also in health agencies, especially those that dealt with pandemics. I think this was an important step forward in again building kind of the connective tissue within the hemisphere that allows a conversation and a level of cooperation that really had never existed before.

When we look back on that summit, I think what we see is:

- A creation of a consensus around political values and around economic models
- A clear instructions to governments to begin to develop the mechanisms
- The action plan or the agenda necessary to make these commitments real.

The governments have responded, bureaucracies have responded, through the Inter American Democratic Charter. The OAS was able to take the democracy clause of the Quebec City Summit and put it into the inter American system, but it was able to do it in a way that is really worth taking a minute or two to understand what the Inter American Charter, the democratic charter, is. I am not sure how many of you have had a chance to look at it in any detail. The first article of that Charter, the first clause of the first article, says that democracy is a right of all the peoples of the Americas and that their governments have an obligation to promote and defend it; in other words, democracy is a right.

Now, this is a radical statement. Typically, if you talk to people who study these things they will argue that democracy is a form of government that is made up or constructed from fundamental rights such as freedom of association, freedom of speech, freedom of belief, but that it is these fundamental rights that are liberties and freedoms, not the form of government. But the foreign ministers were arguing the opposite not the opposite, they were arguing that, although it has component parts that are liberties, democracy itself is a right. This was a unique statement. It was a unique statement for the Americas. I think it was a unique statement in the world. It said that governments have an obligation to promote and defend democracy, so it creates not only a right for individuals and peoples but an obligation for governments. The second clause of the first article says that democracy is essential for the political, social and economic development of the Americas. This statement is just as radical as the first because what it is proposing is that for development to be real it has to be democratic. What the foreign ministers were attempting to articulate here was a belief that this hemisphere needed to fashion a new understanding of development and a new model for development and not a model that is capitalist, socialist or communist, but a model that is democratic.

I think that this has highlighted the essential issue that we are facing in this hemisphere right now, which is this linkage between democracy and development and the ability to show that democracy can deliver the goods, that at the end of the day, as I mentioned earlier, democracy is not
a conservative form of government, that in fact it has the potential to be a very revolutionary form of government, a revolutionary form of government that protects individual rights and liberties but at the same time gives people a voice in their national destiny and recognizes them in a citizenship which is all inclusive and which, more importantly, takes the step beyond democratic government to the recognition that we live in democratic states and as members of democratic states our government has responsibilities to provide benefits and services and we have responsibilities also to engage in our societies and operate in our societies as democratic actors. In some ways the challenges that we face now in the hemisphere are the product of the consensus that was created in Quebec City and then the commitment that was built through the Inter American Democratic Charter. One other point which is very important to make here, the Inter American Democratic Charter was approved by acclamation in Lima, Peru on September 11, 2001. For us who had been working on it for some time it was a profoundly bittersweet moment, sweet obviously because the promise of the Quebec City Summit had been realized in an important agreement, bitter obviously because our country was under attack and we knew what this was going to mean for us in the years to come.

The fact that September 11, 2001 kind of links terrorism and democracy in such a dramatic way is important and the fact that the charter itself links democracy and developments is also vitally important. One of the things that we have tried to do, the United States government has tried to do, as it establishes its policy in the region and as it looks at how it expends resources is to make sure that our policy corresponds to the structure or the consensus that was built in Quebec City, whether it be commitment to consolidation of democratic institutions, whether it be promoting economic opportunity and prosperity, ether it be investing in people or whether it be in working to protect the democratic state from non state actors. In other words, our policy, and this might surprise some of you, really was conceived through the summit process. It is structure reflects the summit process and as we try to implement it we try to implement it in a way that corresponds to that process and corresponds to the priorities laid out in that process. I think we have done a pretty good job of it and I will run you through a few numbers just to give you an idea.

For instance, the Bush administration has doubled foreign direct assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean. When President Bush came into office, the United States was spending about $800 million a year in foreign direct assistance to the region. That is now about $1.6 billion. It has been $1.6 billion for the past five years. In fact, if you look at the entire amount of money that the previous administration spent in the region it was a little under $7 billion. The Bush administration hit that figure at about four years, so everything since then has been kind of an add on.

What is important also is that this money has been concentrated in specific areas. The development side of the equation has been enhanced. There has been an important alternative development component put into the counter drug activities, especially in the Andes, and a lot of money has also gone to Haiti in order to help Haiti work itself through a very difficult political moment and show that a democracy can rebuild. A democratic government, with the help of the United Nations (U.N.) and countries like Canada, can rebuild a democratic state.

The Bush administration increased funding to the Peace Corp by about 40 per cent and put about a thousand new Peace Corp volunteers into the region and into countries that historically had not had Peace Corp volunteers like Mexico.

The Bush administration created the Millennium Challenge Corporation and the Millennium Challenge Accounts, which are designed to take the principles developed at the Monterey United Nations meeting on financing development linking the policy of developing countries to donor assistance and providing new moneys and new funds to promote governments that make the right kinds of decisions, the right kind of policy decisions about fighting corruption, improving education, improving health care and creating an environment in which people develop individual capacity.
The administration has put about $500 million up to this point, new money, into the region through the Millennium Challenge Account and it will put additional money in if we are able to negotiate compacts with Bolivia and with Guyana.

Then through trade and preferential access programs we have we think dramatically reshaped the economic dynamic in the region and have begun to foster a series of micro economic revolutions in specific countries where we have free trade agreements that are really all about tearing down old economic structures and old ways of doing things and opening up market space and creating an environment in which new companies can emerge and in which small and medium sized enterprises have a chance and create economies that pull people out of the informal sector and into the formal sector where not only do they pay taxes but they are also covered by labour law and by social security regimes.

Right now about 85 per cent to 90 per cent of all goods coming from Latin America and the Caribbean to the United States come in duty free, either through GSP, through our Caribbean Basin Initiative, through the Andean Trade Preference and Drug Eradication Act, or through our free trade agreements. Right now our free trade agreements cover about two thirds of the entire Gross Domestic Product of the hemisphere.

We think that this kind of response to the region, that this kind of engagement with the region has been positive. I will let the Canadians speak for themselves, but I know the Canadian engagement has been just as robust. This is important because it really is changing a dynamic in the region and it is changing how people understand their futures and how they understand their engagement with other countries. This is why from our point of view we have to maintain a hemispheric approach in our policy.

We have to maintain a pan American approach to our policy because without that South America in particular, parts of South America, really run the risk of becoming Pluto, of kind of floating off to the far end of the universe and eventually being declared not a planet. I do not say it entirely in jest because South America in particular has a tendency to parochialism. It has a tendency to close in on itself. Even with all the activity that countries like Brazil and others are doing to try to open the region up and the degree to which the Chileans have been reaching out very aggressively. Historically there has been a tendency to look inward, to not necessarily see itself as part of a larger hemispheric project. We have to do everything possible to not allow that to happen, and to not allow that break to occur.

This is actually a moment in which I can talk a bit about the challenges that we face in the region and especially the challenges to the consensus that we built through the Quebec City Summit process and then through all the summits that have come after it.

Obviously, one of the most vocal and visible challenges of this consensus is Hugo Chavez in Venezuela. Chavez has a message which resonates in some parts of Latin America, especially on the fringes of political society. We have seen it expressed and manifested in a variety of ways, one of the most dramatic being during the Mar del Plata Summit when a people’s summit, a counter summit, was held as an effort again to attack the larger free trade agenda of the region, not just the United States but the region, but also as a response, a negative response, to the impact of globalization.

This challenge is really a challenge of vision. It is a challenge of ideas. We need to understand it that way and we need to respond to it in that way. In other words, we really should not see it as a political threat. We need to see it as a challenge to us to improve our ability to communicate but more important to improve our ability to provide results. What I mean by this is that in some ways what we see in this competing vision is something that we have seen and heard before. The vision is based on personalistic politics. It has heavy authoritarian overlay and it sees democracy as a means to channel class conflict. It sees democracy as a means to choose leaders but not as a method of
government. The method of government is really about trying to address the problems of class conflict and class divisions through an elected government but acting in an authoritarian way and doing so by concentrating resources back to the state, back to the public sector, and by resisting economic integration, the belief being that economic integration actually degrades and erodes the power of the state and that the state is necessary to address the underlying social problems that especially South American countries face.

From our point of view at least we have seen this movie. We have heard these arguments. We know what the result is. It is broken institutions, it is failed economies and it is a suffocation of civil society. This is a message that resonates because of desperation. It is a message that resonates because of the frustration that people in some countries feel about governments that are not delivering the goods.

One of the challenges that we face, one of the things we need to do, is look for ways to make sure that governments that have made a commitment to democracy, governments that have made a commitment to free markets and economic integration, can succeed. Most of them are succeeding. Those who are not are not succeeding because their institutions are weak and because the political dynamic in the country is so fractious that there is no possibility for continuity of policy over time. In this regard, the inter American system has institutions and organizations that can help these countries.

In fact, one of the important aspects of the Inter American Democratic Charter is that it creates a means for countries in the hemisphere to express solidarity and provide institutional assistance to countries that are going through democratic crises, not only in terms of electoral observation but also in terms of a variety of other interventions that can be done. We are only beginning to understand the power and the strength of the Inter American Democratic Charter in this regard. There is a lot more that we can be doing. There is a lot more creativity that we can be bringing to this issue.

I guess the central point here as we look at this kind of I do not want to use the word “battle”, but as we look at what these competing visions mean and how it is we are going to address them, ultimately we have to address them through results. We can not address them through rhetoric. We can not address them through ideological attack. We have to do it by showing that we have the capability of linking democracy and development and delivering the goods and services that many of the countries in the region need to address the underlying problems of poverty and equality and exclusion. I think we can do it. In fact, I think there is tremendous opportunity out there to do it.

When you look at what countries like Chile and El Salvador have been able to do in terms of reducing poverty levels, and especially critical poverty levels, there are lots of good models. There are lots of approaches that work. It also requires a degree of flexibility on our part as we understand that countries all have an internal political dynamic that needs to be worked out and that what we need to be doing is looking for ways to help to facilitate that process, to help these countries work this out.

In this regard, I believe that there is still a consensus around democracy, free markets and economic integration and a consensus around the importance of investing in people so that they don’t become dependent on the state but they become independent in themselves, that they have the capacity to take advantage of economic opportunity. I believe that Canada and the United States can play a huge role in this.

This kind of brings me back to North America. What we have been able to accomplish through North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) has been remarkable in terms of dramatic economic growth and dramatic growth of trade. But NAFTA was an agreement which once done was kind of left to itself and left to the private sector. It was really through the security and prosperity partnership that governments finally reengaged in a NAFTA process and finally began to look for ways to enhance
NAFTA but at the same time build into it other components, especially on the security side, recognizing in the aftermath of September 11, 2001 that it is through protecting our security that we protect our prosperity and we protect the wellbeing of our democratic institutions but also in terms of building new constituencies for governments.

One of the interesting things about the security and prosperity partnership is that it has components that allow those who use the border all the time, whether they be the private sector and movement of goods and services, whether it be state and municipal institutions along the border, the frontier, or other people who have an abiding interest in borders, whether they be non-government organizations or universities, or who have studied them at great length, to provide input to governments and to enhance our understanding of where friction points still exist and what more we can do in terms of harmonizing regulations, in terms of improving procedures and processes, but also in developing levels of cooperation and collaboration that have not existed before.

When the State Partnership Program was first conceived several years ago it was seen as something that would be done as an add on to NAFTA and taking into account the events of September 11, 2001 but it has evolved over time. With the disasters that we in the United States faced because of Hurricane Katrina, because of the fears raised by the possibility of an avian flu pandemic, our understanding of security in North America and its relationship to trade has also changed and evolved.

What we are doing in North America today is consolidating democratic states, integrating them economically but then providing a security overlay and a level of cooperation and dialogue that will strengthen the economic institutions, strengthen our ability to protect and promote our prosperity and enhance our ability to create the opportunity that people can actually take advantage of. In this way we have taken a model of economic integration that is largely accepted around the hemisphere and raised it one level higher. It is a huge challenge for the rest of the hemisphere but it is a challenge that we have to push them to accept.

We think that the degree to which we can improve our cooperation and collaboration within North America will actually be effectively pulling central and South America and the Caribbean with us and letting them know that we can indeed address the fundamental problem of democracy and development in North America with Mexico as a vital partner, look for ways to address profound issues like immigration, and create an environment in which our democratic societies, our open societies, are secure. This is obviously important for us, it is important for you, it is important for Mexico, it is important for other countries in the region.

One of the reasons why I wanted to say why the Americas matter, aside from the obvious interest to ourselves, is that the degree to which we can show that democracy can deliver the goods, the degree to which we can link democracy and development and show that you can have open societies that are resilient, that can protect themselves and can protect their economic institutions is that we are sending a very strong message to those parts of the world that are just beginning a democratization process, whether it be in the Middle East or whether it be in south and central Asia. The degree to which we can show that democracy can deliver the goods will act as a source of encouragement for those who are really working to democratize countries in the Middle East and elsewhere in the world. The degree to which we fail will reinforce those who have always argued that only authoritarian governments can address the tough decisions that are required to end poverty and inequality and create societies that are allowed to grow.

For that reason I think that the Americas is still the new world. I think that the Americas still have the capability to show the rest of the world some profound and important lessons in governance and in how you protect individual liberties but operate successfully in a globalized economy.
Broadening and Deepening Our Proliferation Security Initiative Cooperation

By

Robert G. Joseph

Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security

[The following are excerpts from the speech presented in Warsaw, Poland on June 23, 2006.]

From the outset, Poland has been a key partner in the proliferation security initiative (PSI) and my government is grateful for its strong efforts to further the work of the Initiative. Three years ago, in Krakow, President Bush proposed the creation of the Proliferation Security Initiative, bringing together those nations willing to work together to stop the trafficking in weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. Today, the sixty-six nations gathered here in Warsaw, and others that have endorsed the PSI, demonstrate the breadth of that global commitment. Our presence sends a strong message to proliferators that we are united in our determination to use our laws, our capabilities, and our political will to ensure that proliferators will not find safe haven within our borders, air space, or territorial waters for their deadly trade.

We are here in Poland not only because we agree that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is intolerable and a threat to all of us. We are also here because we understand the need to defeat the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threats posed by states like Iran and North Korea, terrorist groups like al Qaeda, and the facilitators willing to buy and sell sensitive technology for these states and groups. Our readiness to find and implement solutions to the legal, operational, and policy issues surrounding proliferation will remove the inhibitions against action and will ensure that we succeed in addressing these threats.

Proliferation Security Initiative and the Broader Proliferation Strategy

The governments represented here have undertaken varying levels of engagement and participation in the PSI. Some have been active in PSI from the start. Others have joined recently. Many have participated in exercises or cooperated in PSI interdictions. Some, having made the political commitment to support PSI and to engage in some PSI activities, may still be considering how to make their commitment most effective.

In many ways, these differences reveal the essence of PSI. Individual states contribute as their capabilities and their laws allow, using their diplomatic, military, economic, law enforcement, and intelligence tools to combat the trade in proliferation creatively within the context provided by a shared commitment to the principles on which we are all agreed. PSI countries have put all of these assets to work in a multinational, flexible, yet targeted, fashion.

Three years into the PSI, it is useful to assess the progress of the initiative to reinforce why PSI has become a vital component in the fight against the proliferation of WMD and a standard of good nonproliferation behavior. We should consider how to develop further the capacities needed to defeat the threat posed by such proliferation, including what new tools are required to ensure that the PSI remains a dynamic initiative. This too is consistent with our obligations under United Nations (U.N.) Security Council Resolution 1540, which requires states to put in place laws and enforcement mechanisms to stop the proliferation of WMD.

One area for further development is the creation of tools to interdict payments between proliferators and their suppliers. We need to develop additional tools such as denying proliferators access to financing, which my treasury colleague will discuss in more detail on the next panel. For
our part, the United States has put in place a new executive order, which prohibits U.S. persons from doing business with entities designated because of their proliferation activities.

When the PSI was first envisioned, responsible states were becoming increasingly aware of the dangers posed by black market networks operating in the shadows of legitimate business to deliver WMD and missile-related technologies to states and persons of great concern. The threat posed by terrorist networks seeking to acquire WMD, and the inability of any one state by itself to stop the proliferation of WMD, heightened this awareness. In essence, a gap existed that proliferators had become adept at exploiting. Proliferators were succeeding by taking advantage of governments that did not have adequate information or capabilities, or in some instances the political will to enforce legal authorities against the proliferation trade.

The PSI principles were developed to reinforce political will, cooperation, and legal frameworks to close this gap and deny proliferators the ability to operate. Thus, the principles recognize that each sovereign state has national authorities, the ability to use them broadly, including in conjunction with international legal authorities and in cooperation with like minded states, to bring effective pressure against the proliferation trade.

The exercise training program and operational meetings of the PSI have been effective tools in directing our efforts to turn these agreed principles into action. To date, we have held twenty-three exercises improving and testing our capabilities on land, air, and sea. Recently, in Turkey, more than thirty nations participated in the most far-reaching exercise to include training in each of these modes of shipment. Another area for training that we will experience first-hand this afternoon albeit in an abbreviated form is the gaming simulations designed to highlight the interaction between limited information, varying legal authorities, and available operational capacity.

**Proliferation Security Initiative Interdictions and National Capacity**

Turning from exercises to concrete results, we should be proud of the PSI record. While it might be instructive to discuss more details, it is inevitable that much of our work is done quietly and with cooperation in sensitive channels outside the public spotlight. We should welcome this. Discreet actions often help us stay one step ahead of the proliferators and give them less insight into steps they can take to evade detection.

Between April 2005 and April 2006, the United States worked successfully with multiple PSI partners in Europe, Asia and the Middle East on roughly two dozen separate occasions to prevent transfers of equipment and materials to WMD and missile programs in countries of concern. For example, PSI cooperation has stopped the export to Iran’s missile program of controlled equipment and dual-use goods. One PSI partner has also stopped the export of heavy water-related equipment to Iran’s nuclear program.

As we evolve the PSI, our efforts will need to be flexible in order to adapt to the lessons we learn in real world interdictions, as well as in our training exercises, and in assessing responses by proliferators to evade our efforts. One clear lesson is that PSI must continue to operate as a results-oriented activity; one that identifies problems and develops innovative solutions. For such an approach to continue to be effective, timely information sharing will remain a key element of the PSI and one in need of emphasis in the next year.

**Continuing to Build the Proliferation Security Initiative**

As we consider what we want to accomplish in the next year, I would highlight three opportunities for further development of our Initiative. First, because PSI is an activity, not an organization, much of the forward momentum of PSI rests on the sustained commitment and innovative efforts of each of the participating nations. Maintaining our readiness to respond to proliferation activities must be
a shared objective of all PSI states. Regular participation in training exercises that test capacities and legal authorities is a positive way to maintain our operational readiness against what are creative and clever adversaries.

While this meeting is an opportunity for all governments to take stock of PSI’s rapid development and to reinforce the strong message of deterrence to proliferators, we must be ready to discuss the hard questions we face when considering actions to stop proliferation. Furthermore, we must continue to explore the limits of our legal authorities, to address the liability questions that could arise, and, perhaps most importantly, to overcome the difficulties in sustaining the political will to enforce laws pro actively against states of proliferation concern.

A second challenge is broadening global participation in the Initiative. As President Bush said when he announced the PSI three years ago:

“Over time, we will extend this partnership as broadly as possible to keep the world’s most destructive weapons away from our shores and out of the hands of our common enemies.”

We are making good progress with more than seventy countries now supporting the PSI. This is a testament to the outreach activities conducted by PSI partners. However, as PSI partners we all need to continue an active outreach campaign to encourage additional countries to commit to the PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles and to be prepared to take action against proliferation. The more global the PSI reach, the less the opportunity for proliferators to find safe haven for their activities.

Significant percentages of global commerce transit through such key strategic areas as the Straits of Malacca, the Suez Canal, the Middle East and Gulf regions, as well as major air routes which crisscross the globe. Since this time last year, the PSI has been endorsed by many states in Central Asia and the Middle East and Gulf regions. The participation by these states adds an important element to our efforts to deny proliferators access to maritime and air routes. We continue to engage with states in Asia, an important region for enhancing our cooperation, as well as in Latin America and Africa. We should increase our efforts to gain more PSI partners from each of these key regions.

To further secure increased participation, we will need to dispel any misunderstandings about the PSI Principles. Some countries do not fully understand the flexibility of the Initiative and its complete consistency with national and international legal obligations, particularly when questions of infringement on national sovereignty arise. The partners gathered here understand that each country involved in a PSI interdiction will rely on its own legal authorities, which may be different from another nation’s. Governments can look to take action when and where their own laws as well as international authorities provide the necessary legal basis. Even though authorities may differ among states, what remains constant is the ability for all states to enforce existing authorities strictly and to develop new laws as needed.

A third challenge for the Initiative is developing solid information and suggested courses of action to respond to proliferation activities. The unraveling of the A.Q. Khan proliferation network demonstrated the importance of working with key supplier and transshipment countries to share information. A.Q. Khan’s nuclear network highlighted for the world the ability of an illicit network to operate without detection by law enforcement and other regulatory bodies. The network also relied on a number of vulnerable points along the supply chain, including financiers, shippers, distributors, and front companies.

It is vital to our success that we have solid information that we can use. We need to consider how we can do more to build the kind of partnerships it will require to exchange information and recommendations for action in a timely way. Connecting the dots and sharing associations between the various pieces of the supply chain used by proliferators are important areas for enhancing our
interdiction capabilities. To do this, we need to sensitize and invigorate the attention to proliferation-related activities by our enforcement personnel across a range of disciplines, including financial regulators, customs officials, consular officers, and traditional law enforcement officers.

In the United States, PSI has been an important organizing factor in our review of interdiction opportunities with the full range of intelligence, law enforcement, diplomatic, economic, and military tools. We have learned through both our PSI successes and failures the importance of gathering expertise from all of our relevant agencies and to integrate a wide range of operational capabilities to respond quickly and effectively to information of proliferation activity. We have heard from many PSI partner governments, such as Poland, Canada, and Portugal, that the PSI similarly has helped them establish regular interagency coordination.

In conclusion, the next year should be an opportunity to further develop the initiative not only among states participating in this meeting today, but new states ready to join in the fight against proliferation. On behalf of the United States, I urge each nation to commit to the following actions in the coming year:

- **First:** think innovatively. Undertake a review of your laws and how they can be strengthened to deny the proliferation of WMD and missile-related shipments and services that support proliferation from or through your states

- **Second:** enforce aggressively. Develop a regularized interagency mechanism in your government to review enforcement data and share information on possible interdictions of shipments, personnel, funds, and other services that aid in proliferation

- **Third:** engage regularly. Commit to active outreach and to host and participate in PSI exercises in your region and beyond

These activities will ensure that all of our governments are both developing the capacity to act against proliferators and creating connectivity and operations for action with other PSI partners. Carrying out these activities also will send a strong signal to proliferators that PSI partners are prepared to take effective actions against them. Together, we can broaden and deepen our partnership against proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, their related materials, and means of delivery. This is a preeminent threat to international peace and security. We must continue to do all we can to combat this threat.
Middle East Region at Critical Crossroads

By

C. David Welch
Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs

[The following are excerpts of the address presented to Tufts University Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Medford, Massachusetts, September 6, 2006.]

The Middle East region stands now at a critical crossroads with profound implications for America’s national security. The region is in transition, but to what? With a combined population of some 230 million people, the vast majority of whom is under age thirty, the region is confronting challenges of an order of magnitude beyond what we could have envisioned when I was here in 1975. The socialist, secular state machinery that once held such promise has demonstrably failed to keep up with the needs of the people. As the Arab Human Development Reports from 2002 to 2004 have chronicled, huge deficits in the areas of education, economy and politics have resulted, creating vacuums that in some cases, well-organized Islamic organizations have stepped in to fill. [The Arab Human Development Reports from 2002-2004 can be found at the following web site: http://scholar.google.com/scholar?q=Arab%20Human%20Development%20Reports%20from%202002%20-%202004&hl=en&lr=scholart.]

Governments have been slow to respond to this rapid change, but many are beginning to do so. Egypt, for instance, through a painful process of economic reform, has been growing for the past couple of years at 5 percent and is expected to grow even faster in 2006. Though slow in comparison to Asia’s powerhouses, Egypt’s growth is allowing it to absorb most of the new entrants into the labor force and is beginning to change mind sets. Egypt has also recently experimented with direct elections and is beginning the difficult process of expanding political space in a one-party dominated system.

Such changes are crucial, but they are also slow. They need time and space to come to fruition, but in that same period there are disruptive alternative visions. While there is a trend to democracy, there is also resistant to it. The same factors pushing reforms upon the governments of the region are also empowering those who would like to wipe the entire slate clean and start over with an exclusionary, intolerant world view. In many ways this is a race, and our decision has been to seek to engage now rather than wait to see what happens later. There is a legitimate question as to whether we will succeed, but we know that if we do nothing we will most certainly fail.

The challenges are numerous but the path is clear. Obviously, Iraq is a huge focus. We must work with moderate Iraqis to stabilize Iraq and to give that nation a chance to strengthen its democratic foundations. Security is primordial to that endeavor and, for the moment, that can only be created by a combination of U.S. troop pressure, Iraqi forces build-up, reconciliation with non-terrorist elements of the insurgency, and elimination of death squads. This must be complemented by continued international support for Iraq. Our focus here is the United Nations and Iraq-led effort for an international compact linking Iraqi economic reform and political steps to enhanced international financial and political support.

We must continue to go on the offensive against radicals and extremists who exploit other conflicts to undermine a non-violent and liberal order. In particular, we must confront the new challenge that the Islamic Republic of Iran represents to the international community and to peace and stability in the region. And, more widely throughout the region, we must continue with our efforts to support moderate governments and civil society in their efforts to meet the needs of their people and to encourage genuine freedom to take root.
Meeting any of these individual challenges would not be sufficient to bring peace and stability to the region. And the Arab-Israeli conflict, which has been so central for so long, must be solved if any hope for lasting peace is to be assured. Precisely because all of these issues are so deeply intertwined, our approach must be comprehensive and must seize opportunities where only dangers seem apparent. In no place now are the risks and opportunities more apparent than in the current situation in Lebanon, for it is related to all of these challenges. Hezbollah, a powerful terrorist organization, emerged as a “state-within-a-state” because of the failure of the central government to meet the needs of its citizens. Iran has aided and abetted Hezbollah’s growth through cold hard cash and weapons, a policy that dates back to the early 1980’s, but recently has been reinvigorated. Iran has also looked to replicate the Hezbollah “model” in Iraq in order to further destabilize that country, and has enlisted the minority Alawite regime in Syria. After Hezbollah initiated the violence on July 12, 2006 the U.S. and France led the effort to create a new dynamic in Lebanon for greater stability and peace in that country, an effort that resulted in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701 (UNSCR 1701). Through 1701 the international community supports the sovereignty of the Lebanese state, with a monopoly on force within its borders and controlling those borders, so that Hezbollah cannot be present as an armed group in the south and cannot be rearmed. It is our expectation that the introduction of an international force into Lebanon to work with the government of Lebanon and the Lebanese Armed Forces can achieve these critical objectives and avert yet another round of violence in this pivotal nation.

With the arrival of the international force, we will also look to empower the government of Lebanon by urging the prompt lifting of the Israeli embargo by deploying the force as Israel withdraws, and by beginning reconstruction efforts in earnest. We will also work with the government of Lebanon in concert with the international community to address underlying structural problems in the economy that existed before the war. This can only be a beginning. We must also work for Hezbollah’s disarmament, which is in the end the only way to support harmony among all Lebanese. Above all, Syria’s continued interference in Lebanon must stop.

Iran looms as an emergent, dangerous challenge. Shortly, we will be going back to the United Nations Security Council to demonstrate to the Iranian government that the international community is resolved to see an end to Iran’s effort to weaponize its nuclear program. To give strength to the EU-3 (France, England and Germany) negotiations with Iran, the U.S. recently agreed to join our European partners at the table with the Iranians should Iran agree to suspend enrichment and reprocessing. Iran has made abundantly clear that they will not, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has confirmed continuation of enrichment, so we have no choice but to consider how further to isolate Iran. We continue to hold out hope that Iran will abide by the will of the international community, but hope is not a plan. We will therefore seek to constrain Iran’s ability to benefit from the international community which it now threatens.

