**1. REPORT DATE**
JAN 2009

**2. REPORT TYPE**

**3. DATES COVERED**
00-00-2009 to 00-00-2009

**4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE**
Guerilla Counterintelligence: Insurgent Approaches to Neutralizing Adversary Intelligence Operations

**5a. CONTRACT NUMBER**

**5b. GRANT NUMBER**

**5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER**

**5d. PROJECT NUMBER**

**5e. TASK NUMBER**

**5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER**

**6. AUTHOR(S)**

**7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)**
Joint Special Operations University, 357 Tully Street, Alison Building, Hurlburt Field, FL, 32544

**8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER**

**9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)**

**10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S)**

**11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S)**

**12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT**
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited

**13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES**

**14. ABSTRACT**

**15. SUBJECT TERMS**

**16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:**
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>a. REPORT</th>
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**17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT**
Same as Report (SAR)

**18. NUMBER OF PAGES**
92

**19. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON**

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*Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)*
Prepared by ANSI Z39-18
Joint Special Operations University and the Strategic Studies Department

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On the cover. Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) guerrillas in Cartegena del Chaira, a small town in the jungle of southeast Colombia, in June 1997. AFP photo/Meredith Davenport, used by permission of Newscom.
Guerrilla Counterinsurgency

Insurgent Approaches to Neutralizing Adversary Intelligence Operations

Graham H. Turbiville, Jr.
Comments about this publication are invited and should be forwarded to Director, Strategic Studies Department, Joint Special Operations University, 357 Tully Street, Alison Building, Hurlburt Field, Florida 32544. Copies of this publication may be obtained by calling JSOU at 850-884-1569; FAX 850-884-3917.

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ISBN 1-933749-29-6
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Dr. Graham Turbiville’s monograph on insurgent counterintelligence approaches one facet of an insurgency and continues his research writings on the functions of insurgent organizations he started with in his 2005 JSOU Press monograph on insurgent logistics. A key issue underpinning this current volume is the complex relationship between state and nonstate actors. The nonstate actors are organizations with structures and personnel; albeit that these structures vary considerably in complexity from group to group. Insurgent groups have goals that require a strategy and operational planning to achieve. Consequently, the groups need to secure their operations to ensure effectiveness; they also need to provide security because the operations entail securing the organization and its personnel from government counterinsurgency operations. Ultimately, this leads groups to develop some form of counterintelligence rules and structure to provide security. In small groups this may be limited to security-focused rules of conduct and operational security, but as groups grow in size and complexity, the need for a more formal type of organizational structure increases and a more robust security organization will be needed.

Dr. Turbiville does an excellent job of highlighting the critical element of security and how insurgent groups ignore it at their peril. Another effective analysis is his discussion of trends and similarities that can be observed across geographical, historical, and cultural boundaries. In other words, all insurgent groups must provide for some form of security and understanding; this provides a useful prism with which to analyze various groups. Piercing a group’s intelligence capabilities can be critical in undermining its operations. As a word of caution, insurgents can do the same thing to governments. Dr. Turbiville persuasively argues Michael Collins’ targeting of British intelligence organizations seriously undermined British security force’s resolve in Irish counterinsurgency operations in the early 20th century.

This tit-for-tat threat and counterthreat also applies to the concept of infiltration, the greatest threat to an insurgent group. Shielding itself from government infiltration or penetration is a critical element in ensuring an insurgent group’s freedom of operation. Ultimately, this requires the population to either actively support or passively tolerate the insurgents.
Consequently, the population’s loyalty, a fundamental tenet of irregular warfare, is the objective of both sides fighting in an insurgency.

Violence will be part of any insurgency or irregular-warfare campaign. The fundamental question is whether the use of violence or, more importantly, how violence is used will affect winning or losing the population’s loyalty. This factor applies to both sides in the conflict. Excessive force can drive a wedge between the population and the operational forces, be they government or insurgent. However, retribution by security forces to an insurgent attack or operation can often play into the hands of the insurgents. This is particularly true when the security forces are viewed by the population as an “external” force. Once again, the local population decides who or what is an external force. In the case of Ireland, the British believed they were the local government, but the locals came to view them as occupiers.

