I hope all is well as we conclude the holiday season. Our thoughts continue to be with all away from their families due to worldwide operations and security cooperation initiatives.

This quarter’s DISAM Journal features a series of articles covering the School of International Graduate Studies at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), and their relationships with the Center for Civil-Military Relations, Defense Resource Management Institute, and Global Center for Security Operations – a good update to the Winter 2005 Journal which featured NPS in total.

There is a multitude of articles in the legislation and policy arena these days and this edition of the Journal attempts to cover the gamut. Particularly, we join, Deputy Secretary of State John D. Negroponte in congratulating the Foreign Service Institute on sixty years of service. We offer the “Perspectives” of John B. Bellinger III on the United States and International Law along with a take on offsets by Won-Joon Jang and Tae-Yun Joung.

We have a great variety of subjects in a section entitled “Security Cooperation Community”. CENTCOM’s Greg Marme looks into fiscal policy issues from a COCOM perspective. Angela Kravitz’ (SAF/IA) reports on the emphasis being placed on the “United States Air Force International Affairs Career Field”. Ron Weinberger’s discussion of NAVAIR’s process improvement efforts and Petty Officer First Class David Votroubek’s (CSTC-Afghanistan) notes the partnership with DISAM in providing training to Afghan personnel. Lieutenant Colonel Mario Matos documents the success of “Operation Iguana Volador”, combined exercise in Latin America. Charles Taylor’s update on GMAP II all authenticate the dynamics of our environment.

Special congratulations to DISAM’s Joanne Hawkins for her effort, combining substantial field expertise and experience in her article, “Where’s My Stuff?” Even if you are not a logistician, you owe it to yourself to read this article which helps cut to the core of getting the right stuff to the right person at the right time. A central issue if you are a logistician working security cooperation materiel issues. She acknowledges the help of many in her article, and I add my thanks as well.

Two of DISAM faculty fixtures retired recently, Dr. Craig Brandt, Dean of Academic Affairs/Deputy Commandant retired at the end of July 2007. A major component of our management core and faculty, he led teams to many of your locations over the years. Additionally, Mr. Roger Reynolds, formerly of AFSAC and then with University of Dayton, taught his last class as an adjunct faculty member last month. Over the last ten year, he superbly addressed cross cultural issues to United States and international students at DISAM. Both of them will be sorely missed.

Lastly, we bid farewell to Charlie Collins who passed away on November 17, 2007. Talk about fixtures, Charlie was one particularly to the security assistance and security cooperation training community. After retiring from the Army, he was a DISAM civilian faculty member and had retired from DISAM last January 2007. We will have more about him in the next edition of the Journal, but I wanted to make sure all got a more timely notification in my comments. His wife, Sherrie, and the entire family appreciate all the e-mail, cards, thoughts, and prayers from everyone who knew Charlie.

Again, thank you for your support of DISAM and the Journal. Keep that feedback and influx of articles coming. Take care more to come next quarter!

RONALD H. REYNOLDS
Commandant
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Dr. Craig M. Brandt  
Dean of Academic Affairs,  
and Deputy Commandant Retires from the  
Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

Dr. Craig Brandt served as an instructor of security assistance management during his last tour of duty in the United States Navy, and as Director of Research, the Dean of Academic Affairs, and the Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM) Deputy Commandant as a Department of Defense (DoD) civilian employee until his retirement on 31 July 2007. In all, Craig was assigned to DISAM for over sixteen years and made contributions too numerous to record to not only DISAM, but the entire security assistance and security cooperation community.

After graduating from the NROTC program at Rice University, Craig was commissioned in the United States Navy on 31 July 1964, and reported for duty at the Navy Supply Corps School in Athens, Georgia. He graduated with distinction and in May 1965 was sent to be the supply officer of USS Vernon County (LST-1161), home-ported in Yokosuka, Japan. For two years the ship was occupied with the logistics build-up in Vietnam and as a support vessel in the Mekong Delta for Swift boats and Coast Guard cutters on “Market Time,” a maritime interdiction operation.
Following his shipboard tour, Craig was assigned to the Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Ingalls Shipbuilding Corporation, Pascagoula, Mississippi, where as the material officer he was responsible for government-furnished material, provisioning and repair parts outfitting, and transportation in support of the construction of five different classes of ships. This served as the perfect experience for his first job in security assistance, the logistics/material officer of the Navy Shipbuilding Liaison Office, Europe, in Madrid, Spain. The principal program there was the co-production of five DEG-7 class frigates. After a year in the Spanish headquarters, Craig was sent to the Resident Shipbuilding Liaison Office at the shipyard in El Ferrol del Caudillo.

Returning to the U.S. in November 1972, Craig became the head of the Allowance and Load List Branch at the Navy Ships Parts Control Center in Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania. During the second half of his tour he headed the Special Programs Branch which included security assistance programs, support of Antarctica and Diego Garcia, and management of all Navy material handling equipment.

In January 1976, Craig reported as supply officer of USS Richmond K. Turner (CG-20), homeported in Norfolk, Virginia and later in Charleston, South Carolina. The highlights of his tour included participation in OPSAIL, the bicentennial festival in New York City, and a deployment to the Mediterranean.

On a cold and snowy day in January, 1978, Craig became the last of the initial military cadre to stand up the fledgling Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management in Dayton, Ohio. During his tenure he was the logistics functional coordinator, the director of European studies, and developed the SAM-I (Industry) course for which he was the course manager. Craig was assigned to DISAM until his retirement from the Navy on 31 July 1984. Entering the private sector, he became a logistics analyst with Systems Exploration, Incorporation in Dayton, Ohio, primarily working on research and development of logistics projects such as the integrated management information system. He left industry in March 1987 to join the faculty of the Air Force Institute of Technology. During his last five years there, he served as the head of the Graduate Department of Logistics Management. While at AFIT, he won the national field award for international logistics education awarded by the Society of Logistics Engineers and the Air Force Association’s Professor Ezra Kotcher Award for his development of the Air Force’s first distance learning graduate program. He also received the Air Force Meritorious Civilian Service Award.

In November 1998, Craig rejoined DISAM as the director of research, a position he held until his promotion to dean of academic affairs in May 2001. While continuing to teach logistics, he led the efforts to obtain academic accreditation from the Council on Occupational Education.

Craig has received the designation of certified professional logistician from the Society of Logistics Engineers. He is the author of two books, Military Assistance and Foreign Policy and The Fundamentals of Military Logistics as well as several articles and academic papers on logistics and security assistance topics.

Craig’s contributions to DISAM and the international affairs community are numerous and significant – he will be missed. Fair winds and following seas – your DISAM shipmates.
Building Partnership Capacity Through International Military Education and Training

The Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) in Monterey, California, has emerged as a center of excellence in the advanced study and application of defense matters. Further, the school has aided in the building of security alliances and coalitions as well as the capacities of our coalition partners and allies. In fact, the School of International Graduate Studies (SIGS) leads the transformation of NPS to meet evolving global security demands. The origins of SIGS reach back into the early 1990’s, when NPS recognized the need to house all security assistance and international programs under a single roof. Building upon this foundation, SIGS has fostered innovative programs to meet the security challenges of the present conflict, with an eye to the needs of all the services and the duty to build partnership capacity.

The cornerstone of SIGS is the Department of National Security Affairs (NSA), a leading program of theoretical and applied advanced strategic study recognized by policy makers and researchers throughout the world. The department offers Master’s and Doctoral degrees in Regional Studies and Security Studies. The majority of the faculty are tenured or tenure-track and engage in advanced research with the United States (U.S.) government and other organizations. The faculty analyzes the most urgent strategic issues, focusing on the requirements of our officers and teaching from relevant materials suited to both theoretical and practical aspects of the current conflict. Through the U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency’s International Military Education and Training (IMET) and Expanded-IMET programs, many of the NSA professors have established long-term relationships with senior security, defense and military officials around the world, opinion makers, and scholars studying how nations interact and cooperate. The NSA faculty’s research has helped senior military and civilian leaders to better understand the requirements of statecraft, strategy, and leadership in a tumultuous global environment. Through their work, they have heavily contributed to the decision making process on issues of U.S. policy and strategy. Such networks of education and cooperation help NSA faculty to stay at the vanguard of developments in diplomacy, strategy, society, and culture.
Short course programs, executive education, and mobile education teams (METs) offered by the Center for Civil-Military Relations (CCMR) provide outstanding opportunities to build the security capacity of partner nations. Education efforts of this kind are also provided by the Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction, the International Defense Acquisition Resource Management Program and the Defense Resources Management Institute (DRMI). It was from DRMI’s initial effort in the 1960’s that a variety of excellent international security programs evolved at SIGS. Each of these centers offers graduate-level executive education in various facets of security, defense and military reform presented in a true academic setting. The programs of these entities – tailored by the SIGS faculty and their partners to the needs of the host country – aid partner officials around the world to better analyze, formulate, and execute optimal security practices tailored to defense and military policies. Such an effort falls squarely within the needs of U.S. national strategy.

In addition to these programs to build international capacity, SIGS supports the U.S. Army education requirements outlined in Department of Defense Directive 3000.5 through its Leadership Development and Education for Sustained Peace (LDESP) program. LDESP prepares U.S. military units to deploy for stability operations in cooperation with multi-national partners. LDESP comprises a program of short courses focused on U.S. policy and strategy and is tailored to the precise needs of the unit. All involved gain an advanced understanding of the regional, geopolitical and cultural factors in their area of operations. The courses include the history, politics, society, economy and culture of the country or region in question, as well as details of language, means of negotiations, and other issues of relevance to area experts who advise the individual soldier and broader unit in security operations.

In this journal issue, SIGS provides articles about the IMET programs offered by the Center for Civil-Military Relations and the Defense Resources Management Institute, including information on the programs and research conducted by their faculty. Should you have any questions about the School of International Graduate Studies please contact us at (831) 656-1781 or visit our web site at http://www.nps.edu/Academics/SIGS/index.html.
Overview:
The Center for Civil-Military Relations

The CCMR for Civil-Military Relations (CCMR) in Monterey, California, helps nations strengthen their democracies and resolve issues resulting from defense transformation, stability, security, transition and reconstruction (SSTR) operations, terrorism, and other security challenges. In the past two years, the CCMR has helped educate over 7,000 international military officers and civilians in programs conducted in host countries and in the United States.

Wherever possible, the U.S. works with or through others: enabling allied and partner capabilities, building their capacity and developing mechanisms to share the risks and responsibilities of today’s complex challenges. Quadrennial Defense Review (Office of the Secretary of Defense, February 6, 2006.)

In a democracy, those who govern have power by virtue of a popular vote of their country’s citizens. While not similarly elected, the military also holds power based on the strength of the institution and its control over the means of violence. Consequently, effective civil-military relations – the relationships between elected civilian leaders and the military – are vital to those seeking to create a government that is ultimately responsive to the people who elected it.

The key issue remains how a democratic government can exert control over the military, rather than the other way around. This is especially important since the military formed the government in many countries, and in others the military is relied on periodically to support a civilian government. As always, “the devil is in the details” because institutions such as defense ministries, legislative committees, oversight commissions, and others must exercise control over the military for a democratically elected civilian government to succeed.

Democracy is a value by itself, derivative of the benefits of liberty and freedom, and it is widely accepted that democracies create better conditions than other political systems for human progress and the minimization of conflict and war. The study and teaching of civil–military relations is extremely important because unless civilians know how to establish and manage these key institutions, real democratic civil–military relations cannot be achieved. By employing a lessons-learned and best-practices approach, civilians can learn how to control the military, and officers can come to understand that in the long run such control benefits them and their nation.

The CCMR at the Naval Postgraduate School was established in Monterey, California, in 1994 to provide graduate-level education to international civilian and military participants through resident and nonresident courses. The CCMR’s programs assist foreign nations in resolving civil–military issues that can occur as a nation addresses defense transformation requirements, participates in SSTR operations, seeks to combat terrorism, and steps up to other security challenges. In so doing, CCMR assists in the implementation of the National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, Security Cooperation Strategy, the Quadrennial Defense Review, and other Presidential directives and policies.

Last year the CCMR reached 4,166 students through 93 programs, 77 delivered abroad, and 16 at its California campus. Through October 2006, the CCMR had conducted 129 nonresident programs, 38 took place away from Monterey in the U.S. and 91 abroad. It also offered 17 resident programs in Monterey. Participants in these 146 programs included 2,929 foreign officers, 1,644 foreign civilians, 13,659 U.S. military personnel, and 977 U.S. civilians.
All of the CCMR’s programs emphasize three main goals:

- First, consolidate and deepen democracy with particular reference to national defense and the armed forces
- Second, increase the effectiveness of the armed forces in fulfilling the multiple roles and missions assigned to them by their democratically elected civilian leaders
- Third, seek success in the most efficient manner possible at the lowest possible cost

While these goals apply to all of its programs, the CCMR has a number of different programs tailored for specific purposes in response to changing world conditions and emerging requirements. For example, CCMR is teaching leaders:

- How to carry out defense transformation
- How to formulate defense policy and strategy
- How to implement defense reform
- How to address civilian control and personnel management issues
- How to pursue defense acquisitions
- How to handle civil-military relations and public affairs

In the area of combating terrorism policy and strategy, the CCMR has created programs that emphasize how to implement these policies effectively while simultaneously strengthening democratic processes and culture. Of particular emphasis is the theme of reforming intelligence policies and processes. The CCMR has taken the lead in U.S. graduate-level education and training for SSTR operations. Three dozen nations, for example, are receiving education about the most current doctrine and peacekeeping methods through the Global Peace Operations Initiative program. The United Nations (U.N.) provides the doctrine, and the CCMR contributes to its formulation.

Through other programs, U.S. officers and civilian leaders learn about the challenges and opportunities provided by international peacekeeping duties. In one program, Leader Development and Education for Sustained Peace (LDESP), the CCMR prepares U.S. military units and personnel for stability operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq.

Increasing demand on the CCMR has led to the proliferation of programs and greater student participation. The CCMR has rapidly expanded its graduate-level, short-course educational programs for international civilians and officers, as well as for American civilians and officers scheduled to serve abroad.

The CCMR’s programs incorporate requirements established by the U.S. government and, when abroad, by the host nation. The programs are rigorous and demand graduate-level thought and analysis. The CCMR draws on the teaching expertise of academic experts, retired military officers, retired members of Congress, executive and legislative staffers, and international experts. Discussion groups and simulations are emphasized throughout. In response to a request this year by the Department of State (DoS) and the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), CCMR developed a series of programs with the Government of Nepal. The purpose of the program is to assist Nepalese government officials with developing procedures to reform the security structure, establishing a process...
for democratic civil-military relations and developing a peace process. The first of the series was delivered in June and will be followed by four additional seminars.

Successful programs in short courses generate additional requests, for longer-term programs. Examples include creation of a civilian defense cadre in Taiwan; reform of the defense planning and management system in Estonia; Ministry of Defense reform and promotion of national security public awareness in Colombia; and development of a national defense planning system in Ukraine. Building upon previous seminars and workshops, the CCMR can assist in institutionalizing its three goals of achieving democratic civilian control, demonstrating military effectiveness, and promoting efficient use of resources.

The Naval Postgraduate School faculty members lead most CCMR programs. Organized into teams, the faculty maintains geographic academic currency and reaches out to prominent civilians, officers, and members of academia and other communities to promote learning. This, in turn, has been an effective recruiting tool to build a cadre of young faculty members with expertise in Africa, the Middle East, South Asia, Latin America, Asia, and Central and Eastern Europe.

The CCMR’s decade of experience has allowed the faculty to publish scholarly articles on such topics as democratic consolidation, defense reform, and democratic control of intelligence organizations. Last year, the University of Texas Press published, *Who Guards the Guardians and How: Democratic Civil Military Relations*, which includes chapters by several Civil-Military Relations faculty. Another book, which grew out of the *Intelligence and Democracy Program* and published this year, *Reforming Intelligence: Obstacles to Democratic Control and Effectiveness*, discusses reform of intelligence organizations throughout the world. Yet another book, *Global Politics of Defense Reform*, examining case studies on defense reform will follow this. In all cases, the book–length manuscripts have grown out of the course material.

The CCMR has been able to compound its influence through partnerships with other educational and research institutions. In El Salvador, for example, it has been working with the College for Higher Strategic Studies (CAEE) for a decade. Graduates are now spread throughout the upper levels of the government and the military. In addition, the Defense University of Mongolia created the Civil–Military Relations Research Center in 2002, establishing close links to the Monterey center. Together the two centers have now published two books.

The CCMR is a unique institution. It combines academic excellence in teaching and publishing with customized courses on all aspects of civil–military relations and security decision–making. Its reputation is well known in North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Partnership for Peace circles, within the U.N. community, and among international scholars. As it celebrates over a decade of development and growth, the CCMR stands ready to respond to emerging demands with high quality, relevant, graduate–level programs. For more information contact Mr. Richard Hoffman, Director, Center for Civil–Military Relations web site at: [www.ccmr.org](http://www.ccmr.org).
There is a common perception in mainstream academia that research and teaching on topics of current relevance are often characterized by conceptual poverty and mediocrity. On the other hand, policy makers frequently criticize the research and publications of academics as irrelevant, as all too often captive in the proverbial “ivory tower.” The Center for Civil-Military Relations (CCMR) at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) seeks in all of its programs to combine scholarly rigor with real-world relevance in a wide spectrum of programs focused on civil–military relations and national security and defense. The faculty at NPS consists of approximately 200 tenure track faculty, 30 military faculty, and a varying number of other non-tenure track faculty who support the teaching and research programs. Among the tenure track faculty, virtually all hold doctorates.

Most CCMR programs, whether conducted in residence or abroad, are led by faculty members at NPS, and for team members draw upon the tenured and tenure–track faculty in the Department of National Security Affairs, Defense Resources Management Institute, and the Graduate School of Business and Public Policy. These faculty members, who are recruited from the premier research universities in the United States (U.S.) and abroad, are active in their disciplines, conduct research, and publish books and articles. In the NPS graduate degree courses they are teaching highly motivated young officers from all of the U.S. military services and officers and civilians from more than fifty other countries. The emphasis at NPS is on graduate–level teaching, analytical rigor, and original research in that NPS follows the same “publish or perish” orientation that keeps the U.S. at the top of the international graduate education hierarchy.

These tenured and tenure–track faculty bring to the CCMR one-week and two-week courses their conceptual and empirical background and insights, not to mention language skills and in–depth familiarity of different countries and regions. In this manner, virtually all CCMR programs are conceived, developed, and delivered with a graduate–level education perspective and analytical standard in mind.

The NPS faculty members benefit from their integration in CCMR short courses in three main ways.

- First, CCMR delivers programs throughout the world and to select groups of middle–to upper–level policy makers, both officers and civilians. NPS faculty members, through their participation in the CCMR team, travel to countries in Asia, Africa, Latin America, Central and Eastern Europe, and North Africa and the Middle East, thereby updating their contacts and information, or in some cases developing new research interests and contacts. While CCMR programs are supported by the U.S. embassy in country, and thus the threat to personal security is minimized in what are often very dangerous places, the team members often meet not only the participants of the seminar but also local academics and members of think tanks and non-government organizations. The NPS faculty member can thus gather data with which to update their research, for subsequent publication.
Second, the NPS faculty also benefit in that the American officer students at NPS are very likely to go to assignments abroad, in the combatant commands (COCOMs), or in the Pentagon dealing with the areas and the issues they have studied while at NPS. The international students, officers and civilians, will return to their countries and frequently assume very important positions. The faculty member returning from a CCMR seminar in one of these countries is thus able to bring back fresh data and insights, as well as contacts that will be of real and vital interest to NPS students. Very frequently graduates, both U.S. officers and internationals, will remain in touch with NPS faculty, and their U.S. and international colleagues long after they have departed.

Third, the CCMR teams routinely include as instructors retired flag and general officers, members of the U.S. Congress, retired ambassadors, staffers from Congress and executives in positions on the National Security Council and Office of the Secretary of Defense, as well as international experts. Through participation on the team during an intense week or so, the NPS faculty member learns a tremendous amount about how civil–military relations really work in the U.S. and other countries. Participation in a team is a very intense learning experience. In short, taking part on a CCMR team increases the breadth and depth of NPS faculty research and teaching, and directly benefiting NPS graduate students.

Institutionally, CCMR is finally, after ten years of developing and delivering unique programs, able to collect the insights and data from conducting programs abroad and in Monterey to produce book–length manuscripts for publication. Until recently, the CCMR faculty and staff were so busy developing and delivering programs, in response to exponentially increasing demand from other countries, the Department of State (DoS), the Department of Defense (DoD), and the COCOMs, that they were unable to collect and document the knowledge acquired through these programs. Now, however, with the support from the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) sponsoring to develop new course content for the seminars in residence and abroad, CCMR has been able to go beyond creating and updating course material, and writing edited books for publication by a prestigious academic publisher.

The first book, *Who Guards the Guardians and How: Democratic and Civil-Military Relations*, edited by Thomas Bruneau and Scott Tollefson, was published by the University of Texas Press in 2006. It contains chapters on such key civil–military issues as:

- “The Military as a Profession”
- “Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces”
- “The Role of the Legislature and Legislative Control of the Budget”
- “Professional Military Education”

It has been proclaimed as one of the most useful books published on civil-military relations in the last fifty years, and is something of a manual for practitioners throughout the world seeking to reform the defense sector.

The second book, resulting from CCMR seminars in residence and abroad, and specifically from an international roundtable held in Monterey in August 2004, *Reforming Intelligence: Obstacles to Democratic Control and Effectiveness*, was edited by Thomas Bruneau and Steven Boraz. This book, published by the University of Texas Press in 2007, contains chapters on the efforts to reform the intelligence services not only in the so-called new democracies in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and Central and Eastern Europe, but also in the United States, Great Britain, France, and Israel. This book is unique in the field of intelligence studies for the approach and the case studies, all based on original
research. This book, like all CCMR programs, seeks to combine the goals of democratic civilian control with military effectiveness and efficiency.

CCMR is unique in focusing on and developing multiple links between premier graduate-level education, research, and publishing and practical applications in a broad spectrum of programs on civil–military relations and defense planning and restructuring. On one hand the CCMR programs are pushed to graduate level analytical and empirical research standards by the integration of premier NPS faculty in the seminars. On the other hand, faculty benefit from their participation in the global CCMR programs which expose them to middle-level and upper-level policy makers in real and concrete contexts. In this manner, there is a powerful synergy that benefits all involved, including the international participants and their countries.

About the Author

Dr. Thomas Bruneau is a tenured faculty member in the Department of National Security Affairs, School of International Graduate Studies.
The advent of more deadly forms of terrorism has challenged all governments to craft responses that stop terrorism while strengthening democracy – and without breeding more terrorism. The era of new terrorism is fraught with paradoxes and dilemmas that require decision-makers to develop a thorough understanding of the threats they face, as well as a comprehensive appreciation for the tools available to them for developing effective responses. No single government can respond effectively to the new terrorism, laced as it is with global net worked support. Neither can any single agency within government execute the strategy necessary to prevail over terrorist networks. These conditions place international and interagency coordination at the very center of all successful strategies for combating terrorism.

The Center for Civil-Military Relations (CCMR) core competency of helping other governments make better defense decisions has found a natural extension in the Regional Defense Counter-Terrorism (CT) Fellowship Program, managed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Like other CCMR programs, the CT Fellowship consists of short courses, both in Monterey, California and overseas. Using a panel approach, teaching teams comprised of scholars, retired military and law enforcement officers and selected government officials, conduct one- and two-week seminars worldwide. To date, CCMR has educated over 1300 students from more than 66 countries in how governments can respond effectively to the terrorist threat. This series of courses, administered through the security assistance system, is aptly titled “Civil-Military Responses to Terrorism.” This is not a course about the United States; the focus is on how other governments can fight terrorism within their own political, budgetary, and societal circumstances.

These courses are offered to all interested governments, who can choose from a menu of global, regional, and bilateral programs. Countries with specific allocations of CT Fellowship funding are encouraged to work directly with CCMR, but must get approval for their proposals from the responsible regional combatant commander (COCOM). Countries without CT allocations can request that COCOM “discretionary” funding be used to support their participation in regional or bilateral courses. This funding enables CCMR to conduct regional courses that promote vital cooperation among neighboring countries fighting the transnational threat of terrorism. For interested governments without access to CT Fellowship funds, International Military Education and Training (IMET) funds or self-funding options may be available.

The global course is conducted in Monterey for an audience of between 25 and 40 personnel. This two-week seminar is offered twice per year. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) funds up to 25 participants in this course, with the balance of attendees financed from requesting country allocations or combatant commander discretionary funds. The biggest advantage of this format is the widest possible audience diversity. Such diversity reveals the largest number of useful ideas and insights during class discussions.

Regional courses have been the main emphasis in the CT Fellowship program to date. Conducted in a country selected by the regional COCOM, these events bring together representatives of governments fighting terrorism in the same region or sub-region. These seminars allow participants to become acquainted with the common threats they face and with each other. No single country can
beat terrorism by itself, and worldwide cooperation comes with political limitations. If the global ‘war’ on terrorism is to be won, it will be won in the regions.

Bilateral courses are offered to those governments who wish to expose the maximum number of their own officials to course material relevant to national issues in terrorism. Up to 60 military officers and civilian officials can be gathered into a seminar, specially designed to address the host nation’s most pressing needs. Security Assistance Officers can program this Military Education and Training (MET), and CCMR will help them shape a curriculum, estimate costs, and plan logistic support.

A Unique Approach

CCMR faculty members remain with the class between presentations, offering insights regarding lecture material given by others, as well as audience interventions. This creates the learning atmosphere of an extended panel discussion, in which the participants remain actively engaged. In order to add further relevance to the seminars, CCMR custom-builds its programs to ensure that all audiences are exposed to the best possible mix of presentations, case studies, and classroom exercises. Additionally, most courses contain a requirement for participants to make a presentation to the class regarding the challenges of terrorism in their countries. Such a cross-fertilization of ideas makes it very important to put together mixed civil-military audiences, representative of all components of the security sector (the Armed Forces, intelligence services, and law enforcement agencies). The objective of each CCMR CT event is to have every participant leave the course with a coherent, holistic understanding of the terrorist threat, and what governments can do about it. Every program is planned with this goal in mind.

CCMR balances its course material between defining the problem and examining possible solutions, but the main emphasis is on the latter. Presentations are always being improved and expanded, but a short list of topics would include the following:

- Terrorism: The Old and The New
- Terrorism and Insurgency
- Maritime Terrorism
- Weapons of Mass Destruction and Terrorism
- Terrorist Networks
- Terrorist Financing
- Tools and Strategies
- Intelligence and Combating Terrorism
- Information as a Weapon in Combating Terrorism
- Interagency Decision-Making
- Media Issues in Combating Terrorism
- International Approaches
- Ethics and Combating Terrorism
- Restructuring the Security Sector for Responding to Terrorism
- Measures of Effectiveness
Case studies are presented in order to extract lessons learned and best practices from the widest spectrum of government experiences. Cases are drawn from within the region, but also from outside (in many instances, cases from far away have more to teach the audiences than those too close to home). New cases are added as needed, but a short list of case studies that have been used would include:

- Turkey
- Kenya
- El Salvador
- Colombia
- Peru
- Malaya (historical case)
- United Kingdom
- Spain
- Chechnya

Each course is designed to include multiple opportunities for participants to break down into smaller discussion groups. In one-week programs, this means simply discussing specified topics in breakout groups of between six and fifteen people. During two-week courses, these breakout groups take on the role of committees advising a fictitious government’s leadership and develop strategy recommendations against terrorist threats. This classroom exercise is a highlight of the Monterey course and can be modified to suit regional and bilateral seminars.

What is New?

CCMR has begun to conduct focused METs on a variety of topics. These courses appeal to governments having special areas of concern in their efforts to combat terrorism. Focused seminars and workshops can be regional but are most often requested by single governments from the following list:

- Intelligence
- Policy and Strategy
- Restructuring the Security Sector
- Maritime Terrorism
- Organized Crime and Terrorism
- Civil-Military Cooperation and Terrorism
- Ethics and Combating Terrorism
- Border Control
- Consequence Management
• Public Affairs in Responses to Terrorism

• Building CT Institutions

In order to extract maximum synergy from DoD institutions, CCMR is developing collaborative relationships with all regional centers. The model for these relationships is that between CCMR and the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS), which features regular faculty sharing in the Honolulu-based “Comprehensive Security Responses to Terrorism” course, and in mobile programs within the region.

With the establishment of numerous centers and schools dedicated to fighting terrorism, CCMR is developing a series of institution-building workshops to share lessons learned and best practices among faculties. The resulting network of CT teaching organizations will ensure that the CT Fellowship program maintains long-term relevance. The first of these workshops was conducted in Turkey for the Turkish “Center of Excellence in Defense Against Terrorism” in the spring of 2005. CCMR conducts regular exchanges with similar institutions in other regions.

Something for Everyone

The CCMR CT Fellowship program is a dynamic, flexible, and creative way to address host nation concerns regarding terrorism threats, realities, and responses. Using only the most qualified faculty and keeping them in the classroom throughout the seminar provides the most productive learning environment found anywhere. We view these events as beginnings rather than endings, and we stand ready to assist our graduates with research and technical guidance for as long as they need it. By bringing in experts from around the country and the world CCMR can build courses for any audience mix in any country or region. The Center is proud of its hands-on, entrepreneurial approach and looks forward to an increasingly productive series of events in the coming years.

About the Author

Captain Paul Shemella, USN (Retired) is the Program Manager for the CCMR CT Fellowship Program is Paul Shemella, Captain, USN (ret). More information, including upcoming CT Fellowship events, can be found on the CCMR web site: www.ccmr.org/combating terrorism.
Helping Countries to Better Manage Limited Defense Resources

By
Dr. C. J. LaCivita
Executive Director of The Defense Resources Management Institute

The Defense Resources Management Institute (DRMI), located at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) in Monterey, California, is an educational institution sponsored and supervised by the Secretary of Defense. The DRMI teaches graduate level, professional education programs in analytical decision making and resources management for military officers and senior civilians from both the United States (U.S.) and other countries. Since its inception in 1965, over 30,000 officials from the U.S. and 162 other countries have participated in DRMI programs. The Institute’s courses enable participants to develop the skills and thought processes necessary for deciding how best to allocate scarce resources among abundant alternatives under conditions of uncertainty.

The DRMI curricula integrate economic reasoning, management science, and quantitative analysis in a systems approach to decision-making. The basic tenet of all DRMI curricula is that sound decisions begin with clearly stated goals and objectives and followed by analysis of alternatives for achieving those goals. The systems approach uses various models to predict the consequences of different alternatives and provides a framework for the decision maker to explore trade-offs, gain insight, and make a choice. The great advantage of this method is that a link can be drawn from the problem to a course of action and to the cost of resources necessary to implement the course of action. The modeling principles taught at the Institute allow the manager to explain the relationship between resource inputs and organizational outputs and outcomes. Instead of relying on best-guess speculation, a defendable argument can be made for resource requirements.

DRMI’s faculty is a mix of twenty civilians and four military officers all with graduate degrees and all members of the NPS faculty. The majority of the civilian faculty have Ph.D.s and are experts in their academic fields. Many also have prior military experience. In addition to teaching, they conduct research in defense areas relative to their academic fields. The military faculty includes lieutenant colonels and commanders representing the four military Services. In addition to holding graduate degrees, all have served extensive operational tours as well as staff assignments where they have used the procedures they now teach. Many are Joint Staff Officer qualified and understand the broad issues of joint operations in the DoD.

Courses Offered

All DRMI courses have two overarching goals: to provide an analytical framework for making defense resources allocation decisions and to provide a forum for the exchange of ideas. Courses differ depending on the intended audience, particular topics to be addressed and the amount of time available for the course. The method of instruction for all DRMI courses is a mix of lecture and small group discussions. Participants are presented with a series of real world problem scenarios and encouraged to share their ideas and experiences. The diversity of experience among the participants is a valuable addition to the mix of ideas and viewpoints on a particular problem. In fact, the exchange of ideas among peers is one of the most valuable learning aspects of the course. DRMI has been at the forefront of the Expanded International Military Education and Training (E-IMET) initiative since 1991, and all courses listed below are approved for E-IMET.
Defense Resources Management Course

The Defense Resources Management Course (DRMC) is a four-week course offered five times a year. It is designed for U.S. military officers (active or reserve) of rank O-4 to O-6, civilian officials of grades GS-11 through GS-15 or equivalent, individuals participating in accelerated career development programs, and foreign officials of similar rank or grade. Although designed for a U.S. audience, international students have participated in every DRMC the Institute has offered. International participants in the DRMC are typically from our NATO allies and usually comprise 30-40 percent of the class. Germany, for example, sends three officials to every DRMC. Maximum enrollment is fifty-four participants.

As noted above, the course has two major goals. The first goal is to develop an understanding and appreciation of the concepts, techniques, and decision making skills related to allocating defense resources in order to enhance effectiveness in modern defense organizations. The course provides an integrated, multidisciplinary approach that encourages the participant to develop an understanding of concepts, principles, methods, and techniques drawn from management theory, economic reasoning and quantitative reasoning. Course content emphasizes ways of thinking about defense resource issues and problems through three interdependent areas of study. The first area concentrates on the formulation of resource allocation problems and methods of analysis suited to solving such problems. Special attention is given to the tools and techniques of quantitative reasoning. The second focuses on the use of economic concepts in resource allocation and the importance of weighing benefits against their costs. Economy and efficiency, marginal reasoning, production analysis, cost concepts and measuring effectiveness are treated in detail. The third area examines the development of management systems for aiding resource allocation decisions. Budget systems and their design are studied, with special attention devoted to the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS). Generic concepts are emphasized throughout the course with the aim of facilitating their introduction as part of a broader effort to improve the conduct of defense management.

The second goal is to provide a forum for the comparative exchange of ideas. The participants learn about the operations of other DoD organizations as well as those of other countries. The U.S. and international participants learn about each other’s countries and cultures, and form long-lasting friendships. Discussion groups provide participants with the opportunity to interact with each other. The course is conducted through a variety of interrelated activities, including lectures that present basic concepts, assigned readings to support and supplement the ideas presented in the lectures, and discussion groups (consisting of eight to ten participants with a faculty facilitator). In the discussion groups, concepts from lectures and readings are discussed, compared, and critically examined. Discussions often center on a problem or case study in which theoretical concepts and analytical methods are applied to illustrative situations.

International Defense Management Course

The International Defense Management Course (IDMC) is an eleven-week course offered twice a year. The course is designed specifically for international participants of rank major through colonel and civilians of equivalent rank. All of the topics covered in the DRMC are also covered in this course but in much more depth. Additional material includes a week of manpower issues, a week focused on logistics management and two weeks of financial management and budgeting. A typical IDMC has 50-54 participants from 35-45 countries, giving the participants ample opportunity to learn about other countries and cultures and form long-lasting friendships. Course participants are provided with opportunities to learn more about the U.S., its people and its institutions. Each participant has a host family from the local community that provides the opportunity to see how Americans live. A field trip to Washington, DC is also part of this program. The intent is to show the participants how our democratic institutions work.
Senior International Defense Management Course

The Senior International Defense Management Course (SIDMC) is a four-week professional course conducted once a year. The course is intended for flag and general officers and equivalent-ranking civilians from countries throughout the world. As with all DRMI offerings, the foundation of the course is analytical decision making, but the course is tailored to senior leaders. As with other DRMI courses, participants are provided with opportunities to learn more about the U.S., its people and its institutions. Each participant has a host family from the local community that provides the opportunity to see how Americans live. A field trip to Stanford University and San Francisco are also part of this program.

Mobile International Defense Management Course

The Mobile International Defense Management Course (MIDMC) is a two-week course designed for military officers of rank O-4 and above and civilians of equivalent rank. As with all DRMI courses, the emphasis is on analytical decision making and resources management systems. The course can be tailored to meet the needs of the host country and is conducted in English or in other languages through translation and interpretation. A significant number of the mobile courses have been regional in nature, offering participants from different countries in a region the opportunity to interact with one another. Since 1991, DRMI has conducted 139 mobile courses in 54 countries to officials from 101 different countries. Participants included 3,601 military officers and 1,575 civilian officials.

A number of countries have incorporated a DRMI MIDMC as part of the curriculum of their National Defense Colleges. Argentina, Honduras and Malaysia, in particular, have done this by scheduling an annual MIDMC to coincide with the resources management portion of their program. Other countries, such as Croatia and the Philippines, have requested special courses designed to help them install planning, programming, and budgeting systems (PPBS) in their ministry of defense (MoD). MIDMCs must be requested through in-country U.S. security assistance agency personnel (military assistance advisory group (MAAG), military group (MILGP), office of defense cooperation (ODC), security assistance office (SAO), defense attaché office (DAO), etc). In view of the high demand for mobile courses, official requests should be made at least one year in advance. The annual Training Program Management Reviews (TPMRs) offer a forum for initial requests and planning.

Recently, DRMI has added a number of new courses to its offerings:

- **Multi-Criteria Decision Making Course.** The Multi-Criteria Decision Making Course (MCDM) is a two-week course designed for military officers of rank O-4 and above and equivalent ranking civilians. The course develops a method of approach to support decision making by managers in defense organizations. The focus is on practical application to management decisions involving many organizational objectives. Emphasis is placed on formulating the problem, understanding the analytical process involved in evaluating potential solution alternatives, and interpreting the results of the analysis in support of choosing a solution. The curriculum provides practical examples from defense resource allocation problems. Participants will be required to apply the approach to a decision problem of current interest to their MoDs. This exercise will serve as a foundation for further work once they return to their own organization.

