Irregular Warfare (IW)

Joint Operating Concept (JOC)

Version 1.0

11 September 2007
This concept outlines the Department of Defense contribution to a holistic US Government and partner nation approach to irregular warfare. This concept challenges all agencies of the US Government to synchronize and integrate their activities, and commit to cross-agency training, cooperation and resourcing in order to wage irregular warfare against state and non-state adversaries.

As the Department of Defense lead for the Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept (JOC), US Special Operations Command co-authored this concept with the US Marine Corps (Marine Corps Combat Development Command) and developed it jointly with the Joint Staff, Services, Combatant Commands, and Agencies through the use of joint and Service operational lessons learned, joint wargames, seminars, workshops and other concept development venues. Throughout, this process was guided by direct input from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

US Special Operations Command and the Marine Corps will continue to use experimentation and lessons learned to further refine this concept.

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APPROVED

BRYAN D. BROWN
General, United States Army
Commander Special Operations Command

APPROVED

PETER PACE
General, United States Marine Corps
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

APPROVED

ROBERT M. GATES
Secretary of Defense
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Irregular warfare (IW) is defined as a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. IW favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will. It is inherently a protracted struggle that will test the resolve of our Nation and our strategic partners.

Our adversaries will pursue IW strategies, employing a hybrid of irregular, disruptive, traditional, and catastrophic capabilities to undermine and erode the influence and will of the United States and our strategic partners. Meeting these challenges and combating this approach will require the concerted efforts of all available instruments of US national power.

Influencing foreign governments and populations is a complex and inherently political activity. This Joint Operating Concept (JOC) describes the military role in protracted IW campaigns; however, these campaigns will fail if waged by military means alone. The nature of IW requires the US Government (USG) to achieve the level of unified action necessary to integrate all available instruments of national power to address irregular threats. The USG will have to develop “Whole of Government” approaches to waging IW at the political, strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Other government agencies must build their capacity to operate in unstable or hostile environments.

Irregular warfare is about people, not platforms. IW depends not just on our military prowess, but also our understanding of such social dynamics as tribal politics, social networks, religious influences, and cultural mores. People, not platforms and advanced technology, will be the key to IW success. The joint force will need patient, persistent, and culturally savvy people to build the local relationships and partnerships essential to executing IW.

Waging protracted irregular warfare depends on building global capability and capacity. IW will not be won by the United States alone, but rather through the combined efforts of our partners. This will require the joint force to establish long-term sustained presence in numerous countries to build the necessary partner capability and capacity to extend US operational reach, multiply forces available, and increase options for defeating our adversaries.

This JOC describes how future joint force commanders will accomplish strategic objectives through the conduct of protracted IW on a global or regional scale. It identifies capabilities and capacities required to successfully prosecute IW. Many of the ideas advocated in this JOC are drawn from best practices of current conflicts and history. A synopsis of the logic and key elements of the IW JOC are depicted in the following figure:
Irregular Warfare JOC Logic

**IRREGULAR WARFARE DEFINITION**
A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. IW favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities, in order to erode an adversary's power, influence, and will.

**Operational Environments**
- Within Friendly States
- Within Hostile States
- Within non-belligerent states

**Key Elements**
- Indirect approaches
- Protracted
- Global Scale
- Focus on Will of the People
- Unified Action

**Supporting Ideas**
- Persistent Presence
- Interpersonal Relationships
- OPS/INTEL fusion at tactical levels
- Expanded Role of the GPF
- Alternative Command and Control (C2) for IW

**Desired End State**
A Joint Force with enhanced capability for IW and a balanced approach to warfighting that allows it to be as compelling in IW as it is in conventional warfare.

**Solution-Central Idea:**
The Joint Force will conduct IW operations against state and non-state adversaries in protracted regional and global campaigns designed to subvert, coerce, attrite, and exhaust an adversary rather than defeat him through direct conventional military confrontation.

**Implications**
- Enhanced IA capabilities and capacities
- Building “Rugged-ized” IA Capability
- Interagency framework
- Building IW coalitions
- Shifting force requirements
- Expanded global presence to support IW
- Expanded operational environments
- Building DOD civil-govt capability
- Manning the Joint Force
- Training the Joint Force
- Leadership development
- Stress on personnel
- Impact on DOD Definitions

**The Joint Force Problem.** How to employ conventional and non-conventional military capabilities in support of integrated US Government and partner IW efforts to:
- Conduct protracted military campaigns to defeat adversary states through indirect methods and means
- Conduct protracted military campaigns on a global scale to defeat non-state irregular threats
- As a supported effort, defeat IW threats independently of a conventional operation
- As a supporting effort, defeat IW threats in combination with conventional military operations
1. Purpose

The purpose of the Irregular Warfare (IW) Joint Operating Concept (JOC) is to describe how future joint force commanders (JFCs) could conduct protracted\(^1\) IW to accomplish national strategic objectives in the 2014-2026 timeframe. The JOC will guide the development and integration of Department of Defense (DOD) military concepts and capabilities\(^2\) for waging protracted IW on a global or regional scale against hostile states and armed groups.\(^3\) The JOC will provide a basis for further IW discussion, debate, and experimentation intended to influence subsequent IW concept and capability development. It will also influence joint and Service combat development processes by helping the joint force gain a better appreciation for IW challenges that will result in doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) changes. JFCs and their Interagency (IA) and multinational partners will use this JOC to assess potential integration challenges and opportunities. The overall desired end state is a joint force with enhanced capability for IW and a balanced approach to warfighting that allows the joint force to be as compelling in IW as it is in conventional warfare.

2. Scope

The IW JOC broadly describes operational-level solutions to how future JFCs will conduct protracted IW in combination with other available instruments of national power and in concert with our state and non-state\(^4\) partners to achieve strategic objectives. This concept describes IW as a form of warfare and addresses the implications of IW becoming the dominant form of warfare, not only by our adversaries but also by the United States and its partners. This JOC applies across the range of military operations and relies heavily on the pre-conflict activities described in the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO) and the other JOCs. It does not provide a tactical description of how to conduct IW operations but instead introduces new conditions and capability needs for IW.

2.a. Defining Irregular Warfare

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\(^1\) This JOC uses “protracted” to mean an operation, campaign, or war of such long duration that it requires multiple unit rotations for an indefinite period of time.
\(^2\) This JOC uses “capability” to include all major components of “military capability,” including capacity or force structure, as defined in Joint Publication 1-02. See Glossary.
\(^3\) An armed group is a group that employs force to achieve its objectives; is not within the formal military structure of any state, alliance of states, or intergovernmental organization; and is not under the control of the state(s) in which it operates. (Proposed)
\(^4\) A non-state actor is a group or organization that is not within the formal structure of the government of any state, not limited by any state boundary, and operates beyond the control of any state and without loyalty to any state. (Proposed)
**IRREGULAR WARFARE is defined as:** “A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. IW favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will.”

IW is a complex, “messy,” and ambiguous social phenomenon that does not lend itself to clean, neat, concise, or precise definition (see the call-out box on page 5). This JOC uses the term in two contexts. First, IW is a form of armed conflict. As such, it replaces the term “low-intensity conflict.” Second, IW is a form of warfare. As such, it encompasses insurgency, counterinsurgency, terrorism, and counterterrorism, raising them above the perception that they are somehow a lesser form of conflict below the threshold of warfare.

The nature of warfare in the 21st century remains as it has been since ancient times – “a violent clash of interests between or among organized groups characterized by the use of military force.” These organized groups are no longer limited to states with easily identifiable regular armed forces, nor do they all operate by internationally accepted conventions and standards.

**Defining Irregular Warfare**

The development of a precise IW definition is hampered by two major factors:

A) The role of IW at the different levels of war.

B) The methods used to define IW.

**A. IW at the Different Levels of War.** The IW definition takes on different meanings at each level of war because:

- At the **Strategic Level**, the focus of the definition is likely that of control and influence over a relevant population.
- At the **Operational Level**, the focus may be on indirect approaches for planning and conducting operations and campaigns.
- At the **Tactical Level**, the focus is probably on asymmetric applications of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) that may be applied differently in an IW operation than it would under a conventional operation.

There is clearly friction among the three points of view. This friction occurs not because of an incomplete or inadequate definition but rather because IW is

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5 The current DOD definitions of conflict and low intensity conflict (LIC) are too limiting because they categorize conflict and LIC as being “below conventional war,” confined to a localized area in the “Third World,” constrained in weaponry and level of violence, and limited in objective. The implication of these definitions is that conflict and LIC are of lesser strategic importance than conventional warfare.

6 The terms “organized” and “military force” refer to a group’s ability to mobilize support for its own political interests and its ability to generate violence on a scale sufficient to have significant political consequences.

contextually different at each level of war and as such will be applied differently by those operating at each level of war.

B. The Methods Used to Define IW. There have been many definitions for IW proposed during the development of this JOC. Each of these definitions has focused on defining IW by who conducts it (actors), how they conduct it (methods), or why they conduct it (strategic purpose).

What makes IW different is the focus of its operations – a relevant population – and its strategic purpose – to gain or maintain control or influence over, and support of, that relevant population. In other words, the focus is on the legitimacy of a political authority to control or influence a relevant population.

The proposed definition of IW:

- **Exposes what is “different” or “irregular” about IW**
- **Underscores that the relevant population is the principal focus of IW**
- **Recognizes the role of non-state actors**
- **Deconflicts IW with extant doctrine without getting down to TTP level**
- **Does not exclude any of the IW activities listed in the Quadrennial Defense Review IW Execution Roadmap**

The purpose of IW, like any other form of warfare, is to win – to achieve the strategic purpose of the war. Winning wars and campaigns involves the control of forces, populations, and territory. Conventional or “traditional” warfare is a form of warfare between states that employs direct military confrontation to defeat an adversary’s armed forces, destroy an adversary’s war-making capacity, or seize or retain territory in order to force a change in an adversary’s

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8 The National Defense Strategy of March 2005 and the subsequent QDR adopted the term “traditional” to describe “recognized military capabilities and forces in well-understood forms of military competition and conflict.” In practical terms, the term is interchangeable with the term “conventional.” The problem with using the term “traditional” to describe these types of forces and operations and this form of warfare is that these traditions stem from European-style armed forces of the Industrial Age, whereas most military historians would describe “traditional” warfare as being non-Western and pre-industrial in its origins – in other words, as irregular warfare. The tradition of the US Army from its colonial roots until the early 20th century was as a frontier constabulary engaged in irregular warfare against the native tribes of North America. Only in the past 100 years has European-style warfighting become the US military tradition. Nevertheless, this paper will remain consistent with the National Defense Strategy and the QDR by using conventional and “traditional” as interchangeable terms.
government or policies. The focus of conventional military operations is normally an adversary’s armed forces with the objective of influencing the adversary’s government (left diagram, Figure 1). It generally assumes that the indigenous populations within the operational area are non-belligerents and will accept whatever political outcome the belligerent governments impose, arbitrate, or negotiate. A fundamental military objective in conventional military operations is to minimize civilian interference in those operations.

In contrast, IW focuses on the control or influence of populations, not on the control of an adversary’s forces or territory (right diagram, Figure 1). Ultimately, IW is a political struggle with violent and non-violent components. The struggle is for control or influence over, and the support of, a relevant population. The foundation for IW is the centrality of the relevant populations to the nature of the conflict. The parties to the conflict, whether states or armed groups, seek to undermine their adversaries’ legitimacy and credibility and to isolate their adversaries from the relevant populations and their external supporters, physically as well as psychologically. At the same time, they also seek to bolster their own legitimacy and credibility to exercise authority over that same population.9

Contrasting Conventional & Irregular Warfare

![Figure 1: Contrasting Conventional and Irregular Warfare](image_url)

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9 Some terrorist organizations are exceptions to this general rule in that they attack populations to coerce or intimidate governments or societies in pursuit of their objectives, without regard to their own legitimacy or popular support.
IW operations also employ subversion, coercion, attrition, and exhaustion to undermine and erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will to exercise political authority over a relevant population. **What makes IW “irregular” is the focus of its operations – a relevant population – and its strategic purpose – to gain or maintain control or influence over, and the support of, that relevant population through political, psychological, and economic methods.** Creating and maintaining an enduring, functioning state requires the government to be legitimate in the eyes of the population. On the other extreme, while a brutal dictatorship may control a population, it will eventually lead to frustration and dissatisfaction that can be exploited by an irregular adversary.10

Warfare that has the population as its “focus of operations” requires a different mindset and different capabilities than warfare that focuses on defeating an adversary militarily.

**2.b. Operations and Activities That Comprise IW**

IW includes a wide variety of indirect operations and activities that occur in isolation or within “traditional” inter-state combat operations. Some IW activities, such as terrorism and transnational crime, violate international law. US law and national policy prohibit US military forces or other government agencies (OGAs) from engaging in or supporting such activities. However, since our adversaries employ terrorism and transnational criminal activities against the interests of the United States and its partners, these activities are included below as examples of the range of operations and activities that can be conducted as part of IW:

- Insurgency
- Counterinsurgency (COIN)
- Unconventional warfare (UW)
- Terrorism
- Counterterrorism (CT)
- Foreign internal defense (FID)
- Stabilization, security, transition, and reconstruction operations (SSTRO)
- Strategic communications
- Psychological operations (PSYOP)
- Information operations (IO)11

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10 By “irregular,” this concept means any activity, operation, organization, capability, etc., in which significant numbers of combatants engage in insurgency and other nonconventional military and paramilitary operations without being members of the regular armed forces, police, or other internal security forces of any country.

11 DOD Directive (DODD) 3600.1 includes PSYOP as a component of IO, but the definition of IO limits it only to actions taken to affect adversary information, information systems, and decision-making, while defending one’s information, information systems, and decision-making. However, PSYOP also plays a critical role in influencing neutral and friendly foreign audiences outside the scope of IO. Therefore, this JOC lists PSYOP separately from IO.
Civil-military operations (CMO)
Intelligence and counterintelligence activities
Transnational criminal activities, including narco-trafficking, illicit arms dealing, and illegal financial transactions, that support or sustain IW
Law enforcement activities focused on countering irregular adversaries

Insurgency and counterinsurgency are at the core of IW. The purpose of insurgency is to overthrow and replace an established government or societal structure. Terrorism and counterterrorism are activities conducted as part of IW and are frequently sub-activities of insurgency and counterinsurgency. However, terrorism may also stand alone when its purpose is to coerce or intimidate governments or societies without overthrowing them. FID refers to the participation of the agencies of one government in the programs of another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. FID is thus the external support component of counterinsurgency. UW most frequently refers to the military and paramilitary aspects of an insurgency designed to resist, overthrow, or gain political autonomy from an established government or used to resist or expel a foreign occupying power. However, UW can also refer to military and paramilitary support to an armed group seeking increased power and influence relative to its political rivals without overthrowing the central government and in the absence of a foreign occupying power. SSTRO are an essential component of counterinsurgency campaigns, but SSTRO such as foreign disaster relief or foreign humanitarian assistance can also occur outside the context of IW or armed conflict.

PSYOP, CMO, IO, and intelligence and law enforcement activities can occur in major combat operations (MCO), IW, or SSTRO. They are listed above because their role in IW is often proportionally greater than is the case in MCO. They all impact directly on the operational focus of IW – the relevant populations – in ways that combat operations do not.

In practice, most wars and campaigns are hybrids of conventional and IW operations. The balance or primary focus of operations gives a war, campaign, or major operation its predominant character.

**Note:** This concept uses the term “IW campaign” to describe a campaign that primarily focuses on IW operations or activities.

### 2.c. IW in the Future Security Environment

“... Instead, we imagine the brewing threats of ‘Perfect Storms’ of failed governments, ethnic stratification, religious violence, humanitarian disasters, catalytic regional crises, and the proliferation of dangerous weapons. We see lagging economies, unintegrated and disenfranchised populations,
transnational crime, illicit sub-national power structures, and destabilizing bulges of uneducated and unemployed youth.”

Dr. John Hillen, Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs

The future security environment includes a mix of military and non-military challenges by state and non-state actors to US national security, with IW as the favored form of warfare of those who would be our adversaries. The rise of political, religious, and ethnic extremist ideologies fuels conflicts worldwide. The absence of effective governance in many parts of the world creates sanctuaries for terrorists, criminals, and insurgents. Many states are unable or unwilling to exercise control over their territory or frontiers, leaving them open to exploitation. Weak or failing states suffering from stagnant economies, corrupt political institutions, environmental issues, poor public health or epidemic diseases, or those that are caught up in multinational competition for their natural resources too often become hotbeds for conflict. This conflict in turn provides a nurturing environment, protection, and cover for insurgents and transnational terrorists. The competition for the contested populations within these weak or failing states will be one of the key objectives of IW.

2.d. Strategic Guidance

2005 National Defense Strategy. The 2005 National Defense Strategy identified the complex array of security challenges facing the United States as traditional, irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive challenges. Key portions of the guidance relating to IW include:

- Improving proficiency against irregular challenges.
- Redefining past conceptions of general purpose forces.
- Comprehensively defeating terrorist extremists and other irregular forces may require operations over longer periods, using many elements of national power. Such operations may require changes to the way we train, equip, and employ our forces.

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12 Remarks at the Joint Worldwide Planning Conference, Edelweiss Conference Center Garmisch, Germany, 30 November 2005.
Based on strategic guidance, the QDR 2006 discussed a shift in DOD capabilities (see Figure 2) to better address irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive challenges. The Department of Defense has refined its force planning construct, dividing its activities into three objective areas: Homeland Defense, Global War on Terrorism (GWOT)/IW, and Conventional Campaigns. Requirements associated with GWOT and IW include:

- **Steady-state** – deter and defend against external transnational terrorist attacks, enable partners through integrated security cooperation programs, and conduct multiple, globally distributed IW operations of varying duration. Employ general purpose forces (GPF) continuously to interact with allies, build partner capability, conduct long-duration COIN operations, and deter aggressors through forward presence.
- **Surge** – conduct a large-scale, potentially long duration IW campaign including counterinsurgency and SSTRO.

> “Increasingly sophisticated irregular methods – e.g., terrorism and insurgency – challenge U.S. security interests. Adversaries employing irregular methods aim to erode U.S. influence, patience, and political will. Irregular opponents often take a long-term approach, attempting to impose prohibitive human, material, financial, and political costs on the United States to compel strategic retreat from a key region or course of action. … Our experiences in the war on terrorism points to the need to reorient our military forces to contend with such irregular challenges more effectively.”

2005 National Defense Strategy

**2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR 2006).** Based on strategic guidance, the QDR 2006 discussed a shift in DOD capabilities (see Figure 2) to better address irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive challenges. The Department of Defense has refined its force planning construct, dividing its activities into three objective areas: Homeland Defense, Global War on Terrorism (GWOT)/IW, and Conventional Campaigns. Requirements associated with GWOT and IW include:

- **Steady-state** – deter and defend against external transnational terrorist attacks, enable partners through integrated security cooperation programs, and conduct multiple, globally distributed IW operations of varying duration. Employ general purpose forces (GPF) continuously to interact with allies, build partner capability, conduct long-duration COIN operations, and deter aggressors through forward presence.
- **Surge** – conduct a large-scale, potentially long duration IW campaign including counterinsurgency and SSTRO.

![Figure 2: 2006 QDR “Shifting Our Weight” Chart](image-url)
Key QDR findings related to IW include:

- US military forces are primarily organized, trained, educated, and equipped for traditional warfighting, and these capabilities remain essential to deter and fight conventional wars.
- US military forces are not as well organized, trained, educated, or equipped to conduct protracted IW on a global scale in the current or envisioned future operational environments.\(^\text{13}\)
- Rebalancing GPF to conduct IW will enhance their adaptability and improve their capability to operate against potential adversaries who have mobilized their populations to resist and oppose US military intervention in their countries.
- Increasing special operations forces (SOF) capability is essential to defeating terrorist extremism in the Long War. Beyond defeating terrorist extremism, increasing SOF capability will broaden and deepen US strategic options for dealing with hostile states and occupying powers through the support of friendly insurgent groups, surrogate warfare, and other offensive uses of IW.

**2006 QDR Execution Roadmap for Irregular Warfare.** The IW Roadmap seeks to implement the IW-related broad policy decisions of the QDR by directing development of a number of DOD IW capabilities. It also requires the development of a joint concept for IW. This JOC is designed to meet this requirement and will describe “how we operate” in order to help tie together the application of many of the capabilities identified in the IW Execution Roadmap.