Stabilizing Iraq, shoring up Lebanon, and containing Iran are all part of a broader strategy that also seeks an end to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. For too long, extremists have traded off the tragedy of this conflict to attract recruits by radicalizing the poor and uneducated. Increasingly, it is extremist Islamic groups who most vigorously exploit this issue. We remain committed to advancing the President’s two-state vision of peace, and we continue to work with the parties and key regional allies to realize that vision. Progress will also strike a blow to rejectionist groups that have adopted anti-Israeli rhetoric in an attempt to further their own political agenda.

While making progress on the Arab-Israeli conflict remains a core concern, the ability of the international community and key states in the region to improve their economic and political situation remains the only way to create the conditions for real development and lasting stability. To the degree that we and they are successful the ambitions of radicals and extremists will fail. Increasing the scope of political freedom, reducing high rates of unemployment, creating opportunities for personal
economic improvement, and raising the standard of living will help address the root causes of terrorism and reduce the appeal of extremist-Islamic political movements. By creating an autonomous business class, new political leaders could emerge.

It will be equally important that governments in the region take on the task of reform. The international community should do its utmost to support reformers as they go through the inevitable growing pains. Our plan is ambitious. We continue to push for greater market transparency, privatization of banking and financial institutions, and a Middle East Free Trade Agreement (MEFTA) by 2012. To build partnerships for change, the U.S. has initiated two comprehensive plans: the Broader Middle East and North Africa (BMENA) initiative and the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI). These two programs work directly with civil society, nascent democratic movements, and government officials to identify areas of reform and provide support where possible.

We are under no illusions. We know how hard conflict resolution and reform in the region will be. But I am an optimist and I think we can succeed. As I said before, the Middle East is a region in transition and it has come to a crossroads. U.S. leadership is key. How we respond will define our relationship with the region for the foreseeable future.
The United States and Japan: Partners in Hope

By
Ambassador Randall L. Tobias
Director of United States Foreign Assistance and
United States Agency for International Development Administrator

[The following are excerpts of the remarks presented to the Midwest U.S. and Japan 38th Annual Meeting Indianapolis, Indiana, September 11, 2006.]

Those of you who know me from my previous life in the private sector may know that I frankly never expected to find myself serving as our nation’s first Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance and Administrator of USAID. This is not exactly how I had planned to spend my time at this stage in my life. But the issues related to foreign assistance are so important, and opportunities for impact so great, that I consider it an enormous privilege to have been asked by the President to lead the new and significant foreign assistance reform effort underway within the United States Government.

Before I tell you about our efforts to refocus United States foreign aid, I do want to first take note of the significance of the day on which we are gathered. Five years ago today, the United States was attacked by terrorists who had plotted and trained in a nation-state marked by repression, failed governance, and lack of opportunity. And indeed the task to which I am devoting my time these days is very directly related to our efforts to address these root causes of terrorism.

On September 11, 2001, it became clear that the locus of national security threats has shifted to the developing world where poverty, oppression, injustice, and indifference are exploited by our foes to provide haven for criminals and the planning of criminal acts. Foreign assistance is an effective tool for countering these new threats, and thus has become a foundational pillar of our national security architecture.

Ensuring that we deliver that assistance strategically, and in partnership with our fellow donors—such as Japan—is vital to its effectiveness. Both Japan and the United States have long recognized that helping our neighbors in the global community of nations is simply the right thing to do. But in more recent times, and with even greater awareness in the years since September 11, 2001, we have also come to understand that investing in foreign assistance is essential for other reasons, because our future is inextricably linked to those we seek to assist, and because hope is the antithesis of fear and hatred.

• How do we truly create hope?
• How do we get the best return on our foreign assistance investment?

The short answer to that question—as I learned through my experience leading the President’s Emergency Plan for Aids Relief—is remarkably similar to what I learned in my thirty-nine years in the corporate world. Whether in Japan or the United States, to get a return on investment in the private sector requires a clear vision, clear objectives, and then a focus on performance, results, and accountability. In foreign assistance, too, we must take that same strategic approach.

That is why we have created a new strategic framework for United States foreign aid—one intended to focus our foreign assistance on programs intended to develop well-functioning and accountable nation-states that respond to the needs of their people, because the majority shareholders in the future
of any nation must be the people of those countries themselves. And we must always remember that our foreign assistance is not about us—it is about them.

Our framework explicitly identifies end goals for U.S. foreign assistance that focus on ultimately graduating the nations we are helping from the need to receive further foreign assistance. But without a coordinated, comprehensive, mutually supportive foreign assistance program we will not be able to achieve, and then sustain for the long term, the gains of our investments.

The framework explicitly identifies a comprehensive approach to achieving those sustainable results. It recognizes that nations cannot progress without peace, security, and stability. They cannot progress without just and democratic governance. They cannot progress without investments in the human capacity of their citizens. And they cannot progress without economic growth. These now are the objectives of U.S. foreign assistance. And we are in the midst of reforming the organization, planning and implementation of United States foreign assistance in order to achieve this objective.

I know that Japan, too, is in the midst of reforming its own foreign assistance capabilities and we look forward to working with our counterparts there, as we have so often in the past, to leverage our respective strengths toward the accomplishment of our shared goals.

The United States and Japan have a strong record of aid cooperation worldwide in areas including health, water, trade and investment, humanitarian assistance, and post-conflict reconstruction. For instance, in 2002, the United States and Japan began a collaboration to launch the Clean Water for People Initiative, a joint endeavor to provide safe water and sanitation to the world’s poor, improve watershed management, and increase productivity. As part of the initiative, this past March, our two governments signed an agreement with the Indian Ministry of Urban Development. As a result with financing from Japan and policy and technical assistance from the United States over 100,000 households in 368 slum settlements across Bangalore city will receive water and sanitation services. Perhaps most importantly, a grant jointly sponsored by the U.S. and Japan is helping Bangalore slum residents organize to make critical decisions, such as where to locate public water taps and community toilets.

The reason we are working with the city authorities and focusing on helping residents take part in decision making is because Japan and the United States both recognize that empowering human potential and achieving transformational development requires more than short-term charity or even the long-term provision of services. Citizens must understand that their governments are responsible for their health and safety, for educating a critical mass, and for creating the conditions needed for economic growth. We must educate and support citizens to make demands of their governments, and reject excuses for failure. That’s part of what democracies are all about.

But the efforts of donor governments alone will never create the kind of hope and opportunity that the public and private sectors can foster together. That is why the U.S. government is committed not only to working with fellow donors, but to creating opportunities for partnership with the private sector.

In 2001, the U.S. government started an innovative initiative that unites the unique skills and resources of private companies, foundations, and other partners to identify, design, implement, and fund development projects. Since its inception, USAID’s Global Development Alliances initiative has provided over $1.4 billion to fund approximately 400 public-private alliances worldwide, leveraged over $4.6 billion in committed partner contributions and engaged over 1000 alliance partners.

One of those is an alliance with a company based right here in the Midwest Procter and Gamble (P&G). The longstanding partnership between USAID and P&G launched a new product PUR®
Purifier of Water used as a new point-of-use water purification product. When properly deployed, PUR is practical and effective for providing safe drinking water in emergencies.

Last year, following the devastating earthquake in Pakistan, P&G along with many in the private sector demonstrated the kind of generosity of which we can all be proud. When disaster struck, P&G responded by providing $270,000 in cash as well as a donation of PUR sachets worth more than $30,000. The total donation provided enough product to produce safe drinking water to more than 50,000 households for three months. The U.S. matched P&G’s contribution to support the purchase of materials, such as buckets and cloths, needed for proper preparation of PUR. While households frequently have these common materials, in the case of this devastating earthquake, many families had lost all of their possessions. Our partnership proved essential to providing safe drinking water to Pakistan in its hour of need.

Yet, while we certainly welcome the private sector’s contributions in response to humanitarian crises, I would encourage all of you here today to consider being our partners on long-term projects as well. Building sustainable societies around the world, driven by sustainable economies, is in the interest of all of us. And there is no time like the present to get involved. The reforms under way will allow those in the private sector looking for the best way to partner with us to gauge where their resources are likely to have the greatest impact.

Despite the history and generosity of our foreign aid program, remarkably, the United States has never before had a comprehensive and integrated foreign assistance strategy. Now, clear goals and objectives, with common indicators to assess performance, will enable us to compare country progress, partner performance, and program results against our goals, in ways that have never before been possible. As leaders who know and understand the value of sound investment, I hope as we move forward on reform that we will be able to count on your support. Together, we can get the return on investment that the global community expects from foreign assistance, and that all human beings deserve. In a spirit of partnership with allies like Japan and drawing on the innovation of the private sector we can help replace fear and hatred with the kind of enduring hope that might have helped prevent the tragedy we remember on this day.
The United States and the Republic of Korea Alliance

By

Christopher Hill
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs

[The following are excerpts of the statement to the House International Relations Committee, Washington, D.C., September 27, 2006.]

I would like to focus my remarks on the U.S. and Korean Alliance; on the many important issues which we have been able to make essential progress as we update it for the 21st Century. An alliance as important as this one is really a living and growing entity that needs tending and nurturing. The Republic of Korea (R.O.K.) is a key ally of the United States in Asia and around the world. Like us, the R.O.K. is dedicated to maintaining regional security and to promoting peace and stability around the globe. But our alliance represents more than a defensive balance of power. It is also a positive force for progress. We now have a historic opportunity to transform our alliance to meet the challenges of the 21st century, including both traditional and new security, economic, and transnational challenges. We are working very closely with the Department of Defense, including my colleague Richard Lawless, to adapt our partnership with the R.O.K. to meet those challenges on the Korean peninsula, in Northeast Asia and around the globe. The mature global partnership we are forging together now reflects the combined capabilities we bring to bear not just in the military sphere, but also in the political, economic and cultural areas. Today, we view that partnership as a chance to pool our shared goals in the face of new challenges and opportunities, from terrorism to the tsunami relief efforts to human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (HIV/AIDS) to our new Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate.

We want to look ahead and begin to identify further ways in which our two countries can work together to realize our goals and face shared challenges based on the strong bonds of friendship, common political values and economic interdependence.

Shared Security Concerns

As we construct a new partnership, however, it is important we not lose sight of the cornerstone of our alliance over the years: the security of the R.O.K. North Korea remains a very real threat with over a million troops, possibly several nuclear weapons, and a propensity to export all kinds of dangerous things. But how we do these things is undergoing a tremendous change. For one thing, it is no longer solely the U.S. that dictates the terms of this relationship. It has evolved into a more balanced partnership. Working in concert with Seoul, we are realigning our troops, consolidating our bases, and shifting more responsibility to the R.O.K.’s armed forces all while enhancing our capacity to defend the Peninsula in time of crisis.

We continue to face a number of challenging issues in our military alliance, which I know my colleague, Deputy Undersecretary Lawless, will discuss in greater detail. Our military partnership is no longer the dominant feature of our bilateral relationship but it still remains an important foundation. The current issue animating both our political and military relationship, one which I am sure Mr. Lawless will cover in greater depth, is the question of transitioning the operational control of Republic of Korea forces in war-time to an independent command structure in contrast to today’s Combined Forces Command arrangement. This stems from a key platform position President Roh Moo-hyun promoted during his campaign for President in 2002. We are now working out the details to fulfill that request, because it makes sense in the context of our 21st century partnership. This is an issue that has excited a number of public protests and engendered press comment. I realize that for many Koreans contemplating the end of this arrangement is difficult. It is important for Koreans
to understand that it is the United States’ enduring commitment to the defense of the R.O.K., not a military headquarters that has safeguarded their country for more than fifty years. At the same time, we don’t accept the view that this arrangement, which has worked well, has somehow diminished the R.O.K.’s sovereignty or made it less of a country.

There has also been significant discussion on the timing of the transfer. When President Bush and President Roh met at the White House on September 14, 2006 they agreed that it should not become a political issue. Decisions about the placement of our troops and the size of our troops will be made in consultation with the South Korean government. We will work in a consultative way at the appropriate level of government to come up with an appropriate date. We will also be looking to the government of South Korea to provide an adequate share of the extra costs associated with stationing U.S. troops there.

While I am discussing our security strategy in the context of our modernizing alliance, I think it is also noteworthy that the R.O.K.’s national security strategy is consistent with the U.S. effort to pursue strategic flexibility in the region. We respect the Korean position that it won’t be drawn into a conflict in Northeast Asia against the will of the Korean people. In turn, Korea has demonstrated its respect, given the range of challenges from the war on terrorism to humanitarian operations in response to natural disasters, for U.S. forces to be flexibly deployed across regions and different parts of the globe.

Looking further into the future, these developments in the U.S. and R.O.K. military alliance could evolve toward a new cooperative structure of security in Northeast Asia. The ultimate destination is not yet clear; it could be a formal institution, or perhaps just a series of informal relationships. However, I believe that there may be opportunities to create new multilateral mechanisms in Northeast Asia that would help promote cooperative relations among China, Korea, Japan, and the United States. Such a mechanism could also help address the inevitable regional frictions that can and will arise and provide a forum for improving mutual understanding.

The six-party talks have demonstrated that when there are common interests, the major players in Northeast Asia can work together to address problems. I believe this framework has the potential to develop into a mechanism that can cooperatively manage change on the Korean Peninsula, as well as usefully address a range of functional issues in the sub-region from energy and environment to economic and financial cooperation.

Meanwhile, we are also working with Koreans as a force for peace in the global community. Koreans have participated alongside Americans in U.N. peacekeeping missions around the world and Korea has been a reliable partner in the war on terror. With a contribution of 2,300 troops, the R.O.K. is the third largest coalition partner in Iraq. We hope Korea will continue to make a strong and positive contribution toward building stability and democracy beyond its borders. Indeed, we can work in partnership with Seoul to promote new forms of security cooperation in Northeast Asia as a way of dealing with common threats and overcoming historically-based tensions between Korea and its neighbors.

Challenges to the North

At the core of assuring regional security and stability in Northeast Asia has been confronting the security threat posed by both the strengths and weaknesses of the D.P.R.K. The R.O.K. has been a critical partner in the multilateral effort to end North Korea’s nuclear program. Of course, the R.O.K.’s relationship with its neighbor to the north is an exceptional case. On the one hand, there is the aspiration of the South Korean people to see their nation made whole once again. On the other, they have first-hand experience, beginning with the outbreak of the Korean War through the present of the threat posed by North Korea’s ideological hostility and its considerable arsenal of conventional and as the North continues to boast nuclear weapons. The U.S. and R.O.K. alliance was formed as an
explicit response to these threats. We remain committed to the fundamental mission of defending the Republic of Korea.

In that vein, as I mentioned earlier, the United States and the R.O.K. have embarked on a major modernization of our alliance that will enhance our ability to fulfill our mission by better exploiting our respective strengths and capabilities. At the same time, we are working with the R.O.K. to end the nuclear threat posed by North Korea the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (D.P.R.K.). As the U.S., R.O.K., D.P.R.K., China, Japan, and Russia all agreed in last year’s September Joint Statement, North Korea’s denuclearization would open the path to a permanent peace treaty on the Peninsula and mark a profound contribution toward a more stable and secure Northeast Asia. We support the R.O.K.’s hope that such a peace treaty would lay the foundations for reunification and extend the peace, prosperity, and freedom that the South enjoys to the rest of the Peninsula.

But our concerns about the behavior and actions of the Pyongyang regime extend beyond denuclearization. The D.P.R.K.’s economic failings and totalitarian behavior create another set of problems. The U.S. has sought to address the plight of North Korean refugees and implement the 2004 North Korean Human Rights Act, and in doing so we have forged an active dialogue with the R.O.K. on the most effective ways to assist this vulnerable population. The R.O.K. has dedicated significant energy and resources to assisting North Korean asylum seekers. The R.O.K. has resettled more than 8,700 North Korean asylum seekers within its borders, including 1,387 just last year. As you are aware, the U.S. has recently resettled some North Korean refugees in the U.S., and we continue to work with international organizations and countries in the region to look for additional opportunities to assist and resettle North Koreans in need. Even as we move forward with our own program, the R.O.K. will continue to be the primary resettlement destination for North Korean asylum seekers. We will continue to work closely with the R.O.K. on this important Congressional and Administration priority.

In addition to our concerns about North Koreans outside the D.P.R.K., the U.S. and R.O.K. are both focused on the conditions facing North Koreans inside the D.P.R.K. In particular, the U.S. remains concerned about the serious human rights abuses in the D.P.R.K. The R.O.K. also worries about the situation facing North Koreans in the D.P.R.K., but while it shares the same goal of freedom in the North, its approach to the issue has at times differed from our own. We continue to urge the R.O.K. to take a more active stance against D.P.R.K. human rights abuses, and to support international measures aimed at addressing the North’s abuses.

A Common Interest in Free Trade

You know well that while we are still military allies, we now have a more mature, multi-faceted relationship that features a healthy and strong economic partnership based on a common interest in free trade. It is that partnership that is becoming the driver of our relationship.

We are currently working with the Government of South Korea to negotiate a free trade agreement (FTA) that would be the largest U.S. trade agreement in more than a decade. Korea is already our seventh largest trading partner. Through July of 2006 we exchanged more than $45 billion worth of goods, and we have a healthy trade in services as well. The United States is the largest foreign investor in Korea, and Korean investment in the United States is growing rapidly. We have never before been so economically vested in each other’s well being than we are today. An FTA would further strengthen this economic relationship, bringing benefits to both countries and providing a new pillar for the alliance. These negotiations will not be easy, as no undertaking of this magnitude is. There are powerful interests lined up on both sides. We are trying to bring down both tariff and non-tariff barriers including in Korea’s highly protected agricultural markets and in the automotive sector. Polls in Korea show opinion is about evenly split over the FTA. In a way it has become a proxy for attitudes about Korea’s place in the world in general. Opponents assert it will impoverish Korean
farmers and turn Korea into a U.S. economic colony. Others see the FTA as a historic opportunity for Korea to undertake needed reforms to modernize its economy and become a dynamic economic hub for Northeast Asia.

President Roh has unambiguously aligned himself with the latter, more confident point of view. I too am confident that in the end, that point of view will prevail in Korea, and our commercial relationship will move to a new level, bringing our societies closer together. A successful U.S. and R.O.K. FTA would also have a regional impact. It could become part of a network of FTAs in the Pacific as we have already concluded agreements with Australia and Singapore and are negotiating with Thailand and Malaysia. It might also spur Japan to accelerate its market opening.

Global Concerns

The Alliance has also changed to encompass shared political values. As South Korea has evolved from a military dictatorship to a fully democratic society, the United States and the Republic of Korea have become a more natural pairing, sharing a common respect for human rights, rule of law, and freedom of speech. This, I believe, should provide the foundation for our efforts, in tandem with our joint work within the Six Party Talks to overcome the division of the Korean Peninsula and bring about genuine reform and respect for human rights in the North.

Furthermore, our common political values have opened the way for the United States and Korea to work together, side-by-side, on an unprecedented number of global issues of common concern. Trafficking in Persons is an excellent example. Our countries stand together in opposing trafficking as aflagrant violation of human rights and as a form of modern-day slavery. Last year, the South Korean National Assembly unanimously passed anti-prostitution and anti-trafficking laws aimed at ending the commercial sexual exploitation of women and girls. In our annual Trafficking in Persons Report, the State Department held up your law as model legislation that the rest of the world should regard as a “best practice.”

The R.O.K. is also a key partner in a number of multilateral efforts to meet the challenges of the 21st century. It is a founding member of the Asia-Pacific Partnership of Clean Development and Climate. South Korea is also actively participating in a host of multilateral efforts to develop and deploy transformational technologies able to rise to the challenge of generating adequate and affordable supplies of clean, sustainable energy that will benefit the environment and could reduce greenhouse gas emissions (GHG). These include the Carbon Sequestration Leadership Forum (CSLF), the International Partnership for a Hydrogen Economy (IPHE), Methane-to-Markets partnership, and the International Thermal Experimental Reactor (ITER) project which seeks to develop clean fusion energy.

The Ties That Bind

Our Alliance has also expanded to include ties of education, culture and family. Koreans continue to flock to the United States to study. There are over a million Korean-Americans living in the United States. They have had a huge positive impact on our country and continue to provide a vital and unique link between the two nations.

There is little doubt that lifting U.S. requirements for Korean visitors to obtain visas for tourism or business travel will provide a tangible boost to a closer bilateral relationship. It is certainly one of our biggest public outreach challenges in Korea. The Koreans are aware of their status as our seventh-largest trading partner, one of our strongest military allies, and one of our primary sources of tourists and foreign students. Korea is also the third-largest contributor of troops to Iraq, after the U.S. and Great Britain, and has been a participant in peacekeeping operations in Afghanistan, East Timor and Africa. So Koreans look at all of this and wonder why they are not included with Japan and the twenty-six other countries whose people can visit the U.S. without a visa under certain circumstances.
There are a number of requirements to be allowed in the Visa Waiver Program, including, for example: plans to issue an electronic passport; a program to ensure effective border security and law enforcement cooperation with the U.S.; and, a visa refusal rate of less than 3 percent. The Koreans are developing an electronic passport and expect to have it ready for their general public sometime next year. They have made great efforts to work closely with us on law enforcement and border security, and we have very active cooperation with them. Fifty years ago, the blood that bound our countries was the blood spilled on the battlefield. Now it is the living blood of families that stretch from Seoul to San Francisco that unites us. Korean culture and American culture are increasingly coming together. Our role as government should be to remove as many obstacles as we can and encourage these exciting and dynamic cultural ties.

**Public Diplomacy**

At the same time we are coming together, persistent displays of anti-American sentiments sometimes seem to be a regular feature of the political landscape in Korea. I do not believe that across the general population feelings against the United States have actually grown in any significant way. It was, however, something that I took very seriously during my time there as Ambassador and I still take it very seriously but I think this is something that is, frankly, somewhat misunderstood here in the U.S. The number of Koreans who are truly anti-American is very small. However, the number of people who care about what America does and how we interact with the Republic of Korea is very large just about everyone in South Korea, really. And Koreans like to express their opinions. They live in a free society and they have that right and they exercise it. Yes, sometimes they protest against the U.S. or one of our policies but they also protest against real estate taxes, education reforms, fishing regulations, labor laws and a whole range of issues wholly unrelated to the alliance.

Our two countries have a tremendous connection, encompassing the tens of thousands Korean of students who have studied here, the many Koreans who have relatives living here, or the personal relationships forged between members of the two militaries. Many Koreans have a great affection for the U.S. even if they do not always agree with us and I was reminded of that often when I was ambassador there. I would say though, that there is something that we could do better in talking to Korea and that is to focus even more on the future. The Korean war and the alliance of the last fifty years are very important and we should not forget them, but older Koreans already understand and appreciate that history. We also need to make our case to the younger generation of Koreans especially those in their twenties and thirties and I do not think bringing up the war is the most effective way to reach them. How many of you have ever tried to convince a twenty-year old that something was important by citing something that happened in 1951. I can tell you that it is not any more likely to work with Korean twenty-year old than with American twenty-year old.

We have to focus on the future of the relationship and how its changing and is going to meet the future needs of our two countries. Korea has become a very technologically sophisticated society and Koreans, very rightly, have a lot of confidence about their future. Our message to them should be that we share this confidence. Ambassador Vershbow and our embassy in Seoul are working hard to get that message out; the good news is that we have already made significant progress on telling this very compelling story.

I would add that Congress has an important role to play in communicating with the Korean public. When members travel to Korea or meet visiting Korean legislators or officials here in the U.S. it sends a strong signal that the relationship is important to us, so I would like to acknowledge the role you have also played. Notably, your recent visit, Mr. Chairman, to Korea generated a lot of attention there. Visits such as those have an enormous impact on Korean perceptions of U.S. priorities and policies.
In this respect, a key goal of our public outreach efforts is to encourage continued direct contact between Korean citizens and U.S. officials and to help advance our foreign policy interests in Korea and strengthen our alliance. One new way we hope to do this is by establishing a diplomatic presence in Korea’s second largest city, Busan. By inaugurating what is called an American Presence Post (APP) there, we hope to reach out to an under-targeted segment of the Korean population that has experienced a significant and generational shift away from the traditionally positive feelings towards the U.S. Furthermore, an additional diplomatic post in Korea would demonstrate an expanding commitment to a critical ally in a region where the rise of China and instability of North Korea create a possibly unfavorable geopolitical outlook.

Finally, the establishment of an APP in Korea’s largest port and main transport center for U.S. imports will benefit our growing business and commercial and contribute to the success of our Free Trade Agreement negotiations. In response to our Secretary of State call for new ways to make diplomatic inroads into under-represented regions, we have already begun preliminary logistical investigations for the opening of an APP in Busan, Korea that is required before we can formally submit the proposal to Congress for approval. I look forward to your future support in what I fully expect to be a rewarding foreign policy project.

Conclusion

Our relationship with the Republic of Korea is one with a long and honorable past; but more importantly, an even more promising future. It is blossoming into a maturing global partnership, and we are at a point in time where we can start to translate those exciting ideas into actions that will benefit both countries and our close relationship. I look forward to doing what I can to work with you to seize this historic opportunity.
The United States Policy Toward Taiwan

By
Clifford A. Hart, Jr.
Director, Office of Taiwan Coordination

[The following are excerpts of the remarks presented to the U.S. and Taiwan Business Council Defense Industry Conference, Denver, Colorado, September 12, 2006.]

As always when discussing U.S. policy toward Taiwan, it is important to review core principles. First, we must not forget that the stakes are high: while unlikely, war in the Taiwan Strait is not impossible. The Peoples Republic of Chin (P.R.C.) refuses to renounce the use of force against Taiwan, even as any such use of force would be a disaster for people on both sides of the Strait, the region, and America itself. The United States therefore has an abiding interest in the preservation of peace and stability there. President Bush has made clear his commitment to the long standing touchstones of our one China policy, the three U.S. and China Joint Communiques, and the Taiwan Relations Act. Precisely to defend the peace, America does not support Taiwan independence and opposes unilateral changes to the status quo by either side. We urge all parties to avoid confrontational or provocative acts, and we believe the future of Taiwan should be resolved peacefully.

In this context, we continue to call on Beijing to reach out to Taiwan’s elected leaders in a flexible and sincere spirit with a view to promoting genuine dialogue. We also call on Beijing to demonstrate more military transparency, to cease its arms buildup opposite Taiwan, and to reduce its armed threat to Taiwan. At the same time, we assign special importance to President Chen’s June 8, 2006, public reaffirmation of his commitments are the following:

- Taiwan will not declare independence
- Change the national name
- Push for sovereignty themes in the constitution
- Promote a referendum to change the status quo

We are all too painfully aware that the P.R.C. continues to channel a substantial portion of its remarkable economic gains into a military build-up targeted against Taiwan. As the Department of Defense’s annual Chinese military power report makes clear, this build-up risks disrupting the status quo as the PLA’s rapid military expansion is creating a capabilities gap that is widening with the deployment of every new missile, fighter aircraft, submarine, warship, and tank.

In law and policy, the United States stands behind its commitment to make available defense articles and services to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability. Indeed, in response to Beijing’s military build-up, Washington in this decade has substantially boosted its defense cooperation with Taipei and taken steps to maintain its own capabilities should the President choose to respond militarily to any use of force or coercion against Taiwan. President Bush five years ago made a ground-breaking commitment to sell Taiwan several advanced defensive weapons systems that it had requested. Even as I speak, two KIDD-class destroyers a part of the package President Bush approved are sailing from the United States to join Taiwan’s fleet.

Perhaps because America has moved with speed to meet the new challenge, many of Taiwan’s friends in the United States regret that Taipei has failed to respond in kind. Fortunately, I am pleased to speak to you at a time when there appears to be growing recognition among the people of Taiwan that they need to do more. In this regard, however, they are dependent on their leaders from across
the political spectrum to undertake serious deliberations on the threat and agree on how to allocate taxpayers’ dollars to meet it. This in turn can only happen if those leaders place national security above partisan politics and responsibly articulate the diverse views that are bound to exist in any democracy. Speaking from our own experience, these deliberations must result in action, requiring a serious willingness of political parties to compromise and bury differences in the interest of peace, prosperity, and security.

Because the American people share a direct interest in the success of this process, the impatience one sometimes hears from Taiwan’s American friends is not unreasonable. Such concerns do not threaten the traditional friendly ties between the Taiwan and American peoples; these rest on unusually strong and deep fundamentals. Nevertheless, optimal cooperation between our peoples depends on a serious, mature effort in Taipei to meet Taiwan’s security needs. Leaders who aspire to represent the Taiwan people in dealings with the American people should appreciate that their positions right now on core national security issues cannot help but inform the sort of relationship they will have with Washington in years to come.