- **Budget Preparation, Execution and Accountability.** The Budget Preparation, Execution and Accountability Course (BPEA) is an eight-day course designed for military officers of rank O-4 and above and equivalent ranking civilians. This course examines the preparation, execution and accountability of defense budgets. It provides the foundation for preparing and executing the budget by discussing the overall budget process beginning with planning and programming. Planning and programming are
the stages where policy formulation and allocation of resources support national priorities, goals and objectives. This course reviews these concepts, and then illustrates how to take the programming decisions from the MoD through the budget cycle. It begins with a section on budget preparation using MoD programming guidance, integrating programs with budget guidance to create a budget. It then provides information, tools and techniques, and exercises on estimating budget submissions, funds control, performance management and feedback, all components of preparing, executing, and providing accountability for defense budgets.

• The Streamlining Government through Outsourcing, Privatization and Public-Private Partnerships Course (SGOP) is a one-week course designed for military officers of rank O-4 and above and equivalent ranking civilians. The goal of this course is for international participants to be able to apply economic and management theory and some practical lessons learned to make concrete policy recommendations. The course is designed to provide a forum for the exchange of ideas to improve the management and support of defense operations; to review economic and management theory and lessons learned from privatization, outsourcing and public-private partnerships as they relate to governments’ make-or-buy decisions; to provide an analytical approach to effectively plan, implement and monitor privatization and outsourcing initiatives. Participants will be responsible for completing a strategic proposal to benefit their defense organization, department or team.

• The Base Realignment, Closure and Economic Redevelopment Course (BPEA) is a two-week course designed for military officers of rank O-4 and above and equivalent ranking civilians. The course focuses on the problems associated with selecting military facilities for closure or realignment as well as the economic redevelopment of former military facilities. In the first part of the course, concepts and applications of strategic planning and the linkages between strategic plans, military capabilities and program budgets are examined. The second part of the course discusses the requirements necessary to support base closure and realignment decisions. The third part of the course, we explore the issues related to economic redevelopment of facilities selected for closure or realignment.

• The Financial Integrity, Accountability and Transparency (FIAT) Course is a seven-day course designed for military officers of rank O-4 and above and equivalent ranking civilians. The course explores how the principles of good governance and the concepts of financial integrity, accountability and transparency can reduce the negative impact of corruption in government. The course will introduce students to basic management and economic concepts that are useful for understanding how corruption reduces government effectiveness and efficiency. The definition and measurement of corruption as well as its effect on the national economy will be presented. Tools and techniques for enhancing transparency and accountability will be discussed, including budgeting processes, accounting principles and financial management systems. Principles of good governance and issues related to external aid and non-government organizations will be explored and the concept of integrity will be discussed from the financial and personal perspective. Case studies and open discussions will give students the opportunity to explore these subjects in further detail.
Graduates

King Abdullah II of Jordan, along with his brother Prince Faisal and sister Princess Aisha, are SIDMC graduates. Numerous other graduates of DRMI programs have become ministers of defense and chiefs of staff. For example in the last ten years,

DRMI graduates have been:

- Ministers of Defense in Argentina, Honduras, Latvia, Philippines, Romania and the Slovak Republic;

- Chiefs of Staff of the Argentine Army and Air Force, Bangladesh Army, German Army, Honduran Army, Jordanian Air Force, Mongolian Armed Forces, Namibian Army, Royal Norwegian Air Force, Army of Senegal, Spanish Air Force, Surinamese Army, Swedish Air Force, Swedish Land Forces and the Taiwan Air Force and Army; and the Chief of Naval Operations of Argentina, Bangladesh and the Philippines.

About the Author

Dr. C. J. LaCivita is the Executive Director. For more information about DRMI, please visit the web site at: http://www.nps.navy.mil/drmi.
Latin America and the Debate over Environmental Protection and National Security

By
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and
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Abstract

In this paper, we examine the national security issues resulting from environmental transformation and demographic change in Latin America. We note a lack of consensus in the literature as to what constitutes environmental change, security, and its corresponding impact on national security. If environmental degradation and the national security of Latin American countries are linked, then policy makers must take these linkages into account when formulating economic and social policy. Omitting these factors from national security strategy discussions may overstate the risks associated with other threats and lead to a biased allocation of public resources. On the other hand, if these threats are overstated (or non-existent), then incorporating them into national security discussions may divert attention and resources from issues of importance. Given the relatively fragile nature of many of the Latin American economies, accurately addressing these threats is imperative for economic and social stability and security.

Introduction

In 1993 the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) argued that political instability, economic tensions, ethnic conflict and environmental degradation directly correlated to mass movements of refugees throughout the developing world. While some researchers assert that individuals displaced by environmental degradation are the largest single class of refugees, these individuals lack official standing and protection accorded to others avoiding political persecution and violent conflict. Environmental degradation and its corresponding flows of displaced persons may pose a significant threat to national security in developing countries. Yet, the impact of these individuals on internal and external security is unclear as persons fleeing environmental change are unaccounted for in official refugee statistics.

In this paper we argue that there is a paucity of theoretical and empirical evidence supporting the hypothesized linkage between environmental degradation and national security. Researchers and policy makers alike have been unable to reach consensus on what constitutes environmental, human, and national security as well as what, if any, relationships exist between these variables. Understanding this debate is important for policy makers attempting to cope with environmental change (degradation, natural disasters, and climate change) and demographic change (population growth, migration, and urbanization). In order to develop a comprehensive national security strategy, developing nations may need to build their capacities to address these environmental and demographic factors both individually, as well as the ways in which they relate to existing, conventional threats to national security.

We examine the national security issues resulting from environmental transformation and demographic change in Latin America. If environmental degradation and the national security of Latin American countries are linked, then policy makers must take these linkages into account when formulating economic and social policy. Omitting these factors from national security strategy discussions may overstate the risks associated with other threats and lead to a biased allocation of public resources. On the other hand, if these threats are overstated (or non-existent), then incorporating them into national security discussions may divert attention and resources from issues of importance. Given the relatively fragile nature of many Latin American economies, accurately addressing these threats is imperative for economic and social stability and security.

The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. We first discuss the lack of consensus in the literature on the meaning of the term environmental security. Second, we consider the demographic composition and trends in Latin America. Third, we review demographic change and its relation to environmental security. We then examine environmental transformations as they relate to population and security. The last section concludes and offers suggestions for future research.

Environmental Change and National Security

While environmental degradation emerged in the second half of the 20th century as a focal point of political contention, its influence on official United States (U.S.) national security policy is much more recent. Environmental degradation has been the focus of significant and regulatory efforts in the U.S., but the concept of environmental security has only recently entered public discourse and security documents. In 1991, the U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) included environmental security as a concern for the first time. Environmental security’s importance increased during the Clinton administration with the explicit incorporation of environmental objectives in the NSS. In 1996, for example, Secretary of State Warren Christopher asserted that, “environmental initiatives can be important, low-cost, high-impact tools in promoting our national security interests.” The 2002 National Security Strategy noted the need to address environmental concerns in trade negotiations and the impact of environmental threats on the welfare of citizens. Curiously, environmental security has become part of the national security discourse despite a lack of consensus among academics and policy makers regarding the existence of a significant linkage between environmental security and national security.

The inclusion of environmental security threats may be a reflection of the purported declining relevance of traditional symmetric threats to national security and the emergence of asymmetric and non-conventional threats. While much of the early literature on environmental security is general and anecdotal in nature, it posits a discernable linkage between environmental degradation and, in turn, national security. Whether such a linkage exists, the direction of the linkage (uni or bi-directional),

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3. In the August 1991 National Security Strategy of the United States, in the section entitled “Our Interests and Objectives in the 1990s” states “favorale to the United States, its interests and its allies” is to “achieve cooperative international solutions to key environmental challenges, assuring the sustainability and environmental security of the planet as well as growth and opportunity for all.”


and the magnitude of the relationship remains a matter of debate. There is also a paucity of advice on how to translate this purported relationship into policy guidance on the environment and non-conventional threats.

What is meant by ‘environmental degradation’? Environmental degradation is “any change or disturbance to the environment that is perceived to be deleterious or undesirable.” While many academics accept this seemingly simple and succinct definition:

“The logical combination of the current definitions of environment and degradation...is open to a variety of legitimate interpretations”, and the application of the term (or lack thereof) is a matter of debate.

The problem of environmental degradation refers to the totality of a wide range of interdependent processes occurring at a range of scales, in different places, with differing degrees of impact. These processes include, among others, atmospheric pollution and climate change, biodiversity loss, soil loss, salinization and acidification of soils and water, fisheries depletion and contamination of plants and animals by synthetic and radioactive substances. Environmental degradation may increase the probability and intensity of conflict as resource scarcities increase, economic opportunities dwindle, and state institutions decline in effectiveness.

We would be remiss, however, if we did not note that environmental quality might initially decline with economic development, only to improve after the population reaches a certain threshold of income. Market forces may induce improvements in public institutional quality, a strengthening of property rights, and other factors that improve environmental quality successfully avoiding the tragedy of the commons. While obviously controversial, empirical evidence appears to support the assertions, casting doubt on the environmental degradation-conflict relationship. Whether an emerging region such as Latin America can achieve this income threshold before degradation harms development remains unknown.

Comprising nearly thirty percent of the world’s total territory, Latin America and the Caribbean region has the world’s largest reserves of arable land and sixteen percent of the world’s degraded

lands (1900 million hectares), ranking it third behind Asia and the Pacific and Africa. The pace of human-induced forms of environmental degradation and resource depletion appears to have increased throughout Latin America due to a combination of increasing demand for agricultural products, improving means of exploitation and the lagging pace of conservation and control. Coupled with natural changes in the environment, the last half of the twentieth century witnessed a gradual increase in the pace of deforestation, land degradation, erosion, salinity and desertification in Latin America. Erosion, a main cause of land degradation, now affects 14.3 percent of the territory in Latin America and 26 percent in Central America. Human-induced land degradation and water shortages directly affect economic sufficiency in many rural areas.

While human-induced environmental degradation appears to directly impact the well-being of individuals, there again is a paucity of empirical evidence with respect to this hypothesis. First, there is a problem of measurement in that environmental degradation may appear to be accelerating when, in fact, improved measurement methods are merely refining our estimates of degradation. Second, environmental degradation’s influence may be more subtle and indirect than previously thought. Degradation may indirectly impact economic growth, for example, through its potential influence on income inequality, economic efficiency, and other, as yet unexplored, variables. Development projects, mainly dams and irrigation projects, provide a more salient example of the purported linkages between environmental degradation and human development. The World Bank estimates that development projects uproot more than 10 million people in the developing world each year. Many large-scale development projects often involve forced resettlement, which directly influences the distribution and income of a subset of the population. Improvements in the utilization of natural resources (e.g. power generation and irrigation) may either cause or potentially offset environmental degradation. In turn, the simultaneous input of environmental degradation and economic development may also influence national security in an unknown fashion. Before proceeding to a discussion of the relationship between environmental transformation, demographic change and national security, we must first, however, attempt to define national and environmental security.

What is national security?

We believe that the contentious (and somewhat vague) nature of the debate in the literature can be, in part, attributed to the various interpretations of the terms ‘national security’ and ‘environmental security.’ The interdisciplinary nature of the potential linkages between environmental degradation, human security, and national security has further complicated discussion of the terms. Academics and policy makers not only disagree as to whether environmental concerns should be defined as a

national security issue, but also, more importantly, they debate the meaning of the terms human and environmental security.

Academics and national security specialists continue to discuss, sometimes contentiously, the definition of national security as well as what constitutes a national security threat. While the debate over an explicit definition of national security continues, the literature, apparently has reached consensus over its more general idea and appropriate response to threats. National security is any issue that may dramatically impact the welfare of a sovereign state and any response to the threat must be centrally coordinated by the state.\(^{19}\)

Central coordination, in this view, is necessary due to the negative spillovers represented by these threats; spillovers that could not be adequately captured by a market response mechanism. Even if the threats were asymmetrically distributed (New York and California, for example, but not the Midwest) a decentralized response would likely fail to adequately protect the state due to negative externalities. An adequate response requires central coordination, even if such a response represents an over-provision of the public good in some jurisdictions. Any economic inefficiency due to the misallocation of resources is viewed as small, relative to the potential cost of a threat to national security.

We argue that the set of issues now classified as threats to national security has significantly expanded from an almost singular focus on military readiness to one encompassing regional and global military threats, economic and political concerns, and most recently, environmental degradation and resource scarcities.\(^{20}\) Whether such an expansion is prudent, remains a point of contention. The inclusion of environmental concern and objectives starting with the 1991 National Security Strategy (NSS) typifies this debate. Critics have argued that the inclusion of environmental concerns in the national security strategy is counter-productive, and promotes neither environmental nor security concerns.\(^{21}\) Proponents of environmental concerns appear to support this line of reasoning by arguing that the national security specialists develop national security strategy documents from a military, rather than an environmental, perspective. Military responses to environmental concerns are not only inappropriate, but they also bias the state’s response if the environmental issues are classified as a national security concern. In essence, this argument suggests the environmental issues are of national importance but the NSS is the wrong vehicle to align these issues with national strategic objectives. We thus observe arguments not only where environmental issues are national security issues, but also whether classifying these issues as a national security concern biases the response.

Including environmental concerns in national security documents also explicitly promotes the primacy of central government institutions, even if a centrally coordinated response is allocatively and technically inefficient. Environmental threats are likely to have asymmetric impacts and a uniform response may be economically inefficient relative to differentiated provision by sub national governments. The NSS may not only be the improper vehicle for environmental concerns, but a uniform response may also create inefficiencies that outweigh the costs of addressing the environmental concerns. These questions, examined in the fiscal decentralization literature on the assignment of revenue and expenditure authority to sub national governments, have not been examined to the best of our knowledge in the national security literature.

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What is meant by ‘human security’?

If there is a lack of consensus in the literature as to the definition and application of national security, it should come as no surprise that a similar, even more contentious debate exists with respect to human security. Initially, human security pertained to physical threats to an individual. The concept of human security has, much like national security, evolved to encompass economic, health and environmental concerns. As the definition of human security evolved, its precise definition lost meaning and the debate as to its application increased in volume. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP), for example, argues that human security is an ‘integrative’ rather than merely a ‘defensive’ concept, encompassing a broad range of economic, political, and social concerns. If actually applied, the UNDP’s definition could classify almost every activity as a component of human security. Furthermore, the UNDP argues that existing challenges to human security are global and require international response. Implicit in this argument is that governments are, to some extent, responsible for ensuring human security, however broadly defined.

The UNDP, however, also notes that human security should not be equated with human development. Following this logic, the Global Environmental Change and Human Security (GECHS) program suggests that a nation achieves human security when individuals and communities have the options necessary to end, mitigate or adapt to threats to their human, environmental and social rights; have the capacity and freedom to exercise these options; and actively participate in attaining these options. Moreover, human security can be achieved through challenging the structures and processes that contribute to insecurities. While optimistic from a national security perspective in a global environment with asymmetric threats, and again, overly broad from an application perspective, the GECHS argument sets a standard (albeit, some might argue, unachievable) against which we can measure human security. Whether such a standard is acceptable to all stakeholders is doubtful, given the relatively broad definition of human security and its suggested measure. The GECHS definition of human security is arguably not useful from a national security perspective as it suggests that almost every form of human security should be considered a national security objective.

What is meant by the term ‘environmental security’?

Given ambiguity and contention surrounding the discourses of national and human security, it should not be surprising that a similar debate is ongoing with respect to environmental security’s definition and application. Academics and security specialists alike contest the cornerstone of the environmental security discourse: resource scarcity contributes to inter and intra-state conflict. Some in the literature argue that inter-state conflict resulting from resource scarcity is unlikely. Not only is resource-driven interstate conflict unlikely, some in the literature hold that interstate spillovers associated with internal resource conflicts are even more unlikely to occur. Academics

22. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the United Nations in 1948, states that “everyone has the right to life, liberty, and the security of person.”
23. Lonegran, et al. Global Environmental Change and Human Security (GECHS) Science Plan. International Human Dimensions Program, Report No. 11: Bonn, Germany. (June 1999): 25. The United Nations Development Program’s definition of human security includes seven categories of threats: economic, security (assured basic income); food security (physical and economic access to food); health security; environmental security (in terms of access to potable water, clean air and non-degraded land); personal security (security from physical violence and threats); community security (security from ethnic cleansing); political security (protection of basic human rights and freedoms).
24. The United Nations Development Program considers the following global human security threats: unchecked population growth, excessive migration, environmental degradation, disparities in economic opportunities, drug protection and trafficking, terrorism.
view discussions attempting to link resource scarcities with interstate security issues, at best, as unproductive and harmful to policy development. Likewise, these same people view attempts to integrate security discussions within the dialogue of sustainable development as unrealistic given its holistic approach. Finally, academics tend to dismiss evidence on the environment’s potential degradation. One can posit, of course, that resource scarcity is playing a role in Dafur’s ongoing conflict and the potential exists for substantial negative spillovers into Sudan’s neighbors.

While some argue that a link exists between environmental factors and violent conflict, they feel that environmental issues are unlikely to cause significant conflict between sovereign states. From this perspective, resource scarcity, although not the catalyst for conflict, exacerbates its likelihood in areas that are prone to it for non-environmental reasons. The emerging line of research on the economics of conflict suggests that low rates of economic growth, a rapidly increasing population, and monoculture export dependence positively influences the likelihood of intra-state conflict. We note that the literature skirts the issue of environmental security due to, in part, its ambiguous nature. Obviously the same factors that the literature suggests will influence the likelihood of conflict will also likely influence the state and evolution of the environment. The state of the environment, in turn, will likely influence these causal variables, suggesting that an endogenous relationship exists between the environment, economic conditions, and the likelihood of conflict. The literature largely leaves unaddressed the potential endogeneity between these variables, casting doubt on the efficacy of the empirical estimates and the conclusion that environmental degradation causes violent conflict.

Another area of ambiguity in the literature is the differentiation between environmental factors that generate violent and nonviolent conflict. Traditionally, security issues are associated with violent conflict. Nonviolent environmental and demographic security issues potentially can spill over international borders, impinging on the traditional security realm, regardless of their likelihood to cause violent conflict. We cannot begin to adequately discern the linkages between environmental security and conflict until we are able to separate and analyze the impact of the environment on nonviolent and violent conflict. Obviously, pooling violent and nonviolent conflicts in the empirical analysis can introduce bias as to the relationship between environmental security, conflict, and, in turn national security.

Even if disagreement exists as to the definition and application of the term ‘environmental security,’ one might believe that the term ‘environmental refugee’ is sufficiently precise to be devoid of contention. As with national, human, and environmental security, there is substantial disagreement over the need for the term ‘environmental refugee’ and its subsequent definition. The UNHCR’s definition of a refugee primarily concerns itself with persecution due to race, religion, nationality, social standing, or political opinion and does not address emigration due to environmental insecurity. The absence of environmental conditions in the UNHCR refugee definition makes legally permissible a signatory state’s refusal to acknowledge, shelter or offer asylum to individuals fleeing environmental degradation. Even if such a condition existed in international protocol, internal migration

29. The United Nations’ High Council on Refugees Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Article 1A(2), 1951. Any person with a “well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.

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would not be covered by such a protocol. Individuals displaced by environmental degradation will likely lack the standing of individuals displaced by more conventional forms of persecution.

El-Hinnawi argued that an environmental refugee is an individual who has been forced to leave their traditional habitat because of a marked environmental disruption that would seriously affect their quality of life or existence. Following this definition, one would classify an individual as an environmental refugee if they were internally or externally displaced in response to substantial changes in the environment, which, according to El-Hinnawi’s research, is unable to support human life. The literature leaves open for interpretation, of course, the personal threshold for response to evolving environmental conditions and substantial ecosystem changes. Utilizing this definition, an environmental refugee could be any number of people forced to leave their home either as a result of environmental degradation, be it natural, such as a hurricane or other natural disaster, human-induced, such as deforestation, soil degradation and desertification, or accidental, such as an oil spill.

Given the overly broad nature of El-Hinnawi’s definition, it is not surprising that disagreement persists in the literature on its efficacy. Castles argues that the term ‘environmental refugee’ is misleading and possibly harmful given ongoing attempts to restrict the UNHCR’s protocol. The legal status for those claiming to flee environmental degradation provides recipient states with the means to deny shelter, protection, and asylum. Furthermore, given the potential interactions of environmental degradation with the socio-economic environment, whether environmental degradation provides sufficient justification for an individual to claim refugee status remains a point of contention. If environmental refugees were to acquire the equal status of other currently recognized refugees, this would, obviously, have a significant impact on national security, especially in the U.S.

Left unaddressed in the literature are concise, metric oriented definitions of environmental and human security and environmental refugees. The lack of consensus has undoubtedly biased estimates of the number of individuals affected by environmental conditions in an uncertain direction. Solely focusing on environmental conditions as a rationale for emigration is likely to overstate the impact of environmental degradation; non-environmental conditions, however, clearly influence emigration decisions. Ignoring environmental degradation, likewise, most likely introduces downward bias.

Demographic Change and Environmental Security in Latin America

Given the lack of consensus in the literature, we now turn to the question of environmental security in Latin America. We highlight potential linkages between the environment and national security and areas of ambiguity requiring further research. We find that, as with the literature, a priori bias plays a significant role in determining whether demographic changes, environmental and national security are linked in Latin America. We first discuss population trends in Latin America before focusing on the issues of migration and urbanization. We argue that the demographic trends discussed in this section are more pronounced in other developing regions, thus our arguments are as applicable in other countries. We conclude with an application of the concepts of this paper to El Salvador.

The combined population of the Latin American region (including Central America, South America, Mexico and the Caribbean states) in mid-2003 was approximately 540 million, an increase

30. El-Hinnawi, Essam E., and the United Nations Environment Programme. Environmental Refugees. Nairobi, Kenya: United Nations Environment Programme, 1985. El-Hinnawi defined an environmental refugee as “as those people who have been forced to leave their traditional habitat, temporarily or permanently, because of a marked environmental disruption (natural and/or triggered by people) that jeopardized their existence and/or seriously affected the quality of their life. By ‘environmental disruption’ is meant any physical, chemical and/or biological changes in the ecosystem (or the resource base) that render it temporarily or permanently, unsuitable to support human life.”

of approximately 90 percent from 1970. While the Latin American population growth rate of 2.74 percent per annum was the highest among developing regions in the 1960s, its population growth rate has declined significantly since then. In 2000, average population growth of 1.51 percent in Latin America exceeded the global average of 1.21 percent, but lagged behind the population growth averages of Sub-Saharan Africa (2.26 percent), the Middle East and North Africa (1.91 percent), and South Asia (1.73 percent). We can attribute these growth rates, in part, to U.S. immigration patterns, as well as smaller family sizes throughout the region.

Average fertility for Latin America and the Caribbean has declined steadily from 5.82 births per woman between 1960-1969 to 2.51 births per woman in 2000-2003, below the global average of 2.63 births per woman during the same period. Average infant mortality in the Latin American and Caribbean regions has consistently been below developing and global averages. On the other hand, average life expectancy at birth (total years) in Latin America and the Caribbean has consistently been the highest of the developing regions, even exceeding world life expectancy averages. Although life expectancy has steadily increased in the Latin American and Caribbean regions, the gains have not been homogeneously distributed throughout the region.

Inter and intra population density varies greatly. El Salvador, the smallest and most densely populated country in Central America, is approximately thirty times denser than the least populated country, Belize. Consistently, Latin America is the most urbanized region in the developing world with the urban population increasing from 52.92 percent of the total in the 1960s to 75.94 percent between 2000-2003. Although it only houses 8.4 percent of the world’s population, Latin America accounts for some 15 percent of all human beings living in settlements of more than 1 million inhabitants. El Salvador has approximately 360 million urban residents and four metropolitan areas of more than 10 million people; nearly 30 percent of the total population resides in cities with more than 1 million inhabitants. The institutional framework of El Salvadoran development, a leftover from Spanish colonization, is a legacy of economic inequality, particularly regarding access to productive resources, such as land. These inequalities, in turn, induce out-migration that shifts pressures to urban

32. U.S. Census Bureau, population Division, International program Center, International Data Base. [Accessed 8/2/04.]
34. During the 1960, average infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births) in Latin America and the Caribbean was 102.37 deaths compared to a world average of 122.29 deaths; this rate declined further to 29.63 and 55.85 respectfully most likely as a result of the AIDS epidemic in Sub-Saharan Africa (which consistently has had the highest infant mortality rates globally).
35. During the 1960s, average life expectancy at birth awas 57.78 years in Latin America and the Caribbean with a world average of 54.63 years; this has leaped to 70.50 years and 66.60 yearsrespectively between 2000-2003.
36. Note: For example, life expectancy in Cuba and Puerto Rico is fully twenty years greater than in Haiti. In South America, meanwhile, residents of Venezuela and Colombia live, on average, a full decade longer than residents of Bolivia. From Hillstrom, Kevin, and Laurie Collier Hillstrom. Latin America and the Caribbean: a Continental Overview of Environmental Issues. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2004.
37. El Salvador has the highest population density in Central America, with a population density of 288.1 habitants per square kilometer in comparison to a regional average of 65.0 habitants per square kilometer.
39. Note: Currently, the uran population of countries in North America and Europe is between 70 and 75 percent, roughly equivalent to that of Latin America. See United Nations Center for Human Settlements, 2001; and United Nations Population Division, 2001.
areas. Whether these migration patterns result in environmental degradation, per se, is a matter of contention.40

The rapid growth of urban populations, coupled with the resultant migration of people onto previously undeveloped land, burdens municipalities, which, in turn, are unable to provide basic infrastructure and public services to their rapidly expanding (and denser) jurisdictions.41 The region’s cities currently lack the ability to handle the amount of solid waste generated, which has doubled over the last thirty years. Air and water pollution problems plague Latin America’s urban centers as well as their proliferating slums. Severe health and crime issues manifest themselves as a result of the increased population density within urban areas. Latin America’s evolving demographic composition illustrates how demographic change may undermine existing institutions and degrade human health and security. Whether these changes influence national security is an unanswered question.

Demographic change, however, may not necessarily induce environmental degradation. The composition and disposition of the populace may be independent of environmental change. If there is no robust empirical linkage between demographic change and environmental degradation, then the argument for environmental degradation as a source of violent conflict may also be weakened. What may not be weakened is the argument that environmental degradation may induce non-violent conflict. The literature has yet to explore these empirical hypotheses.

While environmental degradation may result from demographic shifts, population growth, per se, does not necessarily damage the environment, but it may interact with existing socio-economic structures to influence environmental quality.42 A fall in the quality and quantity of renewable resources combined with population growth may encourage powerful groups within a society to shift resource distribution in their favor. Unequal resource access combined with population pressure may induce migrations to regions that are ecologically fragile, such as steep upland slopes, tropical rainforests, and watersheds. High population densities in these areas, combined with a lack of knowledge and capital to protect local resources, often triggers environmental degradation and chronic poverty. Over time, large segments of the society may become ecologically and economically marginalized, increasing social instability and undermining security.

The interaction of resource capture and ecological marginalization forms the standard argument that population growth may overextend the natural resources of a given geographic region, leading to deprivation, conflict and instability.43 The scope of instability resulting from population growth may increase as more people try to sustain themselves in ecologically marginalized environments.44 While increases in income, democratic governance and technology may mitigate the influence of population growth on the environment and, in turn, security population’s effect is not completely absent. Increases in income and democratic governance may, in the short-run, actually increase resource capture and ecological marginalization, as seen with respect to NAFTA.45 Increased resource capture

and economic marginalization may result in a decline in resource quality (if not quantity) and per capita income growth. Slow and negative rates of per capita income growth appear to be associated with increased probabilities of conflict, suggesting a linkage between population growth, economic development, and national security. Whether Latin America can increase incomes sufficiently to avoid this conflict remains to be seen.

Migration

Migration refers to the movement of people across jurisdictions (both within and across sovereign states) and can be characterized as a system of interactions.\(^{46}\) Migration has been described as “an extremely varied and complex manifestation and component of equally complex economic, social, cultural and political processes operating at the local, regional, national and international levels.”\(^{47}\) The linkages between migration and security are complex and may take several different forms. Differentiating the processes, related to migration from the social, economic, political and institutional structures of which they are a part, is problematic.\(^{48}\) Subsequently, establishing a linear relationship between migration and security is difficult, but we will attempt to identify certain cases where migration plays an important role as a contributor to insecurity. Distinguishing these linkages is useful by considering the following:

- The determinants of migration, including the role of environmental factors on stimulating or forcing out-migration or on attracting in-migration
- The effects of migration on destination and departure areas, focusing also on their effects on the environment\(^{49}\)

We have characterized the factors that affect migration as ‘push’ factors (in the place of origin) and ‘pull’ factors (in the place of destination). Environmental variables may be an element in both. Environmental push factors include both natural disasters as well as human-induced environmental degradation. Environmental pull factors may include the attraction of good farmland or a better growing climate. Environmental change that adversely affects land productivity tends to reduce agricultural incomes and stimulate out-migration.\(^{50}\) Environmental degradation in such instances may constitute a root cause of out-migration and the decline in crop yields only the proximate cause.\(^{51}\)

We can observe the consequences of migration in terms of human security threats through two forms of traditional instability related to migration: internal migration conflicts, and cross-border migration conflicts and may be triggered by either voluntary migration or forced displacement. Internal migration is often induced by structural environmental changes such as persistent drought, flood and soil erosion. Individuals tend to migrate from depressed areas to more favorable zones such as fertile rural or urban areas. Forced displacement and expulsion may appear in connection with large industrial mining and dam projects or through violent means by groups seeking to capture a region’s resources.

\(^{50}\) Ibid.
Intra-regional migration and displacement may trigger tensions, clashes, resource competition, and in some cases violent conflicts between newcomers and settled populations. These conflicts are in part determined by environmental discrimination against actors who are heavily dependent on scarce natural resources. Violent conflicts (skirmishes, clashes and riots) usually occur in disputed rural zones (the San Juan region between Nicaragua and Costa Rica, for example). Some conflicts, however, may spread to urban areas and blend with existing patterns of urban violence. Intra-regional migration can also lead to political struggles for state power if and when groups that had been discriminated against succeed in penetrating the ruling elite or driving it out of power in other ways.  

Environmentally induced migration usually takes the form of slow infiltration over a long period of time. People move into areas that either permit survival or provide more favorable living conditions. In many regions it may be advantageous to cross a national frontier if more favorable foreign destinations are geographically nearer than the remote capital of one’s native country. Frustration and despair can create social tensions in host countries or trans-boundary regions populated by hostile identity groups (or earlier migrants from common identity groups) who display hostile attitudes toward the newcomers. Internal and cross-border migration pose serious threats to human security due to their inherent social and political destabilizing effects as well as their negative impacts on the natural environment. Migration processes often prompt local populations to engage in practices of land intensification in order to meet economic needs. The degradation of productive land tends to create shortages of renewable resources (water, cropland, forests, etc.), which in turn generates environmental scarcities. These scarcities may produce mass movements of people fleeing major environmental disruptions.

When migrants or refugees cross national borders, resettling in rural border areas or urban areas, they may pose a threat to the national security of the recipient state. Migration and environmental discrimination may be linked, and environmental disruption may result as a consequence of large refugee movements. At the same time, environmental transformation is itself a reason for migration or flight. Migration channeled by environmental discrimination may also increase the likelihood of conflict, especially in areas with poor macroeconomic performance or political instability. The current debate concerning environmental refugees illustrates migration’s potential for destabilization, although evidence to this impact remains weak.

**Urbanization**

Increases in population and migration may pose an increasing threat to national security. Rapid (and some might argue, excessive) urban migration and the corresponding emergence of mega-cities (population of ten million or more) may pose a significant challenge to existing institutions. High levels of urbanization coupled with low levels of gross domestic product per capita may pose a threat to political stability. Rapid urbanization not only increases the demand for public services and infrastructure, but also may overwhelm the capacity of local governments. Demand for public services is not offset by increases in revenue, as there is often a persistent mismatch between employment opportunities and the size and quality of the labor force. Much of the low-grade employment growth, moreover, is drawn into urban communities, swelling them far beyond their real economic base.

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53. Ibid.
The resulting urban underclass may turn to violence as public and private institutions fail to meet their basic needs.

Environmental refugees often head for urban areas, although socioeconomic conditions may be worse in the cities. Finding a lack of economic opportunities they often continue to migrate until their resources are exhausted at which point they turn to the state for assistance. In Mexico, for example, impoverished people tend to migrate first to Mexico City and other urban communities. In many cases, they then migrate to the U.S.. The U.S. thus has an express (and financially significant) interest in the flow of environmental refugees seeking improved economic prospects.

Another consequence of this rapid urbanization and migration is an increasing rate of urban instability that disrupts domestic order and threatens political stability. Over the past several decades, massive public protests and riots in cities throughout the developing world have resulted in significant loss of life and widespread destruction of property. Such disturbances have been triggered by economic circumstances (e.g., rising food prices, food scarcity, and currency devaluation) or by political upheavals. In Latin America, powerful narcotics constituencies offer economic opportunities in cities with otherwise over-burdened economic bases, which increasingly threatens the exercise of sovereignty and the rule of law. Beyond the direct economic costs, urban crime erodes the state by corrupting institutions (including the judiciary, the media and even security forces) and co-opting segments of the population. Urban disturbances not only destroy physical capital but also discourage foreign direct investment, inhibiting economic growth and political stability.

The environmental stresses associated with urban areas contribute to the weakening of state institutions. Urban environmental problems include the spatial concentration of people, industry, commerce, vehicles, energy consumption, water use, and waste generation, among others. Water contamination issues, for example, burden state institutions that lack the resources to detect chemical contamination or establish water treatment facilities. Sanitation is a major problem affecting water quality in urban areas. As cities become more densely populated, the per-household volumes of wastewater may exceed the infiltration capacity of local soils and require greater drainage capacity and improved sewer systems. Most municipally provided sanitation systems, however, are based on conventional sewer systems. Coverage is generally inadequate, sewers are in poor condition and sewage treatment plants discharge effluents that are little better than raw sewage. Providing partial service, or service that is intermittent, may impact human health and exacerbate existing environmental problems because sanitation is a service that depends on consistent and reliable coverage.

Urbanization, as expected, has also resulted in widespread urban poverty and chaotic cities. Zoning regulations are largely absent, allowing usage of a single space for a variety of activities. Some of these activities increase both the likelihood of exposing the population to industrial pollution, as well as the probability of an environmental threat developing from contamination and waste proliferation. This consequent lack of urban planning often leads to the creation of slums or shantytowns on the

59. Ibid.
city’s outskirts, a phenomenon that we observe in Latin America and other developing countries. We can also now see a similar phenomenon in the U.S. as a result of immigration from Latin America.61

**El Salvador: Environmental Security or Economic Development?**

While El Salvador is the most densely populated country in Latin America, its urbanization rate is behind that of the Latin American region, with 62 percent of 6.5 million residents living in urban areas, compared to 76 percent of the Latin American population as a whole.62 In the past three decades, we have witnessed a change in the composition of economic activity with a shift from the agricultural sector to the industry and service sectors.63 This shift in economic activity is mirrored in the demographic composition of El Salvador.

According to Programa Salvadoreño de Investigación Sobre Desarrollo y Medio Ambiente (PRISMA), the urban population in El Salvador grew 164 percent between 1971 and 2000 while the rural population only grew 24 percent. Population growth has not been homogenously distributed across urban areas with 67 percent of the growth concentrated in the south surrounding the city of San Salvador. The rapidly growing assembly industry (maquila) accounted for 17 percent of the foreign exchange in 2000, displacing traditional agricultural exports that accounted for 11 percent of foreign exchange in 2000, a significant decrease from the 80 percent generated in 1978. In rural areas, non-agricultural employment has increased rapidly, from 39 percent of the rural workforce in 1980 to 53 percent of the workforce in 2000, supplanting agriculture as the primary employer of the rural population.

While we have observed a marked decline in the relative importance of agriculture in El Salvadoran economic activity, we have not observed a corresponding shift in labor from agriculture. In 1980, 37.5 percent of the workforce was engaged in agricultural activities, only declining to 21.8 percent in 2001, even though agriculture as a percentage of gross domestic product declined from 37.96 percent in 1980 to 9.44 percent in 2001.64 This suggests a marginalization of the economic activity of those individuals in the agricultural sectors relative to the industrial and services sectors.

Economic marginalization of the agricultural workforce, further exacerbated by inequitable land distribution patterns in El Salvador, may be a contributor to internal conflict and emigration. The roots of the El Salvadoran Civil War (1980-1992) arguably lie in an established pattern of unequal land distribution that provoked the rise of a guerilla insurgency.65 The Peace Accords negotiated following the civil war in 1992 between the El Salvadoran government and Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) rebels established a land transfer program to re-integrate former combatants into civil society, although the success of this program remains a matter of debate. Land redistribution

61. See Richman, Neal and Bill Pinkin. *Urban Slum Reports: the Case of Los Angeles, USA.* Case Studies for the Global Report on Human Settlements 2003. Los Angeles, CA: UCLA Advanced Policy Institute. Neal and Pinkin cite that Latinos are over represented in slum neighborhoods at two-thirds of slum neighborhood residents. According to Near and Pinkin, most residents of these slum neighborhoods are immigrants, many of whom are illegal, and thus unwilling or unable to complain about their living conditions for fear of deportation. Latino workers are also five-and-a-half times more likely to be poor than white workers in LA according to LA-based research center. [http://www.lane.org](http://www.lane.org).