This monograph has significant implications for U.S. Special Operations Forces as we continue to operate in both combat and noncombat zones against groups desiring to overthrow existing governments. We must take into account the insurgent organization’s plans and operations, but to do so will require us and our local hosts to overcome the insurgent or terrorist group’s internal security processes while protecting our operations and organizations from insurgent infiltration.

Michael C. McMahon, Lt Col, USAF
Director, JSOU Strategic Studies Department
About the Author

Dr. Graham Turbiville is a senior fellow with the JSOU Strategic Studies Department. At JSOU, his current research is centered on a range of regional and transnational threats to include insurgency, terrorism, the development of foreign Special Operations Forces (SOF), and foreign perspectives of United States and allied capabilities and vulnerabilities. Dr. Turbiville also serves as a senior consultant and researcher for a Department of Defense/Intelligence Community program dealing with geographic and cultural intelligence in several areas of the world and which produces history-based assessments of tribal/clan societies in contemporary war and conflict.

He received his B.A. in Foreign Languages from Southern Illinois University, M.A. in Russian Studies from George Washington University, and Ph.D. in History from the University of Montana. Dr. Turbiville served 30 years in intelligence community analytical and leadership positions at the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Department of the Army. These positions included director/chief of long-range and current intelligence offices and directorates, director of a Joint Reserve Intelligence Center, and other assignments dealing with foreign combined arms, security, and SOF.

Dr. Turbiville has authored many monographs and studies for military, law enforcement, and intelligence venues. JSOU has published four of his monographs:

a. *Private Security Infrastructure Abroad* (November 2007)

b. *Hunting Leadership Targets in Counterinsurgency (COIN) and Counterterrorist Operations* (June 2007)


The views expressed in this publication are entirely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views, policy or position of the United States Government, Department of Defense, United States Special Operations Command, or the Joint Special Operations University.
Successful insurgent leaders have identified effective counterintelligence planning, tradecraft, and implementation as essential for the continued survival of insurgent groups and for their eventual development and advancement. Typically threatened at every turn by more numerous and robust government means, resourceful guerrilla counterintelligence cells in every area of the world have sought to devise approaches and actions that neutralized the intelligence organizations and activities arrayed against them. It has been a prerequisite for carrying out the organization, concealment, recruiting, arming, financing, planning, and execution of operations by dissident armed groups.

All insurgent groups—incorporating variations in concept and nuance—recognize the need to protect their forces from the hostile action of enemy intelligence initiatives and to degrade the intelligence and security components facing them. As a consequence, insurgent counterintelligence—like its government counterparts—has both defensive and offensive components that range from the most passive security measures and admonitions for exercising discretion, to aggressive direct actions targeted against enemy intelligence personnel and resources. While addressed to some extent in the literature of intelligence and counterinsurgency, attention to insurgent counterintelligence thought and practices has been less focused than for other associated issues.

This monograph addresses dimensions of insurgent counterintelligence (CI) with the aim of illuminating the CI perspectives, operational approaches, and innovations that have characterized diverse guerrilla or other armed groups operating in hostile environments around the world. Focusing
primarily on the human intelligence aspects, it will examine historical and current approaches by guerrilla and terrorist groups in order to:

a. Understand how government/coalition adversaries operate and seek information about insurgent activity
b. Counter government intelligence collection initiatives with defensive measures
c. Carry out direct actions to disrupt government intelligence and operational initiatives
d. Identify common and unique approaches, tradecraft, and techniques employed
e. Address the important ways in which guerrilla CI forms a part of insurgent planning and operations.

