THE EUROPEAN UNION'S HUMAN SECURITY DOCTRINE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS

by

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March 2009

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# The European Union’s Human Security Doctrine: A Critical Analysis

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**Abstract**

The term “human security” first officially appeared on the scene of international relations in 1994, with a report by the UN Human Development Program. The concept has fast been gaining supporters and sparking associated intellectual debate. It challenges the traditional concept of security by contending that the central focus of security efforts should be the individual human being, not the nation state, as has been–and remains–the typical focus of analysis. This thesis investigates the hypothesis that the doctrine of “human security,” which has been featured in official policy statements of the European Union (EU), is not yet well formulated. Partly because it is inconsistently defined, it has been difficult to implement. Four criticisms stand out: namely, that the “human security” concept is vague, incoherent, arbitrary and difficult to operationalize. The EU has nonetheless attempted to make “human security” an element of its European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), with mixed results–reservations as to its limitations and acknowledgements of its achievements.

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ABSTRACT

The term “human security” first officially appeared on the scene of international relations in 1994, with a report by the UN Human Development Program. The concept has fast been gaining supporters and sparking associated intellectual debate. It challenges the traditional concept of security by contending that the central focus of security efforts should be the individual human being, not the nation state, as has been–and remains–the typical focus of analysis. This thesis investigates the hypothesis that the doctrine of “human security,” which has been featured in official policy statements of the European Union (EU), is not yet well formulated. Partly because it is inconsistently defined, it has been difficult to implement. Four criticisms stand out: namely, that the “human security” concept is vague, incoherent, arbitrary and difficult to operationalize. The EU has nonetheless attempted to make “human security” an element of its European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), with mixed results–reservations as to its limitations and acknowledgements of its achievements.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The concept of security has for too long been interpreted narrowly: as security of territory from external aggression, or as protection of national interests in foreign policy or as global security from the threat of nuclear holocaust. Forgotten were the legitimate concerns of ordinary people who sought security in their daily lives.\(^1\)

The term “human security” officially appeared on the scene of international relations in 1994, and it has fast been gaining supporters and sparking associated intellectual debate. It challenges the traditional concept of security by contending that the central focus of security efforts should be the individual human being, not the nation state, as has been–and remains–the typical unit of analysis. This thesis investigates the hypothesis that the doctrine of “human security,” which is gaining support in the European Union’s official policy statements, is not yet well formulated and therefore difficult to implement.

This topic is important because the European Union (EU) is a major economic power that has been developing what it terms a European Security and Defense Policy since 1999. The first deployment of European Union troops under the ESDP was for “EUFOR Concordia.” In this operation, the EU employed NATO assets in March 2003 in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. It was considered a success and replaced by a smaller EU police mission, “EUPOL Proxima,” in December 2003. Since December 2004, the EU has deployed peacekeepers in Bosnia and Herzegovina in cooperation with NATO in the “EUFOR Althea” mission. From May to September 2003, the EU conducted its first operation without the use of NATO assets: “Operation Artemis” in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) under UN Security Council Resolution 1484. This laid the framework for a system to be used in future ESDP operations. In 2006, the EU returned to the DRC with “EUFOR RD Congo,” which supported the UN mission there during the country's troubled elections. The EU has conducted additional ESDP

missions outside the Balkans and the DRC in Georgia, Indonesia, Palestine, Moldova, and Sudan, among other places. There is also a current judicial mission in Iraq entitled “EUJUST Lex,” as well as “EULEX” in Kosovo.

A. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESIS

Any concept that is heralded as possibly “new and improved” has its naysayers, and should spark healthy academic debate. “Human security” is no exception. Criticism has come both from organizations and people involved with the development and promotion of the concept, as well as from disinterested specialists in security studies. Four criticisms stand out: namely, that the “human security” notion is vague, incoherent, arbitrary and difficult to operationalize. This thesis investigates whether these criticisms are justified. If the concept is indeed poorly formulated, this may explain the difficulties encountered in its implementation.

B. LITERATURE REVIEW

The first prominent use of the term “human security” was in a document called the Human Development Report prepared for the United Nations Development Program’s 1994 Social Summit in Copenhagen. This report declared that:

The concept of security has for too long been interpreted narrowly: as security of territory from external aggression, or as protection of national interests in foreign policy or as global security from the threat of nuclear holocaust. Forgotten were the legitimate concerns of ordinary people who sought security in their daily lives.

This report and the definition of “human security” that it put forward focused simultaneously on the notions of “freedom from fear” and “freedom from want,” which are two of the major diverging guidelines on the concept. Another divergence would be

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3 Human Development Report 1994, 22; emphasis added.
the “narrow” versus the “broad” approaches. Certain countries and international financial institutions such as the World Bank have also given considerable time and effort to examining the concept of human security.

At the onset, the notion of “human security” was defined as a wholly civilian concept with no military aspects attached to it, and this stretched the idea of “security” so much that it appeared to include almost everything—except military affairs. This early definition drew the criticism that the concept of “human security” was too broad and practically impossible to operationalize. As Sabina Alkire, an economist and current director of the Oxford Policy and Human Development Initiative at Oxford University, succinctly observes, “the surrounding discussions of the 1994 report, and in particular the breadth and apparent arbitrariness of the original seven dimensions, have led others to judge the concept of human security to be too all-encompassing for practical purposes, the report idealistic, and its recommendations naïve.”

It was not until 1996-1997 that the concept was reevaluated and reshaped into a more solid and project-oriented approach to security. This was done largely by Canadian experts and officials, who remain among the theory’s main and most fervent supporters. In 1998, a meeting in Norway of representatives of eleven nations focused on efforts to achieve international recognition of—and cooperation on—the issues affecting civilian populations in war zones such as landmines and child soldiers. The participants expressed an intention to heighten international awareness of these issues, and they became the core of the emerging “human security” network. Through subsequent meetings and continuing collaboration, this group of countries made significant strides towards refining the theory of “human security” and gaining support for corresponding tasks. According to Janne Haaland Matlary, a professor of international politics at the

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6 Ibid.
University of Oslo and senior adjunct researcher in security policy at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, some even initiated “national ‘human security’ projects both inside and outside the UN structures.”

An even larger role in the popularization of the “human security” concept was played by an organization called the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). This organization in 2001 published a report entitled *The Responsibility to Protect*, which firmly underlined an international ethical obligation to defend and protect individual human beings when national governments fail to do so. However, the terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001 temporarily deflected attention away from the discussion of “human security.”

In 2004, the UN High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change issued a report entitled *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility*, which revitalized the debate about “human security” by continuing the work started by the ICISS. This report asserted that the model of sovereignty has evolved to include a sense of ethical obligations. That is, the sovereign state must be held responsible for the “human security” of its citizens. This document differed from and improved upon its predecessor by acknowledging and incorporating both the newer concept of “human security” and the traditional concept of “state security.”

The European Security Strategy (ESS) policy document of 2003 did not specifically mention the term “human security,” but it did advocate “building an international order” which is “rule-based” and supported by “effective multilateralism.” In 2004, a special report was commissioned to evaluate how the ESS could be revised to have a “human security” foundation and effectiveness. It was called *A Human Security Doctrine for Europe: The Barcelona Report of the Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities*. According to Janne Haaland Matlary, the Barcelona Report “represents the first coherent attempt to develop a policy for intervention based on individual rights to security—not only in terms of policy and legal principles (as the ICISS report does) but

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also in terms of the needs of civilian–military integration.”

The Barcelona Report states, “In today’s world, there is a gap between current security capabilities, consisting largely of military forces, and real security needs.”

The newly issued European Security Strategy of 2008 does, however, make reference to “human security,” which implies that the doctrine is indeed gaining in importance.

C. THESIS OVERVIEW

A critical conceptual analysis is undertaken to test the logical coherence of the propositions advanced by the proponents of the “human security” doctrine. The practical applicability of the as yet rather vague and general presumptions is also examined.

This thesis is organized as follows. Chapter II discusses the historical evolution of the “human security” concept as well as the various definitions and key statements that have been advanced to date. This chapter also includes an assessment of the major texts and specifies the core ideas. Chapter III offers an analysis of critical interpretations of the concept, including responses to the criticisms and concerns. Chapter IV provides a summary and conclusion.