64. World Bank. *World Development Indicators.* Washington, D.C.: The World Bank Group, 2003. In comparison, the percentage of the workforce in 1980 in the industrial and service sectors was 21 percent and 42 percent respectively. In 2001, the percentages shifted to 24 percent for the industrial sector and 55 percent for the service industry.

efforts, while still not perfect, have facilitated the acquisition of household assets, to include housing and credit. Land redistribution also appears to provide a buffer to external shocks (commodity prices, government prices, etc). The government, in an effort to assist the poor agricultural sector, passed a debt relief law in 1996 that forgave 70 percent of the agrarian debt and gave $575 to individual parcel holders if they paid the debt off in one year; the government also passed a second law directly aimed at breaking up collectively held lands.\textsuperscript{66}

According to the Inventory of Conflict and Environment, El Salvadoran government surveys dating from 1978 to 1982 showed that only 17 percent of El Salvador’s land area could be classified as high quality soil suitable for intensive agricultural use although 29 percent varied in quality and acceptability for agricultural use; 35 percent was of a poorer quality, more susceptible to erosion and best suitable either for forest or grazing, while 13 percent was classified as severely degraded.\textsuperscript{67}

Despite these classifications, nearly half of the land appropriate for intensive agricultural use was underutilized while three-quarters of the crop cultivation was on marginal, degraded land. The underutilized land generally belongs to that of the wealthy elite while the marginal land belongs to that of the subsistence farmer. As a result, subsistence farming increasingly is not viable as a means to maintain livelihoods of the poor, rural population. Food security, as well as rapid and increased levels of environmental degradation of the land, is a growing concern in El Salvador given the aforementioned inequitable land distribution and use.

Landless rural families are more susceptible to shocks than those with access to land and are more likely to remove their children from school when confronting external shocks than those with land access. If the landless poor, in reaction to shocks, withdraw their children from school and limit their ability to receive an education and instruction, they adversely impact their children’s future ability to overcome employment entry barriers. While the importance of agricultural employment is decreasing in rural areas, the poor, without access to other means of employment are, to a greater extent, forced to abandon their lands, thus contributing to the higher rates of urbanization and emigration. As the economic marginalization of agricultural workers increases, their vulnerability to external shocks, including that of environmental degradation, increases accordingly. We argue that the evolution of the El Salvadoran economy has left a relatively large segment of the workforce vulnerable to shocks and thus this evolution indirectly undermines the security of the El Salvadoran state and its neighbors. If this hypothesis holds, we should observe an increase in internally displaced persons (IDPs). Anecdotal evidence suggests that these flows of individuals exist and have increased over time. Unfortunately, neither the El Salvadoran government, other governments in Latin America, nor the UNHCR tracks individuals displaced by environmental degradation or economic marginalization.\textsuperscript{68}

Given the absence of credible data on IDPs, we must rely on indirect measures of the impact of environmental degradation and economic marginalization. The development of the El Salvadoran economy has increased relative wages in the manufacturing sector, slowing the pace of emigration of skilled workers. The vulnerability of workers in the agricultural sector, however, has led to a marked increase in the emigration of lower skilled labor over the last ten years. Internal migration


\textsuperscript{68} UNHCR data on IDPs primarily focuses on individuals displaced by internal violent conflict and not environmental or economic conditions. Most IDPs, according to the UNHCR are not included in the IDP statistics. See UNHCR Population Data Unit/PGDS Division of Operational Support. (2004). 2003 Global Refugees Trends. UNHCR Geneva. \url{http://www.unhcr.ch/statistics}. See also Global IDP Project at \url{http://www.idpproject.org}. 

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(24 percent) has given way to direct emigration to the U.S. and Canada (72 percent). This marked increase in individuals displaced in search of economic opportunities appears to be mirrored in many other countries in Latin America. The adjustment lag between economic activity and the composition of the workforce not only poses a security challenge to Latin American countries, but also to that of the U.S.

We argue that the evolution of the Latin American economies affects the national security of the U.S. In support of this argument, one need only look to the flow of individuals from Latin American to the U.S. over the past four decades relative to overall population growth in Latin American and the U.S. Overall, the number of foreign-born nationals from Latin American countries has increased from 908,309 in 1960 (9.3 percent of the U.S. population) to 16,086,974 in 2000 (51.7 percent of the U.S. population). Due to increased immigration, remittances occupy a larger role in rural areas with the number of households in rural areas receiving remittances increasing from 13 percent in 1992 to 20 percent in 2000. By 2000, remittances provided a full two-thirds of the foreign exchange of El Salvador and are a significant source of foreign exchange for many other Latin American countries.

Given the significant expenditures of public resources to mitigate this flow and the commensurate expenditure of public resources to support these individuals once they succeed in reaching the U.S., one may conclude that unchecked immigration can be considered a threat to national security. The dependence of the Latin American economies on remittances suggests that efforts by the U.S. to reduce the flow of immigrants may pose a threat to their economic, and thus, national security. Environmental degradation may thus, indirectly pose a significant concern to the security institutions of Latin America and the U.S.

Conclusions

The issue of potential human and environmental security threats in Latin America is complex. A vast number of variables, both independent and dependent, are at play and their linkages are still not fully understood. Most analysis of security threats falls short when attempting to link the variables, usually attempting to focus too narrowly on the linkages while ignoring key interactions. Given the complexity of the issue, one cannot reduce the analysis to include only the interactions between merely two variables. Variable’s interactions may be simplified initially, perhaps, but they cannot overlook relevant associations when asserting final conclusions.

A large problem with analysis of the human and environmental security equation, and its subsequent linkages to environmental and demographic change, is the lack of consensus and sound empirical research. A point probably most evident from this paper is a definite absence of substantial research attempting to relate and explain the relationships and interactions between the variables of human and environmental security, population growth, migration, urbanization, environmental degradation and environmental scarcity. We have attempted to identify the foundational questions in the literature that have yet to be addressed and to note where a lack of credible analysis calls conclusions into question.

Although this paper is directed at the security concerns of Latin America, the problems are assuredly similar to those of other developing nations. Latin American is not alone in its high levels of poverty, rapid urbanization and susceptibility to climate change and other variables thought to impact human and environmental security. Developing countries, however, are not the only ones that should look to Latin America for insight on security threats.

What remains central to this debate is whether individuals are fleeing environmental degradation or searching for improved economic opportunities. We suspect that a combination of factors influences the emigration decision and that studies suggesting that only one factor is involved are, perhaps, biased in their conclusions. The trade offs or synergies are yet to be explicitly quantified between
environmental and economic factors and the resultant impact on the security of the emigrating and immigrating states. We leave these questions for future research.
The Global Center for Security Cooperation (GCSC) is a subordinate organization of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA). It was established by the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy to build cohesion amongst the Department of Defense (DoD) international education programs. Specifically, it is a vehicle to enhance mission support of the Regional Centers for Strategic Studies (RCSS).

As noted in the February 2007 Defense Institute of Security Assistance Journal, Volume 29, No. 1, the Deputy Secretary of Defense established a new vision for the RCSS’s. The Regional Centers are now “the principal strategic communications tools for creating a regional international dialogue on U.S. security policy for the Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD).” Primary objectives include harmonizing views on common security challenges and educating on the role of civil societies.

To facilitate and reinforce the Regional Centers’ objectives, during the Regional Centers Roundtable in November 2005, the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (PDUSD) communicated an enduring vision that would unify the programs of key international education providers in support of the Regional Centers under a Global Center for Security Cooperation. The new vision, endorsed by the Regional Center Directors, recognized the need to:

- Build a federation under the School of International Graduate Studies (SIGS) at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS)
- Create a collaborative relationship with each RCSS
- Harmonize efforts in accordance with Defense Security Cooperation Guidance, Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy, and Combatant Command (COCOM) direction

In an October 6, 2006, memo to the President of the Naval Postgraduate School, the PDUSD gave direction to formalize and implement the GCSC as an OSD Policy entity located at the NPS and under the Executive Agency of the (DSCA). The Dean of SIGS at the NPS was appointed to be dual-hatted as the director of the newly envisioned GCSC because the PDUSD for Policy and DSCA recognized the relevant and unique advanced education roles and missions provided by SIGS. SIGS’ organization complements the Regional Centers and is consistent with the Secretary’s vision for the DoD international education. The GCSC opened on 1 October 2007. A formal ceremony was held on 16 November 2007.

The GCSC is not an academic or educational institution, does not conduct research, or develop curricula. Instead the Center’s role is to serve as the primary conduit for the following:

- Educational and subject matter expertise
- Faculty sharing
- Mobile education teams (METs)
- Distance learning
- Program and curricula synchronization
• Support through faculty and student research

This allows the Regional Centers to draw on SIGS for support. Specifically, the goals of the USD for Policy and DSCA are to accomplish the following:

• Provide a greater awareness of DoD international education and training resources available to specialized education and training providers

• Coordinate, integrate and de-conflict selected international military education providers’ capabilities and programs to minimize duplication in accordance with OSD priorities in support of the Security Cooperation Guidance

• Expand target audiences to approved recipients to build trust and influence

As mentioned, one of the roles of the GCSC is to align the programs of key international education providers in a GCSC consortium. Currently being evaluated for inclusion in the GCSC consortium in a coordinating relationship, are the Defense Institute for International Legal Studies (DIILS), the Defense Institute for Medical Operations (DIMO) and the Defense Language Institute English Language Center (DLIELC). The resulting additional capacity in the RCSSs, achieved through the integration of other providers into the GCSC, will generate:

• Increased coordination among the centers

• Worldwide awareness and maximization of international training and education capabilities and capacities

• Maximum collaboration with OSD to ensure that policy makers are informed by the Center’s wealth of expertise

• A collaborative set of centers with a coherent message which exceeds the sum of their individual contributions

• A common information technology network to improve alumni outreach efforts and strengthen collaboration among centers, other DoD education institutions, and OSD policy

The GCSC is a small unique operation supporting the international education needs described in DoD’s Security Cooperation Guidance. The GCSC consortium is an exclusive affiliation of world class providers, enhancing security assistance efforts throughout DoD.
Presidential Determination on Major Drug Transit or Major Illicit Drug Producing Countries for Fiscal Year 2008

Memorandum for the Secretary of State

[Released September 17, 2007 by the office of the White House Press Secretary.]

Pursuant to section 706(1) of the *Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003* (Public Law 107-228) (FRAA), I hereby identify the following countries as major drug transit or major illicit drug producing countries: Afghanistan, The Bahamas, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, India, Jamaica, Laos, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, and Venezuela.

A country’s presence on the Majors List is not necessarily an adverse reflection of its government’s counternarcotics efforts or level of cooperation with the United States. Consistent with the statutory definition of a major drug transit or drug producing country set forth in section 481(e)(2) and (5) of the *Foreign Assistance Act of 1961* (FAA), one of the reasons that major drug transit or illicit drug producing countries are placed on the list is the combination of geographical, commercial, and economic factors that allow drugs to transit or be produced despite the concerned government’s most assiduous enforcement measures.

Pursuant to section 706(2)(A) of the FRAA, I hereby designate Burma and Venezuela as countries that have failed demonstrably during the previous 12 months to adhere to their obligations under international counternarcotics agreements and take the measures set forth in section 489(a)(1) of the FAA. Attached to this report are justifications for the determinations on Burma and Venezuela, as required by section 706(2)(B). I have also determined, in accordance with the provisions of section 706(3)(A) of the FRAA, that support for programs to aid Venezuela’s democratic institutions is vital to the national interests of the United States.

Although President Karzai has strongly attacked narcotrafficking as the greatest threat to Afghanistan, one third of the Afghan economy remains opium-based, which contributes to widespread public corruption, damage to licit economic growth, and the strengthening of the insurgency. The government at all levels must be held accountable to deter and eradicate poppy cultivation, remove and prosecute corrupt officials, and investigate and prosecute or extradite narcotraffickers and those financing their activities. We are concerned that failure to act decisively now could undermine security, compromise democratic legitimacy, and imperil international support for vital assistance.

In Afghanistan, one model for success can be drawn by comparing the marked differences in cultivation between the northern and southern provinces. Several northern provinces contributed to a decline in poppy cultivation resulting from a mixture of political will and incentives and disincentives, such as public information, alternative development, and eradication. Furthermore, several northern provinces with very low amounts of poppy are well on their way to becoming poppy free.

Despite the significant progress made in Afghanistan since 2001, the country continues to face tremendous challenges. Our struggle to win hearts and minds, while confronting the insurgency, continues to directly hinge on our ability to help the Afghan government produce visible results. We
need to encourage a firm belief among the Afghan people that their national government is capable of delivering an alternative to the preceding decades of conflict. Our reconstruction assistance is an essential instrument to achieve that goal.

Bolivian counternarcotics cooperation has been uneven. The Bolivian government has cooperated closely on interdiction, and operations and seizures have reached record levels. The government is on track to reach 5,600 hectares of eradication this year, surpassing its goal of 5,000 hectares.

However, these measures have been outstripped by replanting and expansion of cultivation in Bolivia, the world’s third-largest producer of coca. The Government of Bolivia’s policy of “zero cocaine, but not zero coca” has focused primarily on interdiction, to the exclusion of its other essential complements, especially coca crop eradication. We strongly encourage the Government of Bolivia to make its number one priority the reduction and eventual elimination of excess coca crops, a major source of illegal cocaine for the hemisphere, Europe, the United States, and increasingly, for Bolivian citizens. In the area of drug control policy development, we urge the Government of Bolivia to revamp its national drug control strategy to eliminate permissiveness in licit cultivation, to abolish the so-called “cato” exemption, and to tighten controls on the sale of licit coca. As a party to the three major United Nations drug conventions, we urge Bolivia to move quickly to adopt and implement a modern anti-money/counterterrorism financing law, and take concrete steps to strengthen and better enforce precursor chemical controls and its asset forfeiture regime.

The United States enjoys close cooperation with Canada across a broad range of law enforcement issues. We remain concerned that the production of high-potency, indoor-grown marijuana for export to the United States continues to thrive in Canada in part because growers do not consistently face strict legal punishment. The marijuana industry in Canada is becoming increasingly sophisticated, with organized crime groups relying on marijuana sales as the primary source of income and using profits to finance other illegal activities. The production of synthetic drugs such as MDMA/Ecstasy and methamphetamine, some of which are exported to the United States, appears to be on the rise in Canada. The Government of Canada has made a serious effort to curb the diversion of precursor chemicals that are required for methamphetamine production to feed domestic and U.S. illegal markets and has worked productively with the United States in joint law enforcement operations that disrupted drug and currency smuggling operations along both sides of the border.

The Government of Ecuador has made considerable progress in combating narcotics trafficking destined for the United States. However, a dramatic increase in the quantity of cocaine transported toward the United States using Ecuadorian-flagged ships remains an area of serious concern. Effective cooperation and streamlined maritime operational procedures between the U.S. Coast Guard and Ecuadorian Navy are resulting in an increase in the amount of cocaine interdicted. Building on that cooperation, we will work with Ecuador to change the circumstances that make Ecuadorian-flagged vessels and Ecuadorian citizenship so attractive to drug traffickers.

Guinea-Bissau is becoming a warehouse refuge and transit hub for cocaine traffickers from Latin America transporting cocaine to Western Europe. Narcotics traffic is becoming yet another hurdle for Guinea-Bissau as it emerges from civil conflict. International donors and organizations are working to encourage and assist Guinea-Bissau in its efforts to confront organized cocaine trafficking networks that would use the country for warehousing and transshipment. These efforts are certainly appropriate and should be supported and advanced to deter illegal drug activities in Guinea-Bissau.

India has an exemplary record on controlling its licit opium production and distribution process, despite formidable challenges to its efforts. The Government of India can be correctly proud of its diligent law enforcement agencies and the introduction of high-tech methods, including “Smart Cards” for each licensed opium farmer. Recently, Indian enforcement officials identified and destroyed substantial illicit opium poppy cultivation in areas thought to be free of illicit cultivation in
the past. Indian officials will want to investigate the circumstances of this surprisingly large illicit cultivation to identify those behind this disquieting phenomenon and arrest, prosecute, and convict them.

Nigeria has made progress on many narcotics control and anti-money laundering benchmarks. There is reason to be hopeful. The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission has seized millions in the proceeds of crime, anti-money laundering efforts have been successful, and Nigeria is cooperating with the international community to improve its efforts against money laundering even more. Still necessary are procedural reforms to streamline extradition procedures. For many narcotics criminals no sanction is more effective than the fear they could face a court and jail time in the countries to which they have trafficked narcotics. Nigeria should also re-double its efforts to use its frequent apprehension of street criminals and couriers to identify and prosecute major drug traffickers.

You are hereby authorized and directed to submit this report under section 706 of the FRAA, transmit it to the Congress, and publish it in the Federal Register

GEORGE W. BUSH
President of the United States

The Pentagon is seeking to make permanent and expand to other countries some security and foreign assistance programs underway in Iraq and Afghanistan that traditionally have been supervised by the State Department and the Agency for International Development.

Legislation sent to Capitol Hill under the title of Building Global Partnerships Act of 2007 would allow the secretary of defense, “with the concurrence of the secretary of state,” to spend up to $750 million to help foreign governments build up not only their military forces, but also police and other “security forces” to “combat terrorism and enhance stability.”

In a January 25, 2007 memo for top Pentagon officials, Robert L. Wilkie, assistant secretary of defense for legislative affairs, said the act would increase “speed and efficiency” in training and equipping other countries and would give the Pentagon greater ability to assist partners deployed “alongside or instead of U.S. forces.” He called the act “the centerpiece of our legislative program in 2007.”

The act is an outgrowth of the Section 1206 authority, which initially provided funds to the Pentagon, renewed annually, to train and equip military and police forces in Iraq and Afghanistan without Department of State (DoS) involvement. It was later broadened to allow for paying the costs with DoS agreement of coalition partners in Iraq, including Algeria, Chad, Dominican Republic, Indonesia, Lebanon, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Yemen, and Sao Tome and Principe.

Another Iraq initiative the Pentagon wants to expand is the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP), which remains under discussion with the DoS and is not in the Pentagon draft bill. Begun in Iraq in 2003 with cash seized from Saddam Hussein’s government, CERP gives commanders money that they can spend on small construction projects such as rebuilding schools and roads. For fiscal 2008, the Pentagon is seeking $1 billion to fund the CERP program worldwide.

However, Congress approved authorization for an additional $500 million in the fiscal 2007 Iraq supplemental for combat commanders around the world to spend on foreign assistance within their regions of responsibility. That bill, which President Bush vetoed, is back before Congress, though the CERP funds are not an issue of debate.

Since 2002, the Department of Defense has also provided $3.5 billion to countries such as Pakistan and Jordan as reimbursement for basing rights and other assistance for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The vetoed fiscal 2007 supplemental contained an additional $600 million for this program, and the fiscal 2008 request totals $1.7 billion.
The House Armed Services Committee took a step in formalizing the Special Operations Command’s activities abroad by writing into law its authority to undertake “counterinsurgency” and “information operations.” In an April 23 interview with the national security blog IntelliBriefs, Major. Gen. David P. Fridovich said the Special Operations approach includes providing “civil affairs assets to assist in humanitarian and civic assistance” and offering “information operations resources to aid the host nation in countering violent ideological threats.”

The Pentagon’s growing role in foreign assistance has drawn criticism. Last month, former House speaker Newt Gingrich told a Council on Foreign Relations meeting that “we do not want uniformed military doing what others should be doing.” He suggested that DoS funding should grow by 50 percent so ambassadors could lead such projects.

December 2006, following an investigation directed by then-Chairman Richard G. Lugar (Republican Indiana), the Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported the following:

... as a result of inadequate funding for civilian programs ... U.S. defense agencies are increasingly being granted authority and funding to fill perceived gaps in public diplomacy and foreign economic assistance.

The result “risks weakening the Secretary of State’s primacy in setting the agenda for U.S. relations with foreign countries,” the report said. The committee also warned that “some foreign officials question what appears to be to them a new emphasis by the United States on military approaches to problems that are not seen as lending themselves to military solutions.” Gordon Adams, a former national security official at the Office of Management and Budget, said in congressional testimony in February that the process is gaining momentum. “The more we ask the DoD and the military to do, the more they become responsible for our overseas relationships,” he said. He called Iraq and Afghanistan “a test bed for a new concept” in U.S. foreign aid.

Pentagon officials, however, have pushed such programs on Capitol Hill. In February testimony for the House Armed Services Committee, Marine General Peter Pace, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, called for an interagency National Security Initiative Fund “to better invest in countering terrorism with other countries.”

“We need a dramatic leap forward in our relationship with interagency and international partners,” Pace said in prepared remarks. Terrorists sometimes “hide in countries with whom we are not at war,” he said, adding that in many cases the best way to respond “is by augmenting the capacity of those countries to defeat terrorism and increase stability.” An unclassified briefing by Marine Lt. Gen. John F. Sattler, director for strategic plans and policy of the Joint Staff, said the fund, which would be administered by the DoD and DoS was necessary because “beyond Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. is underinvested in preventative strategies that build the capacity of foreign partners.”
The Future of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization: How Valuable an Asset?

By
Daniel Fried
Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs

[The following are excerpts of the testimony presented to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Washington, D.C., June 22, 2007.]

I will make two key points:

• First, I will describe how the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is meeting current transatlantic security challenges.

• Second, I will highlight NATO’s transformation, perhaps halfway through. We and our allies have done much more remains to be done.

Meeting Security Challenges

During the Cold War, NATO focused on Europe, because that’s where the dangers were. Now, without abandoning its core missions, NATO increasingly looks outward, to dangers that can have roots far beyond Europe. These dangers include violent extremism, terrorism, nuclear proliferation, failed states, cyber attacks, and insecurity of energy resources. Protecting NATO members now also requires building partnerships and developing new capabilities.

The shift is historic. Europe’s western half has been at peace since 1945, the longest peace since the Pax Romana and one now extended throughout Europe. Eleven states once behind the Iron Curtain are now democracies contributing to common security within NATO. NATO’s missions span a wide geography and a wide array of activities. This trend is only going to continue. Clearly, there were differences over the war in Iraq, but they never paralyzed NATO. NATO’s scope is demonstrated by NATO’s two largest operations today: Kosovo and Afghanistan.

Kosovo

The Alliance has over 15,500 personnel deployed. Twenty-four of twenty-six NATO nations contribute forces to NATO peacekeeping force for Kosovo (KFOR), along with eleven non-NATO contributing countries. Over 1,500 of these are American. When Kosovo’s status is resolved, which we believe will be through supervised independence, KFOR will continue to maintain a safe and secure environment during this critical time. Every poll taken in Kosovo shows NATO to be the single most respected institution there. Kosovo has been a success story for the Alliance. By proceeding with the resolution of its status, we can move toward ending our post-conflict military involvement.

Afghanistan

NATO’s largest and most challenging mission, Afghanistan, says a lot about NATO today. Consolidation of a stable, democratic Afghanistan is a critical national interest for all Allies. The tools that NATO needs to succeed in Afghanistan expeditionary capability, counter-insurgency capacity, and, most important, an ability to combine security with governance and development, even when provided by other organizations, largely define the directions NATO must go in the future. Reports on a Taliban offensive this spring were in journalistic fashion for months. It never materialized thanks largely to the efforts and sacrifices of Afghan, U.S. and Allied forces.
Instead, NATO has taken the initiative with our own civil and military efforts. Thirty-seven countries’, twenty-six allies and eleven non-NATO partners participate in NATO’s United Nations (U.N.) mandated International Security Assistance Forces: over 40,000 troops. About 24,000 nearly 60 percent are from our allies and partners, and serve throughout all of Afghanistan.

We have continued to press allies to fill force shortfalls in International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), and since last fall allies and partners have pledged well over 7,000 new troops to the mission, most without caveats. Although some caveats remain a concern, allies have expressed a willingness to come to each others’ aid, should the need arise. There is a new flexibility. NATO forces serve side-by-side with Afghan National Security Forces. We are also doing everything possible to train and equip Afghan National Army and Police forces. The recent supplemental passed by Congress, which provided funding to better train and equip Afghan forces, has helped us leverage even more from other contributors.

Today Afghanistan has a democratically elected President and Parliament. Five million refugees have returned. The number of children attending school has increased five-fold to six million, two million of those girls had no access to schools under the Taliban.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Missile Defense

NATO faces the possibility that some of the world’s most threatening and unstable regimes can develop nuclear weapons. Iran already possesses hundreds of medium range and short-range ballistic missiles. The United States has proposed a long-range missile defense system in Europe, and at April’s (2007) meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers in Oslo our NATO allies were nearly unanimous in support. Secretary General de Hoop Scheffer has noted that U.S. missile defense plans do not upset the strategic balance of Europe, and that NATO could help bolt together U.S. plans with the allies national short-range missile and mid-range missile defense systems with the U.S. system, and hopefully even in cooperation with Russia. As has always been the case at NATO, our and other national defense efforts contribute to security for the alliance as a whole. Security, as we learned the hard way in the 20th century, is indivisible; if Europe is not secure, the United States is not secure.

Transformation

In 1994, NATO had sixteen members and no partners. It had never conducted a military operation. At the end of 2005 the alliance was running eight military operations simultaneously and had twenty-six members and partnership relationships with another twenty countries around the world. Developing the capabilities so that NATO can launch and sustain these missions takes political will and resources.

The Riga Summit last November marked an important step forward in NATO’s transformation to meet 21st century challenges. At Riga, the NATO Response Force (NRF) was declared to have reached full operational capability. Twenty-five thousand-strong land, air, and sea elements, the NRF can act as a quick-reaction expeditionary force. On all of these issues, there has been progress since Riga and on all, there is still more work to do.

• The Strategic Airlift Initiative is an important step in addressing one of NATO’s chronic weaknesses, a lack of dedicated strategic airlift and a key capability as NATO operates thousands of miles from Europe.
• The Special Operations Force (SOF) Initiative will improve the coordination and interoperability of allies’ special operations forces.
• The NATO Training Cooperation Initiative (NTCI) constitutes part of NATO outreach to new partners in the broader Middle East.
North Atlantic Treaty Organization Enlargement

A second significant transformation has been the growth in NATO’s membership. NATO’s enlargement is one of the great successes in Europe after the fall of the Iron Curtain. This process continues as Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia complete another cycle of the membership action plan seek invitations in 2008, and as Georgia, and perhaps Ukraine pursue reforms and seek eventual NATO and possibly European Union (E.U.) membership. Others, such as Montenegro, Bosnia, and Serbia, may also choose this path.

The Way Ahead

The April 2008 Bucharest Summit will seek to build on these successes, strengthening NATO’s capacity and its global reach to undertake global missions with partners around the globe. NATO has more to do in each category, but it is in action in key operations in the world, and it is the greatest security instrument of the transatlantic democratic community to deal with security challenges today and tomorrow.
Pentagon Planning Five Regional Teams Under United States Africa Command Framework

By
John T. Bennett
Staff Writer for the Pentagon DefenseNews

[The Editor of the DISAM Journal would like to thank DefenseNews for permission to include the following article in our Journal. Additional articles by authors of DefenseNews are available at the following web site: http://www.defensenews.com.]

Much of the work for United States Africa Command (AFRICOM), the United States (U.S.) military’s newest geographic command, likely will be done by five teams, each deployed to and designed for a specific region of the continent. The plans for these “regional integration teams” are still being laid, but Pentagon officials want a “split-based, tailored presence” there, not a one-size-fits-all approach that might produce dividends in one region but chaos in another, according to Department of Defense (DoD) documents prepared in mid-September 2007.

One team will go to the northern, eastern, southern, central and western portions of the continent, mirroring the African Union’s five regional economic communities, the briefing documents say. The idea is to “establish regional presence on the African continent which would facilitate appropriate interaction with existing Africa political-military organizations,” one of the September 14, 2007 briefings says. The regional teams will link to African Union (A.U.) organizations, “Africa stand-by force brigade headquarters [and] U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) support hubs,” according to the slides.

The Defense News obtained a copy of the DoD documents, which offer a window into the Pentagon’s planning of the much-anticipated new command. Several Africa scholars said the regional approach the Pentagon apparently is taking should be a good fit in a complex place like Africa.

“The teams fit with the reality that peacekeeping is done on a regional basis,” said Steve Morrison of the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies. If the area-specific team members become experts,

. . . they will be able to relate to those places and really develop a regional approach. . . . It’s a good way to begin establishing a greater presence in the region.

Perhaps most importantly, the teams will give U.S. policy-makers a direct link with multinational African organizations involved in policy and security efforts, Morrison said.

“That is how the A.U. is organized,” said Brett Schaefer, a fellow at the Washington-based Heritage foundation, “so makes sense to mirror the A.U.”

- One team will have responsibility for a northern strip from Mauritania to Libya
- The second team will operate in a block of east African nations - Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia, Uganda, Kenya, Madagascar and Tanzania
- The third will carry out activities in a large southern block that includes South Africa, Zimbabwe and Angola
- The fourth team would concentrate on a group of central African countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Chad and Congo
The fifth regional team would focus on a western block that would cover Nigeria, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Niger and Western Sahara

Schaefer said the command must be based on African soil, though others believe differently.

The teams will contain planners, “area experts,” health capabilities, and command and control systems, though more details remain to be fixed, the documents said. The area-specific teams will “direct and facilitate” organizations the Pentagon will dub “offices of security cooperation,” according to the slides. After nearly two decades of talk in Washington about creating a new military command for all things Africa, the Bush administration in early February 2007 finally formally announced the organization would soon be a reality.

Africa Command will enhance our efforts to bring peace and security to the people of Africa and promote our common goals of development, health, education, democracy and economic growth in Africa, President Bush said February 7, 2007.

The administration has set AFRICOM planning on a course to hit initial operational capability by October 1, 2007, with the larger goal of having a fully functioning command by October 1, 2008. Ward’s organization will take responsibility for a continent that previously was split between three U.S. military regional outfits:

- U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). CENTCOM will oversee American activities in Egypt, Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia and Kenya
- U.S. European Command (EUCOM). The European organization is in charge of managing things across the remainder of the continent
- U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM). PACOM is responsible for Madagascar, the Seychelles and the part of the Indian Ocean just off the East African coast

The new outfit will have substantially more than a military mission. The Administration and Pentagon officials continue to stress AFRICOM officials will primarily work on diplomatic, developmental, economic and security projects. To that end, they stress its deputy commander for civil-military activities as well as the AFRICOM commander’s top foreign policy adviser both will be Department of State officials.

The U.S. has a number of strategic reasons for devoting an entire regional command to the troubled continent, experts said this week. For Washington, pushing responsible governance, ensuring access to certain natural resources, especially oil and engaging areas that lack governance and could become staging grounds for terrorists is important, regional experts said. Additionally, several experts agreed the Bush administration has done a poor job explaining to African governments exactly what AFRICOM will do.

“They have created a lot of confusion among many African governments,” Schaefer said. The murky message from Washington has essentially “focused [aid efforts and other tasks] traditionally done by other agencies through a strictly military lens, so African officials view this as something else.” “It should be much more clear just what AFRICOM is going to do,” Schaefer said. Administration officials should step up efforts to make clear to regimes across the continent that the command will not be charged with “making all U.S. policy with regards to Africa,” he said.

Not all of the new American presence will have a permanent home on the continent, however. Some functions that could be deployed to Africa but which cannot be located on the continent will be based elsewhere, according to the slides. With the initial operational capability date only weeks away, a U.S. transition team, composed of 80 military and 20 civilian personnel, is working out of Kelly Barracks in Stuttgart, Germany. Morrison praised the transition team, saying it has been
stacked with the Pentagon’s “best and brightest” up-and-coming officers. That team is attempting to complete a list of difficult tasks, including:

- Refining mission requirements
- Drawing up a list of possible nations where the AFRICOM headquarters might be based
- Determining how many personnel and resources it will take to run the command
- Tweaking the headquarters organization and overall structure
- Crafting a plan to transfer “mission sets” from the U.S. commands that now have a hand in Africa

The emerging plans are not yet set in stone. Officials working on AFRICOM planning still expect to get additional direction from Defense Secretary on “structure and basing.”
A New Consensus in International Development

By
Henrietta H. Fore
United States Agency for International Development
Acting Administrator and Acting Director of United States Foreign Assistance

[The following are excerpts of the remarks presented to the Chicago Council on Global Affairs and the United States Global Leadership Campaign, in Chicago, Illinois, September 19, 2007.]

United States Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, in describing her vision of “American Realism,” said “we achieve our greatest and most enduring goals when we unite power and purpose together.” I have felt this spirit and purpose throughout the global development community. You know what is possible when collective power is driven by experience and commitment.

Under President Bush’s leadership, the United States has launched the most ambitious development agenda since the Marshall Plan - nearly tripling our foreign assistance in six years. We have nearly doubled spending in Latin America. We have nearly quadrupled spending in sub-Saharan Africa. With the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, we lead the world in funding HIV treatment. And, the President’s Freedom Agenda has stimulated global debate on freedom and democracy. Relief efforts for the Asian tsunami, the Pakistan earthquake and the Darfur crisis show our nation’s strong commitment to providing rapid and sustained assistance to those in immediate need. We are still the largest bilateral donor in the world - public or private. Today, development is on the world’s agenda. When you see it in Vanity Fair Magazine, when you hear about it from rock stars, when the G-8 holds a global summit to make new progress in Africa, you know our moment has arrived.

• But have we been smart enough?
• Have we communicated and worked together closely enough to see where and why a program works?
• Do we capture all of our best practices?

Today, I join you to capitalize on this moment and ensure that our combined efforts are strong, revitalized, and ready for the next phase. For context, let us briefly consider the evolution of foreign assistance over time.

The first era, in the 1950s and 1960s, was an era of institutional and infrastructure development. It established the major frameworks, infrastructure, international and bilateral donors, and the financing organizations we all work with today.

The second era, in the 1970s, might be thought of as the era of human development a people-oriented period, which introduced an enormous diversity of innovations in social sectors like education and health.

The 1980s brought new energy and emphasis on private sector development; and the 1990’s saw tremendous transitional development, as state-run economies and non-democratic governments in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, Latin America and Asia gave way to democracy.

Today, we are at the threshold of a new era. And in this new era we are just beginning to create what could be described as a Global Development Commons. A Global Development Commons would be a community of continuous and real-time exchange, collaboration, partnership and action between public and private donors, agencies, non-government organizations, host governments and civil society all operating as equals.
It is a time of great excitement and momentum, with an explosion of ideas, actors and solutions. While we will continue to build on past advances, the number of players and the complexity of the issues demand that we build a more comprehensive and efficient network of resources, skills and information exchange. Rather than command and control, we must communicate, collaborate, and act together.

A Global Development Commons relies on the interconnections, information institutions, businesses, organizations, governments, sectors and individuals within a country, within a region, and around the world. The greatest danger to our common cause in development is not the developed world’s will to use its power or its political designs. We find the greatest risk is in our gaps in communication in a shared understanding of the facts and in intramural competition among well intentioned offices, agencies, donors, and non-government organizations. This competition undermines morale and commitment, as well as clarity of action, and inflicts a poverty of hope and an abundance of paperwork.

I join you today, to make a singular appeal to you, as well as to the larger community of development experts and partners, contractors, entrepreneurs, corporations, foundations, funding organizations, non-government organizations, and agencies of the federal government to join me in a new quest. In this era, so different from that which prompted the Marshall Plan, together we need to seek a New Consensus in international development: a commitment to work together in ways we never have before. Think of it as a declaration of inter-dependence. Genuine consultation and increased collaborative efforts within our own community, with civil society and with governments will ultimately make our shared commitment and the network that supports it stronger.

To start that conversation, here is a principle I would like to offer. Many of us are devoted to our own businesses, agencies, organizations, regions, or sectors. We will always need to manage through the complexity of that matrix, I believe we are most successful when we put the host country, its priorities, capacities, norms, and local design at the center of our collective thought and action.

What I am hearing from host governments, most recently from President Kufuor of Ghana, is that they want direct access to the world economy. They are interested in trade, not aid. They want all of us the U. S. government, the business community, and the development community to help them create coherence out of the chaos of good intentions. We must be open to new ways of doing business. I believe that USAID, the Department of State (DoS), PEPFAR, the Millennium Challenge Corporation, and the business world must all operate as part of a Global Development Commons that reaches across to every donor in the world including the non-government organizations and the private sector.

The USAID is the world leader in engaging the private sector, mobilizing ideas and resources, skills and technologies. To expand our network in the for-profit world, our Global Development Alliance has built more than 500 public-private alliances with over 1,800 partners, using $1.4 billion of the people’s money to leverage $4.8 billion in private money, and leveraging thousands of people in the process. I am proud to announce that USAID is about to sign a global memorandum of understanding with the Microsoft Corporation. International development and technology are rapidly converging. You’ll soon hear more about how and where Microsoft and USAID are going to be working together around the world.

This week I also met with John Chambers of CISCO with whom we have helped launch a profound technological partnership with their global networking academies which is bringing education and economic opportunity to children and young adults throughout the developing world. We are committed to using technology to improve, leverage, and deepen aid effectiveness. At USAID, we know it works, and we are leading the U.S. government’s resolve to make partnerships a bigger part of the U.S. assistance package.
Let Us Talk About Execution

Over the past 60 years we have deepened our knowledge about the enormous power of economic growth to improve people’s lives. To do we use our knowledge effectively enough to be the power for global prosperity and stability? More recently, we have added new knowledge about the impact of education, the environment, energy, health, and women in society.

Do we apply and disseminate our knowledge enough?

I am committed to bringing clarity to complexity through technology, because technology is a tool that facilitates insight and networking. We must begin a sustained effort to make all aspects of U.S. assistance work over the web, so the host country and all of the players can see the whole, not just the distinct parts, and they can see their role and opportunities in it. We will marshal resources to build a Development Net, a database, and website to let the host country and all stakeholders see the whole picture. We need a country-centric base of information and a trading exchange that lets public and private partnerships and foundation donors look at potential projects by country or by type of program, and helps host governments and delivery teams drive efficiency and reduce redundancy. We need to make this data asset available, and link it with some of the excellent portals and networking sites already being built by groups like the Development Gateway Foundation and the Development Executive Group.

From an overall execution perspective, the American people and the international community who trust us with their money want to know that our work delivers results, and that it changes the world. I want to engage with you to identify and apply high-quality outcome measures so that we can more quickly adjust programs to ensure we achieve results.

The USAID was the first agency to require systematic evaluations of its projects and programs. We are going to emphasize that discipline with the useful purpose of sharing the best practices and then investing more resources to scale up best practices.