This focus includes, as backdrop, a brief look first at the innovation and universality of “counterintelligence” as practiced in irregular organizations as different as ancient tribal structures and modern dissident or criminal groupings. The awareness, studied reactions, aggressive responses, and effectiveness of “counterintelligence” by these groupings have been more widespread than generally supposed and roughly analogous to contemporary insurgent CI requirements. Collectively, they underscore that effective security countermeasures are not just the provenance of modern state militaries and security organizations, and may often be underestimated. The monograph then focuses on some examples of insurgent CI “theory” or precepts as articulated by guerrilla leaders, intelligence chiefs, and practitioners; discusses the ways in which insurrections have applied CI measures in defensive and offensive ways; and provides some conclusions about the practices, successes, and failures of guerrilla CI overall. Initially, the opening section addresses some old and new illustrations evocative of the folk wisdom that concludes “it is a double pleasure to deceive the deceivers,” a thought that has many antecedents and heirs.

Some Precursors and Analogs

If intelligence, in the tired old joke, is considered to be the “world’s second oldest profession,” then CI likely appeared first among its several components. This prospect applies to ancient tribal confederations and loosely organized or irregular groups of all types where some threat influences their
interests. Organized efforts to deny adversaries knowledge of one’s activities and goals, while also damaging or distorting the means and ability of competitors, date to at least 3,000 years in the distant past and appear to be a fundamental part of human interaction. Concepts and practices developed to achieve such goals have not been confined to military and political endeavors alone. They also apply to many other forms of organized human activity including economic and criminal. Literature and history are replete with examples suggesting that even the most primitive political and social organizations had developed approaches to protect their plans, assets, and activities, while also degrading the information-gathering and assessments of enemies. As a consequence, it is fair to say that “counterintelligence,” as understood and executed today, has been preceded by many centuries of similar practice and has often anticipated—and in some case informed—the most modern concepts, application, and fieldcraft. Neither differentials in modernization and technology nor standardized and carefully ordered political structures have necessarily been determinants of successful efforts to counter “intelligence” threats.

Practitioners whose CI efforts have been characterized by structure, training, and an array of “tactics, techniques, and procedures” encompass a number of ancient, pre-state, and tribal entities. They have included (and include) radical, extremist, and issue-oriented groups willing to use violence. Among these are anarchists of various stripes with global agendas (e.g., free trade), fringe environmental groups, and public/social policy protesters whose passions have crossed into criminal or terrorist activities. International criminal gangs and various ethnic “mafias” are prominent practitioners, while law enforcement has been increasingly confronted with prison and domestic street gangs that are race- or nationality-based and determined to counter the focused police targeting on which they soon become expert. With few exceptions, these kinds of irregular groups and organizations have paid the closest attention to CI-type measures to protect their existence, advance their operational freedom, and damage central and local government bodies attempting to dismantle or control them.
brief look at a few illustrative precedents provides some backdrop for contemporary practices. But most importantly, it also underscores the old and continuing dangers of underestimating the level of careful consideration, innovation, and effectiveness that even the most ancient and unsophisticated organizations have possessed.

Biblical passages are replete with accounts of military and political deception and stratagems. Classical strategists like the 6th century BC’s Sun Tzu offered numerous ideas on espionage and counterintelligence-like precepts for the wise leader to follow. Scholars of the ancient world have found considerable detail available, as well, from early tracts that illustrate how concerns about enemy spying were transformed into organizational systems designed to deny information and eliminate enemy informers and spies. Intelligence-gathering agents, reliance of a supportive population to tell of anything suspicious, detention, interrogation, and confirmation of information were all well established.

For example, in what is now Iraq, cuneiform tablets from the 8th century BC describe a neo-Assyrian CI effort to catch and interrogate a spy sent...
by the leader of a tribal kingdom, near the mouth of the Euphrates River, which had conquered Babylon and dominated Babylonia. After arriving at the city he was to spy on, the agent’s accent revealed to local tribesmen that he was not who he claimed to be. The information was transmitted to a node on the distributed neo-Assyrian intelligence network, the spy was captured and interrogated, and in time revealed important information on the identities and locations of those who had sent him. Suspicions being at least as great then as now, the Assyrians sent their own agents to confirm what they had been told. An instructive and intricate diagram of a neo-Assyrian HUMINT (human intelligence) network running from remote territories to King Sargon II has been derived from cuneiform tablets, a system that would gratify far more recent practitioners.