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II. DEFINITIONS AND CORE IDEAS

The purpose of this chapter is to offer a survey of definitions of human security. It presents a review of related but differing approaches and identifies the core ideas that are critically examined in Chapter III.

A. BASIC DEFINITION OF THE TERM

However recent the apparition of the term on the international academic and political scene, it is worth pausing for a moment to reflect on the question of whether it is indeed a new concept. After all, is not “human insecurity” a concept as old as time itself? Have not the threats of famine, disease, pain and death, whether caused simply by the cold and harshness of the elements, or inflicted by ravenous wild animals or indeed other people by negligence, war, or torture been a part of the human condition since time immemorial? Do not all human beings desire to live out their lives in relative comfort with in peace with others, and abhor the concepts of fear, pain and death, especially when the latter are inflicted by others for their own ends? It is entirely possible that this “human security” or the removal thereof has been so to speak an aspect of war since the beginning of time. Therefore, one might ask why in a world still so much in need of truly protecting and taking care of the individual human being so much time is wasted discussing the matter, vice doing something about it. As Ann Florini, a senior foreign policy fellow at the Brookings Institution, and P. J. Simmons, a founding director of the Managing Global Issues project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, commented in their thorough evaluation of various definitions and debates about security, there is “too much disagreement” and not enough action in general.12

Some trace the conceptual origins of the modern “human security” concept back to the “Four Freedoms” speech given by President Franklin D. Roosevelt to the U.S. Congress on the January 6, 1941. In this speech, President Roosevelt declared that:

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In the future days, which we seek to make secure, we look forward to a world founded upon four essential human freedoms. The first is freedom of speech and expression—everywhere in the world. The second is freedom of every person to worship God in his own way—everywhere in the world. The third is freedom from want—which, translated into world terms, means economic understandings which will secure to every nation a healthy peacetime life for its inhabitants—everywhere in the world. The fourth is freedom from fear—which, translated into world terms, means a worldwide reduction of armaments to such a point and in such a thorough fashion that no nation will be in a position to commit an act of physical aggression against any neighbor—anywhere in the world.13

The latter two goals, i.e., “freedom from want” and “freedom from fear,” would prove to figure prominently as two diverging paths in the discussion of “human security” today. However, the roots of the human security concept can be followed back much more deeply through the very etymology of the word “security,” which comes from the Latin securus. This can be broken down into its components “se” meaning “without,” and “cura” meaning “care.”14 According to P. H. Liotta, a Professor of Humanities at Salve Regina University and Executive Director of the Pell Center for International Relations and Public Policy, even Cicero discussed the notion of security in terms of “the absence of anxiety upon which the fulfilled life depends.”15

In ethical terms, therefore, human security can be viewed as “both a ‘system’ and a systemic practice that promotes and sustains stability, security, and progressive integration of individuals within their relationships to their states, societies, and regions.”16 There seems to be little to begrudge in such an ideology. As Liotta adds, “the right of states to protect themselves” under the guise of “national security” and to employ traditional instruments of power, often at the expense of enemy combatants and civilians, has “never been directly, or sufficiently, challenged.”17 According to Liotta, it is of note

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17 Ibid., 88.
“that such a challenge is absent despite some recent catastrophic failures of state-based security protection (such as Rwanda, Northern Uganda, and Darfur), where the state either has been unwilling or unable to protect, or even has been antagonistic against, its citizens.”\(^{18}\) However, perhaps precisely the emergence of the human security debate is such a challenge.

B. “TRADITIONAL SECURITY” VS. “HUMAN SECURITY”

Traditional, or “national” or “state,” security has been a predominant preoccupation in international relations since the emergence of nation-states, which is sometimes described as having occurred with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648.\(^{19}\) The central idea revolves around external threats to a nation-state and its citizens, and its ability to withstand such aggression, but the state also acted as a protector of citizens from internal threats. The state was supposed to protect individuals from threats regardless of their origin, whether a local thug or a neighboring country’s army. But since the state was the sole protector, in a time before the emergence of effective supra- and international organizations, this sometimes came at a price to the individual-essentially security of the collective bested the safety of the individual.\(^{20}\) According to Liotta, some scholars have argued that human security has its “roots in a neo-Marxist critique of the 1970s,” but he argues that it can reasonably be shown that “human security is a principle embedded in Enlightenment Liberalism.”\(^{21}\)

Many different theories, including Realism, Idealism and Constructivism, have emerged as to the origins of these threats and how they should be perceived and dealt with, but the common factor among them is the absolute primacy of the nation-state. The proponents of human security theory fundamentally challenge this way of thinking. However, this not to say that the concepts of “state security” and “human security” are


\(^{19}\) Martin Wight and other historians maintain that the modern Western states-system emerged at the end of the fifteenth century. See Martin Wight, Systems of States, ed. by Hedley Bull (London: Leicester University Press, 1977), 112-113, 150-152.


\(^{21}\) Ibid.
mutually exclusive, or cannot coexist. As a matter of fact, there are several good arguments as to why “state security” and “human security” need each other. As Alkire puts it, “protecting others’ human security strengthens the security of national populations and thus would be in the self-interest of the nation-state, because it would be significantly less costly than countering violence or terrorism.” 22 As Benjamin Franklin reflected, those who would give up essential liberty to increase their security deserve neither. 23 It seems obvious even at this point in this study that, as with most things in life, a wise balance must be struck between state security and human security.

The end of the Cold War and the bipolar East-West competition had a dramatic impact on security studies. Traditional, relatively narrow, definitions of security, which focused mainly on military might, were suddenly challenged by modern, broader theories, which took into account political, social, cultural, environmental, and informational factors. 24 One of the trailblazers in this regard was British international relations theorist Barry Buzan, who together with such noted scholars as Ole Weaver, Japp de Wilde, and Bill McSweeney, co-founded the so-called “Copenhagen School” of security thinking in the early 1990s. 25 Karina P. Marczuk, Deputy Director of the Office of the Secretary of the State, National Security Bureau, Poland, draws a direct link to human security by stating that “broad security conception is followed by the modern human security theory which is a consequence of Barry Buzan’s approach to the security matters.” 26 In 1995, Emma Rothschild, a British economic historian and current chair of the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, discussed the broadening of the field of security studies as follows:

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23 Written sometime shortly before February 17, 1775 as part of his notes for a proposition at the Pennsylvania Assembly, as published in *Memoirs of the Life and Writings of Benjamin Franklin* (1818), www.archive.org/details/templefranklin02franrich.
The ubiquitous idea, in the new principles of the 1990s, is of security in an “extended” sense. The extension takes four main forms. In the first, the concept of security is extended from the security of nations to the security of groups and individuals: it is extended downwards from nations to individuals. In the second, it is extended form the security of nations to the security of the international system, or of a supranational physical environment: it is extended upwards, from the nation to the biosphere. The extension, in both cases, is in the sorts of entities whose security is to be ensured. In the third operation, the concept of security is extended horizontally, or to the sorts of security that are in question. Different entities (such as individuals, nations, and “systems”) cannot be expected to be secure or insecure in the same way; the concept of security is extended therefore, from military to political, economic, social, environmental, or “human” security. In a fourth operation, the political responsibility for ensuring security (or for invigilating all these “concepts of security”) is itself extended: it is diffused in all directions from national states, including upwards to international institutions, downwards to regional or local government, and sideways to nongovernmental organizations, to public opinion and the press, and to the abstract forces of the market.27

Thus, Marczuk concludes

that [the] post-Cold War conception of security was called broad, wide, complex or extended, but the main idea was always the same after the collapse of the bipolar system, security should be understood as covering all the aspects of our daily life. Thus the human security theory could emerge and become popular in the 90s, particularly in Western European countries (EU), Canada, Japan, and the Third-World.28

P. H. Liotta and Taylor Owen, a doctoral candidate at Oxford University, affirm, “In pragmatic ways, the broad conceptualization of human security is revolutionary—and quite different from a traditional, state-centric view of security. Most notably, perhaps, it brings what are traditionally considered ‘development’ or ‘humanitarian’ considerations, into the security discourse.”29

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C. HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF THE PROPER TERM AND CONCEPT

As mentioned in Chapter I, the first prominent use of the term “human security” was in a document called the Human Development Report (HDR) prepared for the United Nations Development Program’s 1994 Social Summit in Copenhagen. One of the main authors of this document was Mahbub ul Haq, a noted Pakistani economist who was not only the founder of the series of periodic UNDP Human Development Reports, but also a champion of Human Development Theory and one of the originators of the Human Development Index, which has been used as a standardized measure of human development worldwide. The 1994, HDR defined human security as follows:

Human security can be said to have two main aspects. It means, first, safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression. And second, it means protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life—whether in homes, in jobs or in communities. Such threats can exist at all levels of national income and development.