I am committed to:

- Rebuilding a revitalized diverse and skilled USAID workforce. We need to ensure our staff has 21st Century skills and the ability to use 21st Century tools to advance our development mission. We want people who have world-class policy skills, technical skills, public diplomacy skills, and yes, procurement skills.

- Asserting USAID’s leadership in development. To that end, I will chair the U.S. government’s interagency Development Policy Coordinating Committee. The USAID Office of Development Partners will be strengthened to engage with a broad spectrum of partners, from the bilateral and multilateral donors to the non-government organizations, to the private sector and foundations.

We need more communication about what our foreign assistance does to help U.S. interests around the world and its critical role in fighting poverty and promoting economic growth. We also need more focused forums on the promise and results of public-private partnerships. And we will improve our outreach. The story of the generosity of the people of the United States must be told, domestically and internationally. We need to brand all U.S. foreign assistance as being “From the American People.” And we need your help specifically.

Today and over the next sixteen months, I would like to ask you to join me in forging a New Consensus about the future of international development. If, as I believe, we are entering a new era of international development, a Global Development Commons where the connections between businesses, organizations, and resources matter more than ever, an era when we need tolerant in-
formation, ideas, technology, and public-private partnerships to spur innovation and deliver results, when host countries must be at the center of our collective thought and action. If you accept my invitation, I pledge to be inclusive and earnest in building this new consensus. You will find me a great collaborator and we could not ask for a better sponsor or more powerful advocate than Secretary Rice.

To our many shared stakeholders, I would suggest that we put at least as much energy into communicating what unites us as declaring our differences and inevitable shortcomings. For there is one thing of which I am absolutely certain: A New Consensus will only emerge if, together, we seek it.
America’s Global Leadership Challenge in the 21st Century

By

R. Nicholas Burns
Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

[The following are excerpts of the speech presented to Boston College, Newton, Massachusetts, April 11, 2007.]

Leadership is vital to any successful human endeavor to businesses that must compete in an increasingly tough global marketplace, to non-government organizations and universities. Leadership is also an irreplaceable commodity for a nation, especially one as great and powerful as the United States of America. Today, the global leadership challenge that we Americans have inherited and that will be such a vital factor in the success or failure of our foreign policy in the years ahead.

We face a very different leadership challenge, in my view, than that of all the generations of Americans before us. For all of our history until the mid-twentieth century, our leaders focused primarily on the job of building and sustaining a new country here at home. Starting now, and in the future, I believe we will need American leadership most in the external work of building a strong world beyond our shores. In Virginia, where my family and I now live, we are about to celebrate the 400th anniversary of the founding of Jamestown in 1607. Think of our history since then? Over four centuries, we have succeeded in:

- Building an exceptional nation
- Expanded westward three thousand miles across a vast continent
- We have fashioned an extraordinary melting pot of races and religions
- We have overcome a bloody and deeply divisive civil war
- We have built the most powerful economy and military the world has ever seen

Ours is an astounding story of growth and success. We succeeded in large part, due to our leaders who emerged at pivotal moments in our history to provide vision and greatness. We produced some of the most luminous leaders of modern history here in America. Jefferson whose universal ideal of freedom and liberty was revolutionary in the 18th century and remains so even today. Lincoln who held us together heroically, single-handedly, and without whom the north may not have succeeded in vanquishing slavery in the 19th century. While it is true that America has been a leading force on the international stage for the last half century, our greatest energies have been spent on building America from the inside out here at home.

Now, during these four centuries, we have also had the extraordinary good geographical fortune of living with practically no external threats. Think of that - a situation nearly unique of all great powers in all of human history. For most of this time, the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans have been our great twin protectors sealing off the world’s worst excesses from our shores. This gave us the luxury of retreating, when we were inclined to follow John Quincy Adams, famous admonition that Americans should not go abroad in search of monsters to destroy.

This singular fact of our physical separation from the rest of the world permitted us to vacillate between isolation from the world and bursts of intense, but all too often, brief engagement in it as during the world wars and cold war of the twentieth century. This American ambivalence about the rest of the world is, as I learned so well here at Boston College, the defining feature of our foreign
policy since our founding. We are a people that until now has swung wildly back and forth between seeking to lead and shrinking from leadership itself.

Consider just a few famous examples from our history. Jefferson warned in his first inaugural address of the danger of entangling alliances. Woodrow Wilson put two million of our soldiers into the great war which essentially ensured victory for Britain and France at its climactic moment. But, only two years later, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts defeated Wilson’s vision of a great universal world body to end all wars by leading the drive to kill the league of nations in the senate. Just over fifteen years later, the great American icon, Charles Lindbergh shamefully urged Americans to stay out of the fight against Naziism and fascism. Fortunately for us and for the world, FDR had a more enlightened and courageous view of American responsibilities to lead.

And just ten years ago, when I was spokesman for Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, she had to launch a public campaign to convince Americans that we should pay our dues to the United Nations because Jesse Helms and Senate Republicans had withheld them for two years running. This quick look back at our history portrays an America whose leaders were primarily concerned with the internal, domestic work of building a nation and who felt physically separate and safe from the world beyond our shores.

I am here to tell you that those days are long gone. The days when Americans could decide when to pay attention to the rest of the world and when to shrink back into ignorance and isolation are over. The world has changed and America now finds itself at a fundamental pivot point in its history. Unlike every generation before us, our great challenges are not longer within but abroad, beyond our shores. Unlike the past, the opportunities and the dangers that will be the most powerful forces affecting the course of our future history will nearly all be external. This will require us to think and live and act differently about the rest of the world.

The fundamental fact that each American must now know is that we live in an age of globalization where borders have shrunk and even disappeared, where technological and scientific change has narrowed distance and time. I think, in this respect, that Tom Friedman’s book, The Lexus and the Olive Tree, is the most prescient view of our future. Tom writes that the most important forces shaping the planet are all transnational. They represent at once our greatest future opportunity and our greatest danger.

Think of globalization this way?

There is a bright, positive side and there is a dark side. The bright side of globalization is obvious for all of us to see. The incredible power of the information age as personal computers, iPods, and cell phones give people, especially in the developing world, a degree of personal liberty never experienced before in human history. Medical advances that give us the hope of defeating malaria, polio, and many of the insidious diseases that affect especially poor people. Energy research that promises to help replace carbon-based fuels by using hydrogen, biofuels and wind. Space research that may take us in our lifetimes beyond mars.

When we reflect upon the power of science and computers to change our world for the better, then we understand that we live at one of the most hopeful times in human history. We have more power as individuals to create more wealth, conquer poverty and ignorance and improve the human condition than any other generation before us. This is an exceptional moment.

But there is also the dark side of globalization. We are witnessing the rapid development of negative powers that threaten the way we live, and in some parts of the world, our very existence. I think the greatest dangers we face are all transnational. These will likely be dominant foreign policy issues of the next fifty years:
• Global climate change
• Trafficking in women and children
• International drug and criminal cartels
• The spread of pandemic diseases
• The proliferation of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons and technology
• The chance that global terrorist groups might acquire them and use them against us.

Whether we encounter the positive or negative aspects of globalization, the Atlantic and Pacific can no longer protect us as these forces flow over and under and right through our borders. And because they are by definition global forces, they cannot be combated by one nation acting alone, however powerful that nation may be, they can only be met effectively by many nations acting together. This very fact gives us an enormous opportunity to do great things internationally. But, it also gives us the responsibility to try to do the right thing and to lead effectively. The U.S. is the most important global leader at a time of globalization. That places a huge premium on our having the best possible leadership in business, academia, and government; people who understand the world. We will need to think internationally more than at any other time in our history.

All nations pursue policies based on their national interest. For the last four hundred years, our predecessors have essentially believed their most important work was here at home to work on project America. We can no longer make that argument. Our most important work is unquestionably now to work on project world. We have some great opportunities to do good things but we are also swimming in a sea of trouble. I have been a professional diplomat for twenty-five years and I cannot remember a time when our country was faced with so many difficult and complex challenges seemingly all at once.

Think of the challenges we face:

• War in Iraq and Afghanistan
• A truculent Iran seeking nuclear weapons and regional dominance
• Genocide and a humanitarian crisis in Darfur
• Massive poverty on all continents
• The human immunodeficiency virus and acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (HIV/AIDS) pandemic in southern Africa
• The rise of a dangerous populism in South America
• The challenges, positive and negative from the extraordinary rise of India and China

The essential challenge before us is to lead the world and to do so persuasively and effectively so that we maximize the positive forces at work in the world today and minimize the dark side. With this in mind, I believe that America must meet five leadership challenges in the years ahead if we are to fulfill our destiny as a truly effective leader.

First, we must accept the mantle of global leadership. We really have no choice as our power is unmatched in the world today. How do we measure that power? Politically, we are the indispensable country called upon to mediate or lead on the most difficult world crises? Kashmir, Taiwan, and Jerusalem. Whether people love us or not, they want us in the middle of the world’s hot spots. Economically, we have the largest economy and the most innovative private sector. We are still the
world’s technology leader. The world economy can not run without us at the wheel. And militarily, we may just be the strongest country relative to all the others since the roman empire. Think of the huge strategic advantage that gives us, and the huge challenge to use that power responsibly. This unprecedented power demands that we embrace our status as global leader.

Second, we must simply reject the lure of isolationism which has too often been our national reflex at times of great international turmoil. We need to choose instead a policy of permanent engagement in the world. This is now our overriding national interest. If there is one central lesson we must learn from September 11, 2001 it is that we cannot live apart from the world or turn away from its challenges or pull the covers over our heads on stormy mornings.

Third, we need to reject isolationism’s evil twin – unilateralism. There are some in our chattering classes who still believe that we are best off in acting essentially alone in the world. They argue that our power is so great and pervasive that we can afford to do so. The unilateralists among us are just plain wrong. Theirs is a one-way road to failure for our foreign policy. A unilateralist country could not in the future take advantage of the most powerful positive forces on the bright side of globalization or have enough troops or money or will to fight the dark forces on its own.

I have a question for the unilateralists. Why is going it alone a good idea?

- It makes no sense to neglect our alliances like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) that can help us shoulder the burden of leadership.
- It makes no sense to want our soldiers to do all the fighting or our taxpayers to foot the entire bill in Iraq or Afghanistan.
- The world’s problems will be resolved most easily not by the global cowboy acting alone but by the enlightened sheriff of a united, democratic and global community.

Instead of turning away from the world, as the unilateralists would like us to do, we need to turn back to a stronger and wiser policy of rebuilding the United Nations (U.N.), NATO, the Organization of American States, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the African Union. Fortunately, I think President Bush and the Democratic leadership agree on this fundamental choice of engagement.

Fourth, we need to remain strong if we are to remain a credible global leader. The stark but undeniable reality of the modern world is that groups like al Qaeda and the Taliban are willing to kill large numbers of our fellow citizens. They are ready to fly airplanes filled with innocent people into skyscrapers, to stage spectacular attacks designed to terrorize civilians, just to make a political point. The only way to defeat these groups is to combine enlightened leadership with raw power. We must remain strong to counter them. This calls for continued firm support for a strong American military and diplomatic corps. It calls for asking young Americans to choose national service. We need our very best young people to consider serving our country.

Fifth, the U.S. Must be a positive, inclusive and hopeful world leader. True global leadership requires a concern for all the world’s problems. If we communicate that we do not care about what really grips most people around the world, the environment, social justice, or ending poverty, then the rest of the world will not believe in our leadership or follow us. They will think we really do not care about them.

Simply put, the U.S. foreign policy game plan and agenda cannot be just about us, it has to be the world’s game plan and agenda to have a chance of garnering full international support. We have to show that we are not the selfish giant so often and unfairly caricatured in the world’s newspapers.
Effective leadership demands that those of us who live lives of great wealth and luxury relative to the rest of the world find a way to identify with those less fortunate and build bridges to them. We cannot communicate satisfaction with the status quo when nearly 700 million Indians still live at poverty levels, when we see the poor of northeast Brazil and the slums of Haiti. That is why President Bush was so right to speak out about social justice and poverty on his recent tour of Latin America.

Those are the five challenges that I believe we must meet to be a successful global leader. But, there is one final advance we must make and we have to give the world hope. True global leadership demands more than getting the economics and politics right as we leave behind isolation and unilateralism and embrace more strongly our international and multilateral future. If our generation of Americans is to provide global leadership that is convincing to the rest of the world, then we need to speak out forcefully and with sincerity for the most deeply felt human desires to end poverty and injustice and war.

We live, unfortunately, in and all too often, a cynical time. With this in mind, our generation might seek to regain the sense of idealism that is so essential to greatness on the world stage. Americans have been at their best when we managed to articulate what the rest of the world wanted most. We have been at our best when we called for the type of revolutionary and idealistic change most needed in the world. Jefferson did so in writing that all people are equal before god. Lincoln did so in ending slavery. Eleanor Roosevelt did so in committing the new U.N. to a universal declaration of human rights. Martin Luther King did so when he sat in a Birmingham jail and called for revolutionary change through non-violence one hundred years after the Gettysburg address.

America needs to give the world hope again.

Two weeks ago, at a Washington dinner, I heard a very wise retired American politician, Lee Hamilton, say this in a clear and convincing way. He said “great leaders do not just dump problems in people’s laps. They have to provide solutions and the kind of hope that inspires people to do better and to reach for a bigger dream.” I was thinking about what Hamilton said the next morning when my wife, Libby, and I were walking around Washington’s tidal basin to see the famous cherry trees in bloom. We came upon the Franklin Delano Roosevelt (FDR) memorial along the route and walked in to read his great words now etched in stone. And it struck me clearly that Saturday morning, when the American people faced the greatest crises since the Civil War, the depression and World War II FDR’s greatest act of leadership was to tell people it was going to be all right. We would prevail if we avoided the one thing that can beat hope if we let it; fear, as he said so famously. He refused to instill fear in people’s souls but rather called them to meet a greater challenge – that of hope. FDR gave the people of America, Europe and Asia the great hope that we would triumph and that goodness would defeat evil.

To be a truly great global leader in the years ahead, we Americans will need to communicate that kind of positive hope to the world. This is a mission worthy of our past and our ideals. It is a mission worthy of a great country. It is a mission that the community here at BC devoted to service ought to be able to embrace. It is a mission that I believe our current leaders are embracing. It is a mission vital to the future of America and, I believe, all who live on this beautiful planet.

In closing, I would like to leave you with some words by president John F. Kennedy, in his June 10, 1963 commencement address at American university in Washington, D.C. He said,

So let us not be blind to our differences, but let us also direct attention to our common interests and to the means by which those differences can be resolved. And if we cannot end now our differences, at least we can help make the world safe for diversity. For in the final analysis, our most basic common link is that we all inhabit this small planet. We all breathe the same air. We all cherish our childrens’ future. And we are all mortal.
Celebrating the 60th Anniversary of the Foreign Service Institute

By
John D. Negroponte
Deputy Secretary of State

[The following are excerpts of the remarks presented to the Foreign Service Institute, Washington, D.C., May 21, 2007.]

The Foreign Service Institute (FSI) is, after all, nothing less than the portal to American diplomacy. This is where our professionals first enter the ranks of the foreign service and the Department of State (DoS), and this is where they update and strengthen their diplomatic skills as their careers advance ahead of the curve, and keep in mind that the men and women we bring into America’s service are its greatest strength.

My perspective on FSI is, shall we say, a long one. When I joined the DoS in 1960, FSI had just moved to Rosslyn, D.C., having decamped from an old 21st Street row house to make way for what would become the Harry S. Truman building. The Rosslyn training facilities that many of us remember were a hodgepodge of crowded office cubicles. We did what we had to do there, but no one can say FSI Rosslyn was an optimal arrangement. The contrast between Rosslyn and this spacious campus could not be more striking. Here we enjoy a splendid learning environment, set apart from the press of day-to-day business in a way that encourages study and reflection. We owe a debt of gratitude to those who steered the acquisition and construction of this site, and particularly to Secretary George Shultz, who was its strongest proponent. Even more important, the quality of the foreign service, civil service, and foreign service national students who study at FSI could not be better. Each time I visit FSI, I am struck by the diversity of our classes and the enormous fount of knowledge and experience each student brings to the diplomatic challenges that face us as a nation. We educate our incoming colleagues here, but we also learn from them.

Like Foreign Service Institute Itself, America and the World Have Changed

In 1947, America was grappling with its prominent new role in world affairs. Secretary Marshall and his team confronted a divided Europe in economic ruins. They faced emerging Cold War competition fueled by an aggressive communist ideology. Colonial rule in the developing world was giving way to the powerful forces of repressed nationalism. China was isolated. Our diplomacy at the time was quite traditional. We had not entered the Information Age and were still operating in a relatively (by today’s standards) slow-moving, closed-door fashion. Understandably, our diplomatic training was matched to our diplomatic practices. When FSI opened its doors, it offered instruction in only thirteen languages. Only a dozen or so professional study courses existed. And little thought was given to instilling the best leadership and management practices to meet the needs of a rapidly growing platform of embassies worldwide.

By the time Arlington Hall opened its doors to FSI in the fall of 1993, the Cold War had given way to the march of freedom. The powerful impact of global economic interdependence had left its mark on our diplomacy. Dozens of countries once subject to colonial rule had become important international players. Europe had united. The Soviet Union had disappeared. And China, no longer isolated, was fast becoming integrated into the global community. These profound changes, each in its way a long-standing goal of American diplomacy, benefited the American people. Our diplomats did not cause the transnational trends that swept the world during the last decades of the 20th century, but they recognized them, helped shape and guide them in conformity with our political, security, and economic interests and values.
For all the good we achieved, new challenges emerged. I would cite three in particular:

- First, the scourge of international terrorism, which is more complex than al Qaeda alone (far more complex) but which al Qaeda has done so much to fuel, orchestrate and implement terrorism’s extremist ideology, commitment to violence, and ruthless tactics plague a large large swath of the globe. We must work closely with all of our international partners to put an end to terrorism.

- Second, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Perhaps the most notorious example of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation centered on the infamous A.Q. Kahn network, but there are other WMD proliferation threats. Today it is incumbent on the United States and our partners to bring an end to the nuclear weapons programs of North Korea and Iran, for example, as we did in the case of Libya. This requires tenacious, skillful, highly technical diplomacy.

- Third, I would cite the well-documented dangers the world community confronts when fragile states become failed states, allowing criminal and extremist organizations operational sanctuary. Globalization and the information age notwithstanding, the well-governed, law-abiding nation state remains the fundamental building block of the world order. It is in our national interest that we respond to this third challenge with creative diplomacy, supporting good governance, the rule of law, and economic policies that offer constructive and transformational alternatives to criminality and extremist violence.

We in the DoS are all grateful that FSI has been at the center of our efforts to train America’s diplomats to operate safely and effectively in this changed and changing world. Seventy languages are now taught at FSI, building on FSI’s tradition of superb language and area studies, a core competence of the foreign service. FSI offers almost 250 tradecraft and professional area studies courses. Employees from all federal agencies are trained in how to operate effectively within our embassies, with special attention paid to the question of ensuring thorough security training. The fact is that much of what FSI does today bears little resemblance to the training it provided in 1947. Public diplomacy is a major field of practice. A whole school is devoted to the needs of our information technology specialists.

The FSI Leadership and Management School is Shaping Our Men and Women to be More Effective Leaders at Every Level

These and other changes dramatically reflect the requirements of practicing diplomacy in a world not as it was, but as it is and as we wish it to be. Secretary of State Rice’s encompassing vision for this assignment is to make our diplomacy transformational. The FSI that we celebrate today has taken the lead in explaining how every one of us can be transformational in our actions and impact, through

- Better leadership skills
- Stronger public speaking skills
- More active, results-oriented outreach to those outside government who exert so much influence on national policies everywhere

I am very pleased by the way FSI has stepped up to the challenge of training our Provincial Reconstruction Teams, and helping provide tools to those assigned to American Presence Posts. By the same token, FSI has done pioneering work in developing a whole new range of initiatives in distance learning. Now every desktop is a learning platform, and every employee can acquire the knowledge and skills needed to advance America’s interests regardless of where one is assigned.
This is Visionary Training

So while FSI’s past is as grand as the oaks that surround us on this campus, it is FSI’s future that we applaud today. And we are especially proud of FSI’s devoted staff. They work selflessly, effectively, and hard. It is because of them that FSI will continue to innovate in ways that will help America achieve a more stable and peaceful world.
Europe’s Role in the World
By
Daniel Fried
Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs

[The following are excerpts of the remarks presented to the Europe Forum Program Berlin, Germany, May 9, 2007.]

I have been asked to speak about “Europe’s Role in the World” and you have sought an outside perspective, albeit that of a close Ally. Now how close is that? Let me assure you that there is no closer partnership in the world than that between the United States (U.S.) and Europe. The U.S. and Europe do not constitute a single polity. But we do form a single community of values, interests, and responsibilities. Our roles in the world are not the same, but they are inextricably close, by choice but also by our very natures. We may play different positions, but we do play the same sport, and we are on the same team. Our identities are bound up by our commitments to human rights, rule of law, freedoms of religion and the press, and to market economics. The U.S. and Europe are centers of power, wealth and, have special responsibility to help our fellow human beings and, yes, help shape the world.

This is not simply altruism. An open, prospering world, increasingly characterized by the rule of law and deepening democracy, is better for us all, and far better than a closed world of hostile ideologies and spheres of influence. We have also learned the hard way, that events in far off corners of the world, in failed states, will affect us. There is little that we can do by ourselves. There is much we can do together. Where we cooperate and collaborate, we generally succeed. This is the case from Kosovo to Afghanistan. And I sleep better at night when I know America embarks on a mission with Europeans at our side.

This optimistic picture of transatlantic relations flies in the face of conventional wisdom about transatlantic rifts. But there is more popular support for the transatlantic alliance than the punditry in Europe and America often realize or are willing to admit. Poll after poll reveals a popular mandate for Europe and America to work together on the major issues confronting our societies.

Let me cite a German poll, that of the Bertelsmann Foundation, that has just come out, which shows that vast majorities on both sides of the Atlantic want transatlantic cooperation on issues as far ranging as democracy promotion, proliferation prevention, climate change, and energy security. A large majority in Germany, 73 percent, want to see both of us working together to prevent countries such as Iran from developing nuclear weapons. That figure rises to 74 percent in Spain, and to 79 percent in Finland. American support for that is 81 percent. When it comes to the supposedly controversial subject of promoting democracy worldwide, 84 percent of Germans want to work together with America to this end. That is ahead of the 72 percent support in the U.S. but behind that of Spain at 85 percent. Germans, Spanish and Americans have statistically identical views on the need for transatlantic cooperation to promote energy security, 80, 83, and 81 percent respectively. Across eight European countries, only an average of 4 percent said they did not want, and did not support, closer cooperation between the United States and Europe.

Bertelsmann’s own conclusion was that:

There is a clear mandate among the citizens of Europe and the U.S. for close transatlantic cooperation. Both parties see the other side as a vitally important partner.

I take pleasure in this endorsement for the core of my own country’s foreign policy toward Europe today, which calls for cooperation in resolving common problems we face throughout the world.
This mandate was endorsed last week by our leaders, at the European and U.S. Summit. Our leaders agreed to:

- Support determination of final status of Kosovo, supervised independence, where we both have troops under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
- Coordinate security and civilian support for Afghanistan, where we also have troops under NATO
- Consider additional sanctions in Sudan, to put pressure on that government so that it ends the genocide in Darfur
- Promote the rights of the Cuban people, who deserve democracy no less than we
- Advance cooperation on energy security and climate change

We signed the following:

- A Framework for Transatlantic Economic Integration. The Framework is ambitious and substantive, and it is the original initiative of Chancellor Merkel. It will greatly reduce regulatory obstacles to building a genuine transatlantic economy, already the most robust in the world.
- A U.S. and European Union (E.U.) Air Transport Agreement. The Air Transport Agreement will allow every U.S. and E.U. carrier to fly between every city throughout the E.U. and the U.S.
- An agreement on exchange of classified information between the U.S. and the E.U.

Our declaration on energy security and climate change paves the way for concrete practical cooperation that can help reduce greenhouse gas emissions, an environmental crisis of our time. We have made progress because we have made efforts. From the start of his Second Term, President Bush has reached out to Europe. Europe has reached back, and our relations are again on a strong footing. In the time remaining to the current U.S. administration, we will work with Europe together on many challenges i.e., Iran, Lebanon, Israel-Palestine.

I want to discuss today two longer term challenges.

- One is conceptual and organizational we need an integrative approach to global crises, one that brings together military capabilities and reconstruction and development.
- The second is strategic we need to find a framework for working with, and dealing with Russia, a great nation that deserves respect and with which we seek cooperation, but about whom we have concerns and with whom we have some differences.

On the first challenge, I am not talking about a division of labor between soft and hard power. Like talk of Mars and Venus, this tends to draw divisive lines. In fact, we all need to exercise both powers. The world remains a dangerous place. We have to sharpen all tools at our disposal and learn to work in an integrative, comprehensive fashion. The use of force is no virtue, but it may be our necessity. Force by itself will not bring success. But those who pretend we can dispense with force altogether are deluding themselves. Let us recall a field where our forces and our civilian agencies are equally involved Afghanistan. We need military means to confront and, yes, take out the Taliban. Success does not come from battles, however, but from schools and roads and good governance and jobs. We need teachers. But we need security forces to protect the teachers from the Taliban who could descend into town under cover of darkness and kill them.
Challenges Europe and the U.S. face in the early 21st century may well include those in which insecurity and dysfunctionality are linked, and we need integrated tools of security and development to meet them. We have to think of this conceptual framework, and apply the real world lessons we are learning in Afghanistan, as we sort through the institutional questions of NATO, the E.U., the U.N., World Bank and the other organizations we turn to, work with and are part of.

We must overcome habits of mind and policy and bad habit. To be blunt, we need to overcome the stigma that many in Europe attach to the use of force, and we need to see it as sometimes integral to our efforts to support human development. And to be equally blunt, America must recommit to what some in my country still refer to derisively as “nation building.” And we must do away with rivalries that have kept our best instruments from working together. The inability of the E.U. and NATO to work together is no longer just a nuisance: it costs lives and threatens our success where we cannot afford failure.

I hope that at the end of the current U.S. administration, we can resolve to put aside institutional theology in favor of integrated effort. Can we agree, for example, on the following?

- Total, unrestricted cooperation on the ground between E.U. and NATO operations and activities. Our principles should be transparency, coordination, and integrated action, not institutional separation.

- Greater strategic coordination among NATO and E.U. leaders, 21 countries are in both organizations. Our Foreign Ministers have a strategic discussion over dinner every three to four months. Why not Foreign Aid Ministers, Defense Ministers, or even Prime Ministers? And can we support Javier Solana and Jaap de Hoop Scheffer leading this effort, instead of imposing limits upon them?

- And finally, we need regular, practical coordination between NATO and E.U. staffs in Brussels and not, under the cover of darkness, but as an authorized activity backed by both organizations.

Now let me turn to Russia, even more on our minds this week than usual. Russia and the West have dealt with one another sometimes well, more often uneasily, since at least Peter the Great. It would be hubris to proclaim some policy to resolve overnight the relationship between Russia and the West. We have had some spectacular differences with Russia recently:

- Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE)

- Estonia

- Missile Defense

- Persistent differences, increasingly over democracy

- Additional differences may arise, possibly over Kosovo

But let us be steady. It is long-term partnership with Russia that we seek, and not simply management of difficulties. Let me suggest some principles for relations with Russia through what will be a complicated period as Russia moves toward an expected transfer of power this year and early next. If one is tactical, the United States and the E.U. should cooperate with Russia when at all possible, push back only when necessary, and at all times be realistic about Russia. In this regard, encouraged by the wise advice of Chancellor Merkel, the U.S. is intensifying strategic dialogue with Russia, on CFE, missile defense, and post-START arrangements. Secretary of State Rice and Secretary of Defense Gates have agreed to a “two-plus-two” format with their counterparts, suggested by the way by the
Russians, to consider these issues. We seek common approaches on missile defense, not rhetorical sparring.

A second principle is values based: we should be clear about what sort of Russia we want to see emerge from its unfinished transformation. We do not want a weak Russia. This does nothing for America or, I dare say, nothing for Europe. But a strong Russia must be strong in 21st century, not 19th century terms. In this century, a strong state must include a strong civil society, an independent media, a strong independent judiciary, and a market economy regulated by independent state institutions. On this basis, a nation may build the rule of law, which makes a good life possible. A strong center is part of this healthy mix, but a strong center in a state of weak institutions, is not.

We should be realistic about Russia. This starts with the understanding that Russia even today is freer than under the Communists, and arguably freer than at any time under the Tsars. But Russia is a great country and it can do better than that low standard.

We, the Europeans and Americans, have a stake here. History suggests a link between a nation’s internal arrangements and values on one hand, and its external behavior on the other. Democracies have their flaws, but are apt to be better neighbors and better actors generally.

A third principle is that we should approach Moscow as friend and potential ally everywhere in the world, but we should not pay a price for cooperation, nor indulge Russia when it behaves as if a residual sphere of influence over its neighbors is its due. Europe and the U.S. should continue to speak out honestly and if necessary frankly about the use of political and economic pressure against smaller, vulnerable neighbors, such as Estonia and Georgia.

Countries like Estonia and Georgia have their own responsibilities to build better relations with Russia. Estonia should continue to reach out to its Russian community, not because it is pressured to do so, but because Estonia is a democracy and respects the rule of law, and such outreach is the right thing to do. President Ilves has made clear his commitment to such a positive approach.

Georgia should avoid the temptation of adventurism, and continue to work toward peaceful, responsible resolution of the separatist conflicts on Georgian territory. President Saakashvili has recognized his responsibility in this regard. We should all support Georgia as it deepens its reforms at home and, on that basis, seeks to draw closer to the transatlantic family and our institutions.

Russia has its own responsibilities, including the recognition that the countries that emerged from the Soviet empire, such as Estonia and Georgia, are truly free and sovereign. America, Germany, and Europe have responsibilities of our own to recognize that there is no grey zone in Europe, no implicit sphere of influence for Russia, no outside veto over the fate of these newly free countries. They must be free and responsible to write their own history, for good or ill, whether with us, based on their own readiness to share our values and join our family, or otherwise.

Today is May 9, 2007, when Russia celebrates Soviet victory over Nazi Germany. That victory was heroic, purchased at terrible price. The U.S. recognizes Russia’s strong feelings about it. My country will always remember its wartime alliance with Moscow and we honor the courage and sacrifice of Soviet soldiers in defeating Nazi Germany. But Russia must find ways as well to recognize that while Russians’ feelings are strong and have validity, so do the feelings of some others, especially those whose liberation from the Nazis did not mean freedom.

Relations with Russia are likely to remain a complex mix of partnership, some friction, some perceived competition, but hopefully growing partnership for some time to come. We cannot resolve all our differences in the next twenty months. But we can, perhaps, put relations with Russia on a productive, frank, and, given my country’s electoral calendar, bipartisan footing.
There is much the U.S. and Europe can and must do in the world. In all our endeavors, neither the U.S. nor Europe can go it alone. Unilateralism, isolationism, appeasement none of these approaches ever works to the long-term good. The sterile indulgence of Euro-bashing or, its twin, anti-Americanism, should join other “-isms” in the dust bin of history. America in the world needs Europe and, may I suggest, Europe needs America. Our task is not to put our relationship on the Freudian couch and anxiously take its temperature every few weeks, but to put it to work in the world to resolve the problems only we can resolve together:

- Peace and security
- The advance of prosperity
- The common challenge of climate change and energy security
- The fight against disease and poverty, and misery
A Future Unbound: The United States and India Relations

By

R. Nicholas Burns
Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

[The following are excerpts of the remarks presented to the Heritage Foundation, Washington, D.C., May 23, 2007.]

When I was thinking about this opportunity to discuss United States (U.S.) and India relations with you today, I recalled the title of a book by Gurcharan Das, the former CEO of Proctor and Gamble India. Das wrote a sweeping economic history of India from independence to the new millennium entitled India Unbound, which many of you have no doubt heard of. In India Unbound, Das describes one of the most extraordinary international stories of the late twentieth century India’s evolution from socialism and a state-planned economy to a vibrant free-market economy. The transformation Das so eloquently describes has brought about remarkable economic growth in India, and that growth has in turn launched India onto the world stage as a rising global power. Within the first quarter of this century, India will likely be among the world’s five largest economies, and an undisputed global technology leader. It will soon be the world’s most populous nation, with a huge, skilled, and youthful workforce. It will continue to possess large and ever more sophisticated military forces that will remain strongly committed to the principle of civilian control. And it will serve as an example of, and a partner for, democracy to its neighbors and to developing countries in each part of the globe.

With this unleashing of India’s potential has come the opportunity for a different relationship with the United States. President Bush and President Clinton have both sought to take advantage of this great change to build a new and fundamentally different U.S. and India relationship over the last decade. Instead of an adversarial relationship, we have a cooperative one bilaterally, regionally, and internationally. Where once we were constrained from working together by history, politics, and distance, now we are global partners, tied together at the most fundamental levels. Our partnership rests on a solid foundation of shared values, shared interests, and our increasingly shared geo-strategic view of how best to promote stability, security, and peace worldwide. To borrow Gurcharan Das’s metaphor, our shared future is indeed unbound, and its possibilities are limitless.

I believe that the U.S. and India will continue to create a global partnership that will become for the 21st century a force for stability and peace in Asia. I also believe we Americans will count India as among our most important strategic partners worldwide for the coming century. I would like to review the state of our relationship as I see it now, and as I see it in the future.

The Present

We are witnessing between the American and Indian people an explosion of ties in culture, the arts, technology, and business. The relationship between two states is most often based on the quality of relations among its people.

People to People Ties

For the last three years, India has sent more students to the United States than any other country, even China. There are over 76,000 Indian students in the U.S. this year. This will pay dividends for decades to come, as the ties these students create here in America will create lasting bonds between our countries. In keeping with our long-term partnership, Americans are seeking to understand India its history, languages, cultures, and politics as never before. The number of American students attending Indian universities increased by 50 percent last year alone, and stands today at around 1,800. Our top universities, encouraged by recent decisions to open the Indian higher education sector to
greater participation by foreign institutions, are setting up more partnerships and collaborative re-
search programs with their Indian counterparts.

The growing number of Americans of Indian origin has now reached nearly 2.5 million. The
Indian-American community is one of the most highly educated and highest-earning in the U.S., and
fosters important business, academic, and cross-cultural ties. The rate of legal immigrants from India
who become American citizens has increased from 56 percent in 1995 to 65 percent today. And, as
we witnessed in 2006 with Congress’ passage of the Hyde Act, the Indian and American community
is making its voice felt here in Washington.

And this is not a one-way flow: many thousands of Americans now live and work in India, espe-
cially in Delhi, Mumbai, and Bangalore. To encourage even more contact between our people, the
U.S. plans to open a new consulate in Hyderabad and also to build a new state-of-the-art American
Center in New Delhi. I saw this first-hand in Hyderabad in December when I met with the local CEO
of a U.S. high technology company who perfectly personifies this trend. He studied in the U.S. and
helped grow a successful Silicon Valley company. Seeing the value of a bridge to India, he now man-
ages a large and growing team in India that is keeping a U.S. company on the technological cutting
edge.

Our strengthening ties have bolstered business confidence. India is welcoming more U.S. busi-
ness delegations than ever before, including many sponsored by individual U.S. states. These state
delegations have been successful not only at finding new export markets for their businesses, but also
in enticing Indian companies to pursue investments and create jobs in these states.

Technology

Both Indians and Americans have long been recognized as leading innovators in agriculture,
information technology and high-tech fields, biomedical research, and biotechnology. Increasing the
linkages of the U.S. and Indian knowledge base our scientists, engineers, researchers, academics, and
our private sectors is key to our mutual economic growth and prosperity and a goal of our science
and technology collaborations. Together, we are exploring a host of technological initiatives ranging
from agriculture to civil nuclear power.

We are building closer ties in space exploration, satellite navigation, and in the space science
arena. Through mechanisms such as the U.S. and India Working Group on Civil Space Cooperation,
we are exploring the potential for cooperation in earth observation, satellite navigation and its ap-
lication, space science, natural hazards research and disaster management support, and education
and training in space.

We are providing U.S. instruments for India’s lunar mission Chandrayaan-1. At a time when the
U.S. has not scheduled a moon mission for many years, this is an opportunity to collaborate on efforts
to understand earth’s closest neighbor.

Agriculture

While agriculture accounts for 20 percent of India’s Gross Domestic Product, more than 60 percent
of its people make their living through agricultural enterprises. Knowing how important agriculture
is to the lives and livelihoods of Indians and Americans alike, President Bush and Prime Minister
Singh launched the Agricultural Knowledge Initiative in July 2005. This initiative will provide $100
million to encourage exchanges between American and Indian scientists and promote joint research
to improve farming technology.
Building on our earlier collaboration in India’s Green Revolution 40 years ago, the Agricultural Knowledge Initiative supports agriculture education, joint research, and capacity building projects including in the area of biotechnology.

**Civilian Nuclear Cooperation**

I met with Indian Foreign Secretary Shivshankar Menon in Washington on May 1, 2007, to discuss the outstanding issues in our bilateral agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation. We are making progress in our negotiations and hope to conclude this historic agreement very soon.

The passage by the U.S. Congress of the *Hyde Act* in December, 2006, several other important steps are now necessary to realize full civil nuclear cooperation. We must negotiate a bilateral agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation (known as the 123 Agreement), which Congress will need to approve. India must negotiate a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency, and the Nuclear Suppliers Group must grant India an exception for civil nuclear commerce.

The civil nuclear initiative will bolster nonproliferation efforts by bringing India closer to the international mainstream; enhancing energy security, helping reduce harmful emissions, and creating opportunities for American companies. Its successful implementation will help India meet its growing energy needs and will be a cornerstone of our partnership. The civil nuclear agreement has become, in many ways, the symbolic centerpiece of our overall relationship. Like all good things, it will continue to require hard work and difficult compromises to reach completion. Despite some difficulties of late, I believe we will reach the mountaintop and realize the enormous promise of this breakthrough agreement.