In sharp contrast to ancient Assyrians, but nevertheless illustrative of organized CI efforts, are the security concerns of modern radical groups of all types—for example, militant anarchist groups, radical animal rights organizations, militant environmentalists, and confrontational anti-globalists. These groups continue efforts to mobilize themselves for protecting their activities from police and other security services, as they have from the 1960s when they began to proliferate. Many of them believe that this protection is increasingly important in a security-centric post-9/11 environment where law enforcement watchfulness is greater and tolerance for unusual activity less. This effort has been accompanied by the production of many internal security tracts and other disseminated advice. A good example is Security Culture: A Handbook for Activists, which has appeared in many print and digital forums in several editions. It was assembled primarily by the Earth Liberation Front, but is clearly the work of multiple contributors and drawn from other publications. It was billed for users “associated with groups advocating or using economic disruption or sabotage, theft, arson, self defence from police or more militant tactics.”

Numerous other works, old and new, are found on various activist sites and address similar topics for the same audiences. Among other things, the material:

a. Calls for overall, disciplined operations security (OPSEC), to include limited access to planning by members who have no need to know, strictures against careless speech, and the need for vigilance.
b. Cites the need for background checks and vetting among new activists.
c. Offers insights on the various types of informers and infiltrators that might appear, how to identify them, and how to deal with them.
d. Presents primers or overviews on local and national law enforcement and how they conduct themselves.
e. Cites historic and more recent examples of ways in which law enforcement and intelligence agencies successfully target or disorganize activist groups through coercion, arrest, and disinformation.
f. Puts forward imperatives to counter presumed federal, state, and local government “COIN” models of “repression.”
g. Describes the best way to conduct oneself if arrested and questioned as well as what to do during searches of a residence.
h. Suggests ways to identify and avoid surveillance cameras in areas of planned activity.
i. Cautions about the use and dangers of communications means to avoid police/intelligence compromise.
j. Sets out a variety of tradecraft tips, including instructions on how to avoid leaving clues and identifying evidence during direct actions.

The phenomenon of international criminal street gangs has been around for a while, but has become far more visible and developed in the last two decades. These gangs have taken many forms, with outlaw motorcycle and prison gangs among the most prominent of those having origins in the United...
States. Often racially or ethnically based, the growing activities and sophistication of criminal enterprises—for example, the Bandidos, Hell’s Angels, Outlaws, Barrio Azteca, Aryan Brotherhood, Mexican Mafia, Latin Lords, and MS-13 (and various Mara Salvatrucha variants)—have generated a far larger and focused “gang intelligence” effort among law enforcement nationwide.

A common trend among these gangs, however, is a greater CI effort as they have tracked the threats to their existence posed by compromise, arrest, and dismantlement. These gang-initiated measures have included greater internal security among their often unpredictable members and rules of conduct that incorporate security awareness. Not satisfied with protective measures, more aggressive countermeasures have been instituted as well.

A case in point is the 50-year-old Bandido Motorcycle Gang, centered in Texas but with dozens of U.S. chapters and some overseas as well. A violent organization given to blood feuds with rivals, they are involved with numerous kinds of criminality including drug trafficking, fraud, contract murder, prostitution, and other activities. To control their criminal enterprise and to protect their interests, the Bandidos have developed codes of conduct and a defined structure present from their national “headquarters” to local chapters. Rules of conduct—embedded in formal bylaws and policies—are intended to reduce security dangers.

Along with strictures—for example, against lying, stealing, engaging in some of the more pernicious forms of illegal drug use (“if it doesn’t grow, don’t blow”), paying dues, and keeping bikes in good working order—a phased system of carefully vetting new members governs the extremely sensitive process of slowly integrating someone into the group who might just betray them. Full Bandido members or full chapters recommend a pledge, and typically an aspiring member will go through periods from “hang-around” status, to formal probationary prospect, to full member requiring acquiescence by 100 percent of the chapter membership. Prospects and hang-arounds undergo background checks and are closely scrutinized for police associations.13

Along with elected officers (including a president, vice president, and secretary-treasurer), the Bandidos established appointed national and chapter sergeants-at-arms—called sergentos de armas—with a nod to the organizational name and a constituency that includes Anglo and Hispanic members. The sergentos de armas are responsible for intelligence (including CI), enforcement, and special expertise. Overall, these sergentos de armas,
one to three per chapter, conduct a range of CI activities to frustrate law enforcement efforts through coercion, false reporting, recruiting, bribery, and surveillance/countersurveillance.