### 2.e. Assumptions

This JOC considers an assumption appropriate if it meets the following criteria: 1) It should be a likely future condition, but not a certainty; 2) It should not concern situations or circumstances that implementation of the concept can mitigate or directly influence; and 3) Its future validity is necessary for the concept to be valid. The following are key assumptions of the IW JOC:

- In 2014-2026, the United States will still be engaged in a global Long War, and will also face conflicts involving state and non-state actors that will predominantly use IW to confront the United States and its strategic partners.\(^\text{14}\)
- The Department of Defense will have funding and authorities to support and sustain US commitments for protracted IW.

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\(^{13}\) This JOC envisions three operational environments: hostile, friendly, and non-belligerent.

\(^{14}\) Strategic partners are those state and non-state allies and coalition members operating in concert with the United States against common adversaries.
• The joint force will be required to conduct nonconventional\textsuperscript{15} military operations in support of, or in place of, IA partners for an extended duration.

2.f. Relationship to Other Joint Operations Concepts
The CCJO provides the overarching guidance for this and other JOCs in the Joint Operations Concept family. This JOC applies the basic elements of the CCJO Central Idea while embodying the supporting ideas of: acting from multiple directions in multiple domains concurrently; conducting integrated and interdependent actions; controlling tempo; managing perceptions and expectations; and acting discriminately. It also addresses certain key characteristics of the joint force, to include: knowledge empowered; adaptable; persistent; resilient; and agile.

The IW JOC is integral to the conduct of MCO and Military Support to SSTRO. It complements the conduct of Deterrence Operations and Shaping Operations. It enhances existing JOCs by further developing their IW aspects. It also offers both complementary and competing ideas for ways and means to address strategic and operational challenges. This JOC addresses aspects of IW that current JOCs do not:

• Theater strategy for IW.
• IW campaign design, planning, and execution.
• Global scale of IW operations.
• Protracted timeframe of IW.
• Offensive applications of IW, particularly against hostile armed groups operating in non-belligerent states.

\underline{IW and the MCO JOC}. The MCO JOC includes a general description of IW that focuses on cases where IW is integral to large-scale combat operations. This JOC provides a more robust discussion of IW, both in combination with conventional military operations and also as part of a protracted regional or global IW campaign that may not include significant conventional military operations.

\textsuperscript{15} This concept uses the term “nonconventional” to mean any activity, operation, organization, capability, etc., for which the regular armed forces of a country, excluding designated SOF, do not have a broad-based requirement for the conduct of combat operations against the regular armed forces of another country. This term includes the employment of conventional forces and capabilities in nonstandard ways or for nonstandard purposes.
IW and the Military Support to SSTR JOC. The SSTR JOC is driven by DODD 3000.05, Military Support to SSTR Operations. DODD 3000.05 establishes DOD policy and assigns responsibilities within the Department for planning, training, and preparing to conduct and support stability operations. SSTR focus on the full range of military support across the continuum from peace to crisis and conflict in order to assist a state or region that is under severe stress. IW occurs primarily during crisis or conflict. In both IW and SSTR, a primary focus is on gaining the support of the population. In both concepts the joint force normally plays a more enabling role to the efforts of OGAs rather than a lead role. SSTR are a vital component of most IW operations and campaigns, but SSTR also occur outside the scope of IW. In some operations IW may contrast with SSTR, such as supporting an insurgency or conducting UW where the goal is not to support the host government but rather to undermine stability and security in order to erode an adversary’s control over its territory or population. As with IW, many stability,

**Figure 3: JOC Relationships**

IW and the Military Support to SSTR JOC. The SSTR JOC is driven by DODD 3000.05, Military Support to SSTR Operations. DODD 3000.05 establishes DOD policy and assigns responsibilities within the Department for planning, training, and preparing to conduct and support stability operations. SSTR focus on the full range of military support across the continuum from peace to crisis and conflict in order to assist a state or region that is under severe stress. IW occurs primarily during crisis or conflict. In both IW and SSTR, a primary focus is on gaining the support of the population. In both concepts the joint force normally plays a more enabling role to the efforts of OGAs rather than a lead role. SSTR are a vital component of most IW operations and campaigns, but SSTR also occur outside the scope of IW. In some operations IW may contrast with SSTR, such as supporting an insurgency or conducting UW where the goal is not to support the host government but rather to undermine stability and security in order to erode an adversary’s control over its territory or population. As with IW, many stability,
stabilization, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR) tasks are best performed by indigenous institutions, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and OGAs. Nonetheless, both concepts envision the requirement for joint forces to perform all tasks necessary to establish or maintain civil order when civilian agencies cannot do so.

**IW and the Shaping Operations JOC** (Currently in Development). The Shaping Operations JOC is expected to describe the long-term, integrated joint force actions taken *before or during crisis* to build partnership capacity, influence non-partners and potential adversaries, and mitigate the underlying causes of conflict and extremism. The Shaping Operations JOC will concentrate on pre-conflict, preventative actions intended to avoid a crisis-precipitating event. Shaping operations enable rapid action when crises occur and military intervention is required. Shaping operations are critical to gaining knowledge of the operational environment, gaining operational access, and preparing the operational environment for potential future IW operations.

**IW and the Deterrence Operations JOC.** The joint force deters potential adversaries by the threat of cost imposition, the denial of the prospect of success, or the encouragement of adversary restraint. The credible capability and apparent will of the US government (USG) to defeat any irregular threat and to conduct successful IW against a potential adversary’s homeland or global interests could be an important factor in deterring aggression that could trigger such a war. Thus, a credible IW capability can have deterrent effects consistent with the Deterrence Operations JOC.

**IW and the Homeland Defense and Civil Support JOC.** IW operations represent important elements of protecting the US homeland in the forward regions of the layered defense construct described in the Homeland Defense and Civil Support JOC. IW can eliminate or prevent the emergence of hostile governments or non-state groups, decrease ungoverned spaces that provide breeding grounds for groups hostile to US security interests, and reduce the threat of possible attacks on the US homeland.

3. **The Military Problem**

The complexity of the future security environment is rooted in global and regional ideological and political struggles. These struggles will challenge traditional US military approaches. Faced with the conventional warfighting capacity of the United States, our adversaries will likely choose to fight using a hybrid of irregular, disruptive, catastrophic, and traditional capabilities as a way to achieve their strategic objectives. The strategy of our adversaries will be to subvert, attrite, and exhaust us rather than defeat us militarily. They will seek to undermine and erode the national power, influence, and will of the United States and its strategic partners. Our adversaries will continue to wage IW against us until we demonstrate the same competency in IW that we demonstrate in conventional warfighting.
The United States and its partners are likely to face state and non-state adversaries in protracted struggles for popular support and legitimacy. Future conflicts will likely be fought amongst the people, limiting the utility of conventional applications of military power. This problem will be exacerbated by the increasing number of hostile states armed with weapons of mass destruction and sophisticated anti-access capabilities that may preclude direct military options. These situations will therefore require or favor an irregular military approach of using indirect and often nonconventional methods and means to achieve US strategic objectives.

3.a. **The Joint Force Problem:** How can JFCs employ conventional and nonconventional military capabilities in support of integrated USG and partner IW efforts to gain or maintain control or influence over a relevant population? The Joint Force must determine how to:

- Conduct protracted campaigns to defeat adversary states through indirect methods and means.
- Conduct protracted campaigns on a global scale to defeat non-state irregular threats.
- As a supported effort, defeat IW threats independently of conventional operations.
- As a supporting effort, defeat IW threats in combination with conventional operations.

3.b. **Factors That Compound the Joint Force Problem.** IW will present the following challenges for the future joint force:

- **The Expanding Scale of IW.** The threat of IW will become increasingly global in scale.
- **The Unbounded Scope of IW.** Our adversaries will be unlikely to operate under the same legal or moral restrictions as will the joint force.
- **The Protracted Nature of IW.** IW often favors our adversaries. Protracted IW campaigns are generally undesirable and problematic from a US domestic and international political perspective. COIN often requires disproportionate resource investments to protect the population and infrastructure of a threatened society. In contrast, insurgency and terrorism are relatively inexpensive to conduct or support. Adversaries employing IW against us may not have to defeat US and partner security forces\(^\text{17}\) to win. In many cases, adversaries need only to survive or outlast the United States to win.
- **The Expansion of the Operational Area to Non-belligerent States.** Adversaries are likely to operate within and from non-belligerent states that will limit or restrict joint force access. Adversaries will exploit state

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\(^{17}\) By “security forces,” this JOC means police and constabulary forces as well as military and paramilitary forces.
boundaries and other political, economic, and tribal fault lines in order to seek sanctuary from conventional military capabilities.

- **The Inherent Political Nature of IW.** All wars are fought for political purposes, but the political element of IW permeates its conduct down to the lowest tactical level. At its roots, IW is “local politics with guns.” Influencing governments and populations is a complex and inherently political activity, no matter what methods are used. While the US military has historically dedicated the vast majority of its resources to the tactical arena, the IW adversary views the conflict from the opposite perspective and places emphasis on the political nature of the conflict. In IW, military leaders need to think politically as well as militarily, and their civilian counterparts need to think militarily as well as politically.

- **Direct Applications of Military Power are Often Counterproductive in IW.** An additional paradox for the JFC is that the use of direct military power or military intervention frequently detracts from the legitimacy of the host nation (HN) we are trying to support. While external forces can quell instability and achieve a level of security, they often do so at the expense of HN legitimacy and credibility. The need to stabilize a threatened society and establish short-term security may conflict with the need to create and sustain a stable and enduring political order.

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4. The Solution

**Ends:** Friendly political authority and influence over host population are secured and adversary control, influence, and support are denied.

**Ways:** (This is the central idea of this concept.) The joint force will conduct protracted regional and global campaigns against state and non-state adversaries to subvert, coerce, attrite, and exhaust adversaries rather than defeating them through direct conventional military confrontation. IW emphasizes winning the support of the relevant populations, promoting friendly political authority, and eroding adversary control, influence, and support. Unified action by the USG and its strategic partners is essential to winning an irregular war or campaign. While the direct application of military power may not be the primary means of winning IW, joint forces will often be required to support non-military instruments of power and set the conditions for strategic success.

**Means:** Fully integrated US and partner conventional and nonconventional forces and capabilities.

**The key elements of the central idea are:**
- Using indirect approaches
- Conducting protracted IW campaigns
- Conducting campaigns on a regional or global scale
- Focusing on the will of the people
- Employing unified action

**Supporting ideas are:**
- Establishing a persistent presence for IW
  - Protracted intelligence preparation of the environment
  - Protracted operational preparation of the environment
- Establishing and maintaining interpersonal relationships to support IW
- Expanding the role of general purpose forces to support and execute IW
- Creating alternative command and control mechanisms for conducting and supporting IW

4.a. The Key Elements of the Central Idea

The following paragraphs describe each element of the central idea.

**Indirect Approaches.** The term “indirect approach” has multiple applications within the context of IW:
Focus on addressing the underlying economic, political, cultural, or security conditions that fuel the grievances of the population, rather than on applying military power directly against the military and paramilitary forces of adversaries. Both approaches are necessary, but the direct application of military power is unlikely to be decisive.

Disrupt, dislocate, and defeat adversaries by attacking them physically and psychologically where they are most vulnerable and unsuspecting, rather than attacking where they are strongest or in the manner they expect.

Empower, enable, support, or leverage IA and other partners to attack adversaries militarily or confront them non-militarily, rather than relying on direct and unilateral military confrontation by US joint forces.

Take actions with or against third-party states or armed groups in order to influence adversaries rather than taking actions to influence adversaries directly.

Attack adversaries using a combination of conventional and nonconventional methods and means rather than relying only on conventional military forces. Nonconventional methods and means might include clandestine or covert actions, operations in combination with irregular forces, or the nonconventional use of conventional capabilities.

Subvert the power and influence of adversaries over the relevant populations by isolating them physically and psychologically from their local and international support through the use of PSYOP, public diplomacy, and public affairs activities; security operations; population and resource control measures; and other means.

An indirect approach may include direct actions at the tactical level. For example, a tactical operation, such as a conventional strike against a terrorist training camp, may be viewed as a direct application of military power. This same tactical operation may also be conducted as part of a broader indirect operational or strategic level campaign. This mixture of direct and indirect applications of military power at the various levels of warfare adds to the complexity of IW.

An indirect approach does not mean that IW can be conducted without any direct combat operations to kill or defeat an adversary. Some adversaries, such as terrorists and insurgents fighting for a religious or tribal cause, may be so committed that they simply cannot be persuaded or coerced into laying down their arms; these individuals must be either killed or captured.

**Protracted IW Campaigns.** IW historically has required a prolonged and persistent effort of at least a decade to achieve a political outcome. The

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19 For the purposes of the JOC the term "attack" is used to describe both lethal and non-lethal means.
protracted nature of IW means that a persistent presence and a sustained effort are required over a much longer duration than is typical of conventional MCO. IW will place a demand on DOD force structure for rotation of forces with sufficient overlap to ensure continuity of effort while retaining the capability to keep joint forces trained and ready for conventional MCO. **Without the capacity to sustain a protracted IW effort, the chance of success will diminish because our adversaries will be able to outlast the joint force.** The critical need for sufficient capacity to sustain long-duration IW efforts will make it essential that the Department of Defense partner with and help build the capacity of IA, multinational, and HN forces and agencies.

**Increasingly Global Scale of IW.** IW will be fought not only within a single country or region, but increasingly will be waged on a global scale. While some conflicts may occur in a single country or region, the globalization of emerging transnational threats requires that US joint forces, working in concert with their IA and multinational partners, prepare for multiple, comprehensive, and coordinated IW campaigns across multiple theaters of operation.

**Focus on the Will of the People.** The focus of IW on the will of the people is necessary for two reasons: (1) to establish or maintain the legitimacy of the local government or armed group that the United States and its partners are supporting; and (2) to gain or maintain popular support for joint forces operating in the country or region. Joint forces often must set the conditions that enable long-term diplomatic, informational, and economic means to **gain the popular support of friendly elements and undermine the popular support of adversaries.**

**Foundation of IW Activities.** The foundation of IW activities are those that produce a positive psychological effect on the populace in order to gain their support and weaken their support of an adversary. Assessing psychological effects on contested populations must take into account existing cultural and social norms. Some planning considerations are:

- The people will desire a strong degree of security.
- The people must feel as if they can influence the social and political order.
- The people will want meaningful economic activity that enables them to provide a living for their families.
- The people will want to maintain a society that reinforces their cultural preferences and allows them to feel pride in their citizenship.

Without this focus on the will of the population, IW will degenerate into a struggle marked by brutal suppression and intimidation to force the people to submit to the will of the belligerents.

**Unified Action.** IW will often be led by a USG agency other than the Department of Defense. The complex nature of IW and its focus on the relevant populations will require the JFC to achieve a level of IA teamwork (unified action) beyond that traditionally associated with conventional combat operations that focus on defeating an adversary militarily. IW demands that JFCs and their
staffs work closely with IA and multinational counterparts at all stages of planning and execution. They will require knowledge and perspectives from a broad range of sources to develop a deep understanding of the character of the conflict, the people and culture among which the conflict is fought, the conflict’s context, and its often diverse set of participants. Unified action is essential to integrating the application of all available instruments of power to address the underlying causes of insurgencies and other irregular threats. To achieve unified action in IW, the USG will have to consider and develop alternative integrated military-IA command relationship and staffs at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.

4.b. Supporting Ideas

A number of supporting ideas emerge that contribute directly or indirectly to achieving the central idea of this JOC. These supporting ideas are:

**Establishing Persistent Presence for IW.** IW will require the joint force to operate globally through, by, and with state and non-state partners. The joint force will need a persistent global presence to understand and affect the operational environment and the adversaries, and to build partner capacity for IW. Periodic short-duration deployments to at-risk states will be an inadequate operational approach to IW because the results of these deployments will be quickly reversed by adversary countermeasures and by the inertia common in failed and failing states. Instead, IW will require a sustained US military effort for long-term preparation of the environment. These shaping operations will consist of:

- **Intelligence Preparation of the Environment (IPE).** Persistent, global IPE will play a decisive part of any IW campaign. It will enable the joint force to understand the imperatives of the operational environment and the vulnerabilities of adversaries. To achieve this understanding, the Intelligence Community will establish persistent, long-duration intelligence networks that focus on the populations, governments, traditional political authorities, and security forces at the national and sub-national levels in all priority countries. The joint force will leverage these networks by linking them to operational support networks of anthropologists and other social scientists with relevant expertise in the cultures and societies of the various clans, tribes, and countries involved. Where civilian expertise in the social sciences is not available, the Department of Defense will provide its own experts. Reachback to academia is useful, but not a failsafe in extended IW operational environments.

- **Operational Preparation of the Environment (OPE).** OPE will require permanent posting of joint force personnel overseas. JFCs will position small forward-based joint teams in or adjacent to all priority countries. The teams will be composed of career-tracked regional specialists who have or are developing expertise in the languages, customs, attitudes, and cultures of their region. These teams will prepare for future joint force
operations by gaining understanding of the relevant populations, cultures, political authorities, personalities, security forces, and terrain within potential operational areas. The teams will assist in the training and preparation of friendly security and irregular forces to wage IW. The teams will use their cultural understanding of the population to influence the indigenous people in terms meaningful to them and through their own key communicators. The teams will contribute to joint force operational reach by enabling the rapid employment of forces during crises and contingency operations.

Establishing and Maintaining Interpersonal Relationships to Support IW. IW is about the people. The ability of the joint force to conduct IW will be dependant on its ability to provide continuity of effort over protracted periods. This continuity of effort will depend on the ability of joint force members to establish and maintain long-term interpersonal relationships with their counterparts in the relevant US missions and with foreign governments, traditional political authorities, and security forces.

Expanding the Role of GPF to Support and Execute IW. Executing IW campaigns will increasingly require GPF to perform missions that in the last few decades have been viewed primarily as SOF activities. Rebalancing GPF to conduct IW will expand joint force operational reach and enhance GPF versatility. The results will be improved capability to operate against adversaries who use IW and an expanded ability to use IW to achieve US strategic objectives.

GPF personnel will receive cultural and language training for the operational areas to which they deploy. They will be knowledgeable of the strategic and operational objectives in the operational area. They will be able to communicate the strategic message. Increased GPF interaction abroad is an opportunity to gain area familiarization and gather useful information about potential operational areas. Specific GPF requirements include the following:

- **Provide Support to Distributed IW Operations.** The focus on the population and the nature of the adversaries leads to the need for a greater number of small units operating in a distributed manner throughout a potentially large operational area. These units may be operating in conjunction with the forces of strategic partners, as trainers or advisors, or they may be operating independently. In any case, the GPF may be required to provide logistic support; fire support; and combat unit reinforcement. Specific examples of support to IW include:

  o Deliver precision fires to globally distributed forces conducting IW.

  o Deliver logistic and personnel support to potentially hundreds of small dispersed teams operating globally in permissive, contested, and denied areas.

  o Provide emergency extraction and personnel recovery globally to all
Joint forces executing IW operations.

- Conduct joint net-centric operations that link globally distributed forces conducting IW.

**Conduct and Support Multiple COIN Operations on a Global Scale.** GPF units will be prepared to conduct combat operations in a COIN environment. Because such operations are often “amongst the people,” GPF must conduct them with restraint and consideration of their impact on the population. GPF support units may be called upon to augment the Army Corps of Engineers, OGAs, IGOs, or NGOs to support the restoration of essential services.

**Conduct and Support Counterterrorism on a Global Scale.** GPF will provide support to dedicated US or partner CT forces. They may/will also conduct strikes, raids, and other combat operations against terrorist training camps, safe havens, and other targets when the precision-strike capabilities of dedicated CT forces are not required to perform the mission.

**Build Partner Nation Security Force Capacity on a Global Scale.** The GPF possesses the basic skills necessary to train and advise indigenous forces in basic military skills. To do this effectively, the GPF will require a greater degree of language and cultural instruction, equipment, and other support necessary to train and advise indigenous forces in IW operations. GPF may need to provide a virtual safe-haven for friendly armed groups that will allow them to establish virtual centers to publicize their cause, conduct virtual recruitment, solicit funding, and serve as a venue for strategic communications efforts.

**Provide Interim Military Government or Perform Civil Administration Functions.** GPF may be required to establish interim military government or perform civil administration functions in occupied or liberated territory when indigenous, international, or US civilian agencies cannot do so. This may require additional capabilities for police-like intelligence and security functions in support of population security and rule of law.