**Economics**

Underpinning our partnership in all these areas is the U.S. and India economic relationship. Since the wave of economic reforms initiated by then Finance Minister Singh’s tenure in the early 1990s, Americans have looked to India as the next great opportunity, and Indian companies and entrepreneurs have responded with equal vigor. We both stand to gain by knitting together our two nations in a dense web of healthy economic interconnections.

Our economic ties have expanded dramatically in the last decade - our bilateral trade is growing over 20 percent per year and has doubled to $32 billion since 2002. The U.S. is India’s largest investor, with over $6 billion of portfolio and foreign direct investment, and India has an estimated cumulative investment of over $2 billion in this country.

However, with every billion dollar increase in trade and investment, new commercial disputes are created. To some extent, this is inevitable - new economic opportunities, reforms, and growth are reshaping Indian society. The Indian government’s challenge is to mediate these changes, ensuring that this growth provides an equitable rise in the incomes of the average Indian. The Indian government must also ensure that new regulations or old red tape don’t impede growth, and that foreign companies have a clear path to settling commercial disputes when they arise. The Indian government should also continue the economic reforms and liberalizations that have been the basis of India’s economic boom so far.

In order to achieve sustained higher growth rates as well as broad rural development, India requires world-class airports, irrigation, and communications networks. It needs modern power grids, ports and highways and many other infrastructural improvements that could be vastly accelerated by greater investment, both public and private.

Our focus is on facilitating and promoting foreign direct investment, enhancing bilateral consultations on reducing tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade in industrial goods, services, and agriculture,
preventing the illicit use of the financial system, and strengthening India’s regime for intellectual property rights.

A key driver of our economic relationship has been the innovative CEO Forum which has brought to the table 20 top Indian and U.S. CEOs representing over a trillion dollars of capital. These CEOs provided a detailed set of policy and economic reform recommendations to President Bush and Prime Minister Singh that if implemented, would dramatically increase our bilateral trade and investment flows.

At the CEO Forum Summit in New York last October 2006, attended by three U.S. cabinet secretaries and three Indian ministers, the U.S. government made progress in implementing these recommendations. We also heightened our engagement with the Indian government on issues related to the expansion of banking services in both countries. We pledged to implement an expedited license process for trade in dual-use items, known as the trusted customer program. Finally, we will hold extensive consultations with the Indian government and industry on data privacy standards to develop a framework of common practices in electronic commerce that will address data privacy standards to build confidence in the online marketplace.

For its part, the Indian government announced new initiatives designed to attract much-needed infrastructure investment in India. At the meeting, Citigroup and Blackstone agreed to launch a $5 billion infrastructure investment fund in partnership with the Indian government. In addition, the Indian government renewed their commitment to resolve some legacy commercial disputes. In the next meeting of the CEO Forum, we plan to consolidate the progress we have made so far; we also hope that the Indian government will be able to address more of the CEOs’ recommendations. And, we achieved an important symbolic breakthrough on a long-festering trade dispute. After eighteen years, we have begun importing Indian mangoes into the U.S. market. Mangoes such an important part of Indians’ daily lives can now be enjoyed by ordinary American citizens, which speaks volumes about our deepening trade ties. Let us hope this is a harbinger of similar progress on our overall trade ties in the future.

The Future

What does the future of our relationship hold? In the next year we will move forward in three principal areas: Education, Regional Cooperation, and Security.

Education

We believe that education, especially higher education and research, is a key element in our bilateral and multilateral relationships. Under Secretary Karen Hughes recently led a delegation of presidents of major American universities on a visit to India. We are encouraged by the enthusiastic reception they received, and we are encouraged in our belief that our countries must strengthen our partnership in education.

We are in discussions with the Government of India to renegotiate our bilateral Fulbright Treaty in order to permit funding from the Indian government. The additional resources would permit this highly successful program to expand dramatically and would support funding for more Indian researchers and scholars to pursue their studies and research in the U.S. We are also exploring collaboration on public-private technical training in the fields of information technology, communications, and public health in India both for Indians and for others such as Central Asians and Afghans.

Regional Cooperation

India’s emergence as a global power brings with it commensurate responsibility as a leader not only on regional issues but also on global ones such as promoting democracy and protecting the
environment. Last year the U.S. and India launched our global democracy initiative to promote democracy and development. We agreed to work closely in the region and globally by offering our experience and expertise for capacity building, training, and exchanges to third countries that request such assistance. India has demonstrated its commitment to democracy promotion by contributing $10 million to the U.N. Democracy Fund. It is set to pledge an additional $10 million.

As the world’s sixth largest consumer of energy, India shares our interest in developing new, affordable, and cleaner forms of energy. We will work together through the U.S. and India Energy Dialogue to strengthen energy security by promoting the development of stable, affordable, and clean energy supplies. Diversifying India’s energy sector will help it meet its ever-increasing energy needs and set an example for balancing economic growth with protection of the environment the key to sustainable development.

Both India and the U.S. are committed to strengthening energy security and promoting development of stable and efficient energy markets. We are cooperating through the Asia Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate along with other countries in the region to promote the development of cleaner, cost-effective, and more efficient energy-production technologies.

Both India and the U.S. understand full well that both of our countries have a larger responsibility to be part of the global effort to combat global climate change. India is demonstrating a leadership role regarding avian influenza. It was one of the first countries to join the International Partnership on Avian and Pandemic Influenza and agreed to host the Partnership’s 2007 global conference held December 2007.

Security

We have identified expanding defense relations and counter-terrorism cooperation as the next two big security initiatives between our countries. Growing military cooperation is becoming one of the most visible aspects of our bilateral relations. The 2005 Defense Framework is symbolic of a new era in closer military cooperation and sets forth a joint vision. The Agreement reflects the increasing frequency, size, and complexity of military exercises between the Indian military and the U.S. Our mutual interests also provide an environment for jointly addressing security and humanitarian issues, including disaster relief operations.

The presence of forty-two U.S. defense firms in India during the Aero India show in Bangalore February 7-11, 2007, is evidence of our companies’ willingness to invest in long-term relationships with Indian counterparts. The possibility of increased defense trade makes this a bright spot for future development. U.S. technology is highly advanced, and the Indians are strongly considering our defense industry to provide modern weapon systems such as the Multi-Role Combat Aircraft, anti-tank missiles, and long-range reconnaissance aircraft.

In keeping with our new relationship, our firms do not want to be merely suppliers to the Indian military, but also long-term partners during the modernization and development of India’s defense industry. I hope very much that we will see a breakthrough in our defense relations in the next year. I believe American firms will be well-positioned to succeed in becoming major suppliers in the Indian market if the playing field is level.

We are also working together to combat the global scourge of terrorism. The 8th U.S. and India Counterterrorism Joint Working Group was held in New Delhi on February 28, 2007. India and the U.S. have many lessons learned to share with each other to confront this mutual threat. We have agreed to closer cooperation on terrorist financing, law enforcement, aviation security, and information sharing, as well as combating weapons of mass destruction terrorism and bioterrorism.
Conclusion

The U.S. and India have an extraordinarily promising shared future. The multidimensional nature of our relationship, its range, and its depth all ensure that our ties will be enduring. With our shared future unbound, I am confident that we will be able to achieve the ambitious goals we have set out for our partnership.

I believe the positive history of the 21st century will be written in large part by Indians and Americans together as we will stand together for the growth of democracy, free-market economies, and peace in Asia and around the world. When the history of our time in office is written, I am confident the great strategic leap forward in cementing the U.S. and India strategic partnership will count among the most important accomplishments of Presidents Bush with Prime Minister Singh and his predecessors.
Pakistan plays a key role in some of our most critical foreign policy goals, such as creating a regional environment inhospitable to Taliban extremism and terrorism and building a modern society. Pakistan is also critical to Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. Without Pakistani support and cooperation, we would face severe difficulties in supplying, reinforcing, and protecting our troops and those of our allies who are defending the democratically elected Afghan government. A successful Pakistan, a prosperous, moderate democracy—would also be a stable and stellar example throughout the Muslim world.

Helping Pakistan succeed in becoming a prosperous, moderate, and democratic nation is a critical part of all our policy goals for Pakistan. A stable, prosperous Pakistan is key to the stability and prosperity of the whole region. Pakistan links the landlocked, energy-laden nations of Central Asia to the dynamic markets of South Asia. Therefore, our goal is to forge a long-term strategic partnership between the United States (U.S.) and Pakistan that is strong, multi-dimensional, and enduring. Furthermore, a successful transformation of Pakistan would bring the benefits of prosperity, good governance, and justice to 160 million people, undercutting the appeal of violent extremism and helping to provide an important example of modernity and moderation in the Muslim world.

2007 is a vital year with fundamental tasks to achieve our long-term goals in Pakistan. This is the year that will help determine whether Pakistan makes a successful transformation into a prosperous and stable democracy, and we intend to assist President Musharraf to fulfill his commitment to this goal. Our assistance will help the Pakistani people enjoy the benefits of good governance and change the nature of the relationship between the people and their government in the least governed and most vulnerable areas of Pakistan. We believe that Pakistan must make a full transition to democracy and civilian rule and we support the Pakistani government’s efforts to bring about that transition. The challenge is to maintain the right balance and implement the plan quickly and effectively. Anne Patterson, our new ambassador to Pakistan, who was recently confirmed by the Senate, is fully committed to finding ways to more effectively deliver our message. Social and economic development programs as well as distinct roles for both the military and political forces can play an instrumental role in nurturing democracy.

The upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections will be critical benchmarks in Pakistan’s progress towards full democracy. To help Pakistan’s transition, we are helping strengthen the accountability and transparency of Pakistan’s democratic and civic institutions. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has numerous programs to support fair, free, and transparent elections. But we also know that democracy means more than just holding elections. We are working to strengthen a free and vibrant press, a fair and impartial criminal justice system, active civil society organizations, an independent judiciary, and broadly participative and responsive political parties and institutions.

U.S. development assistance in Pakistan is tailored to help build sustainable growth and improve living standards that will promote the conditions for good governance, responsible citizenship, and
foreign investment. In 2006, the U.S. provided Pakistan $69.3 million to improve primary and higher education along with other funds that support education through the national budget. The U.S. government has also provided $200 million in budget support starting in fiscal year 2005, which has opened budget space for the government of Pakistan to spend additional resources on education, improving macroeconomic performance, and the quality and access to health care and education. This budget support is guided by the shared objectives, which are negotiated every year with the Government of Pakistan to identify those sectors where U.S. budget support will be spent. In 2007, Pakistan agreed to spend $56.25 million of the budget support toward education.

Thus, over $100 million of our assistance goes toward education. As a result, Pakistan has increased its overall spending on education from $1.3 billion in 2003 to $2.3 billion in 2006. In Punjab, Pakistan’s largest province, provision of free textbooks and stipends paid to female students have increased enrollment by more than two million students since 2001. In the Tribal areas, enrollments have increased 38 percent since 2000 with female enrollment accounting for 27 percent of total enrollments. National female literacy rates in Pakistan have increased from 32 percent in 1998 to 40 percent in 2005.

We are also working closely with our Pakistani and non-governmental partners on key issues such as furthering women’s rights and legal protection for ethnic and religious minorities, and combating forced child labor and human trafficking. Women’s health is a particular challenge in Pakistan, but we know that the rate of maternal mortality can be lowered significantly with properly trained rural health providers, and the USAID providing such training.

In the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and the Afghan-Pakistani border regions, the government has developed a comprehensive strategy to combat terrorists and extremists by integrating these ungoverned spaces into the mainstream of Pakistan’s economy and government. By boosting security and governance as well as political and economic development, the people of that region will have an opportunity to reject the violence and extremism and embrace peace and prosperity instead. When this choice has been made on a wide scale these areas currently being exploited as safe havens will be rendered permanently inhospitable to terrorism and violent extremism. The government has meanwhile expanded its political efforts by working to boost the capacity and will of local tribes to resist and expel violent extremists in their midst, achieving successes such as the expulsion of al Qaeda affiliated Uzbeks by tribal forces in and around South Waziristan. It has also brought in additional troops, strengthened border posts and controls, and helped kill or capture major Taliban figures such as the chief field commander Dadullah, and other top leaders Osmani, and Obeidullah.

Of course, we are under no illusions about the difficulties faced by the Government of Pakistan in extending its writ into these territories or about al Qaeda and Taliban activities in this area, and the level of commitment required to prevent them from finding safe-haven there. The Tribal Areas have the worst social indicators in all of Pakistan, such as only a 3 percent female literacy rate. The Government of Pakistan is committed to improving living conditions and expanding governance in the Tribal Areas, and we have requested additional funds in the fiscal year 2008 budget to assist Pakistan in this crucial endeavor.

President Bush has also announced his intention to create Reconstruction Opportunity Zones, which would further expand cooperation and official ties between Afghanistan and Pakistan. These zones are a critical part of our broader counterterrorism strategy in these areas, designed to connect isolated regions to the global economy and create vital employment opportunities in territories prone to extremism. The zones will encourage investment and economic development by granting duty-free entry to the U.S. for certain goods produced in the zones, and create employment alternatives for the working-age population that may otherwise be drawn into terrorism, narcotics trafficking, and other illicit activities. This initiative includes input from across the spectrum of U.S. government
Over the last eight years Pakistan has developed a judicial system worth defending, a civil society that wants to defend it and media capable of publicizing and commenting on their activities and successfully defends its own rights. It will be important for all political parties and all international observers, including ourselves, to allow the judicial proceedings to play out and to respect the final judgment of the court. The majority of Pakistanis are concerned about the growing threat of extremism and radicalism in Pakistan’s traditionally moderate society. The Red Mosque has posed a particularly difficult problem for the Pakistani government. Armed students and clerics at the mosque have openly defied authorities for several months in their campaign for Islamic Sharia law. The Pakistani government did not take action against the Mosque fearing it would endanger the lives of the many innocent woman and children used by Mosque leaders as a shield for their activities. The government stayed its hand, despite mounting public demands for action, until the threat to security became intolerable when those in the mosque compound fired upon and killed two Pakistani soldiers on July 3, 2007. We understand that a military operation against militants inside the compound began on July 10, shortly after negotiators failed to persuade them to choose a peaceful solution.

Our partnership with the Pakistanis gives us an opportunity to support Pakistan’s own efforts to become a modern, open, prosperous, democratic state, and a moderate voice in the Islamic world. This is the vision for Pakistan that President Musharraf has articulated and demonstrated by reiterating his resolve to stop Talibanization in the frontier areas as well as extremism within urban areas such as the Red Mosque compound. It is strongly in the U.S. national interest that Pakistan succeeds in realizing this vision.

There has been a lot of discussion about what Pakistan can and should do against extremists, including the Taliban and al Qaeda. Islamabad faces immense challenges on this front, but Pakistan’s contribution has been significant. Since 2001, the Pakistani government has arrested hundreds of terrorist suspects, turning over to the U.S. such senior al Qaeda figures as Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Ramzi bin al Shibh, and Abu Zubaida. There are currently 85,000 Pakistani forces stationed on the rough terrain of the Afghanistan border region, and more than 450 members of Pakistan’s security forces have sacrificed their lives in support of anti-terror efforts. Pakistani security operations in the tribal areas are disrupting terrorist activities in an area where terrorists previously felt secure. One unfortunate indicator of the insurgents’ desperation to maintain their hold is the intimidation of the local population through targeting tribal leaders.

In many of its operations against militants, Pakistani troops are using equipment and training provided by the U.S. This assistance has been crucial to bolstering Pakistan’s anti-terrorism capabilities, and by extension, our own. The DoS remains committed to working closely with the DoD, with our Pakistani counterparts, and with Congress to ensure that Pakistani security forces have the necessary training and equipment to conduct these operations appropriately and effectively. I am fully aware of the substantial amount of foreign assistance—both economic and security—that Congress has provided Pakistan, and assure you that we will work to ensure that these valuable resources the American people have entrusted to us to work with Pakistan are utilized efficiently and effectively.

We continue to actively pursue our public diplomacy efforts inside Pakistan to ensure that we reach out to Pakistani citizens to share our own message, and help others understand American policies, views and values. Americans continue to be generous in their willingness to help and reach out to Pakistanis as demonstrated after the devastating 2005 earthquake in Kashmir, where the immediate and overwhelming support of the U.S. military and the donations of private Americans saved many
lives and garnered the goodwill of the Pakistani people. Nothing could have been more effective in demonstrating American values and disseminating a message of friendship between our peoples.

We have also made real progress in Afghanistan on a broad range of fronts. On the security side, we and our North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Afghan partners succeeded in blunting the Taliban’s planned spring offensive and we are working together to consolidate and extend those gains. The Taliban have taken some very significant losses this year, including the death of Mullah Dadullah and other key leaders. Reconstruction and development work remains on track in most of the country and the Afghan economy continues to grow at impressive rates, with licit gross domestic product (GDP) more than doubling since 2002. Millions of Afghan children are in school, girls and boys alike, and now for the first time in Afghan history there is a realistic prospect of a mostly literate population. Our support for democracy and governance initiatives in Afghanistan is also paying off, and the Afghan parliament is assuming its appropriate role as a deliberative body.

Clearly, the Afghans still face enormous challenges in all these areas and on other fronts as well. The counternarcotics challenge is especially daunting, as is the broad challenge of promoting rule of law and building the judicial capacity of the Afghan government. But I am convinced that we are all moving in the right direction and that with sustained international support Afghanistan can look forward to a stable, democratic and more prosperous future.

We are working with the Pakistani and the Afghan governments to build stability in the areas along their rugged border. President Karzai and President Musharraf recognize that improving relations and stabilizing the border region are critical to both countries. The joint statement issued by President Musharraf and President Karzai in Ankara this spring illustrates their commitment. Pakistani and Afghan planners are now preparing for a landmark jirga that could build constituencies for stability in both countries and boost bilateral relations. We and our NATO allies are working to foster expanded Pakistan-Afghanistan bilateral dialogue, stronger economic and trade ties, and deeper cooperation between Pakistani and Afghan border security forces. With U.S. assistance, Pakistan is working to secure its border with Afghanistan to prevent the smuggling of arms, terrorists, and illegal drugs which are fueling the Taliban insurgency. Also, much less frequently mentioned is Pakistani cooperation in facilitating the logistical support of U.S. and NATO forces deployed in neighboring Afghanistan. Most of our support for Coalition forces in Afghanistan passes through Pakistan.

Pakistan’s transformation into a moderate democracy and a prosperous and open nation where its people can thrive is vital to our own future and safety, as well as the future prosperity and regional stability of South and Central Asia. I look forward to working with Congress toward this goal.
Russia: In Transition or Intransigent?

By

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[The following is the testimony presented to the Helsinki Commission, Washington, D.C., May 24, 2007.]

Russia is critical to the United States and our partners, particularly in Europe. Whether Russia is in transition or intransigent or a useful if provocative way to frame the challenge of working with Russia, which remains in our interest. Russia certainly remains in transition” from its communist past. Its growing assertiveness in tone and perhaps in action, spurred in part by high energy revenues, may have stimulated your use of the word “intransigent.” In no case, however, can Russia be presented in such stark terms: while Russia does sometimes seem a difficult partner to work with, we also have many important areas of cooperation through which we pursue common interests. Although ours may not be a strategic partnership, it includes partnership on many strategic issues. The U.S. and Russia relations are complicated. Given the legacy of U.S. and Soviet relations, this is no surprise. In Moscow on May 15, 2007, Secretary Rice pointed out that we need to differentiate between discrete disagreements and our overall intention to work together whenever possible.

There are going to be times when we disagree, but it is true that sometimes the rhetoric makes it sound as if the relationship itself is in question, rather than . . . the specific differences that we have.

The Administration’s analysis of Russia is realistic, and our objectives with Russia reflect this. We want Russia to be a partner in the world, and we want Russia to be strong, but strong in 21st century terms: with strong, democratic and independent institutions in and out of government; with a strong civil society, free press and active opposition; with strong and independent middle and entrepreneurial classes. We do not exempt Russia from our belief in the universal potential of freedom, and we also have Russia in mind when we say that we seek an open world characterized by partnerships with like-minded countries.

Our preferred tactical approach is cooperation, we work together wherever we can, always seeking to expand the scope of that collaboration where our interests overlap but we push back when we must, privately when possible but publicly when necessary, in defense of our values, interests and friends. At all points, we also seek to work with our European allies and friends to coordinate our approaches and articulate the common values underlying our policies.

Given the media preoccupation (in both countries) with the problems, I wish to first mention the areas of cooperation in relations. The U.S. and Russia continue to cooperate in critical areas, including counterterrorism and nonproliferation. The U.S. and Russia Counterterrorism Working Group last met in September 2006, and will meet again in a few months, to continue and deepen cooperation on intelligence, law enforcement, weapons of mass destruction (WMD), terrorist financing, counter-narcotics, Afghanistan, United Nations (U.N.) issues, military assistance program address directory (MANPADs), and transportation security.

Our strategic cooperation is intensifying. Last year, together with Moscow, we renewed until 2013 the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, which was launched in 1992 to facilitate dismantlement of weapons of mass destruction in the former Soviet Union. As this program marks fifteen years, the United States and Russia have agreed to accelerate some elements under the Bratislava
Nuclear Security Initiative; nuclear security upgrades are on track for completion by the end of 2008. At the July 2006 G8 Summit in St. Petersburg, Presidents Bush and Putin announced the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, which seeks to prevent nuclear materials falling into terrorists’ hands. We and Russia are both working toward enhancing nuclear fuel cycle security, through the Global Nuclear Energy Policy and the fuel center initiative, respectively, and we are negotiating with Russia an agreement on Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy Agreement (Section “123” of the Atomic Energy Act) as well as one on Defense Technology Cooperation. The U.S. has presented a proposal for substantive cooperation on missile defense, and, with the expiration of the START Treaty in 2009, we have begun positive discussions about a post-START arrangement. There have been several high-level visits in recent months, including those of Secretary Rice and Defense Secretary Gates. We share with Russia many common global nonproliferation goals. We work closely with Russia and others to address the nuclear ambitions of North Korea and Iran, although Moscow has sometimes voiced disagreement with our approach to sanctions and other measures. Russia voted for U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1718 (North Korea), 1737, and 1747 (Iran), calling respectively for the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and imposing Chapter VII sanctions on North Korea, as well as imposing sanctions against Iran until Tehran suspends its nuclear enrichment program and comes into compliance with its NPT obligations. We look forward to the full implementation of those resolutions. The U.S. and Russia, along with China, Japan, South Korea, and North Korea participate in the Six-Party Talks on North Korea, and Russia chairs the Six-Party Talks Working Group on a Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism.

We continue to pursue cooperation through the NATO-Russia Council (NRC), which this year marks its fifth anniversary. We have a broad menu of cooperative NATO-Russia initiatives involving diverse experts on both sides: these range from Russian participation in Operation Active Endeavor to counternarcotics program in Afghanistan. We look forward to greater opportunities for cooperation once Russia ratifies a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with NATO: we welcome the Duma’s ratification on May 23, 2007, and look forward to the Federation Council following suit. That said, the April 26, 2007 meeting of NRC Foreign Ministers in Oslo, Norway, showcased some important differences between Russia on the one hand and most NATO Allies on the other in light of President Putin’s “State of the Nation” Address earlier that day. In that speech, President Putin suggested he would consider suspending Russia’s implementation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty) if no progress was made on ratification of the Adapted CFE Treaty by NATO Allies. At the NRC, NATO Ministers universally responded that we continue to regard the current CFE Treaty as a cornerstone of the European security, and that we are ready to seek ratification of the Adapted CFE Treaty after Russia fulfills its 1999 Istanbul commitments on withdrawal of forces for Moldova and Georgia. The Administration and NATO Allies are very serious about our support for Adapted CFE: the Adapted Treaty, signed in 1999, replaces the bloc-to-bloc structure of the original Treaty with a more flexible system of national and territorial equipment limits. It allows accession by new members, and provides for enhanced information on military forces and more inspection opportunities than the original Treaty. Adapted CFE also contains specific provisions relating to host nation consent to the presence of foreign forces that are very important to our GUAM partners. There should be no question about NATO Allies’ support for CFE and Adapted CFE—neither of which represent efforts by NATO to take advantage of Russia—and no question about NATO Allies’ insistence on fulfillment of the Istanbul commitments as the basis for ratification of the Adapted Treaty.

We also seek to advance cooperation with Russia through the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), an organization, obviously, of deep interest to this Commission. Russia’s critical attitude toward the OSCE remains a cause for concern. Speaking on February 10, 2007, to the Munich Security Conference, President Putin branded the OSCE a “vulgar instrument designed to promote the foreign policy interests of one or a group of countries.” Under the guise of demanding reforms, Russia has proposed changes to the OSCE, the effect of which would be to
cripple its democracy promotion efforts. The U.S. disagrees strongly with this Russian approach and has defended the OSCE’s mandate to advance democratic reforms, including election monitoring. Indeed, these efforts embody commitments that Washington and Moscow undertook when we signed the Helsinki Final Act. The U.S. continues strongly to support the work of the OSCE’s Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR); its elections monitoring mechanisms represent the international “gold standard” in this area.

We applaud the long and distinguished track record ODIHR has accumulated in electoral monitoring throughout the OSCE region, and look forward to its involvement in Russia’s upcoming Duma elections in December 2007 and Presidential elections in March 2008. We also value highly the contributions of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly to the OSCE’s election monitoring work, and the PA’s joint efforts with ODIHR. I should add that the U.S. accepts and welcomes ODIHR monitoring of U.S. elections.

While every organization can be improved, we believe there is wisdom in the aphorism “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.” The OSCE is working well and doing important work, and we will continue to support it against “reform” efforts calculated to circumscribe its activities or debilitate its democracy promotion work. Differences with Russia over the OSCE reflect broader, negative trends on human rights and democracy in Russia itself. We hope that the situation will not deteriorate further over the coming year, in conjunction with upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections cycles and issues connected to succession.

Let us be clear: Russia is even today a vastly freer country than at any time in Soviet history and arguably freer than at any period in Russia’s history. It is also true that post-communist transitions take time. But it would be an insult to Russia to hold that great country to low standards. Suppression of genuine opposition, abridgement of the right to protest, constriction of the space of civil society, and the decline of media freedom all represent serious setbacks that are inconsistent with Russia’s professed commitment to building and preserving the foundations of a democratic state. The unsolved murders of journalists and critics are equally disturbing.

The Department of State (DoS) has publicly protested, including at the OSCE Permanent Council, the recent police brutality employed to break up opposition marches in Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Nizhny Novgorod. The European Union (E.U.) also protested those actions. Authorities sought to prevent the marches from taking place at all:

- They denied permission to stage the events or tried to marginalize them by changing their venues
- They harassed and detained Russians traveling to participate in these peaceful rallies
- On the day of the events, disproportionate police presence wielded undue force against the protestors as well as journalists reporting on the events

Some of the same efforts were directed against members of the Russian opposition seeking to express their opinions ahead of the E.U. and Russia Summit in Samara May 18, 2007. The fact that the authorities allowed pro-Kremlin youth groups to engage in activity from which opposition activists were prohibited demonstrated selective use of the law. Nonetheless, it is encouraging that independent groups, despite harassment, were able to gather, garner supporters, and attract public attention.

Interestingly, Presidential Administration deputy press spokesman Dmitry Peskov acknowledged that the police response to last month’s protests merits review, and St. Petersburg Governor Matviyenko and the Russian Federation’s Human Rights Ombudsman, Vladimir Lukin, have both called for investigations. In his annual report on human rights in Russia, presented April 24, 2007 to the Duma and May 4, 2007 to the Federation Council, Ombudsman Lukin reiterated that his office
had received and would investigate increased numbers of citizens’ complaints about government obstacles to holding rallies.

President Putin’s own chairperson of the Civil Society Institution and Human Rights Council, Ella Pamfilova, has said that Interior Minister Nurgaliyev should resign in connection with the police break-up of those demonstrations. Such calls indicate that, even within official Russia, views differ on human rights.

We are likewise concerned about the increasingly narrow and controlled space within which Russian non-government organizations (NGOs) are forced to operate, and continue to monitor the implementation of the new NGO law enacted in April 2006. The record is mixed thus far. While the process for re-registration of foreign NGOs was cumbersome, and require paperwork and reporting requirements that many Russian and foreign NGOs find onerous, the fact remains that the vast majority of foreign NGOs did succeed in re-registering, although some suffered disruptions in the continuity of their program operations. We are also heartened by the ability of some NGOs to effect change in the law, as when religious groups, concerned that the reporting requirements could be construed to require listing congregants or accounting for collections among the faithful, successfully lobbied the Kremlin to exempt ecclesiastical organizations from those rules.

The increasing pressure on Russian journalists is likewise troubling. Vigorous and investigatory media independent of officialdom are essential to dynamic, healthy processes in all democracies. In Russia today, unfortunately, most national television networks media-the primary source of news for most Russians are in government hands or the hands of individuals and entities allied with the Kremlin. The growing agglomeration of print media in the hands of government officials or those allied with them likewise undercuts press freedom. Attacks on journalists, including the brutal and still unsolved murders of Paul Klebnikov and Anna Politkovskaya, among others, chill and deter the fourth estate. Self-censorship remains a growing problem. Some space for free discussion remains, particularly on the internet, as the vigorous and sometimes sympathetic coverage in the print media of recent opposition marches indicates, but it still appears to be shrinking.

Ahead of parliamentary and presidential elections, the Kremlin is bringing its full weight to bear in shaping the legal and social environment to preclude a level playing field. There have been many instances in which the authorities have used electoral laws selectively to the advantage of pro-Kremlin forces or to hamstring opposition forces. The refusal to re-register Yabloko in St. Petersburg and difficulties encountered by other parties, appear to have been based on political instructions, rather than an objective judgment of whether these parties met registration requirements.

In 2006, the Duma enacted amendments to the criminal and administrative codes redefining “extremism” so broadly and vaguely as to provide a potent weapon to wield against and intimidate opponents; greater self-censorship appears to be a major goal in this effort. We note, for example, that Dissenters’ March leader Garry Kasparov has already been questioned by the FSB in its investigation into “extremist” activity. Even the most cursory analysis of Russian national broadcast media shows news reporting skewed decisively in favor of Kremlin-approved parties and groups.

Against this background, the U.S. and its European allies and friends continue to support Russian democracy and civil society. These issues are regular parts of our bilateral and multilateral consultations. President Bush, when he was in St. Petersburg in 2006, hosted an event with NGO and civil society leaders, sending a powerful message of American support and solidarity. Recently the Secretary of State took part in Moscow in a roundtable discussion with leaders of civil society and other figures. She also has regularly and candidly articulated our concerns with Russia’s leadership, as she did last week. The Secretary, my colleague Assistant Secretary Lowenkron of the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, and I have participated in NGO events in Russia to showcase our support for independent media and civil society. The OSCE also remains an important forum for
the U.S. and others to remind Russia that its commitments to democracy and human rights are not just internal matters, but commitments that all State Parties to the Helsinki Final Act have undertaken to observe and protect.

Russia’s relations with its neighbors and with Europe remain an issue of considerable concern. Moscow often still approaches its neighbors with a zero-sum mentality, particularly when it comes to those countries, such as Georgia and Ukraine, which choose to pursue closer Euro-Atlantic ties. We and European countries have spoken out against Russia’s use of energy to apply political and/or economic pressure on neighbors, such as in the case of Ukraine in 2006. We are concerned by apparently political interference with infrastructures, as in the case of claimed structural deficiencies that restricted traffic on a bridge to Estonia this month, prolonged “repairs” to an oil pipeline to Lithuania, or the closing of Russia’s only legal border crossing with Georgia last year.

Russian-Georgian relations, after a period of extreme tension, have shown tentative signs of limited improvement, but Moscow could do much more to normalize relations. Russia maintains the economic and transportation sanctions it imposed against Georgia last fall. Likewise, it continues to take actions that call into question its professed support for Georgia’s territorial integrity by supporting separatist regimes in Georgia’s South Ossetia and Abkhazia regions; it provides the same support to the separatist regime in Moldova’s Transnistria region. The U.S. continues to call on Russia to end these policies and work with our European partners to implement confidence-building measures designed to bring the sides in each conflict closer together. At the same time, we encourage Russia to play a more constructive role and to use its influence with the separatists to advance a peaceful resolution of each conflict in Georgia. The U.S. has had productive high-level discussions with Russia on these issues. Russia recently sent officials to Tbilisi to discuss reducing tensions in South Ossetia, and publicly scolded South Ossetian de facto authorities for violations of existing agreements. We have also encouraged both sides to ameliorate their relationship and understand that Russian and Georgian officials are scheduled to meet soon for this purpose.

The U.S. is also working to advance a resolution in the separatist conflict in Moldova’s Transnistria region. The U.S. and E.U. are official observers at the 5 + 2 Talks, negotiations that have been at an impasse for more than a year because of the Transnistrian side’s unwillingness to engage. The Russian and Moldovan governments have recently called for a resumption of the 5 + 2 process, although Russia has to date failed to use its heft to bring the Transnistrians back to the negotiating table, and we hope that all parties will engage seriously. Russia’s recent statements calling for resumption of the 5 + 2 process have also made mention of the principle of Moldova’s territorial integrity. Finally, despite promises by President Putin himself last fall that the ban against Moldovan wine and agricultural goods would be lifted, the ban is still in place.

On one separatist conflict, in Nagorno-Karabakh, the U.S. and Russia work well together in trying to facilitate a resolution. Together with OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chair country counterparts from Russia and France, I traveled to the region last spring to push the peace process forward by presenting to the Presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia a set of proposed basic principles for the peaceful settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. These principles remain the centerpiece of negotiations between the two sides even today. While recognizing that the burden for resolving the conflict lies with Armenia and Azerbaijan, we nevertheless continue to show that the U.S. and Russia can work together to facilitate a peace process that could bring greater stability and security to the South Caucasus, which is in our mutual best interest.

We regret Russia’s so far hostile attitude toward U.S. plans for placing elements of a limited missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic (intended to shield the U.S. and its European allies against missile threats from the Middle East) and President Putin’s announcement on April
26, 2007 that Russia would consider a moratorium on implementation of the Adapted Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe.

We have held numerous briefings and consultations with Russia on our missile defense plans for more than a year (both bilaterally and in the NATO-Russia Council), and geography and geometry both demonstrate that the very modest system proposed in Poland and the Czech Republic poses no threat whatsoever to Russia. Speaking at the NATO Ministerial in Oslo April 26, 2007, Secretary of State Rice described as purely ludicrous the idea that somehow ten interceptors and a few radars in Eastern Europe are going to threaten Russia. We and the Russians simply do not agree here, but we will continue to work to reach a better understanding between our two countries on this important issue. Both the DoS and Department of Defense (DoD), including Secretaries Rice and Gates, have briefed Russia on our missile defense plans for more than eighteen months. We have kept-and will continue to keep-Russia fully informed about those plans. We are committed, as we have been in the past, to consulting with Russia and being transparent with it about missile defense. We have offered to cooperate with Russia across the full spectrum of missile defense activities, an offer that the Russians themselves have described as serious, and that offer remains on the table. But Russia does not have a veto over our missile defense plans.

Regarding the Adapted CFE Treaty, it isn’t clear to us exactly what Russia’s concerns are. The Russians have made it clear that they want NATO Allies to ratify the Adapted Treaty, among other reasons because they would like some of our new NATO members, particularly the Baltic states, to be able to join. The U.S. and its NATO Allies are prepared to ratify the Adapted CFE Treaty after Russia fulfills its outstanding Istanbul Commitments, dating from 1999, in Moldova and Georgia. Under the provisions of the adapted CFE treaty signed in Istanbul in 1999, Russia made three sets of commitments.

- First, it pledged to reduce its forces in the CFE flank area to the level specified by the Adapted Treaty, and has done so.
- Second, there has been important progress in Georgia, where the commitments are almost fulfilled, except for the need for Russia to reach agreement with Georgia on the status or withdrawal of the Russian presence at the Gudauta base.
- On the third set of commitments, concerning Moldova, Russian forces were supposed to have been withdrawn by the end of 2002; that deadline was extended by agreement of the OSCE to the end of 2003.

In fact, there has been a stalemate on Russian withdrawal since early 2004. Russian forces, some designated as peacekeepers, remain in the separatist area of Transnistria, along with some 20,000 tons of stored munitions. Moldova wants all Russian munitions and forces, including the peacekeeping force (PKF), to be withdrawn. However, Moldovan authorities have said that they would be willing to accept Russian participation in a genuinely multinational PKF, under an OSCE umbrella. We are urging Russia and others to negotiate seriously on a transformed PKF. A decision to field such a force would be a major step toward solving this conflict and toward fulfillment of the Istanbul commitments.

Russia has made dramatic economic gains over the past few years. We welcome Russia’s economic revival, particularly after difficult economic transitions in the 1990s. Prosperity and peace is in everyone’s interests. We welcome Russia’s economic revitalization, but are concerned that this revival is built upon certain vulnerabilities:

- Russia’s wealth remains more value-extracted than value-added.
- Russia’s economic gains have fueled a certain bravado in Russia’s external agenda.
Those gains are also fostering the growth of a nascent middle class whose emergence, over time, we hope will bring with it modern political reforms, including greater accountability and governmental responsiveness. The U.S. supports Russia’s integration into rules-based international organizations, such as the WTO, consonant with Russia’s commitment to those organizations’ principles. An important step towards Russia’s integration into the norms of the global economy was reached last fall with the closure of the U.S. and Russia bilateral WTO agreement arguably the biggest single step forward in our economic relationship in the past decade. While not a miracle cure for either of us, it very much serves the interest of both our countries.