While most chapters are associated with specific locations, a so-called “Nomad Chapter” is made up of long-term, trusted members who are responsible for security, CI, and organizational issues. Among other tasks, the chapter compiles information and files on law enforcement as well as on rival gangs—a circumstance that is paralleled by some insurgencies too, where other hostile movements may constitute threats as serious as the police and security forces. Law enforcement has identified the following specific activities of Bandido intelligence/CI:

- Corruption of public officials through bribery and coercion to further criminal endeavors
- Coercion of law enforcement with direct violence and threats
- Exploitation of law enforcement as intelligence sources
- Focused countersurveillance of police to include videotaping
- Mobilization of police Internal Affairs against officers (using selected measures—e.g., video/audio clips and proliferating false reports)
- Induction of members (sometimes acquired from the many Bandido “support group” clubs) whose lack of criminal history allows the presentation of a “clean” face in pursuing their interests.

The Bandidos made it an imperative a few years ago for chapters to use technology, as incongruous as it may seem. Some chapter personnel have joined the culture of computers, Internet homepages, “social networking” sites, cell phones, and fax machines; it is also a rule that every Bandido chapter have an e-mail address. (The Heart of Texas Bandido Motorcycle Club Chapter homepage, for example, may be seen at www.bandidosmc.com/). The extent to which computer encryption and other such innovations are used has not become publicly known, but the embrace of communications technology, cameras, and the seizure of computers and hard drives in raids as cyber-forensic evidence suggests that it is a law-enforcement expectation.

Overall, a wide range of ancient societies and even the most loosely organized irregular in modern times groups have made efforts to systematize and apply associated techniques that might fall under the rubric of
counterintelligence. If lacking the levels of sophistication, nuance, and technology of some modern insurgencies and modern state security establishments, they are not so different that they are unrecognizable. In many cases, such approaches have been successful and advanced the interests of the groups that developed and applied them. This reminder of a long, universal history provides a good backdrop for addressing the deeper and more focused counterintelligence thinking of insurgent groups whose formulations sometimes approach what could be called “theory.”

**Insurgent Counterintelligence “Theory”**

Just as there are classic military authors from ancient and more modern times who have captured and synthesized enduring strategic, operational, and tactical insights for warfare generally, there is a far more limited but sometimes quite perceptive group of CI practitioners and theorists. Over decades they have attempted to set out some basic precepts for what they understood to be the critically important subject of insurgent counterintelligence and security.

To perhaps a greater extent than conventional military operations, the world that guerrillas consider is filled with innumerable real, imminent threats, as well as an imperative to continuously imagine others. Their experience universally indicated that enemies are found at every quarter, surprise is frequent and should be expected, and even the smallest mistake and inattention could prove fatal to individuals or disastrous to the movement itself. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officer Carlos Revillo Arango, in an instructive article entitled “Insurgent Counterintelligence,” categorized the range of threats faced by the guerrilla to include:

a. Government security forces and targeted actions of all types
b. Competing armed or dissident groups who might enjoy advantage from the defeat or compromise of a rival
c. Third-country parties whose unilateral actions might damage or restrict insurgent operations
d. Betrayal—deserters, collaborators, and informers from within the group who may act out of jealousies, perceived slights, coercion, or profit—and because of their special knowledge can generate devastating damage
Chance occurrences to include carelessness, unrelated changes in government routine (e.g., curfews, identifications, and checks), and even natural disasters.\textsuperscript{15}