Thus, the definition of human security put forward focused simultaneously on the notions of “freedom from fear” (which was paraphrased in the first point) and “freedom from want” (in the second point). The report went on to specify and discuss seven main areas of threat to individual human beings: “Economic Security,” “Food Security,” “Health Security,” “Environmental Security,” “Personal Security,” “Community Security,” and finally “Political Security.” Additionally four essential characteristics of human security were emphasized: the universality of the concern, the interdependency of the components of the ideology, the desirability of early prevention vice later intervention, and the fact that the concept is “people-centered.” The report also points out that U.S. Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius echoed President Roosevelt’s “four freedoms” language in his June 1945 report on the San Francisco Conference at which the United Nations was founded:

30 Sabina Alkire states that the term was in circulation earlier. Alkire, A Conceptual Framework for Human Security, 13.
32 Ibid., 22-23.
The battle of peace has to be fought on two fronts. The first is the security front where victory spells freedom from fear. The second is the economic and social front where victory means freedom from want. Only victory on both fronts can assure the world of an enduring peace.... No provisions that can be written into the [United Nations] Charter will enable the Security Council to make the world secure from war if men and women have no security in their homes and their jobs.33

As noted in Chapter I, human security was originally defined as a wholly civilian concept with no military aspects attached, and this extended the idea of “security” so much that it appeared to encompass almost everything—except military affairs. This early definition attracted the criticism that the concept of human security was too broad and practically impossible to operationalize. Criticisms of the concept are discussed in more detail in Chapter III of this thesis.

In 1996-1997, the concept was reshaped into a more action-oriented methodology.34 As pointed out in Chapter I, this was done largely by Canadian experts and officials. Numerous academic institutions, think tanks, and research foundations dedicated to human security are home-ported in Canada. In 1998 a meeting in Lysoen, Norway, was dedicated to achieving international recognition of—and cooperation on—issues affecting civilian populations in war zones such as landmines, child soldiers, etc.35 Eleven nations attended and became the core of the emerging “human security network.” These nations were Austria, Canada, Chile, Ireland, Jordan, the Netherlands, Norway, Slovenia, South Africa (participating only in the capacity of an observer), Switzerland, and Thailand. Through subsequent meetings and activities, this group of countries made significant strides towards refining the theory of human security, and some even undertook “national human security projects both inside and outside the UN structures.”36 The 1999 HDR (though primarily focused on the theme of globalization)

35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
also mentioned human security as one of the five elements needed in a new international architecture by stating that strengthening the UN system would give “it greater coherence to respond to broader needs of human security.”

As noted in Chapter I, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), chaired by Gareth Evans, President and Chief Executive of the Brussels-based International Crisis Group, and Mohamed Sahnoun, an Algerian who then served as Special Advisor to the UN Secretary-General, played an even larger role in the improvement and refinement of the human security concept. In 2001, the ICISS published a report entitled *The Responsibility to Protect* (R2P). This report postulated an international ethical obligation to defend and protect people when their national governments fail to do so. According to the report, “Where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is unable or unwilling to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect.” Referring to both “intervention” and “sovereignty” in the same statement tends to make governments uneasy, so the report addressed this delicate issue by specifying a definition of sovereignty as follows:

[S]overeignty is more than just a functional principle of international relations … [T]he conditions under which sovereignty is exercised—and intervention is practiced—have changed dramatically since 1945 … It is acknowledged that sovereignty implies a dual responsibility: externally—to respect the sovereignty of other states, and internally, to respect the dignity and basic rights of all the people within the state. In international human rights covenants, in UN practice, and in state practice itself, sovereignty is now understood as embracing this dual responsibility.

As mentioned in Chapter I, the terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001 turned attention away from deliberations on human security for a while. However, it must be noted that the ICISS report was published after these events and even referred to them. The ICISS report states that:


39 Ibid., 7-8.
[H]uman security is indeed indivisible. There is no longer such a thing as a humanitarian catastrophe occurring ‘in a faraway country of which we know little.’ On 11 September 2001 global terrorism, with its roots in complex conflicts in distant lands, struck the U.S. homeland: impregnable lines of continental defence proved an illusion even for the world’s most powerful state.\(^40\)

In 2004, the UN High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change issued a report entitled \textit{A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility}. This report revived the debate about human security and built on the work of the ICISS. The report declared that the concept of sovereignty has evolved to include a sense of ethical obligations. “Whatever perceptions may have prevailed when the Westphalian system first gave rise to the notion of state sovereignty, today it clearly carries with it the obligation of a State to protect the welfare of its own peoples and meet its obligations to the wider international community.”\(^41\) This document went beyond the ICISS report by incorporating both the newer concept of “human security” and the traditional concept of “state security.” Moreover, it declared that a “threat” is “any event or process that leads to large scale death or lessening of life chances and undermines States as the basic unit of the international system” and noted that “today’s threats recognize no national boundaries.”\(^42\) It follows logically that since the threats have spilled out into the international arena, the responsibility for dealing with them, whatever they may be, has done so as well. According to the report, “The collective security we seek to build today asserts a shared responsibility on the part of all States and international institutions, and those who lead them, to do just that (fulfill the rights of citizens).”\(^43\)

\(^{40}\) Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 5. The phrase “in a faraway country of which we know little” refers to British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain’s notorious remarks about Czechoslovakia on September 27, 1938.


\(^{42}\) Ibid., synopsis.

\(^{43}\) Ibid., 22.
D. VARIOUS VIEWS ON THE DEFINITION AND MEANING OF THE TERM

Since 1994, when the term “human security” first appeared, governments, scholars and interest groups have published analyses of the meaning and merits of the concept. One of the more prevalent ways of classifying the various conceptions of human security is to bifurcate them into “broad” vs. “narrow” categories. This method of classification is often adopted by national governments and/or non-governmental organizations.

Three countries, as well as several NGOs, come up repeatedly in the literature about “human security” – Canada, Japan, and Norway. Canada and Norway are among the countries with active foreign policy concerns and agendas that emphasize the “freedom from fear” aspect of human security. This definition of the term is commonly referred to as the “Canadian” or “narrow” approach. Japan and the World Bank both pursue the dual edged approach of “freedom from fear” and “freedom from want,” though in different ways. The Japanese, World Bank, and Third World interpretation of the concept is generally accepted as the “Japanese” or “broad” approach to human security.

According to Andrew Mack, the current Director of the Human Security Report Project at Simon Fraser University and formerly the Director of Strategic Planning in the Executive Office of UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, “Japan … stresses the importance of development issues and ‘human dignity’ and has been critical of Canada’s approach to human security, which it sees as associated with humanitarian intervention.”

The broad, or Japanese, approach centers more on the initial wording of the 1994 UNDP Report, and the seven components of human security that it spelled out to protect the “vital core” of the individual. The “vital core” is a term that appears frequently in the literature on human security; and, according to Alkire, it is

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a non-technical term for the concerns that lie behind human security. … Elements of the vital core are fundamental human rights which all persons and institutions are obliged to respect or provide, even if the obligations are not perfectly specifiable. The rights and freedoms in the vital core pertain to survival, to livelihood, and to basic dignity.\footnote{Alkire, \textit{A Conceptual Framework for Human Security}, 3.}

Or, as Liotta and Owen put it, “the core remains on the human citizen and his or her ability to live \textit{without} hindrance to one’s personal well-being, whatever the cause.”\footnote{Liotta and Owen, 90; emphasis added.}

Though such a level of security is an admirable goal, perhaps the only way to truly achieve this would be to do away with war and discord all together.