I hasten to add that I am optimistic about the way ahead. It is important that we bear in mind just what is going on in Taiwan. First, even with different parties controlling the legislature and the executive, Taiwan already commits nearly 2.5 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP) to the armed forces. That is less than in the past and than we think is necessary, but, in an economy the size of Taiwan’s, it is substantial. Taiwan has also been making important strides in the more effective use of its military capabilities, and we are hopeful that trend will continue. Finally, we are pleased that the ruling and opposition coalitions are at last agreed in principle on the need to increase the defense budget.

On that final point, the Taiwan legislature’s consideration of the 2007 defense budget this fall will give us an indication of how well-founded our optimism is. It is one thing for both coalitions to call for increases in the budget to 2.85 percent of GDP in 2007 and 3 percent in 2008. It is quite another for them to approve the components of a budget that add up to those percentages, especially when there may be sharp differences on some major and expensive weapon systems. At the end of the day, what will be most important to the United States is not that Taiwan has approved funding for any given package of arms - whether homemade or imported - but that Taiwan’s leaders engage in a serious deliberation on security and exercise wisdom and political courage in agreeing to fund urgently needed increases in Taiwan’s self-defense capabilities.

America fully respects the prerogative of the Taiwan people exercised through their leaders to decide how much to spend on defense and how to spend it. In a democratic political system like Taiwan’s, there is no single correct answer out there for how exactly to structure the response to a military threat. The one thing that is sure, however, is that failure to rise above the political fray to arrive at the best possible answer under the circumstances will represent a singular failure in leadership.

For its part, the United States remains committed to fulfilling President Bush’s 2001 decision to sell Taiwan certain defensive weapon systems it requested. At the same time, my government has made clear its view that urgent needs have emerged requiring immediate funding. We believe in particular that Taipei should move now to invest in hardening critical infrastructure and building adequate war reserve stocks to ensure the sustain ability of its forces. In the ideal, Taiwan will appropriate enough of its wealth to purchase all that it needs. Since the real world normally operates short of the ideal, however, for us a big question is how Taipei will allocate its defense dollars if it has to make tough choices among competing requirements.

Decades from now, people on both sides of the Strait will thank the people of Taiwan for the decisions they are making right now on national security. Weakness can spark conflict as readily as
aggression. As the People’s Republic of China continues its aggressive build-up of forces targeted against Taiwan, it falls to the democratic people of Taiwan to make reasonable, prudent commitments to meet the challenge, emphasizing defensive military systems and strategies that reinforce predictability and stability.

At the end of the day, Taiwan’s democracy gives it advantages that make it the natural guardian not only of the island’s security but of peace in the Strait. It was to this in part that President Bush referred when he praised Taiwan’s democracy during his speech at Kyoto last November. As the President said, by embracing freedom at all levels, Taiwan has delivered prosperity to its people and created a free and democratic Chinese society. In so doing, it has set a hopeful example for the region and the world. Given these advantages, and my country’s rock solid support for Taiwan’s security, I am optimistic about the preservation of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait over the long term. I will be even more optimistic if Taiwan’s political leaders can make the tough decisions needed now to address pressing issues.
South and Central Asia Update

By

Richard A. Boucher

Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asia

[The following are of excerpts of a presentation for the Foreign Press Center Briefing, Washington, D.C., July 17, 2006.]

I have been at this new job now for about five or six months so I thought it was maybe a good chance to come by and talk to you about the many things that are going on in this region. I was just out in Pakistan and Afghanistan with the Secretary of State and, as you know, one of the first things I did on the job was to accompany the President to Afghanistan, Pakistan and India. So we have certainly devoted a lot of high-level attention to this region over the past several months.

I think one of the most interesting things to me is sort of coming in to take the Secretary of State’s logic of putting South and Central Asia together and see what we could actually accomplish in concrete terms. And I think you have heard us talk and brief before about the potential of South and Central Asia, the energy potential of Central Asia, the markets of South Asia, Pakistan and India, the sources of supply and goods from the south, the sources of financing and investment from the north. Many opportunities here and I think we all see those theoretical opportunities and the overwhelming opportunity of developing a region of stable democracies between the Middle East and South Asia, between Russia and China, a region that can stand on its own and move forward in the world as a region of, as I said, democratic stability and newfound prosperity.

And so a lot of what we have been doing is trying to make these ideas become a reality and indeed putting the region together in this way makes sense. We want to see Central Asia and the others maintain their ties to Russia and China and Europe and Turkey and everywhere else. We want to see new ties develop. The more options they have, the more choices they have, the more independence they have.

- We have been working on electricity, and indeed funded electricity studies and see develop the prospects of electricity lines from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan down to Pakistan, and the countries of the region themselves are working on this.

- We have been working with the Asian Development Bank, the Kazakhs and others on an all-weather highway from Almaty to Karachi, with other pieces that can go in different places, and the United States is funding the bridge a key component of that, a bridge from Tajikistan to Afghanistan, as well as getting the ring road finished in Afghanistan. So Afghanistan is now a place of transit and a place of contact and not an obstacle to cooperation.

- We have also been working with countries in the region on the issues of trade policy, customs procedures, border security. All these things can make trade flow so that the production of Central Asia, the melons of the Ferghana Valley, can make it to the markets of the south. And making sure that all those trade relationships are in play is another important part of integration.

And then there is cooperation in South Asia itself. Obviously there are difficulties with this. South Asian free trade and South Asian regional cooperation remains very important to us and we will be working with the countries of the region to try to encourage them to cooperate with each other.
It is an ambitious agenda for the whole region and for many of the individual countries that the United States is promoting here. We have, I think, accomplished a lot with India and it is also coming up tomorrow, the one-year anniversary of Prime Minister Singh’s visit to the United States. So it is a good occasion, I think also, to recognize that we are taking the vision that the Prime Minister and the President enunciated, taking many of the concrete programs that the President and the Prime Minister announced during the President’s visit to India in March, and turning those into reality, turning those into commissions and funding and studies and legislation and especially moving forward very quickly on the U.S.-India civil nuclear arrangements.

Our Congress has been very supportive. We have seen legislation move now from committees in the House and the Senate. We look forward to seeing votes in the House and the Senate, maybe this month. There are some I think the House will be acting, perhaps in the next week, and we hope the Senate will as well.

The United States and India civil nuclear agreement is on track. The legislation is moving forward quickly and the United States is keeping our commitment of turning the President’s and the Prime Minister’s vision into reality that the companies can use for cooperation and that we can use to help support Indian economic growth and India’s economic future.

The other area that I would like to talk about a little bit is Pakistan and Afghanistan, the war on terror. Our relationship with Pakistan is much broader and we have initiated a whole series of dialogues with Pakistan the Strategic Dialogue, the Economic Dialogue, the Education Dialogue, the Science Dialogue, all these areas where we have real practical cooperation going on with Pakistan, helping Pakistan with its energy needs as well. In addition to that, there’s a lot of cooperation with Pakistan in terms of helping the Pakistani Government support its efforts out in the border regions.

You have in both Pakistan and Afghanistan a similar process going on of government extending its control, extending its peaceful and beneficial activities to the edges of the frontier on both sides, and we’re supporting the Pakistani Government in doing that and on the Afghan side of the border we’re supporting the Afghan Government in doing that. So that with the deployment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) troops, the deployment of policemen, drug eradicators, but also the building of roads, building of electricity lines, irrigation schemes, government offices, we’re helping both Pakistan and Afghanistan extend their authority out to the edges of the country so that these places can’t be used by terrorists to fight us, to fight NATO, to fight the Afghan government and to fight the Pakistani government; and in the end, in addition to the actual fighting that has to take place, bringing the benefits of government, the benefits of good government and development, to these regions, because I think what we think in the long term will bring peace and security to the people who live there.

So those are some of the big things we are doing. We can talk about any of the countries and specific issues in this region, but I thought at this moment, five or six months after I started and one year after the Indian meetings with the President, it was a good time to come out and tell you things are going quite well in this region and there is a lot of progress in turning the visions into reality.
The Global Master of Arts Program: A Graduate’s Perspective

[The editor of the DISAM Journal would like to thank the Foundations AETC/IA Newsletter for their permission to reprint the following article. The following is an opinion of the author.]

Graduate studies for security cooperation experts provides greater knowledge, expanded horizons, and unique experiences by Mary Sue “Suzy” Sutton. As one of the thirty-three students of the 2006 class of GMAP II, I proudly marched down the aisle to receive my diploma during the graduation ceremony on March 25, 2006. Crossing the stage to receive my Master of Arts in International Relations from The Fletcher School was one of the highlights not only of my career, but also of my life.

What is GMAP II?

The GMAP II is intended for civilian and military personnel serving in the security cooperation field. It is a yearlong program that culminates in a Master of Arts in International Relations from The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. The program combines three two-week residency sessions with Internet-mediated study. Presented in trimester form with three courses presented during the first and second trimesters, and two courses plus a thesis in the third trimester, students continue working in their home station/country.

Attendance at three two-week sessions in-residence is mandatory. The first and third sessions are held at The Fletcher School outside Boston, Massachusetts. The second two-week residency is conducted in Washington, D.C. Using a 360 degree interdisciplinary approach, students gain a global perspective that provides a framework for analyzing and understanding today’s complex and dynamic world of international affairs.

Personal Insights

The graduation ceremony ended a year of rigorous but rewarding professional work and academic study. This opportunity came from the Defense security cooperation Agency (DSCA) Workforce Improvement initiative. As a student in the public-sector/security focused version of GMAP II, I was privileged to undertake a world-class curriculum taught by an eminent faculty. Their impressive credentials notwithstanding, students felt comfortable addressing most professors by their first names. The faculty, many with a Ph.D. from renowned schools such as Harvard or MIT, shared both academic and practical knowledge and experience. With the former Minister of Defense for Germany conducting the Trans-Atlantic Security Relationship course, a previous Chief Economist for the U.S. Department of Labor teaching transnational labor issues, an employee of the World Trade Organization leading us through the intricacies of international trade, and an attorney who worked in the United Nations Secretariat introducing us to international law and organizations, no one could ask for a better qualified faculty.

Throughout my year of study, contributions made by classmates supplemented faculty expertise and experience. The class consisted of a diverse international mix of mid-level professionals that included Department of Defense counterparts as well as international students from several walks of life. Classmates included diplomats from Cameroon, Canada, Hungary, Indonesia and Eastern Russia.
Europe; journalists from Greece and India; a medical doctor from Belgium; a security analyst from the United Kingdom; a financial officer from Nigeria, and Security Assistance Office employees from Chile, Mongolia and Taiwan.

In addition to the GMAP II faculty and fellow students, the staff of The Fletcher School went out of their way to make the experience meaningful. The dean of GMAP personally participated throughout each of the residencies and entertained us at her home during the first residency. In the future, I know I can reach out to a global social and professional network of faculty, friends, and other alumni for guidance and support.

Although the combination of work and study was intense, it was also relevant and revealing. Having completed my year in GMAP II and earned my master’s degree, I see world events in a more meaningful manner. I have gained the global perspective necessary to help understand the world of security cooperation today as well as tomorrow. As a recent graduate, I strongly encourage interested security assistance personnel to apply for this unparalleled professional and personal opportunity.
How to Request and Get Those Exclusive Flying Training Quotas

By

Colonel Steward Kowall, USAF
Chief of International Training and Education for
Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force for International Affairs

The new SAF/IA Chief of International Training and Education explains the process for requesting and allocating flying slots.

The board is comprised of the Division Chief and/or Deputy from all Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force for International Affairs (SAF/IA) Regional Divisions, AF/A3OT, AF/CC Political Advisor, AF/A30X, subject matter experts, AFSA/T/TO, and is chaired by an O-6. The board publishes a report listing primary allocations and a list of alternate countries that is forwarded to the combatant commanders (COCOMS) in March for their review/concurrence. In May, AFSA/T is provided the board results, and the country managers will then contact the countries selected to receive the primary slots. Countries need to accept or decline allocations not later than July.

All short notice requests during the year of execution (current year) need to be sent to AFSA/T DOT (and information sent to SAF/IAPT). AFSA/T DOT is the point of contact for fulfilling all flight training requests and requirements. Do not send your requests directly to the schoolhouses, AF/A3OT, AETC/DOR or the FTU Squadrons. Requests must be worked by AFSA/T IAW the priorities approved and established by the board.

I look forward to working with you in the future. If you have any questions or concerns regarding this process, please contact my office at: SAF/IAPT, phone (703) 588-8929 or DSN 425.

Flight Training Requirements Currently Exceed Available Allocations

With more of our coalition partners working side-by-side with us worldwide to support the Global War on Terror. It is essential to ensure their flight training requirements are accurately forecasted during the data call for incorporation in the Programmed Flight Training (PFT) process. The PFT conference is held annually (late November/early December time frame) at Randolph Air Force Base, Texas. This conference is the decision-maker on how many training slots will be allocated to the U.S. Air Force, Air National guard, Air Force Reserve, and the international community. It also reflects the shortages for all flight training requests. An accurate accounting of your country’s requests is critical to our ability to successfully advocate for international training within the Air Force corporate process.

The process for capturing your country’s requirements begins when AF/A3, through AFSA/T, sends out a data call message in the February time frame. The data call is for training requests through the FYDP and is due at the end of March. The first three years of requirements submitted are most important. It is essential that all countries provide AFSA/T their requirements when the call goes out. AFSA/T also needs to know if your country does not require flight training. Provide them with a negative input. The requirements need to be as accurate as possible. Anticipated sales and new sales and their associated flight training requests should be included in the out years.

Your requirements, plus the results of the PFT conference, (i.e., how many allocations the international community received), are the documents used when the SAF/IA flight training board is conducted annually. All airframes with more requirements than allocations are boarded. This year a new policy was instituted for boarding. Instead of boarding for a one year period, the board will make recommendations for a two year period. This will allow countries that require up to one
year of English language training prior to starting flight training to program and schedule all courses effectively. This year’s board will be held February 2007 for fiscal year 2008 and fiscal year 2009 allocations.
The risks of ITAR violations continue to increase with the proliferation of new communication technologies because companies fail to focus sufficiently on controlling their data and advertising the ways in which they often lose control of it. It is imperative that defense contractors retain tight control of digital data because the ITAR regulates data exports not only in hard copy but also in digital form (which is far easier to lose control of and with more serious consequences). Existing regulations already contemplate “immaterial” exports (including digital data) because the ITAR covers exports of data carried in the mind’s eye. The act of showing a defense article’s blueprints to a foreign national, for example, is deemed an immediate “export” to his or her home country.¹ The same ITAR provision regulates digital transmittals to a foreign national as if they were transfers of hard copies by hand. Moreover, without a license from the Directorate, a U.S. company cannot release ITAR-regulated data to any of its foreign national employees, whether such release occurs via the internet to an overseas location or via e-mail, instant messaging, or even file transfers through the company intranet to such employees located in the U.S. Companies intent on winning defense contracts or performing work subject to the ITAR must therefore fundamentally re-think their approach to technical data because the ITAR requires that they control the destinations of their digital transfers, internet broadcasts, and other electronic communications.

To assist in understanding the ITAR as they apply to digital data, we explore the missteps of a hypothetical company, NanoNautica, as it embarks on defense contracting for the U.S. government.

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¹ Code of Federal Regulations. Title 22, Section 120.17(a)(1), 2005.
The Company

NanoNautica, a U.S. corporation, earned a significant market share for its advanced design of high performance, computer-controlled precision instruments. Headquartered in Cupertino, California, NanoNautica claims no national corporate identity, has satellite offices in Brazil, the Netherlands, Norway, and China, and employs several Indian and Iranian nationals as software programmers, as well as a Brazilian national as its information technology (IT) administrator. In this respect, it is not dissimilar from many other modern multinational corporations (MNCs). Until 1992, NanoNautica was a U.S. defense contractor, but frustrated by disagreements with the U.S. government over rights to its technical data, its board of directors approved the sale of its defense unit and redirected production towards civil aeronautics. After the September 11, 2001 attacks, however, its management was attracted by the financial opportunities in the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and NASA contracts and ordered modifications of two products for sale specifically to those customers. Company engineers adapted a control movement gyroscope (CMG) and related software to facilitate guidance of a craft’s orientation that outperforms CMG systems currently deployed on U.S. spacecraft. NanoNautica also modified for military use its commercial gyro microchip—a device that determines an airborne plane’s orientation, or helps to stabilize and steer guided missiles.

International Traffic in Arms Regulation Compliance Planning

As the person in charge of NanoNautica’s data governance procedures, your responsibilities include ensuring company-wide compliance with all regulations covering the export of defense articles, services, and technical data. The company’s chief information security officer (CISO) asks you to assist her in preparing for a meeting with the chief executive officer (CEO). Her list of potential ITAR compliance issues includes:

- **Perimeter defenses.** NanoNautica will consolidate its defense-related work into its Cupertino plant and reinforce the perimeter and entrance safeguards. The CEO believes this will avert any noncompliance with the ITAR.

- **E-mail and instant message access.** NanoNautica’s IT administrator (resident in its Sao Paulo office) has access privileges to all international communications (including e-mail and internal messages discussing and transmitting technical data related to the CMG and gyrochip projects). Management instructed engineers on those projects to use code names for e-mail attachments containing sensitive data, believing that this routine, low-cost way of disguising sensitive data would minimize the risk that anyone outside the defense unit with access privileges would open such attachments—a questionable assumption. In practice, the engineers regularly selected constellation names for CMG files and names of stars for gyrochip files—an all transparent pattern that could facilitate data leaks.

- **Network security.** To ensure the control of the destinations of ITAR-regulated data transmissions, NanoNautica’s legal counsel proposed that the company create a special access-controlled intranet solely for CMG and gyrochip communications. Such a network, however, would be costly to create and maintain, and could diminish the productive brainstorming among engineers that often leads to innovative engineering solutions. The IT department responded with a counterproposal: encrypt all sensitive traffic, and distribute the key to authorized personnel with instructions to treat it as a “trade secret.” If the company adopts that proposal, the CEO prefers to encrypt only the attached, code-named files; while this solution has the advantage of fixing the cost of securing relevant files, it ignores the problems that arise when individuals must make ad hoc decisions as to which files contain ITAR-regulate data. It also
overlooks known encryption risks.² Moreover, all relevant personnel must be trained in ITAR compliance, ultimately a much more costly solution than omnibus encryption. Ad hoc decisions—even with compliance training—pose a significant compliance risk because they decentralize compliance authority and diffuse control.

- **Laptop use.** There are certain hours when all NanoNautica engineers worldwide can work collectively on problems from their offices or homes. This requires NanoNautica to issue company laptops to facilitate communications. ITAR-controlled data on these laptops makes them inviting targets for theft by competitors and intelligence agents (both military and corporate). Companies in comparable fields with similar information security risks bar personnel from using laptops, despite frequent travel, because theft would pose unacceptable risks. Their policy is simple: “The best laptop for us is no laptop at all.”³ NanoNautica is considering the efficacy of such a policy for its CMG and gyrochip project engineers, as well as practicable and less Draconian alternatives.

Because the CEO wants to recommend to NanoNautica’s board of directors an omnibus program that addresses both compliance and security issues, there is potential accountability for you and the CEO in the event of a compliance oversight or breakdown. Your responsibility is to design a compliance program that effectively balances costs and risks, yet avoids the strategic error most compliance officers make at this phase: designing a program that responds to corporate officers’ wishes rather than to the applicable regulations (in this case, ITAR requirements and their probable interpretation by the Directorate).

**The International Traffic in Arms Regulation**

After conducting an audit of company action (and inaction) with respect to ITAR requirements, you identify several areas in which the company must make changes to comply with ITAR.

**Registration**

The ITAR requires any company engaged in the manufacturing or exporting of defense articles or the furnishing of defense services in the U.S. to register with the Directorate.⁴ A single instance of manufacturing a defense article triggers this duty. NanoNautica should therefore have registered with the Directorate before it began production of articles developed, adopted, or modified for defense use (such as the CMG and modified gyrochip)⁵.

**Accountability**

The ITAR required companies to appoint an empowered official who must sign the registration form filed with the directorate.⁶ The ITAR further requires that the empowered official have “independent authority” to enquire into any aspect of a proposed export.” To verify the legality of the transaction and the accuracy of the information to be submitted” to the Directorate, and to refuse to sign any license application or other request for approval without prejudice or other adverse

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⁵. Code of Federal Regulations, Title 22, Section 122.21(a), 2005.

These provisions create potential liability for the company and the empowered official, if the company commits certain ITAR violations.

It is the empowered official’s responsibility to alert the company to “red flags” and to investigate any potential ITAR violations. The empowered official must also notify the Directorate within five days of any change in a company’s ownership or leadership, an acquisition or divestment of a foreign subsidiary, a change in location (the consolidation of defense work in NanoNautica’s Cupertino office) or a change in business (for example, if NanoNautica starts dealing “in an additional category of defense articles or defense services,” which happened when it switched to making gyrochips for military systems). In light of these requirements, NanoNautica is already in noncompliance with ITAR notification requirements.

**Unlicensed Release of Technical Data**

Companies should also be alert to the fact that, under the ITAR, “a license is required for the oral, visual or documentary disclosure of technical data by U.S. persons to foreign persons,” as can occur when a firm responds to a foreign customer’s request for a proposal or sends promotional product information to foreign national representatives of a U.S. or overseas firm. The ITAR requires a license for such exports “regardless of the manner in which the technical data is transmitted” (for example, in person, by telephone, electronic correspondence, and so on). It thus includes any and all data transmitted by e-mail, intranet, or instant message—regardless of whether the foreign recipient is outside or within the U.S. If a U.S. person transmits ITAR-regulated technical data by e-mail or instant message to a foreign national without a license, or enables a foreign national to obtain a copy of such data via such a transmission, an illegal export or release has occurred. Any compliance plan must therefore avert unlicensed releases of ITAR-regulated technical data to foreign nationals or to overseas officers, and recognize that for such a release to occur, a foreign national would not have to read an e-mail or even open its attached file.

In the digital era, this explanation seems counter intuitive. Surely the ITAR’s provisions have evolved to conform to the reality of the ways MNCs do business using the internet and web sites to enable companies to work across national borders. NanoNautica’s development of CMG units and gyrochips resulted from collaborative efforts by engineers from all its offices. Personnel around the globe routinely shared their ideas through the company’s intranet, e-mail, instant messaging, and video conferencing using a voice-over-IP (VoIP) system. Thus, ITAR-controlled technical data related to CMGs, gyrochips, and software has been circulating in and out of the U.S. and between U.S. citizens and foreign nationals within the Cupertino defense plant throughout the research and development process. These routine transmissions, however, raise significant issues under the ITAR.

**Deemed Exports of Data**

Unlicensed transmissions of ITAR-controlled data from NanoNautica’s Cupertino office to an overseas office are viewed as illegal exports, and each transmission is a separate violation. Additionally, each transmission of ITAR-controlled data from a U.S. person to a foreign national within the Cupertino location constitutes an unlicensed “deemed export” to that foreign national’s country and is therefore a separate violation.

A question that frequently arises is whether there is a way to recharacterize company conduct to bring it within what is permissible under the ITAR. Does encryption, for example, avoid liability by

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making the transmission a non-transfer? Can a recipient be described as possessing data only after it has been decrypted? The simple answer to both is “no”.

The logic might not seem sound, but it is in fact the logic of ITAR, which defines “export” much more broadly. Companies subject to the ITAR must distinguish between procedures that retain control over data and procedures that relinquish control. Security protocols (such as encryption) that travel with sensitive data inevitably relinquish control of digital data to the recipient, whereas security protocols that limit who can handle and receive sensitive files retain control of digital data.

Files need not be decoded to violate the ITAR’s prohibitions. Under ITAR, when a foreign national has an opportunity to obtain a copy of data, access is deemed to have occurred, even if the data is encrypted and purportedly unreadable. In the ITAR, such potential access constitutes an export and requires a license or exception from the license requirement. NanoNautica’s IT administrator in its SAO Paulo office has access privileges to all internal communications including e-mail and instant messages discussing and transmitting data related to the CMG and gyrochip projects. Such access means that unlicensed transfers of ITAR-controlled data come within his review and thereby violate the ITAR.

Although NanoNautica’s CEO prefers to encrypt ITAR-controlled e-mail, that is not enough to comply with ITAR because encryption could fail to provide a durable safeguard. A safer policy would be to adopt the proposed access-controlled intranet. It is important to recognize that the most obvious approach to portable security–encryption–is only a temporary stopgap. Placing encrypted, ITAR-controlled data in the hands of foreign nationals, in the absence of a license, removes the data from company control and places it in the control of those who might have a strong incentive to appropriate it. A compliance program cannot be characterized as effective if it relies solely on one safeguard or protocol to protect against unauthorized or unlicensed releases. Like a raccoon trying to rifle through a closed garbage can, a determined hacker (with enough computer power) can be counted on to crack encryption if he plays with it long enough.

If NanoNautica stores ITAR-controlled data in an unlocked closet in its Cupertino office and allows foreign nationals visiting from China to store briefcases in that closet, that would give them access to the ITAR-controlled data. This might seem to confuse access with disclosure. However, the ITAR’s broad definition of export includes “disclosing (including oral or visual disclosure) or transferring technical data to a foreign person, whether in the United States or abroad.” If a U.S. person transmits ITAR-controlled technical data by e-mail or instant message to a foreign person, or makes it possible for a foreign person to obtain a copy of such data by such transmission, an export has occurred. Without a license, that export violates the ITAR. The ITAR does not define “export” to mean transfer and disclosure–transfer by itself is sufficient.

Penalties and Precautions

The magnitude of ITAR penalties makes compliance an extremely important data–governance issue. If the Directorate determines that such violations were unintentional, it can impose a civil penalty of up to $500,000 for each violation. One day of heavy e-mail traffic could expose NanoNautica to tens of millions in fines. And this does not illustrate merely a worst-case hypothetical. The Directorate routinely charges multiple violations. If it determines that the violations were intentional, the exposure is much greater: criminal penalties can be imposed of up to $1 million per violation or twice the amount NanoNautica might have gained from such conduct, whichever is greater. Moreover, whether civil or criminal, such violations result in strict liability–with no exoneration for good faith or inadvertence.

A company’s data governance policies must, therefore, ensure that its convenient conveyances of sensitive digital data do not result in ITAR violations, and thereby incur costly and disruptive internal investigations, negotiations with the Directorate, penalties, potential debarment from government contracts, and reputational damage (this last can be significant).

Lessons Learned

The ITAR is designed to protect the most sensitive data–military crucial to national security from release to actual or potential adversaries. If such a release occurs, NanoNautica will either be viewed as having given a foreign power the opportunity to appropriate ITAR-controlled data (probably aggravating its penalties) or as having created define-in-depth controls for its sensitive data that require a commensurate effort to circumvent (possibly mitigating its penalties).

NanoNautica should revise its original compliance program on a through internal investigation that identifies all potential ITAR noncompliance issues. It should then draft a plan for voluntary disclosure to the Directorate. NanoNautica might call a temporary halt to its defense work–a stand-down to permit the implementation of procedures that will prevent further unlicensed exports and “deemed exports.”

Consolidation of defense work in one plant will not suffice. If NanoNautica wants to continue its collaborative mode of research and development, it must obtain licenses for each foreign recipient of ITAR-controlled data. The directorate, however, might not grant all the licenses NanoNautica seeks. Although it would be costly, NanoNautica should create a separate channel of communications for ITAR-controlled data, and should limit access to that channel to U.S. persons and ITAR-licensed foreign nationals.

NanoNautica should also encrypt all sensitive portable files (which might limit the damage caused by a violation by making it harder to break into and read the sensitive data.) And, it should train its engineers to alert it to proposed product developments that would require generation of, access to, or incorporation of ITAR-controlled data or technology. Such notice should enable NanoNautica to weigh the risks of pursuing such development in light of the possibility that the Directorate might not issue a license for sale to certain countries and their nationals.