**Creating Alternative Command and Control (C2) Mechanisms for Conducting and Supporting IW.** IW will require the joint force to conduct protracted IPE and OPE efforts, build the IW capability of state and non-state partners, and plan, coordinate, synchronize, and integrate IA IW activities with US missions around the world. The current use of joint task forces (JTFs) reporting directly to geographic combatant commanders does not facilitate any of these critical IA and multinational IW activities. In the future, combatant commanders will have alternative C2 mechanisms for conducting and supporting IW when a JTF is not required to conduct large-scale combat operations. Some of the alternatives will require changes to current authorities. This concept proposes three alternative C2 mechanisms for further development and experimentation.

- Extend the Current Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) Concept for Counterdrug Operations to Regional Subordinate Combatant
Commands and JIATFs with IW Missions. The Department of Defense may coordinate with, or the President may direct, other USG agencies to assign personnel to the headquarters of regional subordinate unified commands and JIATFs, not as part of a joint IA coordination group, but as integral members of an IA command group and staff. These IA regional commands and JIATFs will synchronize and integrate the activities and operations of subordinate elements of participating USG agencies within their operational areas. With new congressional authority, the Department would be able to fund their activities and operations from a congressional transfer account under the control of a single DOD account manager.

- Establish IA Advisory Assistance Teams at Subnational Levels of Government. The Department of Defense may coordinate with, or the President may direct, OGAs to assign personnel to IA advisory assistance teams collocated with indigenous sub-national (e.g., provincial or district) political authorities within a threatened country. These teams would collaborate with the supported political authorities to synchronize and integrate USG activities and operations with those of the supported indigenous authorities. The teams would report to the US chief of mission in the country or to the appropriate US area military commander, depending on the specific situation.

- Expand the Use of US Military Groups (MILGRPs)\(^{21}\) to Conduct and Support IW. The Department of Defense may establish a network of MILGRPs in or adjacent to all priority countries to conduct and support the full range of IW activities envisioned by this JOC under the operational direction\(^ {22}\) of the US chiefs of missions responsible for those countries. These MILGRPs would be significantly different from current security cooperation organizations. In addition to their title 22 security assistance functions, they would have increased title 10 authorities compared to current security cooperation organizations, including the authority to conduct combat operations, arrange for US combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) of partner forces, and support the IW activities of OGAs. They would have

\(^{21}\) This JOC uses the term “military group (MILGRP)” to describe any DOD element located in a foreign country under the “operational direction” of a US chief of mission and with assigned responsibilities for performing title 10 combat advisory, training, and other operational missions as well as title 22 security assistance management functions. In practice, these elements may be called military missions and groups, military assistance advisory groups, offices of defense and military cooperation, or liaison groups.

\(^{22}\) This JOC uses the term “operational direction” to describe the authority over US military forces that the President will delegate to the chief of mission for a specific complex contingency operation for which the chief of mission has responsibility. 22 USC 3927 currently prohibits chiefs of mission from directing, coordinating, or supervising the activities or operations of military forces under the command of a US area military commander such as a geographic combatant commander. See Glossary.
enhanced authority to expend funds in direct support of the full range of IW activities. They would be capable of exercising operational control of attached rotational and periodic joint forces located within their operational areas. During crises and contingency operations, they would control or be controlled by deployed JTFs under the operational control of the appropriate geographic combatant commander. See Appendix H for further discussion on expanding the role of the MILGRP to conduct and support IW.

4.c. IW Strategy

At the theater strategic level, the JFC may develop a theater strategy using an IW approach to address either state or non-state adversaries. State adversaries include those that may directly threaten the United States or its interests or hostile states that employ indirect means to threaten the United States by sponsoring surrogates such as terrorists, insurgents, or other non-state adversaries.

**Combatant Command Strategic Planning.** Before a JFC can design an IW campaign, the supported combatant commander and supporting and subordinate JFCs will conduct strategic planning to translate national strategic guidance and direction into a strategic concept for achieving a set of military and non-military conditions necessary to achieve strategic success. Unlike conventional warfare, the nature of IW will rarely dictate that the military instrument of power be in the lead. In fact, a strategic military lead will usually be counterproductive in IW because it will tend to alienate the population that is the focus of the IW effort. Typically, the joint force role in IW will be to establish the military conditions necessary to enable and support the other instruments of national power so that they can lead a unified effort to achieve strategic success. However, when other instruments of national power are unavailable in sufficient quantity, the President or Secretary of Defense may direct the supported combatant commander to employ military forces and capabilities to perform non-military tasks and achieve non-military conditions in the pursuit of strategic success.

**The Strategic Estimate.** Unlike the current strategic estimate process, which primarily focuses on the adversary, a future IW strategic estimate will focus on those populations relevant to the strategic situation. The estimate will define the strategic end state and supporting military and non-military conditions in terms of how to control or influence the relevant populations and their established political authorities.

**Theater Strategic Concept.** Based on the strategic estimate, the supported combatant commander will develop or refine a theater strategic concept that describes where, when, and how to employ military forces and capabilities in combination with the forces and capabilities of IA and multinational partners to achieve strategic success. The JFC may select a strategic concept that confronts state adversaries directly using MCO, indirectly using IW, or some hybrid of the
two. When confronting non-state adversaries, the JFC may select a strategic concept that confronts them directly by using US forces to conduct COIN or CT, indirectly by using the security forces of state or non-state partners to conduct the operations instead of US forces, or some hybrid of the two. Using an indirect approach, the strategic concept may call for supporting the COIN and CT efforts of friendly states against local or regional insurgent or terrorist adversaries by providing intelligence, training, logistic, and combat advisory assistance and denying resources to the adversaries, such as finances, transnational movement, and access to communications. Further, an indirect approach would put a local or international face on the effort, reduce the US contribution, and maximize the strategic communications impact while denying the adversary the use of “imperialist US” themes.

IW can occur within several strategic contexts, providing a broad range of strategic options for JFCs as they design future IW strategies and campaigns.

- **Option #1**: Joint forces may conduct IW **independently of conventional combat operations**. This type of IW activity is advantageous when one of the end state objectives is to disguise or limit US involvement to preclude escalation into direct inter-state conflict. This approach is attractive if the adversary against whom the United States is engaged possesses significant strategic, geographic, political, or economic advantages.

- **Option #2**: Joint forces may conduct IW **in support of conventional combat operations** during a direct inter-state conflict. This has been the most common form of IW in which the US military has engaged. The IW component of a broader conventional campaign supplements, expands, and deepens the scope and capabilities of the available lines of operation.

- **Option #3**: Joint forces may conduct IW as the primary or supported effort of a military campaign, with **conventional operations supporting IW activities**. The strategic, operational, and tactical advantages for applying this context of warfighting include economy of force, deception, and increasing the legitimacy of the supported irregular force.

4.d. Campaign Planning for IW

“The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and the commander have to make is to establish...the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to make it into something that is alien to its nature. This is the first of all strategic questions and the most comprehensive.”

Carl von Clausewitz

Campaign planning for IW is similar to campaign planning for MCO with one important distinction – for IW, the military instrument of national power is usually, if not always, a supporting effort to the other instruments of national power. As a result, one of the unique challenges of IW in developing a comprehensive campaign is recognizing that the military plan must integrate
with and support the other instruments of national power to attain national strategic objectives. Therefore it is imperative that all IA and multinational partners be included in IW campaign planning.

**Campaign Design for IW.** Campaign design provides the conceptual linkage of ends, ways, and means. The complexities of IW, often rooted in ideological and political struggles, demand a comprehensive campaign design. An IW campaign must begin with a clear understanding of the political purpose and strategic objectives. The campaign design must consider the protracted nature, cultural aspects, and environmental and political causes of the conflict. This means that prosecuting IW will require an unusual degree of clarity about political objectives translated through every level of command. Because of the essentially political nature of IW, the definition of victory may change with political and ideological shifts in the environment. Continual assessment and negotiation of expectations are essential to ensure success. Ideally, the joint force role in IW will be limited to establishing the military conditions necessary to enable and support the other instruments of national power so that they can lead a unified effort to achieve strategic success.

The JFC must be able to understand the complex nature of the IW problem as well as the purpose and role the military plays in the solution. Focusing efforts on campaign design is an effort to understand the root causes of a problem and to conceive a framework for addressing the problem. In essence, the commander-led campaign design effort guides and informs planning, preparation, execution, and assessment of the IW campaign. The JFC must have the ability to:

- Design an IW campaign that synchronizes all available instruments of national power as well as partner capabilities.
- Understand the dynamics of the operational environment, accounting for the social, cultural, political, legal, economic, and physical conditions.
- Understand the strengths and vulnerabilities of both partners and adversaries. While IW poses significant challenges for the joint force, irregular partners and adversaries possess significant capabilities and vulnerabilities as well. Understanding these dynamics is essential to developing an effective IW campaign.
- Integrate awareness and effects of the local, regional, and global dynamics into the campaign design, which will influence the structure of the IW campaign.
- Conduct adaptive planning and wargaming to optimize the integration of US and coalition instruments of national power.

**Logical Lines of Operation.** The term “logical lines of operation” is derived from U.S. Army Field Manual 3-0 and defined as an arrangement of military forces or capabilities that links decisive points to achieve desired effects that may bear no direct relationship to an adversary’s physical activities.
vital to success in IW. Viewing the operation through various logical lines provides a useful tool in framing the problem and identifying the desired objectives and effects necessary for success. No finite list of logical lines of operation could cover every potential situation. However, the following logical lines provide an example construct:

- **Information** (including strategic communication, PSYOP, and IO). This line of operations allows the JFC to coordinate joint force and DOD information activities with those of other USG agencies, coalition partners, or allies to collaboratively shape the operational environment for IW. These information and engagement activities shall be integrated into IW military planning and operations, and synchronized for unified action.

- **Intelligence.** This line of operations provides timely situational and target awareness in an appropriate form and by any suitable means to the joint force, supporting commands, and agencies. It ensures that the intelligence is understood and considered by the commanders and agency directors.

- **Developing Capacity** (including governance and the rule of law, economic development, essential services, indigenous security, etc.). This line of operations builds the capabilities and capacities of state and non-state partners to conduct IW operations. These operations may be destructive and destabilizing (i.e., UW or lethal strike) or may be constructive and stabilizing (i.e., improved governance or security) in order to support IW campaign objectives.

- **Combat Operations** (including COIN, UW, security operations, etc.). This line of operations seeks to apply destructive and/or disruptive military capabilities against an opponent at a given time under conditions that range from permissive to hostile and producing both lethal and non-lethal effects. Combat capabilities support insurgency, COIN, UW, CT, FID, SSTRO, and combating weapons of mass destruction (CWMD).

While these four lines represent the most likely lines of operation in most IW campaigns, the circumstances of any particular campaign may require that campaign designers emphasize a particular line in a phase or create additional lines to place specific emphasis on a certain campaign aspect, such as providing essential services or security.

The JFC and military and IA planners must acknowledge and maintain balance across the campaign by continuously asking, “What will be the effect of this action or effort on the other lines of operation, the overall political-military campaign, and the strategic objectives?”

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24This question is based on an insight provided by Ambassador Edwin Corr telephonically with Marine Corps Combat Development Command personnel, 4 October 2005.
4.e. Executing IW

“I don’t think it is an exaggeration to say that the internet and global communications have changed this form of conflict [IW] as much as the machine gun and quick-firing artillery changed land warfare in 1914-1918. I think we are in an analogous position to those WWI commanders, knowing that our traditional approach is not working but still struggling to find a new tactical and technical formula that works.”

Lt. Col. (Dr.) David J. Kilcullen, 14 September 2006

The joint force will execute IW operations in support of friendly states; against hostile states; and against non-state adversaries operating within non-belligerent states. Recognizing that every IW situation will have unique characteristics, the following are representative activities that will take place:

- Shaping operations will begin early. These operations will include IPE and OPE as described in 4b above.
- As the campaign progresses, the JFC and strategic partners will employ numerous types of forces and capabilities. SOF, GPF, and elements of OGAs, partner nation security forces, and indigenous forces may all contribute to the accomplishment of campaign objectives. Because of the protracted nature of an IW campaign, synchronization of these forces as they flow into and out of the operational area is key.
- JFCs will employ integrated joint expeditionary force packages that fuse military operations and intelligence activities at the tactical level. When conducting IW, JFCs will frequently conduct military operations to generate their own actionable intelligence and targeting data using human, technical, forensic, and cultural intelligence to illuminate the adversaries’ networks, support activities, and personalities. Intelligence-driven operations will require long-term investments to develop the relationships necessary to gain the insights of the operational environment, personalities, and the populace. For example, the joint force may establish new joint “combined arms” teams in which military intelligence and law enforcement forces join combat forces at the core of the team to accomplish this operations-intelligence fusion.
- Operations will focus on enhancing or destabilizing the relationships between a political authority and the relevant populations. Operations in support of enhancing relationships include humanitarian assistance, civic action projects, promoting effective governance, COIN, CT, SSTRO, and FID. Operations in support of destabilizing relationships include UW, training insurgent forces, and providing combat and combat service support to partners.
- Throughout the campaign, the JFC and strategic partners will continuously update the strategic communications plan based on the reactions of all relevant parties to ongoing operations.
- After the security situation stabilizes in favor of the United States and its
strategic partners, joint forces will reduce their presence as OGAs and partners continue long term, steady state activities.

The vignette at Appendix D contains an additional description of how joint forces might conduct a campaign using an IW approach.

**Additional Considerations for Executing IW in Various Operational Environments Include:**

- **Executing IW in Support of Friendly States.** The joint force has traditionally supported a friendly state threatened by insurgency or terrorism by committing joint forces to conduct COIN and CT operations alongside the friendly state’s security forces within the territory of the friendly state. This JOC takes a wider view of these operations and places them within the context of a broader IW campaign that extends beyond the borders of a single threatened state. Future IW will likely expand traditional single-country COIN to include the gamut of local, regional, and global actors and considerations. This will require the JFC to employ forces not only to help defeat an insurgency in a single country, but also to defeat “an insurgency operating in small cells and teams with ‘low tactical signature’ in the urban clutter of globalized societies.” These insurgent groups will be masters of network-centric warfare, but their networks will include tribal, communal, social, and cultural nets as well as electronic ones. They will exploit the internet and cyberspace for communications, propaganda, funding, recruiting, and training. They will function more like a tribal group, crime syndicate, or extended family than like a military or paramilitary organization. Consequently, the joint force will have to defeat the regional or global dimensions of the insurgency by methods such as strategic communications targeting diasporas, supporting operations against criminal enterprises supporting the insurgency, and denying sanctuary in cyberspace and in the ungoverned and under-governed areas of non-belligerent states unwilling or unable to take effective action against non-state adversaries operating within their borders.

- **Executing IW Against a Hostile State.** Executing IW against a hostile state involves UW and other indirect approaches applied in conjunction with other diplomatic or economic actions such as blockades or sanctions. While UW has been a traditional core mission of SOF, executing UW as part of a larger IW effort will be different in the future. UW has traditionally been confined to operations against a single hostile state or occupying power. Much of the activities took place either within the hostile or occupied state or in the neighboring countries that either directly or tacitly supported efforts against the hostile state. This construct is changing as hostile states have ever-increasing global linkages

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26 Ibid., page 607.
and interests. The increasingly global nature of future IW will require joint forces to plan and execute IW against a hostile state’s decisive points or vital interests that reside outside the borders of the hostile state itself. These interests may include off-shore banking accounts, businesses, oil, and other strategic production operations and facilities. Taking action against these interests provides the JFC with additional pressure points that can indirectly influence the hostile state adversary without entering the adversary’s sovereign territory.

In addition, the expanding global migration of people creates ever-increasing diasporas within which hostile states have interests. These diasporas can serve as recruiting pools for irregular forces, indirectly deliver strategic communications messages to relatives still residing within hostile states, and funnel money and material to armed opposition groups operating within hostile states.

• **Executing IW Against Non-state Adversaries Operating Within Non-belligerent States.** Denied, ungoverned, or under-governed areas will provide potential sanctuary for transnational terrorist networks and other non-state adversaries. These areas will exist not only within failed and failing states, but also within the borders of functional non-belligerent states with which we are not at war. Some of these non-belligerent states will be supporters or sponsors of our non-state adversaries; others will be unwilling or unable to take effective action against non-state adversaries operating within their borders.

While the USG will be obligated to recognize and respect the sovereign lands of other states, our non-state adversaries will not be under the same obligation to respect the borders or sovereignty of states. Our non-state adversaries can violate those states’ non-belligerent status and exploit these gaps to move and operate freely within these areas regardless of borders. These emerging operational areas will frequently be difficult for USG elements to access and make it necessary to work closely with partners that have either access or legal authority to operate in these areas being exploited by the adversary. This extends US operational reach indirectly into these otherwise denied or sensitive areas.

This JOC cannot overemphasize the political and military risks associated with this indirect option. These operations involve the sovereign territory of another country. They frequently involve the irregular forces of non-state armed groups with questionable personalities and motives. Unethical or undisciplined partners could embarrass the United States and negatively affect the will of the people. Direct involvement by US forces carries a huge risk if they are compromised. The

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27 Sections paraphrased from an article submitted to *Special Forces Magazine* by LTC Dave Duffy titled “Unconventional Warfare support to Irregular Warfare and the Global War on Terrorism”
JFC should consider these risks and mitigation options carefully before requesting authority to plan and execute this type of indirect approach.

Before conducting these operations, the JFC will need to conduct a global assessment of current and potential future threat areas to identify strategic partners with potential indigenous capabilities for further development. This assessment should consider the capabilities of state and non-state partners to support UW operations. The joint force will train, equip, and assign combat advisors to the forces of these partners.

Once these forces are ready, the JFC may employ them to conduct UW operations in areas denied to US personnel. These forces can perform a multitude of tasks during the conduct of UW operations against non-state actors. The range of tasks depends upon the mission requirements and the capabilities, access, and placement. Assigned tasks may extend from information collection for final mission planning (acting as an extension of the leader’s reconnaissance) to providing infiltration, exfiltration, or personnel recovery support to the asset actually conducting the operation. Mission requirements, authorities granted, and planning imagination represent the primary limits on asset use.28

5. IW Capabilities29

The inherent complexity and prolonged nature of IW mandate the development of an agile joint force capable of conducting full-spectrum, protracted IW campaigns worldwide. To do so, the joint force must have at its disposal a wide-range of capabilities along with the ability to integrate capabilities with IA and multinational partners. These capabilities have been divided into critical campaign design, planning and force preparation capabilities, and critical operational capabilities.

The joint force will need IW campaign design, planning, and force preparation capabilities to achieve greater understanding of the complex environments that foster irregular threats. It will need the education and skill sets to approach an IW campaign with an appropriate frame of reference from the outset. Building leadership competencies across the force will be essential to IW success. Joint force leaders at all levels must be flexible and able to adapt quickly in a variety of IW environments in which they will operate. The joint force must be balanced

28 Ibid.
29 Many of the military capabilities required to wage or counter IW currently exist within the Department of Defense (i.e., unconventional warfare, counterinsurgency, etc). However, they can do so only on a limited scale. IW is often protracted and takes considerable time to understand and shape the environment, exploit underlying conditions, build ideological support, and develop sufficient intelligence and support infrastructure within an operational area. While this section will identify the broad military capabilities required for IW, a detailed capabilities-based assessment is required to explore not just the capabilities required for IW but also the required capacity of those capabilities.
with SOF and GPF capabilities in order to create the necessary capacity, expand operational reach, and enhance versatility. To do so, the joint force will expand GPF capabilities to execute traditional SOF missions such as building partner nation capacities, fostering development of civil society in ungoverned and under-governed areas, and conducting IPE and OPE. The result will be improved capability and capacity to both operate against adversaries who employ IW against the joint force, and an expanded ability to wage IW against state and non-state adversaries to achieve US strategic objectives. With this preparation and rebalancing, the joint force will be able to apply its operational capabilities creatively in order to accomplish US national security objectives.

5.a. Capabilities and Tasks. CJCSI 3010.02B defines a capability (Figure 4) as the “ability to achieve a desired effect under specified standards and conditions through combinations of means and ways to perform a set of tasks.” It defines a task as “an action or activity (derived from an analysis of the mission and concept of operations) assigned to an individual or organization to provide a capability.”

In keeping with guidance in CJCSI 3010.02B, capabilities required for IW operations and campaigns are defined by tasks that enable the operations cycle, the conditions that impact the tasks, and performance standards for these tasks. Collectively, these supporting tasks (and appropriate effects) comprise the capability. Tasks enumerated below were selected as essential for IW operations based on criticality for mission success and uniqueness for IW. The Universal Joint Task List (UJTL, CJCSM 3500.04D) provided some definitions for these tasks, but desired end states and measures of these existing tasks have been modified in Appendix C to reflect IW-specific conditions. These tasks may require further decomposition in the actual development of supporting joint integrating concepts and functional area analyses.