The World Bank first added to the discourse on human security in its Post-Conflict Unit’s 1999 paper entitled \textit{Security, Poverty Reduction and Sustainable Development: Challenges for the New Millennium}. According to this paper, the traditional notions of security (threats to the state, military defense, and nuclear disarmament) are giving way to contemporary understandings of the term (“human,” or personal, security; freedom from crime, violence, and oppression). Today, security comprises two interrelated concepts: the state’s role in protecting its borders from external threats and its role in ensuring “human security” for its citizens under the broader umbrella of human rights—meaning that every person is entitled to be free of oppression, violence, hunger, poverty, and disease and to live in a clean and healthy environment.\footnote{World Bank Post-Conflict Unit, \textit{Security, Poverty Reduction and Sustainable Development: Challenges for the New Millennium} (Washington, DC: The World Bank, September 1999), 7.}

Subsequently in 2001 in the publication of its \textit{World Development Report 2000/1},\footnote{World Bank, www.worldbank.org .} the World Bank contributed “organic fusion of hitherto disparate areas of study” to the field of human security by using the word “security to refer not narrowly to economic security for vulnerable populations, but also to conflict prevention and/or resolution.”\footnote{Alkire, \textit{A Conceptual Framework for Human Security}, 18.}

The Canadian approach seeks to establish a clear distinction between human security and the much broader, previously established field of international development by principally restricting the parameters of human security to violent threats against the
individual. These threats can have a multitude of origins, from drug trade and small arms trafficking, to ethnic strife and state failure.\textsuperscript{50} The Human Security Report Project, of the School for International Studies at Simon Fraser University, Vancouver, explains the need for a narrower approach as follows:

Since the end of the Cold War, armed conflicts have increasingly taken place within, and not between, states. National security remains important, but in a world in which war between states is the rare exception, and many more people are killed by their own governments than by foreign armies, the concept of ‘human security’ has been gaining greater recognition.

Unlike traditional concepts of security, which focus on defending borders from external military threats, human security is concerned with the security of individuals.

For some proponents of human security, the key threat is violence; for others the threat agenda is much broader, embracing hunger, disease and natural disasters. Largely for pragmatic reasons, the Human Security Report Project has adopted the narrower concept of human security that focuses on protecting individuals and communities from violence.\textsuperscript{51}

Canada and Norway remain the two most vocal governments promoting human security. Norway has a narrow approach to human security similar to that of Canada, and remains the concept’s most fervent supporter in Europe. This is evident in the numerous references to the concept in official Norwegian government statements. The narrow approach to human security concentrates on “the more immediate necessity for intervention capability rather than long-term strategic planning and investing for sustainable and secure development.”\textsuperscript{52} The Canadian and Norwegian governments choose to be more focused and practical in their approach, rather than adopting the broad and idealistic approach favored by Japan, the World Bank, and the Third World. The Canadian government’s resolve and dedication to human security is discussed at greater length in Chapter IV.

\textsuperscript{50} Liotta and Owen, “Sense and Symbolism: Europe Takes on Human Security,” 91.
\textsuperscript{52} Liotta and Owen, “Sense and Symbolism: Europe Takes on Human Security,” 91.
While the scholarly debates and opinions offered throughout the literature are abundant, certain studies appear particularly noteworthy.

As noted earlier, Emma Rothschild contributed greatly to the discussion of human security by analyzing it in an impartial and scholarly manner. She avoided treating it with the enthusiasm of a novelty, in contrast with many other authors. She proposed the term “extended security” and drew parallels with historical events that illustrate security concepts. She demonstrated that human security can be regarded as an extension of traditional state-based security in Europe. However, she also attempted to make human security more viable and palatable by narrowing what the term covers. In her cornerstone work, she raised significant questions with regard to authority, consensus building, resource generation, coercion, and subsidiarity.53

Gary King, the David Florence Professor of Government at Harvard University and Director of the Institute for Quantitative Social Science, and Christopher J. L. Murray, a professor of global health at the University of Washington, have formed a more multidimensional view of human security, which would fall within the category of “broad” interpretations. They advocate using a human security index that measures the years lived outside “a state of generalized poverty” and that includes “only those domains of well-being that have been important enough for human beings to fight over or to put their lives or property at great risk.”54 Put another way, their metric would identify a person as insecure if he falls below a minimum level in any of their specified domains of health, education, income, political freedom, and democracy. Their proposed method differs from the more commonly used metric developed by Mahbub ul Haq and his collaborators in authoring the 1994 Human Development Report.

Caroline Thomas, a recently deceased professor of global politics at Southampton University who devoted her career to the plight of the poor and disadvantaged in developing nations, also argued for a broad interpretation of human security. This was

motivated by her view that available international means to deal with mounting inequality, caused by globalization, were inadequate. Her definition, which is similar to the original concept of the 1994 UNDP document, was as follows:

Human security describes a condition of existence in which basic material needs are met and in which human dignity, including meaningful participation in the life of the community, can be met. Thus, while material sufficiency lies at the core of human security, in addition the concept encompasses non-material dimensions to form a qualitative whole. Human security is oriented towards an active and substantive notion of democracy, and is directly engaged with discussions of democracy at all levels, from the local to the global.55

This seems so far-reaching that it virtually encompasses all of Abraham Maslow’s hierarchy of needs,56 supplemented by a global democratic system.

Jennifer Leaning, a Professor of the Practice of International Health at the Harvard School of Public Health who has written extensively on the topics of disaster response and human rights, and Sam Arie, a widely published author on Africa, have discussed human security especially, though not exclusively, as it pertains to Africa. They stipulate that human security is an “underlying condition” of human development, but their definition comprises cultural and psychological security issues that stem from social systems and perceptions of the future, as opposed to considering only basic standards of living.57 Their work highlights a need to consider cultural and psychological aspects, but without weakening the focus and compactness of human security requirements as a “minimal set.”


56 Maslow’s hierarchy of needs is a theory in psychology, proposed by Abraham Maslow in a paper entitled “A Theory of Human Motivation,” *Psychological Review* 50, no. 4 (1943): 370-96. It is often depicted as a pyramid consisting of five levels: the lowest level is associated with physiological needs, while the higher levels are termed growth needs associated with psychological needs. The lower needs must be met first, and only once they are met, can a human being seek to satisfy the psychological growth needs which drive personal development. The higher needs only come into focus when the basic needs in the pyramid are met.

Canadian researcher Fen Osler Hampson, a professor at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs at Carleton University and a past fellow at the United States Institute of Peace and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and his co-authors define human security as a public good that protects core human values, such as physical security, basic liberties, and economic needs and interests, but that is not being provided to a large number of people.\textsuperscript{58} According to Hampson \textit{et al.}, “the concept of ‘security’ can be defined as the absence of threat to core human values, including the most basic human value, the physical safety of the individual.”\textsuperscript{59} In summary, they propose a “portfolio diversification approach to human security.”\textsuperscript{60}

Roland Paris, a Professor at the University of Ottawa and the founding director of the university’s Centre for International Policy Studies, suggests that all too often human security is defined by attaching it to a certain set of pre-established values and that it thereby loses its neutrality. He prefers that it not be viewed as a theoretical notion, but rather advocates treating it as a category of research into military and non-military threats to states, societies, groups, and individuals. He has constructed a simple grid or graphic representation of approaches to security studies, including traditional, military, redefined, and human security. The “redefined” security approach is also known as the Copenhagen School. This grid is often reproduced in the pertinent literature. In this simple two-by-two matrix he shows that the concepts are not mutually exclusive, and that they have significant overlap in terms of threats and those affected. He holds that numerous definitions of human security can and should exist, and points to several sub-fields in need of research.\textsuperscript{61}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[58] Fen Osler Hampson, with Jean Daudelin, John B. Hay, Todd Martin, and Holly Reid, \textit{Madness in the Multitude: Human Security and World Disorder} (Ottawa: Oxford University Press, 2002).
\item[59] Ibid., 4.
\item[60] Ibid., 59-62.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
The International Commission on Intervention and Sovereignty (ICISS) discussed earlier presented human security as a fundamentally promising concept for national and international institutions and governments. This position was bolstered by pointing to the statement by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan that

For the United Nations, there is no higher goal, no deeper commitment and no greater ambition than preventing armed conflict. The prevention of conflict begins and ends with the protection of human life and the promotion of human development. Ensuring human security is, in the broadest sense, the United Nations cardinal mission. Genuine and lasting prevention is the means to achieve that mission.62

Annan’s statement was taken as an official sanctioning of the concept. “Human Security” as it relates specifically to the European Union.