The consequences of failing to recognize when a product incorporates ITAR-controlled data or technology can be glimpsed in an internal e-mail that the senior contracts manager at an L-3 subsidiary sent (after learning of unlicensed releases of certain gyrochips known as QRS-11 Sensors):

BEI[asuppliersofgyrochips]hasconfirmedthatallQRS-11Sensors,regardlessofwhether
or not they are used predominantly for commercial applications are on the munitions list.
This would mean that if we can’t get a commodity, jurisdiction from the Department of State,
which determines ... [our avionics product] to be a commercial unit, we will need to have a
validatedlicenseeachtimeweexportit,aswellashavingtosubmittavoluntaryself-disclosure
for previously exporting it without a license. Obviously, we don’t want that to happen.11

With each new technological enhancement of data mobility comes increased ways for sensitive data to leak. Daily CD burning and transmittals of electronic dispatches can create instant and specific exceptions to company’s well intentioned compliance plan. Although no company can guarantee that its sensitive data will be secured against access by prohibited persons, companies should not let the conveniences of new technologies make ITAR-controlled data or any sensitive data—less secure.

Companies should, therefore, routinely evaluate their compliance program’s potential vulnerabilities as technology evolves. Companies can minimize the risk of inadvertent transfers of sensitive data without compromising research and development flexibility, if they tag data that has commercial value and legal sensitivity and control it accordingly. A conscientious program will significantly minimize (through not altogether eliminate) the risk of unauthorized access.

About the Author

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Strengthening Our Allies, One Soldier at a Time

By
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Former Commander of Security Assistance Training Management Organization
and
Jon D. Jones
United States Army Security Assistance Training Management Organization

Victory in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) will require firm resolve on the part of the United States alone with capable partners who share our interests. These partners must be willing to fight with us. They must be strong militarily, and have interoperable equipment and doctrine. They must offer us their bases, their roads and airfields, and their national airspace.

Security cooperation provides the “tools” that enable the United States to engage foreign countries. Security cooperation goals and programs are included in the Secretary of Defense Security Cooperation Guidance, Army Security Cooperation Strategy, Unified Commands Theater Security Cooperation Strategies and the U.S. Ambassadors’ Mission Performance Plans. The security assistance training program is a critical tool used by the U.S. Army to train foreign soldiers both in continental United States (CONUS) and outside of the continental United States (OCONUS).

MTT instructors demonstrate MOUT clearing procedures.

A Counterterrorism MTT trains a CT Philippine Reaction Team at the pistol range.

Joint training being conducted in Colombia with U.S. aviation forces and Colombian aviation.

TAFT trains Ecuadorian Quick Reaction Force.
This is where Security Assistance Training Management Organization (SATMO) comes in. SATMO’s mission is to plan, form, prepare, deploy and sustain CONUS-based security assistance teams (SATs) in support of the Secretary of Defense Security Cooperation Guidance, Army Security Cooperation Strategy, Unified Combatant Commands Theater Cooperation Strategies, U.S. Ambassadors’ Mission Performance Plans and the Global War on Terrorism.

SATMO trains any Army, on any skill, at any level, on their turf and under any conditions short of combat. In 2006 alone, SATMO deployed teams to 26 different countries; with over 314 U.S. personnel training over 2,500 foreign personnel. Since 1985, SATMO deployed personnel have spent almost two million man-days on foreign soil in this pursuit. In coordination with the host nation, the combatant command (and in concert with U.S. security assistance officers (SAOs) in the foreign countries request specific Army training and technical assistance from SATMO.

As SATMO develops, coordinates and executes these missions, it assures our allies and partners of the U.S. resolve to fulfill our defense commitments to their countries. Training and technical assistance make our allies stronger. Army teams train and help them to employ U.S. systems we have sold or given to them. They fight better, giving the enemy more to worry about. Our allies understand and may even adopt our procedures and doctrine. While our teams are working with an ally, their presence deters aggression from opposing countries.

(Left) Colombian Aviation TAFT trains with the Fast Rope Insertion and Extraction System.

Center top) Colombian Aviation TAFT train with Colombian Quick Reaction Forces rehearsing target insertion.

(Center below). A U.S. Contractor (far right) instructs future instructors for the Georgian Company Commander’s Course during a recent MTT. Currently, the Georgian Company Commander’s Course is being instructed by the Georgian military leaders.

(Right) During a recent MTT in the Dominican Republic, West Point Cadets provide Dominican Republic Cadets training on room clearing techniques.
SATMO handpicks warrior-diplomats from Army Active Duty, National Guard and Reserve personnel, federal civilians and defense contractors. SATMO can even “tap” the Air Force, Navy, Marines, and DoD for expert personnel. The services send their best to SATMO, certifying each as a soldier-diplomat, able to create the good will that encourages our allies to stick with us through thick and thin.

Cradle to Grave Coverage

- **Planning.** SATMO’s desk officers start at the earliest stages of mission development in the planning process to help the SAO determine mission and funding requirements while meeting policy guidance at all levels.

- **Preparing.** Before deploying, teams attend a five-day course called Security Assistance Training Team Orientation Course (SATTOC). Each SAO member undergoes training in anti-terrorist and force protection, counter-surveillance, special driving skills and cross-cultural communications. They receive threat, intelligence and medical briefings, get their immunizations up-to-date, and spend time team-building. Key to their success is a clear understanding of the overall mission, goals, objectives, and end state. Each team chief demonstrates this understanding in a personal session with the SATMO Commander. During this week, team members also in-process, updating personnel and financial records. Finally, if the SAO wants the team to be specially equipped, SATMO’s logistics section outfits them individually and as a team, and arranges for shipment of the items to the host country.

- **Deploying.** SATMO makes all travel arrangements, gets country and theater clearances, pays for tickets and per diem, notifies the SAO of planned arrival dates, and sends the team on its mission.

- **Sustaining.** SAT managers act as an umbilical cord between the team and the U.S. This connection ensures that each team receives all the support necessary to accomplish their mission. SATMO even operates and active family resource group to “keep the home fires burning.”

- **Re-deploying.** SATMO plans and executes all parts of the team’s return to CONUS. Even after their return, SATMO budget and logistics personnel spend up to three years closing out financial files and property records. This mission is extensive, but SAOs and other embassy representatives help SATMO to develop the very best Army training and technical assistance mission for each country.

Georgian Maintenance MTT discuss proper maintenance procedures for a UH-1. Bahrain MLRS TAFT technical expert discuss electrical testing equipment.

Security Assistance Teams

SATMO fields both permanent change of station (PCS) teams for one or two years or temporary duty (TDY) teams for under 180 days. Teams perform both training and technical assistance to
our allies. A key function for teams is to survey a country to determine the best use of U.S. foreign military air. Expert teams assess the foreign army’s status and needs, and recommend materiel, training, and technical assistance solutions.

**What Kind of Training?**

In two words: almost anything. Restricted only by foreign disclosure and release requirements, SATMO trains everything from basic rifle marksmanship to “how to be a minister of defense.” As an example, SATMO assisted and prepared Latvia to enter into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. SATMO trains joint and service staffs, service chiefs, brigade and battalion commanders and staff, and provincial commanders. SATMO has established training courses for foreign governments to include an Ethiopian Command and General Staff College and numerous company leader schools. A SAT in the Ukraine planned and executed a non-commissioned corps center and school. In the Philippines SATMO teams enhanced the ability of their Light Infantry Battalions, and Light Reaction Companies to conduct sustained operations against insurgency while providing training on U.S. government procured equipment.

In Colombia, a one man psychological operations team developed and trained portions of the Colombian Army (COLAR) on a repatriation and reindoctrination program focused on counter-guerrilla and insurgency groups operating in Colombia. This program persuaded 10,000 “bad guys” to desert and become functional members of society, while the COLAR recovered ammunition and numerous weapons from the deserters. The COLAR also seized two military aircraft which were assisting guerrilla and insurgency groups, and destroyed several illegal operating drug laboratories. Finally, the COLAR received invaluable intelligence gathered from the deserters on other elements of the guerrilla and insurgent operations.

When our allies acquire U.S. government equipment, it increasingly enhances our interoperability. SATMO trains their personnel in operations, maintenance, and tactical employment of that equipment. This builds a stronger ally that can work with us more readily.

Returning team members see that security assistance missions are among the most rewarding jobs in the military today. However, these missions can be very frustrating because of cultural differences and language barriers that make their own challenge. In team preparation, SATMO stresses awareness of these challenges and strives to condition deploying teams to counter the cultural “friction.” SAT members learn the following:

- Keep frustrations in perspective
- Meet the people
- Learn their language
- Understand their culture
- Eat their food
- Become familiar with their religion
- Participate in cultural events

SATMO prepares us for the next war by developing our allies’ ability and willingness to fight with us. SATMO trains the world, one soldier at a time.

**About the Authors**

Having completed his command at SATMO, Colonel Richard N. Helfer has chosen to culminate his career with a final assignment in Afghanistan.

Jon D. Jones is the security assistance team manager for the Pacific region at the United States Army Security Assistance Training Management Organization, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. He is a retired U.S. Army Special Forces officer.
Can We Build a Better Medical Civic Assistance Program?
Making the Most of Medical Humanitarian
Civic Assistance Funding

By
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[The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not represent official policy of Brooke Army Medical Center, the San Antonio Military Pediatric Center, the Department of the Army, Department of Defense or of the United States Government.]

Medical Civic Assistance Programs (MEDCAPs) or also known as Medical Readiness Training Exercises (MEDRETES) are one way that the military health services contribute to the theater security plan. MEDCAP funding is primarily through the Humanitarian Civic Assistance (HCA) program which is authorized by Title 10 Section 401 of the United States Code. According to the U.S. Code, HCA goals are:

- Promote the security of the host nation and the United States
- Enhance readiness skills of the members of U.S. military medics

The most common MEDCAP mission provides short-term medical care to a rural population in a developing country. Under this model, a U.S. military medical unit will deploy to a pre-determined location and set up a clinic in schools, community centers, local health facilities or tents and provide rapid triage, medical and dental care to as many patients as possible. After spending a day or two in one community, the MEDCAP will move on to another pre-determined site and repeat the process. It is important to note that some MEDCAPS are surgical in nature, for example, providing reconstructive or cataract surgery to local populations. This paper does not address these surgical MEDCAPS.

MEDCAPs are a convenient tool for military medical units to practice deployment to a developing country. They are also a means for engagement with host nation militaries and underserved civilian populations. In SOUTHCOM alone, there are from 60-70 MEDCAPs annually. In a typical two week mission, several thousand patients will receive medical care. While a few of these patients may be treated for life-threatening conditions, the vast majority are either healthy or have chronic medical conditions that cannot be addressed by a one-time clinic visit.

Is There Room to Improve Medical Humanitarian Civic Assistance Programs?

One problem with MEDCAPs is a lack of data that objectively demonstrate benefit. Objective outcome data; commonly referred to as Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs), is lacking from both host nation benefit and military training standpoints. After Action Reports (AARs) are the primary information source about MEDCAP outcomes. Unfortunately, AARs focus exclusively on process

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The DISAM Journal, February 2007
assessments such as numbers of U.S. military deployed and patient visit counts. Outcome assessments that document readiness skills developed and health improvements to local population are invariably absent from AARs.

Several authors and studies have discussed the weaknesses of medical HCA. Drifmeyer and Llewellyn reviewed dozens of MEDCAP AARs from several countries and received feedback from hundreds of U.S. military medic-participants in MEDCAPs. They noted the lack of MOEs and inadequate pre-deployment training. They and other authors have also noted the lack of long-term benefit to host nation. A recommendation of many of these authors has been to shift MEDCAP focus from short-term clinics towards public health improvements.

Another recommendation has been to coordinate MEDCAP activities with non-governmental organizations (non-government organizations) to provide long-term care. This is seen as the obvious answer to the conundrum of attempting to do a medical intervention without getting bogged down with long-term care to host nation civilians.

The non-government organization solution ignores several problems.

- One, non-government organizations are inherently politically neutral and may be reluctant to get involved with an operation provided by U.S. military.
- Two, the extreme short-term nature of MEDCAPs makes it difficult for a non-government organization to have a practical reason to cooperate.
- Three, most military medical units have little experience with non-government organizations and have not had the opportunity to develop the relationship of trust that is needed for effective cooperation.

Conversely, legal issues such as malpractice insurance complicate formal interaction between military medics and non-government organizations. Finally, health care that is provided by non-government organizations without coordination through host nation institutions may actually destabilize security by de-legitimizing the host nation government.

**Is a Long-Term Health Benefit from Medical Civic Assistance Programs Desirable?**

A common interpretation of military doctrine governing medical HCA is that benefit to host nation is incidental to training received by DoD personnel. The interpretation being that benefit to host nation is subordinate to training or even not necessary as long as military training takes place. The origin of this interpretation is unknown; clearly the U.S. Code governing HCA does not state the benefits are incidental to training doctrine. On the contrary, it states the following:

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“Such activities (HCA missions) shall serve the basic economic and social needs of the people of the country concerned.”\textsuperscript{11}

A short-term clinic of unproven benefit is probably not the best way to meet those needs. Are there other compelling reasons to avoid a long-term health benefit from medical HCA projects? From a planning standpoint, a simple deploy, provide short-term care, and redeploy operation is a convenient way to get a unit into the field. While convenient, this formula ignores the stated goals of the HCA program. When viewed through the prism of training and security enhancement, a long-term health benefit may well be integral, not incidental to meeting the stated goals of the HCA program.

In other words, a long-term health benefit may be the very key to good training and security enhancement. Why would the U.S. Congress authorize funds to train the military to do things that do not provide significant benefit? The basic premise of training is preparing troops to be proficient operationally hopefully all training is aimed at increasing military proficiency in activities that are most beneficial.

Likewise, if a health intervention executed by the U.S. military does not provide lasting benefit; security relationships may be damaged by raising expectations that are not sustained. In a worse case scenario, host nation leaders and locals may view these short-term interventions as nothing more than cynical exercises in public relations.

**Proposed Model for Improved Medical Humanitarian Civic Assistance**

The following is a list of basic principles of the proposed model:

- On-going projects, not one time events
- Train for Security, Stabilization, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations (SSTRO)
- Coordination with host-nation health officials to provide legitimacy
- Built-in Measures of Effectiveness
- Synergy with other interested parties.

**On-Going Projects, Not One Time Events**

The key change with this model would be the development of a set of public health projects that specifically address the health priorities of the host nation. Instead of deploying to do a two-week series of short-term clinics, military units would systematically rotate to work on an on-going health project. A reasonable amount of time for project completion would be two to five years. During this time, multiple military medical units would deploy to work on each project. Training would take place simultaneously with project work.

Participating medical units would deploy for two-four weeks, with each deployment building upon the preceding missions to complete the overall project objectives. Prior to deployment, units would receive a set of learning tools that would be task and country specific and also teach general principles of the health-related aspects SSTRO.

Each specific project would have a lead agent that would be responsible for project development and management. Lead agents could be drawn from several sources; for example, academic military medical departments, the U.S. Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine, the Uniformed Services University, and military overseas medical research units could develop project proposals and compete for HCA funding.

\textsuperscript{11} United States Southern Command Doctrine 40-46, March 1, 1995, p. 4.
The Geographic Combatant Command Surgeon office would be responsible for developing selection criteria and assessment of whether a specific project should be continued. The Air Force’s International Health Specialist program is another option for assisting with development and oversight. Ideally, all three services would develop a cadre of regional health experts with linguistic and cultural skills to function as medical civil affairs officers.

Medical planners would provide administrative support, but defer to the medical experts and command surgeons to develop and execute the projects. Examples of possible projects would include HIV prevention, health education, hospital equipment repair, and disease surveillance programs. Short-term clinical activities may also take place during the deployment, but would not be the primary focus. Training local health workers would be an integral part of each project.

Training for Security, Stabilization, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations

Department of Defense Directive 3000.05, November 2005, directed the DoD to make SSTRO equivalent to combat operations in priority. It further directs DoD to integrate SSTRO across the full spectrum of DoD activities, including training and exercises. The goal of SSTRO includes:

- Meeting humanitarian needs
- Help develop indigenous capacity for securing essential services

Clearly, HCA is found in the full spectrum of DoD activities and training for SSTRO is the logical goal of HCA.

SSTRO will likely take place in post-war, post-disaster, and complex emergency scenarios. Training objectives for medical HCA deployments would therefore, be aimed at teaching U.S. military medics skills that will be critical for these situations. Additionally, pre-planned medical SSTRO may take place in potential at-risk nations, with the goal of shoring up a failing state prior to total collapse. In these cases, medical HCA missions may function as both a training AND operational deployment.

DoD 3000.05 further notes need for U.S. military to build “indigenous capacity” to provide essential services and of the importance of learning to work in civil-military teams. Pre-deployment MEDCAP training cycles would include general SSTRO principles plus preparation for the specific project that the unit would be tasked to work on. Learning to work within a developing nation health system will teach medics how to build the legitimacy of host nation institutions—a key SSTRO goal.

Coordination with Host Nation Public Health Departments

The specific projects would be developed in collaboration with the host nation Ministry of Health (MoH). To best meet HCA program security goals, the host nation must view a project as existing primarily to meet host nation needs. Paradoxically, by making host nation benefit the top priority, U.S. military training will also be improved by teaching medics skills that support public health departments in the developing world. To build legitimacy, the MoH must have final veto power over key project processes and components.

Cooperation will hopefully flow downward from the central MoH level to local community leaders. Of course, local cooperation is never guaranteed, and HCA project managers and participants must be prepared to win the support of local health workers and leaders which will provide further invaluable training opportunities. Follow-on evaluation of program success and failure would be

built-in with specific delineation of responsibilities between U.S. military, host nation military, MoH and local government.

**Measures of Effectiveness**

Measures of effectiveness (MOEs) would be developed as part of initial project and thoroughly integrated into every aspect of program. MOEs would focus on three areas:

- Health improvement
- Military training
- Security

Funding for these assessments would be integrated into the overall program package. Using standard public health planning models, each project would have specific metrics assessed prior to start and throughout the project life-cycle. Public health outcomes measures such as death and disease rates would be the gold standard for program health effectiveness. MOEs for military training would include pre and post deployment testing of learning objectives and documentation of skills practiced. Use of periodic anonymous questionnaires and focus groups for host nation leaders and local participants are another way to assess program effectiveness. Requiring appropriate MOEs would represent a major step towards professionalizing the medical HCA program.

**Synergy**

Projects that demonstrate synergy with other relevant resources would be preferred and more likely to be selected for HCA funding. HCA moneys would be viewed as seed money to grow a multifaceted, synergistic program. For example, projects that combine HCA funding with resources from research grants, civilian philanthropic funding, or other U.S. government development programs would be considered more competitive. Because these projects would be on-going, enlisting the cooperation of non-government organizations would be far easier than for short-term clinics. Working with other groups would both serve to do more with less DoD resources as well as fulfilling important training objectives such as learning to coordinate and cooperate with non-military organizations.

**Current Working Model of These Principles**

The San Antonio Military Pediatric Center (SAMPC), a joint Army-Air Force pediatric residency program has established a working HCA program that models these principles. Since 2001, it has fielded teams of military medics to Honduras three times per year to work on an on-going nutritional screening project. The program coordinates all activities with the host nation MoH and program managers meet periodically with host nation representatives to share results and collaborate on new goals.

During deployments, U.S. medics work side-by-side with local health workers to assess the nutritional status of isolated rural communities. Nutritional screening is a key component of post-war/post-disaster needs assessments and thus is an excellent vehicle for military training as well as a means to provide the host nation with important public health data.

Prior to deployment, the teams have a twelve week training cycle that teaches them both how to do this specific operation as well as general military and medical skills that are commonly needed in post-war/post-disaster scenarios. Team members plan the operation from start to finish, learning about deployment, force protection plans and how to coordinate with host nation workers.

The program has lacked the funding to complete some of the relevant MOEs, but has documented base-line public health rates such as malnutrition. It also has assisted the host nation in evaluation of effectiveness of programs such as immunizations and micro nutrient supplementation. Pre and post-deployment tests have documented that participants gained significantly more knowledge through
actual deployment as opposed to a purely didactic learning program.\textsuperscript{13} It also demonstrated significant positive change in attitudes such as participants’ confidence in ability to deploy for a humanitarian operation and an increased respect for health workers in developing nations.

Actual HCA expenditures are far lower per participant than a typical traditional short-term clinic MEDCAP. Costs are kept low by having team stay in austere lodging such as local health centers and by using fewer medications. The program also utilizes medical research grants to fund many of the activities and has entered into an agreement with a local non-government organizations to assist teams.

Conclusion

Military Medics have been talking about improving the HCA program for years. With current emphasis on SSTRO as outlined by DoD Directive 3000.05, it is time to re-structure this program to meet today’s security and training needs. The simple deploy-do short-term care-redeploy model may not provide U.S. military medics with all of the skills they need to have a meaningful impact in SSTRO. Incremental tinkering with current medical HCA program is unlikely to achieve the required transformation.

The biggest obstacle to improving the HCA program is institutional inertia, not funding. The funds already exist, they just need to be used in a more flexible and sophisticated manner. Project tracking, planning, and MOE institution will require funding, but these costs can be offset by decreased funding for medications and increased synergy with other funding sources.

To institute these changes, project managers and Geographic Command Surgeons will need greater control over medical HCA funds including the ability to apply funding in a flexible fashion-paying for people, equipment and medical supplies from a single source. The current practice of strict stove-piping HCA funds through the individual service components of a geographic command does not allow for inter-service cooperation and is counterproductive. A single pot of money under the control of the command surgeon who in turns provides it to the lead agent for project execution would be ideal.

The link between host nation health benefit, U.S. training and host nation security needs further exploration. Training U.S. medics to support indigenous health infrastructure should be recognized as a primary training objective. Projects that support the host nation will teach medics key principles of SSTRO and are more likely to provide a lasting health benefit. Providing a lasting health benefit will enhance host nation security. Systematic development of MOEs will professionalize the HCA program and ensure that scarce training funds are used appropriately. Instituting this model will improve health, build legitimacy of host nation institutions, and improve military training—all of which will improve security for U.S. and allies.

About the Author

Lieutenant Colonel Doug Logee is an Army Pediatrician who is currently assigned to Brooke Army Medical Center and is the director of the San Antonio Military Pediatric Center’s civil military-medical training program in Honduras. He has participated in fifteen Humanitarian Civic Assistance missions including working in areas affected by natural disaster and low intensity conflict. He is an instructor for the Military Medical Humanitarian Assistance Course and has studied Pediatrics and Public Health at overseas locations.

\textsuperscript{13} Lemmon, K., Lynch, J., Hartstein, B., Lougee, D., Unpublished data.
Cross-Cultural Considerations for the United States Security Cooperation in the Middle East

By
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The former Commander of U.S. Central Command, General Tony Zinni provides a fascinating account of culturally based misunderstanding at senior levels in Tom Clancy’s book *Battle Ready*. General Zinni describes how in his initial experience in the Middle East, Secretary of Defense William Cohen left a senior meeting in the Arabian Gulf uncertain as to where his interlocutors stood. Secretary Cohen offered succinct explanations and crisp requests for endorsement of U.S. military objectives in the region. Frustrated by hearing anything but direct and clear responses to his agenda, General Zinni explains how he advised the Secretary of Defense that they actually had received endorsements of our objective in those meetings. Perplexed, Secretary Cohen said he did not hear any endorsements at all. However, the culturally astute General Zinni pointed out the subtle meaning of a parting phrase offered to Secretary Cohen: “you must always know that we’re your friends”.

Vagueness had been used to deliberately avoid a clearly defined position which would have contained uncomfortable criticism. The operative implication was a positive reinforcement of the strategic relationship, thereby a green light without saying exactly so. Another example of the typical indirectness in the Middle East, but what was really meant was not readily understood - even by Secretary of Defense.

Despite the fact that English was the common language, cultural rather than linguistic interpretations defined the nature of the communication. From senior U.S. government officials on down to the array of U.S. forces deployed in the Arabian Gulf region implementing the entire spectrum of security cooperation activities, Americans grapple with the significant impacts of cultural differences in the Middle East. Typical examples of misunderstood communication in the Middle East are: the ever polite and positive responses to requests that really mean something else; avoidance of straightforward blunt criticism, seemingly irrational delays that belie a lack of consensus among decision makers; the reluctance of detailed long range planning, the inexplicable avoidance to commit to obvious requirements according to our needs assessments. These are a few examples of situations that frequently present themselves to Americans in the region. Despite our long and successful history of engagement in the region, many Americans continue to misunderstand the real meanings behind these foreign behaviors. The unique context of interpersonal communication in conducting security

1. General Anthony Zinni later on points out that Secretary Cohen committed himself to understanding the Middle Eastern culture and connecting to the people in the region. The incident recounted in *Battle Ready* happened early in Secretary Cohen’s tenure. Secretary Cohen became admired for spending time out there and learning the culture.


3. In this discussion, the term Middle East is defined as those peoples whose mother tongue is Arabic, and/or societies with Islamic traditions as the predominant basis of cultural values. While ethnically and somewhat culturally different, the Turks, Iranians, and Afghans are also included in this category. So, this definition of Middle East can extend well into both the EUCOM and well into CENTCOM Areas of Responsibility (AoR). For instance, in the CENTCOM AoR, the four countries that comprise the Central Asian States, despite their Turkic heritage and in the instance of Tajikistan - a Farsi lineage, have evolved into hybrid cultures combining the legacy of the Central Asian steppe tribes with recent Russian influences. The societies of the Indian subcontinent, despite their robust Islamic identities, possess unique cultures that incorporate the South-West Asian culture with British traditions. Marionite and Coptic Christians in the Levant and “Misir” (Egypt) whose mother tongue is Arabic will tend to exhibit mostly the same culturally based communication patterns as their Muslim brethren. Likewise Arabic speaking peoples across the Maghreb and sub-Sahara Africa will also generally share the same culturally based communication patterns as peoples in the Arabian peninsula and Mesopotamia.

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cooperation activities presents opportunities for us to acquire improved skills in understanding the mentalities and meaning of our Middle Eastern partners. We need to constantly work to enhance our cross-cultural comprehension levels to more effectively interact with our foreign partners in the Middle East.

The United States Department of Defense professionals who engage with our Middle Eastern partners are generally well prepared to deal with the obvious cultural differences. U.S. service members and particularly those involved in implementing security cooperation activities in the Middle East receive effective “cultural awareness” training, but the scope and depth is primarily to avoid embarrassing social offenses. U.S. security cooperation implementors are sensitized to Islamic practices and traditional Middle East norms. The aim is to demonstrate our respect for fundamental values in the region so that we can establish credible relationships that support our mutual interests. American personnel in the region generally know about: inappropriate use of the left hand, are sensitive to avoid compromising situations among mixed genders, adjust well to the enhanced restrictions during Ramadan, and understand what’s going on when hearing the calls to prayer five times per day.

However, as highlighted in the passage from Tom Clancy’s , *Battle Ready*, even the most senior U.S. officials can thoroughly misread the true meanings conveyed to us in English by our Middle Eastern friends and allies. Oftentimes subtle cues and hints go unrecognized while Americans engage with Middle Easterners. This is generally due to misunderstandings of culturally based assumptions. Our security cooperation personnel encounter many subtle and foreign forms of verbal and non-verbal communication that are misinterpreted and or unnoticed, resulting in lost opportunities to effectively engage. There are many types of situations where less than effective cross-cultural communication can directly and adversely affect expectations and impact the outcomes of security assistance activities. Moreover, in large part because of the intangible nature of this subject matter, well intended after action-reviews tend to overlook the impacts, the contributing causes, and the resulting lost opportunities. Cross-Cultural misunderstandings often contribute to misunderstood intentions, diluted explain actions, altered perceptions, and in many instances significantly impact mutual expectations and outcomes. Moreover, cultural misunderstandings and the impacts they can generate frequently occur as unrecognized factors - primarily on the American side. Given the importance of security cooperation in contributing towards our strategic objectives in the War on Terrorism, exploiting any and every opportunity to become more effective in understanding our partners in the Middle East becomes a top priority.

Once we have acknowledged that there are situations in the Middle East that present foreign and subtle forms of communication which we may misinterpret. We can then work to gain a deeper understanding and improve our cross-cultural comprehension level. To better understand why, to more reliably predict when, and to more effectively manage expectations requires an in-depth look into the motivations that drive behavior and the communication patterns that tend to emerge which reinforce those motivations. We can then observe the differences in cross-cultural communication in the Middle East and more effectively define the real meanings conveyed in communication.