Insurgents who were successful—or at least survived to record their views—often lived in a world where threats like these proliferated, and they were hunted constantly. Betrayal was a daily potential, and developing a sense of near paranoia often constituted wisdom. Despite advances in technology that put insurgents at greater risk from the pre-World War II period to date, the greatest danger has remained the “turned” insider. George Orwell’s novel, \textit{1984}, which painted a picture of the complete “counterintelligence state,” captured in a bit of doggerel the milieu of both the novel’s imagined dissident citizen and real-life guerrillas with “under the spreading Chestnut tree, I sold you and you sold me.”\textsuperscript{16} The concern is reflected in most insurgent counterespionage writings that follow. The observations of the men below—whose backgrounds, cultures, and ideologies were quite different—have a decided practical bent and some commonalities. The formulations may not always reflect the level of scholarship associated with “theory” in the grander sense, and certainly not in an abstract sense, but they do meet the criteria of being generalized and based on observation, trial and error, and reasoned consideration. Certainly, one example of theory that has some resonance for the topic at hand is “they killed him on the theory that dead men tell no tales,” a proposition in which guerrilla CI practitioners appear to have universal belief.\textsuperscript{17}

\textbf{Alberto Bayo: Cuba and Counterintelligence Lessons from Three Decades}

To begin a look at some notable, illustrative proponents for the importance of guerrilla CI, Alberto Bayo stands as an instructive figure. Bayo was a storied and colorful figure in the Cuban Revolution that brought Fidel Castro to power. CIA officer Arango noted Bayo’s view that “a counterintelligence agent was of greater value than 50 machine guns: he could work among the security forces and keep one advised of all their intelligence and plans,” and Bayo developed this view through several decades of experience.
“General” Alberto Bayo, the Spanish Civil War veteran and unconventional warfare specialist whose experience fighting the Riffs helped formulate his ideas of guerrilla warfare, emphasized counterintelligence issues when he trained Fidel Castro’s aspiring guerrillas in Mexico prior to their infiltration into Cuba. Used by permission of Paladin Press.

A Spaniard—born in 1892 in Cuba as the son of a Spanish colonel stationed there—Bayo became an officer in the Spanish Army. He had a variety of assignments, serving as a combat pilot in missions against Moorish rebels in North Africa under Riff leader Abd-El-Krim. He was later transferred to the Spanish Foreign Legion as a company commander where he fought the Riffs in Morocco, learning the basics of guerrilla warfare as practiced by these Berber fighters and becoming an enthusiast for irregular operations.18

Bayo sided with the Republican cause in the Spanish Civil War—a catalyst for many special operations and irregular warfare developments in World War II and the Cold War period.19 His most notable Civil War achievement was the temporary seizing of the Spanish island of Majorca, which his command held briefly before withdrawing. He was a tireless proponent for guerrilla warfare as a greater Republican tool, wrote on the topic, and before the end of the conflict did establish a guerrilla warfare school at Barcelona. But the Republicans lost soon after, and Bayo began an expatriate life, first in Cuba and then Mexico. He taught at a Mexican military aviation school, wrote, and involved himself in Latin American revolutionary activity. His title of “General”—retained with the acquiescence of colleagues for the rest of his life—was apparently given to him in the late 1940s by a
group of Costa Rican-based Nicaraguan exiles he trained for an unrealized assault on the Somoza regime.

It was in Mexico that Fidel Castro and his small group of aspiring guerrillas, including Ernesto Che Guevara, sought out Bayo and proposed that he train their group for a future attack on the Batista regime in Cuba. Castro had been familiar with some of Bayo’s guerrilla warfare writings and thought he would be a good choice to turn untrained enthusiasts into real insurgent fighters. The 64-year-old Bayo agreed and undertook an increasingly intense training program for the group, first in tactics and techniques and then renting a Mexican ranch not far from Mexico City for serious physical conditioning, real field work, and practical training. The group’s performance satisfied Bayo—particularly that of his “favorite” student Che—but near its end the training was punctuated by an excellent CI lesson in the consequences of the unexpected—that is, Mexican police pursuing thieves stopped Castro and two others.

When the Mexican police discovered that the thieves’ car was loaded with weapons, they quickly moved to the ranch and arrested Castro and 23 men for three weeks. They also confiscated all weapons. Upon release, however, Castro was able to regroup, rearm, and set sail on the Granma for Cuba and history. Bayo went to Cuba following Castro’s success and set to training Cuban marines and special units, some of whom reportedly took part in Cuba’s export of revolution elsewhere in Latin America. In 1963, U.S. congressional testimony indicated that Bayo was director of the Boca Chica School, in Tarará, Havana Province, a school established for the training of subversives sent to promote revolution abroad.