European integration has at times in the past century been dubbed a “peace project.” For, out of the ashes and horror of the two great World Wars, European citizens and leaders alike fervently strove to reinvent the socio-political loom and weave a new fabric that would this time truly and above all prevent another war on European soil. Thus, the phoenix that is now the European Union was engendered. As Anand Menon, a Professor of West European Politics and Director of the European Research Institute at the University of Birmingham, and Special Adviser to the House of Lords EU committee, and his co-authors put it, the EU is “a pioneer in long term interstate building, a pioneer actor through trial and error and thus designing options for peaceful governance. In this vision, the EU is one of the most formidable machines for managing differences peacefully ever invented.”63 As Marczuk points out,


As far as human security in the European Union is concerned, it is believed that a wide variety of European soft power factors, such as democracy, promotion of human rights and cultural, social, economic values, etc. were reasons why the EU started to be interested in human security in both, Canadian and Japanese, approaches.64

Indeed, the very bedrock that the EU is founded on is fertile ground for the concept of human security to have taken hold and possibly flourish, as is seen in the very wording of the Amsterdam Treaty, which states that “the Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law.”65 Even the realm of foreign policy is expressly discussed in terms of human rights and by extension human security in that, according to the treaty, “The Union shall define and implement a common foreign policy and security policy covering all areas of foreign and security policy, the objectives of which shall be … to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.” 66 It also bears mentioning that respect for human rights figures so prominently in the EU psyche as to be one of the Copenhagen criteria,67 the required benchmarks that must be met for entry into the European Union.

Until recently the geopolitical order of the Cold War placed certain constraints on the autonomy of the states participating in the European Integration movement and precluded, or at the very least did not encourage, the development of a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI). Arrangements supporting an ESDI were pursued under the auspices of NATO and the Western European Union from 1990 to 1999. Since 1999, the European Union has been marching steadily forward, if somewhat slowly and sporadically, toward a more ambitious European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP).68 Though the specific term “human security” was not used in the European Security

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66 Amsterdam Treaty, Title V, Article 11.
68 Denmark maintains a special “opt-out” status in relation to ESDP.
Strategy policy document of December 2003, Sven Biscop, a Professor of European Security at the University of Gent and a Senior Researcher for the Belgian Royal Institute for International Relations, holds that it was “implicitly present.” According to Biscop, human security can be a useful organizing concept, binding everything together and explaining the core aim of the EU’s holistic approach as a global actor: making sure that every individual, everywhere, has access to physical security, economic prosperity, political freedom and social wellbeing. To realize this for its own citizens is the fundamental interest of the EU; to realize it for citizens worldwide is the means to safeguard that interest and, at the same time, a positive agenda in its own right.69

In 2004, the Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities released a report entitled A Human Security Doctrine for Europe: The Barcelona Report of the Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities. According to Matlary, this document “represents the first coherent attempt to develop a policy for intervention based on individual rights to security—not only in terms of policy and legal principles (as the ICISS report does) but also in terms of the needs of civilian–military integration.”70 Though Liotta and Owen point out that the European Union had tried to implement some elements of human security earlier, it was not until the publication of the 2003 ESS and 2004 Barcelona Report that the EU “declared inherent security values in both promoting the rights of nation-states and in protecting the rights of individual citizens.”71 The Barcelona Report states, “In today’s world, there is a gap between current security capabilities, consisting largely of military forces, and real security needs.”72

The Barcelona Report also explains why the idea of human security became a topic of note in Europe around 2004-2005 by observing that “In an era of global interdependence, Europeans can no longer feel secure when large parts of the world are

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70 Matlary, “Much Ado about Little: The EU and Human Security,” 139.
insecure.”  

Dan Henk, a Professor of Leadership at the U.S. Air War College, has noted that “The Europeans are looking at the world—and their role in it—in a significantly new way.” With the statement that “Europe has a historic responsibility to contribute to a safer and more just world,” the report argues that the European Union should become a more active participant on the global security scene, and that it needs the capability to do so, including military forces. The report discusses how these conventional forces should be built differently from currently available forces and used in new and innovative ways. Specifically, the report proposes a “Human Security Doctrine” for the European Union with three components:

A set of seven principles for operations in situations of severe insecurity that apply to both ends and means. These principles are: the primacy of human rights, clear political authority, multilateralism, a bottom-up approach, regional focus, the use of legal instruments, and the appropriate use of force. The report puts particular emphasis on the bottom-up approach; on communication, consultation, dialogue and partnership with the local population in order to improve early warning, intelligence gathering, mobilisation of local support, implementation and sustainability.

A ‘Human Security Response Force’, initially composed of 15,000 men and women, of whom at least one third would be civilian (police, legal experts, development and humanitarian specialists, administrators, etc.). The Force would be drawn from dedicated troops and civilian capabilities already made available by member states as well as a proposed ‘Human Security Volunteer Service’.

A new legal framework to govern both decisions to intervene and operations on the ground. This would build on the domestic law of host states, the domestic law of sending states, international criminal law, international human rights law and international humanitarian law.

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76 Ibid.
By specifying “capabilities” in the form of force structure, organization, and a legal framework, this doctrine represents an ambitious initiative to respond to challenges and resolve crises. The report maintains a direct connection with the 2003 ESS by focusing on the same threats of terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, failing states, and organized crime.

In December 2008, the European Council issued a Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy: Providing Security in a Changing World. This report left the wording of the December 2003 ESS unchanged and expressly stated that it “does not replace the ESS, but reinforces it” and that the ESS “is comprehensive in its approach and remains fully relevant.” This report specifically mentions human security twice. First, in the Executive Summary, the report states, “We have worked to build human security, by reducing poverty and inequality, promoting good governance and human rights, assisting development, and addressing the root causes of conflict and insecurity.” Second, in Chapter III the report declares, “We need to continue mainstreaming human rights issues in all activities in this field, including ESDP missions, through a people-based approach coherent with the concept of human security.”

E. CANADA’S RECENT AND PROMINENT USE OF THE TERM “HUMAN SECURITY”

In addition to European Union documents, note should be taken of the recent report by the Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan, also know as the “Manley Report” owing to the name of the Honorable John Manley, who chaired the study group. In this report, human security is mentioned in two of the four reasons for why Canada (and perhaps other external powers) should maintain a security presence in Afghanistan. According to this report, the second reason for Canadian involvement is that

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78 Ibid., 3.
79 Ibid., 2.
80 Ibid., 10.
Canadians are in Afghanistan in support of the United Nations, contributing to the UN’s capacity to respond to threats to peace and security and to foster better futures in the world’s developing countries. … This is a peace-enforcement operation, as provided for under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. It is a collective use of force, under international law, to address a threat to international peace and security posed by continuing disorder in Afghanistan. … In fact, these are the kinds of force the UN might be called upon to apply more often in future, where the human rights and human security of ordinary people are threatened.81

Further, according to this report, “There is a fourth and equally powerful reason for Canadian engagement [in Afghanistan]: the promotion and protection of human security in fragile states.”82

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81 Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan, Final Report (Ottawa: Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan, 2008), 21. Also known as the Manley report.

82 Ibid., 22.
III. CRITICAL ANALYSIS AND CONCERNS

Chapter II of this thesis surveyed the principal definitions of human security and their historical context. The purpose of this chapter is to subject these definitions to a critical analysis. The chapter considers the following types of criticisms: substantive reservations about the main implications, scholarly concerns related to the intellectual coherence of the human security concept, and questions about its relevance for the European Union’s European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP).