In working to improve our knowledge, skills and abilities to better understand the various nuanced meanings in Middle Eastern cultural contexts, we first need to become more attuned to what is meant, rather than just what is said. In learning to read the meanings we first need to understand the basic motivations of the actions. Recognizing and appropriately interpreting the fundamental motivations which drive meanings depends on knowing about the core ethos of the culture. We will

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address some of the key drivers of motivation and behaviors in the Middle East by peeling back the onion of religious imperatives, values, traditions, and attitudes. Then we will highlight pivotal behavior patterns that reinforce those values. We will then use a series of cross-cultural dialogues to exhibit how Americans and Middle Easterners use different mentalities to approach the same topics of discussion. Progress towards improved cross-cultural communications, requires factoring in new considerations while interpreting meaning in interpersonal engagements. And finally, we need to realize that it takes ongoing practice and experience to improve cross-cultural communication skills.

Cultural adjustment and gaining enhanced cross-cultural communication skills is a more elusive effort than we might initially consider. Effective cross-cultural engagement requires a focused and raised comprehension of foreign and nuanced communications, coupled with practical experience over time. Further, complicating matters, assessing effective cross-cultural communications is also a difficult effort. How was this particular “blend of circumstances” reached and what could have been are frustrating questions to address. Outcomes are more reliable measurements of effectiveness, but inter-personal relationships and cross-cultural communications defies hard evidence of effectiveness. This contributes to less emphasis on the intangible aspects of inter-personal relationships despite our recognition of the importance of those dynamics. We know it is important to drink tea and engage in casual conversation, but it is a chore for most Americans and many do not realize the depth and breadth of meanings in the information exchanged while “shooting the breeze”.

Confucius said “All people are the same, it is only their habits that are different.” In a practical sense, cultural adjustment to different habits suggests adjustment not to culture but to behavior. Culture is an abstraction that can be appreciated intellectually, but behavior is the key manifestation of culture that we encounter, experience, and deal with. Both verbal and non-verbal communication are important behaviors in comprehending the actual meaning conveyed in a given context. Really understanding key dimensions of what’s going on in a given situation by what is termed reading between the lines can be a vague, intangible, and uncertain effort - even within one’s own operating environment, let alone in a foreign context. Trying to detect the real meaning of what is being communicated often relies on unfamiliar cue words and phrases, as well as all sorts of body language. Further complicating this effort, defining the true meaning of a message can also be hinged upon what is not said, or how intensely something is said, and when something is said in a given context.

Much of this cross-cultural misunderstanding is due to reliance on expectations based on social conditioning. The familiar term “ethnocentrism” points to universal tendencies for people to evaluate foreign behavior by the standard of one’s own culture. We are conditioned from our social environment to expect and assume certain meanings in given situations. Our cultural upbringing provides us with a frame of reference that we unconsciously use to interpret situations. However, we recognize that foreign cultures produce, in some instances, vastly different habits and patterns of action to convey different meanings. The old proverb notwithstanding, we can put ourselves in someone else’s shoes, but it is still our own feet we feel. A useful way to identify and define the differences in Middle

Eastern communication patterns is to also recognize American behavior patterns and the underlying American cultural basis for communicating and comprehending situations.7

American practitioners in the field can work to raise awareness of probable differences in meaning and over time understand the coded hints, the underlying, oblique, and indirect subtle meanings conveyed by Middle Easterners. However, we need to realize that there is no consistently applicable formula to discern meaning in every set of circumstances. There is no absolute explanation that can be applied to every situation. Each situation includes participants with individual traits and each situation carries a unique context that defines what meaning and responses are appropriate for the people engaged.

The cross-cultural dialogues in following paragraphs will illustrate and contrast the Middle Eastern and American “mentality”. The idea here is to identify some key culturally based assumptions in the Middle East that drives different behavior. Cross-cultural dialogues are useful tools to highlight how different cultural conditioning affects interpersonal behaviors. The dialogues show that culture affects meaning and that once aware of the motivations and subtleties, we can work to improve our understanding of actual intentions, and reduce the pitfalls of false expectations. The explanations of the dialogues contain generalizations. Cultural generalizations may be accurate about wider groups, but would never be wholly true of particular individuals. Individuals encountered in the Middle East will display a broad range of characteristics that may or may not conform to any extent to the typical generalizations. In particular, military officials in the Middle East generally represent an elite progressive class within their society. Most of the military officials in the Middle East who are specially selected to interact with Americans have either already served overseas or possess experience interacting with foreigners. As such, they tend to have adjusted their own cross-cultural communication skills to better interact with Americans. Consequently, the Middle Eastern official’s ways of communicating with Americans will invariably be different than the garden variety merchant in the bazaar. Nonetheless, a lifetime of cultural conditioning will continue to have a compelling drive upon the motivations and expressions that Middle Eastern officials will exhibit.

There is an underlying ethos - a shared core of assumptions about people and the world that Middle Easterners will continue to experience and express. It is these core culturally driven motivations and communication patterns that are key to understanding context and meaning. Highlighting the underlying Middle Eastern cultural ethos that motivates and determines behavior patterns provides us with a basis of explanation of the supporting behaviors.

Core Middle Eastern Ethos

- At the end of the day, God, not detailed planning determines outcomes (fate)
- Avoid shame - preserve the collective honor (group identity)

7. We develop our notions of how to behave and interpret situations from out upbringing. We internalize these behaviors and meanings to the point where they become unconscious and instinctual. What we know and understand is what we have taken in and has been reinforced from our experiences. But the world we observe and the behaviors we internalize are not exactly the same as Mohammed’s. In the U.S., parents teach their children: that it is good to be an individual; self reliance; say what you mean and mean what you say; where there is a will, there is a way; hard work can take you wherever you want to go; and that once you are grown up, you alone are responsible for your actions. In Mohammed’s world, kids learn to: identify themselves through the group; depend on others as they depend on you; avoid direct interpersonal confrontations; and that God’s will is paramount. These learned cultural attitudes are acquired over time primarily in the formative years. Most people can not even explain why they behave or think in certain ways. This is also part of the reason why we project our own norms onto people of other cultures. If we do not remember formally learning these ways, it must have been inborn and therefore universally human. Another reason we attribute our own norms to foreigners is that people we have encountered have consistently behaved according to our expectations so why interpret things any other way?
• Obligations to always remain courteous, polite, respectful, and hospitable
• Requirements to protect the virtues of our women
• Preserve and enhance the stature of history and reputation - of family, clan, tribe, region, ethnicity, those like us [states are the newest link]

Some of the supporting behavior patterns are listed below.

• Exaggerated flattery is an expectation. Reduced quantities subtly signals criticism. Absence of any flattery silence is thunderously meaningful and devastating.
• Identity lies in membership of a social group. The group takes the credit, so the group gets the flattery, not the individual. Over doing individual flattery invites jealousies from others. Intentionally over-exaggerated flattery to an individual signals an intent to wish bad tidings upon them.
• Since my team (family, clan, tribe, neighborhood, region, sect, nation, country) is everything, respecting the hierarchy is vital, and inter-personal relationships are approached through cooperation, group support and preserving appearances. Embarrassing others openly, publicly, and directly by competition and slander is reserved for outsiders.
• Working the network. Raise and reduce stature - praise and criticize - via intermediaries and emissaries. Who is doing it (who they are in the hierarchy) signals how heavy the meaning is.
• Silence speaks volumes. The absence of what would otherwise be said can be thunderously meaningful. No comment - no joy - no shame.
• One always knows - knows how to do it, knows someone who can do it. Knowing things and knowing people demonstrates individual abilities and personal stature. Long diatribes about related topics can mean I really don’t know about that subject, but look how much I do know about this - so you’ll continue to respect me.
• Smiles and hospitable offerings mean little substantively. Strangers and foreigners must receive more. Familiar faces can gauge their standing by how much they receive relative to previous instances and others.
• The interpersonal relationship matters. Friendship sows trust, respect, and mutual obligations for support. Thus, the need to look each other straight in the eyes, smell one’s breath and body odor, touch hands and arms - to connect viscerally. Middle Easterners have highly honed skills at reading and judging people.
• Middle Easterners carry the reputation of their entire group. So, who’s selected to be there “who’s who” signals “what’s what”. Someone with the reputation and clout needs to be there to have anything done. “Experts” with no clout means no importance. It is not unlike the axiom: “It is not what you know, but who you know . . .”

8. Our women can be understood in terms of priority and intensity by relationship in the various groups to which family reputation, obligations of protection, and kindredness is ascribed. Therefore, in concentric circles of decreasing priorities we can see Middle Eastern males feeling protective for females of: their immediate household, extended family, neighborhood, tribe, province, country, region, ethnicity, religion, and finally any woman in distress.
## Conceptual Comparisons of American and Middle Eastern Cultural Attributes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>American</th>
<th>Middle Eastern</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Action oriented</td>
<td>Interaction oriented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goal oriented</td>
<td>Being oriented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct and open</td>
<td>Indirect and tactful</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disclosing</td>
<td>Face saving</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Optimistic</td>
<td>Fatalistic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual orientation</td>
<td>Interdependent orientation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Symmetrical Relationships

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(age, status)</th>
<th>Complimentary Relationships</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Do one thing at a time</td>
<td>Juggle many things at once</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concentrate on the job</td>
<td>Distractions and interruptions ok</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stick to deadlines and schedules</td>
<td>Time commitments are objectives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focused on the job</td>
<td>Focused on the people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reluctant to borrow or lend</td>
<td>Often and easily borrow and lend</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avoid crossing privacy boundaries</td>
<td>Minimal privacy boundaries with</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>family/friends/close associates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accustomed to short term relationships</td>
<td>Tendency towards lifetime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>relationships¹⁰</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The following situation based dialogues are intended to illustrate typical cultural differences and how Americans and Middle Easterners can approach the same situation from entirely different viewpoints. For some readers, the subtle cues and meanings conveyed by the Middle Easterners will be evident and stark. However, we need to remind ourselves that what may seem obvious to comprehend in an academic environment can be easily misread or missed altogether while engaging in a foreign and distracting set of circumstances on the ground.

### Situation: Just Trying to Help - Versus - I Need A Straight Shooter Who’ll Get It Done

Iron Mike: I saw the official in the customs office today.

Abdullah: Oh, good.

Iron Mike: He said you never spoke to him about releasing that U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) equipment.

Abdullah: I’m very sorry, sir.

Iron Mike: In fact, he said he’s never heard of you.

Abdullah: It is possible, sir.

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Iron Mike: But when I asked you if you knew him and if you could help, you said you could.

Abdullah: Oh, yes, sir.

Iron Mike: But it wasn’t true. You don’t know him and you didn’t even talk to him.

Abdullah: Excuse me sir, but I was only trying to help.

For Iron Mike, Abdullah is not only ineffective, but may be considered a liar! He said he knew the customs official and he could help. Abdullah did not know the customs official - therefore he lied. However in his world, Abdullah is obliged to give his boss a positive response - whether or not he can actually deliver. Another Arab would understand that Abdullah’s positive response should not be taken literally - that he actually knows the man in the customs office and is going to be able to do something. It is understood that he’s willing to try to help either because it is his job and his superior has tasked him, or in another similar situation because a friend has asked for help. Abdullah figures that he may know somebody that knows the customs official and somebody can have some pull. Abdullah will use his network of friends to help. Abdullah also expects some time to get this networking done and if after some time, he can’t then he expects his boss to realize that he wasn’t able to do it and he should look for another alternative - without direct confrontation. Instead, Iron Mike directly confronts Abdullah with the failure and even implies he’s a liar. It is a measure of Abdullah’s good manners that he maintains his composure and respectfulness. If other Arabs had been witness to Iron Mike’s confrontation revealing Abdullah’s deficiencies, the shame factor would have a serious impact on Abdullah. It would be no surprise to other Arabs in that case, if Abdullah gradually withdrew his efforts and found a polite reason to find employment elsewhere. Iron Mike would have no clue as to why he lost a good man.11

Situation: A Bird In the Hand - Versus - One Well Done or Two Half Baked

Mohammed: Sir, would you like to see the two new offices we’ve completed?

Iron Mike: Offices? I thought we agreed to build one office and, if there were any funds left over at the end of the fiscal year, we would buy equipment for the one office.

Mohammed: Yes, but there was enough money to build two offices at once.

Iron Mike: But, is there any money left over to equip the offices?

Mohammed: Unfortunately, no, sir.

Iron Mike: Then we can’t use them!

Mohammed: Not presently, but isn’t it good? We used all the money!

Iron Mike thinks Mohammed is cooking up something on the side or is irresponsible with government funds, or just plain irrational. Mohammed’s view is completely different yet just as rational and dutiful as Iron Mike’s. Mohammed wouldn’t think to rely on left over money to remain available to fund office equipment. It is better to use up all the money at once while you have it available and then request additional money for the necessary equipment to complete the overall effort. Now you have two offices and the funding source is under pressure to equip at least one if not two. All this is based on operating assumptions of predictability and reliability of the system, the

government, and even in reality in general. Iron Mike trust his system and government, and as an American has grown up with principles like: Make it happen, where there’s a will there’s a way, there’s nothing we can’t do . . . ! Government services are transparent, law abiding, and for the benefit of citizens regardless of who’s involved. Mohammed has no such notions of accountability in government or predictability over outcomes in life. Fate determines everything and if you have it you use it or lose it.12

**Situation: Feasibility - The Facts or the Man**

Iron Mike: I think we should examine the feasibility study for the proposed Ministry building.

Nasser: I agree, sir. Perhaps we can begin by discussing who the director of the project will be.

Iron Mike: That will have to be decided, of course. But first we have to see if the project is doable.

Nasser: Yes, sir, that’s exactly my point.

Iron Mike wants to examine the substance of the new project for a Ministry building to see if it is executable. Nasser is also interested in determining if the project is doable, but not by examining the facts contained in the feasibility study. He will know if it is really going to happen based on who’s put in charge of the project. If someone of influence and authority is put in charge, then it means the Ministry takes the project seriously. If a relatively minor official with no clout is selected to run the project - no matter how expert he may be - it is a good bet the project will never get off the ground regardless of how well engineered the plans are.13

**Situation: A Very Persuasive Decision Brief**

Iron Mike: So, Hamad, how do you think the briefing was?

Hamad: Sir, Brigadier Ali was very impressed. Your presentation was clear, organized, and informative.

Iron Mike: Well we worked really hard to capture all the data - we focused on the relevant metrics.

Hamad: Yes, the briefing had a lot of information.

Iron Mike: Yes, but It is been awhile and no feedback or decision from Brigadier Ali.

Hamad: I think the Brigadier may have thought there was something missing, that you were not very involved or enthusiastic about the project.

Iron Mike: I don’t know what else I could have done, the facts really speak for themselves in project.

For Iron Mike, the cold hard facts don’t lie. You can’t argue with the statistics. Stick to the numbers and we can’t go wrong. Brigadier Ali appreciates facts too, but facts are not going to implement the project. This is Iron Mike’s project and Brigadier Ali is thinking he certainly has his information in order, he’s made a persuasive case on the

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12. Ibid., p. 78
13. Ibid., p. 84.
merits of the facts. But who is Iron Mike. We can trust facts on paper. Brigadier Ali wants a warm and fuzzy about Iron Mike - that he’s committed to complete the project as outlined. In addition to the facts, Brigadier Ali wants to see something of Iron Mike - the man - in his briefing, but Iron Mike didn’t come out from behind his numbers. Instead of embarrassing Iron Mike by openly discussing his rational, Brigadier Ali would prefer to choose silence as a signal that he’s not convinced to give the project to Iron Mike. If Iron Mike pressed for an answer, a polite yet seemingly oblique reason would be given by Brigadier Ali’s intermediaries that would further confound Iron Mike.\textsuperscript{14}

\textbf{Situation: The Plan is Under Study}

Iron Mike: Abdulsalam, what did you think of the new plan?

Abdulsalam: Seems very fine, but I’m still studying it, we need to be certain.

Iron Mike: Still studying it after three weeks? It is not that complicated!

Abdulsalam: There are one or two aspects that might be a problem.

Iron Mike: Oh, I know that, but we should put the plan into action and work the bugs out later.

Abdulsalam: Seriously?

Iron Mike is ready to adopt new concepts into action and make adjustments once implemented. Many other cultures are skeptical of new things, “There’s nothing new under the sun.” The presumption is what’s worked is better than risking failure. When all the glitches are addressed in the plan, then Abdulsalam may be more inclined to initiate a trail run. Trial and error is not the preferred way to operate. Americans believe if you fall on your face, you get up. Many other cultures feel if you fall on your face, no one ever forgets the sight of you sprawled in the mud.\textsuperscript{15}

\textbf{Situation: Wait Here - Versus - I’ll Do It Myself on the Way}

Iron Mike: Khalid, I was wondering if my vehicle was ready from the service shop down the street yet?

Khalid: Yes, sir. The shop called and your car is ready.

Iron Mike: Great. I’ll go pick it up.

Khalid: Oh, no sir! I’ll send a driver to pick it up and bring it here for you.

Iron Mike: No need to pull someone out of the office for that. It is on my way anyway.

Khalid: Please, sir. You wait here and drink some tea. I’ll have the car here right away.

Iron Mike is unaware of the image and status he carries around in this environment. The image of the American officer in charge walking down the street to the garage to talk with the mechanics to get his own car signals to those in this environment that his office is in disarray, his drivers and assistants are absent, and he has no clout to do anything about it. Not only does this reflect badly on Iron Mike in the eyes of the

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., p. 121.

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., p. 22.
locals, but all the locals working in his office would never live it down to others that they allowed such an indiscretion to happen.16

**Situation: Performance Evaluation - Constructive Criticism**

Iron Mike: Khalil, let’s go over your semi-annual performance evaluation.

Khalil: Whatever you think, sir.

Iron Mike: As you know, you’re performing well overall. There are just a few areas for improvement I’d like to discuss with you.

Khalil: I see.

Iron Mike: One is in writing, which isn’t easy for you, is it?

Khalil: No, sir.

Iron Mike: And the other is in identifying training needs. Your staff could use more computer training.

Khalil: Yes.

Iron Mike: Anyway, it is all written here in the report. You can read it for yourself. Otherwise, no serious problems.

Khalil: I’m very sorry to disappoint you, sir.

The imperatives of honor and avoidance of shame means that criticism has to be handled very delicately in the Middle East. Oftentimes, a lack of overdone praise is sufficient to signal dissatisfaction. When unavoidable, criticism should be expressed with the utmost discretion and indirection. Iron Mike was actually pleased with Khalil’s performance and said so - once, and closed with “otherwise no problems.” An American would probably read that evaluation just for what Iron Mike meant. For Khalil, the brief understated praise coupled with a direct focus on spelling out the deficiencies meant his boss thought he’s performing badly. Khalil naturally assumes that Iron Mike will bend over backwards to be sensitive about Khalil’s sense of self image, honor, and reputation. If that was the best Iron Mike could do to praise him and if that represents the best face Iron Mike could put on the situation; then Khalil’s read was things are bad for him there. If Iron Mike had quickly slipped the critique into a majority of the time highlighting Khalil’s successes, then Khalil would have been able to stomach the criticism. Now, Iron Mike has no clue that Khalil’s morale is shot after that performance evaluation. That terribly insensitive session will be the main family topic of discussion for a long time in Khalil’s house. It would be no surprise to another Arab if soon enough Khalil’s performance really drops off and he soon finds a new place to work. Khalil would offer a plausible and polite reason to find employment elsewhere yet would remain on the friendliest of terms. Iron Mike will still have no clue as to really why he lost such a good man.17

**Situation: She’s The Best Man For the Job**

Iron Mike: Khalid, Even though the host nation senior leadership pledged to fully support our investigation, ever since I sent in Lieutenant Jane to investigate the incident, the host nation support has declined. Are they stonewalling because of gender?
Khalid: Sir, there are several female forensic officers in the military here.

Iron Mike: Well, Lieutenant Jane is the very best forensic expert we have. That should have signaled our priority on this.

Khalid: I’m sure everyone recognizes her technical expertise.

Although Iron Mike perceives a passive-aggressive reaction to assigning Lieutenant Jane to the case, he can’t see any other reason than gender bias as the cause of host nation indifference to her. Iron Mike sent in the best expert he had to work the case. The host nation reaction doesn’t make sense. Khalid understands that the lack of enthusiasm by the host nation to pursue the case is because an unknown officer of very young age showed up on the scene without Iron Mike’s personal endorsement on the ground. Her expertise notwithstanding, her youth and lack of introduction by a trusted senior, signals a lack of priority in the eyes of the locals.

**Situation: The “Inshallah”**

Iron Mike: Mohammed, will you be here tomorrow to join us for dinner, and will you bring your friends too please?

Mohammed: Yes, - Inshallah!

Iron Mike: We’ll expect to see you and your friends here for dinner tomorrow at 19:00.

Mohammed: Yes, Mike, Inshallah. Dinner with you and our friends. It will be our pleasure!

Iron Mike has heard of the real meaning of Inshallah - “if it is God will”, it really means not likely to happen. So, Iron Mike will now invite another group for dinner because he doesn’t expect Mohammed to show.

In Mohammed’s context, Inshallah must be added - as reinforcement of his personal commitments. He said yes - twice, and confirmed yes is for dinner - with friends. Although he will do everything he can to attend, it is doubtful he would show up precisely at 19:00 sharp. Iron Mike is probably in for a surprise when Mohammed shows at 20:30 and Mike will have to awkwardly manage the situation as he had invited another competing group to the dinner. The meaning of “Inshallah” can range from a definite yes - as in a subordinate’s response to a direct order from a superior, an uncertain maybe, and even to a polite deflection signaling no. The local environment, the context of the circumstances, and the people involved will all determine the appropriate usage.

**Situation: Getting to Know You**

Iron Mike: Hassan, now that we’ll be working together as counterparts, I wanted to let you know about my background. I’ve got B.S. and M.S degrees in engineering, and have 18 years experience in the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. I’ve completed several major projects of the type we’re about to embark on together. How about you?

Hassan: Sir, my family is from a section of Baghdad- that you would probably not be familiar with. My uncle Nasser speaks excellent English and would like to meet you. Shall I arrange to have my Uncle Nasser meet you ?

Mike has no clue as to the meaning of Hassan’s seemingly off target response. Mike will probably drive on and see how Hassan performs, but why couldn’t Hassan just rattle off his credentials and experience and what does his family’s location and his uncle have to do with it anyway? On the other hand, Hassan considers it very inappropriate to tout his own credentials directly to Mike. Hassan typically discusses his family’s background
and most Arabs would instantly understand his reputation by his family name and his by his neighborhood. Hassan did realize that Mike wouldn’t know his family’s reputation by mentioning the city and neighborhood, so he then proceeded to set up a meeting for Mike with his uncle who would represent his family and act as an intermediary with Mike and openly brag about his nephew’s impressive engineering credentials.

**Situation: The Agenda**

Iron Mike: Khalifa, I see what you mean, that’s a very important point, That’s what we need to focus on but . . .

Khalifa: Sir, now if I could explain some of the details.

Iron Mike: I wish you had brought this to my attention earlier in the meeting.

Khalifa: Excuse me, sir?

Iron Mike: I mean, this is something we need to look at together very closely. But, we’ve already extended our meeting.

Khalifa: Yes, of course, sir. But if you’ll just bear with me a few moments.

Iron Mike: Let me ask my secretary to put you on my calendar for Friday.

Khalifa: Excuse me, sir?

Iron Mike: So we can continue then .

Khalifa: You want me to come back again, on Friday?

Even though Iron Mike recognizes that they’re getting somewhere, he’s unwilling to further extend the meeting and prefers to keep things on track rather than upset the schedule. Schedules are man made, but once we have a schedule, for many of us A-Type hard chargers, it is the person, not the schedule that has to do the accommodating. To do otherwise means being unorganized and undisciplined. Khalifa is operating off of another set of assumptions. The time and schedules are meant to be a flexible framework to organize the day’s activities. What can a few more minutes of their time be worth compared to resolving the issue.18

The following excerpts highlight how complex cross-cultural interactions can be and how others assume Americans are conditioned to respond.

**Knowledge and a Little Luck!**

Sometime in 1906 I was walking in the heat of the day through the Bazaars. As I passed an Arab Café, in no hostility to my straw hat but desiring to shine before his friends, a fellow called out in Arabic, “God curse your father, O Englishman.” I was young then and quicker tempered, and could not refrain from answering in his own language that “I would also curse your father if he were in a position to inform me which of his mother’s two and ninety admirers his father had been!” I heard footsteps behind me, and slightly picked up the pace, angry with myself for committing the sin Lord Cromer would not pardon - a row with the Egyptians. In a few seconds I felt a hand on each arm. “My brother,” said the original humorist, “return and drink coffee and smoke with us. I did not think

18. *Id.*, p. 121.
that your worship knew Arabic, still less the correct Arabic abuse, and we would benefit further by your important thoughts.”

Ronald Storrs. “Orientations.”

Those Americans, They’ll Follow The Rules - Even When There’s No Good Reason To!

Once we were out in a rural area in the middle of nowhere and saw an American come to a stop sign. Though he could see in both directions for miles and saw no traffic was coming, he still stopped!

Turkish Exchange Student In “There Is A Difference.”

Profiling the Yanks

MacDonald’s restaurants are probably a good reflection of the American character. They’re fast, efficient, they make money, and they’re clean. If they’re loud and crowded and if the food is wastefully wrapped, packaged, boxed, and bagged . . . let’s face it, that’s us Americans.

Andy Rooney “A Few Minutes With Andy Rooney.”

Increasing effectiveness in cross-cultural communication involves becoming more attuned to what the real meaning is in a situation - what is meant versus what is said. We need to recognize our own American-centric assumptions and then deliberately adjust our interpretations to our acquired understandings of Middle Eastern motivations, cultural conditioning, assumptions, and supporting behaviors. The challenge is not only to become equipped to define the situation more appropriately - that is according to the locals’ viewpoint. We also need to increase our perceptiveness to recognize the brief and subtle cues while engaging in the substance of the agenda, and invariably while functioning within a broader and distracting environment. Discerning the significance of various behavior patterns can be like acquiring a new language. When we listen to someone speak a foreign language we tend to only hear those words that seem familiar, and the rest is noise. Similarly, in observing foreign behavior - including English spoken in a foreign context - we pick out those actions and the meaning of the spoken English and define what’s going on according to our own culturally based assumptions. All the rest, rich in meaning to everyone but us, is just random undifferentiated action and utterances. It is the same when we come across a word we don’t understand while reading. We guess at the meaning from the context. Further complicating this challenge is the Middle Eastern style of omission of input, or the deliberate timing or intensity of the input - all which impart a significance that is altogether absent in American forms of communication. We also need to be aware that there is not only behavior that we misinterpret because there’s no corresponding cultural meaning in the American context, but there is behavior and speech in the Middle East that we don’t even pick up on at all. There is, quite literally, more to a foreign culture than meets the eye. While we can’t always trust what we see, our observations remain the primary gauge to learn about a foreign culture. We simply have to be aware that some of what we see may only be in the eyes of the beholder.

In identifying Middle Eastern core cultural ethos, we gain an improved understanding of the common motivations of behavior. We can realize that Middle Eastern motives can be very different than American “mentalities”. People naturally assume that their interpretations of context and meaning

20. Ibid., p. 112.
21. Ibid., p. 113.
22. Ibid., p. 81.
are common everywhere. Therefore, it is a common tendency for Americans to draw upon their own distinct American frames of reference to define meaning in cross-cultural situations - and likewise for the inexperienced Middle Easterner. The list of key Middle Eastern values and the highlights of various behaviors that tend to emerge in support of those values, provide a basis to examine the cross-cultural dialogues. Cross-cultural dialogues can be an effective tool to exhibit vastly different mentalities expressed in key yet nuanced and subtle communications. The explanations of the dialogues - from the viewpoints of the American and Middle Eastern participants - offer insights as a new frame of reference to define meaning in certain situations.

American service members conducting security cooperation activities with Middle Easterners need to remain mindful that we’ve acquired our own cultural conditioning over the course of our formative years into adulthood. We need to recognize that like learning a foreign language in adulthood, we gain proficiency but our newly gained knowledge, skills, and abilities to adjust to foreign contexts should be a continuous learning process. If approached as an ongoing effort to enhance our cross-cultural communication abilities, we can expect to increase our understandings of why, increase our ability to predict when, and thereby improve our management of important mutual expectations that emerge in the unique interactive and personally driven field of security cooperation activities.