Bayo appears to have published his most influential work, 150 Questions for a Guerrilla, in Havana in 1959, from where it was disseminated to Latin American armed groups in other countries including Brazil, Guatemala, and Venezuela. The instructive booklet was intended mainly as a primer for recruited rural guerrillas who were little steeped in guerrilla skills. As noted above, Bayo chose to heavily emphasize CI lessons learned among the Rifis in the Moroccan civil war. That 1920s conflict was noted for its twists, turns, and deceptions, which in Bayo’s judgment reflected the complexities of conspiratorial revolutionary politics he found in the 1940s and 1950s. In focusing on CI, he contributed to the body of “insurgent counterintelligence” thinking in which readers will note a number of themes echoed by others.
in their own context and circumstances. The following topics are among the pertinent CI issues he addressed:

a. A guerrilla “Information Section,” headed by the second-in-command of the group, must be established to handle intelligence and counterintelligence functions and activities. It should be composed of small cells to mitigate damage and larger compromise. In addition to gathering “positive” intelligence of all types [there clearly being at least as much overlap with CI for guerrillas as there is for governments], it will carefully monitor the conduct of group members, record all large and small wartime activities, maintain lists of outside sympathizers and blacklists of known or potential informers, and maintain a coding/decoding center. These activities, along with the investigation of traitors, were noted by Bayo as suitable for both male and female guerrillas.

b. Intelligence and counterintelligence work must be accomplished by all guerrillas. But the counterintelligence agent, per se, has pride of place among guerrillas in wartime, giving “better results than the intelligence agent.” The CI agent—for which task women are “unbeatable”—penetrates enemy organizations and areas masquerading as a friend and sympathizer, often acting as a seller of provisions and other merchandise at a low cost. Relying on observation alone and not asking questions, he or she reports troop levels, strength, movement, equipment, and morale. Training of such agents must be well done. Reports are generated in code by a third party or by messenger where there is urgency. In the event of a guerrilla attack, guerrilla CI agents should pretend to fight in behalf of the enemy, but avoid causing any damage to guerrilla forces.

c. The potential for having a guerrilla CI operative who is an officer in the enemy forces is prized. Such an operative can be more valuable to the guerrillas than “ten of our own officers fighting face to face with the enemy.” Not only will he be able to provide quality information but he should seek combat assignments that allow him to create vulnerabilities that guerrillas can exploit (e.g., leading government forces into ambush and arranging for undermanned garrisons). The formation of “private” armed groups—that is, militias—seemingly friendly to
the state but actually in collaboration with the guerrillas is another possibility (actually practiced against the Cuban Batista regime).

d. Regarding intelligence and counterintelligence and underscoring their importance to the guerrillas, the view was asserted that “more wars are won through cunning and shrewdness than by pulling the trigger…”

e. Recruits for the movement must be fully vetted to include filling out applications that provided information on their families, personal political history, and references within the revolutionary movement itself. If determined to be a potential informer, “he will be judged by a summary court martial as a traitor to the revolution.” Recruiting and the acceptance of volunteers were considered a critical potential vulnerability.

f. If the movement is infiltrated by a “chivator” (informer)—who despite all the efforts made to screen recruits successfully penetrates it—he will be judged by a Council of War and sentenced to death. Political enemies outside the movement might be pardoned for their mistaken beliefs, but a chivator will be executed.

g. The group must be alert to enemy forces masquerading as supporters (e.g., government pseudo-operations). One example of such a group was a column that shouted “Viva Fidel” upon encountering the insurgents and then surprised them by pulling out weapons, coercing their surrender, and then executing all of the captured guerrillas except a seven-man advance guard that managed to escape.

h. Before attacking a town or population center, a list of traitors and “persecutors” and their addresses should be compiled by the guerrilla Information Section (Intelligence and Counterintelligence) including their addresses, and this should be provided to the guerrilla Operations Section.