Appendix C also identifies the linkage among IW capabilities; associated level
UJTL tasks; and the Tier 1 and 2 Joint Capability Areas (JCAs). The links between IW capabilities and UJTL tasks are generally well established, although some of the task descriptions and measures need revision to address IW concerns. The JCAs are relatively immature and there are no formal task linkages with the more detailed UJTL tasks that support them.

5.b. Critical Campaign Planning, Preparation, Execution, Assessment, Force Development, and Force Management Capabilities

**Plan.** The JFC must be able to understand the complex nature of the IW problem as well as the purpose and role the military plays in the solution. Focusing efforts on campaign design is an effort to understand the root causes of a problem and to conceive a framework that employs all elements of national power to address the problem. In essence, commander-led campaign design effort guides and informs planning, preparation, execution, and assessment of the IW campaign. The Joint Force will need the education and skill sets to approach an IW campaign with an appropriate frame of reference from the outset. The desired effect of this capability is development and dissemination of a suitable, feasible, and acceptable plan that achieves the military strategic objective in the complex operational environments that characterize IW. The primary supporting tasks are:

- Design irregular warfare campaign plan(s).
- Assess operational situation(s).
- Conduct joint force targeting.
- Synchronize joint IW campaign plans and subordinate IW operations.

**Prepare.** Preparation allows the joint and/or combined force to execute IW operations and campaigns. This includes sharing information among IW elements as well as organizing and integrating the SOF and GPF capabilities and activities. The Joint Force must be able to influence the education, training, manning, equipping, and organization of resources to posture joint forces to conduct IW campaigns. The desired effect of this capability is the arrangement of capabilities in time and space to execute planned IW operations against state and non-state adversaries. The primary supporting tasks are:

- Command subordinate operational forces (US and partner SOF, GPF, and other forces conducting IW).
- Conduct operational maneuver and positioning of forces conducting IW.
- Coordinate and integrate joint and/or multinational and IA support.

**Execute.** Executing IW focuses on capabilities associated with effectively accomplishing a discrete task within a particular line of operation, such as training HN forces, developing an information operation to discredit an adversary, or conducting intelligence operations to support the IW campaign. The primary supporting tasks are:
• Conduct strategic communications in support of IW campaign objectives.
• Conduct information operations (operations security, information security, military deception, PSYOP, electronic warfare, computer network attack and defense; and physical destruction) in support of IW campaign objectives.
• Conduct HUMINT network operations in advance of and throughout the IW campaign.
• Collect and exploit information on the situation.
• Produce and/or disseminate intelligence on the situation.
• Conduct counterintelligence operations.
• Provide political-military support to IW.
• Provide security assistance.
• Execute CMO.
• Provide nation assistance to foreign states, organizations, or groups.
• Provide combat and non-combat military training and advisory assistance to the armed forces and other security forces of a foreign state, organization, or group.
• Conduct FID.
• Train selected partners to conduct FID.
• Conduct UW.
• Train selected partners to conduct UW.
• Ensure that forces conducting IW have the ability to control significant land areas.
• Ensure that forces conducting IW have the ability to control significant littoral areas.
• Ensure that forces conducting IW have the ability to conduct lethal strike operations.
• Ensure that forces conducting IW have the ability to strike targets using non-lethal means.
• Ensure that forces conducting IW have the ability to conduct personnel recovery operations.
• Conduct joint net-centric operations that link globally distributed forces conducting IW.
• Ensure that forces conducting IW have the ability to conduct CWMD operations.
• Provide base support and services to IW operations.

Assess. This capability seeks to determine the effects of the IW operation and/or campaign, the impact on various adversaries, and the requirements for subsequent operations. These tasks include collecting information about IW activities and conducting an assessment of operational effectiveness in order to update situational understanding and future planning activities. The desired end state of this task is the ability to measure progress of the joint force toward
mission accomplishment. The joint force will possess the required assets to collect data required to make a thorough IW assessment using measures of performance and measures of effectiveness. Primary supporting tasks are:

- Assess IW operations and/or campaigns.
- Develop joint and Service concepts, doctrine, and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP).

**Force Development.** This capability seeks to translate projected military resources—manpower, fiscal, and materiel—into time-phased programs and structure (expressed in dollars, equipment, and units) needed to accomplish national IW strategy. Primary supporting tasks are:

- Educate and train the joint force on the nuances of IW operations.
- Develop appropriate analytical models to support analysis of IW operations and campaigns.
- Develop joint concepts for IW.
- Exercise operational plans with IW elements.
- Gather IW lessons learned.
- Implement IW lessons learned.

**Force Management.** This capability seeks to recommend and provide forces in accordance with the Global Force Management Rotation Force Allocation Process for the purpose of supporting combatant commander requirements and Theater Security Cooperation Plans and allowing the rapid application of military force by placing US forces in a position from which they can rapidly respond to demands. Primary supporting tasks are:

- Manage the composition and disposition of the Joint Force to support protracted IW campaigns.
- Coordinate forward presence of joint forces in theaters in support of shaping operations and protracted IW campaigns.

6. Risks and Mitigation

**RISK #1 – Conducting a Protracted IW Campaign in Addition to MCO and Other Long-term Global Commitments**

- **Mitigation.** Conduct wargaming and analysis to understand the demands of a protracted IW campaign while simultaneously prosecuting an MCO and other long-term global commitments. Identify those areas in which capability and capacity shortfalls are likely to occur. Develop hedging strategies and plans to reduce the associated risks, such as plans for surging forces, accessing additional capacity in the Reserve Component, substituting similar capabilities across Services or components, rapidly retraining US personnel in new specialties, examining expanding the role of DOD civilians, and repositioning US forces around the globe while encouraging allies and partners to take on additional responsibilities.
**RISK #2 – Other USG Agencies Fail to Develop Concepts, Capabilities, and Capacity Necessary to Plan and Conduct IW Operations.**

- **Mitigation.** Conduct simulations and exercises that treat non-DOD US capabilities as a key variable in order to better understand the range of demands that could be placed on the military in future IW operations. Develop hedging strategies, capabilities, and capacity not only to support the full range of IW operations, but also to lead them if necessary. This will require the Department of Defense to be able to operate effectively across all lines of operation, not just those in which it traditionally plays a lead role, and could have substantial implications for issues such as DOD authorities, training, leader development, and the mix of capabilities that need to be resident in the Reserve Component, among others.

**RISK #3 – USG Does Not Develop the Integration Mechanisms Necessary to Achieve Unity of Effort at the Political, Strategic, Operational, and Tactical Levels.**

- **Mitigation.** Conduct concept development and experimentation focused on improving IA integration at all levels. Host IA wargames and simulations designed to develop a unified government approach to developing strategy guidance for IW campaigns. Pioneer and test IA planning mechanisms at the operational level to develop a holistic government approach to IW campaign design. Based on lessons learned and best practices from recent operations, develop and test IA mechanisms for achieving unity of effort across agencies and lines of operation in the field. If necessary, provide the funding needed to enable IA partners to participate effectively in these efforts.

**RISK #4 – USG Does Not Develop Effective and Integrated IA Approaches to Building Partner Capacity.**

- **Mitigation.** Conduct analyses to identify lessons learned and best practices from past efforts to build partner capacity and share these findings with other agencies. In the absence of National Security Council or Department of State leadership, lead an effort to develop a unified government approach for partner capacity building as well as IA plans for specific partners.

**RISK #5 – The United States is Unsuccessful in Building International Coalitions to Conduct IW.**

- **Mitigation.** Develop hedging strategies and plans for surging US forces, accessing additional capacity in the Reserve Components, substituting similar capabilities across Services or components, rapidly retraining US personnel in new specialties, and repositioning US forces to adapt to new operational priorities.
**Risk #6 – Operating in an Ambiguous IW Environment Will Create New Mental and Physiological Demands on Personnel Conducting Long-term Assignments in Foreign Austere Settings.**

- **Mitigation.** Create IW models and simulations using live, virtual, and constructive environments that provide joint force leaders and members the opportunity to practice engagement with foreign forces and populations in daily routine activities as well as IW operations. Exercise communicating, persuading, and negotiating skills using the members’ language proficiency (or lack thereof), cultural knowledge, and cross-cultural communications skills.

**Risk #7 – The United States is Unsuccessful in Establishing an Effective Strategic Communication Capability to Impact Relevant Populations That Are the Focus of IW Operations.**

- **Mitigation.** Create a global DOD strategic communications capability supported by a transformed DOD PSYOP force.

**Risk #8 – The Department of Defense Fails to Appropriately Prepare and Organize GPF for Extended Regional and Global IW.**

- **Mitigation.** Conduct assessments of GPF capabilities to execute IW in the envisioned future environment. Based on these assessments, prepare a plan for Secretary of Defense approval with a timeline to address GPF capability gaps.

### 7. Implications

The IW JOC uses a top down approach to concept development that includes defining the future operating environment, developing broad problem and solution statements, and identifying supporting ideas and broad operational capabilities. Those implications identified to date are set forth below:

**Implications for the US Government:**

- **Enhanced IA Capabilities and Capacities.** The USG will need to enhance the capabilities and capacities of its civilian agencies to conduct protracted IW activities on a global scale.

- **Developing “Ruggedized” IA Capabilities.** While OGAs currently perform their designated overseas roles in established US missions, they may be constrained from operating in an unstable or hostile environment. Joint IA teams conducting IW will typically be required to operate in unstable or hostile areas. The ability to operate in these areas will require the IA to invest in building this “ruggedized” capability. The alternative is that the Department of Defense build this civil-military capability to perform these non-military roles where the operational environment precludes OGA activities or operations.
• **Establishing an Effective IA Framework for IW.** The USG will need to develop an effective IA framework for building partner capacity rooted in a deep understanding of the indigenous culture, unity of effort among the various US agencies involved, and sustained interaction and relationships with the host country over time.

• **Building and Maintaining IW Alliances and Coalitions.** The United States will need to enlist key coalition partners in the planning and conduct of IW operations.

**Operational and Force Development Implications:**

• **Shifting DOD Global Capability and Force Requirements to Meet Protracted Global IW Requirements.** The character and protracted nature of IW will require a thorough examination and assessment of DOD capabilities, force structure, and global defense posture, including a prudent forecast of the likely duration of ongoing commitments combined with an estimate of the likelihood and location of additional commitments. The future joint force must be able to win a risk-informed number of overlapping IW campaigns while maintaining the steady-state GWOT posture and capacity to conduct surge MCO as required. This may require the future joint force to accept more risk in conventional or traditional joint capabilities.

• **Expanded Global Presence for IW.** IW will require a permanent US military presence in every priority country to conduct IPE and OPE and build partner capacity. In order to obtain a permanent global presence, there will need to be an increase in the number of personnel permanently assigned to regional commands, JIATFs, US Missions, and Military Assistance Advisory Groups overseas.

• **Expanded Operational Environments for IW.** The joint force will be required to operate within non-belligerent states or provide increasing levels of support to OGAs to address IW threats operating within ungoverned or under-governed areas within those states. This will require:
  • A greater portion of the joint force to operate in conjunction with OGAs in ways and areas that have been traditionally outside the purview of the joint force.
  • Specific authorities for the joint force to either operate in or provide support to operations against adversaries in non-belligerent states, including ungoverned or under-governed areas.

• **Rebuilding DOD Civil Administration Capability.** The joint force will be required to conduct non-conventional operations in support of, or in place of, IA partners for an extended duration when adequate numbers of IA partners are not available in the operational area. This will require the joint force to:
  • Rebuild its civil administration capability. This capability needs to
be robust enough to meet civil administration functions in the absence of IA support, or for protracted periods of time until appropriate civil authorities can assume these functions in IW environments.

- Assist OGAs to build more expeditionary capabilities for performing their functions in IW environments.

- **Manning the Joint Force for IW.** The joint force will be different from the force of today because of targeted recruitment of native linguists of relevant ethnicities to fill the forward-based teams of regional specialists permanently engaged in IW. This dramatic change in joint force recruitment and assignments will facilitate permanent assignment of joint teams within a single operational area, potentially for their entire careers. These teams will be able to train and advise partner security forces, link those forces to US and coalition CS and CSS, conduct IPE and OPE, and perform advance force operations for deploying joint expeditionary forces during crises and contingency operations.

- **Training the Joint Force for IW.** Future operational commanders will require a joint force that is fully trained, equipped, integrated, combat-ready, and available to conduct and/or counter IW operations on demand. Further, this joint force must be flexible and adaptable enough to prosecute an IW scenario while it is conducting other types of missions across the full range of military operations. This will require:
  - The Services to provide a pool of linguistically and culturally educated personnel capable of operating in priority countries.
  - A greater degree of force management, since language and cultural knowledge is not easily transferable between regions.
  - The ability to apply precise and discrete force during combat operations among and within close proximity to the population.

- **Joint Force Leadership Development.** Leadership development will need to address the challenges of decision-making in an IW environment. The joint force must devise a training strategy to provide leadership an in-depth knowledge of specific geographical areas and concurrent training in the culture and politics of that area. The strategy should employ training support tools as distance learning, simulations, and reach-back to allow leaders to maintain currency and proficiency. The strategy should address use of intelligence resources, sharing information in a joint environment, and engaging foreign leaders in dialog and negotiation. Successful leaders will be adaptive, able to rapidly change their method or approach to decision-making and problem-solving in an ambiguous and complex IW environment.

- **IW Stress on Joint Force Personnel.** Operating in an IW environment will create new mental and physiological demands on personnel conducting long-term assignments in foreign austere settings. Stresses on both personnel and units caused by frequent, repetitive, dangerous, and apparently endless deployments in remote areas of the world will have a
serious impact on the force and require Services to re-assess personnel and unit policies to meet the demand for persistent global IW operations.

- **Impacts on Existing DOD Terms and Definitions.** Joint Publication 1-02 will need to be reviewed to incorporate IW terms and to acknowledge non-state actors within existing DOD definitions. See Glossary for proposed additions and changes.

**Concept Development and Experimentation Implications:**
See Appendix F, Paragraph 2 (Recommendations for Further Assessment).
Appendix A – References

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Appendix B - Glossary and Acronyms

armed group. A group that employs force to achieve its objectives; is not within the formal military structure of any state, alliance of states, or intergovernmental organization; and is not under the control of the state(s) in which it operates. (Proposed)

attribute. A testable and measurable characteristic that describes an aspect of a capability. (CJCSI 3170.01C)

capability. The ability to execute a specified course of action. (A capability may or may not be accompanied by an intention.) (JP 1-02) It is defined by an operational user and expressed in broad operational terms in the format of an initial capabilities document or a DOTMLPF change recommendation. In the case of materiel proposals, the definition will progressively evolve to DOTMLPF performance attributes identified in the [capability development document] and the [capabilities production document]. (CJCSI 3170.01) See also military capability.

civil-military operations. The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations to consolidate and achieve operational US objectives. Civil-military operations may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Civil-military operations may be performed by designated civil affairs, by other military forces, or by a combination of civil affairs and other forces. Also called CMO. (JP 1.02)

clandestine operation. An operation sponsored or conducted by governmental departments or agencies in such a way as to assure secrecy or concealment. A clandestine operation differs from a covert operation in that emphasis is placed on concealment of the operation rather than on concealment of the identity of the sponsor. In special operations, an activity may be both covert and clandestine and may focus equally on operational considerations and intelligence-related activities. (JP 1-02)

combating weapons of mass destruction. The integrated and dynamic activities of the Department of Defense across the full range of counterproliferation, nonproliferation, and consequence management efforts to counter [weapons of mass destruction], their means of delivery, and related materials. Also called CWMD. (National Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (NMS-CWMD), 13 February 2006)

conflict. An armed struggle or clash between organized groups within a nation or between nations in order to achieve limited political or military objectives.
Although regular forces are often involved, irregular forces frequently predominate. Conflict often is protracted, confined to a restricted geographic area, and constrained in weaponry and level of violence. Within this state, military power in response to threats may be exercised in an indirect manner while supportive of other instruments of national power. Limited objectives may be achieved by the short, focused, and direct application of force. (JP 3-0)

**contested environment.** An operational environment in which: (a) A friendly government or occupying power has authorized US military operations but does not have effective control of the territory and population in the operational area, or the capability or intent to assist the joint force effectively; or (b) A hostile government or occupying power is opposed to US military operations but does not have effective control of the territory and population in the operational area, or the capability or intent to oppose the joint force effectively. See also operational environment. (Proposed)

**conventional.** Activities, operations, organizations, capabilities, etc., of the regular armed forces of a country that are capable of conducting military operations using non-nuclear weapons, but excluding designated special operations forces. (Proposed)

**conventional forces.** 1. Those forces capable of conducting operations using non-nuclear weapons. 2. Those forces other than designated special operations forces. (JP 3-05)

**counterinsurgency.** Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency. Also called COIN. (JP 1-02)

**counterterrorism.** Operations that include the offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, preempt, and respond to terrorism. Also called CT. (JP 1-02)

**denied area.** An operational area where a friendly or neutral government or occupying power is opposed to US military operations and has both effective control of the territory and population in the operational area, and the capability and intent to oppose the joint force effectively. (Proposed)

**foreign internal defense.** Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. Also called FID. (JP 1-02)

**general purpose forces.** The regular armed forces of a country, other than nuclear forces and special operations forces, that are organized, trained, and equipped to perform a broad range of missions across the range of military operations. Also called GPF. (Proposed)

**guerrilla warfare.** Military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held or hostile territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces. (JP 1-02)

**hostile environment.** See operational environment.
indirect methods (or means). The term “indirect approach” has three distinct meanings within the context of IW: 1. Unbalance and dislocate adversaries by attacking them physically and psychologically where they are most vulnerable and unsuspecting, rather than where they are strongest or in the manner they expect to be attacked. 2. Empower, enable, and leverage IA and multinational strategic partners to attack adversaries militarily or non-militarily, rather than relying on direct and unilateral military confrontation by US joint forces. 3. Take actions with or against other states or armed groups in order to influence adversaries, rather than taking actions to influence adversaries directly. (Proposed)

information operations. (1) Actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one’s own information and information systems. (JP 1-02) (2) The integrated employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision-making while protecting our own. (DOD Directive 3600.1) Also called IO.

insurgency. 1. An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict. (JP 1-02) 2. An organized, armed political struggle whose goal may be the seizure of power through revolutionary takeover and replacement of the existing government. However, insurgencies’ goals may be more limited. Insurgencies generally follow a revolutionary doctrine and use armed force as an instrument of policy. (FM 100-20, 1990) 3. An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of an established government or societal structure, or the expulsion of a foreign military presence, through the use of subversion and armed conflict. (Proposed by US Special Operations Command)

intelligence activities. The collection, production, and dissemination of foreign intelligence and counterintelligence by agencies within the Intelligence Community. (Derived from Executive Order 12333 and DODD 5240.1)

intelligence collection operations. The use of sensors, including human assets, to detect and monitor both physical and non-physical objects and events in all domains (i.e., physical – maritime, air, space, and land; virtual – cyber and information; human – social, moral, and cognitive). Observation and collection include the gathering of pertinent environmental factors that can influence operations throughout the domains. (Derived from JCA Comment Resolution Conference – 28 April 05; modified from JP 2-01)

intelligence preparation of the environment. Tactical intelligence activities conducted to gain understanding of the physical, military, and civil characteristics of potential operational areas. Also called IPE. (Proposed)

irregular. Activities, operations, organizations, capabilities, etc., in which significant numbers of combatants engage in insurgency and other
nonconventional military and paramilitary operations without being members of the regular armed forces, police, or other internal security forces of any country. See also conventional, nonconventional. (Proposed)

**irregular forces.** Armed individuals or groups who are not members of the regular armed forces, police, or other internal security forces. (JP 1-02)

**irregular warfare.** A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. Irregular warfare favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will. Also called IW. (Proposed)

**irregular warfare campaign.** A campaign that primarily focuses on irregular warfare operations or activities. (Proposed)

**Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System.** The Department of Defense system for identifying, assessing, and prioritizing joint military capability needs. Also called JCIDS. (Proposed)

**line(s) of operation.** 1. Lines that define the directional orientation of the force in time and space in relation to the enemy. They connect the force with its base of operations and its objectives. (JP 1-02). 2. An arrangement of military forces or capabilities that links decisive points to achieve desired effects that may bear no direct relationship to an enemy’s physical activities. Also called logical lines of operation (LLO). (Proposed definition derived from Army FM 3-0)

**low-intensity conflict.** Political-military confrontation between contending states or groups below conventional war and above the routine, peaceful competition among states. It frequently involves protracted struggles of competing principles and ideologies. Low intensity conflict ranges from subversion to the use of armed force. It is waged by a combination of means, employing political, economic, informational, and military instruments. Low intensity conflicts are localized generally in the Third World, but contain regional and global security implications. Also called LIC.