References

3. Ibid, p. 51

About the Author

Major Hank Kron has been the Director of Middle East Studies at DISAM since August 2004. In addition to presenting Middle East subjects to various courses offered at DISAM, he is an instructor in SAO Operations, International Military Training, and U.S. Defense Acquisition Policies and Procedures. He is a Middle East Foreign Area Officer with nineteen years of service. He served as a Political-Military Staff Officer at Central Command Headquarters. He has a M.A. in Near East Studies from Princeton, and a B.A. Summa Cum Laude from City University of New York in Political Science.
Planning for the Security Assistance Organization:  
Or How Do We Get There From Here?  

By  
Gary Taphorn  
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If you have served in a security assistance organization (SAO), the actions outlined above, whether in writing or expressed orally, should sound familiar. The common theme in all of the taskers above from Colonel Shawkinaugh is that they are short-term in nature, the so-called 50-meter targets. As with any other organization, the SAO inevitably becomes pre-occupied with near-term issues. While there is nothing wrong with this, focusing on these actions to the exclusion of long range issues can potentially be fruitless - or worse - counterproductive. In today’s environment where an increasing number of SAO personnel are serving one-year unaccompanied tours, a ten-week suspense to prepare for the arrival of Major Kumming might seem like a mid-term action, when in reality it is a mere blip on the radar scope. The SAO must be equally concerned with the so-called 400-meter targets, those goals or actions which will likely not happen on his watch, but on that of his successor, or even his successor once or twice removed.

This is the crucial planning function of the SAO, in which it helps to shape the organization and capabilities of the host nation military, as well as its capability and willingness to work with the United States on issues of regional or global security.

Planning Guidance  

Fortunately, the system has plenty of safeguards and guidance to aid Colonel Shawkinaugh in his planning responsibilities. Both the Department of State (DoS) and Department of Defense (DoD) have, over time, developed planning processes which apply uniformly and globally to all embassies and SAOs. Moreover, since the onset of the Global War on Terror, DoS and DoD have more closely

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**MEMO FOR:** All Personnel  
Office of Defense Cooperation  
American Embassy Bandaria  

**FROM:** Colonel Butch Shawkinaugh  
Chief, ODC  

**SUBJECT:** Summary of Taskers from Weekly ODC Staff Call  

1. Urge Bandarian Air Force to sign Amendment 2 to BN-C-YCY before it expires on the 28th of the month.  
2. Work with Bandarian Training Directorate to identify an English language qualified field grade officer to attend U.S. Army Command and General Staff School before we lose the quota.  
3. Set up hotel reservations and rental car arrangements for the HMMWV maintenance mobile training team (MTT) coming next week.  
4. Take the necessary actions with embassy housing, the international school, and the combatant command budget folks to accommodate inbound Major I. M. Kumming, the replacement for Major Nuisance, who will arrive in ten weeks with four children.
coordinated their goals and programs. To this end, and for the first time, the two departments convened a two-day security cooperation summit in Washington in April 2006.

This article examines the four planning processes for the SAO chief, one with DoS and three within DoD. It also describes the resultant documents and explains their benefit to the SAO and to the bilateral relationship with the host nation. Each planning process was developed independently and in response to separate requirements and each operates on its own annual cycle. Collectively, however, they make for a complete matrix of planning guidance for the SAO chief. The four processes are as follows:

- The Mission Performance Plan (MPP)
- The country component of the Theater Security Cooperation Strategy (TSCS)
- The Combined Education and Training Program Plan (CETPP)
- The foreign military financing (FMF) and International Military Education and Training (IMET) Budget Formulation and Submission Web Tool

**The Mission Performance Plan**

From personal experience as a Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM) instructor, the author can attest that most students bound for SAO billets are well aware of the combatant commander’s theater security cooperation strategy (TSCS). However, strikingly few have heard of the Mission Performance Plan (MPP) for their embassy.

In fact, the MPP is more important. It is the single planning document within the U.S. government that defines our national interests in any given foreign country. The MPP coordinates the efforts and establishes the performance measurement among all U.S. government agencies represented on the embassy country team (including the SAO and the defense attaché office) or which otherwise have interests in that country. The MPP is not intended to limit the scope of the activities of federal agencies. Rather, it creates a framework for all agencies to define priorities, articulate the goals and objectives of their programs, and directly relate program accomplishments to agency-specific and government-wide strategic goals. The MPP process is thus a truly interagency activity.

At each U.S. embassy, the plan is created by the country team under the leadership of the chief of mission, normally the ambassador. Guidance provided to members of the country team stresses the importance of congruity between the MPP and each agency’s strategic plan (for DoD, the country component of the TSCS). The MPP addresses not only foreign policy and national security issues, but also establishes benchmarks for internal embassy administration, staffing, and budget efficiencies. Finally, the MPP acts as a transmission document for the request of appropriated funds under the DoS-managed foreign operations budget. Of key interest to SAO chiefs are the requests for FMF and IMET funding.

Upon approval by the ambassador, the MPP is sent to the DoS where it undergoes interagency review. All concerned agencies, including DoD, then have the opportunity to review and comment on each individual country MPP. Each of the more than 180 DoS missions around the world executes this process annually. The MPPs for fiscal year 2008 were submitted to DoS for review in February, 2006. In part, this is to meet the timelines for the submission of the foreign operations budget request to the Congress. Timelines are discussed in more detail below.

Individual MPPs are typically unclassified documents, but are marked Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU), the DoS equivalent of For Official Use Only (FOUO) and, as such, must be controlled. MPPs follow a standardized and highly structured format and are organized to reflect how an embassy supports DoS’s four broad, enduring strategic objectives and its twelve strategic goals, as reflected in
The fiscal years 2004 through 2009 Department of State and USAID Strategic Plan. (This document can be found at http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/dosstrat/200/).

The chart below outlines these objectives and goals. While Colonel Shawkinaugh and his fellow SAOs support at least indirectly most or all of DoS’s twelve strategic goals, their work most directly impacts on regional stability and counterterrorism.

![Diagram of Strategic Objectives and Goals]

Figure 1. Department of State four strategic objectives and twelve strategic goals, as outlined in the fiscal years 2004-2009 Department of State and USAID Strategic Plan. Security assistance supports primarily the strategic objective of Achieve Peace and Security.

The Theater Security Cooperation Strategy

Since the end of World War II, United States military forces have been continuously involved in a myriad of peacetime missions and activities to help shape the strategic environment. For decades, however, most of this was done on an ad hoc basis, with no overarching guidance on prioritization of partner countries and use of DoD resources. It was not until 1998 that DoD formalized its peacetime engagement process and strategy. It did so by establishing the requirement for geographic combatant commands to develop and implement theater engagement plans (TEPs) that would shape the environment in their areas of responsibility.

Under Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld’s tenure, the TEPs were renamed security cooperation plans, and now security cooperation strategies. Secretary Rumsfeld’s personal stamp on the process is seen primarily through the Security Cooperation Guidance (SCG), which was issued initially in
April 2003 and followed by a more robust version in November 2005 (and amended in June 2006). The SCG provides the basis for all further security cooperation planning and activities within DoD. This document acts as the foundation for all DoD interactions with foreign defense establishments and supports the president’s National Security Strategy and the Secretary of Defense’s National Military Strategy. The requirement to produce a security cooperation strategy now extends to all combatant commanders (both geographic and functional), as well as to secretaries of the military departments and directors of Defense agencies. The SCG makes reference to four ways in which we accomplish our strategic objectives, as articulated in the March 2005 National Defense Strategy. They are:

- Assure allies and friends
- Dissuade potential adversaries
- Deter aggression and counter coercion
- Defeat adversaries

The SCG then identifies a total of nineteen objectives which collectively support the four goals above. As geographic combatant commands develop their theater security cooperation strategies, they align their programs, activities and priorities with these SCG goals and objectives. The TSCS is comprised of various sections, including strategies for sub-regions within the combatant commander’s (COCOM) area of responsibility (known as regional strategies) and strategies of the COCOM component commands. However, for Colonel Shawkinaugh and other SAO chiefs, the key component of the TSCS is the country-specific portion of the document, now typically called a country campaign plan (although the name varies among the COCOMs) and enclosed as an appendix. While the country campaign plan is drafted by the COCOM J5, it is utilizing input from the other COCOM directorates, the component commands, and above all the SAO. Indeed, the SAO becomes the unofficial “point man” for the development and execution of most of the country-level portion of the TSCS. As the de facto expert within the COCOM on his partner nation, the SAO is in the best position to recommend the nature of peacetime engagement and the types of activities which will yield optimal benefits to both the United States and the host nation, and with the most efficient expenditure of resources. The SAO and other players within the COCOM utilize a classified data base called Theater Security Cooperation Management Information System (TSCMIS) to schedule, track, and assess specific security cooperation activities and events.

In summary, just as the MPP is the ambassador’s document, so is the Theater Security Cooperation Strategy the document of the area combatant commander. While the SAO is not the lead agency in either process, it has a key role to play in both formulating and executing the plan and strategy. In rare instances, the SAO may detect conflicting guidance or priorities between his ambassador’s MPP and the combatant commander’s TSCS. In such cases, the SAO chief must seek clarification or resolution at the first opportunity. While the SAO chief is in the occasionally difficult position of responding to two masters, he is also uniquely positioned to understand both the combatant command and the embassy, balance their respective priorities, and leverage their resources.

The Combined Education and Training Program Plan

The Security Assistance Management Manual (SAMM, para C10.4.1) is the genesis of this third planning requirement. Specifically, it requires that:

SAOs in coordination with host country counterparts (author’s italics) develop a Combined Education and Training Program Plan (CETPP).

The same paragraph specifies that the CETPP is part of the SAO input to the budget process, including the ambassador’s MPP and the combatant commander’s TSCS. The format of the CETPP is spelled out by SAMM Figure C10.F1.
The CETPP is the SAO chief’s “deliverable” for the annual Training Program Management Reviews (TPMRs), hosted each spring by the combatant commands. The country plans created for the spring 2006 TPMR cycle are for budget year 2007 and beyond. The SAO is required to prepare the CETPP as an unclassified document and upload it to the Security Assistance Network (SAN) for review prior to the TPMR. (Beginning in 2005, the CETPPs migrated to the SAN web). More than any of the other planning documents, the CETPP illustrates the requirement for the SAO to coordinate its planning with that of the host nation. Put differently, if Colonel Shawkinaugh’s training officer (or foreign service national employee) returned to Bandaria from the TPMR and announced that all training requested on the CETPP was approved, it would be no surprise to Bandarian counterparts. Since it is not always possible that all requested training will be approved, or otherwise become available, the SAO must also work closely with the host nation on alternative plans. For example, if Bandaria requests a senior service school, such as the U.S. Army War College, through its IMET program, an alternative plan must in place in the event that Bandaria does not receive an invitation to the course.

The CETPP is required to address the execution of all training with DoD, regardless of the source of funding. In theory, the host nation has unlimited ability to request training through FMS cases which are paid with customer funds. At this point, the constraint may be DoD training resources. However, the reality remains that many countries are so limited in budgets that, unless the U.S. pays for both the cost of the training course (i.e., tuition), as well as the associated travel and living allowances, they can not afford the training at all. Most nations receive at least some U.S. appropriated funds for training. The IMET program alone provided training funds to at least 135 countries in fiscal year 2006. Other U.S.-funded sources of training include, for example, the Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP) and International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INCLE). Finally,
the new authority for the President under section 1206 of the fiscal year 2006 National Defense Authorization Act (commonly referred to as “building partner capacity” or simply “1206 authority”) also provides for U.S.-funded training.

2. Combined Education and Training Program Objectives
   a. Specific U.S. Program Objectives. U.S. training program objectives should support objectives articulated in the Mission Performance Plan (MPP), Theater Security Cooperation Plan (TSCP) and in the DoD Security Cooperation Guidance (SCG). While the TSCP provides a seven-year focus and the SCG is limited to five years, training objectives should be near-term (two years) and be unclassified.
   b. Host Country Objectives.
   c. Significant Accomplishments Toward Meeting These Objectives. Provide tangible examples of how individuals applied Security Assistance training to achieve program objectives.
   d. Future Objectives and Program Requirements. This paragraph should address U.S. and host country out-year objectives with regards to Security Assistance training program requirements. Data (e.g., IMET, FMF, FMS) must closely match the inputs developed by the U.S. Country Team for the MPP and data found in the TSCP.

3. Program Planning and Implementation
   a. Program Development. This should include a brief description of the training planning process, highlighting host country and SAO roles, problems (if any), and plans for improvement. The objective is to demonstrate an orderly process in the shaping of a training program that is in the U.S. interest and supportive of MPP, TSCP and SCG.

Figure 3. An extract of Part One of the CETPP format, as found in the SAMM, Figure C10.F1. It emphasizes the importance of the training program meeting both U.S. and host nation objectives. While the SAMM indicates that the CETPP should be limited to two years, combatant commands now consider the CETPP a multi-year document, with the number of “out-years” variously defined.

The Foreign Military Financing and International Military Education and Training Budget Formulation and Submission Web Tool

The final planning document is the Defense Security Cooperation Agency’s FMF and IMET Budget Formulation and Submission Web Tool. This document differs from the other three planning tools in that it applies only to countries which receive (or are proposed to receive) IMET and/or FMF as assistance. This excludes the so-called purely “cash customers” such as traditional North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies and miscellaneous other high income countries ranging from Australia and South Korea to Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates. The web tool has become the automated successor to the older Annual Integrated Assessment of Security Assistance (AIASA), in which embassies submitted their annual requests by cable narrative to the DoS. The web tool is managed by DSCA on a password-protected web site in which the access of the various DoD users is customized according to their position (SAO, combatant command, etc.). DSCA reminds SAOs that budget requests should be consistent with the objectives and priorities in the Secretary of Defense’s Security Cooperation Guidance.

Web tool submissions by SAOs work their way through the combatant commands, the Joint Staff and Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) level offices before being used by OSD and DSCA in discussions with DoS. Depending on the justification by Colonel Shawkinaugh, the importance of his host nation to U.S. foreign policy and national security, and numerous other factors, the original SAO submission may be endorsed, reduced, or (rarely) increased at the combatant command level.
or higher. The end result of this process is the annual Congressional Budget Justification (CBJ), submitted in January at the beginning of each session of Congress. The FMF and IMET budget process within DoD channels is outlined in the figure below.

Figure 4. The annual flow of SAO requests for country FMF and IMET is depicted here, as per DSCA’s FMF and IMET Budget Formulation and Submission Web Tool. SAOs made their submission for fiscal year 2009 in October and November of 2006.

The lengthy timelines associated with this process are symptomatic of what some would call the cumbersome nature of security assistance. For example, DSCA initiated the budget cycle input for fiscal year 2009 with a call-up message on September 29, 2006. That tasker required SAOs to submit their IMET and FMF requests and justification by 10 November to meet a DoS deadline of March 30, 2007. The administration uses the next ten months for interagency discussions, including with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), to finalize the budget request before submission to Congress the following January. Congress typically requires typically a full annual session or more before passing the resultant foreign operations appropriations bill. As often as not, this spending bill is part of an omnibus package after a series of continuing resolutions early in the following fiscal year. Effectively, then, the SAOs are being asked to make budget requests for fiscal year 2009 when Congress has not yet acted on even the fiscal year 2007 budget and the 2008 budget request has not yet even been submitted to Congress. By this author’s calculation, Colonel Shawkinaugh can now expect a turn-around time of 26 to 28 months between his submission on the Web Tool and eventual allocation of funds to Bandaria. By that time, Colonel Shawkinaugh has likely moved to his first or
even second follow-on assignment while his successor (possibly once removed) must live with the results. The DSCA chart below illustrates the complete budget cycle.

In fairness, the budget submission through the web tool is only slightly longer (perhaps ninety days) than that through the Mission Performance Plan. DSCA is cognizant of the difficulties that these timelines impose on the SAO. It provides as much guidance to SAOs as possible by including in the web tool the current recommended levels of funding within the administration for the interim years (in this case, fiscal year 2007 and fiscal year 2008). However, the lengthy budget process continues to impede the ability of SAOs and combatant commands to react swiftly to changing realities and emerging challenges in their regions. This is a primary reason why DoD has asked for (and received) from the Congress the authority to “build partner capacity,” as outlined in the fiscal year 2006 National Defense Authorization Act (section 1206).

Figure 5. The complete budget cycle for traditional security assistance funding and most other categories of foreign aid. The President’s annual Congressional Budget Justification (CBJ) is enacted by the Congress through the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act approximately one year later.

There is no formal DSCA requirement that SAO funding requests for FMF and IMET be identical in both the MPP and the web tool. However, the combatant commands realize the importance of coordinating both efforts and in general are now ensuring that SAO input into both processes is consistent. It should be mentioned that the annual FMF and IMET submission is actually a four-year plan. In this case, the fiscal year 2009 submission is actually for fiscal years 2009 through 2012. In part, this is designed to meet a Congressionally-mandated requirement for a national security assistance strategy.

The final fiscal year 2006 appropriation for FMF, after a one percent rescission, was $4,464,900,000. Of this amount, Congress earmarked certain amounts to specific countries. These earmarks, as in prior years, were almost entirely for the three Middle East peace partners, specifically, $2,280,000,000 for Israel, $1,300,000,000 for Egypt, and $210,000,000 for Jordan. There were also approximately $40 million in earmarks for nine other countries, of which $30 million was for the
Philippines. Even excluding the smaller earmarks, the FMF dedicated by Congress for the big three alone amounts to 84 percent of the total. This means that Colonel Shawkinaugh and the vast majority of his SAO chief counterparts are effectively competing for less than $700 million of the entire FMF pie.

A word about execution of FMF is appropriate here. For obvious reasons, the SAO should work closely with the host nation to promptly commit FMF monies through the FMS process. The ever-present factor of inflation alone should drive early commitment of funds, under the premise that the same articles and services will almost certainly cost more six months or a year from now. However, the increasing scrutiny of resources at all levels, from the combatant command to the State Department, is also a factor. If the Bandarians “sit” on their FMF for a year or so after its allocation, it will sooner or later make Colonel Shawkinaugh’s job harder to justify continued funding for the Bandarian country program.

To summarize the four processes just discussed, a notional SAO planning calendar is provided below. The timelines indicated are for calendar year 2006.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event Or Function</th>
<th>Jan</th>
<th>Feb</th>
<th>Mar</th>
<th>Apr</th>
<th>May</th>
<th>Jun</th>
<th>July</th>
<th>Aug</th>
<th>Sep</th>
<th>Oct</th>
<th>Nov</th>
<th>Dec</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mission Performance Plan</td>
<td>Assist COM &amp; Country Team with FY 08 MPP (due to State 1 Feb 06)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Theater Security Cooperation Strategy</td>
<td>Draft (2-star level) COCOM TSCS due to JS by 15 Apr</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Final TSCS published by 1 Aug</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMF &amp; IMET Budget Web Tool</td>
<td>Obtain access to special DSCA web site at <a href="https://63.97.161.12/">https://63.97.161.12/</a> thru DSCA desk officer; 2005 suspense for SAOs was 18 Nov 2005.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Inter-agency roundtable (COCOMs, DSCA, OSD, State) on FY 08 Request</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 6. Notional SAO Planning Calendar. Dates provided are for calendar year 2006.

The Assessment Environment

A decade or so ago, it was not unusual for FMF and/or IMET funding within individual country programs to “cruise” at the same level for a number of years with only casual scrutiny in Washington. For most countries, however, those days are long gone as both the executive branch and the Congress are more closely examining the “bang for the buck” in foreign operations appropriations. Congress has played a key role here through the Government Accountability and Results Act (GPRA) of 1993. This law requires most federal agencies, including the Department of State, to complete three plans, which can be summarized as follows:

1. A strategic plan of at least five years in duration. In response to this requirement, Department of State and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) produced their Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years 2004 through 2009, which was referenced above.
2. A performance plan on an annual basis, designed to reflect performance based on the budgetary resources for that year. Performance goals and indicators are to be expressed in an objective and quantifiable manner. The DoS’s current performance plan also produced with USAID was published in February 2006 and is titled Fiscal Year 2007 Joint Performance Summary. It is on-line at [http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/perfplan/2007/](http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/perfplan/2007/).

3. A performance report, also on an annual basis, which reviews the success of achieving the previous year’s performance goals, identifies any causes of failure in meeting those goals, and evaluates the current year’s performance plan in light of last year’s successes or failures. DoS satisfies this requirement with its Performance and Accountability Report (PAR), the most recent (2005) of which can be found at [http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/58402.pdf](http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/58402.pdf).

In its 2005 performance report, DoS rated itself “on target” for all twelve strategic goals, including regional stability and counterterrorism. However, when evaluating the 195 performance indicators supporting the strategic goals, only 78 percent of them were considered “on target” or above. Put differently, 43 performance indicators were rated “below target” or “significantly below target”. Additionally, the performance report summarized the results of surveys by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) using its Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART). OMB uses this tool to assess all federal programs against performance-related criteria. Of the 39 PART reviews conducted of DoS programs (as of the 2005 performance report), 22 were rated effective, five as moderately effective, and twelve as adequate. All four of the assessments directly involving security assistance were considered effective. An extract of these from the 2005 report is below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategic Goal</th>
<th>State Bureau</th>
<th>Program Name</th>
<th>Score and Rating as of October 2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regional Stability</td>
<td>African Affairs</td>
<td>Security Assistance</td>
<td>97% – Effective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Stability</td>
<td>South Asian Affairs</td>
<td>Security Assistance</td>
<td>93% – Effective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Stability</td>
<td>Western Hemisphere Affairs (WHA)</td>
<td>Security Assistance</td>
<td>90% – Effective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Stability</td>
<td>International Organization Affairs</td>
<td>Contributions to Peacekeeping Activities</td>
<td>86% – Effective</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In its 2007 performance plan, DoS identified seven initiatives and programs under its strategic goal of regional stability. Of these, two were directly related to security assistance. The first of these focused on the number of foreign military personnel receiving training under the IMET program and the second on U.S. military training for African units deployed in peacekeeping operations.

Separately, the geographic COCOMs have been submitting annual assessments to the OSD annually since 2004. As of 2006, that requirement is extended to the military departments, defense agencies, and the functional combatant commands. All such DoD entities have sixty days after the end of the fiscal year to submit a report to OSD. These assessments are designed to evaluate the effectiveness of their security cooperation functions and activities, help shape the future use of
resources for maximum effectiveness, and lastly identify constraints that can be fixed by changes in law and/or policy.

The point of this discussion is to emphasize that, whether at the global, regional, or country level, the degree of oversight of foreign operations programs is steadily increasing. The lesson for Colonel Shawkinaugh is that his plans for utilizing FMF, IMET, and other appropriations and resources must be well-justified, fully coordinated with the host nation, and fully supported by both the ambassador and the combatant commander.

From their first days in uniform, military personnel are taught the importance of teamwork. SAO personnel in particular, who work largely in small offices, understand this concept. But the transient nature of personnel serving in SAO billets, the lengthy timelines associated with budget processes, and the complex nature of equipping and training any military organization all combine to add a new dimension to teamwork for the SAO. The SAO team includes those U.S. personnel who have not yet been identified for the assignment, or perhaps not yet even promoted to the appropriate grade, and who will not arrive in Bandaria for another two, three, or five years. Only by carefully following the planning processes described here, and working closely with counterparts, will Colonel Shawkinaugh ensure the continued success of the SAO team.

About the Author

Mr. Gary Taphorn is an assistant professor at DISAM and a retired U.S. Army officer. He previously served in two security assistance offices and currently manages the Security Cooperation Officer Overseas (SCM-O) course.
An Introduction to Theater Strategy and Regional Security

By
Lieutenant Colonel Clarence J. Bouchat, USA
Director, Theater Operations Studies
U.S. Army War College

U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) found itself in a bubbling pot of crises from one end to the other. We had to develop a CENTCOM [theater] strategy to handle them without necessarily using military force—or else only as a last resort. We needed to help build stability in this troubled region, in my review, or we would pay the price in the long run.

General Anthony Zinni
Central Command Commander 1997-2000
Battle Ready written with Tom Clancy

Theater Strategy

Since the demise of the Soviet Union and its allies as an over arching world-wide opponent, regional security issues have risen as the greatest challenge for U.S. national security. Even the Global War on Terrorism is a chain of regional problems linked by an amorphous network based on an extremist philosophy and anti-Western sentiment. Since regional problems now dominate security issues, the primary contribution towards attaining U.S. national, defense, and military strategy by the Department of Defense (DoD) is at the theater level through the combatant commander’s theater strategy. Theater strategy coordinates both the use of force and the many other military activities supporting national strategy that do not involve force, since not all security problems can or should be resolved with kinetic solutions. Despite its importance to military and national strategy, however, there is little definitive or comprehensive information available on theater strategy. For that reason, this article acts as a framework to integrate the concept, processes, products, and activities associated with theater strategy. It introduces the implementation of national strategy at the theater and operational levels by explaining what theater strategy is, its basis, how it is formulated, and how it is executed with emphasis on theater security cooperation. With this background, a reader involved with the development, execution, or support of theater strategy will better understand its role in defense and national affairs through examples from a case study of the formulation of theater strategy and security cooperation in CENTCOM leading up to Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan.

Theater Strategy Overview

Joint Publications 3-0, Joint Operations, and 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, use this new, broader definition of theater strategy:

Concepts and courses of action directed toward securing the objectives of national and multinational policies and strategies through the synchronized and integrated employment of military forces and other instruments of national power. [JP 5-0, Signature Draft 24 August 2006, GL-26, JP 3-0 Sep 2006, GL-32]

Theater strategy directs military activities ranging from peacetime cooperation with other countries, to meeting potential threats through contingency planning (previously known as deliberate planning) and crisis action planning. Theater strategy organizes a theater’s forces and operational areas, and arranges the relationship among them to ensure unified action. Theater strategy also ensures adequate logistics and other support for theater activities, and synchronizes joint, multinational, and interagency operations and training [JFSC Pub 1 3-24]. All of this maintains military unity of effort within a geographic region to achieve strategic goals. Such unity of effort in theater strategy must be maintained even while some regions of the theater are at war or in conflict, and others remain at peace.
Thus theater strategy must be broad enough to encompass a wide variety of political-military activities at the same time. Campaigns, military operations, security cooperation, and use of the operational art each is a part of theater strategy throughout the continuum of military activities.

Theater strategy is an extension of national military strategy tailored to a geographic combatant commander’s area of responsibility (AOR). It is both similar and in complementary support to national strategy. A combatant commander’s theater strategy consists of the three elements found in any strategy: theater objectives and strategic end states (ends), which are achieved through the synchronization of integrated strategic concepts (ways), by using theater organization, activities, and plans employing joint, interagency, and multinational resources (means), and thereby accomplishes national and multinational objectives [JFSC-1 p. 3-25].

The geographic combatant commander is the focus for developing and executing theater strategy. Theater strategy should be coordinated with other regional elements of power, as is done with national strategy in the interagency process. The Department of State’s (DoS) Assistant Secretaries of State direct Regional Bureaus, but they have less authority and resources than a geographic combatant commander has, and the regional areas used by the Departments of State and Department of Defense (DoD) do not coincide (see Fig. 1). Diplomatically, national strategy is mainly applied at the country level through the U.S. ambassador and the country team. At the country team level DoD representatives such as the defense and military service attachés, and the combatant commander’s security assistance officers, work together with the representatives from the other federal government agencies in the embassy to attain national strategic goals as interpreted by the President’s personal representative, the ambassador. The country team military representatives must balance the ambassador’s guidance with that of their DoD commanders. At the country level this system works when both sides reference and use the common national strategic direction. On a regional level, however, there is no equivalent of the National Security Council (NSC) to coordinate efforts among the various U.S. federal agencies, much less internationally with like-minded states. This sometimes gives the geographic combatant commander a stronger comparative influence in the region when he directs a comprehensive theater strategy.

Figure 1. DoD Combatant Commanders Area of Responsibility and DoS Regional Bureau Areas

Note: State of Alaska assigned to USNORTHCOM area of responsibility. Forces based in Alaska remain assigned to USPACOM.
To compound the imbalance between the DoS and DoD further, the DoS simply lacks the depth of personnel and resources given to the DoD [Zinni 319]. The DoS, for instance, has fewer than a brigade’s worth of foreign service officers (FSO) (4-5000 people) in the field. Their resources for tangible engagement activities also do not match the opportunities that the DoD’s schools, visits, exercises, equipment, and other cooperation activities offer. Thus an imbalance has occurred where the DoS has the authority for international engagement, but the DoD has most of the resources to do so.