A. QUESTIONS OF ETHICS

Many criticisms of the human security concept have been levied. One of the more general ones is that the ethical framework appears arbitrary and suspiciously convenient. Supposedly, human security represents an ethical and righteous superiority over traditional or state-centered security. As Liotta and Owen put it,

> On the one hand, ethics collectively involves codes of values, morality, religion, history, tradition, and even language. Such an ethical system that enforces, as it were, human security inevitably collides with conflicting values—which are not synchronous or accepted by all individuals, states, societies, or regions. Pragmatically, enforcement of these values, or the perceived right to even make these judgments, is contested. On the other hand, in the once widely accepted, and still dominant, realist understanding, the state was the sole guarantor of security. Indeed, security extended downward from nations to individuals; conversely, the stable state extended upward in its relationship to other states to influence the security of the international system. This broadly characterizes what is known as the anarchic order.

Yet individual security, stemming from the liberal thought of the Enlightenment, was also considered both a unique and collective good. The responsibility, however, for the guarantee of the individual good—under any security rubric—has never been obvious.83

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Matlary voices similar concerns by asking, “if human security is paraded in rhetoric but has no policy effect, is not the rhetorical exercise itself the more unethical?”

She also maintains that, “if rhetoric promises more than policy can deliver, the ethical implications are grave.”

The basis for her critique is her view that human security does not really represent a new or improved approach to understanding or providing security. While this specific criticism of human security will be discussed in more detail shortly, it must be mentioned here because Matlary directly links the these two issues by stating that “the more it [human security] is employed in political rhetoric, the more ethically questionable this becomes, since it is not implemented in security policy in any new way.”

Note should, however, be taken of the fact that her comments predate the prominent use of the term human security in the 2008 report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy. Moreover, as noted in Chapter II, the term was also employed in a recent official statement made by a panel established by the Canadian government. These EU and Canadian statements indicate that the notion is in fact being taken seriously as an element of obligation and aspiration. Perhaps a little patience and less accusatory language are in order. After all, if the implementation of the concept was hurried and done without sufficient reflection, that might in itself discredit the concept. A deliberate approach gives the concept a fair chance to prove its merits.

B. LARGE POWERS VS. MIDDLE POWERS

It is a sad truth that perception sometimes matters more than reality, and that the identity of the actor sometimes matters more than what the action is or the motivation behind it. In this vein, certain scholars have argued that reactions to the concept of human security may derive as much from the identity of the proponent as from what the concept fundamentally represents. The accusation is that so-called “middle power” states such as Norway, Canada, and most of the member states of the European Union are using human security and other ethical, moralistic, or utopian concepts as a means to distinguish

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85 Ibid., 143.
86 Ibid., 142.
themselves from the “larger” or “great” powers and to assert a moral superiority over them, since they clearly cannot compete with them on more traditional security criteria such as military might. As Liotta and Owen put it,

Such so-called “middle power” states, after all, can exercise significant moral clout by emphasizing that the rights of the individual are at least as important as protecting the territorial and sovereign integrity of the state. Yet when larger powers, particularly those with significant militaries (such as the United States or the United Kingdom) advocate similar positions, it is their overwhelming power that is recognized, respected, and resented.

On the one hand, what is perceived as the “moral clout” of the middle power is sensed as “hegemony unbridled” when it is emphasized in an attempted similar fashion by major powers. On the other hand, when actions taken in the name, or in the principled following, of human security do occur, they often are inextricably linked to issues that are embedded in the more traditional concepts of “national security” and protection of the state.87

Whether or not it is indeed true that certain middle powers are using human security merely as a means of gaining a distinctive identity in relation to the larger powers, one must point out that, regardless of their good intentions, exactly this “clout” exerted by the middle powers makes them members of the club of intervening external powers, much as in colonial times. Liotta and Owen hit the nail on the head when they succinctly remarked that “Idealism thus becomes enmeshed in realism; actions taken on behalf of the powerless are determined only by the powerful.”88 As Matlary states, certain actions have been described as “human security operations, but military force is, as we can document in the scholarly literature, very rarely deployed for purely humanitarian purposes.”89

As previously mentioned, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty popularized the Responsibility to Protect concept, which holds that it is the duty of external agencies or other states, including the members of the United Nations, to make the security that sovereign states owe to their citizens a reality. As noted

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88 Ibid.
previously, this admirable and necessary notion raises issues with regard to crossing boundaries between ethical responsibility (to protect) and legal obligations (to respect the state’s right to sovereignty). As Liotta and Owen observe, “In the topology of power, dominant states will likely continue to intervene at the time and place of their choosing.”90 One might hope that this choice of when to act may increasingly, though not necessarily exclusively, be motivated by altruistic ends. Ayn Rand pointed out that the “virtue of selfishness”91 can be taken to mean that the desire to feel a sense of satisfaction when performing acts of charity is in and of itself virtuous because it causes good things to happen. Nations should be afforded the same consideration as individuals, in that regard for one's own welfare need not imply disregard for the well-being of others. In this respect, Bailes notes that Robert Cooper, a British diplomat who in 2002 assumed the role of Director-General for External and Politico-Military Affairs at the General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, “famously pointed out … [that] to survive in a still largely unreconstructed world the good may need to pursue a kind of rational selfishness requiring acts of ‘old-style’ zero-sum competition, bullying and coercion or even violence towards others.”92 Such an approach may be acceptable as a temporary measure, but only during a transitory phase.

C. IS HUMAN SECURITY AS A SPECIFIC FIELD SUPERFLUOUS?

Some have argued that human security “overpopulates an area that is already adequately addressed by state security, human development, and human rights initiatives, causing needless confusion and competing for scarce resources.”93 Other criticisms that have been expressed against the notion are that it is “unnecessary” and “redundant.”

Here it is crucial to accept that of course there are overlaps and interrelationships between the concept of human security and concepts of state security, human development and human rights.

There are various non-conceptual ways of distinguishing these three approaches: disciplinary, historical, and institutional. For example, whereas human development tends to be undertaken by activists and social scientists, and human rights by activists and lawyers and political scientists, state security studies described practitioners and scholars of defence and strategic studies, intelligence, and international relations. The disciplines that predominate in any of the areas shape the expertise and method of scholarship devoted to an area. Furthermore, the instruments and institutions that support each agenda differ: human development involves nongovernmental development organizations, sector-specific agencies in governments, overseas development assistance. Human rights mobilizes the international legal framework, UN Conventions, human rights organizations and legal instruments. State security mobilizes foreign policy, military expenditures, and defence and intelligence departments.  

Alkire firmly asserts that while these distinctions are vital, “one of the distinctions of human security from each of the other three approaches will be the unique blend of disciplines and institutions it engages.” As noted in Chapter II, King, Murray, and Thomas recognize conflict-related threats and, in the spirit of the 1994 UNDP, stress the fact that poverty is a root cause of conflict. As Alkire points out,

The key elements that they have adopted are the focus on the co-reasonability of elements of multidimensional human security—in other words, that security is achieved only when all of them are in place—and the individual focus of human security, which is not amenable to the aggregate indices often used in Human Development.  

The 2000 UNDP Report bore the subtitle of Human Rights and Human Development, and discussed the interrelationship of the two, as well as human security, at great length.