**military capability.** The ability to achieve a specified wartime objective (win a war or battle, destroy a target set). It includes four major components: force structure, modernization, readiness, and sustainability. a. Force Structure - Numbers, size, and composition of the units that comprise our defense forces; e.g., divisions, ships, air wings. b. Modernization - Technical sophistication of forces, units, weapon systems, and equipment. c. Unit Readiness - The ability to provide capabilities required by the combatant commanders to execute their assigned missions. This is derived from the ability of each unit to deliver the outputs for which it was designed. d. Sustainability - The ability to maintain the necessary level and duration of operational activity to achieve military objectives. Sustainability is a function of providing for and maintaining those levels of ready forces, materiel, and consumables necessary to support military effort. (JP 1-02)
military support to security, stability, transition, and reconstruction. Department of Defense activities that support US government plans for stabilization, security, reconstruction, and transition operations, which lead to sustainable peace while advancing US interests. (DODD 3000.05)

nation assistance. Civil and/or military assistance rendered to a nation by foreign forces within that nation’s territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between nations. Nation assistance programs include, but are not limited to, security assistance, foreign internal defense, other US Code title 10 (DOD) programs, and activities performed on a reimbursable basis by federal agencies or international organizations. (JP 3-57)

national strategic level of war. See strategic level of war.

nonconventional. Activities, operations, organizations, capabilities, etc., for which the regular armed forces of a country, excluding designated special operations forces, do not have a broad-based requirement for the conduct of combat operations against the regular armed forces of another country. This term includes the employment of conventional forces and capabilities in nonstandard ways or for nonstandard purposes. See also conventional, irregular. (Proposed)

non-state actor. A group or organization that is not within the formal structure of any state, not limited by any state boundary, and operates beyond the control of any state and without loyalty to any state. Examples include international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, political parties, labor unions, commercial trade associations, criminal enterprises, and armed groups such as insurgent and terrorist organizations, informal armed militias, and private military companies. See also armed group, nongovernmental organization. (Proposed)

operational direction. The authority over US military forces that the President delegates to a chief of mission for a specific complex contingency operation for which the chief of mission has responsibility. Operational direction normally includes the authority to assign tasks, designate objectives, synchronize and integrate actions, and give authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. (Proposed)

operational environment. A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of military forces and bear on the decisions of the unit commander. Some examples are as follows: a. permissive environment – Operational environment in which host country military and law enforcement agencies have control as well as the intent and capability to assist operations that a unit intends to conduct. b. uncertain environment – Operational environment in which host government forces, whether opposed to or receptive to operations that a unit intends to conduct, do not have totally effective control of the territory and population in the intended operational area. c. hostile environment – Operational environment in which hostile forces have
control as well as the intent and capability to effectively oppose or react to the operations a unit intends to conduct. (JP 1-02)

**operational mode.** The degree of secrecy or concealment placed on an operation to limit exposure of those involved or their activities. See also clandestine operation; covert operation; low visibility operations; overt operation. (Proposed)

**operational preparation of the environment.** Activities conducted prior to d-day, h-hour, in likely or potential areas of operations to prepare and shape the environment to mitigate risk and facilitate success. Also called OPE. (Proposed)

**overt operation.** An operation that is planned and executed without any effort to conceal the operation or the identity of the sponsor. (Proposed)

**paramilitary.** Connotes activities, operations, organizations, etc., distinct from those of the regular armed forces of any country but resembling them in organization, equipment, training, or mission. (Proposed)

**paramilitary forces.** Forces or groups that are distinct from the regular armed forces of any country but resembling them in organization, equipment, training, or mission. (JP 1-02)

**partisan warfare.** Not to be used. See guerrilla warfare. (JP 1-02)

**permissive area.** An operational area in which host country military and law enforcement agencies have control as well as the intent and capability to assist operations that a unit intends to conduct. (Proposed)

**permissive environment.** See operational environment.

**psychological operations.** Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator’s objectives. Also called PSYOP. (JP 1-02)

**reconstruction operations.** Operations to establish or rebuild the critical political, social, and economic systems or infrastructure necessary to facilitate long-term security and the transition to legitimate local governance in an operational area. See also stability operations. (Derived from SSTR JOC)

**security forces.** Police and constabulary forces, as well as military and paramilitary forces, that protect societies from criminal, terrorist, and other threats to public order. (Proposed)

**special operations.** Operations conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to achieve military, diplomatic, informational, and/or economic objectives employing military capabilities for which there is no broad conventional force requirement. These operations often require covert, clandestine, or low visibility capabilities. Special operations are applicable
across the range of military operations. They can be conducted independently or in conjunction with operations of conventional forces or other government agencies and may include operations through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces. Special operations differ from conventional operations in degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques, mode of employment, independence from friendly support, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets. Also called SO. (JP 3-05)

**stability operations.** (1) An overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment and provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. (JP 1-02) (2) Military and civilian activities conducted across the spectrum from peace to conflict to establish or maintain order in states and regions. (DODD 3000.05)

**strategic level of war.** (1) The level of war at which a nation, often as a member of a group of nations, determines national or multinational (alliance or coalition) security objectives and guidance and develops and uses national resources to accomplish these objectives. Activities at this level establish national and multinational military objectives; sequence initiatives; define limits and assess risks of the use of military and other instruments of national power; develop global plans or theater war plans to achieve these objectives; and provide military forces and other capabilities in accordance with strategic plans. (JP 1-02) (2) The level of war at which a state or non-state actor, often as a member of an alliance or coalition, determines strategic objectives and guidance and develops and uses its resources to accomplish these objectives. Activities at this level establish strategic military objectives; sequence initiatives; define limits and assess risks of the use of military and other instruments of power; develop global or theater plans to achieve these objectives; and provide military forces and other capabilities in accordance with strategic plans. The strategic level of war is divided into two sublevels: a. **national strategic** - The President, Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and functional combatant commanders operate at the national strategic sublevel of war when establishing national and military strategic objectives; sequencing strategic initiatives; defining limits and assessing risks of the use of military and other instruments of national power; developing global strategic plans to achieve these objectives; and providing military forces and other capabilities in accordance with these strategic plans. b. **theater strategic** - Geographic combatant commanders normally operate at the theater strategic sublevel of war when developing theater plans to achieve national security or strategic military objectives and applying the military instrument of power in coordination with the other instruments of national power in their areas of responsibility to achieve the desired military end state within the strategic end state determined by national security or strategic military objectives and guidance. (Proposed)
**task.** A discrete action performed by an individual or organization to accomplish a mission. Tasks specify what actions must be performed, not who will perform them, how they will be performed, or what means will be employed to perform them. (CJCSM 3500.04C)

**terrorism.** The calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological. (JP 1-02) The calculated use or threat of unlawful political violence against noncombatants, intended to coerce or intimidate governments or societies through fear. (Proposed)

**terrorist group.** Any number of terrorists who assemble together, have a unifying relationship, or are organized for the purpose of committing an act or acts of violence or threatens violence in pursuit of their political, religious, or ideological objectives. See also terrorism. (JP 1-02)

**theater strategic level of war.** See strategic level of war.

**uncertain environment.** See operational environment.

**unconventional warfare.** A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes, but is not limited to, guerrilla warfare, subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and unconventional assisted recovery. Also called UW. (JP 1-02)

**ungoverned area.** An operational area in which no effective government exists to control the territory and population, or over which the state government is unable to extend control. (Proposed)

**ungoverned environment.** An operational environment where no effective government exists to control the territory and population in the operational area or to assist or oppose the joint force. See also operational environment. (Proposed)

**unified action.** A broad generic term that describes the wide scope of actions (including the synchronization of activities with governmental and nongovernmental agencies) taking place within unified commands, subordinate unified commands, or joint task forces under the overall direction of the commanders of those commands. (JP 0-2)

**war.** A violent clash of interests between or among organized groups characterized by the use of military force. (Derived from USMC Warfighting)

**warfare.** The use of military force and other forms of organized political violence in combination with other instruments of power and influence to achieve strategic objectives. (Proposed)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronyms</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C2</td>
<td>command and control</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>CJCSM</td>
<td>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMO</td>
<td>civil-military operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>COIN</td>
<td>counterinsurgency</td>
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<tr>
<td>CONOPS</td>
<td>concept of operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>CS</td>
<td>combat support</td>
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<td>CSS</td>
<td>combat service support</td>
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<tr>
<td>CT</td>
<td>counterterrorism</td>
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<tr>
<td>CTF</td>
<td>combined task force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>DODD</td>
<td>Department of Defense Directive</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOTMLPF</td>
<td>doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities</td>
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<tr>
<td>FID</td>
<td>foreign internal defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>GPF</td>
<td>general purpose forces</td>
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<td>GWOT</td>
<td>Global War on Terrorism</td>
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<td>HN</td>
<td>host nation</td>
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<tr>
<td>HUMINT</td>
<td>human intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>IA</td>
<td>Interagency</td>
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<tr>
<td>IGO</td>
<td>intergovernmental organization</td>
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<td>IO</td>
<td>information operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPE</td>
<td>intelligence preparation of the environment</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISR</td>
<td>intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance</td>
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<tr>
<td>JCA</td>
<td>Joint Capability Area</td>
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<tr>
<td>JFC</td>
<td>joint force commander</td>
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<td>JIATF</td>
<td>joint interagency task force</td>
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<td>JOC</td>
<td>joint operating concept</td>
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<td>JP</td>
<td>joint publication</td>
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<td>JTF</td>
<td>joint task force</td>
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<td>LOE</td>
<td>limited objective experiment</td>
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<tr>
<td>LOO</td>
<td>line of operation</td>
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<td>MCO</td>
<td>major combat operations</td>
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<td>MILGRP</td>
<td>military group</td>
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<tr>
<td>MN</td>
<td>multinational</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOU</td>
<td>memorandum of understanding</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>nongovernmental organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPE</td>
<td>operational preparation of the environment</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSD</td>
<td>Office of the Secretary of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OGA</td>
<td>other government agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSYOP</td>
<td>psychological operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIBR</td>
<td>Security, Institution Building and Reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOF</td>
<td>special operations forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSTRO</td>
<td>stabilization, security, transition, and reconstruction operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<td>------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>TTP</td>
<td>tactics, techniques, and procedures</td>
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<tr>
<td>UJTL</td>
<td>Universal Joint Task List</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>USG</td>
<td>United States government</td>
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<tr>
<td>USSOCOM</td>
<td>United States Special Operations Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UW</td>
<td>unconventional warfare</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix C - Table of Operational Effects and Broad Military Capabilities

The UJTL (CJCSM 3500.04D) provided definitions for these tasks, but desired end states and measures are specific for IW. These tasks may require further decomposition in the actual development of supporting joint integrating concepts and functional area analyses.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Capability Conditions</th>
<th>Effect</th>
<th>Tier 1 JCA</th>
<th>Tier 2 JCA (Tier 3 JCA)</th>
<th>UJTL Tasks</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Planning</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>IW 0.7-001C</td>
<td>The ability to design IW campaign plans.</td>
<td>IW campaign plans are oriented on the relevant populations and political authorities and the underlying conditions fomenting IW.</td>
<td>Joint Command and Control</td>
<td>Operational Planning</td>
<td>SN 5.4.1 ST 5.3.2 ST 5.3.4 OP 5.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IW 0.7-002C</td>
<td>The ability to assess operational situations.</td>
<td>Accurate assessment of the operational situation based upon consideration of all available, pertinent information and to determine and fully understand the adversary deterrence decision calculus.</td>
<td>Joint Command and Control</td>
<td>Operational Planning</td>
<td>SN 5.2 ST 5.2 OP 5.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IW 0.7-003C</td>
<td>The ability to conduct joint force targeting.</td>
<td>Appropriate targets and target sets, effects, force elements, and sequencing actions across the domain space are linked to subvert, coerce, attrite, and exhaust an adversary.</td>
<td>Joint Command and Control</td>
<td>Operational Planning</td>
<td>SN 3.2.1 ST 3.1 OP 3.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IW 0.7-004C</td>
<td>The ability to synchronize joint IW campaign plans and subordinate IW operations.</td>
<td>Tasks and operations of assigned, attached, and supporting IW elements are synchronized horizontally and vertically in time and across domains to achieve unity of effort.</td>
<td>Joint Command and Control</td>
<td>Operational Planning</td>
<td>SN 5.4.3 ST 5.4.2 OP 5.4.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Preparation</td>
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<tr>
<td>IW 0.7-005C</td>
<td>The ability to command subordinate operational forces (US and partner SOF, GPF, and other forces conducting IW).  • In contested, hostile, denied, and ungoverned areas  • In concert with other government agencies and coalition partners</td>
<td>Joint and coalition force has a clear understanding of the commander’s vision and intent, a concept of operations, and is empowered to implement locally with minimum control imposed by higher headquarters.</td>
<td>Joint Command and Control</td>
<td>Operational Planning</td>
<td>SN 5.4.3 OP 5.4</td>
<td>No relevant ST task.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Capability Conditions</td>
<td>Effect</td>
<td>Tier 1 JCA</td>
<td>Tier 2 JCA (Tier 3 JCA)</td>
<td>UJTL Tasks</td>
<td>Remarks</td>
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<tr>
<td>IW 0.7-0006C</td>
<td>The ability to conduct operational maneuver and positioning of forces conducting IW</td>
<td>All IW elements have the position of advantage across the domain space and are positioned to execute their respective mission on order.</td>
<td>Joint “Domain” Operations</td>
<td>Conduct Operational Movement and Maneuver Forcible Entry Joint Deployment/ Rapid Distribution</td>
<td>SN 3.1 ST 1.3.1 OP 1.2</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• In contested, hostile, denied, and ungoverned areas</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Population-oriented</td>
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<tr>
<td>IW 0.7-007C</td>
<td>The ability to integrate IA activities and operations. Integrate and harmonize the activities and operations of US military and civilian elements involved in conducting IW campaigns and major operations.</td>
<td>Activities and operations of US military and civilian elements integrated into unified action in time, space, and purpose.</td>
<td>Joint Interagency/ IGO/MN/ NGO Coordination</td>
<td>USG Interagency Integration IGO Coordination NGO Coordination MN Integration</td>
<td>SN 8.1.10 SN 8.2.2 ST 8.5.1 ST 8.5.3.2 OP 4.7.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IW 0.7-008C</td>
<td>The ability to integrate joint/multinational activities and operations. Integrate and harmonize the activities and operations of US and coalition partners involved in conducting IW campaigns and operations.</td>
<td>Activities and operations of US and coalition partners integrated into unified action in time, space, and purpose.</td>
<td>Joint Interagency/ IGO/MN/ NGO Coordination</td>
<td>IGO Coordination NGO Coordination MN Integration</td>
<td>SN 8.1 SN 8.1.9 SN 8.1.10 ST 8.2.10 ST 8.2.11 ST 8.2.12</td>
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**Execution**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Capability</th>
<th>Effect</th>
<th>Tier 1 JCA</th>
<th>Tier 2 JCA (Tier 3 JCA)</th>
<th>UJTL Tasks</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IW 0.7-009C</td>
<td>The ability to conduct strategic communications in support of IW campaign objectives.</td>
<td>Partner, neutral, and adversary decisions and behavior are influenced favorably.</td>
<td>Joint Shaping</td>
<td>Strategic Information and Engagement Coordination</td>
<td>No relevant UJTL tasks.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• In support of a global effort</td>
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<tr>
<td>IW 0.7-010C</td>
<td>The ability to conduct psychological operations in support of IW campaign objectives.</td>
<td>Friendly and neutral foreign states, organizations, groups, forces, and populations support and cooperate with joint forces. Will and capacity of hostile or potentially hostile foreign states, organizations, groups, forces, and populations to wage warfare is eroded. Friendly, neutral, or hostile foreign governments, organizations, groups, forces, and individuals develop more favorable emotions, attitudes, motives, objective reasoning, and behavior.</td>
<td>Joint Special Operations and IW</td>
<td>Irregular Warfare (Psychological Operations from Joint Special Operations)</td>
<td>ST 3.2.2.1 OP 3.2.2.1</td>
<td>No relevant SN task.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Capability Conditions</td>
<td>Effect</td>
<td>Tier 1 JCA</td>
<td>Tier 2 JCA (Tier 3 JCA)</td>
<td>UJTL Tasks</td>
<td>Remarks</td>
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<tr>
<td>IW 0.7-011C</td>
<td>The ability to conduct counter-psychological operations. Identify, expose, and counter adversary attempts to influence friendly and neutral governments, organizations, groups, forces, and populations.</td>
<td>Adversary attempts to influence friendly and neutral governments, organizations, groups, forces, and populations are countered and thwarted.</td>
<td>Joint Special Operations and IW</td>
<td>Irregular Warfare (Psychological Operations from Joint Special Operations)</td>
<td>OP 6.2.12</td>
<td>No relevant SN or ST task.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IW 0.7-012C</td>
<td>The ability to conduct information operations in support of IW campaign objectives. • In contested, hostile, denied, and ungoverned areas</td>
<td>Adversary decisions are influenced to cause behavior favorable to joint force interests.</td>
<td>Joint Information Operations</td>
<td>Electronic Warfare Computer Network Operations Military Deception Operations Security PSYOP</td>
<td>SN 5.5</td>
<td>ST 5.6 OP 5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IW 0.7-013C</td>
<td>The ability to execute HUMINT network operations in advance of and throughout the IW campaign. • In contested, hostile, denied, and ungoverned areas • Against clandestine insurgent, terrorist, and criminal networks • Overtly, clandestinely or covertly • Persistent and continuous • Before adversaries can react to render information useless</td>
<td>Friendly forces have sufficient information to accomplish their assigned missions.</td>
<td>Joint Battlespace Awareness</td>
<td>Observation and Collection (All Domains)</td>
<td>SN 2.2.1 ST 2.2.5 OP 2.2.1 OP 2.2.5 OP 2.3.1</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>IW 0.7-014C</td>
<td>The ability to collect and exploit information on the situation. Obtain significant information on enemy and friendly forces and the nature and characteristics of the area of interest and its resident populations. • In contested, hostile, denied, and ungoverned areas • Against clandestine insurgent, terrorist, and criminal networks • Overtly, clandestinely, or covertly • Persistent and continuous • Before adversaries can react to render information useless</td>
<td>Friendly forces have sufficient information to accomplish their assigned missions.</td>
<td>Joint Battlespace Awareness</td>
<td>Observation and Collection (All Domains)</td>
<td>SN 2.2.1 ST 2.2.5 OP 2.2.1 OP 2.2.5 OP 2.3.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Capability Conditions</td>
<td>Effect</td>
<td>Tier 1 JCA</td>
<td>Tier 2 JCA (Tier 3 JCA)</td>
<td>UJTL Tasks</td>
<td>Remarks</td>
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<tr>
<td>IW 0.7-015C</td>
<td>The ability to conduct counterintelligence operations.</td>
<td>Adversary is unable to collect information from joint forces and their strategic partners.</td>
<td>Joint Battlespace Awareness</td>
<td>Analysis and Production (Counterintelligence)</td>
<td>SN 2.8 ST 6.2.6.4</td>
<td>Counter-intelligence Tier 3 JCA does not appear to belong under analysis and production. No relevant OP task.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IW 0.7-016C</td>
<td>The ability to execute civil-military operations.</td>
<td>Military forces and local civil authorities and populations in a friendly or occupied area have favorable relationships. Operational area is being effectively and justly governed.</td>
<td>Joint Special Operations and IW Joint Stability Operations</td>
<td>Irregular Warfare (Civil-Military Operations from Joint Special Operations) Security (Basic Services Restoration) Humanitarian Assistance Reconstruction</td>
<td>SN 8.1.6 ST 8.2.2 OP 4.7.2 OP 4.7.4 OP 4.7.6 SN 8.1.5 ST 8.2.5</td>
<td>No relevant OP task. UJTL ST and OP tasks do not address CMO in occupied areas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IW 0.7-017C</td>
<td>The ability to provide nation assistance to foreign states, organizations, or groups. Support and assist in the political, economic, and social development of a friendly or occupied state or other political entity.</td>
<td>Local populations have access to basic essential services such as food, potable water, power, waste management, medical care, education, law enforcement, firefighting, transportation, commerce, communications, and agriculture. Political, economic, and social development of a friendly or occupied state or other political entity has mitigated underlying conditions that foster insurgency.</td>
<td>Joint Stability Operations</td>
<td>No Relevant Tier 2 JCA</td>
<td>SN 8.1.2 ST 8.25</td>
<td>Joint Stability Operations JCA does not support the IW JOC lines of operation (LOOs) for governance or economic and social development. No relevant OP task.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IW 0.7-018C</td>
<td>The ability to provide combat and non-combat military training and advisory assistance to the armed forces and other security forces of a foreign state, organization, or group.</td>
<td>Armed forces and other security forces of a foreign state, organization, or group are fully mission capable.</td>
<td>Joint Shaping</td>
<td>Security Cooperation (Building Military Partner Capability/ Capacity)</td>
<td>SN 8.1.1 ST 8.2.1 OP 4.7.1</td>
<td>UJTL tasks focus exclusively on non-combat security assistance programs. Security Cooperation JCA excludes non-military security forces and irregular forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Capability Conditions</td>
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<tr>
<td>IW 0.7-019C</td>
<td>The ability to conduct foreign internal defense.</td>
<td>Insurgent and terrorist organizations are defeated militarily. Security conditions necessary for strategic success are established.</td>
<td>Joint Special Operations and IW</td>
<td>Irregular Warfare (Foreign Internal Defense)</td>
<td>SN 8.1.8 ST 8.2.9 OP 4.7.7</td>
<td>UJTL tasks need to be further decomposed to make them actionable.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IW 0.7-020C</td>
<td>The ability to train selected partners to conduct foreign internal defense.</td>
<td>Insurgent and terrorist organizations are defeated militarily. Security conditions necessary for strategic success are established.</td>
<td>Joint Special Operations and IW</td>
<td>Irregular Warfare (Foreign Internal Defense)</td>
<td>SN 8.1.8 ST 8.2.9 OP 4.7.7</td>
<td>UJTL tasks need to be further decomposed to make them actionable.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IW 0.7-021C</td>
<td>The ability to conduct unconventional warfare.</td>
<td>Supported armed groups and their irregular forces have gained legitimacy and popular support and defeated their adversaries politically and militarily. United States has achieved its strategic objectives.</td>
<td>Joint Special Operations and IW</td>
<td>Irregular Warfare</td>
<td>ST 1.37</td>
<td>No relevant SN or OP task.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IW 0.7-022C</td>
<td>The ability to train selected partners to conduct unconventional warfare.</td>
<td>Supported armed groups and their irregular forces have gained legitimacy and popular support and defeated their adversaries politically and militarily. United States has achieved its strategic objectives.</td>
<td>Joint Special Operations and IW</td>
<td>Irregular Warfare</td>
<td>ST 1.37</td>
<td>No relevant SN or OP task.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IW 0.7-023C</td>
<td>The ability of forces conducting IW to control significant land areas. Control strategically or operationally significant land areas to facilitate the freedom of movement and action of forces and to enable and facilitate the decisive non-military activities necessary to win an IW effort. In contested, hostile, denied, and ungoverned areas Against clandestine insurgent, terrorist, and criminal networks Overtly, clandestinely, or covertly Persistent and continuous By and with indigenous forces Oriented on the population and its needs and grievances</td>
<td>Friendly forces have adequate freedom of movement and action. Adversary forces do not have adequate freedom of movement and action. Relevant populations are physically isolated from adversaries. Adversaries are denied the resources they need to operate, survive, and flourish.</td>
<td>Joint Land Operations</td>
<td>Control Territory, Populations, and Resources Security</td>
<td>ST 1.6.1 OP 1.5.1 OP 1.5.4 OP 1.5.5</td>
<td>No relevant SN task.</td>
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Appendix C
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<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Capability Conditions</th>
<th>Effect</th>
<th>Tier 1 JCA</th>
<th>Tier 2 JCA (Tier 3 JCA)</th>
<th>UJTL Tasks</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
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<tr>
<td>IW 0.7-024C</td>
<td>The ability of forces conducting IW to control significant maritime and littoral areas. Control strategically or operationally significant maritime and littoral areas to facilitate the freedom of movement and action of forces and to enable and facilitate the decisive non-military activities necessary to win an IW effort. • In contested, hostile, denied, and ungoverned areas • Against clandestine insurgent, terrorist, and criminal networks • Overtly, clandestinely, or covertly • Persistent and continuous • By and with indigenous forces • Oriented on the population and its needs and grievances</td>
<td>Friendly forces have adequate freedom of movement and action. Adversary forces do not have adequate freedom of movement and action. Relevant populations are physically isolated from adversaries. Adversaries are denied the resources they need to operate, survive, and flourish.</td>
<td>Joint Maritime and Littoral Operations</td>
<td>Maritime/ Littoral Expeditionary Operations (Riverine Operations)</td>
<td>ST 1.6.3 OP 1.5.2 OP 1.5.6</td>
<td>No relevant SN task. UJTL ST 1.6.3 and OP 1.5.2 focus exclusively on MCO and do not address littoral operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IW 0.7-025C</td>
<td>The ability of forces conducting IW to establish control of significant airspace. Control strategically or operationally significant airspace to facilitate the freedom of movement and action of forces and to enable and facilitate the decisive non-military activities necessary to win an IW effort. • Over contested, hostile, denied, and ungoverned areas • Against clandestine insurgent, terrorist, and criminal networks • Overtly, clandestinely, or covertly • Persistent and continuous • By and with indigenous forces</td>
<td>Adversary forces, systems, or capabilities are disrupted, neutralized, or destroyed. Adversary systems and their key personnel are denied the resources they need to operate, survive, and flourish.</td>
<td>Joint Air Operations</td>
<td>Offensive Counterair Operations</td>
<td>ST 1.6.3 OP 1.5.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>IW 0.7-026C</td>
<td>The ability of forces conducting IW to conduct lethal strike operations. Attack, disrupt, neutralize, and destroy adversary forces, systems, or capabilities and deny them the resources they need to operate, survive, and flourish.</td>
<td>Adversary forces, systems, or capabilities are disrupted, neutralized, or destroyed. Adversary systems and their key personnel are denied the resources they need to operate, survive, and flourish.</td>
<td>Joint Land, Air, Maritime and Littoral Operations</td>
<td>Provide and Employ Joint Fires Conduct Decisive Maneuver Maritime Interdiction Maritime/Littoral Fires</td>
<td>SN 3.3.1 ST 3.2.1 OP 3.2</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Number</td>
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<td>IW 0.7-027C</td>
<td>The ability of forces conducting IW to strike targets using non-lethal means. Degrade, impair, disrupt, or delay the performance of adversary forces, systems, or capabilities using electronic attack or other IO capabilities.</td>
<td>Adversary forces, systems, or capabilities are degraded, impaired, disrupted, or delayed.</td>
<td>Joint Information Operations</td>
<td>Electronic Warfare (Electronic Attack) Computer Network Operations (Computer Network Attack/Exploitation)</td>
<td>SN 3.3.4</td>
<td>ST 3.2.2 OP 3.2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IW 0.7-028C</td>
<td>The ability of forces conducting IW to conduct personnel recovery operations. Report, locate, track, support, recover, and repatriate captured, detained, evading, isolated, or missing personnel.</td>
<td>Captured, detained, evading, isolated, or missing personnel are reported, located, tracked, supported, recovered, and repatriated.</td>
<td>Joint Protection</td>
<td>Personnel Recovery</td>
<td>SN 3.4.9</td>
<td>ST 6.2.7 OP 6.2.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| IW 0.7-029C | The ability to provide base support and services to IW operations. Provide necessary logistic support to distributed joint forces engaged in operations against adversary forces, systems, or capabilities.  
• Very short notice movements to remote and austere locations with limited or no infrastructure or HN support  
• Distributed operations by large numbers of small teams operating from remote and austere bases  
• Support of indigenous and coalition forces  
• Protracted operations  
• Less than 1 year to rest, refit, and reconstitute between deployments | Joint forces can operate uninterrupted by logistic shortfalls. | Joint Logistics | Agile Sustainment                                    | SN 4.2.1        | ST 4.4 OP 4.6                  |