There are also no economic and information regions, equivalent to the DoD AORs and DoS regional bureaus, in which the other elements of national power are planned or coordinated, further weakening national strategic direction at the regional level. All of these challenges to the development and implementation of theater strategy emphasize the need to keep theater security in very close support of national strategy, and for government officers to work towards common goals.

**Sources of Theater Strategy**

The national strategic direction that a theater commander receives should initiate and guide the development of theater strategy. National strategic direction is the common thread that integrates and synchronizes the activities of the U.S. military with other government agencies, and is derived from national values, interests, and policy [JP 5-0 Sig, Aug 2006, II-1]. The President and Secretary of Defense translate policy into strategic and defense end states and objectives, which are reflected in the following:

- National Security Strategy (NSS)
- National Defense Strategy (NDS)
- Unified Command Plan (UCP)
- Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG)
- Strategic Planning Guidance (SPG)
- Joint Programming Guidance (JPG)
- Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)
- The “Forces For Unified Commands” memorandum and national policy and multinational policy statements
- Goals when the United States is operating as part of an alliance or coalition

The interplay between these guiding documents is shown in Figure 2 [JP 3-0 Sep 2006, I-2 to I-3].

To digest the direction given, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) uses the resources of the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS), the consultation means by which the CJCS develops strategy, plans, budgets, and assessments [JP 3-0 Sep 2006, GL-20]. Thus the JSPS provides strategic guidance and direction to the armed forces of the United States for theater security cooperation planning, joint operation planning, and force planning, illustrated in Figure 3. [JP 5-0, Sig, Aug 2006, II-4]. The CJCS refines this direction further for the combatant commanders in the form of the National Military Strategy (NMS), the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), Global Force Management, and other forms of guidance [JP 3-0 Sep 2006, I-2 to I-3]. Of all of these documents, the JSCP is usually the most focused in giving direct guidance for theater strategy for contingency planning.
**Figure 2.** Strategy: Foundation for all Major Processes.

**Figure 3.** Joint Strategic Planning (Joint Pub 5-0, Figure I-1).
The process and documents, cited above, work well for contingency planning. However, in the unanticipated circumstances and short time period that usually follows a crisis, less formal forms of national direction are given. When existing plans and guidance are applicable they should be used, although they are normally supplemented by additional direction as the circumstance’s intelligence and situation become better known. Memos and verbal guidance from the President, Secretary of Defense, or CJCS may initiate or change a plan or theater strategy, to be followed by more formal planning directives in the form of a Warning Order, Planning Order, or Alert Order [5-0 sig I-19 to I-20]. Other forms of timely and flexible direction during a crisis are the national policy statements, speeches, and other forms of strategic communication that inform the U.S. and international public. Strategic communications from the President and cabinet secretaries establish unity of themes and messages, and as such can be a major source of national security direction in a crisis situation when little documented guidance may be available [JP 5-0, Sig Aug 2006, II-2].

Joint strategic planning from the theater strategy level, be it contingency or crisis planning, should contribute to the President and Secretary of Defense’s formulation of political-military assessments, define political and military objectives, develop strategic concepts and options, allocate resources, and formulate policy [JP 5-0 sig Aug 2006, II-1]. Ultimately, national strategic direction guides theater strategy, but together the geographic combatant commands’ theater strategies also influence strategic direction. The Secretary of Defense melds these theater strategies to ensure that the relative importance of the combatant commands’ competing interests are prioritized and integrated, and that they adequately support strategic goals in a limited resource environment. This resulting global strategy is the bridge coordinating national and theater strategies [3-0 Sept 2006, I-7].


In his book, Bob Woodward chronicles the formation of strategic direction for the response that led to Operation Enduring Freedom. These passages show how national direction for theater strategy is formed in a crisis. This reading opens with the attack on the Pentagon. The author notes the lack of a contingency plan against Afghanistan, so the Secretary of Defense starts forming the first draft of strategic direction, by defining the problem. Three weeks later, in the second reading, the Secretary issues very clear strategic guidance to the Department of Defense to use for crisis action planning.

Theater Strategy Formulation

From the interlocking sources that form strategic direction, the combatant commander provides comprehensive guidance and direction to his subordinates and staff to formulate theater strategy. To effectively craft theater strategy, however, the commander and staff must understand in depth the context of the theater and its mission, which is typically achieved through developing a strategic (or theater) estimate [JFSC Pub 1, 3-26]. Once the theater’s environment and mission are analyzed and understood, the commander’s vision for theater security is formed. From the resulting theater objectives the theater concept is derived and codified into theater strategy and its implementing actions and plans.

A strategic estimate starts with a review of the complex and interconnected theater environment (Figure 4 on next page). This contextual review sets the parameters within which to frame the combatant commander’s theater actions and plans. This review must take into account the geographic, economic, and cultural characteristics of the region; the geopolitical context of regional influences, causes, and interests; and an understanding of the capabilities and vulnerabilities of each friendly, neutral, and adversarial state or relevant organization in the region. This review must also account for the United States’ own situation, including limitations in the form of constraints, restraints, and restrictions; planning assumptions [JFSC Pub 1 3-26 to 27] (which should be periodically reviewed
for validity); and deduce relative power and capabilities. A theater’s environment is best analyzed through a systems approach. This is an integrated, holistic perspective that improves understanding, and generates more options than just military actions through force.

- Assigned objectives from national authorities.
- Translation of national objectives to objectives applicable to the combatant command of theater.
- Visualization of the strategic environment and how it relates to the accomplishment of assigned objectives.
- Assessment of the threats to accomplishment of assigned objectives.
- Assessment of strategic alternatives available, with accompanying analysis, risks, and the requirements for plans.
- Considerations of available resources, linked to accomplishment of assigned objectives.

Figure 4. Strategic Estimate.

With a systems perspective, [commanders] gain the situational awareness to determine what effects (behaviors) need to be attained within the Operational Area to achieve their objectives . . . [and] to mitigate risk and act with greater precision [Commander HB viii]. One systems approach to analyzing a theater’s environment is through a regional strategic appraisal which is an assessment of a specific region in which U.S. regional interests are determined, policies to support these interests are identified, and strategies to support the policies are developed [Lemons, RSA, 3].

More focused and detailed is the net assessment of a country, a systems understanding of the operational environment in the form of a common, shared, relevant database and a network of people . . . used to understand key relationships, dependencies and vulnerabilities within and across political, military, economic, social, information, and economic systems . . . [to ascertain] leverage points such as key links and nodes . . . to influence adversary capabilities, perceptions and decision making [Lemons, NA, 2].

These system analyses do not replace but complement products such as the Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment. Sun Tzu’s dictum to “know the enemy and know yourself, and you can fight a hundred battles with no danger of defeat,” is reflected in a systemic theater environment analysis.

Along with the analysis of the review of the theaters environment, a thorough mission analysis of given national and multinational strategic direction is needed. This analysis derives objectives, desired effects, and key assumptions [JP 5-0 sig, Aug 2006 III-17]. The emerging effects based approach in joint operations is useful in deriving theater strategic objectives, effects, and assumptions because its systemic analysis examines all aspects of an opponent or friendly system, and coordinates the application of all instruments of national power. This process:

enhanc[es] the probability that objectives can be translated more accurately into actionable direction . . . [giving] a shared common understanding of the effects . . . before tasks are prescribed and assigned . . . [CHB Effects, viii].

With an improved understanding of the assigned mission through the effects based approach, the combatant commander identifies and prioritizes specified, implied, and essential tasks, which tailor and orient a higher command’s purpose to regional conditions [JP 5-0 sig, Aug 2006 III-18]. Determining the appropriate scope and content of the mission, and proposing changes to it through
restating it back to higher headquarters is an important aspect of this mission analysis. Once the theater’s situation and mission are thoroughly analyzed, the theater commander articulates his intent through strategic vision, which then guides theater objectives, theater strategic end states, and mission statements [JFSC Pub 1 2000 3-26].

Based upon the strategic estimate, the combatant commander develops strategic alternatives (broad statements of what is to be accomplished). The combatant commander then selects implementing actions that will support national or multinational policies and address the requirements identified in the theater. The selected implementing actions become the basis for the theater strategic concept, which sets the stage for planning and actions in broad flexible terms. Such plans and concepts include those for theater security cooperation, combat operations, and support throughout the range of military operations [JP 3-0 Sep 2006, I-10 to 11].

From the analyzed mission and regional environment, the combatant commander determines the possible means his command will employ to attain national goals. There may be diverse sets of options to address the tasks and problems faced by the combatant commander. These courses of action must be evaluated, compared to actions that other players in the region may take, and then the most appropriate one(s) selected to complete the strategic estimate [JFSC Pub 1, 2000, 3-28]. Using a systemic approach, any military actions must be integrally coordinated with a larger interagency effort of diplomatic, information and economic efforts [CHB Effects, I-1]. The combatant commander also organizes command relationships, and requests resources required to fulfill any requirements derived from this theater strategy development process. Theater strategy is the basis for initiating and coordinating international programs and activities, requesting support for the theater, and synergizing actions and activities with the other combatant commands. The resulting estimate is continuously updated based on a constantly changing environment in the theater, and to maintain consistency with national objectives and end states [JFSC Pub 1, 2000, 3-29].

Thus, theater strategy is derived from U.S. national strategy, and theater strategy determines operations and activities. Since the inauguration of the Security Cooperation Guidance in 2003, theater strategy and its implementation plans must be written in a prescribed format, and annual assessments provided to the Secretary of Defense [JP 5-0 Sig Aug 2006, I-3]. This should standardize the products of what has been an ad hoc system. However, since no two combatant commands follow the same process, the procedures for developing theater strategy remain different. Each combatant command has adapted its method to the peculiarities of its region, and the personalities of its commanders. The process described here is generic, but it is the basis for many of the processes found among the geographic combatant commands.


These are Gen Zinni’s reflections on the state of CENTCOM as he takes command in 1997. What he describes here is the formal and deliberate method of developing theater strategy, in contrast to the crisis method described in Vignette 1. He discusses the sources of national strategy which he must consider to determine his theater’s mission, summarizes the theater’s situation, states the strategic alternatives, and proposes ways of implementing his strategy, including operational and theater engagement plans. Note that Gen Zinni identifies a new charge to “shape” the region. Shaping is a significant addition to theater strategy and will be presented later in this article in the Theater Security Cooperation Implementation section.
Theater Strategy Implementation – Joint Operation Planning

Theater strategy implements many activities of a combatant command through its guidance, which ensures those activities are in direct support of the theater strategic objectives which in turn support national objectives and strategy. One of the most important missions for a geographic combatant commander is to deter hostile actions against U.S. and friendly-nation interests, and, if necessary, to counter such hostile actions through contingency operations. To be prepared for such contingencies, combatant commanders conduct joint operation planning, which translates national and theater strategy into operational concepts. Joint operation planning encompasses both contingency planning and crisis action planning (CAP), as coordinated at the operational level through campaign planning [JFSC Pub-1 4-10]. The process for both contingency and crisis action planning is similar, although their time lines and the validity of assumptions used are significantly different. The DoD is developing a modified method of campaign planning known as adaptive planning, which is meant to incorporate both contingency and crisis action planning into one. The elements introduced here, however, are still valid and will be incorporated into adaptive planning. The current joint operation planning method remains instructive for the basic process until adaptive planning is validated and approved.

Contingency planning is the means during peacetime by which contingencies are anticipated and deliberate plans developed. These plans are based upon the Secretary of Defense’s CPG and CJCS’s JSCP [JP 5-0 sig Aug 2006, I-16]. To ensure close adherence to national strategic goals and guidance, contingency plans undergo an in-progress review (IPR) by the Secretary of Defense at critical points in the development process, illustrated in Figure 5. The process also involves the entire Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC, see Fig. 6), an informal group consisting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and their staff, the military services and their major commands, the combatant commands and their subordinate commands, and the combat support agencies [JP 5-0 sig Aug 2006 x]. Contingency plans are fully coordinated by the JPEC, and often have forces and resources allocated to them before execution. Because of its thorough coordination, contingency planning normally takes longer to complete than crisis action planning. The assumptions upon which contingency plans are based are important to the process, but may not always be valid when faced with the actual crisis envisioned. For that reason nearly all contingency plans are modified through crisis action planning.
before execution. To keep them as relevant as possible, contingency plans are updated regularly [JP 5-0 sig Aug 2006, I-16 to I-17].

Crisis action planning occurs as the contingency it addresses unfolds. CAP is more immediate than contingency planning and the contingency plan assumptions are either verified as fact or disproved leading to the plan’s modification [JP 5-0 sig Aug 2006, III-22]. CAP often builds upon previously conducted contingency planning, but a crisis could occur for which no previous planning has taken place, [JP 5-0 sig Aug 2006, I-19 to I-20] as happened with Operation Enduring Freedom. In such situations operations orders are developed from scratch rather than modified from operations plans.

Theater strategy, as translated into theater plans through the joint operation planning process, is one major example of how to execute theater strategy.


These are Gen Zinni’s memoirs covering his time as the CENTCOM combatant commander from 1997 to 2000. Operation DESERT VIPER, recounted here, was one of the periodic “smack downs” of Iraq after Operation Desert Storm in response to hindering the work of U.N. weapons’ inspectors. This reading highlights the process of getting an operational plan approved by the President in a crisis, and the balance of authority between the Service chiefs and combatant commanders.

**Theater Strategy Implementation – Products and Activities**

To implement a theater’s strategy, and thereby national security strategy, a variety of activities and products are involved. Through the contingency planning process just described, combatant commanders’ staffs produce the estimates, base plans, concept plans and operational plans (also
called level 1, 2, 3, and 4 plans), and crisis action planning that collaboratively coordinate efforts, and identify forces, functional support, and resources to deter and defend against aggression, or participate in assistance to civil authorities [JP 5-0 sig, Aug 2006, I-17 to I-18]. Another major means of implementing theater strategy is through theater security cooperation. The theater security cooperation plan that results from this process is part of the joint operation plans family, and will be covered in more detail in a following section. Theater organization and theater logistics cover other crucial aspects of implementing theater strategy, by arranging how to attain unity of effort among the U.S. Services, government agencies, and other countries’ forces. This is accomplished through organizing the commands in a theater, and sustaining theater strategy and its activities and plans through logistics and movement.

Although the above activities are the major products and efforts needed to support theater strategy and national objectives, there are other activities that are also elements of implementing a theater strategy. Since the combatant commander is responsible for developing joint operation plans for his theater, he is also responsible for ensuring that the force capabilities needed to execute those plans are available to him through apportionment in Global Force Management or the “Forces For Memorandum.” At the theater strategic level, force planning encompasses all of those activities performed by the supported combatant commander and the subordinate component commands to select forces and capabilities to accomplish an assigned mission, or request capability found wanting [JP 5-0 sig Aug 2006 I-4]. However, having forces assigned, attached, or apportioned for an operation plan (OPLAN) is of little use if those forces are not ready for their mission. For that reason another means by which the combatant commander helps to implement theater strategy is through the training of joint forces. Although the individual services and special operations command are responsible for the combat training of associated forces, the combatant commander is responsible for ensuring that those forces can operate together in the manner envisioned by his command’s plans and strategy [JP 5-0 sig Aug 2006 I-16]. Multinational training accomplishes the same purpose between U.S. forces and friendly international forces in the region. One way to ensure that assigned, attached, and apportioned forces can operate together is to conduct joint or multinational exercises to ensure forces are capable of fulfilling the objectives espoused in the theater strategy [JP 5-0 sig Aug 2006, II-5]. These three means of implementing theater strategy, attaining adequate military force capability for the mission, ensuring those joint and multinational forces are properly trained, and providing adequate joint and multinational exercises to gauge the forces’ capability, are all important activities of a combatant staff that support theater and national strategy objectives.

Another means of implementing theater strategy is through a Combatant Commander’s Initiative Fund. The expenses for running the various geographic combatant command headquarters are paid through the service budgets and leave little flexibility on how the money is spent. Some combatant commanders have chaffed at this funding arrangement believing that service chiefs had little interest or understanding of the engagement programs [Zinni 323]. The Combatant Commander’s Initiative Fund, although relatively small, is spent at the discretion of the combatant commander in order to further the needs of his command, and often supports theater strategy. This can be used as seed money to start programs to be funded formally later, or to directly support unanticipated situations through theater security cooperation [USC Title 10, a, I, 6, 166a]. Such funds may provide significant regional leverage to a theater strategy if judiciously applied.

As an end product of theater strategy, combatant commanders feed back to national authorities their inputs to better develop and refine national strategy and priorities. The Integrated Priority Lists (IPL), for instance, are high priority requirements that fill capability shortfalls a combatant commander’s component forces face when trying to accomplish their assigned missions. This feedback gives combatant commanders a formal voice in force planning, national level apportionment of resources, and development of strategic concepts in the Programming, Planning and Budgeting System (PPBS,
see Fig. 2) [JP 1-02, IPL]. Another feedback mechanism is the Joint Quarterly Readiness Review (JQRR, formerly the Joint Military Readiness Review (JMRR)) in which the services and combatant commanders respond to a stated future crisis scenario with limiting factors (LIMFACS) and deficiencies that may reduce mission accomplishment in their command. JQRR feedback covers many aspects of theater:

- Strategy, mobility, and sustainment
- Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
- Joint headquarters command and control
- Joint personnel and training that may be beyond the control of the combatant commanders

Such feedback influences national political-military assessments, and the formulation of strategic policy and planning guidance [JFSC Pub 1 2-21, Macken]. The end result should focus the senior national leadership on pressing immediate readiness issues in order to determine where to place additional emphasis and resources, and thereby better support the theater strategy through improved funding, assigned forces, and combat systems.


These are Gen Zinni’s memoirs from the time he was Commander of CENTCOM, implementing his theater strategy and the challenge of gaining support for his strategy from national authorities. Gen Zinni raises a point about the control of funding for the combatant commanders, and the built-in tension between the services and combatant commands.

**Theater Security Cooperation Overview**

Theater security cooperation (TSC) is part of the combatant commander’s theater strategy of linking military activities involving other countries to U.S. national strategic objectives. The characteristics of TSC are inherently joint, interagency, and multinational. Whereas much of the rest of theater strategy is military in nature, theater security cooperation includes more of a diplomatic, information, and economic flavor [JP 3-0, Sep 2006, xxvi]. As part of a greater interagency effort in national security, TSC is a complementary activity with other agencies such as the DoS with its oversight of security assistance programs, or the Department of Justice which has the lead in fighting drug and human trafficking.

The TSC seeks to shape and maintain the international environment within which the U.S. military must act during both peacetime and contingencies. The TSC consists of both the overall theater environment in which it is executed, and the programs that execute it. The purpose of TSC is to reinforce each geographic combatant commander’s mission to deter aggression by strengthening ties and interoperability with friendly military forces, supporting regional stability and U.S. values, and showing U.S. resolve in supporting allies [JP 3-0 Sep 2006 I-6, I-12]. Each command’s TSC is customized to the specific geographic, economic, political, demographic, and military situations found in a region. By design, TSC stresses activities that directly support theater operational plans and objectives. This is unlike the previous philosophy of theater engagement which relied upon varied military activities to only generate bilateral good will; TSC is a continuous process that is pertinent through all phases of joint operation planning. Its multiplying effect is most felt during Phase 0, Shape, and Phase 1, Deter, operations because each can successfully isolate adversaries and buttresses allies on its own reducing the need to resort to combat operations [JP 3-0 sep 2006, V-3 to V-4].
Each region’s theater security cooperation direction is derived from specific national strategic engagement known as security cooperation. Security cooperation consists of a focused program of bilateral and multilateral defense activities conducted with other countries to serve U.S. security interests, and, as a result, build the right defense partnerships for the future [JP 5-0 Sep 2006, I-3]. Although foreign policy is the purview of the DoS, the DoD is also actively engaged in foreign policy through security cooperation. At the strategic level, Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, states:

Security cooperation consists of a focused program of bilateral and multilateral defense activities conducted with foreign countries to serve U.S. mutual security interests and build defense partnerships. Security cooperation efforts should also be aligned to support strategic communication themes, messages, and actions. The [Secretary of Defense] identifies security cooperation goals, assesses the effectiveness of security cooperation activities and revises goals when required to ensure continued support for U.S. interests abroad. Although they can shift over time, examples of typical security cooperation goals include: creating favorable military geographical balances of power, advancing mutual defense or security arrangements; building allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and preventing conflict and crisis. [24 Aug 2006, pg I-3]

A geographic combatant commander focuses security cooperation at the theater level by deriving his theater security cooperation guidance from sources such as the President’s UCP and the CICS’s JSCP [JP 5-0 sig Aug 2006, II-5]. However, the Secretary of Defense’s CPG Annex A, and Security Cooperation Guidance (SCG) (see Fig. 7) articulate more specific direction for the combatant commanders, Joint Staff, each of the Services, and the defense agencies [JP 3-0 Sep 2006, I-3, I-9]. The overall combatant commander’s theater security cooperation program is the interpretation of this national security direction, and built from the foundation of a regional strategic appraisal. Theater security cooperation is executed through the theater security cooperation plan (TSCP), which proposes and prioritizes military activities with other countries [JP 3-0 Sep 2006, I-6]. The TSCP activities must demonstrably support the theater’s strategy and defense relationships to promote specified U.S. security interests identified in Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, as:

- Military contacts, including senior official visits, port visits, counterpart visits, conferences, staff talks, and personnel and unit exchange programs.
- National assistance, including foreign internal defense, security assistance programs, and planned humanitarian and civic assistance activities.
- Multinational training.
- Multinational exercises, including those in support of the Partnership for Peace Program.
- Multinational education for U.S. personnel and personnel from other nations, both overseas and in the United States.
- Arms control and treaty monitoring activities. [24 Aug 2006, pg I-3]

The subordinate service components of each combatant command (for instance, Pacific Air Forces in Pacific Command) play an important role in TSC, especially when directly dealing with the counterpart Service components of target nations.
These are Gen Zinni’s musings over the importance of engagement (the term then used for what we now call theater security cooperation) to war fighting. He is outspoken for engaging in “not strictly military activities” that still impacted the theater, such as environmental security. He again illuminates the importance of interagency operations, especially in supporting “not strictly military” concerns.

**Theater Security Cooperation Planning**

A TSCP is a deliberately developed plan covering non-combat military activities with other nations within a region. A TSCP implements the combatant commander’s theater security cooperation program, and thus is a way to shape the security environment to protect and promote U.S. interests and regional objectives [JP 3-0 Sep 2006, I-6]. A TSCP is a joint strategic plan, part of the joint operation planning family presented earlier. Joint Publication 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*, describes the TSCP planning process:

In response to direction in the *DoD Security Cooperation Guidance (SCG)*, [combatant commanders], Service Chiefs, and combat support agencies directors prepare security cooperation strategies in accordance with SCG objectives for CJCS review and Secretary of Defense approval, with the geographic combatant commanders as the supported entities. These strategies serve as the basis for security cooperation planning. Collaboration among the combatant commands, Services, and combat support agencies is essential. Equally important is the close coordination with U.S. agencies that represent other instruments of national power, and particularly with the U.S. Chiefs of Mission (Ambassadors) in the CCDRs’ AORs. [JP 5-0 sig 24 Aug 06 I-3]

A TSCP is composed of a theater situation overview, the combatant commander’s mission, how the plan will be executed, an assessment of the program to date, and the current plan’s implementation [CJCSM 3113.01A 31 May 2000, C1 to C-8]. The Situation section is derived from an area’s regional strategic appraisal and analyzes the environment in which the TSCP will be implemented. The Mission states the theater’s prioritized regional objectives (see Fig. 8) as derived from national strategic direction. The combatant commander gives guidance on the threats to security and stability in the theater, opportunities, assumptions, and a planning schedule to develop a TSCP [CJCSM 3113.01A 31 May 2000, A-10 to A-11].
The DISAM Journal, February 2007

Figure 8. Samples of EUCOM Theater Security Cooperation Objectives

- Encourage NATO, European Union, and European nations to encourage beyond Europe
- Promote combined approaches in the war on terrorism
- Ensure access to and use of supporting facilities and infrastructure
- Revitalize the partnership for peace
- Revitalize Mediterranean dialogue
- Promote human immunodeficiency virus and acquired immunodeficiency syndrome awareness and prevention
- Improve abilities of sub-regional organizations and key partners to conduct stability operations and fight terrorism

The execution section of the plan consists of the commander’s vision, objectives, prioritized effects (all three defining a theater strategic end state), and concept sections. The centerpiece is the combatant commander’s concept which outlines security cooperation activities, resources, and interagency coordination needed to realize the stated vision and objectives [CJCSM 3113.01A 31 May 2000, C-3 to C-4]. The security cooperation activities comprise the typical ways through which theater security cooperation is executed, while the resources and interagency coordination sections represent the means. Assessment of past theater security cooperation is needed to improve the current plan, and those lessons should be applied through the TSCP’s Implementation Guidance. The annexes provide detailed information on the theater security activities and interagency coordination required by the plan [CJCSM 3113.01A 31 May 2000, C-6 to C-8].

The crucial part of a TSCP is the concept section’s security cooperation activities to engage other countries and directly support the combatant commander’s strategy, and the complementary annexes. For ease of organization, CICS Manual 3113.01A, Theater Engagement Planning, lists eight separate categories for consideration when developing security cooperation activities [CJCSM 3113.01A 31 May 2000, C-4 to C-6]. The underpinning of each of these activity categories remains solid, but in the years since CJCSM 3113.01A was written much has changed in the perspective of joint doctrine. For that reason, a modified listing of seven theater security cooperation activity categories based upon new Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, guidance would be best represented as:

- Multinational exercises
- Multinational training
- Multinational education
- Security assistance
- Humanitarian and civic assistance
- Military-to-military contacts
- Other engagement activities

These activities should support specific theater objectives, so not every category will be given equal importance or weight depending upon what needs to be accomplished. The SCG enumerates other engagement activities to include:

- Bilateral information operations
- Intelligence sharing
• Arms control and monitoring
• Defense experimentation and industrial cooperation

Once developed, each TSCP is reviewed by the theater’s service components to develop their own supporting plans. A TSCP covers a seven-year period [CJCSM 3113.01A 31 May 2000, A-4]. Upon completion, the TSCP is forwarded to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff for review and inclusion in a global family of security cooperation plans. This review should ensure the TSCP attains national objectives, and that together each of the regional TSCPs is sustainable at a global level [CJCSM 3113.01A 31 May 2000, A-4 to A-5]. These theater plans are also coordinated with similar plans that each of the services produce, and are supported by defense agencies such as the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Defense Logistics Agency, the military services and unified commands such as U.S. Transportation Command or U.S. Special Operations Command [CJCSM 3113.01A 31 May 2000, A-8].

Although CJCSM 3113.01A, Theater Engagement Planning, calls for a national level review of the military’s theater security cooperation programs there is no process in place to prioritize efforts within the government, and the process within the Department of Defense has not prioritized well among its commands, agencies, and Services either. This situation has led one war college scholar to observe, “because there is no national level prioritization, each particular component is left to determine which requirement to support.” [Hagar, 1-28] Direction from the Secretary of Defense in his Security Cooperation Guidance attempts to remedy this situation, as part of his transformation efforts in security cooperation.


This reading from Gen Zinni’s memoirs as the CENTCOM commander is an example of engaging Yemen to keep it from becoming a failed state. He offers several ways through security assistance and intelligence sharing to make a difference. Notice how theater security cooperation works to benefit both parties, and how he leverages several types of activities to achieve his purpose.