**D. MORE SPECIFIC SCHOLARLY CRITICISMS OF HUMAN SECURITY**

Paris has reviewed much of the skeptical literature. One of the common critiques of the human security concept is the question, on what grounds are the various domains of concern chosen? Paris is quite critical of authors such as King, Murray, and Thomas,

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95 Ibid.
96 Ibid., 16; emphasis in the original.
who identify certain values as more important than others, without offering a clear and logical justification. He holds that their process of identifying elements of human security is not sufficiently elaborated, and that not enough light is shed on how their definitions evolve. Concerning vagueness, he writes,

> Human security is like “sustainable development”—everyone is for it, but few people have a clear idea of what it means. Existing definitions of human security tend to be extraordinarily expansive and vague, encompassing everything from physical security to psychological well-being, which provides policymakers with little guidance in the prioritization of competing policy goals and academics little sense of what, exactly, is to be studied.\(^97\)

However, it is of interest to note that the 1994 HDR itself addresses this issue by stating that

> Several analysts have attempted rigorous definitions of human security. But like other fundamental concepts, such as human freedom, human security is more easily identified through its absence than its presence. And most people instinctively understand what security means.\(^98\)

Though the latter part of this statement may be debatable, Alkire seems to agree with parts of this HDR statement by noting that the very vagueness of the concept of human security “may also have positive value, by holding together an otherwise disparate coalition of interests.”\(^99\)

As to the concept’s incoherence, Paris points out that in trying to narrow the definition of the human security notion, many authors do not “provide a compelling rationale for highlighting certain values”\(^100\) over others. He specifically questions the cogency of the analysis by Murray and King: “their decision to exclude indicators of violence from their composite measure of human security creates a de facto distinction between human security and physical security, thereby purging the most familiar


\(^{100}\) Paris, “Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?,” 95.
connotation of security—safety from violence—from their definition of human security.”¹⁰¹ Paris is not alone in formulating this objection, for, according to Alkire, “Buzan, Weaver, and de Wilde, who review criticisms of ‘wide approaches’ (not necessarily human security) from traditional security literature, find this [incoherence] to be one of the two main criticisms.”¹⁰²

The criticism as to the theory’s arbitrariness has been well expressed by Lawrence Freedman. In his words, “Once anything that generates anxiety or threatens the quality of life in some respect becomes labeled a ‘security problem,’ the field risks losing all focus.”¹⁰³ Alkire raises pertinent questions:

When the potential set of critical and pervasive threats is so wide, by what criteria is a small subset of these chosen for consideration? So often the importance of a particular human security threat is argued in isolation from other threats, or threats appear to be chosen arbitrarily or in response to the interests of those responsible. It seems that the criteria of selection could include a wide range of considerations. Some are predictive: the probability of a threat occurring, the extent and depth of insecurity that is likely to result, and the duration of it. Some are perceptive: what human insecurities do people feel most strongly about? Some are ethical: will threats further exacerbate? Some are simply pragmatic: what is the relative cost of preventing threats; how feasible is it that prevention will be successful?¹⁰⁴

Some discussions of—and proposed answers to—the critical questions were uttered by Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh, the Director of the Program for Peace and Human Security (formerly the Center for Peace and Human Security) at the CERI (Centre d’Etudes et Recherches Internationales) in Paris, at a UNESCO forum entitled “Human Security: 60 Minutes to Convince” in 2005. In her short paper, she describes seven challenges to operationalizing the concept of human security. Firstly, does the issue of definitional consensus matter? She states that, while there is general disagreement on the definition, there is no doubt that the point is,

that there should be a shift of attention from a state-centered to a people-centered approach to security, that concern with the security of state borders should give way to concern with the security of the people who live within those borders. …At the end of the day, perhaps human security may prove to be more effective as a broad flexible framework rather than being codified in rigorous terms, but we need to recognize that we are not referring to one concept or paradigm but rather an approach.105

Secondly, Tadjbakhsh asks, how does the resurgence of “national security” affect “human security?” She suggests that globally “increased attention paid to the war against terrorism has now raised concerns that development policies risk being subordinated to a narrow security agenda, with aid allocated according to geo-strategic priorities.”106 She implies that this is not a positive development because it diverts attention from human security priorities.

Third is the question of responsibility. Tadjbakhsh finds it odd that in the flurry of discussion on human security the idea of individual empowerment is strangely absent. “Discussions around human security put too little emphasis on empowerment and on the agency approach, of the role of individuals as agents of change. An expanded notion of human security requires growing recognition of the role of people—of individuals and communities—in ensuring their own security.”107

Fourthly, Tadjbakhsh discusses the question of prioritizing and give and take. She argues that “to ‘hierarchize’ and prioritize among human security goals may be a futile exercise, as the concept is based on the postulate that all threats are interdependent: the eradication of one of them is of little effect without the implementation of a comprehensive framework.”108 She suggests that the task of prioritizing and “Policy-making should not be a vertical process but a networked, flexible and horizontal coalition of approaches corresponding to a complex paradigm.”109

106 Ibid., 2.
107 Ibid., 3.
108 Ibid.
109 Ibid.
Tadjbakhsh’s fifth question addresses the possibility of achieving an “inter-sectoral agenda.” In her words, “It is not enough to design programs that include education, health, sciences, media, [and] poverty as part of a ‘holistic’ package. It is more important to look at the relationships, how interventions in one sphere can actually have externalities, both positive and negative, on other areas, and what causalities could be in order to better design human security interventions.”\(^{110}\) She rightly points out that government bureaucracies and donor agencies not only do not understand each other, but lack the experience and know-how to work well together.

Tadjbakhsh’s sixth point concerns the failure to comprehend what conflict really is and how it arises, and how this failure leads to an inability to prevent it. “Very often we fail to understand the impact of conflicts on changing social norms and fail to integrate preventive measures in post-conflict stabilization programs.”\(^ {111}\)

Tadjbakhsh’s seventh and final argument is that care must be taken to provide help vice harm. “The best that international organizations can do for the cause of human security is actually not to increase more insecurities by failing to coordinate properly between partners and between sectors. The ultimate challenge is to make sure that interventions do no harm.”\(^ {112}\)

Tadjbakhsh’s statements are at such a high level of abstraction and so logically convoluted that some readers may find them confusing and unhelpful.

**E. CRITICISMS OF HUMAN SECURITY AS IT RELATES SPECIFICALLY TO THE EU AND ESDP**

The previously mentioned questions regarding the ethical issues surrounding the human security debate apply in particular to the EU and its ESDP. Alyson J. K. Bailes, formerly the British Ambassador to Finland, political director of the Western European Union and until recently director of the well known Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, voices several critiques in a recently published article entitled “The


\(^{111}\) Ibid.

\(^{112}\) Ibid.
EU and a ‘Better World’: What role for the European Security and Defense Policy?” She indicates that the EU and the ESPD are simultaneously reflecting two competing views in one policy: on the one hand, Realism, assuming that the ESDP is solely supporting the national interests of the EU member states; and on the other, Idealism, assuming that ESDP missions are motivated by the desire to create a better world. In her view, in ESDP and the EU’s human security doctrine there is a great contradiction between ambition and reality, and many “convenient” choices both in language and action.

A number of EU nations, including Germany, Austria, Spain and doubtless some of the new members, also seem to regard missions ‘close to home’ as inherently more legitimate; but what are the moral grounds for this, when cases further abroad might involve greater breaches of security and human rights and reap greater ‘added value’ from an EU military input as such?113

Bailes also points out that the EU sometimes hurts the same states and individuals with its trade and immigration policies that it claims to protect with its ESDP and human security doctrine. According to Bailes,

the point here is that the EU has chosen to be–with important exceptions like climate policy and some development aid–just as self-serving in its non-defence global policies as it strives to be altruistic in its defence and security ones. In any other context the word hypocrisy would swiftly come to mind.114

Bailes offers some insight into why the EU has developed such double standards. Basically it can be summed up by saying that it is in the nature of the institution. She states that some of the double standards of EU policy can be explained by a need to maintain cohesion, image, and self-confidence, but what she takes issue with is that the EU markets this as “ethical” behavior. This is glaringly apparent in her statement that

There is a strong impression that the EU’s more militarily active members are deliberately casting the ESDP in the role of the ‘nice cop’: as the storefront where they advertise themselves as friendly and ‘safe’ interveners, with bloodied hands discreetly held behind backs. This kind of double-think may be highly utilitarian in terms of maintaining the EU’s

114 Ibid., 120.
coherence, self-confidence and image: but this author would hesitate to call it ethical behaviour on the part of either the states that practise it or the EU that lends itself to the ploy.\textsuperscript{115}

However, it must be remembered that the EU is an organization that is built on and that breathes consensus among governments and sometimes even national populations (by referenda). Bailes acknowledges this, and logically extrapolates that “there is no certainty that such a collective entity will ever attain the toughness and rapidity of action of a single strategic power.”\textsuperscript{116} Also, owing to the high standard of living which is common in the EU, many Europeans expect the EU to project and establish these same conditions abroad. Nevertheless, this presents a pitfall. The question, as Liotta and Owen point out, is

how direct a link must be made between vulnerability abroad and EU security. Once the human security doctrine is applied to people outside of the EU’s political responsibility, must they justify intervention on national security grounds? If so, there are significant difficulties with relying solely on the “terrorist breeding ground” argument in guiding an entire foreign policy. If not, they will have to move beyond direct causal links to a more nuanced argument connecting suffering abroad to security at home.\textsuperscript{117}