**Assessment**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Capability Conditions</th>
<th>Effect</th>
<th>Tier 1 JCA</th>
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<th>UJTL Tasks</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IW 0.7-030C</td>
<td>The capability to assess IW operations and campaigns</td>
<td>Joint force has an understanding of effects of past and ongoing operations and campaigns and has identified the requirements for future operations and campaigns.</td>
<td>Joint Command and Control</td>
<td>Monitor Execution, Assess Effects and Adapt Operations</td>
<td>SN 3.3.5</td>
<td>ST 3.1.3 OP 3.1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
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<td><strong>Force Development</strong></td>
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<td>IW 0.7-031C</td>
<td>The ability to educate and train the joint force on the nuances of IW operations.</td>
<td>Joint force is provided with fully educated and trained personnel and units to execute IW operations and campaigns.</td>
<td>Joint Force Generation</td>
<td>Develop Skills</td>
<td>SN 7.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IW 0.7-032C</td>
<td>The ability to develop appropriate analytical models and simulations to support the analysis of IW campaigns and operations.</td>
<td>Models and simulations provide realistic effects of direct and indirect action in an IW campaign or operation.</td>
<td>Joint Force Generation</td>
<td>Equip</td>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| IW 0.7-033C | The ability to develop joint concepts for IW. Capture lessons learned in combat and institutionalize them into the joint force so that it can adapt to the dynamics of the strategic and operational environments.  
  • Under combat conditions                                                                                                                                  | Lessons learned in combat are captured and institutionalized in TTP.                              | Joint Force Generation      | Develop Skills            | SN 7.1.2    | ST 7.1.5                 | No relevant OP task |
| **Force Management**                                                                                                                                       |                                                                                                  |                              |                           |             |                          |
| IW 0.7-034C | The ability to manage the composition and disposition of the joint force to support protracted IW campaigns. Enable the sustained employment of military power to wage protracted IW on a global scale. | Joint force is organized and postured to wage protracted IW on a global scale.                    | Joint Force Management      | Global Posture Global Force Management | SN 7.3.1    | SN 7.3.2 SN 7.3.3 SN 7.3.4 ST 7.1.2 OP 4.4.2.1 |
| IW 0.7-035C | The ability to coordinate forward presence of joint forces in theaters in support of shaping operations and protracted IW campaigns.                  | Forces positioned in time and space to shape the operational environment and to support rapid and persistent response. | Joint Force Management      | Global Posture Global Force Management | SN 3.1      | SN 3.1.1                 |
Appendix D – Universal Joint Task List-Defined Conditions

Listed below are the UJTL-defined conditions that impact execution of IW tasks in contested, hostile, or denied environments and the probable worst case characterizations of these conditions.

1. Urbanization (C 1.1.3.1). (Presence of built-up population centers.)
   Significant urban areas (> 500,000 people) in the operational area.

2. Pre-Existing Arrangements (C 2.1.1.2). (Those plans, organizations, relationships, and arrangements that existed before the present mission or tasking and that might influence execution of the concept of operations.)
   Partial to none.

3. Mission Classification (C 2.1.1.3). (The degree of secrecy assigned to the mission.) Clandestine or covert.

4. Military Commitments From Other Nations (C 2.1.1.7). (The amount of commitment on the part of other nations to support mission.) Limited. The JFC will be expected to operate with a range of military commitments from other countries. Political considerations may drive the participation of less capable forces.

5. Lead Time (C 2.1.5.1). (The time from receipt of a warning or directive to initiation of military operations.) Long. The JFC may have weeks, months, or years to prepare an operational environment.

6. Mission Duration (C 2.1.5.2). (The time a unit is expected to continue a mission.) Protracted. The JFC will have to plan and conduct multiple unit and personnel rotations for more than 5 years.

7. Intelligence Database (C 2.4.2). (The availability of intelligence data or threat assessments to support a mission or task.) Marginal to negligible.

8. Theater Intelligence Access (C 2.4.4). (The ability of intelligence gathering resources to penetrate and cover the operational area.) Difficult to impenetrable for US personnel. Difficult to penetrate for coalition partners.

9. Degree of Dispersion (C 2.6.1). (The degree to which forces or facilities are concentrated in one area or conform to linear formations or lines.) Highly dispersed and completely nonlinear with large numbers of small teams operating from remote and austere locations.

10. Collateral Damage Potential (C 2.6.7). (Potential for physical damage and collateral effects on noncombatant persons, property, and environments occurring incident to military operations.) High level of concern that collateral damage will exceed specified levels of impact on noncombatants.

11. Sustainment Facilities (C 2.8.1). (Those grounds, buildings, and equipment available to provide and support sustainment of the force.) Operational area has limited to no physical infrastructure to provide or support sustainment of the force.

12. Host-Nation Support (C 2.8.5). (The extent of civil and military assistance provided by an HN to foreign forces within its territory.) Limited to none.
13. **Threat Form (C 2.9.2).** (Types of potential aggression.) For US and coalition forces countering an insurgency or terrorist movement, threat form is unconventional or terrorist with potential access to nuclear, chemical, biological, and radiological weapons. For US and coalition forces conducting or supporting an insurgency, threat form is conventional military, paramilitary, police, and other internal security forces.

14. **Breadth of Conflict (C 2.10.2).** (Scope and breadth of conflict area.) Multi-theater or global, involving more than 40 countries.

15. **Interdepartmental/Interagency Relationship (C 3.1.1.3).** (The extent to which the Executive Branch of government and other agencies work together toward articulated goals.) Partially cooperative. OGAs may be willing but unable to cooperate.

16. **Culture (C 3.2).** (Those aspects of a people that relate to their language, history, customs, economics, religion, and character.) Non-western.

17. **Language (C 3.2.1).** (The spoken and written means of communication.) Other. Great percentage of indigenous population is unlikely to speak English.

18. **Customs Adjustment (C 3.2.2).** (Customs within a nation or an area that may require accommodation.) Significant.

19. **Societal Openness (C 3.2.2.1).** (The degree to which the population of a nation or an area is open to the presence of people from different nations or cultural backgrounds.) Limited (very hard to penetrate).

20. **Religious Beliefs (C 3.2.3).** (Strength of adherence to religion, the impact on behavior, and the degree of domination over the life of a nation.) Strong.

21. **Cultural Unity (C 3.2.5).** (The extent to which a country is free from serious ethnic, cultural, and language divisions.) Low (serious cultural divisions are causing internal conflict).
Appendix E – IW JOC Vignette

1. Overview. This vignette describes a notional regional IW scenario that involves operations in the three geopolitical operating environments previously discussed (operations within a friendly state, operations against a hostile state, and operations within a non-belligerent state). Only the operations within the friendly state and against a hostile state will be described here; operations within a non-belligerent state will be included in a classified annex. There are three countries of primary interest located in one geographic combatant commander’s area of responsibility and a linkage to the national campaign against transnational terrorism. See Figure E-1.

Figure E-1: Regional Map

Defined Relationships. The following is provided to describe the elements used in the vignette:

- Red Elements—identified as US adversaries.
- Brown Elements—nation or group willing to directly or indirectly support red elements who oppose US interests or actions within a specific country or within the region.
- Green Elements—HN and/or groups or nations predisposed to support US interests and/or be supported by the United States. (For example, Country A hosts Nation Sparrow, a third party country located within Combatant Command Ford, another geographical combatant commander’s region).
- Blue Elements—US
2. **Regional Situation/US National Objectives.** The United States has long-term national security and economic interests in the region. A combination of developing but weak governments and rogue governments or organizations has created an environment that presents opportunities for terrorist and criminal organizations to operate with near impunity. Tribal and ethnic boundaries overlap, and cross national borders complicate efforts to secure borders and regulate traffic. A severe drought is displacing hundreds of thousands, and more than 8 million people will be directly affected. As they surge into the urban areas to escape the drought’s effects, they are drawing on already insufficient resources and infrastructure. The overall result is widespread instability in a region that contains untapped natural resources with strategic importance and that lies astride vital sea-lanes. A by-product of this instability is an expansion of a strain of religious fundamentalism possessing a particularly strong anti-American/anti-Western ideology.

The USG has identified three countries as critical for establishing regional stability. A brief description of each country is provided below.

- **Country A (friendly state, permissive environment).** Country A has a fragile, developing government with a weak economy located in an area of strategic importance due to its proximity to vital sea lanes. Latent transnational terrorist elements create significant regional security challenges. Country A faces inter-tribal conflicts, large sections of ungoverned spaces, and an active insurgency.

- **Country B (non-belligerent state, uncertain environment).** Country B is a collapsed state. Its territory is essentially ungoverned with fundamentalist militia warlords and tribal chiefs maintaining local control. There are active transnational terrorists operating in the country.

- **Country C (belligerent state, hostile environment).** Country C is a state sponsor of terrorism that promotes fundamentalist ideology and conducts a campaign of genocide in portions of the country. It is faced with an insurgency.

**US National Objectives.** Based on US national interests, the President directs the attainment of the following overarching objectives within the region:

- Defeat terrorist networks.
- Prevent the attainment, use, and/or distribution of weapons of mass effects.
- Assist regional governments in establishing plans for long-term economic stability.
- Assist the legitimate government of Country A to establish internal stability and a path to long-term economic prosperity.
- Defeat terrorists in ungoverned areas in Country B and assist in the establishment of a duly elected, legitimate government.
• Depose the current government of Country C and assist insurgent forces in establishing a duly elected, legitimate government.

3. Combined Task Force (CTF) Regional Concept

**CTF Mission.** Combined forces conduct operations in the region supporting effective governance, security, and economic development in friendly regimes; removal of adversarial regimes; and the defeat of terrorist organizations and elements in order to promote regional stability.

**CTF Commander’s Intent/Planning Guidance.** Use an IW approach to design a single, long-term campaign aimed at promoting stability in Countries A and B, while eroding Country C’s governing body to the point where it can be replaced by a governing regime acceptable to the United States.

**Purpose.** In conjunction with the application of other elements of national power, gain the support of the local populace and ensure the stability of the Country A government.

**Method.** We will use a long-term (approximately 8-10 years) indirect approach characterized by persistent presence, where acceptable, and the use of indigenous elements where the presence of US forces is deemed detrimental to success. Our protracted campaign includes the following focus areas:

- Establish and maintain a safe, secure environment to include collaboration between USG and HN to expand and improve security of ungoverned regions to and deny safe haven for insurgent and terrorist groups.
- Deliver humanitarian assistance.
- Reconstruct critical infrastructure and restore essential services.
- Support economic development.
- Establish representative, effective governance and the rule of law.
- Conduct strategic communication.
- Train Country A armed forces in COIN operations.
- Keep base camps and staging areas to a minimum, consistent with mission requirements, to minimize force protection needs.
- Conduct precise application of combat power.
- Initial Focus. Compile in-depth area expertise, refine understanding of root causes of tensions and establish effective intelligence collection networks.
- Mid-Term Focus. Establish effective security and stability.
- Long-Term Focus. Shift emphasis to maintaining conditions enabling continued long-term stability and prosperity.

In many cases, our operations will be in support of multiple US agencies. At all times our actions will be coordinated with IA partners to ensure unified
Integrate multi-agency planners within the operational planning team to coordinate military operations with OGA activities. Specific efforts include:

- Incorporating regional area officers within the operational planning team.
- Exchanging liaison elements from Nation Sparrow via coordination through Combatant Command Ford.
- Coordinating planning against transnational terrorist elements with appropriate global and geographic combatant commands.
- Planning alternative basing strategies that enable the rapid introduction and withdrawal of forces as needed.
- Planning for rapid response against extremists using strike assets.

Because we will be operating in three distinct geo-political environments—permissive (Country A), uncertain (Country B), and hostile (Country C) -- our actions across the region must be synchronized so that actions in one environment do not create deleterious consequences in another environment.

**End State.** Countries in the region that: can provide effective governance and stability within their borders; can defeat terrorist elements seeking to operate within the region; possess the requisite conditions to allow long-term economic growth.


**Special Situation.** Country A hosts US forces (to include logistic elements) involved in regional security operations. In addition, Nation Sparrow has been assisting Country A with security and economic development.

**Red Elements.** Transnational terrorist elements (with ties to local militias and displaced elements from Country B) that are capable of clandestine movement, bombings, assassinations, and conducting ambushes.

- **Objective.** Force the withdrawal of Western forces throughout the region and maintain or expand a strong regional network of terrorist forces and supporters.
- **Concept.** Disrupt HN and Blue/Green efforts to provide internal security within Country A. Focus on HN governmental targets and Western soft targets (e.g., hotels). Exploit widespread corruption that exists to undermine economic recovery and exploit tribal conflicts. The insurgents can be expected to conduct ambushes, guerrilla attacks, and use a large array of explosive devices. They are actively trying to obtain weapons of mass effects from organizations and states sympathetic to their cause.