The range of both U.S. and Russian interests are clearly global. Given that reach, it is imperative that both our countries seek to work together wherever possible, even when such cooperation may prove challenging. At the same time, we are committed to defending our principles, pushing back wherever we must. U.S.-Russia relations require ongoing dialogue. As I mentioned, Secretary of State Rice just completed a good visit to Moscow. Opportunities in the coming months will provide important moments to try to narrow our differences on issues that matter to us while pressing forward on elements of our constructive engagement with Russia as well.
Some of you may think it rather bold of me to come to a city renowned for its institutions of international peace, justice, and security and talk about the United States’ commitment to international law. It is hardly news that the United States has taken a battering in Europe, particularly over the last few years, for its commitment to international law - or, rather, what is criticized as its lack of commitment. To put it simply, our critics sometimes paint the U.S. as a country willing to duck or shrug off international obligations when they prove constraining or inconvenient. That picture is wrong. The U.S. does believe that international law matters. We help develop it, rely on it, abide by it, and contrary to some impressions it has an important role in our nation’s Constitution and domestic law. Three days after she was sworn in to office, at a meeting to which all Department of State (DoS) employees were invited, Secretary of State Rice declared:

This Department, along with the rest of the Administration, will be a strong voice for international legal norms, for living up to our treaty obligations, to recognizing that American’s moral authority in international politics also rests on our ability to defend international laws and treaties.

Tonight I will show you how we have kept the Secretary’s promise. I will demonstrate that our approach to international law how and why we assume international obligations, how we implement those we have assumed, and how international law binds us in our domestic system all reinforce our commitment to international law. In the course of the evening, a few themes should emerge. One is that a reliance on sound bites and short-hand can give the deeply misleading impression that we are not committed to international law. A second is, in fact, deeply ironic: that the very seriousness with which we approach international law is sometimes mischaracterized as obstructionism or worse. A third is that some of the most vehement attacks of our behavior although couched as legal criticism are in fact differences on policy. A fourth and related theme is that our critics often assert the law as they wish it were, rather than as it actually exists today. This leads to claims that we violate international law when we have simply not reached the result or interpretation that these critics prefer. It is a happy coincidence that I am giving a speech on the U.S. and international law today, the day after the sixtieth anniversary of the announcement of the Marshall Plan. That extraordinary effort demonstrated that the U.S. commitment to a free, democratic and stable Europe did not end with the coming of peace. With U.S. participation and leadership, the international community created new organizations that were unprecedented in scope and function. The United Nations (U.N.) and the Bretton Woods institutions were only the first. Later, we worked with the international community to build new institutions, including the World Trade Organization (WTO). We helped reshape the U.N. Security Council into a positive force in meeting new threats to peace and security, including Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait, the breakup of the former Yugoslavia, and various conflicts in Africa. And we continue to work multilaterally, with friends and allies, to face continuing challenges. Just
last week, our efforts, in tandem with others on the Security Council, resulted in the establishment of the new Special Tribunal for Lebanon to bring to justice those suspected of assassinating former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. On a less visible level, the U.S. participates actively in a number of international organizations and argues its positions before international bodies like the International Court of Justice, the WTO, the Iran and U.S. claims tribunal, and North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) tribunals. Every year we negotiate and conclude hundreds of international agreements and treaties. We entered into 429 last year alone, which belies the notion that we shrink from accepting international obligations. And just recently, this Administration put forward a priority list of over 35 treaty packages that we have urged the Senate to approve soon, including the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea. Our level of engagement is reflected in the resources we devote to international law efforts and how we integrate such efforts into the decision-making process. For example, at the DoS (which is not the only agency with international lawyers), I have a staff of 171 lawyers, who work every day to furnish advice on legal matters, domestic and international, and to promote the development of international law as a fundamental element of our foreign policy. This is not a picture of a country indifferent to international institutions and international law, but rather a country actively engaged in and with international law. Indeed, it is a reflection of our belief in the role international law can and should play, which includes shaping cooperation on international concerns, ensuring accountability and justice, and settling disputes peacefully.

**United States Treaty Practice Demonstrates Commitment to International Law**

If your information comes mainly from the press particularly its reporting on how the U.S. negotiates and joins treaties you may have a jaundiced view of U.S. commitment to international law. In part, this is because the press focuses a disproportionate level of critical attention on the U.S. (a “side-benefit” of our global role and reach), and so its reporting can be unbalanced. The press also tends to focus on a small number of treaties, some of which have been transformed into symbols for what is seen as the U.S. hostility to international law and global cooperation. In reality, our treaty practice reflects the seriousness with which we take international obligations, not our indifference to them. For example, whenever we consider taking on new obligations, we examine a number of factors:

- What problem is the treaty designed to address?
- Is it a problem susceptible to solution through a treaty?
- Will we be in a position to implement, or will there be complications because of domestic law?

During negotiations, we try to eliminate ambiguities and pin down important questions of policy. This makes it harder to paper over disagreements, and sometimes harder to reach consensus. But we do not do this to be obstructionist. Rather, we want the treaty obligations to be as clear as possible. This is in part a matter of good draftsmanship, and an attempt to head off disputes and promote compliance. But it is also a reflection of the reality in which we operate. We need to explain to our Senate exactly what obligations we are taking on and what the implications of joining a particular treaty are. Important too, is what happens after we join a treaty. More than almost any other state, we are subject to broad and vigorous oversight through private litigation and scrutiny by the press, civil society, and the international community as a whole. If we do not get the words in a treaty exactly right, we will have to answer for the consequences.

This accountability, coupled with the seriousness with which we implement our obligations, also explains why we are so careful from the very start to determine whether we need to subject our ratifications of treaties to any reservations or understandings and why we make sure to line up any implementing legislation in advance. Unlike certain countries, we do not join treaties lightly, as a goodwill gesture, or as a substitute for taking meaningful steps to comply.
Ironically, this rigorous approach is sometimes seen not as a mark of seriousness, but as a sign of hostility. In part, this can be traced to a widespread view that willingness to join a treaty is a litmus test of a country’s commitment to international law. Under this view, joining a treaty is good; not joining a treaty, or expressing concerns about its purpose, enforceability, effects, or ambiguity, are the excuses of a nation unwilling to shoulder international responsibilities. Take, for example, the International Criminal Court (ICC). Some critics have interpreted our decision not to become a party as an expression of disdain for international law and international institutions. This is wrong. In fact, for many years, the U.S. sought to create a permanent tribunal to deal with international crimes. Back in 1990 our Congress called for the creation of such a body but made clear that its support would hinge on the tribunal’s guarantees of due process and fair trial, and its respect for national sovereignty. In our view, the Rome Statute falls short. We object on principle to the ICC’s claim of jurisdiction over persons from non-party states. And we are particularly concerned by the ICC’s power to self-judge its jurisdiction, without any institutional check. We hope that the prosecutor and members of the court will honor their jurisdictional limits, and that the ICC will act only when a state with jurisdiction over an international crime is unable or unwilling to do its duty. But we cannot ignore the chance that a prosecutor might someday assert jurisdiction inappropriately, and the Rome Statute offers no recourse in such a situation. Our attempts to address such concerns during the drafting of the Statute failed - leaving us unable to join. This decision was in no way, however, a vote for impunity. We share with the parties to the Statute a commitment to ensuring accountability for genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity - look, for example, to our unflagging support for the tribunals established to prosecute crimes committed in such disparate places as the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone. We also believe that our domestic system is capable of prosecuting and punishing our own citizens for these crimes. Moreover, over the past couple of years we have worked hard to demonstrate that we share the main goals and values of the Court. We did not oppose the Security Council’s referral of the Darfur situation to the ICC, and have expressed our willingness to consider assisting the ICC Prosecutor’s Darfur work should we receive an appropriate request. We supported the use of ICC facilities for the trial of Charles Taylor, which began this week here in The Hague. These steps reflect our desire to find practical ways to work with ICC supporters to advance our shared goals of promoting international criminal justice. We believe it important that ICC supporters take a similarly practical approach in working with us on these issues, one that reflects respect for our decision not to become a party to the Rome Statute. It is in our common interest to find a modus vivendi on the ICC based on mutual respect for the positions of both sides. More recently, we took a drubbing over our objections to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Cultural Diversity Convention, accused of being against culture, against diversity, and against treaties. This is silly, and not only because the U.S. is among the most multicultural nations on earth. In our view, the Convention reflects in part the efforts of some countries to engage in protectionist behavior under the guise of diversity; its ambiguous language can be read to permit the imposition of restrictive trade measures on goods and services defined as “cultural,” including books, newspapers, magazines, movies and perhaps even content available over the internet. This could undermine other international mechanisms, such as the General Agreement on Trade in Services and other WTO agreements, and could, by hindering the free flow of information, raise human rights concerns. One may disagree with the policy judgment not to join. But it hardly shows disrespect for international law to oppose one international legal regime because it threatens to undermine another. It is also simplistic and misleading to set up ratification of a treaty as a test for whether a state takes the underlying issue seriously. Take the Kyoto Protocol. Is it truly a proxy for whether a state takes climate change seriously?

- First, a developed country can join Kyoto without necessarily taking on stringent commitments. Indeed, some countries - rather than having to take climate-change measures themselves - will actually be net financial beneficiaries.
• Second, even when a country has commitments under the Protocol, it will not necessarily implement them. A U.S. push for serious consequences for non-compliance was successfully opposed by other developed countries. As a result, the Protocol lacks bite.

• Third, developing countries do not have any commitments under Kyoto to limit their emissions, despite the fact that they are generating the highest increase in emissions. These flaws, coupled with anticipated harm to the U.S. economy, were legitimate reasons not to join Kyoto.

Our concern for climate change, however, has led us to pursue a host of climate-related measures, both domestically and internationally. Just last week, President Bush expressed support for major country emitters of greenhouse gases and energy consumers to convene and develop, by the end of 2008, a new post-2012 framework on climate change. Similarly, in the case of the Convention for the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), we have not been persuaded that the binding international obligations contained in that treaty would add anything to the measures we take domestically. Our law is already highly protective of women’s rights. In addition to a constitutional guarantee of equal protection, we have robust federal anti-discrimination laws and the recently re-authorized Violence Against Women Act. Further, the U.S. is a world leader in promoting women’s rights and participation in the political process. We have spent billions of dollars in foreign aid to improve women’s political participation, economic status, education, health care, and legal rights. Indeed, our levels of direct assistance for women around the world have increased substantially over the past four years. It cannot seriously be maintained that our decision not to push for ratification of this treaty reflects a lack of respect for, or attention to, women’s rights.

Finally, I want to take issue with the notion I sometimes hear that we don’t join treaties so that we can avoid compliance. For example, the U.S. has been abiding by the Law of the Sea Convention since 1983, even though we have not yet joined. The Convention is enormously important:

It codifies and clarifies rights and obligations concerning a wide variety of navigational, economic and environmental issues relevant to the use of the world’s oceans.

Early on, concerns about the deep seabed mining aspects of the Convention kept the U.S. and others out. An implementing agreement resolved those concerns, and this Administration is a strong supporter of U.S. participation. We have been working with the Senate to move the treaty forward. In fact, although the press has not actively reported it, last month President Bush personally urged the Senate to approve the Convention during this session of Congress. Our strong hope is that we will be able to join the Convention shortly. But in the meantime our conduct has been fully consistent with its obligations. Some may see our concerns about the potential difficulties in these treaties as excessively scrupulous. Certainly if the U.S. were to take the approach of “join now and worry about complying later,” there might be more international law. But would the international law be better? If treaties do not create clear and serious obligations, but only express good intentions, they lose their capacity to encourage states to rely on each other. I believe that our approach results in stronger and more effective international cooperation in the face of real global problems.

**U.S. Practice Demonstrates Belief in the Important Role of International Law**

Let me turn from the international obligations we undertake to how we meet them. I have heard people say that the U.S., and this Administration in particular, does not regard international law as “real law” in effect, that we cast international obligations aside when they would interfere with our immediate interests. To the contrary, we recognize that international law has a critical role in world affairs, and is vital to the resolution of conflicts and the coordination of cooperation. Secretary Rice could not be clearer on this point. Shortly after taking office, she told the American Society of International Law:
When we observe our treaty and other international commitments... other countries are more willing to cooperate with us and we have a better chance of persuading them to live up to their own commitments.

And so when we respect our international legal obligations and support an international system based on the rule of law, we do the work of making the world a better place, but also a safer and more secure place for America. This commitment to international law is reflected in the seriousness with which we approach our international obligations even when implementing them proves difficult or painful. Let me give you a few examples. For nearly a decade the U.S. has struggled to reconcile our obligation to obey orders of the ICJ with our system of criminal justice, in which most criminal law is state, not federal, law. In 1998 the ICJ asked the Clinton Administration to delay the execution of a convicted murderer who claimed certain rights under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. The U.S. government conveyed the request to Virginia, the state that had imposed the sentence, along with its endorsement of the request, but believed it could do nothing more. More recently, in the Avena decision, the ICJ ordered the U.S. to review the cases of 51 Mexican nationals convicted of capital crimes. All of these individuals were represented by counsel and had or will have multiple opportunities to seek judicial review of their convictions and sentences. All of their lawyers had reason to know of the Vienna Convention and how it affected their clients. But all had failed to present the grievance about violation of the Vienna Convention to the trial court in a timely manner. The ICJ, however, declined to acknowledge the U.S. rule requiring timely presentation of a defense during the course of a criminal trial, a rule that prevents defendants and their lawyers from abusing the system to obstruct and delay the administration of justice. The cases covered by the ICJ judgment all involved heinous murders, including of young children. Some proceedings had gone on for many years, with the victims’ families patiently waiting while our state and then federal courts reviewed the outcome to ensure that it fully complied with our laws. Yet the ICJ judgment nonetheless required us to review these cases again to consider the unlikely possibility that the outcome would have been different if the defendant had been asked whether he wanted his consular officer notified of his arrest. It is hard for those who were not intimately involved in the process to appreciate how difficult, legally and politically, this issue was, or how seriously we took it. The pressure on this administration was enormous. The President had been Governor of Texas, where many of the cases arose. The crimes had been atrocious, and the ICJ judgment required us to disregard the normal rules of procedure for our criminal trials. The President, acting on the advice of the Secretary of State, nonetheless decided to require each State involved to give the 51 convicts a new hearing. The first defendant to try to take advantage of the President’s decision was in the state of Texas, which objected to the President’s decision. In response, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals ruled that the President had no power to intervene in its affairs, even to obtain compliance with an order of the ICJ. This Administration has gone to the Supreme Court of the U.S. to reverse this decision. We expect a ruling from that Court this time next year. This is not the only time we have defended an international principle against a local interest. New York City has sued India and Mongolia in our courts for taxes said to be owed on property owned by their U.N. missions. We believe the law of sovereign immunity bars these suits, and we sided with the foreign governments against New York, both in the lower court and, most recently, in our Supreme Court. We expect a decision shortly.

Let us look next at how the U.S. meets its obligations in the field of international economic law. In the negotiations leading to the Uruguay Round Agreements, the U.S. pushed for creation of a strong and independent dispute settlement body within the WTO. In the years that followed, some of our trading partners have initiated dispute settlement proceedings, asking the WTO to declare that certain of our domestic laws do not comply with the agreements. On occasion we have lost. In some instances, the required response has been wrenching. To comply with one WTO ruling regarding alleged subsidies, for example, this Administration persuaded Congress to end an important decades-
old tax program that the old, pre-1994 *General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade* (GATT) regime had specifically approved. We did not like this result, but we complied.

Finally, I would like to touch on what is probably the most divisive and difficult international legal issue that we have faced: our detention policies. Frankly, I do not expect that most of you will agree with the steps we took or the decisions we made, but I hope you will understand the difficulty we faced after September 11, 2001, when we captured or took into custody suspected members of Al Qaeda and the Taliban. We were confronted by a dilemma. What legal rules to apply to them? These suspected terrorists did not fit neatly within existing legal rules, whether of domestic criminal law or the laws of war. The majority were captured or turned over to U.S. forces in Afghanistan or Pakistan during the international armed conflict that took place in Afghanistan in 2001 and 2002. Most of these persons could not be tried in U.S. courts because U.S. criminal laws did not extend to their activities in Afghanistan, with the obvious exception of those who committed specific war crimes.

This, of course, is a very different situation from that of terrorist suspects in Europe in the 1980s and even today, where European courts can preside over domestic prosecutions of members of the IRA, the Red Brigades, the Red Army Faction and, now, of Islamic extremists in London and Madrid. On the other hand, these detainees did not qualify, as some critics claim, as prisoners of war under the Geneva Conventions - which by their terms apply only to conflicts between High Contracting Parties and also extends special protection only to persons who openly identify themselves as part of a party’s armed forces.

This Administration has worked hard to identify and implement international rules applicable to these terrorist suspects. We have not ignored, changed, or re-interpreted existing international law. In fact, last year, our Supreme Court ruled that the one provision of the Geneva Conventions that does apply, even if the Conventions as a whole do not, is Common Article 3. Because this creates at best an incomplete legal framework, it has been necessary for the Administration to work with Congress to fill in the gaps in our detention system - something we have done in a way that complies with and in certain respects exceeds our obligations under Common Article 3. As a result of many discussions with European governments, a growing number of European officials and legal experts have come to acknowledge that members of Al Qaeda captured outside our own territories do not fit neatly into traditional criminal law rules or into the Geneva Conventions. Although we do not and will not always see eye to eye, I am encouraged that we have reached some degree of common ground, and that there is a growing acknowledgment of a gap in the international legal system. In each of these examples, the U.S., and this Administration in particular, has worked hard to uphold international law. The efforts we have made are not always easy to see or to appreciate. But our having taken such steps even when it was not easy or cost less, and our struggles to identify an appropriate path even when one was not clear, demonstrates the respect in which the U.S. holds international law.

**International Law Plays an Important Role in United States Domestic Law**

As my last major topic, I would like to describe in some detail how the U.S. legal system operates to enforce international law. Rather than leaving it to politicians to decide when to comply with our international obligations, our system goes to great lengths to attach serious legal consequences to international rules. My goal here is to clear up some common myths and misperceptions, including that international law is not truly binding in our system.

First, we should start with our Constitution. It declares that treaties are the “supreme law of the land” and assigns to the President the responsibility to take care that the laws are faithfully executed. This duty includes the upholding of such treaties. In addition, in many instances, our courts are authorized to apply and interpret international law. Indeed, our Supreme Court is increasingly confronted with cases involving international law. In the U.S. we do, however, recognize a distinction between treaties that can operate immediately and directly in our legal system, without the need for an
implementing parliamentary act, and treaties that require the Executive branch and Congress to take further steps to adopt a law.

This distinction is not unknown on the continent either. When the European Communities joined the Uruguay Round Agreements, for example, there was an express provision that those obligations would not enter directly into force as European law. Our approach to these agreements is the exactly the same. Let me give an example of how international obligations can be handled in our system. In the case of the Convention Against Torture (CAT), our Constitution already prohibited cruel and unusual punishment, which we interpret as encompassing torture. The U.S. directly enforces our obligations under Article 15 of the CAT by prohibiting the use of statements obtained through torture in legal proceedings, including military commission proceedings. Congress also adopted a statute imposing criminal sanctions on persons who commit torture, consistent with our obligations under the Convention. I should add that contrary to what you might hear from some critics, no one in the U.S. government has sought to disregard or avoid these obligations. To take another example, the U.S. directly enforces the obligations of the Geneva Conventions, including by disciplining military personnel who violate those obligations. Moreover, Congress has enacted laws imposing criminal sanctions on U.S. nationals who commit a grave breach of these Conventions. Our military lawyers receive special training on the Geneva Conventions and work hard to uphold them wherever our forces are engaged in combat. Again, no one in our government has the authority to override these laws.

Some critics have argued that even if we regard international law as binding, we do not give it the same stature as our domestic laws. They complain that we do not do enough to open our courts to private claims based on international law. I should note that we also get criticized for exactly the opposite reason: other countries argue that our generous approach to private litigation violates international law, even when the lawsuit itself rests on claims about international law. Most people would agree that private litigation of international law disputes is a mixed blessing, especially in a legal system like ours. Some issues touch at the heart of foreign policy and are too important to be left to the vagaries of private suits. It therefore is not surprising that no country, to my knowledge, allows unlimited private litigation of international law. Yet the U.S. does provide for substantial private enforcement of international law. Let me provide some examples. Our Congress has enacted legislation that allows private persons to sue for specific violations of international law, namely extrajudicial killings and torture. Most other countries limit redress of these international wrongs only to their criminal justice systems. Congress also opened our courts in some circumstances to claims for compensation based on expropriations of property that violate international law. And our courts will allow private parties to raise treaty issues in litigation, if the treaty clearly was intended to achieve this result.

Finally, let me respond briefly to a charge I have sometimes heard, that we hide behind our Constitution to avoid enforcing international law. This is a bit perplexing. After all, the principles of liberty and equality enshrined in our Constitution have helped inspire much of the international law of human rights that has emerged over the last sixty years. Our Constitution has contributed to the progressive development of international law, not held it back. Still, our Constitution does require us to do certain things by congressionally enacted statutes, rather than by treaties. In particular, it requires a legislative act to impose a tax or create a crime. This reflects the critical role of the House of Representatives, which is more directly accountable to the electorate than the Senate or the President. In addition, our Supreme Court has made clear that our Constitution protects certain core individual rights, including the right to a fair trial, to free speech, and to equal protection of the laws, from infringement by any legal act, including international rules. This practice also does not distinguish us from other countries. The German Constitutional Court, for example, in the several “Solange” decisions has upheld exactly the same principle. In those cases, decided over decades,
the German Court repeatedly ruled that it, and not the European Court of Justice, has the final authority to determine whether the European treaties comply with the fundamental provisions of the German Constitution. Similarly, our highest court must have the final say when safeguarding the fundamental rights enshrined in our Constitution. And, as I noted above, far from shielding the U.S. from international law, our Constitution expressly recognizes treaties as the law of the land. It also authorizes Congress to define and punish offenses against the law of nations. Our Constitution does not prescribe isolationism. To the contrary, it promotes our active participation in the development and enforcement of international law. In sum, the U.S. does treat international law as real law, is serious about its international obligations, and, through its legal system, assigns courts to play an important role in international law enforcement.

Conclusion

Today’s world presents many challenges, from transnational terrorism to economic inter-dependence to global warming, AIDS, and possible future pandemics to the eternal quest for human dignity and liberty. The U.S. believes that collective action and international law are essential in coordinating the international community’s approach to these deep and difficult problems. Shortly after she was confirmed, Secretary Rice explained: “International law is critical to the proper function of international diplomacy.”

I hope I have also made it clear that the U.S. role in the world makes international law more important to us, not less. We do not seek to impose constraints on others but shrink from them ourselves. Our careful approach to treaty negotiation and treaty acceptance reflects our respect for international law, not a desire to be free of it. When we assume international obligations, we take them seriously and seek to meet them, even when doing so is painful. And where international law applies, all branches of the U.S. government, including the judiciary, will enforce it.

The U.S. and its critics have gone through a difficult period of reproach and recrimination regarding international law. But in the face of the grave challenges before us, we must look forward, and seek new ways to build international cooperation and the rule of law. We are open to discussion and suggestions, and welcome the opportunity to work with all states, our traditional partners in particular. Together we must strengthen the international community and promote the rule of international law, for the sake of our collective interest and common values. The principles that The Hague symbolizes are ours too, and our common future rests on them.
The Defense Offset Valuation Model

By
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and
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Introduction

Defense offsets are a type of counter-trade obligations related to the transfer of defense core technologies and component parts production required by the importing country as part of a large defense procurement contract for export of arms, equipment and related services.1 Given the growing scale of foreign weapon procurement contracts in the Republic of Korea, the importance of defense offsets is being highly recognized as an efficient way of building up defense strength. Therefore, defense offsets provide a window of opportunity to obtain defense core technologies from the more advanced countries while not violating the relevant world trade organization (WTO) agreements.2

To value something is difficult, but this is one of the most important activities today.3 The value is quite different from the cost itself. In the matter of defense offset estimation, the buyer focuses on the value whereas the Seller mainly deals with the cost itself. From the seller’s point of view, the cost is the money itself incurred to implement the offset obligation. However, from the buyers’ point of view, the value is greater because the offset program gives the buyer a chance to acquire intangible assets including technology, parts production opportunity, and so on. Therefore, the buyer continues to take a chance of getting defense technology and other valuable opportunities by using offset programs.

The policy concerning offset programs include greater than $10M projects of foreign defense acquisition, and in this case, the Republic of Korea (ROK) government needs over 30 percent of the value of the amount in the defense acquisition contract.4

The Types of Defense Offset Programs

The offset program has two distinctive types according to the relation to the imported weapon systems: direct and indirect. Direct offsets are related to the weapon systems or related services exported by the defense firm and usually include technology transfer5, buybacks, overseas training, technical assistance, co-production, acquisition of maintenance capability and others. Indirect offsets are unrelated to the weapon systems or related services from the overseas defense firms. These include purchase of defense equipment, training, technology transfer, technical assistance and others.6

2. Nothing in these agreements shall be construed to prevent any party from taking any action or not disclosing any information which it considers necessary for the protection of its essential security interests relating to the procurement of arms, ammunition or war materials, or to procurement indispensable for national security or for national defense purposes. (WTO GPR/Spec/77, Article 23, 1993. 12.15).
5. Technology transfer contains three types of technology, which is research and development (R&D), manufacturing and depot level maintenance. (DAPA regulations, 2006).
They are also distinguished by five different types of offset programs. It is important to keep in mind the various types of defense offset programs when evaluating defense transfer technology since the offset value varies across different types of offset. Figure 1 displays five different types of offset programs and illustrates the concept of counter-trade.

![Diagram of Types of Defense Offset Programs]

**Figure 1. Types of Defense Offset Programs**

Whereas defense offsets are used in defense terminology, the counter-trade refers to the type of agreement involving reciprocal purchase of civilian goods. Table 1 presents the definition of five different types of defense offset programs. According to the definitions of offset programs below, technology transfer distinguishes itself quite substantially from the processes of co-production, licensed production, overseas investment and subcontractor production.

Recognizing the importance of defense offset programs, however, the purchasing countries have scarce means of estimating the defense offset value due to the lack of an objective and credible technology valuation model. Most previous research on the issue of defense offsets chiefly focused on impact analysis. Also, only cost approach was used for defense offset valuation. Even the technology data and multiplier are evaluated based on its number of pages and its status of equipment. For these reasons, the paper has developed a framework for evaluation of the defense offset technology based on the appropriate technology valuation approaches.

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7. Technology transfer is usually required for its know-how. But, for parts production cases, the offset value is credited at 100% due to its amount, therefore, the know-how is only credited when the seller transfers its manufacturing technology to the KIP for the first time. (ROK Offset Guidelines, 2003).
9. Counter-trade is not an available way of the trade because the WTO does not allow this type of trade in the global market.
Technology valuation has been spurring increasingly growing attention since the beginning of the 1990’s. As distinct from the issue of technology assessment, technology valuation is an evaluation activity to review technology, industrialization, and market factors with intangible technology. It presents the technical values as money terms, levels, points, and other suggestions. The defense offset technology valuation is slightly different from the definition of technology valuation. It focuses on the valuation of defense technology from the offset contracts; therefore, it defines an evaluation activity of defense technology itself to describe money values with a review of its technical, economical, and defense strength effects. Technology valuation is different depending on its purpose, usage, a point of view and intention of managers, and evaluation methods. Therefore, the real technical value is decided in the consideration of who, when, what for and how factors.

There are basically three well-known approaches to the valuation of technology, namely, the cost-based, market-based and income-based approaches. The cost approach is based on the basic economic assumption that neither buyer nor seller would be willing to pay more for an asset than the cost of creating or replacing the asset. The cost approach thus typically falls into two different types,

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of Offset</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Co-production</td>
<td>Based on the government-to-government contract, either importing governments or commercial firms acquire relevant technology data and information in order to produce either the finished weaponry or component parts abroad.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Licensed Production</td>
<td>Based on the technology data from the firm-to-firm or the firm-to-government direct contract, the exporting manufacturer's weapons or parts thereof are produced in the buyer's country.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subcontractor Production</td>
<td>The subcontractor produces component parts according to the direct contract between export manufacturers and foreign subcontractors, not necessarily involving the licensed production or technology transfer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overseas Investment</td>
<td>Investment arising from an offset agreement, taking the form of capital investment to establish or expand a subsidiary or joint venture in the foreign country.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technology Transfer</td>
<td>Occurs as a result of an offset agreement that may take the form of research and development conducted in the buyer country, technical assistance provided to the subsidiary or a joint venture in the foreign country, or other activities under direct commercial arrangement between exporting manufacturer and the buyer entity.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Introduction of Technology Valuation Approaches

Technology valuation has been spurring increasingly growing attention since the beginning of the 1990’s. As distinct from the issue of technology assessment, technology valuation is an evaluation activity to review technology, industrialization, and market factors with intangible technology. It presents the technical values as money terms, levels, points, and other suggestions. The defense offset technology valuation is slightly different from the definition of technology valuation. It focuses on the valuation of defense technology from the offset contracts; therefore, it defines an evaluation activity of defense technology itself to describe money values with a review of its technical, economical, and defense strength effects. Technology valuation is different depending on its purpose, usage, a point of view and intention of managers, and evaluation methods. Therefore, the real technical value is decided in the consideration of who, when, what for and how factors.

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namely, the reproduction cost and replacement cost, both of them taking account of depreciation and obsolescence.\textsuperscript{17} This approach has an advantage of simplicity and easiness of application, especially in case of the defense critical technology. However, the cost-based approach is unable to capture the wealth-creating potential of the technology due to the difficulties of obtaining the underlying data and identifying depreciation factors.

The income approach is measured by the net present value of the stream of the associated economic benefits over the lifetime of the technology. The benefits in this case are typically classified by the different types of underlying factors, namely, the technology, market, entrepreneurial, and management factors. It appears reasonable to incorporate measures of the real value of technologies, patents, trademarks, copyrights and other technology-related factors into the value of the technology transfer contract. The income approach makes use of the option approach, which is highly popular these days.

The market approach is more appropriate to use if the real-world market for technology is in place since it is based on observing similar transactions that take place in the market and using them as a benchmark for evaluating one’s own transactions. It is a simple and reasonable method; however, it is impossible to apply if the data on similar technology-transfer transactions are not available. One of the reasons is that the market for trading defense technologies is quite limited, prohibitively narrowing down the scope for the application of market approach to the valuation of technology.\textsuperscript{18} Table 2 summarizes the characteristics of alternative technology valuation approaches in defense offset program.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Approach</th>
<th>Cost Approach</th>
<th>Market Approach</th>
<th>Income Approach</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Definition</td>
<td>Valuation based on reproduction or replacement costs</td>
<td>Valuation based on the comparable market price</td>
<td>Valuation based on the present value flow of benefits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advantages</td>
<td>Easy to use and calculate if cost data are available</td>
<td>Easy to rationalize if the market data are available</td>
<td>Makes use of the well-developed concept of net present value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disadvantages</td>
<td>Difficult to obtain the data; ignores potential future value</td>
<td>Lack of comparable market data especially in defense field</td>
<td>Chance of error due to subjective estimation only deals with the amount of revenue ignore defense strength effects</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{17} Boer, F. P., \textit{The Valuation of Technology}, John Wiley & Sons, 1999.
The Defense Offset Valuation Model

The defense offset valuation (DOV) model consists of four areas of technology valuation. Because there is no single perfect valuation approach in the world today, neither is the offset technology valuation perfect. Therefore, within the limited time and available data, all necessary valuation approaches are essential to use to get the ideal values of the offset program.

Cost Approach

The cost approach is the base of the defense offset valuation model. Based on the valuation principles, the formula is presented below:

\[
\text{Offset Value} = \text{Suggested Value} \times \text{Peer Review Value} \times \text{Adjusted Value}
\]

With the suggested value from the seller, the valuation process begins with appropriate tools and approaches. The cost approach consists of three phases. The first phase, with the deep analysis of the offset proposal, the technology experts from relevant institutes and defense firms are grouped to evaluate its real values. In this phase, the expert evaluates the suggested technology with the use of proven tools including the Delphi and Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP). The questionnaire consists of three factors:

- Economic
- Technical
- Arms strength

The three major factors are divided with nine sub factors each. Economic factors are composed of budget reduction, economic spillover, and technical usefulness factors. Technical factors are made up of the technical level, technical importance and technical difficulty factors. Finally, defense strength factors are comprised of urgency of technology, defense contribution, and defense needs factors.

After evaluation of peer review phases with the questionnaire, the second phase mainly deals with valuation factors. Time to transfer affects the technology value much. The faster the transfer, the technology gets more value of offset credit. The extent of technology transfer requires a deep analysis by experts. If the seller fully follows the offset request for proposal (RFP), they get more offset value. The technology right is also an important factor to evaluate technology. The more rights of technology transferred to the Buyer, the more offset value they can get. And other factors including the credibility of offset proposal are also considered and affect the offset technology valuation. Finally, the offset value is estimated by these deep analyses using proven tools and approaches. Table 3 shows the procedures of the cost approach of the offset technology valuation.
The income approach is a widely used technology valuation model in commercial sectors and can be also applied to the offset program. There are two different ways of using income approach in the offset program. First, when the seller proposes manufacturing technology with the amount of buy-backs, the paper can be used the traditional income approach to get the associated offset values using the equation below.\(^{19}\)

\[
\text{Offset Value} = \left\{ \sum_{i=1}^{N} \frac{FCF_i}{(1 + WACC)^i} + \frac{V_t}{(1 + WACC)^N} \right\} \times \text{(Technology Factor)}
\]

(where, \( FCF_i \) : Future Cash Flows at Times \( t \), \( N \) : Estimation Period, \( V_t \) : Salvation Value at Time \( t \), Technology Factor : Technology Contribution Factor, \( WACC \) : Weighted Average Cost of Capital \(^1\), \( i = T_1, T_2, ..., T_n \) : Offset-proposed Technology)

As seen above, the income approach of the offset program starts when the seller proposes manufacturing technology with the amount of buy-backs. This consists of two phases. When it is proposed as an offset program, the experts present the appropriate data and prepare the questionnaire. With the use of proven tools including net present value (NPV) and technology contribution methods, the questionnaire is analyzed to get the final estimated values. Table 4 shows the procedures of the income approach of the offset technology valuation.

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Second, when the seller proposes the defense equipment, the paper can be also used the income approach to get the values, too. This consists of two phases. When the seller proposes the defense equipment as an offset program, the buyer could get the budget reduction effects while the buyer could use it during its lifecycle time. The equipment usually contains depot maintenance and test equipment. So, with the deep analysis with the experts and the use of AHP and NPV methods, the paper could estimate the values of budget reduction effects. Table 5 shows other procedures of the income approach.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>First Phase</th>
<th>Second Phase (Final Phase)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Methods</td>
<td>Revenue Creation (Questionnaire)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tools</td>
<td>NPV, Technology Contribution Method</td>
<td>Final Estimated Value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consideration Factors</td>
<td>Estimated Income Statement Surplus Value Technology Contribution Ratio</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Therefore, in the offset program, the paper presents the income approach, which is the widely used valuation methodology with the adjustment of its own defense offset circumstances as well.

**Line of Code method**

The Line of Code method is quite useful to valuate the software source code evaluation. According to the increasing importance of software upgrade needs with weapon system and relevant equipment, the appropriate valuation tools are also becoming important. Based on these principles, the formula is presented below.

\[
\text{Software Value} = \text{Lines of Code Value} \times \text{Peer Review Value}
\]
When the seller proposes the software source code with a relevant weapon system, the valuation process begins with the appropriate valuation tools. The method is mainly applied with the “Software Project Valuation Guidelines.” With the guidelines, the first phase, the proposed lines of code are evaluated with the number of code lines and adjusted factors. The second phase follows the peer review process with its economic, technical, and arms strength effects in the buyer’s point of view. The final value is also presented with these firms, solid tools and methods. Table 6 shows the procedures of the lines of code method of the offset technology valuation.

Table 6
Lines of Code Method of Defense Offset Technology Valuation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>First Phase</th>
<th>Second Phase</th>
<th>Final Phase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Methods</td>
<td>Line of Code</td>
<td>Peer Review</td>
<td>Final Estimated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(Questionnaire)</td>
<td>Value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tools</td>
<td>Software Valuation</td>
<td>Delphi, APH</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consideration Factors</td>
<td>Number of Code Lines Adjusted Factors</td>
<td>Economic Factor Technical Factor Defense Strength Factor</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Case Studies Method

The case studies method is useful when the relevant databases are appropriate. It is also possible that the defense offset technology valuation can use this method. After valuating the offset program, the databases include more than hundreds of offset proposed technology and equipment. Therefore, with the use of cost, income and line of code method, finally the case studies are used to verify the estimated offset values with their mean, maximum, and minimum values. Table 7 shows the procedures of the case studies method of the offset technology valuation.

Table 7
Case Studies Method of Defense Offset Technology Valuation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>First Phase</th>
<th>Second Phase</th>
<th>Final Phase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Methods</td>
<td>Cost Approach</td>
<td>Case Studies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Income Approach</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Line of Code</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tools</td>
<td>Delphi, AHP</td>
<td>Offset Valuation</td>
<td>Final Estimated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Peer Review</td>
<td>Databases</td>
<td>Value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Software Valuation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consideration Factors</td>
<td>Three Major Factors</td>
<td>Mean Value</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of Code</td>
<td>Minimum and</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lines Adjusted</td>
<td>Maximum Value</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Factors</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

20. It is the government guidelines of Ministry of Information and Communication in 2005, ROK.
Overall Defense Offset Valuation Model and its Major Outcomes

With the deep research and advice of the technology valuation experts worldwide, the defense offset valuation (DOV) model is developed and used for the offset valuation methodology today. Because there is no golden rule of valuating the technology, each approach and methods have their own pros and cons. Therefore, it is most important to use these approaches together and compare the results to get the most objective and credible values. Table 8 shows the overall DOV model approach including cost, income, lines of code, and case studies methods.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Valuation Tools</th>
<th>Contents</th>
<th>Final Values ($)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Offset Technology</td>
<td>Cost Approach</td>
<td>Technical Data</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Overseas Training</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Technical Assistance</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Equipment</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Know-how</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sub Total</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Income Approach</td>
<td>Budget Reduction Value</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Revenue Creation Value</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sub Total</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lines of Code</td>
<td>Software Source Code</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Case Studies</td>
<td>Offset Database Values</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The defense technology and Quality (DTAQ) has the responsibility to evaluate the defense offset technology valuation in ROK. With the DOV model, it had outstanding outcomes last year shown in Table 9.
Conclusion

As the importance of defense offset is currently increasing today, more than 100 countries have an offset policy of their own for the foreign defense acquisition. The annual report of the offsets in defense trade shows the great attention to the defense offset program today. Although the demand for technology valuation has been growing, there have hardly been any attempts at evaluating the defense offset programs today. In this paper, based on an extensive review of existing technology valuation methods and real implementation today, the paper presented a model of valuation of defense offset programs, DOV model, which features the following characteristics.