The Barcelona Report seems to decidedly lean toward the “narrow” interpretation of human security, and this has been criticized by some scholars as overly restrictive. The EU doctrine makes violence against the individual and how to prevent it the center of attention by stressing the establishment of legal frameworks and law enforcement, with only an occasional use of force mentioned.\textsuperscript{118} However, the Barcelona Report does state that in some circumstances the use of force may be necessary. As Liotta and Owen have noted,

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{115} Bailes, “The EU and a ‘Better World’: What Role for the European Security and Defence Policy,” 120-121.
  \item \textsuperscript{116} Ibid., 121.
  \item \textsuperscript{117} Liotta and Owen, “Sense and Symbolism: Europe Takes on Human Security,” 94.
  \item \textsuperscript{118} \textit{A Human Security Doctrine for Europe: The Barcelona Report of the Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities}, 20, 29.
\end{itemize}
The report does state that in extreme circumstances, a human security intervention may be needed against the more egregious nonviolent threats, thus incorporating some aspects of the broader human security conceptualization, though notably using the type of threshold suggested above as a limiting mechanism.\textsuperscript{119}

Bailes would criticize this approach as choosing the less demanding tasks and disregarding the greater challenges:

Choosing operations that require relatively little force and risk, or where the professional military component is minimized, means ignoring some of the literal and metaphorical cries for help that ought to mean most for a European sense of values: cases of manifest genocide, as in Darfur, or, indeed, violent abuses of human rights and human security going on just over the EU’s new frontiers in Chechnya or the Palestinian territories. The deliberate choice not to build up more reaction capacity in depth or to attend to the further stages of strategic deterrence also creates a risk that the EU’s modest forces could end up needing to be rescued themselves if things go unexpectedly wrong.\textsuperscript{120}

The Barcelona Report is, however, specific in regard to expectations and norms. This is evident in the three elements listed in the Executive Summary and quoted in Chapter II of this thesis. Liotta and Owen therefore conclude that, “By responding simply to direct threats, the doctrine itself might be nothing more than a well-thought-through intervention force proposal; itself, it would remain little more than a response force to react to violence and its aftermath.”\textsuperscript{121}


\textsuperscript{120} Bailes, “The EU and a ‘Better World’: What Role for the European Security and Defence Policy,” 120.

\textsuperscript{121} Liotta and Owen, “Sense and Symbolism: Europe Takes on Human Security,” 96.
IV. CONCLUSION

Overall, the human security enterprise can be summed up by the following conclusion: the ambitions are idealistic and hopeful, but as yet vague and inconsistently defined, and in need of implementation and action. The idealism should not necessarily be held up as a shortcoming, while the need for practical implementation reflects the consequences of an evolutionary process. As Alkire puts it,

Human security [is] best specified procedurally, so that it would be both appropriate and feasible. The definition retains many degrees of freedom. But concrete situations have far fewer. They are constrained by data sets, by political realities, by limited resources and by the needs for urgent action. Thus those who criticize human security of “vagueness” are requested to consider the practical instances of human security promotion by agencies, and even to enter the discussion of what human security priorities and responsibilities should be.122

The European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) pursued by the European Union (EU) is an intergovernmental activity. Compromises are therefore understandably greater than in a single state’s policies. It is noteworthy that even Alyson Bailes, who is generally highly critical of the EU’s use of the term human security and its selection of ESDP missions, concedes, “It is hard to imagine any regional intergovernmental institution having a more high-minded and correct prescription than the EU’s for military activity.”123 Her reservations and those advanced by other critics seem to be on even higher moral ground than that which the EU, the ESDP, and the Barcelona Report claim to occupy.

Double standards are nothing new. As La Rochefoucauld once wrote, “Hypocrisy is the homage that vice offers to virtue.”124 Moliere added, “Hypocrisy is a fashionable

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vice, and all fashionable vices pass for virtues.”125 This does not excuse the vice, but it
must be recognized that it is perhaps an inescapable aspect of the human condition. The
states and intergovernmental organizations staffed by human beings are not exempt from
this condition. Some observers might contend, however, that the EU is far from having
enough cohesion to choose consciously to be hypocritical in its statements and actions.

Credit should be given to the EU for the aspirations and ambitions that it has
expressed. Considering its innate complexity, it is remarkable that the EU has succeeded
in drafting policy documents such as the European Security Strategy and the Barcelona
Report, and in conducting various types of ESDP missions around the world. As Bailes
states,

Within the ESDP itself, ten out of 14 operations launched up to mid-2007
were non-military ones—police operations; observer and planning
missions; assistance missions in the fields of border control, internal law
and justice (Eurojust-THEMIS in Georgia) and security sector reform
(EUSEC Congo); and rear-echelon support and advice for the African
Union’s deployment in Darfur, Sudan. On this showing, it might be argued
that there is no case to answer in terms of the EU’s becoming over-
‘militarized’ in any meaningful sense, and certainly no risk of its losing its
generally peaceful and non-threatening image by this means.126

The European Union’s apparent determination to maintain a peaceful and police-style
enforcement posture should not be considered a fault. After all, as Bailes has added,

Europeans believe in tackling security challenges by methods of ‘effective
multilateralism’, under the ultimate authority of the United Nations. They
further believe that no problem can be solved by military force alone, and
that military methods must be used only as a last-resort adjunct of other,
‘peaceful’, diplomatic, political, economic and humanitarian measures. All
these points were stressed partly as a deliberate contrast to and implicit
criticism of the U.S. National Security Strategy of 2002, which assigns a
far greater role to military power, and claims much greater freedom for
Washington to use force for its own purposes on its own authority.127

125 Moliere, *Don Juan*, in Anthony Lejeune, Editor, *The Concise Dictionary of Foreign Quotations*,

118.

127 Ibid.

42
Brooks Tigner, the editor of *Security Europe*, a monthly publication focused on EU homeland security policy, technology and business, has argued that the EU is uniquely suited to navigate this course.

The eschatological advantage is that Europeans conceive the fight between good and evil in the world, as well as their political “mission” and approach to it, in ways that substantially diverge from those of the United States. Due to its own more recent history, the Old World has drawn its lessons. Thus, Europe is beyond automatic reliance on brute force; it shies away from direct confrontation in favor of the collegial; it seeks the mantle of legitimacy conferred by multilateral versus bilateral solutions; it hands out generous amounts of united foreign aid; and it is always careful to stress the need for sustainable growth and a fair division of wealth among nations as the keys to international stability and respect for human rights.¹²⁸

Karina Marczuk hopes that constabulary forces, like the European Gendarmerie Force (EGF), could become a tool for providing human security, because the European Union is trying to reinforce its “soft power” policy. She discusses the value of the EGF and human security in relation to EU-U.S. relations as follows:

the unique capabilities of the Mediterranean constabulary and, consequently, the EGF could be a very attractive partner for the U.S. army [units] which conduct a policy of foreign interventions and are still seeking a solution to this dilemma: how to stabilize effectively a post conflict environment?... Perhaps it will be the EGF, as a practice tool, and the human security theory, as a theoretical support, which would allow the U.S. to deal successfully with foreign campaigns.¹²⁹

In the end, the desire to do good and the aim to uphold ethical and moral standards constitute a sound and virtuous point of departure. The implementation of these objectives in the EU’s ESDP remains a work in progress. The EU, because of its very genesis, history, and composition, may nonetheless be one of the most appropriate vehicles to champion this new and enlightened possible way forward. As Bailes puts it, the EU has played a “role in creating permanent peace among its own ever-multiplying


members,” and the EU benefits from “its demonstration value as embodying the greatest step the world has yet seen away from the order based on national sovereignty that produced all the modern era’s wars.”\(^{130}\) The fact that the EU is widely perceived to be slow, awkward, and dependent on improvisation in pursuing this goal should not diminish the validity of the cause. There is, undeniably, much potential for growth, but the EU has seen to the germination and solid rooting of the seedling known as human security.


Amsterdam Treaty. Title V, Article 11.


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