**Brown Elements.** Internal tribal and ethnic groups who support the terrorist insurgency only to the extent that it increases their chances of assuming power within the country.
• **Objective.** HN regime failure and increased power.

• **Concept.** Conduct assassinations, bombings, and limited attacks against key governmental officials and assets.

**Green Elements.** The HN government and Nation Sparrow.

• **Objective.** HN seeks internal security for survival of the regime. Nation Sparrow has similar interests to the United States.

• **Concept.** HN welcomes economic and security assistance to include a substantial in-country footprint. Nation Sparrow focuses on security institution building, security training, and economic development.

**Blue Elements.**

• **Objectives.** Promote and reinforce the government of Country A so that it is capable of maintaining internal security; promote Country A democracy and economic development. Improve the capability and capacity of the HN to secure its borders and remote areas by defeating insurgency and terrorist elements. Increase HN infrastructure to provide a path for long-term economic development.

• **Intent/Planning Guidance:**

  **Purpose.** In conjunction with the application of other elements of national power, gain the support of the local populace and ensure the stability of the Country A government.

  **Method.**

  • Establish and maintain a safe, secure environment.
  • Expand and improve security of ungoverned regions to and deny safe haven for insurgent and terrorist groups.
  • Deliver humanitarian assistance.
  • Reconstruct critical infrastructure and restore essential services.
  • Support economic development.
  • Promote effective governance and the rule of law.
  • Conduct strategic communication.
  • Conduct civil action projects and population-oriented operations.
  • Train Country A armed forces in COIN operations.
  • Keep base camps and staging areas to a minimum, consistent with mission requirements, to minimize force protection needs.
  • Coordinate and synchronize military operations with Country A government.
  • Conduct precise application of combat power.
  • Conduct intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and intelligence fusion.
End State. Country A armed forces capable of conducting COIN operations against a reduced threat and Country A government stabilized.

CONOPS. The CTF will conduct a three-phased operation (note: activities within phases may overlap):

- **Phase 1: Preparation and Build-up.** The CTF, in conjunction with Country A and Nation Sparrow, deploys assessment teams to conduct an initial assessment and/or ISR in the JOA to refine coalition and/or joint planning. Priority efforts for the CTF are developing battlespace awareness, conducting force closure, and integrating with Country A forces and government.
- **Phase II: Execution.** Train Country A armed forces in COIN operations and conduct FID and CT operations.
- **Phase III: Follow-on Operations.** The CTF will incrementally reduce forces and begin redeployment.

5. Country B: Executing IW Within a Non-Belligerent State. See Classified Appendix for Blue Operations (TBP)

**Red Elements.** Transnational terrorists.

- **Objective.** Incite instability and maintain ungoverned areas to allow continued freedom of action.
- **Concept.** Use a fundamentalist creed to unify Country B elements and gain control of core territory. They can be expected to use kidnappings, assassinations, robberies, explosive devices, and incite and/or coordinate tribal or clan engagements against threats.

**Brown Elements.** Regional non-aligned tribes and/or clans and secessionists from Country B.

- **Objective.** Prevent the establishment of a strong central government with broad population support to maintain freedom of action for criminal activities.
- **Concept.** Maintain a high level of violence by lending material support, intelligence, and forces to the terrorists.

**Green Elements.** Multiple groups of resistance forces that are opposed to the fundamentalists or terrorists.

- **Objective.** Establish a functioning government with their clan in control.
- **Concept.** Garner and leverage US and international support on their terms to achieve their goals.

6. Country C: Executing IW Within a Belligerent State
Red Elements. Country C.

- **Objective.** Maintain regime control and defeat the insurgency.
- **Concept.** Government forces will attempt to infiltrate and defeat insurgent organizations and can be expected to conduct mass punishment against insurgent supporters. They will support both internal and external terrorist activities.

Brown Elements. Transnational terrorist elements.

- **Objective.** Prevent defeat of the Country C regime.
- **Concept.** They can be expected to use surrogates to attack US regional and global targets.

Green Elements. Country C insurgent irregular forces.

- **Objective.** Overthrow the Country C government and establish a new government.
- **Concept.** Employ UW to attack Country C security forces and erode political support for the ruling regime. The insurgents can be expected to accept US training and material support and leverage selected US military capabilities.

Blue Elements.

- **Mission.** Execute joint and combined operations throughout the area of responsibility to create conditions that assist Country C in establishing a stable government friendly to the US interests in the region. Be prepared to execute stability operations, as requested, to assist the US-backed insurgents and/or reformist government with stabilization of liberated areas.
- **Objectives.** Set the conditions to remove the current Country C regime and ensure transition to self-sufficient civil authority in a stable Country C by:
  - Defeating the current regime and establish a stable, effective government.
  - Establishing legitimate, local civil governance throughout the country.
  - Establishing safe and secure environment and provide essential services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.
  - Reforming Country C military, political, and economic institutions.

- **Intent/Planning Guidance.**
  - **Purpose.** The overall purpose of this operation is to create conditions that assist Country C in establishing a stable, effective government friendly to US and coalition interests in the region.

  - **Method.**
• Foment a massive popular movement resulting in a peaceful change of regime through Country C’s political process.
• Degrade and disrupt the current regime’s support to internal and external terrorism organizations.
• Discredit the current regime and bolster popular domestic and regional discontent with the current regime.
• Assist Country C rebels with intelligence, communications, selected IO capabilities, logistics support, and force protection.
• Expand the resistance by employing more combat operations if the regime refuses to step down despite a massive popular movement.
• After removal of the regime and when requested by the new government, vet, reform, and employ existing Country C military and security forces to provide domestic security and national defense.

End State. The end state is a self-sufficient civil authority in a stable Country C that is not hostile to US interests and does not provide support to terrorism.

CONOPS. The operation will be conducted in three phases (note: activities within phases may overlap):

• **Phase I: Assessment and Preparation.** Conduct OPE in nations adjacent to Country C to set the conditions for the next phase of UW activities in Country C. UW capability development goals include the creation of a synchronized, overt, clandestine and, if appropriate and authorized, covert network of capabilities sustainable for the duration of the campaign.

• **Phase II: Operational Employment.** Continue coordinated UW activities and begin operations. SOF teams will make contact with indigenous opposition groups and attempt to develop them into an organized resistance force. Cadres are trained and preparations are made to expand and build up the resistance force. Intelligence nets are established or further developed. As the buildup proceeds, the membership of the resistance force is expanded and its activities broadened, to include infiltration or interim procurement of equipment and supplies to support subsequent combat operations. Previously trained cadres continue to recruit and train new members, and additional units are formed. Limited operations are conducted to build confidence in the guerrillas and confuse and harass the Country C government. UW will focus on identifying, training, and equipping resistance elements and assisting in identifying and securing a replacement regime.

• **Phase III: Stability Operations.** After the present Country C regime is deposed and a reformist government declared, US forces will transition to stability operations.
TABLES TO BE USED WITH THE VIGNETTE

For Country A, accomplish broad COIN, CT, FID, and civil action program objectives and tasks as outlined in the table below (note: list is not intended to be all inclusive):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE OF OPERATION</th>
<th>OBJECTIVES</th>
<th>TASKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>COIN/CT</td>
<td>▪ Interdict insurgent/terrorist network LOCs (ground, maritime, air, finance, cyber).</td>
<td>▪ Provide COIN and CT training and military assistance for Country A forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>▪ Destroy established insurgent and terrorist networks and deny safe havens.</td>
<td>▪ Train Country A armed forces to intercept terrorist arms, money, and/or recruit trafficking.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>▪ Capture and/or kill high value targets.</td>
<td>▪ Share ISR and provide support and training on intelligence fusion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>▪ Stabilize contested areas and former safe havens.</td>
<td>▪ Integrate IO to enable and synchronize PSYOP support of COIN efforts to bolster Country A government legitimacy with the local populace.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>▪ Support the government’s efforts to provide security for nation building activities.</td>
<td>▪ Provide full-spectrum combat, CS and CSS functions to augment HN capabilities as required.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>▪ Employ effective security forces capable of full-spectrum combat, CS, and CSS functions.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FID</td>
<td>▪ Increase the capacity of Country A security forces to defend their territory against internal and external destabilizing threats.</td>
<td>▪ Provide security until Country A armed forces can fully assume unilateral security operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>▪ Build capability and effectiveness of security forces to enable full-spectrum combat, CS, and CSS functions.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Action Program</td>
<td>▪ Improve Country A’s ability to govern and meet citizens’ needs.</td>
<td>▪ Assist in construction of key infrastructure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>▪ Assist in establishing basic services and utilities (medical, power, water).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>▪ Conduct civil action projects and limited HA to support governmental security and stabilization.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>▪ Provide support to NGOs as requested.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The following table provides focus relative to Country A lines of operation (these logical LOOs were used to frame this notional campaign):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Line of Operation</th>
<th>Focus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Combat Operations</td>
<td>Country A armed forces have the lead with the support of the CTF as required. Combat should be limited to clearly identified insurgent targets with the risk of collateral damage considered. The right of self-defense by coalition forces remains undiluted.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Developing Capacity (Governance, Economic Development, Essential Services, Training & Employment of Indigenous Forces) | Governance: The Department of State has lead. Focus in on eliminating fraud, waste, and abuse while promoting democracy. Country A is already a democracy. It may need assistance in maintaining existing democratic infrastructure and mechanisms.  

Economic Development: Country A business community has lead. Country A and CTF armed forces provide support by neutralizing the terrorist threat, maintaining freedom of navigation, and improving infrastructure such as roads and municipal buildings. Nation Sparrow will participate.  

Essential Services: Country A government has lead. International and nongovernmental organizations are in support. Priority is potable water, roads, home building, community building, electricity, and preventative medicine.  

Training & Employment of Indigenous Forces: Help the Country A military fight their own insurgency. The CTF remains behind the scenes by providing training, advice, and logistic support. This LOO includes FID activities led by special operations component and Security, Institution Building and Reform (SIBR) activities lead by DOS. FID and SIBR are related but distinct efforts. FID deals mostly with the military. SIBR is mostly a civilian effort. FID includes senior leader visits, international military education and training for mid-grade officials, and expansion of regional initiatives to promote professionalism. FID includes individual and unit training and logistic assistance to include maintenance, spare parts, and mobility enhancements. |
| Information (Strategic Communication)     | The Department of State has lead. The international force is present at the request of the people to help them eliminate the twin threats of terrorism and insurgency. The goal is to deliver this message over a variety of media and demonstrate it when the CTF makes contact with the populace. Counter insurgent attempts to disseminate their message. Prevent access to insurgent-run websites, use of internet for e-mail and/or chat, and spam or virus-type attacks. |
| Intelligence                               | The Department of Defense has lead. Focus is on actionable intelligence. Winning the trust of the populace is key to providing good intelligence. The locals will identify insurgents when they feel it is in their best interest to do so. Building trust and respect is the foundation of good intelligence. |
The following table provides focus relative to Country C LOOs (these logical LOOs were used to frame this notional campaign):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Line of Operation</th>
<th>Focus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Combat Operations**                  | • Build the required human infrastructure and networks in and around Country C and then employ the strengths of each of the groups in a synchronized, sustained attack to cause the Country C regime to succumb to multiple attacks on multiple fronts on multiple levels and, ultimately, to fall.  
  • Support reformed national forces to conduct stability operations and transition to a self-sufficient civil government. |
| **Developing Capacity**                | Governance:  
  • Break down the existing regime’s powerbase while generating a legitimate alternative to replace the regime. It is possible that this can occur with a minimum of violent opposition activity, but the campaign must be ready to leverage more extreme disruptive activities, and potentially organized armed conflict.  
  • Identify and secure a replacement regime.  
  • Degrade and disrupt the current regime’s support to internal and external terrorism organizations.  

Economic Development: Priority is to neutralize the terrorist and insurgency threat and then improve infrastructure such as roads and municipal buildings.  

Essential Services: Priority is potable water, roads, home building, community building, electricity, and preventative medicine.  

Training and Employment of Indigenous Forces:  
  • Identify, train, and equip resistance elements.  
  • Assist Country C rebels with intelligence, communications, selected IO capabilities, logistics support, and force protection.  
  • After removal of the regime and when requested by the new government, vet, reform, and employ existing Country C military and security forces to provide domestic security and national defense. |
| **Information (Strategic Communication)** | • Increase international interest in Country C unrest in both public and political domains.  
  • Lower world opinion of regime’s legitimacy and human rights policies.  
  • Discredit the current regime and bolster popular domestic and regional discontent with the current regime.  
  • Emphasize the role of the reformist government, IGOs, NGOs, and/or OGAs during stability operations. |
| **Intelligence**                        | • Provide actionable intelligence to resistance elements.  
  • Provide actionable intelligence to the replacement government. |
Appendix F - Plan for Assessment

1. Insights and Results Gained From Experimentation or Other Forms of Assessment Conducted During the Writing or Revision Effort

IW JOC Limited Objective Experiment (3-5 Oct 06).

Purpose. The IW JOC Limited Objective Experiment (LOE) was conducted over three days (3-5 October 2006) at Booz Allen Hamilton in Mclean, Virginia. The purpose of the LOE, hosted by US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and sponsored by OSD’s Office of Force Transformation, was to provide a forum for key stakeholders to further the development of the IW JOC, ensuring completeness, thematic consistency, and operational utility of the concept.

Objectives. The objectives of the LOE were to determine if the operational environments, LOOs, and focus of operations are adequately captured and logically consistent in the concept. In order to accomplish these objectives, the LOE explored the development of a strategic assessment to address the regional environment, how and what LOOs would be implemented, the effects and outcomes desired in IW, and the metrics necessary to determine success as well as identifying critical capabilities needed to conduct IW.

Key Insights

- **Insight #1:** Teams identified strategic communications, building partner capabilities and capacity, and security as key instruments of IW.
- **Insight #2:** The political nature of IW requires an orchestrated effort that integrates a range of USG capabilities.
  - Participants in all groups articulated a need for a clear IW policy at the presidential and DOD levels, recognizing that most activities in an IW campaign are non-kinetic.
  - Participants expressed a need for a national-level USG concept for IW.
  - In order to ensure cooperation and integration within the USG, participants from all groups highlighted the need for a designated entity that can provide strategic direction to all government agencies and compel them to communicate and cooperate for the good of the IW effort.
  - With clear policy and funding lines, the USG writ large must be empowered to conduct decentralized execution of IW. Participants highlighted the effectiveness of empowering local commanders and other USG officials with the authorities, and the authorization, that allow them to assess and act upon local situations.
- **Insight #3:** In IW, the approach to intelligence collection should focus on the population and is integral to the success of an IW campaign.
  - Restricted operating environments limit military options and require a pre-existing human network and clandestine infrastructure that must be established well in advance of any operations.
• JFCs must understand how to maximize their technical and human intelligence equities over the long term.
• Vertical integration of USG intelligence equities from the strategic through tactical levels is essential to informing the IW campaign. Additionally, horizontal integration among lateral intelligence entities is also critical.
• Cooperation between coalition and USG intelligence entities is vital to informing an IW campaign.
• In order to provide timely intelligence and information to HN and other supported forces, the JFC must establish in advance, when possible, memorandums of understanding (MOUs) with the intelligence community. These MOUs should state what information can be released and what requires foreign disclosure authorization.
• Participants expressed a need for a DOD partnership with cultural anthropologists or a cadre of cultural anthropologists within the Department to foster greater cultural awareness.
• Participants proposed a program similar to the Foreign Area Officer program to enhance cultural understanding. This program would place military officers with local entities such as tribes instead of only the national government.
• **Insight #4:** The IW JOC should be refined to capture the nuances of IW, informing the JFC on considerations for an IW campaign design.

2. **Recommendations for Further Assessments on IW.** The following are areas that are beyond the scope of this JOC and are listed in recommendation priority for future experimentation to determine impacts on the joint force.

**Assessing DOD Ability to Fulfill its IW Support Role.** Experimentation should continue the IW study and involve USG agencies, non-NATO allies, combatant commands, IA players, and NGOs. The experimentation should address:

• What are the operational challenges projected for 2020 and those that endure from today?
• What is the theory of conflict and its underlying principles with respect to IW?
• What are the operating principles underpinning offensive IW that allow us to challenge our adversaries in non-traditional ways?
• What are the challenges limiting our concept and capability for offensive IW with respect to:
  • Strategic agility?
  • Operational planning?
  • Operational maneuver?
  • Tactical maneuver?
• What are the IW challenges, implications, and potential solutions regarding:
  • Extending the dialog on the practice of operational command
  • Joint asymmetric warfare
  • Operational maneuver from strategic distances
  • Intra-theater operational maneuver and operational raiding
  • Intensive asymmetric activity in the homeland
• What are the implications of conducting IW operations in a Long War environment?
• What are the implications of conducting simultaneous IW and SSTR operations?

**The Global Footprint of IW.** IW is being conducted across the globe. Many of our adversaries are transnational and require the United States to operate transnationally against them as well. IO to understand the operational environments and the nature of our adversaries will require extensive preparation time and a large investment in human capital. Likewise, IW campaigns to confront adversaries the United States may potentially face will require a significant long-term investment. Both preparing for and executing IW will require an extensive global footprint for IW. Further analysis is required to determine:

• The extent of this global footprint and the number of countries/areas that require US investments to establish a persistent and effective presence to meet our global challenges.
• The number and types of forces (conventional and SOF) required to conduct IW within each of these countries/areas.
• The contributions of partner nations to provide additional capacities to fill portions of the global footprint or to provide additional capabilities in areas denied to the joint force, either because of unique cultural relationships with the population of the area, or because of operational or political constraints placed upon the joint force.

**Intelligence Support to IW.** Persistent, global intelligence operations will play a decisive part of any IW campaign. Further analysis must be conducted on the long-term investments required to establish persistent, global intelligence infrastructure that will enable the joint force to understand the operational environment, identify potential threats and their vulnerabilities, and to accurately focus theater security cooperation efforts to build support. This analysis must include the joint force’s ability to establish intelligence networks for assisted recovery of downed aviators, isolated personnel, and for exfiltrating critical intelligence assets.

**Sustaining the Joint Force During IW.** The US military must provide the JFC with an effective joint force projection and sustainment system that is tailorable, survivable, and responsive to joint force requirements when engaged
in IW operations. This must include data about friendly and adversary forces, as well as other joint, IA, and MN military and civilian partners and enablers to provide a complete picture of the operational environment for IW. Further analysis must be conducted to:

- Determine capacity of global lift assets required to support global IW operations (varying from small teams to potentially large scale COIN or UW operations) within a global context and dispersed within potentially over 50 countries simultaneously. These assets may also require precision air drop delivery means due to the remote regions in which forces conducting IW may be required to operate.

- Determine capability of support assets to meet the time-sensitive and unique IW demands. Indigenous forces with non-standard equipment will require the conventional logistics system to provide non-standard spare parts, local rations, and even saddles and grain for horses and mules. Providing support to geographically dispersed and often culturally diverse forces conducting IW in remote regions of the world will require further analysis.

- Determine the appropriate mix of conventional fixed, rotary wing, sealift, and ground mobility assets that support IW operations. Analysis of alternatives to supplement conventional assets such as contracted air, sea, and ground assets needed to fulfill shortfalls in logistics support, especially considering the remote and geographically dispersed nature of IW operations and operational areas.

- Determine the requirement for low-visibility delivery assets. Some IW operations may be conducted in politically sensitive areas and might require low-visibility assets to preserve the joint force’s freedom of maneuver.

Confronting Non-State Actors Using UW. This application is beyond the scope of more traditional uses of UW and requires further analysis to explore this aspect of IW. This analysis is required because:

- Non-state actors do not have the same centers of gravity or the traditional infrastructure that have been the critical nodes for planning traditional UW operations.

- Unlike more typical UW campaigns against hostile states or occupying powers, future campaigns will be conducted against non-state actors operating either within or behind the laws of non-belligerent states with which the United States is not at war. While this is normally the purview of OGAs, analysis of potential support that the joint force may be required to provide to support those agencies in that operational area must be done to accurately determine a true picture of the scope of global IW support requirements.

- UW campaigns also will be conducted against non-state actors existing outside of the normal institutions of a state (such as ungoverned or under-
governed areas) or within a hostile state that harbors, either wittingly or unwittingly, these non-state actors within its borders.