By mixing the cost, income, lines of code and case studies methods, the paper presents a more objective and credible defense offset valuation model. Therefore, the DOV model is unique in the sense that it is able to use all proven valuation tools and approaches for the offset technology valuation, thus rendering it as credible and valuable to the potential buyer countries planning to engage in the process of defense acquisition Figure 2 shows the overall summary of defense offset valuation (DOV) model.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Projects</th>
<th>Number of Offset Technology</th>
<th>Suggested Dollar Value</th>
<th>Final Dollar Value</th>
<th>Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>7.28 M $</td>
<td>2.39M $</td>
<td>32.80%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2. The Overall Summary of the Defense Offset Valuation Model

The paper suggests that our DOV model provides a helpful basis for a useful valuation tool of the defense offset contracts. Defense offsets have become a well-established part of international arms trade. It is firmly believed that the DOV model could be a great contribution to the objective and credible valuation tools of the defense offset program and should be a solid bridge to being a win-win relationship between the buyer and the seller in the future.

About the Authors

Dr. Won-Joon Jang has received his Ph.D. in economics from the Seoul National University, Republic of Korea. He graduated from the Korean Military Academy in 1991 as a member of 47th class and also has graduated from the U.S. Air Force Institute of Technology in 1998 with an M.S. in logistics management. He is an ROK Army Major on Active Duty and has been working for a defense offset program manager in the Defense Technology and Quality (DTAQ) in Seoul since 2006. In 2005, he was the Integrated Logistics Support manager of the Army Tactical Communication and Information Command, ROK Army Headquarters. His major interests include technology valuation, technology transfer, performance evaluation, and priority selection.

Mr. Tae-Yun Joung has received his B.S. in mechanical engineering from the Hanyang University, Republic of Korea. Between 1981 and 2005 he worked as a Researcher in the Defense Quality Assurance Agency in Seoul. He is a Senior Researcher and has been working for a defense offset program manager in the Defense Technology and Quality (DTAQ) in Seoul since 2006. His major interests include quality assurance of defense articles and technology.

The established rule is that the expenditure of public funds is proper only when authorized by Congress, not that public funds may be expended unless prohibited by Congress. U.S. vs. MacCollom, 426 U.S. 317 (1976)

Moderate caution prevails in efforts to interpret and consistently execute the many fiscal laws enacted each year by the Congress. For a combatant commander (COCOM), consistent interpretation of fiscal laws and policies are essential to the morale and well-being for all personnel assigned within the purview of the commander. In fact, the COCOM has the responsibility to determine what is fair and appropriate for his members and to establish equitable standards, Army Regulation 12–15/SECNAVINST 4950.4A/AFI 16–105, 5 June 2000. Inconsistency is the enemy of the joint combatant comptroller. This is where it gets interesting for financial managers.

Often, Department of Defense (DoD) organizations have anchored their fiscal policy solely on the Appropriations Act and Authorizations Act passed by Congress each fiscal year. However, there is another Act to consider, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1968 (FAA). It arguably has enough additional authorizations to raise a few eyebrows each time one of the different authorizations gets executed. The major differences are in the source of funds: the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Trust Fund is appropriated to the DoD, while the Foreign Operations appropriation belongs to the Department of State (DoS) and the legal authorities and restrictions in the FAA and the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), which control the use of the funds.

One might ask if the FAA is truly appropriated money. The DoDFMR 7000.14-R, Volume 15 answers that question.

. . . appropriated funds are not limited to those appropriated by Congress to federal agencies from the general fund of the Treasury. Rather, funds available to agencies are considered appropriated, if made available for collection and expenditure pursuant to specific statutory authority. Transactions which involve FMS trust funds can constitute violations of the Anti-Deficiency Act.” Issues involving FMS monies need to be carefully evaluated on a case-by-case basis, taking into account all relevant aspects of each case for application of the Anti-Deficiency Act.

What kind of differences would raise eyebrows and cause financial managers at COCOMs to cringe every time one is enacted upon? Here are a few examples:

A simple difference to look at first concerns authorization to purchase ice and drinking water for use outside the continental United States (CONUS). An authorized expense for those members occupying billets covered by the FAA. Contrast that to an Air Force organization that may purchase drinking water with appropriated funds only when it is a necessary expense from the government’s
standpoint. The circumstances for which they can purchase water are listed in AFI 65-601 Volume 1 Paragraph 4.45:

- The public water supply is unsafe for human consumption as determined by competent medical and environmental authority in writing
- There is an emergency failure of the water source on the installation
- A temporary facility has no drinking water available within a reasonable distance
- There is no water fit for drinking purposes, as determined by competent medical and environmental authority in writing, available without cost or at a lower cost to the government
- The purchase of drinking water (bottled water) with APF ceases to be authorized when the problem with the drinking water has been remedied

Another difference of the FAA is in purchase of uniforms, an authorization used mainly to purchase driver uniforms, usually in the form of a new suit or two for the security assistance office (SAO) Chief’s driver. Compare that to the Air Force policy where a civilian clothing is almost never allowed for civilian employees and is an allowance paid only to active duty enlisted members and officers (in the form of a periodic allowance in their paychecks) when stationed overseas. Normally, a civilian driver would be expected to come dressed appropriately for work and therefore purchase of a uniform would not be allowable.

Funding appropriated for Emergency and Extraordinary Expenses is routinely used by Department of Defense (DoD) entities for official representation purposes and is used at the highest levels for entertaining and upholding the prestige and standing of the United States. The FAA has similar representation authorizations but if one begins to delve into the goals of the FAA (funding is for the purposes of or pursuant to the Act) they might suggest use of the funds at a much lower level, to allow such things as “counterpart gifts” and hosting of individuals at a counterpart level.

The FAA also allows procurement of supplies and services without regard to laws and regulations governing the obligation and expenditure of funds of the U.S. government as may be necessary to accomplish the purposes of the Act. Security assistance offices (SAOs) are given authority to purchase from wherever they decide is most efficient and appropriate. They are not required to use DoD systems. They can purchase them from another department or a public firm.

The FAA hints of other differences as well. This kind of information opens up new opportunities for financial managers to compare similar programs in different jurisdictions. Please contact the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) at the following web site: http://www.dsca.mil.

. . . the DSCA is a DoD organization. Therefore, DoD authorities, policies, and regulations apply unless DSCA has a specific authorization or prohibition in law that differs from DoD authorities, policies, and regulations. . .

The FAA differs from Appropriations and Authorizations Act in their extent and scope. Indeed, from the beginning, financial managers saw an authorization, aimed at changing the fundamental incentives of all people within government and eschewed partial reforms. A review of the literature on FAA reveals there were five more differences:

- Department of Defense financial professionals often contend that the benefits of contracting with individuals for personal service abroad are not sufficient to justify the scrutiny the rest of the DoD would put on them even though such individuals shall not be regarded as employees of the U.S. government for the purpose of any law administered by
the Civil Service Commission. Yet manpower has not been allowed to increase since 1968

- Passenger motor vehicles may be purchased for replacement only and the cost shall not exceed the current market price in the U.S. of a midsize sedan

- Insurance of official motor vehicles or aircraft acquired for use in foreign countries

- Rent or lease outside the U.S. for not to exceed ten years of offices, buildings, grounds, and quarters, including living quarters to house personnel, and payments therefore, in advance; maintenance, furnishings, necessary repairs, improvements, and alterations to properties owned or rented by the U.S. government or made available for use to the SAO

- Printing and binding without regard to the provisions of any other law

The additional authorities contained in the FAA can help security assistance organizations to achieve their missions, realizing the real value in these differences is the purpose for which they are enacted. What has been shown is that these authorities differ in meaningful ways and it is COCOM’s responsibility to ensure any one organization will not benefit from these differences while at the same allowing users to take full advantage of budgetary flexibility made available via the FAA. As financial management in the joint environment continues to evolve, new legislation, new requirements, new management initiatives, new missions and the proviso to get the “biggest value for the buck” continually forces resource managers to develop new approaches to resource management to guarantee interoperability of the forces that ensure mission success.
International relationships are critical enablers for United States Air Force (USAF) expeditionary air and space forces conducting global operations and fighting the war on terrorism. Building these critical relationships requires skilled, knowledgeable, and experienced international affairs (IA) professionals. Our Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force, International Affairs (SAF/IA) team recognized this need, and developed and implemented an International Affairs Career Field (IACF), which provides Air Force civilian personnel opportunities for career development and advancement. These new opportunities not only provide benefits for individual team members. They work to systematically attract, develop, and retain a workforce that meets the needs of the entire security cooperation community. This article provides an overview of USAF efforts to shape the total force, explains how IA leadership responded to the strategic direction of the Air Force by creating the IACF, and shares the benefits of the new Career Field to Air Force civilians and the broader security cooperation community.

Air Force Efforts to Shape the Force

IACF implementation comes at a time of great importance as the Air Force transforms and reshapes itself to meet the challenges presented by the Global War on Terror. (GWOT). Air Force Doctrine Document 1-1, Leadership and Force Development, provides the principles behind total force development and current transformation efforts pertaining to civilian development. The force development concept outlines a framework to maximize individual capabilities by clearly defining three levels of development:

- Tactical
- Operational
- Strategic

Each level builds on the other ensuring Air Force team members possess the necessary skills and enduring competencies needed to meet current and future mission requirements.

The force development concept of operations for civilians takes the principles in Air Force Doctrine Document 1-1 and outlines a cohesive plan for developing civilians as an integral part of the total force. Every civilian position in the Air Force now belongs to a Career Field that provides a structured framework for civilian development. This will ensure that all civilian team members receive the appropriate education, functional training, and assignment experiences to prepare them to meet present and future challenges.

International Affairs Community Response

The Air Force and U.S. government depend on the political-military expertise of both military and civilian IA personnel to build relationships with U.S. partners and allies that facilitate access and overflight, partner nation capability and capacity, and coalition interoperability. Executing security cooperation programs in support of Air Force and U.S. national security objectives requires strong, competent, and effective IA professionals.
SAF/IA responded to Air Force direction by implementing a career field for IA civilian professionals in alignment with the total force effort. IACF provides a framework to increase the effectiveness and perpetuate the excellent performance of our IA civilians.

**International Affairs Career Field History and Concept**

The IACF Development Team recognized the IA civilian workforce as all Air Force civilian personnel who are employed in IA functional areas. These areas include:

- International Security Assistance
- Cooperative Research
- Development or Acquisition
- Foreign Disclosure and Technology Transfer
- International Education and Training
- Financial Management, and Logistics
- Information and Personnel Exchanges

An in-depth analysis of Air Force IA positions identified 319 civil service positions as part of the IACF. The majority of IACF positions are located at SAF/IA, the Air Force Security Assistance Center (AFSAC), and the Air Force Security Assistance Training (AFAST) Squadron. Remaining positions are located at Air Force Material Command Air Logistic Centers (ALCs) and Product Centers, Air Mobility Command (AMC), Air Combat Command (ACC), and Air Force Space Command (AFSPC). As the Career Field matures, positions will be evaluated continuously to ensure that IACF includes all appropriate positions.

IACF was organized under the existing Air Force Career Field framework which provides three key functions:

- Career Field Management and Oversight
- Civilian Development
- Position Management

These functions work together to create a civilian workforce that is responsive to mission requirements and meets IA community needs for skilled, knowledgeable, and experienced IA professionals. Like all other Air Force Career Fields, IACF reports to the Force Development Council through the Functional Authority.

For day-to-day operations management, IACF maintains a Career Field Management Team located at the Directorate of Civilian Force Management, Air Force Personnel Center. The team manages IACF key functions by identifying qualified candidates for:

- Referral to position vacancies
- Recruiting interns to provide entry-level personnel
- Advocating continuing education and functional training such as civilian developmental education, tuition assistance programs, and career broadening
- Administering all other developmental and professional opportunities available to the workforce
The Career Field Management Team ensures that the Air Force IA community maximizes training and placement opportunities for our civilians and equips our team members to adapt and meet the challenges of the changing global security environment. IACF began initial operations in March 2006 and will achieve full operational capability in October 2007.

**International Affairs Career Field Benefits**

For individual team members, IACF provides new opportunities for professional growth and development. Air Force IA personnel will have flexible career development paths, thereby increasing opportunities for challenging work experiences with timely, appropriate training and education. This series of experiences and challenges provided by the Career Field will assist IACF team members in gaining vital experience necessary to meet future civilian leadership requirements through IA and the greater Air Force.

At the same time, IACF affords IA leadership the opportunity to deliberately develop team members for positions of increased responsibility in the Career Field. The end result will be civilian leaders that possess the right professional, technical, managerial, and administrative skills necessary to execute the IA mission now and in the future. For more details or if you have questions about information mentioned in this article, please contact the IACF Management Team at (210) 565-1758 or e-mail: afpc.dpdc@randolph.af.mil.

**About the Author**

Angela M. Kravetz is the Chief of the Human Capital Development Branch, Under Secretary of the Air Force International Affairs (SAF/IA), Washington, D.C. She oversees the civilian and military human resource programs at SAF/IA providing a full range of responsive human resource services consistent with merit principles to the management of federal and military employees. She also oversees a multi-million dollar International Affairs Workforce Development Initiative Program where she identifies executive training, educational programs and career broadening assignments and opportunities for the Air Force International Affairs civilian and military community. In 1987 she earned her Master of Public Administration, Public Administration, Public Policy and Public Budgeting, University of Nevada Reno, Reno, Nevada. In 1980 she earned her Bachelor of Science Political Science and Speech Communication, Texas Tech University, Lubbock Texas.
Naval International Aviation Logistics Process Improvement Through Enhanced International Partner Relationships

By
Ron Weinberger
Naval Air Systems Command Director of Logistics for International Programs

The Naval International Aviation Logistics Process Improvement Team (LPIT), consists of representative members from:

- Navy International Program Office (Navy IPO)
- Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR)
- Naval Inventory Control Point (NAVICP)
- Defense Logistics Agency (DLA)
- Industry
- Foreign military sales (FMS) partners

In addition the list above, guests from other agencies and organizations, changed the course of NAVAIR international logistics support by enhancing relationships with international partners to form a “One Team” philosophy. At the LPIT annual Naval International Logistics Workshops, international partners have been empowered to select and provide feedback on their top issues, which are worked by the LPIT community throughout the year. Some of these issues include:

- Third party transfer
- Diminishing manufacturing sources and material shortages (DMSMS) and parts obsolescence
- Transportation
- Out-of inventory (OOI) weapon systems support
- Performance based logistics (PBLs)

Innovative ideas and recommendations have resolved major international logistics issues and resulted in multiple benefits for the international community. Through LPIT efforts, international logistics benchmarks have been set and models established that will continue to be used in the future. While developing and implementing new international logistics methods, the LPIT has also enhanced NAVAIR’s international logistics profession for Product Support Team Leaders and
the FMS Deputy Assistant Program Managers for Logistics by clearly defining and articulating their mission, responsibilities, and goals.

Through revised emphasis on international partner relationships, there has been a noticeable increase in international partner participation at Naval International Aviation Workshops. There were sixty-five international participants representing nineteen nations at the LPIT Workshop on 30 April through 3 May 2007. This represented over a 100 percent increase in international attendees from the previous year.

Working as one team can make everyone stronger and more successful. This has been the case with the LPIT and the emphasis on listening to the voice of international partners throughout the year and in a formal, facilitated session at the annual LPIT Workshop. Some of the top issues worked by the LPIT are discussed below.

**Diminishing Manufacturing Sources and Material Shortages and Parts Obsolescence - Number One Issue in 2006**

In 2006, NAVAIR LPIT members were asked to join the Department of Defense (DoD) Diminishing Manufacturing Sources and Material Shortages (DMSMS) Working Group, which supports Office of the Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Materiel Readiness Policy (ADUSD (MR&MP)) and Assistant Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics Plans and Programs (ADUSD (LP&P)). LPIT members had an immediate impact on that DoD committee. The chairman of the DoD DMSMS Working Group asked NAVAIR to take a primary role for all the DoD international programs by leading the new DMSMS Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Interoperability Committee, which has a goal to assist U.S. coalition forces with affordable readiness. As a result of the LPIT’s work on this committee, DMSMS FMS initiatives were presented this year at the Joint Council on Aging Aircraft’s annual conference.

The LPIT has made several contributions to integrate international partners into the DMSMS process. LPIT members understand that the international community’s DMSMS mitigation consists mainly of life of type buys, that the process is very reactionary, that funding deadlines are very short fused, and that there is a lack of communication by original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) and vendors regarding alternative sources. The LPIT has attacked these problems as well as worked to provide international partners access to available DMSMS tools and data based on platform configuration and defining quick parts qualification processes with the OEMs.

Through the LPIT, the NAVAIR international community, in concert with the U.S. Navy F/A-18 program, is currently working on both a reactive plan by using multiple tools and a predictive plan by forecasting potential DMSMS issues. Despite the similarities, LPIT members know that solutions that work for the USN do not always translate directly to the international community. Historically, international platforms are in service long after U.S. variants have been retired. FMS partners also face several barriers that the domestic platform operators do not. Predominant among these are:

- Access to available tools and web sites
- Release of technical data
- Restrictions engaging DoD entities not under the USN umbrella
- Not being able to quickly qualify parts with an OEM

DMSMS tools such as the Obsolescence Management Information System and other commercial tools provide the international research analysis the ability to plan ahead.
Transportation Number One Issue in 2005

In 2006, the LPIT’s vision of having a NAVAIR international logistics transportation team assembled to work international partner transportation issues became a reality. The demands for the team’s expertise exceeded expectations to the degree that other military services became interested in the team’s services and expertise.

The transportation team now provides transportation consultation and coordination for both unclassified and classified requirements. This includes contracts and documentation, program directives, and Military Assistance Program Address Directory (MAPAD) recommendations. The team also provides management support for shipments requiring special handling such as salvaged aircraft, missiles, ammunition, communication security, and cartridge actuated devices and propellant actuated devices.

At the program managers’ and international partners’ requests, the transportation team also assists freight forwarders in mitigating existing issues. In addition, they provide training to NAVAIR, FMS partners, and contractor support personnel in the areas of international transportation at symposia, conferences, working groups, and dedicated training courses. The NAVAIR international logistics transportation team has provided critical information on transportation topics that are important for the successful movement of hazardous, explosive, and classified material. Support has been provided by the transportation team to over twenty-five programs including the F-18, P-3, E-2, H-3, T-2, Sidewinder, Harpoon, and CAD/PAD programs. The transportation team also began combining international country requirements across U.S. services by getting consolidated special assignment airlift mission (SAAM) flights. In-country military services’ ability to consolidate their SAAM flights by country, instead of by platform or by individual service, has resulted in a thirty to forty percent estimated savings for each country’s program.

The NAVAIR International Logistics Transportation Team continues to face unique, as well as common, transportation challenges for the tri-service FMS community. These challenges are being met successfully by the team on a daily basis, while they also focus on innovative initiatives and solutions to reduce transportation costs for FMS Partners.

Third Party Transfer

In July 2000, LPIT members requested blanket third party transfer on behalf of FMS F/A-18 partners from Australia, Canada, Finland, Kuwait, Malaysia, Spain, and Switzerland so they could exchange common and unclassified F/A-18 spare parts, subsystems, accessory attachments, support equipment and related technical data. The transfer of items was not intended to result in an increase in individual military enhancements, although it did provide an increase in the countries’ collective readiness availability. There was also a need to exchange common supply support from one FMS F/A-18 operating country to another for efficient and economical logistics support, particularly with increased joint operations throughout the world. In 2003, the Department of State (DoS) approved this request after receiving appropriate end-use, security, and retransfer assurances from the FMS F/A-18 governments as required by the Arms Export Control Act.

In 2006, based on the previous work and approval of the F/A-18 Third Party Transfer, the LPIT initiated the process to request the pre-approved P-3 blanket third party assurance for NAVAIR international partners to enable the exchange of common and unclassified non-significant military equipment (SME) parts among countries which had purchased P-3 aircraft. September 2006, NAVAIR signed out the pre-approved P-3 blanket third party transfer assurance request via the NAVIPO to the DoS. The letter was sent on the behalf of the P-3 international partners from:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Argentina</th>
<th>Australia</th>
<th>Brazil</th>
<th>Canada</th>
<th>Chile</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>New Zealand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
It is a pleasure to report that the DoS agreed with initiating the preliminary process request for a pre-approved P-3 blanket third party transfer assurances for NAVAIR’s P-3 FMS partners in record time and is now waiting for the FMS P-3 users positive replies to the DoS correspondence. Once the majority of the FMS P-3 users have returned their signed assurances, the DoS will process the final paperwork to begin the official P-3 blanket third party assurances.

The LPIT has had proven success with the DoS retransfer process by previously getting the process approved for F/A-18 international partners. At that time, it was the first and only DoD aircraft pre-approved third party transfer by the DoS. Now there should be another one approved for our P-3 FMS partners.

Foreign Military Sales Spares Call

Working as one team is beneficial for both the USN and our FMS partners, and taking a common business approach to consolidate efforts is better than going it alone. The annual FMS Spares Call is one of those efforts that provide benefits to all who participate. In the past, due to the multiple fiscal years that are experienced by our FMS partners, many were ordering one or two spare items in support of their sustainment efforts. Because of the different orders coming in throughout the year, opportunities to procure spare parts with other FMS partners were being missed.

The establishment of the annual spares call program allows all participating nations to take advantage of economy of scale procurements leading to cost avoidance and savings as procurements are combined for the FMS community. NAVICP issues spares calls in January each year, requesting FMS countries to project twelve-month requirements for NAVICP managed (1R & 7R cog) items. Spares Call responses by FMS partner countries are requested by 1 May. Each country’s requirements are reviewed and compared for matches with other international partners. Procurements are then coordinated to combine FMS partner requirements wherever possible. Attempts are also made to combine international partner requirements with those of the USN.

Spares Call is an excellent example of countries sending in known requirements at the same time regardless of a country’s fiscal year. Through LPIT efforts, the annual spares call has provided an increase in cost avoidance over three years. Documented examples for a single country for one item reflect increased cost avoidance from $618,000 in fiscal 2004 to $1.9 million in fiscal year 2006 for an individual participating country.
International Products and Services

The LPIT has also been the primary focal point in the Naval International Aviation community for fair share funding for NAVAIR products and services provided to International Partners. Correspondence has been sent to the FMS Logistics Managers concerning fair share funding for international technical data support. In this correspondence, a recommended Naval Air Technical Data and Engineering Service Command (NATEC) fair share funding plan (shown below) was provided to standardize technical publication logistics support costs and to reflect consistency across international platforms regardless of platform.

Fair share funding will ensure a minimum level of support is offered to international partners and enable efficient and effective program execution and to keep the FMS partner’s cost at a minimum. In addition, this concept will enable NAVAIR to plan projected workload requirements for establishing new international programs and will allow retention of critical NAVAIR personnel working international efforts.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Standardized Technical Data In-Servce Support Options</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Baseline</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respond to customers queries with regards to approved technical data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establish, manage and coordinate with program manager on FMS releasability review and sanitization determination and distribution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prepare DD 1149 for tech data products debits and credits and research supply discrepancy reports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintain shipping confirmation and research open records</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perform coordination of requirements with common equipment support equipment and weapons program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forward USN IRACs with FMS effectiveness to program manager upon Naval Air Technical Data and Engineering Service Command (NATEC) receipt</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The level of support will be determined based on country requirements with appropriate funding.*
Conclusion

Based on LPIT initiatives and innovative ideas, there has been a growing request by more international partners to attend the annual LPIT Workshop. The 2007 Workshop where partners selected the following as their top issues:

- Performance based logistics
- SAMM 48 (standard level of service)
- Repair of repairables (RoR)
- DMSMS

The next LPIT workshop will be in Tucson, Arizona, 14 through 18 April 2008. It should be noted that the workshop committee attempts to keep the participants attendance cost low to encourage maximum participation. There are no conference fees and the meeting location sites are selected based on the available government low per diem rates. To save transportation cost, we have scheduled this year’s LPIT workshop the week prior to the Joint Aging Aircraft Conference, 21-24 April 2008, since it will be held within driving distance in Phoenix, Arizona. For more information on the Joint Aging Aircraft Conference, please go to their web site at http://www.agingaircraft2008.com. We anticipate the LPIT workshop in 2008 to be one of our best meetings with speakers will be presenting ideas on individual platform support. The following are some of the contributing organizations:

- The Department of Homeland Security
- The Defense Security Cooperation Agency
- NAVIPO
- The Foreign Procurement Group
- The International Customer User Group
- The Security Assistance Foreign Representatives
- The Foreign Liaison Officers
- FMS Partners

2007 LPIT Workshop Senior U.S. and FMS Leaders
Separate logistics “tracks” will also be part of the 2008 LPIT Workshop. These “tracks” will include:

- Support equipment
- RoR
- Supply support
- Tech data
- Transportation
- Training

The Voice of the FMS Partner session will again be a highlight of the LPIT Workshop. For additional information about the 2008 LPIT Workshop, please go the following web site: www.events.gdit.com/LPIT.2008.

About the Author

Mr. Ron Weinberger is Naval Air Systems Command’s Director of Logistics for International Programs, where he serves as the principle international logistics advisor within the NAVAIR’s International Program Office. Prior to his current assignment, he worked within the F/A-18 FMS Hornet Program Office for over seventeen years on various international programs. Prior to that, he worked with the F-14 Assistant Program Manager for Logistics supporting the USN’s Fleet Logistics Action Center. He is a graduate of the University of Southern Mississippi.
The Defense Contract Audit Agency

[Editor’s note: Recall that all U.S. government contracts established to support our international customers receive the same Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) services provided to Department of Defense (DoD) customers. The information presented below is courtesy of the DCAA web site at: http://www.dcaa.mil/.

History

Audits of military contracts can be traced back sixty years or more. Initially, the various branches of the military had their own contract audit function and associated instructions and accounting rulings. Uniformity was non-existent. Contractors and government personnel recognized the need for consistency in the areas of contract administration and audit.

The Navy and Army Air Corps made the first attempt to perform joint audits in 1939. By December 1942, the Navy, Army Air Corps, and Ordnance Department had established audit coordination committees for selected areas where plants were producing different items under contracts for more than one service.

On 18 June 1952, the three military services jointly issued a Contract Audit Manual (CAM). The Manual prescribed detailed policies and procedures for use in auditing procurement contracts. Because of differences between the procurement organizations and practices of the services, finalizing standard guidelines was difficult.

In May 1962, Secretary, Department of Defense, Robert S. McNamara instituted “Project 60” to examine the feasibility of centrally managing the field activities concerned with contract administration and audit. An outcome of this study was the decision to establish a single contract audit capability.

On 8 January 1965, the DCAA was formed. Mr. William B. Petty, formerly the Deputy Comptroller of the Air Force, was selected as the Director with Mr. Edward T. Cook, formerly Director of Contract Audit for the Navy, selected as the Deputy Director.

Today, the DCAA consists of approximately 4,000 people located at more than 300 field audit offices throughout the United States, Europe, and in the Pacific. The Agency provides standardized contract audit services for the DoD, as well as accounting and financial advisory services regarding contracts and subcontracts to all DoD Components responsible for procurement and contract administration. These services are provided in connection with negotiation, administration, and settlement of contracts and subcontracts. DCAA also provides contract audit services to some other government agencies.

The Defense Contract Audit Agency Organization Mission

Perform all necessary contract audits for DoD and provide accounting and financial advisory services regarding contracts and subcontracts to all DoD components responsible for procurement and contract administration. These services are to be provided in connection with the negotiation, administration, and settlement of contracts and subcontracts.

Provide contract audit services to other government agencies as appropriate. DCAA consists of six major organizational components: a Headquarters and five regions. The five regional offices manage more than 300 Field Audit Offices (FAO) and sub offices located throughout the United
States and overseas. An FAO is identified as either a branch office or a resident office. Sub offices are established by regional directors as extensions of FAOs when required to furnish contract audit service more economically. A sub office is dependent on its parent FAO for release of audit reports and other administrative support.

Headquarters is located at the Headquarters Complex, Fort Belvoir, Virginia. Principal elements of Headquarters are the Director, Deputy Director, Executive Officer, Special Assistant for Quality, General Counsel (Defense Legal Services), and the Assistant Directors for Operations, Policy and Plans, and Resources. Regional offices are located in the following cities and states:

- Irving, Texas
- Smyrna, Georgia
- Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
- Lowell, Massachusetts
- La Mirada, California

The regions direct and administer the accomplishment of the DCAA audit mission for assigned geographical areas. They also accomplish the following:

- Manage personnel and resources assigned to the regions
- Manage the contract audit program
- Direct the operation of FAOs within their region

Principal elements of regional offices are the following:

- Regional Director
- Deputy Regional Director
- Special Assistant to the Regional Director for Quality
- Regional Audit Managers
- Regional Special Programs Manager
- Regional Resources Manager.

A resident office is established at a contractor’s location when the amount of audit workload justifies the assignment of a permanent staff of auditors and support staff.

A branch office is established at a strategically situated location within the region, and is responsible for performing all contract audit service within the assigned geographical area, exclusive of contract audit service performed by a resident or liaison office within the area.

A DCAA liaison office is established at a DoD procurement or contract administration office to provide effective communication and coordination among procurement, contract administration, and contract audit elements.

**DCAA Products and Services**

DCAA provides a wide variety of products and services to contracting officers:

- Pre-award Contract Audit Services
• Price Proposals
• Preaward Surveys
• Forward Pricing Labor and Overhead Rates

• Postaward Contract Audit Services
• Incurred Costs/Annual Overhead Rates
• Truth in Negotiation Act Compliance
• CAS (Cost Accounting Standards) Compliance & Adequacy
• Claims
  • Financial Capability

• Contractor Internal Control System Audits
  • Accounting
  • Estimating
  • Electronic Data Processing (EDP)
  • Compensation
  • Billing
  • Budgeting
  • Material Management
  • Labor
  • Purchasing
  • Indirect and Other Direct Cost

In addition to performing formal audit activities, agency auditors provide negotiation assistance, including:

• Fact-finding and analysis of contractor information after audit
• Procurement liaison assistance

In fiscal year 2006, DCAA audited $121.1 billion of costs incurred on contracts and reviewed 9,015 forward pricing proposals amounting to $182.3 billion. Approximately $2.3 billion in net savings were reported as a result of the audit findings associated with these audits. When compared to the $448 million expended for the Agency’s operations, the return on taxpayers’ investment in DCAA was approximately $5.20 for each dollar invested.
Defense Intelligence Agency

[Editor’s note: While most personnel are aware that Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) manages the Defense Attaché system, the agency is becoming increasingly involved in international affairs as the U.S. looks toward regional coalition building and the war on terror. The information presented below is courtesy of the DIA web site at: http://www.dia.mil.]

The DIA was established October 1, 1961, and designated a combat support agency in 1986. DIA is a major producer and manager of foreign military intelligence for the Department of Defense and a principal member of the U.S. Intelligence Community. The Director of DIA is a three-star military officer who serves as the principal advisor on substantive intelligence matters to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. DIA has a workforce of about 11,000, and is staffed with highly skilled civilian and military personnel.

Agency headquarters are at the Pentagon, Arlington, Virginia; however, DIA personnel are located throughout the world. Major U.S. locations include:

- The Defense Intelligence Analysis Center at Bolling Air Force Base, Washington, D.C.
- The Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center at Fort Detrick, Frederick, Maryland
- The Missile and Space Intelligence Center at Redstone Arsenal, Huntsville, Alabama

DIA’s mission is to provide timely, objective, all-source military intelligence to policy makers, war fighters, and force planners to meet a variety of challenges across the spectrum of conflict. The information collected and analyzed by DIA’s intelligence professionals is disseminated to a wide range of customers including senior U.S. government national security and defense officials, members of Congress, Combatant Commanders, weapon systems planners and developers, and U.S. forces stationed around the world.

DIA employs extensive analytical expertise in a number of areas such as:

- Foreign military and paramilitary forces, capabilities, and intentions
- Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
- International terrorism
- International narcotics trafficking
- Information operations
- Defense-related foreign political, economic, industrial, geographic, medical and health issues

A major component of the Agency, the Defense Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Service, operates around the world to obtain critical pieces of the intelligence puzzle often not available from technical collection means. DIA also manages the Defense Attaché System, which has military attachés assigned to more than 135 embassies overseas. These attachés are an integral part of the U.S. diplomatic presence abroad. To support Department of Defense efforts in the global war on terrorism, DIA has established and operates the Joint Intelligence Task Force for Combating Terrorism (JITF-CT), which consolidates national-level all-source terrorism-related intelligence.
DIA serves as executive agent for the U.S. Intelligence Community’s Prisoner of War and Missing in Action Analytic Cell. This unit provides actionable, national-level intelligence support to locate missing, isolated, evading, or captured U.S. military and U.S. government personnel.

DIA directs and manages Department of Defense intelligence collection requirements for the various intelligence collection disciplines such as human intelligence, measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT), imagery intelligence (IMINT), and signals intelligence (SIGINT). DIA provides centralized management for all national and Department of Defense activities related to MASINT, which is technically derived information that measures, detects, tracks, and identifies unique characteristics of fixed and dynamic targets.

The National Defense Intelligence College (NDIC), a principal component of the Agency, is a fully accredited educational institution authorized by congress to award a Master of Science of Strategic Intelligence degree and a Bachelor of Science degree in intelligence. The College is attended by students from throughout the government to satisfy the growing need for trained intelligence professionals to help safeguard the nation’s interest.

Integration of highly skilled intelligence professionals with leading edge technology to discover information and create knowledge that provides warning, identifies opportunities, and delivers overwhelming advantage to our warfighters, defense planners, and defense and national security policy makers.
The Defense Reutilization and Marketing Service:
At a Glance

[The following information about the Defense Reutilization and Marketing Service (DRMS) is courtesy of the DRMS web site listed at: http://www.dla.mil/drms.]

Reutilization Means Big Savings

In fiscal 2006, $1.9 billion worth of property was reutilized. Every dollar’s worth of property reutilized is a tax dollar saved. The DRMS also supports the Humanitarian Assistance and Foreign Military Sales programs (FMS). Over the years, sales of DRMS excess property through the FMS program has risen from modest beginnings to a multi-million dollar program. A large portion of that growth can be attributed to the advent of modern, web based systems by which purchasers can have ready access to material available for purchase.

Originally established in 1972 to consolidate the different military services’ disposal operations, the Defense Property Disposal Service (DPDS) was renamed the DRMS in 1985. DRMS is part of the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), based on Fort Belvoir, Virginia.

Disposing of Excess Property

DRMS disposes of excess property received from the military services. The inventory changes daily and includes thousands of items: from air conditioners to vehicles, clothing to computers, and much more. Property is first offered for reutilization within the Department of Defense (DoD), transfer to other federal agencies, or donation to state and local governments and other qualified organizations. Selling DoD surplus property, DRMS manages the DoD surplus property sales program. Excess property that is not reutilized, transferred or donated may be sold to the public as surplus.

The DRMS National Sales Office has a commercial venture partnership with Government Liquidation to purchase and re-sell all non-demil-required usable property in the United States, Guam, Hawaii and Puerto Rico. Sales include high-value property, such as aircraft parts, machine tools, hardware, electronics, material handling equipment, and vehicles. DRMS overseas locations conduct zone sales for all non-demil required usable property. These sales are either held through sealed bid, auction, or retail, fixed price sales, aimed at customers interested in buying inexpensive items for personal use.

DRMS also offers a sales service for those DoD customers who have direct sales authority (such as under the Exchange Sale Program). For a modest percentage of the proceeds, DRMS will perform all merchandising, advertising and contracting functions, providing the DoD military service peace of mind that all laws and regulations are followed.

Our Web Site

DRMS displays property available for reutilization, transfer and donation on the Internet. The Web site offers detailed information, including the property’s condition and location. For sales information, sales schedules, and past bid sales results, go to the Government Liquidation web site: http://www.govliquidation.co/.

Keeping the Environment in Mind

DRMS manages the disposal of hazardous property for DoD activities, maximizing the use of each item and minimizing environmental risks and costs.
Special Programs

The Resource Recovery and Recycling Program conserve natural resources, reduce waste products and returns revenue to the military services. Through recycling, the Precious Metals Recovery Program significantly reduces the need for DoD to purchase metals such as gold, silver and platinum family metals through recycling of excess and surplus scrap containing precious metals.

Demilitarization

Certain property is demilitarized (i.e., rendered useless for its originally intended purpose). Surplus property with inherent military characteristics must undergo “demil.” Offensive and defensive weapons and associated material are demilitarized prior to sale or as a condition of sale.

Global Support for the U.S. Military

DRMS has a worldwide presence within DoD, with disposal specialists in fourteen foreign countries, two U.S. territories (Guam and Puerto Rico) and thirty-nine states. The total DRMS work force numbers approximately 1,400 people. Of those, approximately 332 work at its Battle Creek, Michigan, headquarters. DRMS also supports military contingency missions, wherever that takes us, be it Iraq, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Bosnia, Kosovo, Kyrgyzstan or Uzbekistan.