**Theater Security Cooperation Execution**

As JP 3-0, Joint Operations, notes, “security cooperation is a key element of global and theater shaping operations . . .” [JP 3-0, Sep 2006, I-13] and more of a combatant command staff’s time is spent on these security cooperation activities than any other aspect of theater strategy. In a resource constrained environment, as all government operations are, the trick to executing TSC is matching the TSC requirements, which the combatant commander determines is needed to succeed in his mission, with finite resources allocated to each commander in competition with other priorities. Prioritization of goals and resources is a necessity in TSC. For each of the theater security cooperation activities Figure 9, the combatant commander must plan for the forces and command organization needed to control these endeavors, and the movement and sustainment aspects that support them. All of these various actions to implement theater security cooperation activities are ultimately meant to prepare the command to meet its assigned missions, to balance the risk, and manage the consequences inherent in trying to attain the objectives of its strategy in a fiscal and resource-constrained environment.
Although the commanders and staffs of the combatant commands, military services, and defense support agencies each play an important role in planning and executing theater security cooperation, the security assistance offices (SAOs) which are part of the country team of most American embassies, are the pint men. The SAOs are military members, DoD civilians, and host nation employees that closely work with the host government to ensure that their security requirements and the combatant commander’s security cooperation plan for that country mesh. The SAO members also ensure that their efforts in supporting the military elements of power with the host nation are also synchronized with the broader diplomatic, economic, and information activities established by the American ambassador referencing the National Security Strategy and DoS’ Strategic Plan. The SAO usually administers international military education and training and other training and education programs by matching host country needs to available U.S. positions, and coordinating the U.S. funding allotted to some countries. SAOs also arrange for sales or donations of military goods, services, and training to the host country through foreign military sales, which are sales directly from the U.S. government; direct commercial sales, which are sales brokered by the U.S. government but are from a U.S. company; or one of several other special programs that transfer goods to developing countries. SAOs in coordination with the Defense Attaché’s Office, which is also part of the country team, may also be responsible for coordinating bilateral exercises, U.S. participation in trade and air shows, oversee exchange programs and military to military exchanges, or be responsible for a host of many other security cooperation activities. The overlap of duties between these two military agencies requires
close cooperation between the two. SAOs are the combatant commander’s direct representatives to their host country, and responsible for the success of the command’s theater strategy and theater security cooperation in their affected area.

The planning and execution of these security cooperation activities by the SAO and other involved DoD organizations, directly support combatant commanders when preparing for future military operations, especially engaging friendly and neutral countries, and deterring hostilities with potential opponents. The U.S. military employs a full spectrum of actions to protect national interests ranging from mutual peace-time cooperation to full combat against aggressors. Shaping may be the most important of these OPLAN phases because, if successfully conducted, shaping activities can by themselves reduce the frequency of crises, and thereby avert the need to resort to combat operations. Shaping actions also promote U.S. and coalition partners’ mutual interests, increase understanding of the region, and strengthen future multinational military bonds and operations. This shaping is accomplished through security activities that organize and train forces, maintain operational area access, rehearsal operational plans through exercises, employ space assets, and anticipate stability operations that may occur in later phases [JP 3-0 Sep 2006, V-3 to V-4]. As the dark blue area in Figure 10 shows, shaping activities remains to be the foundation upon which the other phases of military operations are developed.

The considerations behind the phases of major operations that combatant commanders make when engaging friendly and neutral countries, and deterring hostilities with potential opponents are a major component of theater strategy, and are directly supported by theater security cooperation activities. The U.S. military employs a full spectrum of actions to protect national interests ranging from mutual peace-time cooperation to full combat against aggressors. Shaping may be the most important of these OPLAN phases because, if successfully conducted, shaping activities can by themselves reduce the frequency of crises, and thereby avert the need to resort to combat operations. Shaping actions also promote U.S. and coalition partners’ mutual interests, increase understanding of the region, and strengthen future multinational military bonds and operations. This shaping is accomplished through security activities that organize and train forces, maintain operational area

Figure 10. Generic OPLAN Phasing versus Level of Military Effort. (Joint Staff J7) (Vego, 5)
access, rehearse operational plans through exercises, employ space assets, and anticipate stability operations that may occur in later phases [JP 3-0 Sep 2006, V-3 to V-4]. As the dark blue area in Figure 10 shows, shaping activities remain the foundation upon which the other phases of military operations are developed.

Deter phase operations are closely linked to the shaping activities, although in the former the role of theater security cooperation diminishes. Deter operations are overt conventional deterrence or increased readiness to avert the need for the violent use of military force. The Deter phase prepares the U.S. military to conduct potential high-tempo operations intending to preempt further adverse actions by an opponent. With the contingency better defined in this phase, deterrence operations prepare joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment and understanding of the operational area’s physical environment; prepare the operational area through use of special operations, stability operations, civil affairs activities, and logistics sustainment; continue the employment of space capabilities; enable force protection; and use flexible deterrent options in order to isolate an opponent and stymie hostile intentions before resorting to combat [JP 3-0 Sep 2006, V-4 to V-8]. While shaping activities and deterrence operations directly benefit the most from theater security cooperation, theater security cooperation spans all six phases of military operations and is a valuable augmentation to each. Theater security cooperation is a continuing activity for each combatant command, military Service, and defense agency during all levels of peace, contingencies, and war.


These are Gen Zinni’s memoirs covering his time as the EUCOM deputy J-3 from 1990 to 1992. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, but before the end of the Soviet Union, the EUCOM commander, General Galvin, sent a contingent of officers to Moscow as part of his command’s engagement activities. Then Brig Gen Zinni discusses the importance and intent of military-to-military contacts for a combatant commander.

Summary

This overview of theater strategy and theater security cooperation is a primer on one of the most important tools the U.S. military uses to engage other countries, deter unwanted actions, and defend U.S. and friendly nation interests. To be effective, theater strategy and theater security cooperation must be derived from and consistently linked to national and multinational strategic guidance and policy, and formulated to meet the requirements found in each of the world’s regions. To attain the security goals of a combatant commander’s strategy, the proper support for joint operation plans through organizational structure, force projection, sustainment, readiness training, and force development input is essential. A crucial means to attain a combatant commander’s objectives is through the proper derivation and development of theater security cooperation. Theater security cooperation directly supports national goals at the regional level, and enhances military operations by obviating the need for military action, or by preparing the environment better for U.S. military intervention should it be necessary. Theater strategy is an important part of realizing national strategy around the world, and theater security cooperation is not only one of the most powerful tools in attaining the goals of theater strategy but, through its ability to obviate the need for violent military action, a cost effective tool as well. The Operation Enduring Freedom case study shows how each of part of theater strategy and theater security cooperation is manifest in an unexpected military operation and the actions that led up to it in the years before.

Theater Strategy: Operation Enduring Freedom Case Study

Operation Enduring Freedom Overview

Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan was not the campaign for which the U.S. military had prepared in the years following Operation Desert Storm. For a variety of reasons OEF
was a combination of high technology weapons and sophisticated command and control with tactics and equipment U.S. forces had not seriously employed in nearly a century. By necessity its operations and support were both joint and combined in ways the armed forces had not considered before. Yet, by relying on international connections established in the years leading to this unexpected operation, modifying established processes, and the creativity and ingenuity of professional and well-led forces, U.S. forces were able to complete their assigned combat missions. Doing so was difficult, however, and presented many challenges.

The OEF was a short-notice, come as you are operation. It was fought in a region in which the U.S. military had completed little contingency planning, conducted with minimal crisis action preparation, and the active combat part was of relatively short duration and used limited U.S. forces. It was an operational success, replacing the pariah government of the Taliban with one more representative of the people of Afghanistan and willing to adhere to the conventions of civilized nations. Terrorist organizations, most notably al Qaeda, lost an important sanctuary for their activities, and were weakened. However, this operation also became the basis for significant changes to military and interagency processes and operations that were to follow, due to the problems encountered during its execution. Some of these problems, especially the interdependence of operations, and strategy and security cooperation at the national and theater levels, are the focus of this case study.

This case study covers the theater security cooperation endeavors in CENTCOM from 1996 to 2001, and the national and theater strategy that developed for OEF before and during combat operations. It reviews and applies the theater strategy concepts described in this article, and contrasts the doctrinal process of developing theater strategy with the reactive crisis action methods that were adapted from the established processes for OEF. The next section focuses on the national direction given to the combatant commander waging OEF and the operations that resulted. With this better understanding of operations and direction given during the operation, the final part of this case study presents the theater security cooperation that preceded the operation, and how it affected combat operations. The first reading, below, is an early analysis of OEF to familiarize the reader with that operation.


This study is an early analysis of Operation Enduring Freedom highlighting the difficulty of executing national and theater level strategy in an unexpected situation, and using joint forces to combat terrorism. Read this to ascertain national strategic direction and missions given to the combatant commander, and then for an understanding of how operations evolved. As an early review of an operation, this study is subject to further revision. Reproduced with permission of the Army Heritage Foundation, Carlisle, Pennsylvania.

Theater Strategy and Crisis Planning in Operation Enduring Freedom

This section presents the development of combat operations in Enduring Freedom, which did not follow the contingency planning process as presented in this article. The attacks on the U.S. homeland surprised many by the quarter from which they came. As a result, there was little direct guidance or preparation for military operations against Afghanistan before September 2001, although diplomatic, information, and economic elements of power were already engaged in isolating the Taliban regime and pressuring al Qaeda. Plans existed in CENTCOM for strikes against Afghani targets, as had been done by the previous administration, but there were no plans for ground operations or regime change, hence this was a crisis action planning process. Nonetheless, national and theater guidance were quickly developed into strategies that guided operations. This part of the case study contrasts the contingency planning process of developing national and theater strategies with the ad hoc process
that followed the September 11, 2001 attacks, to show that the deliberate process can be adapted when needed, and that it is often a messier process than military manuals show. Indeed, to make matters worse, as national strategic direction developed and evolved during OEF, the operation’s goals and objectives rapidly changed to keep pace.

Below, read the presidential administration’s national security policy directive that was too late in influencing policy with regard to the Taliban, and the examples of national security direction that were given on the fly. The evolving national security direction and demand for immediate action made developing a coherent theater strategy to counter terrorism, particularly al Qaeda and the governments that harbored them, difficult to develop.


The Federation of American Scientists (FAS) is a watchdog group that acts as a convenient clearinghouse for government documents. From open source reporting, FAS has assembled the content of the otherwise classified NSPD 9, which was the first policy directive of the new Bush administration to address terrorism and al Qaeda. Ironically it was set to be signed on 10 September 2001. This was one of the few national security direction documents issued during Operation Enduring Freedom, and it was released 18 days after combat operations started.


In this passage, Bob Woodward chronicles the formation of national strategic direction for the crisis action response that led to OEF. The President’s speech on the evening of September 11, 2001 establishes the Bush Doctrine, declaring that America would pursue those who planned and executed terrorist acts, and those who harbored them. Security policy and national strategic direction are sometimes promulgated in this way through dramatic public speeches, especially in a crisis. In the end, national strategy is always the President’s to make; in this case the President did not consult with the Vice President, Secretary of State, or Secretary of Defense.


On 17 September 2001, Bob Woodward recounts a National Security Council meeting in which the President gives clear direction based on discussions held earlier on September 16, 2001 (pages 78 to 81). He chooses the level of the military response against Afghanistan, how wide to make the war on terrorism, and issues diplomatic initiatives, as part of national security direction. In the second reading, memos are signed which formally issue strategic direction for nearly all aspects of diplomatic, information, military, and economic responses.


This snapshot by Bob Woodward chronicles the continuing formation of national strategic direction for OEF. Objectives for the campaign are examined in detail by the cabinet principals. Note the issues that arise with relying on indigenous opposition forces, the discussion on interagency cooperation, support from other countries, and prioritization. The principal cabinet members involved may be trying to direct events outside of the control of the United States, and are doing so on October 11, 2001, five days after the start.
of hostilities. Jawbreaker is the code name of the first Central Intelligence Agency team operating inside Afghanistan.


In his autobiography, the Commander of CENTCOM recounts how his command built the guidance and plan that directed OEF. He had to design the military response with minimal guidance from command authorities because they were developing national direction during this time too, as the readings above indicated. The CENTCOM staff used their best judgment of what their bosses would want, and started to build a theater strategy to meet the new situation. This passage outlines the three options that eventually evolved into OEF.

**Theater Security Cooperation and Operation Enduring Freedom**

As a short notice crisis, OEF was essentially fought with the environment, forces, and processes that were in place on September 10, 2001. The national and theater security cooperation pursued with countries of the CENTCOM region prior to hostilities set the stage for what was possible, or not possible, during the operation. Although additional diplomatic, information, military, and economic actions were accomplished in the harried, confused days that followed the September 11, 2001 attacks, operations were conducted based on the international political environment that CENTCOM and the DoS carefully constructed in the years prior. Since few people seriously planned for a regime change in Afghanistan before September 11, 2001, these security cooperation efforts were focused on achieving outcomes for different purposes and in different places. The personal contacts, established trust and procedures among governments, familiarity with bases and forces, and exercised interoperability, however, gave CENTCOM operational flexibility to pursue OEF. In particular, CENTCOM benefited from international assistance which provided over flight permission, basing, intelligence, forces, or many other forms of support and aid from Kuwait to Kyrgyzstan and beyond.

The readings below offer examples of theater security cooperation efforts that preceded September 11, 2001, and set the stage for OEF. These are the shaping activities that theater security cooperation supports, so you will read examples of security cooperation continuing around the region, as another means of influencing the outcome of the conflict. These documents show what was done to engage the political and military interests in this region, and how such relations were used to support OEF. Note also the weaknesses of the security cooperation efforts that left operational gaps to fill, and threatened the success of OEF. The readings below are presented in the approximate chronological sequence under three successive CENTCOM commanders, General Peay, General Zinni, and General Franks.


This is an overview of theater strategy and engagement used by the Commander, CENTCOM from 1996 to 1997. Since theater strategy and theater security cooperation are long-range activities, the actions taken or not taken during this time would have reached fruition during OEF. Read this document to see how CENTCOM approached engagement with key supporters of the future OEF effort, to include Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Bahrain. Although in its AOR, crucial governments affected by OEF, Iran and Afghanistan, did not have diplomatic ties with the U.S., and therefore were not directly influenced by theater strategy; however, that strategy may have been formed with those countries in mind. Other key players such as Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan were not assigned by the Unified Command Plan to CENTCOM’s AOR until 1999.
Although marked For Official Use Only, this document’s proponent has determined that the protective marking no longer applies.


In this set of readings from Gen Zinni’s memoirs, he is commander of CENTCOM. He writes about a time where the relationships he gained through the military-to-military relationships of theater security cooperation opened doors during a crisis in May 1998, which were otherwise unavailable. His insight on Pakistan’s views toward cooperating with the U.S. before the tragedies in September 11, 2001, is important, and shed some understanding on Pakistan’s involvement in OEF.


In this reading from Gen Zinni’s memoirs, he discusses his first visit to central Asia as the commander of CENTCOM in September 1998. He analyzes the state of affairs between these countries and the U.S. before September 2001, and the problems they faced. He accesses the effectiveness of his theater security cooperation plan, and the growing threat of al Qaeda in the region.


The Commander, CENTCOM gave this summary of the state of his command and region six months before the commencement of OEF. He starts by citing activities that are part of his theater engagement plan (now known as theater security cooperation plan). General Franks presents threats in the region, which are many, but only specifically mentions Afghanistan or central Asia twice, once obliquely through terrorism and once with smuggling. If central Asia was not a concern to Congress or CENTCOM, it then follows that the theater strategy would not address this region sufficiently either.


At the September 29, 2001 National Security Council meeting, Bob Woodward’s account stresses national security cooperation efforts. Multinational support is beginning, but Uzbekistan remains an unknown. A key question from this meeting is “we need to identify what the Pentagon wants from countries . . .” By October 4, 2001, in the second reading, Uzbekistan was supporting U.S. military requirements. Security cooperation seems to have achieved its desired effect.


This article gives a brief overview of the types of security cooperation that the United States conducted in Central Asia by country between 1996 and 2001 and the operational impact they had
for Operation Enduring Freedom. The article advocates for increased use of security cooperation because it is a cost effective military operations enabler.

**Case Study Points to Consider**

- In order to examine the effectiveness of theater security cooperation in supporting combat operations during OEF, we must first note the theater strategy, missions, and objectives that guided its efforts. Identify the national strategic guidance given to the CENTCOM commander in the wake of the September 2001 attacks, and the formal national strategic direction given in documents that preceded the attack but might still be applicable to the situation. Comment on how effective the guidance was towards reaching its goals.

- After identifying the national strategic guidance given, identify the mission and goals that General Franks issued to his command to guide the OEF effort, and show the links between national and theater guidance, if any.

- Since there was little time to reflect on the situation and action was demanded quickly, was the right national strategic and theater guidance given, did it sufficiently cover what needed to be covered, and did it outline what was needed to implement it? As an operational commander, was there something else you would have wished was given? Was the guidance given sufficient to reach the goals that were set?

- Many restraints and constraints were placed on military operations, because of the environment in which OEF was fought. That environment was shaped in large part by the theater security cooperation policies and activities that CENTCOM engaged in before and during OEF. Identify the theater security activities that occurred or were proposed between 1996 and 2001, and critique their influence on successes and problems in OEF. Were these TSCP activities able to support combat operations in a way and place not considered when they were proposed? Discuss this in terms of the theater security cooperation categories (Multinational exercises, multinational training, multinational education, security assistance, humanitarian and civic assistance, military-to-military contacts, or other engagement activities) as conducted with countries in the region and surrounding regions.

- TSCPs are meant to shape the AOR for potential future operations, and the OEF case study scenario here is different only in that the OEF events have already occurred, so we know the “future” with certainty. Knowing now what problems will need to be resolved for the “future,” but remaining based on the general situation and guidance in 1996, what theater security cooperation activities should be developed to better prepare for anticipated combat operations in central Asia?

- As with any government endeavor, a TSCP is restrained by limited funds, resources, and time. Therefore, the activities of a good TSCP are written with an eye to salesmanship, meaning selling the Secretary of Defense, the President, and the Congress on how well the activities support national goals and objectives to attain funding. The prioritization, integration, and synergy among the activities of a TSCP, and with the activities of the TSCPs of other combatant commands, are selling points. Clear succinct descriptions of the TSCP activities are also important if we are to influence busy decision makers. For all of these reasons, integrate the pieces of the TSCP that were developed earlier, looking for prioritization and synergy among the plan’s activities; clear adherence to national guidance through ends and ways links; firm grounding in the scenario and addressing a problem of concern; and activities that clearly describe themselves in terms of who, what, where, when, why, and how.
References


Bonin, John A. *Operation Enduring Freedom*, p. 119
Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management: Distance Learning Updates and Initiatives

By
Richard Rempes
and
Bill Rimpo
Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

In the winter 2003-2004 edition of the *DISAM Journal*, Volume 26 No. 2, web site: [http://www.disam.dsca.mil/pubs/indexes/Journals/Journal_Index/v26-2/McFarland.pdf](http://www.disam.dsca.mil/pubs/indexes/Journals/Journal_Index/v26-2/McFarland.pdf), we reported on the progress of our Security Assistance Management Online (SAM-OC) course. As promised in that article, we have updated the course in response to user comments. In addition, we have developed and implemented several new online modules of instruction to provide just-in-time training for the security assistance community. In this article, we will report on the status of the Orientation Course (SAM-OC), and the International Programs Security Requirements – Online (IPSR-OL) course. We will also describe in detail two of our newest offerings “Military Standard Transaction Reporting and Accounting Procedures for Foreign Military Sales” (MILSTRIP) and “Security Cooperation and Human Rights.”

**Status of Fielded Courses**

The SAM-OC and IPSR-OL courses continue to provide an alternative to conventional classroom instruction for hundreds of students in need of initial and refresher training in security assistance and international programs security. The following chart details enrollment in these two courses over the past three years:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Course</th>
<th>USA</th>
<th>USAF</th>
<th>Maritime</th>
<th>Foreign Service National</th>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Distance Learning Fiscal Year Total</th>
<th>All DISAM Fiscal Year Total*</th>
<th>Distance Learning Percent of Total</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>SAM-OC</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>355</td>
<td>4991</td>
<td>21.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IPSR-OL</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>363</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>705</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1060</strong></td>
<td><strong>4991</strong></td>
<td><strong>21.2%</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>SAM-OC</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>448</td>
<td>5697</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IPSR-OL</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>365</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>813</strong></td>
<td><strong>5697</strong></td>
<td><strong>14.3%</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>SAM-OC</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>486</td>
<td>4545</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IPSR-OL</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>374</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>860</strong></td>
<td><strong>4545</strong></td>
<td><strong>18.9%</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Includes all resident, mobile education team (MET) and distance learning course enrollees for the fiscal year.*
SAM-OC Updates

Several changes were implemented to improve the overall functionality of the course in addition to updates for volatile content including legislative and policy changes, current foreign military sales (FMS) figures and agency name and address changes.

- The three quizzes associated with the course have been re-written to now present 20 multiple choice questions each (vice 17). Students will now see each quiz score in Blackboard (DISAM’s online learning management system) under “My Grades” as a percentage (e.g. 80/100) as opposed to a raw numeric score. Additionally, a glitch that caused randomly selected questions to occasionally appear more than once in a quiz has been fixed.

<table>
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<th>Item Name</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>Points Possible</th>
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<td>Quiz 3A (Lessons 9-12)</td>
<td>9/25/06 3:26 PM</td>
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<td>100</td>
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<tr>
<td>End Of Course Evaluation</td>
<td>9/25/06</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- A print function has been added on the main menu that allows for either full (landscape) or half page (portrait) printouts of the current lesson page.
- The audio narration has been recoded into a “streaming” format which allows for playback to begin as soon as a small portion of the audio file has been downloaded.
- The registration process has been changed from self-enrollment in Blackboard to an automatic enrollment process handled by the DISAM registrar.
- Course certificates are now provided via a link in an e-mail sent to students within five working days of successful completion of the course.

International Programs Security Requirements-Online Updates

In the summer of 2006, the 2-day and 5-day classroom versions of the IPSR course were consolidated into a single 3-day version. As the IPSR-OL course was originally designed to mirror the 2-day version, it is currently in the process of revision to reflect the 3-day classroom version. The current on-line course will continue to count for credit towards the International Affairs Certification. In addition to the content revisions, the course will be updated to incorporate all the technical and functional changes found in the SAM-OC course.

New Initiatives

Real education must ultimately be limited to men who insist on knowing – the rest is mere sheep-herding.

Ezra Loomis Pound

We realized that developing new distance learning products required a systematic process or else we do nothing but “herd sheep.” The first step in this process was to determine what the security assistance community saw as a deficiency in knowledge. In April of 2002 DISAM conducted a survey of international customers, security assistance offices, and the implementing agencies. [Taphorn, 2002] Additionally, DISAM faculty routinely identifies training needs in the security assistance community through direct observation and inquiries made at CONUS MILDEP organizations, security assistance offices (SAOs) worldwide and at security cooperation related events, such as
Training Program Management Reviews (TPMRs), International Military Student Officer (IMSO) conferences, Theatre Security Cooperation (TSC) conferences and the various mobile education team (MET) courses conducted annually. As a result of these efforts, a list of training needs exists for DISAM to consider as new distance learning projects.

Recent top priorities on this ever-growing list included:

- A need for instruction with a “drill and practice” approach regarding the MILSTRIP,
- How-to modules for reading an FMS bill (DD Form 645) and the letter of offer and acceptance (LOA)
- An online version of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) course

As the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) schoolhouse, DISAM can also respond to requests for DL production assistance from other DSCA-affiliated organizations. For example, the Defense Institute for International Legal Studies (DIILS) requested assistance with a DL course on human rights. DISAM has completed two of these projects, MILSTRIP for FMS and Security Cooperation and Human Rights, which are discussed in more detail below.

Military Standard Requisitiioning and Issue Procedure for Foreign Military Sales

Have you ever wondered what the acronym MILSTRIP means? Have you ever been asked to interpret an AE2 document from S9G with a status code of BC and then make a logistics management decision based on the status of the requisition?

During DISAM’s visits to SAOs around the world (in particular our newest customer countries), and in our discussions with the customer and the implementing agencies, it became evident that customers had a lack of understanding on the Military Standard Requisition and Issue Procedures (MILSTRIP) in general and in the interpretation of the codes found in the various MILSTRIP documents. These problems are more evident with the newer FMS customers and in countries with small offices and security cooperation programs. Additionally, the move to use the Security Cooperation Information Portal (SCIP) for information dissemination adds to the confusion surrounding MILSTRIP.

Why is MILSTRIP so important for our international customers and SAO’s? It is the procedure by which the customer orders materials from the U.S. supply system. Understanding the unique codes that comprise a requisition is critical in the customers’ ability to submit orders and in tracking the status of these orders. MILSTRIP for FMS is designed with the FMS customer and the SAO in mind, but is just as useful for personnel in the implementing agencies.

MILSTRIP for FMS will introduce the student to the standard and unique codes that make up a MILSTRIP document, the common documents used within the U.S. supply system, and how to interpret status documents sent to the customer. This module was developed using the same interface and motif as our other distance learning courses.

- Navigation is through linear “next” and “back” buttons as well as a non-linear “pop-up” menu.
A print function has been added to the navigation line permitting the student to print the current screen for future reference.

Each section opens with a short video setting for the scene the information to be presented in the section.

The course consists of seven sections. MILSTRIP for FMS progressively takes the student from a basic understanding of MILSTRIP to a comprehensive exercise concluding the module of study. Section One breaks down the MILSTRIP document into five major groups discussing the purpose of the record positions in the document.

Following Section One, we begin a discussion of a variety of related documents.

- The requisition document (Section Two)
- The status document (Section Three)
- Three modifying documents (Section Four)
- The shipping document (Section Five)

Each section builds on the information provided in the previous section, providing an integrated picture of the MILSTRIP process.

Unique to the MILSTRIP for FMS module is incorporation of hands-on interactions for the student using facsimiles of Security Information Portal (SCIP) interactive screens. As the military services move away from providing the customer paper copies of logistics reports, SCIP is becoming the sole source for information for our international customers. Section Six discusses the use of SCIP to view logistics data through planned reports as well as ad hoc report generation. SCIP also has the capability for the customer to submit requisitions on-line to the supply system. The student will input data for a requisition, gaining hands-on experience using representations of actual SCIP screens. An example of a SCIP screen is on the next page.

How does one use MILSTRIP for FMS to interpret a MILSTRIP document? Built into the module is a translator. The MILSTRIP translator takes the codes in selected fields and expands them into their full definitions. The translator can be found under the Resources button on the navigation bar. Not all fields can be displayed due to the nature of the data. For instance, there is no translation for the National Stock Number (NSN) field due to the vast number of NSNs that would have to
be loaded. As you can see from the screen shot of the translator, the status code “BC” used in our example means the item is back ordered and the requisitioner can expect a long delay.

Currently, MILSTRIP for FMS is only available on CD-ROM and is provided to students in the SAM-F, SCM-O courses and to students attending a MET course. Requests for the MILSTRIP for FMS CD can be submitted using the DISAM publication order form located at: http://www.disam.dsca.mil/pubs/DISAM%20publication%20order%20form.htm.

Security Cooperation and Human Rights

The Defense Institute of International Legal Studies (DIILS) provides instruction on a variety of legal topics related to security cooperation, one of which is internationally recognized human rights. In the spring of 2006, DIILS and DISAM began a cooperative effort to produce an introductory on-line human rights module. The material contained in this module closely parallels the block of instruction that DIILS instructors present in the resident DISAM SCM-O and SAM-TO courses. Topics include international human rights law, gross violations of human rights and congressional human rights awareness and action.
The DISAM Journal, February 2007

The module is presented in the same format as the SAM-OC and IPSR-OL courses, is fully narrated, and contains a variety of interactions to facilitate learning and retention of the material. As an example, one interaction asks the student to match articles from the United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights to related amendments to the United States Constitution.

Currently, this module of instruction is available on the DISAM web site at: http://www.disam.dsca.mil/DistLearn/DL.htm.

Conclusion

Over the past five years, the addition of distance learning materials to the DISAM curriculum has provided students with numerous training opportunities beyond the traditional classroom. These include:

- Formal certificate instruction on security assistance topics (e.g. SAM-OC, IPSR-OL)
- Short modules of basic instruction on specific topics on the periphery of security assistance (e.g. SAO Entitlements, Ethics and Human Rights)
• Informal, in-depth information, instruction and practice on specific topics e.g., the Letter of Request, MILSTRIP for FMS, and the International Military Student Pre-Departure Briefing

The last three years of enrollment data for our for-credit courses reflect the continuing need for distance learning, in addition to standard classroom instruction, for the security assistance community. The IPSR-OL and SAM-OC courses alone represent 15-20 percent of the total annual DISAM student load, and several of the developed short modules of instruction have freed up valuable time in our resident courses for other group-orientated learning activities.

As with all courses, the value of the instruction is in part determined by assessment of post-training performance, and in-part by the feedback obtained from our students. Regarding student feedback, DISAM encourages all of our DL students to comment on existing courseware and to make recommendations for future courseware that will benefit the security cooperation community.

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References