**Role of the IA in IW.** The US military cannot conduct IW operations indefinitely without responsive and eventual support from the IA. This IA support can come from a variety of sources, i.e., US, coalition, or multinational. IA support provided must not only have the right skill sets and capabilities, but it must meet capacity requirements of the conflict. Once IA support becomes available, the military must be prepared to transition from a supported role to a supporting role. Further analysis is required to determine:

- What IA support is required to support successful IW operations?
- What are the implications related to the US military performing security, diplomatic, information, economic, nation building, rule of law, and governance functions in the absence of robust IA involvement?
- How long should the US military be prepared to accomplish these functions before the IA arrives in force?
- What conditions need to be set to allow the US military to transition these nontraditional military support roles to the IA?

**Operational Command.** Campaign planning for support of IW operations in a Long War is different than planning for shorter conventional operations against an adversary during MCOs. Adversaries being faced during IW operations usually operate without space and time limits. They may be state or non-state actors and often employ asymmetric tactics in a complex environment. The population is important, as is a thorough understanding of religious, cultural, and economic influences. In this regard, JFCs and their staff must be able to effectively accomplish responsive operational planning using techniques that effectively respond to the IW threat. Continued analysis is required in this area to identify the evolving operational command techniques that will work best for the conduct of IW campaigns and operations during the Long War.
Appendix G - A Historical Look at Irregular Warfare

History reveals that violent clashes of interests often include irregular forces or armed groups that exist outside the authority of established states, with the United States and other Western nations possessing a rich history of involvement in operations fighting against irregular threats and fighting irregularly against their adversaries. From the Indian Wars during the seventeenth century to Somalia and Bosnia in the 1990s, this long US history of IW provides a basis for understanding how to confront irregular threats and to operate more irregularly in the future. Using our long historical experience with IW combined with an appreciation of the evolving security challenges we face, we can effectively wage IW against adversaries and counter the irregular threats that they present.

The chief lesson to be drawn from the study or irregular wars centers around the importance of operations on an expanded operational continuum. In case after case, to be successful, the military intervention force worked in LOOs (though they may not have called it that) beyond purely kinetic combat operations. The participants seemed deliberately to blur the lines between types of operations. That is, the military became comfortable working with other agencies and even performed tasks that would not be associated with a traditional military mission. These historical examples will show both some similarities and very notable differences. Irregular wars are different from each other; at least to the extent that no solutions can be “templated.” IW doctrine therefore must be written with great flexibility in mind. History can help understand the character of a conflict by providing context and can help prepare for future challenges by showing what worked (or failed to work) in the past.

Examples of Countering Irregular Threats:

The Philippine Insurrection (1899 - 1913). Following the 1898 US acquisition of the Philippines in the aftermath of the Spanish-American War, the US military was dispatched to that area to seize control of the islands. In response to the imminent US seizure, the Filipinos led an insurrection against US occupation. President William McKinley decided that a policy of assimilation should be adopted in the Philippines and carried out by the US military. This shift forced the US military (the Army in particular) to devote at least as much attention to civic projects—public works, government-building, and education—as to more traditional military operations. While military operations were never independently decisive during the Philippine Insurrection, the US military wove them effectively into the fabric of counterinsurgency and what we would now call “nation-building” activities. The insurgents were worn down, their re-supply cut off, and ultimately were chased into the most remote, rural parts of the islands, separating them from the populace. Meanwhile, the US military built infrastructure, formed and trained Filipino police and military forces, and established schools and rule of law. While the leader of the insurgency was eventually captured, the population had already begun to see the advantages of
aligning with the Americans and the insurrection effectively came to a close. Perhaps better than other historical references, the Philippine counterinsurgency clearly exemplifies an intervention force working multiple LOOs concurrently.

**The “Banana Wars” (1915 - 1934).** During the period between the Philippine Insurrection and the Second World War, the US Marine Corps was engaged in what are now referred to as the “banana wars.” Marines were extensively involved in counterinsurgent operations in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua, to name just a few.\(^{30}\) With many of these operations akin to constabulary duty, the Marine Corps learned how to work effectively with indigenous paramilitary forces and among indigenous peoples. The Marines were comfortable working in small units in extremely remote locations with limited or vague guidance. That observation is not an indication that these operations were executed in some disjointed, haphazard manner. On the contrary, the Marine leaders involved held a clear vision of success and a purpose, and worked according to that vision. In a true sense, the Marine Corps at that time had a small wars ethos.

**The Malaya “Emergency” (1948 - 1960).** Following the Second World War, Malaya was a British colony that experienced a communist-inspired insurgency. The insurgents’ primary goal at the beginning of the conflict was to cause maximum disruption of the country’s economy and administration.\(^{31}\) In response, the British counterinsurgent strategy in Malaya consisted of three parts (or phases): (1) Defensive, when the adversary was prevented from taking over and the insurgency was kept from escalating; (2) Offensive, during which they broke the insurgent’s ability to win; and (3) Victory, in which they hunted down and destroyed the communist insurgents and established an independent Malaya. The British counterinsurgency effort was able to separate the insurgents from the people and wear them down by chasing them into remote jungle areas and occasionally killing them. Without the support of the people, the guerrillas found that their struggle had been undermined.\(^{32}\) The British, following the defeat of the insurrection, worked with the fledgling Malay government to help them build the capacity to govern. The process took some time because it involved educating and training a generation of leaders and developing the infrastructure on which to function. The military moved seamlessly from the purely military tasks to these new challenges.

**The Algerian Insurrection (1954 - 1962).** The insurgents in Algeria forced the French army to fight essentially two different wars. On one hand, due to the physical security threat, they challenged the French military to maintain stability, which forced the French military to bring in a large conventional force and to garrison key populated areas. These forces were largely immobilized. The

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\(^{32}\) Laqueur, p. 290.
other conflict was predominantly an information war characterized by psychological actions by the Front de Liberation Nationale and reactions by the French. Ultimately the French counterinsurgency effort was tactically successful in terms of isolating the insurgents from re-supply and reinforcement (border control), bringing security to key infrastructure and populated areas, and wearing the insurgents down by hunting down insurgent fighters. Unfortunately, by the time this eventually occurred, France agreed to a peace accord that granted Algeria its independence in 1962 with no transitional measures in place in order to maintain stability. There are many lessons to be learned here, both at the tactical and strategic levels. The French use of small, mobile forces and larger, stationary forces is a model for other counterinsurgency efforts. However, perhaps the most important lesson is that the levels of war are inextricably linked (or should be), and that a tactical victory is hollow without the strategic vision and political will to capitalize upon it.

**The Vietnam War (1960 - 1975).** This lengthy war provides a valuable case study in the US approach to countering future irregular threats. As in every conflict, there are plenty of good and bad lessons to learn from the intervention effort. Vietnam showed that the American military’s bias for mounting large-scale combat operations with large troop formations and reliance on massive combined arms in order to dominate the adversary was not always appropriate. As in most irregular wars, the adversary seized on the advantages of using this asymmetry to his advantage and thereby precluded the US military from being able to take full advantage of its enormous arsenal. A particularly important lesson from the Vietnam experience was the effectiveness, and ultimately the necessity, of the military working with OGAs. Where other purely military efforts failed to bring a long-term stability or to counter the communist insurgency, the IA activities brought about a measure of stability, moral legitimacy, and some indigenous capacity to South Vietnam and its government forces.

**El Salvador War (1980 - 1992).** The war in El Salvador was a near classic case of insurgency and counterinsurgency. The people were aroused to the point of insurrection by a relatively small elite. As usually occurs in a case such as this, the Government of El Salvador reacted inappropriately. However, something rather unusual occurred in this case; the regime listened to the issues that the people voiced as their reasons for rebellion and made sweeping changes that irked the conservatives among the non-rebelling elite while not going far enough for the liberal elites who had incited the rebellion in the first place. However, the compromise seemed to serve the government well—the primary catalytic agents for insurrection no longer existed and the population started to lose interest. Unfortunately for the rebellion, the insurgency continued without the real support of the populace. The Salvadorian military was able to win most tactical engagements in the field and Duarte ensured that his military cleaned up their civil rights abuses. This rectification of civil rights

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abuses had the distinctly positive effect of garnering US support as well as the support of the Salvadorian populace. Ultimately, the insurgency lost its energy and languished to the point that it was no longer a genuine threat to the country's stability.

Examples of Waging Unconventional Warfare:

**US-Philippine Resistance to Japanese Occupation (1942 - 1945).** US support to, and in some cases leadership of, irregular resistance to Japanese forces in the Philippine archipelago was an unqualified success. It stands as a premier example of what military planners today call operational preparation of the environment. The Philippine resistance movement, comprised of a number of groups spread throughout the archipelago but most numerous on the main island of Luzon, collected and transmitted intelligence on adversary order of battle, conducted hit-and-run raids against Japanese forces, and provided de facto government services in a number of villages. The resistance movement benefited from environmental factors that contributed to the overall success of the campaign. These factors included the size of the archipelago (almost 115,000 m²) spread out over 7,100 islands and the imposing jungle and mountain terrain on the largest islands. Both factors, as well as the requirement to maintain lines of communication and supply between garrisons, severely stretched the occupying Japanese forces. Although the Japanese initially offered positive or neutral incentives not to resist, such as amnesty to military stragglers and those under arms, increasing negative measures (including collective reprisals against villagers for attacks, imprisonment and/or torture or execution of suspected guerrillas, and seizing crops and livestock) turned the population against them.

**United Nations Partisan Operations in Korea (1951 - 1953).** Success and failure in waging IW can be difficult to judge. In the case of IW conducted during the Korean War, the evidence seems contradictory. Although UN partisan forces contributed to allied interdiction efforts in the operational rear areas of North Korea, the movement nevertheless failed to achieve more widespread strategic IW success. Most if not all of the preconditions for IW success existed on the Korean peninsula, but a number of factors inhibited the success of UN partisan forces. First, the responsibility for UN partisan operations shifted between different command instruments, neither of which had developed a comprehensive plan or phasing for IW in the theater. Second (and as a result of the first factor above), UN partisan forces were used primarily for seaborne raids, not unlike British commando raids in the Second World War. The purpose of these raids was to interdict main supply routes, inflict casualties, and boost the morale of anti-communist instruments in North Korea. Little effort was applied to establishing sanctuaries and base areas on the peninsula itself or cultivating the population to support an insurgency. From 1952 onwards, the North Koreans placed greater emphasis on rear area counter-partisan operations that limited the mobility and access of UN partisan forces to the North Korean population. Finally, and most significantly, US advisors to UN partisan forces
neither spoke Korean nor understood their culture. This seriously influenced the ability of UN partisan forces to undertake IW actions more complicated than episodic raids-in-force.

**US Unconventional Warfare in North Vietnam (1964 - 1972).** With few possible exceptions, US UW efforts in North Vietnam were among the least successful of any it has attempted. According to two respected scholars, US UW efforts failed because of “Lack of imagination in planning, faulty execution of missions, and poor operational security.”

Although originally planned and controlled by the CIA in 1960, responsibility for UW activities was shifted to the Department of Defense in 1964. Most of the activities conducted subsequently in Northern Vietnam bore a striking similarity to missions conducted by the Office of Strategic Services during the Second World War. These missions included parachuting lone Vietnamese agents, or teams of agents, deep into North Vietnam to gather and report intelligence or conduct attacks. Maritime missions included short-term seaborne raids, agent insertion, and deception and psychological warfare operations. Such UW was designed to distract North Vietnamese attention as well as resources to combating saboteurs operating in their homeland. The results of these UW efforts were dismal. The fact that such operations continued despite persistent evidence of their failure is a testament to the lack of imagination mentioned above, as well as the bravery of most of the Vietnamese volunteers. The inability of US planners to set meaningful strategic and operational objectives for UW and use such forces haphazardly in an uncoordinated manner simply because the option existed, without any hope of generating support among the local populous, ultimately doomed such efforts.

**US Unconventional Warfare in South Vietnam (1967 - 1972).** The successful US-led UW efforts in South Vietnam had its genesis in the Mike Force and Mobile Strike Force concepts, which were initially corps-level reserve forces designed to react quickly to contingencies such as Viet Cong attacks on Special Forces or Civilian Irregular Defense Group camps. Instead of responding to the adversary and ceding the local initiative to them, the newly developed Mobile Guerrilla Force would operate autonomously for extended periods of time to take the fight to areas of South Vietnam controlled by the Viet Cong. A crucial difference between the Mobile Guerrilla Forces and their predecessors was operational control. They were placed directly under the control of the corps-level Special Forces commander, as opposed to the conventional corps commander, in each of the four corps of South Vietnam. The Mobile Guerrilla Forces were designed for extended operations, including long-range reconnaissance patrolling and ambushing, to fight the Viet Cong using their own tactics against them. Comprised of any combination of Vietnamese, Montagnard (tribal hill peoples), and ethnic Cambodians, these forces were led by US and/or South Vietnamese Special Forces personnel. Operating largely in sparsely populated areas, the Mobile Guerrilla Forces combined cultural awareness, local

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knowledge and support, US supply, mobility, firepower, and guerrilla tactics offensively and successfully against the Viet Cong.

**US Unconventional Warfare in the Soviet-Afghan War (1981 - 1989).** Not all offensive IW efforts need involve the US working with indigenous forces directly, as was the case with US support to Afghan mujahideen forces during the Soviet-Afghan War. Initially, the United States funneled financial support for the Afghan fighters from OGA through the intelligence service of Pakistan. The Pakistani Inter-Service Intelligence maintained direct links with a number of mujahideen leaders and dispensed the funds to favored groups so that they could buy arms and other supplies. In addition, some of these Afghan groups maintained training bases and safe areas within Pakistan. Although financial support was important to sustaining the mujahideen, one of the key turning points in the war occurred when the US and British militaries introduced shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles such as Stinger and Blowpipe into the conflict. The mujahideen were effective at ambushing the largely road-bound motorized and mechanized Soviet forces. Soviet airpower, especially in the form of helicopter transports and gunships, inflicted serious losses on mujahideen forces. The introduction of man-portable surface-to-air missiles severely constrained the Soviet use of their airpower; continued numbers of casualties on the ground, as well as mounting domestic opposition to the war, convinced Soviet leaders to withdraw from Afghanistan. The United States was able to achieve its goals by waging IW through third-party actors without directly confronting the Soviet Union.

**US Unconventional Warfare in Afghanistan (2001 - 2002).** Experience in Afghanistan from 2001-2002 demonstrates that waging IW need not be a prolonged, costly undertaking. Waging IW can quickly and efficiently achieve policy goals if the conditions for success are right. In this specific case, a standing indigenous force was already in existence. The forces of the Northern Alliance, although somewhat demoralized from its previous losses, were armed and many were combat veterans, including some who had fought against the Soviets in the campaign described above. The introduction of US military and paramilitary advisors and resources was critical in defeating and scattering Taliban and al Qaeda forces in less than 4 months. Conventional force options would take too long to implement and, according to at least one account, CIA Director George Tenet suggested more unconventional uses of force including waging IW. Supported by Army and Air Force special operations aviation assets, US Army Special Forces teams conducted two primary missions in the subsequent IW campaign. The first was political in nature and involved close liaison with Northern Alliance faction commanders to prevent jealousy and rivalries from adversely affecting the campaign. A key to the success of the Special Forces teams was their cultural sensitivity and willingness to engage the Afghan and Uzbek leaders on their terms, creating considerable trust between US and Northern Alliance forces. The second mission was military in nature and involved combat advice and leadership, C2, and the calling of precise fires against Taliban strongpoints and key force concentrations. The flexibility and
adaptability of joint special operations teams, connected to awe-inspiring levels of firepower, greatly boosted Northern Alliance confidence and, in one particular case, led to the first horse-mounted charge against armored forces in over 60 years. Although the character of the campaign changed from overthrowing the Taliban regime to stabilizing the country and chasing the Taliban and al Qaeda remnants, the success of the US IW campaign is undeniable. It also underscores the necessity of achieving a close working relationship with indigenous forces, one based on trust and mutual competence.
Appendix H – Expanding Role of the MILGRP in IW

While the following article was written to describe the potential role of the MILGRP activities to support the GWOT, it provides sufficient illustration of the vital role that US missions may play in coordinating and executing future IW operations. As such it is included in this JOC as an appendix to guide future experimentation and CONOPS development.

“As warfare moves into the shadows, it will become a deadly game of cat and mouse — something more akin to tough investigative and police work than traditional warfare. In this type of environment, command and control concepts tailored for the Cold War do not apply. Large joint task forces with multiple components, designed for divisional fire and movement against similarly equipped adversary forces are not appropriate for fighting irregular, small-scale conflicts where surrogate forces carry much of the burden.

For IW fought in the netherworld between real peace and all-out war, one command and control model has proven to be appropriate, effective and efficient over time. This is the US ambassador’s interagency country team and its tailored US military component working as an interagency team nearest the problem and closest to the principal actors in the host nation. The Defense Department contribution to the country team is a military organization ranging from a small Office of Defense Cooperation to a full US Military Group tailored to meet the ambassador’s needs for military coordination and support. This is a time-proven design that helps the host nation solve its own problems, designs information activities to best complement the overarching campaign, and guarantees cross-cultural understanding and overall success.

US Military Groups, when assisting a country with an active insurgency or as part of a wider IW effort, are designed to manage the provision of materiel and training packages, US military advisers and trainers, and intelligence assets within the context of political constraints. Despite the proven effectiveness of this formula, the need to fight IW simultaneously in many locations around the world over an extended time should prompt an overhaul of Military Group staffing and structure. Of particular importance is commander selection and preparation, with an eye toward his coordination chain outside an embassy. Intelligence linkages must also gain greater scope and definition, and make use of the latest technology. Release authorities and parameters for host nation partners, as well as the degree of interagency sharing, must also be clearly defined. Depth among staff members is critical, with emphasis on experience with counterinsurgency, unconventional warfare, psychological operations, civil-military operations, security assistance, and logistics. Country-specific experience is vital as well.

35 Extract taken from a pending article “Group Dynamics -- How U.S. Military Groups support the War on Terrorism” by MG (Ret.) Geoffrey C. Lambert
As the “long war” enters its informational phase, US military forces will play a more pronounced role in coordinating civil-military operations. This implies the need to provide the Military Group with greater contracting and budget authority, strategic communications, and direct links to the geographic combatant commander. As US forces work closely with their non-US counterparts, the release of US technology, tactics, techniques and procedures must be monitored carefully.”
Appendix I – Executing IW Within Ungoverned or Under-Governed Spaces

While the following was written to describe activities for the GWOT, it provides sufficient illustration of future DOD activities within this operational environment. As such it is included in this JOC as an appendix to guide future experimentation and CONOPS development.

Implementing the GWOT Strategy: Overcoming IA Problems

“...A key GWOT objective is to keep radical Islamists from regaining state sanctuary. To the extent that we succeed, the principal GWOT battleground will occur in states with which the US is not at war, and the principal fight will be an indirect and low visibility/clandestine one from a US perspective. This poses a number of challenges for the effective integration of all instruments of national and international power. In addition to the planning frictions and compartmentalization problems noted above, there is also the issue of to what extent the US armed forces will be engaged in this fight. In countries with which the US is not at war, Department of State and CIA dominate. As a result, military capabilities that might be brought to bear have been denied country clearance, or have had their operational freedom severely restricted if clearance is granted. The current IA system for operations in countries with which the US is not at war too often defaults to pre-9/11 modes of thinking and ways of operating and, in any event, is very much dependent on the risk profile and policy priorities of US Chiefs of Mission and Station. Determining the extent to which US military capabilities will be brought to bear in these countries and which organization will own them is imperative.

A first step toward effective command would include the designation of GWOT operational areas, followed by the establishment of standing CIA-DOD organizations aligned with these areas. GWOT operational areas would be both country-specific and sub-regional. Achieving unity of effort across sub-regions would permit more effective use of airborne and maritime surveillance platforms and enable expanded unconventional warfare operations against trans-national terrorists. There are a number of areas of the world – Pakistan-Afghanistan, for example – where an integrated sub-regional approach to operations is vital. CIA-DOD Interagency Task Forces aligned with key sub-regions could be commanded by a military officer or a CIA officer, depending on the dominant character of operations involved. The senior Chief of Station in a sub-region could be dual-hatted as an IATF commander. Operational command of IATF components should generally be in the hands of a military or CIA officer, as appropriate, though cross-organizational teams should be established when operational circumstances dictate...”

36 Testimony by Michael Vickers, Director of Strategic Studies, before the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities of the House Armed Services Committee, 15 March 2006
“...What would appear to make most sense in terms of GWOT execution would be to bolster DOD’s presence at the Country Team level, particularly for countries with which the US is not at war, and establish standing CIA-DOD IA operational task forces at the country and sub-region levels, led, as noted above, by either a military officer or a CIA officer, who could be dual-hatted as a Chief of Station, as operational circumstances dictate. Given the indirect character of our strategy, integration at the IA level must also be extended to our allies and partners.”
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