Customer Interaction Center

Customer service representatives are available to answer your questions 24 hours a day, seven days a week at phone numbers (877) 352-2255 from Canada; (269) 961-7197. You can also fax your questions, (269) 961-5305, or e-mail them, custservice@dlis.dla.mil.
“Where’s My Stuff?”
Examining the Challenges of Tracking Foreign Military Sales Material Moving Through the Defense Transportation System

By Joanne B. Hawkins
Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

“Where’s My Stuff?”

For centuries, operational commanders have demanded a response to that question from their logistics officers. Pinpointing an exact location of materiel shipments has only become possible in the last decade. Technological innovations have enabled commercial companies and transporters to identify carriers, containers, pallets, boxes and individual items in near real-time. The Defense Transportation System (DTS), however, lacks uniform shipment reporting and tracking methods. Advance notification of shipments does not always occur, and, for those shipments that DTS does track, there is no reliable reporting system to provide complete in-transit visibility to the foreign military sales customer. The international customers and the U.S. security assistance personnel in their countries are not much better off today in locating their DTS shipments than they were more than a decade ago. The good news is that an inter-service transportation working group is attempting to resolve many of the obstacles that impede foreign military sales shipments, and an enhanced freight tracking system is currently being tested.

The Defense Transportation System

The Defense Transportation System, managed by the U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), consists of three elements:

- The Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC) operates military ports in both the continental United States (CONUS) and overseas (OCONUS).
- The Air Mobility Command (AMC) transports materiel and personnel around the world through organic and commercial contracted air carriers.
- The Military Sealift Command (MSC) transports materiel around the world through organic and contracted commercial surface ships.

These organizations are responsible for the movement of about 560 tons of freight per day, and they service seventy-five percent of the world’s countries on a weekly basis. Actual foreign military sales (FMS) shipments, however, comprise only about six percent of USTRANSCOM’s annual business. The FMS shipments that move overseas through DTS are identified by delivery term codes (DTC) 7 or 9 on the letter of offer and acceptance (LOA). It is for these overseas shipments that DTS lacks reliable in-transit visibility. To complicate the picture further, the limited data that does exist is not available to the FMS customer directly, but rather must be pulled from various DoD data systems by the security assistance office (SAO) or other U.S. representative in country.

The DoD prefers not to be involved in the movement of FMS material, and encourages customers to be self-sufficient in arranging for transportation from the point of origin to the final destination. FMS customers are strongly encouraged to hire commercial freight forwarders to make these

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transportation arrangements for them. However, not all material can be moved through commercial channels and not all customers employ freight forwarders. The Defense Transportation System is the only alternative. The DTS is defined as any port or carrier, commercial or organic, which is under contract to the DoD.

Foreign military sales customers use the DTS for several reasons. Many countries lack the volume of shipments that make employing a commercial freight forwarder a cost-effective option. Other countries lack the financial resources to employ a commercial freight forwarder, since they must use national funds to do so.4 Most arms, ammunition and explosives (AA&E) are prohibited by both transportation and security regulations from moving through commercial freight forwarders or commercial ports.5 For this reason, countries use the DTS to move AA&E through a DoD-controlled port of embarkation to a port of discharge in their country or to a port of discharge in a nearby country, from which the customer can arrange onward transportation to the final destination. This arrangement is indicated by a delivery term code 9 on the LOA. Others use the DTS to move classified freight when their freight forwarder lacks the necessary security clearances. While many countries arrange to pick up their material at a CONUS port of embarkation using their own carriers, others lack these resources and expect delivery to their final destination. These “door-to-door” deliveries are indicated on the LOA by a DTC 7.

**Total Asset Visibility**

DoD’s goal is for total asset visibility throughout the supply chain, beginning at the manufacturer’s facility, through the distribution and transportation process, to receipt confirmation by the end-user.6 Automated identification technology is the key to tracking the shipment, and is accomplished through a multi-layer process that includes linear and two-dimensional bar coding and passive and active radio frequency identification devices (RFID). Identification devices are affixed to the product, its package, its transport unit, and the containers and carriers in which the boxes are moved, as shown in Figure 1.

Reliable identification of shipping unit contents is essential for reliable global in-transit visibility. DoD defines in-transit visibility as the near-real-time capability to track logistic resources and transportation assets while they are mobile and underway. In 2004, the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (AT&L) directed the use of active RFID technology on all consolidated shipments moving to, from, or between overseas locations via DoD-controlled ports. Radio frequency identification technology is a data input system that consists of a transponder, generally referred to as a tag; a tag reader, also known as an interrogator, that reads the tag using a radio signal; centralized data processing equipment; and a method of communication between the reader and the computer. The interrogator sends a signal to the tag, prompting the tag to respond. The battery-powered tag sends a signal to the interrogator with information about the container, pallet, or item to which it is attached. The information is forwarded to the central data processing equipment where it is stored and can be used to provide visibility over inventory items as they move throughout the supply chain. The DoD mandated 100 percent compliance of RFID on consolidated shipments by January 2007, but in June 2007 the Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported that during a six-month period between 2006-2007, thirty-five percent of containers moving into Kuwait and Iraq could not be identified.7 Some containers had no radio frequency tags while others had broken tags. Some tags had incorrect information and did not match the container contents.

4. Arms Export Control Act, Section 23.
The success of global in-transit visibility depends not only on being able to accurately identify each shipment unit and the carrier in which it is moving, but also on being able to report this information to the customer. USTRANSCOM operates the Global Transportation Network (GTN), an in-transit visibility system that collects and distributes transportation information to DoD customers. The GTN receives input from a myriad of military departments’ and agency-managed data systems, as well as unique reporting systems from participating contractors and commercial carriers. The reliability of the GTN data is dependent upon accurate input of data to the systems that feed GTN, and therein lies the problem. The GAO determined that many DoD ports lacked the information technology tools, or lacked trained personnel to report shipment receipts.

There are other reasons why these reporting systems do not provide a complete picture of materiel pickups or deliveries. Shipments made from commercial vendors and through commercial ports are not required to have RFID tags at all, although many in CONUS do. Not all commercial carriers under contract to the DoD report their deliveries to their destination. This is particularly true of foreign carriers who move material from an OCONUS port to the next destination. As a result, FMS customers or their US representatives may be able to see that their DTC 7 shipment arrived at an overseas POD, such as Ramstein Air Base, but have no idea where it went after that. When DoD contracts with a commercial carrier to move material from a depot or contractor facility to a CONUS

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military or commercial port, the carrier will have a record of the delivery to that port which may be accessible through the carrier’s web site. That delivery should be uploaded to a data system that feeds GTN. Routine, unclassified, non-hazardous FMS material shipments with DTC 7 and 9 often go through commercial ports rather than through a U.S. military port. The commercial port should report onward shipping information to a DoD system, but this process doesn’t seem to be consistent. The information trail often ends at the CONUS port and the FMS customer or SAO has no idea if onward movement has been made, where the stuff is or when it will arrive in country.

Another complication with in-transit visibility is the length of time the transportation information is available in GTN. The GTN purges data 120 days after the last record is posted. Commercial carriers, such as FEDEX, DHL and UPS delete delivery records from their web sites after 45 to 90 days, depending upon the carrier. An FMS customer who is unaware that an item has been shipped may not start questioning where the shipment is until the customer is billed for the item. The Defense Finance and Accounting Service sends billing statements to the customer only every 90 days. The record of the shipment’s last known location may be unavailable by the time the SAO or FMS case manager assists the customer in looking for it.

Arms, ammunition and explosives, most very hazardous items and many classified items are required to transit through a DoD-controlled port. The Defense Transportation Regulation (DTR) requires a Report of Shipment (REPSHIP) notification for such surface shipments from CONUS, and surface shipments from all overseas locations. The regulation requires DoD shippers to use an automated means to transmit this notification to the U.S. military representative in the receiving country before DTC 7 and 9 shipments arrive. A REPSHIP must be sent to the consignee no later than two hours after a shipment’s departure, and may be in the form of a message or a copy of the bill or lading. The notification is usually sent to the Type Address Code (TAC) 4 address in the Military Assistance Program Address Directory (MAPAD). If the TAC 4 address in the MAPAD is not that of the SAO, the SAO must make arrangements directly with the SDDC documentation division at Fort Eustis, Virginia, to be on distribution for these notifications, otherwise neither the SAO, nor the customer, will know that the classified, hazardous or AA&E shipment is coming. Sensitive and hazardous shipments have arrived in OCONUS DoD ports without available storage facilities and no instructions for making pickup arrangements.

Shipment of classified freight requires a written, approved transportation plan that details the ports and carriers to be used for movement, and identifies by name the designated government representatives authorized to transfer and accept the classified material for the U.S. and receiving government. The transportation plan is required for shipments made through the DTS system as well as through commercial ports and carriers. The plan does not accompany each shipment, and is usually not provided to the SAO. Security regulations require advanced notification to the customer on classified shipments. Notices of Availability (NOA), however, are not sent when the classified shipment is moved through DoD ports and carriers because the DTR does not require NOAs for DTC 7 or 9 shipments. As a result, SAOs and FMS customers have been unprepared to receive classified shipments that arrived in country without proper coordination.

Reports of shipment are not required for routine, non-hazardous surface shipments, and there is no requirement in the DTR to provide advance shipment notification to the customer or SAO for air ship-

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11. When the FMS customer employs a freight forwarder, the company must have a facility clearance from the Defense Security Services in order to handle classified freight.
ments of any type of cargo. As a result, FMS shipments on DTC 9 frequently show up at commercial and DoD ports without any coordination with the SAO or customer to arrange for pickup. Shipments on DTC 7 may show up at the final destination when the customer is not prepared to receive them.

The SDDC is responsible for military port operations, to include materiel containerization and shipment documentation. However, the Defense Logistics Agency is responsible for individual supply item documentation and consolidation at the distribution depot. Customers are electronically notified of initial item shipment through the supply system, which provides the customer with a transportation control number (TCN) against which the item is shipped. Tracking and visibility become an issue because TCNs change as cargo moves between the vendor, a consolidation point and the final destination. Depending on the size and priority of the shipment, many items are consolidated into a larger shipping container for onward movement. Consolidation means repacking multiple supply units and individual requisitions into a single multi-pack, tri-wall container or pallet. The consolidated shipment unit is tracked by a single transportation control number, which should cross-reference to each individual supply requisition inside. If each supply item’s information is entered accurately into a tracking system, the customer should be able to identify the location of the individual item of supply by querying the requisition document number.

For security assistance customers, shipments should be consolidated based on the purchaser’s service and in-country destination (the Mark For code). The consolidated shipment unit must also have on the outside of the container documentation of each item packed inside to permit customs clearance at both ends. However, FMS shipments have occasionally been frustrated by mixing customer countries and destinations in the same consolidated shipment unit, or missing documentation. Thus, FMS shipments bound for one country end up in another, freight intended for a customer’s Navy ends up at an Army installation, and freight arriving without paperwork cannot clear customs.

**Resources for Finding Shipments**

In an effort to assist FMS customers and SAOs, DISAM conducted a study of shipment tracking resources and procedures. The informal study was based on complaints DISAM received from customers and SAOs concerning lack of notification of DTC 9 and 7 shipments. The countries that reported problems included Colombia, Croatia, Djibouti, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lithuania, Netherlands, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, Senegal, Sweden, and the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I). DISAM identified 112 individual shipments made to many of these countries between May 2006 and August 2007 with DTCs of 7 or 9, and attempted to track their movement.

DISAM determined that there are no in-transit visibility data systems accessible to the FMS customer. The Global Transportation Network and the systems that feed it are blocked to non-DoD users. Most require passwords and/or CAC certificates. Many security assistance offices may be able to access these systems, but only if they use a .mil network. The SAOs who work off Department of State networks are also unable to access these systems.

Initial shipment notification to the customer may not occur if the FMS customer is not receiving electronic status updates via the Defense Automatic Addressing System Center’s (DAASC) International Logistics Communications System (ILCS). FMS customers who subscribe to ILCS receive an electronic shipping notification, usually identified by an AS1 or AS2 document, and a TCN. The customer should then be able to track the shipment by either the document number or the TCN. If the total supply requisition has been broken down into more than one shipment, each shipment will have a different TCN. A query by document number should reveal all the applicable TCNs for that requisition. If only one shipment is of concern, a query by TCN should provide status on that shipment.

15. A total of 49 supply requisitions resulted in multiple shipments having separate transportation control numbers.
particular shipment unit. FMS customers who do not have an electronic interface with DAASC do not get this shipment notification from the supply system. Their only source of shipment information is the Security Cooperation Information Portal (SCIP).

The Security Cooperation Information Portal (SCIP), developed and managed by the DSCA, is a window into the military departments’ logistics management systems for international programs. The latest supply status resident in these legacy systems is visible to the user. FMS customers who use SCIP can view a list of active requisitions against their various LOAs, and if the item has shipped, the TCN will be indicated, as shown in Figure 2.16 This is not true, however, for active requisitions against U.S. Air Force LOAs, because the USAF’s SAMIS system does not reflect shipping details. Consequently, a query of active Air Force requisitions in SCIP provides no TCNs even if the item has shipped. The SCIP doesn’t have the capability to “drill down” through the TCN to determine shipment status. To accomplish this, the user must query yet another data system. For Air Force cases, the user must further query each individual active requisition to determine if a BA status (pending shipment status) is recorded. If so, the customer could potentially query another data system by document number to determine shipment status. Customers who use SCIP for determining the TCN should be aware that SCIP truncates the TCN in the on-screen display, generally dropping the first character. Since the TCN usually consists of the FMS document number followed by two additional characters representing shipping increments, users should query by document number, not by the TCN shown in SCIP, to ensure accurate input. Such a query will provide the user with all available shipment status against that document number.

Once it was determined that an item had shipped, the next step was finding out where it went. One useful system, managed by the Defense Logistics Agency, is the Distribution Standard System (DSS) requisition tracking system. The site provides supply transaction history of shipments made through DLA, not in-transit visibility. This is the only system that is available to both DoD and FMS customers without a login, password or CAC certificate. The web site is http://wegal.ogden.disa.mil/mrostatus. A document number query will provide a list of applicable TCNs, and display the date, time, and name of the carrier to whom it was released from the supply depot. It also includes the carrier’s tracking number. The carrier’s tracking number may be hot-linked to the carrier’s web site, which then provides delivery information to the next destination.

When the shipment leaves the supply depot, its departure is reported via the DAASC and should be reflected in an in-transit visibility reporting system. The same is true when a shipment comes from a contractor facility. The Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) arranges for DTS transportation from the vendor, and this

16. Country designators have been modified to protect the identity of the FMS customer.
movement should be captured in an in-transit visibility system. Of all the requisitions examined in DSS, about 62 percent did not provide status to indicate if or when the item had been delivered to the next destination by the carrier. In some cases, there was no link to the carrier’s tracking system, and in others, the carrier had already deleted the record of delivery. Two additional tracking systems, The Global Transportation Network (GTN) and Tracker, were queried, and in both cases, the record of shipment ended with the initial pickup of the shipment at the depot or vendor’s facility.

The next destination is typically either a CONUS DoD-controlled port or a commercial port. At this point, the shipment may be further consolidated and containerized for overseas movement by another carrier. A new TCN is usually created and an active RFID tag should be applied to this container identifying the contents. The information about the contents, the carrier, the origin and the destination should be available in an in-transit visibility reporting system. USTRANSCOM’s comprehensive Global Transportation Network, https://www.gtn.transcom.mil/index.jsp, is only accessible from a .mil network, and requires advanced registration with USTRANSCOM. When the shipment data is current, that is, within 120 days, some delivery information may be available to the SAO. Queries for FMS materiel in GTN are best made by document number or TCN, without date or location constraints, requesting last known status. This query provides the widest output of available information. All 112 shipments were queried in GTN. The GTN returned only twelve records, but with the same information as that reported by Tracker.
Tracker is a web-based system managed by the Air Force Materiel Command. Tracker, at https://tracker.wpafb.af.mil/, can only be accessed with a CAC card from a .mil site, but does not require a user account. Tracker retains data for ten years. An FMS case manager or SAO can query Tracker by requisition document number, TCN, commercial tracking number or bill of lading number.

Tracker intercepts copies of transactions that are transmitted between computer systems used to acquire, store, repair and move assets for the U.S. Air Force. Additionally, Tracker pulls useful data from other data warehouses, so the system is useful for locating FMS shipments initiated by the Army, Navy or DLA. Tracker is not one of the systems that feed GTN.

There were 110 shipments with a record in Tracker, but there was a wide range of data available within those records. Sixty-seven shipments were released by the supply depot or contractor to a carrier, with no subsequent delivery information. Twenty-eight shipments were reported as having been delivered by the carrier to a CONUS port, but showed no onward transportation information. Four shipments with delivery term codes of 7 had a record of arrival at the OCONUS port of debarkation, but no information of onward movement from the overseas port to the final destination. Of the 112 FMS shipments initially tracked in this study, only eleven could be tracked to their final destination in an in-transit visibility system.

The research concluded that the FMS customer and the SAO have two difficult issues to wrestle with:

- First, there is no reliable notification system of shipments arriving either at the final destination or to an overseas port from which the customer must arrange onward transportation.
- Second, once the supply system provides initial shipment notification, total asset visibility data is generally incomplete to permit the customer or the SAO to determine where the shipment might be in transit.\(^\text{17}\)

Of the two tracking systems available to the SAO, only Tracker retains data longer than four months after the last recorded transaction against a particular document number.

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17. GTN permits a query format to be saved for repeated use. A query of multiple document numbers can be submitted on-line for an overnight run, with output to an e-mail account. Tracker users can submit a list of document numbers to the Tracker program office at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio and receive an e-mail status report. Contact the Tracker PMO at (937) 257-6883 for customized queries.
The Inter-service Transportation Working Group

An Inter-service Transportation Working Group (ISTWG) has been meeting quarterly for nearly three years to address transportation issues. The group members include the transportation coordinators from the three military departments’ International Logistics Control Offices (the U.S. Army Security Assistance Command), the Navy Inventory Control Point-OF, the Air Force Security Assistance Center), DSCA, and representatives from various ports under the control of USTRANSCOM.

The ISTWG has been successful in resolving many problems with FMS shipments clearing U.S. Customs, and is now focusing on the DTS shipment notification process. The ISTWG has proposed several changes to how FMS material will be shipped and notified in the future, and the group has identified the numerous DoD and service publications that must be updated to reflect the process changes. Changes to notification procedures at U.S. military ports will be implemented first. The ISTWG proposes that no routine FMS cargo should be shipped via a DTS air terminal. No classified and sensitive cargo will be released to an OCONUS port until the port acknowledges that coordination has been made to receive the material, and onward transportation arrangements have been coordinated as necessary. The ISTWG, however, has no influence over the in-transit visibility issue, and one can only assume that as DoD improves the ITV reporting procedures for its own shipments that the trickle-down effect will be an improvement to tracking FMS shipments as well.

The Enhanced Freight Tracking System

In 2003, the GAO identified the lack of movement and receipt confirmation as a major flaw in the FMS process. Without adequate in-transit visibility, the only way for the DoD to know that the FMS customer has actually received a shipment of materiel, is for the FMS customer or SAO to send a report back to the FMS case manager. Currently several SAOs are doing exactly that, sending periodic spreadsheets of closed document numbers back to the implementing agency to close the loop on shipments. This manual effort should become unnecessary as ITV improves.

In the future, tracking FMS shipments will be accomplished through the Enhanced Freight Tracking System (EFTS), now being tested in a pilot program. The system, which will be accessible to FMS customers and SAOs through the SCIP, intends to pull and store shipment data daily from GTN so that it is accessible to SCIP users even after USTRANSCOM purges it from the GTN database. Additionally, participating freight forwarders will report receipts of FMS material through a data transfer to the EFTS. When the FMS customer employs a freight forwarder, the current DoD tracking process ends upon delivery of the shipment to the freight forwarder. It becomes the freight forwarder’s responsibility to arrange onward transportation. There is no requirement for the freight forwarder to report onward movement back to the DoD, nor is there any requirement for the customer to report receipt at final destination. International customers understand that a freight tracking program would reduce missing shipment claims. With EFTS, freight forwarders would report receipts of material received from the DoD supply centers and contractors, as well as material returns coming from the FMS customer, and report onward movement. In the future, an application should be available for customers and/or SAOs to report deliveries in country.

The EFTS is now being tested by Germany, Israel, the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Finland and Egypt. Full production of EFTS is expected to start in early 2008. Freight forwarder participation isn’t mandatory, and each has a contract with their associated country, so it takes some political coordination to get them involved. However, as more countries recognize the benefits of freight

tracking, more freight forwarders are expected to participate. For the customers who do not employ a freight forwarder, or for those shipments that must go via DTS, accessibility to GTN data via SCIP will provide FMS customers and SAOs with a better picture of material shipments than they have access to today.

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- John Rhodes – AFMC Tracker
- Major Ted Davis – DISAM

About the Author

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Security Assistance: Train to Obtain

By
Petty Officer First Class David Votroubek, USN
Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan Public Affairs Officer Kabul, Afghanistan

The representatives from the Afghan National Army and National police waited in the small room for class to begin. They’d literally come to learn something early. For the 46 students waiting to learn about defense acquisition, it was information that will someday help keep Afghanistan free.

“We are teaching them to defend themselves,” said one of the instructors, Lieutenant Colonel Michael Ericksen, USAF.

Ericksen, and two other instructors from the Defense Institute for Security Assistance Management, came to Kabul to teach the International Purchaser Orientation Course from June 25 to, 2007 29. In the United States the course takes eight instructors two weeks to teach, but DISAM spent six months tailoring it to fit Afghanistan’s needs.

“Afghanistan is of particular interest to us, their situation is unique,” DISAM instructor James Taphorn told the class.

The course is helpful to purchasing agents in recipient countries like Afghanistan, because the U.S. government is a very complex process. Ironically, it is also the most requested source.

DISAM teaches the regulations for security assistance and how to acquire the items. According to the syllabus, the course is designed to be an overview of the programs, without detailed financial, logistics, or training management information. DISAM instructor Lieutenant Colonel Ericksen, who was a logistics officer for fourteen years, stressed that the U.S. government does not sell things. The defense articles are not put in a catalog, have a salesman or get offered for sale. Foreign governments must first request the assistance from the Department of State, not the Department of Defense. The embassy in that country is consulted and each request is evaluated carefully. If the request is approved, contracts will be signed. The end use will also be monitored. This assistance often takes the form of defense articles such as weapons, but can also come in the form of training. In fact, the U.S. government provides training of some kind in 134 countries.

Currently, all defense acquisitions from the United States are being handled by the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan CJ-4 office, but eventually the ANA and ANP will do it for themselves. The old equipment being used today will someday need replacement and these students will probably be involved.
Afghanistan—students from the Afghan National Army listen to a DISAM instructor explain the mission of DISAM on the first day of class. The International Purchaser Orientation Course was held in Kabul to prepare the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police to acquire defense articles for the defense of Afghanistan.
We intend on using graduates from this class to stand-up an ad-hoc Security Assistance Office for the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Interior,” said Master Sgt. John Smits of CJ-4. This would be the first for Afghanistan.

Brigadier General Fatah, the current deputy for the acquisition agency, is counting on it. “It is good to train the new generations and retire people like me,” he said. “It is good to train them.”

About the Author

Petty Officer First Class David Votroubek, USN, is a military Journalist with CSTC-A in Kabul, Afghanistan.
Combined Exercises:  
A Security Cooperation Tool  

By  
Lieutenant Colonel Mario Matos  
Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

When we think of security cooperation (SC) many of the things that come to mind are humanitarian assistance, demining operations, counternarcotics, counterterrorism, among a growing number of programs. Another key component is combined exercises, whether joint or multinational. Each of the combatant commands (COCOMs) develop Theater Security Cooperation Strategies that may include exercises based on their areas of operations and emphasis. This article will focus on the United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), and a joint exercise which was recently completed.

Admiral Stavridis’, the SOUTHCOM commander, plans for the region include a strong International Partnership Program. One of the elements of this partnership is an exercise that supports this program called “Iguana Voladora.” (IV). IV is a multinational parachute jump held once a year, sponsored by SOUTHCOM, operated and hosted under the control of Joint Task Force-Bravo, (JTF-B) located at Soto Cano Air Base, Honduras.

This combined exercise is a multinational airborne operation designed to bring representatives from the nations within North America, Central America, and South America together in a neutral setting in order to stimulate operations between these nations and better effect “progress through unity”, which is the the JTF-B’s motto.

These yearly airborne operations, began in August of 1997, when only three partners participated: Guatemala, Honduras, and the United States. In April 1998, the total participating nations were five and by June 1999 there were six participating nations. Unfortunately, in March of 2000 only four nations participated and no multinational exercise was hosted in 2001. In April 2002, JTF-B
re-instituted the multinational jump exercise with six participants, and named the operation Iguana Voladora or translated in to English “The Flying Iguana”. The name has remained since. The Iguana Voladora Air Base operations have taken place every year since with the following countries participation in 2003.

El Salvador
Guatemala
Honduras
Mexico
The United States

In 2004 the following countries participated:

Bolivia
Ecuador
El Salvador
Guatemala
Honduras
Mexico
Nicaragua
The United States

Most impressive was the total participating countries for this year’s multinational jump conducted 30 April through 4 May 2007. A grand total of fourteen nations were represented:

El Salvador
Belize
Bolivia
Costa Rica
Ecuador
Guatemala
Honduras
Mexico
Nicaragua
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Uruguay
The United States

The Military Group Commander for Nicaragua was not only present during this event, but also jumped with the Nicaraguan paratroopers. Recognizing that not all military group commanders can attend and also jump, this level of participation is particularly relevant from both a partnership and a leadership perspective.

This year, the combined exercise consisted of various activities starting with the arrival of the delegates, followed by an air mission brief and ice breaker. The second day consisted of demonstrations, a group photo, and the initial manifest. The third day, after breakfast, jumpers departed on the first lifts or were bused to Tamara Drop Zone. The drop zone is located at the Honduran Army Airborne School, 2do Batallón Infantería Aero Transporte (2nd Infantry Airborne Battalion Transported (IABT)). Upon completion of all air operations, the 2nd IABT hosted a reception at their Officer’s Club. On the fourth day, the JTF-B commander planned an ABN run or walk along with other organized sporting activities. The fifth and final day was set for departures.

One cannot help but enjoy the transition from a group of individual paratroopers looking at each other as strangers on the first day, to the incredible camaraderie generated by the time they are getting ready to depart for their home stations. This is a community that refers to each other an “Hermanos
de Ceda” or Brothers of Silk. We anticipate exactly this outcome during any type of security cooperation event. These friendships will go beyond Tamara Drop Zone and into the future may play a major role in diffusing a potential conflict, or building more solid friendships.

The Iguana Voladora gathering allows SOUTHCOM to maintain partnerships within the area of emphasis. These types of combined exercises pay high-dividend for the COCOM, but not without a lot of planning by unsung heroes behind the scenes. The funding process, contacting of military groups to search for participants, vetting process by military groups, coordination with SOUTHCOM’s J-8 for funding (Developing Countries Combined Exercises Program Funds), and logistics plans are necessary to ensure the operations are safely and successfully executed.

The number of participants is determined by funds allotted and air transportation cost based on the Joint Federal Travel Regulation (JFTR) and the Defense Travel System (DTS). The military groups can consider using non-U.S. carriers in order to minimize cost since there is no requirement to transport non-U.S. nationals on U.S. air carriers.

The day prior to airborne operations Lieutenant Silva, ARFOR Commander, provided a welcome brief to all participants outlining the week’s events and rules of engagement during their stay at JTF-Bravo. Lieutenant Colonel Caceres, 2do BIAT Commander, gave a few welcoming comments. The rest of the day’s events focus was on training and familiarization with U.S. paratrooper Sustained Airborne Training and actions in the aircraft (Chinook, CH-47). After training concluded, the JTF-B public affairs office took group photos which were later framed and presented to each delegation during the airborne banquet.

Two CH-47 helicopters were designated to support the operation. Approximately half of the participants departed on the helicopters and the rest were bused to Tamara, the Honduran drop zone. Upon completion of airborne operations, Lieutenant Colonel Caceres hosted a reception at the Honduran Officer’s Club, located on a hill top with a beautiful view overlooking Tamara drop zone. Part of the activities included the ceremonial release of a caged iguana by each delegation. Colonel Hughes, JTF-B Commander, kept his iguana for display at the JTF-B headquarters sanctuary, where several iguanas from previous years are currently on display. This tradition has become a Honduran custom since the Iguana Voladora in 2004.

Iguana Voladora 2008 is currently scheduled for 28 April through 2 May 2008 with the actual jump on 20 April 2008. ARFOR will begin mailing invitations around December 2007. With this bit of information, military groups should start the vetting process for selected participants in order to minimize issues and generate a pool of personnel to choose from based on the availability of funds.

About the Author

Lieutenant Colonel Mario D. Matos, U.S. Army, is the Deputy Director of Management Studies and Western-Hemisphere Seminar director at the Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM). He served two consecutive tours at JTF-Bravo, 2000-2002, as the S4 and XO of Army Forces and participated during IV 2002 and 2007.
Masters Program Key to Tomorrow’s Mission

By

C. E. Taylor

Defense Security Cooperation Agency

When the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) set out to increase educational opportunities for the Department of Defense (DoD) international affairs community, it partnered with Boston’s Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy of Tufts University for a unique initiative. The Global Masters of Arts Program (GMAP) II, a 12-month graduate program, combines three two-week residency sessions with state-of-the-art internet-based courses of study.

The ink was barely dry on the Memorandum of Understanding between DSCA and Tufts University before students began lining up for the accelerated graduate program. Since its inception, in September 2001, more than 70 DoD security cooperation professionals have gone through the school.

The Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM) coordinated the funding and activities of the departments and agencies wishing to participate in the program and works in close partnership with Tufts University.

The initial thought was to have a quality international affairs graduate program that would further the careers of our civilian security cooperation workforce, explained DISAM Commandant Dr. Ron Reynolds.

He said the mission was given to DISAM because it serves as the education center for the security cooperation community. DSCA-sponsored students are drawn from foreign military sales funded positions. There are thirty-five students per class and DoD currently fills twelve of those slots. As one class closes, another is formed. Reynolds, who is dedicated to strengthening the academic and intellectual foundation of the security cooperation community, begins canvassing DoD, seeking out civilians who hunger to expand their knowledge of international relations and global affairs. He admits there is enormous satisfaction in watching students successfully maneuver through the program.

This program is no cake walk, Reynolds added. The courses are designed to prepare students to face the challenges associated with international relations. We want students to come away from the program with renewed energy and ideas that contribute to both their future and the future of their organization.
He said supervisors should understand that graduating from the program can boost an employee’s career, but this initiative is designed to benefit the organization. According to Reynolds, there have been a number of Navy military personnel selected for the foreign area officer program based on graduating from GMAP II. Nichole Petras, DSCA operations directorate, graduated from the program in April 2007. She said at times it was a challenge balancing the stress of school, work, and home life, but she managed to meet all of the requirements within the course time line.

“I have learned a lot from studying international politics, security studies, and will certainly be able to apply what I have learned to my position in the security cooperation community,” she explained. “I was able to incorporate my experience at DSCA into my Masters Thesis, ‘Reassessing Military Aid to Egypt’ in which I analyze the future of Foreign Military Financing (FMF) to Egypt and the possible repercussions of changing the thirty-year precedent set by the United States government.” Petras said the course requires a lot of teamwork, which can also promote a few challenges. “In the end we became very close,” she added. “As a result we have established a tight network of friends from as far away as Latvia, Nigeria, Indonesia, France and Taiwan.” “The diversity of the participation is critical to the exchange of information and ideas,” said Reynolds. “We want to bring together folks with various security cooperation expertise and perspectives.”

According to Petras, completing the GMAP graduate program helped her meet the goal of becoming a Country Program Manager at DSCA. “The GMAP is an incredible program and I recommend that others apply. However, applicants should understand that the program is quite demanding,” she said.

Reynolds said applications for the program are accepted between April and December. He said the military departments have their selection process, but he reviews every DSCA sponsored nominee prior to forwarding the application package to the Fletcher School. The class is made up of U.S. and international students. The hope is that each country represented will offer unique and valuable perspectives that excite and inspire one another.

There is no Graduate Admissions Test requirement, but the program does require a language proficiency exam. Reynolds said students have one year beyond the academic year of active participation to complete language requirements without incurring additional personal expense, according to Petras the language requirement can prove challenging for some students. Petras stated the following:

I recommend students begin preparing and studying for the language portion of the program prior to the start of the GMAP to avoid doing it concurrently with the coursework or after graduation.

The program is in its fourth year, and has just completed recruiting for year five. Reynolds suggests supervisors actively pursue star candidates to participate in the program, realizing there is a commitment by the individual and their organization. Reynolds noted the GMAP II is a short term, but healthy investment that will reap long-term benefits for the individual and the future of the security cooperation community.
The Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management
Says Goodbye to Mr. Roger Reynolds

By
Aaron M. Prince
Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

September 10, 2007 Mr. Roger Reynolds taught his last class at the Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM) as one of its most esteemed and highly respected Adjunct Faculty Members.

Since December 1997, Mr. Reynolds has been teaching DISAM students that “other people’s actions and views may not be wrong, they may just be different” and the perspectives people take are very definitely influenced by their geographic location. Mr. Reynolds was one of the Inter-Cultural Communications instructors at DISAM.

Drawing on his background as a former Executive Director for the Air Force Security Assistance Center (AFSAC) at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base along with extensive travels to foreign countries in support of security assistance missions, Mr. Reynolds shared his wealth of knowledge and wisdom gained about cultural differences with over 3,300 students of DISAM, consisting of United States Department of Defense employees, U.S. military members, foreign military members, members of foreign ministries of defense as well as foreign service nationals.

DISAM, realizing the importance of exposing members of the security cooperation community and their customers to the concept of cultural differences, offers a block of Inter-Cultural Communications instruction in each of the Security Assistance Management CONUS (SAM-C), Security Assistance Management International Purchaser (SAM-I) and the Security Assistance Management Training Officer/Training Management (SAM-TO/TM) courses taught at DISAM. Mr. Reynolds has been an integral part of this training and to the enormous success of these courses, consistently receiving high compliments and praise from his students.

Retired from AFSAC, recently retired Adjunct Professor at the University of Dayton, and now retired from DISAM, Mr. Reynolds plans on enjoying a less hectic life with family and friends while staying busy with various volunteer projects in his hometown of Yellow Springs, Ohio.

DISAM, although sad to see Mr. Reynolds leave the podium, wishes him the very best for his future and on behalf of all the students would like to say a well deserved thank-you for your time, the knowledge you have conveyed, and for your humor in the classroom keeping student’s attention while at the same time getting the point across. Your presence at DISAM has been instrumental in furthering the concepts of security cooperation and better understanding different points of view.
About the Author

Mr. Aaron M. Prince is an assistant professor at the Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM). He has been at DISAM since February 2001 and a civilian employee of the U.S. Department of Defense since 1990. He has a Bachelor of Science Degree in Marketing from Miami University in Oxford, Ohio.

Photograph

The photograph displayed in this article was provided by Mr. Aaron Prince.
April 2007 Defense Security Cooperation Agency Humanitarian Assistance Conference

By

C. E. Taylor
Defense Security Cooperation Agency

More than 100 experts gathered in Washington for the 2007 Defense Security Cooperation Agency’s (DSCA) Humanitarian Assistance (HA) Conference. The event drew representatives from across the spectrum, covering everything from budget, policy and training to inter-agency coordination and technology.

Lieutenant General Jeff Kohler, [then] DSCA director, opened the event by applauding the collaborative efforts of the humanitarian assistance community by stating the following:

I want to express my thanks and admiration for your significant contributions to our government’s vision of shaping the military environment, seeking to avert humanitarian crises, promoting democratic development, enabling countries to recover from conflict, and, at the same time, giving relief to people and communities in need. These programs support regional cooperation strategies by providing access to selected countries and fostering goodwill for our military forces and our government.

DSCA assumed responsibility for program management, implementation execution responsibility for the Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDACA) appropriation about nine years ago.

Over the last few years the humanitarian assistance community has been extremely busy. Most of OHDACA’s appropriation over the last two years was used to support both the 2004 tsunami disaster relief mission in the Indian Ocean and the people of Pakistan’s 2005 earthquake recovery efforts. Attendees heard from all of the supporting elements for DoD HA programs, including the Office of Management and Budget, Department of State, United States Agency for International Development (USAID), various policy offices from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Staff, DSCA’s Humanitarian De-mining Training Center representatives, and the Special Operations Command. While the briefings and views reflected a depth of experience and expertise, this conference was also about feedback.

“The DoD HA program is a DoD tool for supporting national security,” said Diane Halvorsen, director of humanitarian assistance and mine action, DSCA. “Our goal for this conference was to rationalize the different methodologies employed by each Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) to carry out its HA activities, share lessons learned, and provide the guidance needed for implementing these programs as efficiently and effectively as possible across all commands,” she said. DSCA’s humanitarian assistance staff consists of thirteen people. Each individual is strategically connected to the web of humanitarian professionals across the globe. “We have a group of program managers who constantly communicate throughout the humanitarian assistance community,” Halvorsen added. “Events like these are designed to improve upon that level of communication.”

Like chain-linked fence, Halvorsen’s team serves as the connectors between the war fighters, the supplies or suppliers, U.S. federal agencies and the rest of the world. Unique DoD guidance supports a level of humanitarian engagement that paints a smile on a hungry child’s face, rebuilds a community stricken by natural disaster or offers medicine to those attacked by crippling diseases. “This event gave us an opportunity to bring representatives from the combatant commands together to explore the different ways humanitarian assistance operations are managed in the field,” Halvorsen explained.
“These gatherings help DSCA develop and cement relationships that will certainly improve future humanitarian business practices.”