i. The maximum size of guerrilla cells should be three people to avoid the compromise of larger numbers if a member is turned or compromised. Any cell of 8–10 guerrillas whose members also head other groups of the same size should be dissolved.

j. Careful attention should be directed towards how executions for “counterrevolutionary acts” or crimes are carried out. As large a crowd as possible should witness the event, and a guerrilla leader should address them with an explanation of what the prisoner had done to
deserve a death sentence and emphasize how the moral qualities of the guerrillas are superior. The execution should be a “public spectacle” accompanied by the promise to carry out swift justice against any malefactor in the future.

k. Arms and equipment caches should receive close oversight for their physical security and danger of compromise by individuals. Caches should be buried deep, to a depth sufficient to avoid detection by enemy forces, even if they dig in the area. Rural guerrillas should locate caches at a distance of some 30–60 yards from a farmhouse or dwelling. Close uniformity in approach, however, should be avoided so that government personnel cannot establish patterns.

l. Despite the unflinching punishment of traitors and informers, moderation should be used with the “lackeys” of the oppressor “that the people want to kill.” Rather, such individuals should be allowed a defense, with consideration given also to the possibility that a suspect may be a “counterspy” working in behalf of the revolution and only appearing to work with the state.

Michael Collins: Coercion and Assassination as Counterintelligence Tools

One of the most successful practitioners of counterintelligence in behalf of an insurgency was Irishman Michael Collins. While he died young (age 31) in a 1922 roadside ambush in County Cork, he had developed an approach to dealing with hostile intelligence services that remains an extraordinary example of how CI can immeasurably advance an armed dissident movement. It established a pattern for much later British-Republican struggles of the 1970s, troubles, and continued conflict in the 1980s and 1990s, particularly the intelligence-counterintelligence dimensions. His approaches and ideas have been studied by many other subsequent armed groups and leaders engaged in a struggle against state power, and his extraordinary success in targeting adversary intelligence officers still serves as a cautionary potential among some intelligence services today. His activities and those of the British—featuring such entities as “Brain Center,” the “Inner Circle,” “the Squad,” “the Twelve Apostles,” and the “Cairo Gang”—entered Irish revolutionary mythology. They were all quite real, however, their intent serious, and their roles in the push for Irish independence substantial.
When Collins was born in 1890, Ireland was entirely under British rule. Irish nationalists had long had aspirations to change this, some by creating a fully independent Irish Republic and others willing to accept their own Irish Parliament and some form of Home Rule, even if British oversight and linkages remained. Collins immediately identified with the cause of Irish independence and joined the secret Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB) while still a teenager. He participated in the failed 1916 Easter Rebellion, served time in a British internment camp, and upon release enthusiastically joined the Sinn Fein political party and the armed “Volunteers” (later the Irish Republican Army—IRA). Membership in these organizations was fed not just by long-standing independence aspirations but also anger over British reprisals after Easter 1916, particularly executions of Irish uprising leaders. Collins rose to leadership positions in all three organizations and—most pertinent to this discussion—became the director of Organization and director of Intelligence for the Volunteers in March 1918.

Collins’ intelligence contributions had many dimensions during his leadership. The most central components, however, were counterintelligence-oriented and included:

a. Unremitting efforts to create extensive intelligence networks penetrating British military, police, and political structures and subsequently
b. An offensive CI approach that targeted opposing intelligence establishments as well as specific members of the British and allied Irish military, police, and intelligence services.
At first, the networks Collins established provided him with high quality intelligence, including tip-offs of impending operations and policies that affected Irish independence movement activities. By early 1919, however, the start of the “War of Irish Independence” brought the second component into full play as well and came to define how an “intelligence war” could confound a far more powerful state adversary. As tensions mounted—and with the Volunteers rechristened as the IRA—Collins’ initial formulations took further shape. His principal intelligence adversaries were known and tracked as they developed and were reinforced. Essential tasks like arms smuggling techniques were perfected. Collins’ intelligence targets came to include the British-directed police force (the Royal Irish Constabulary [RIC] and its intelligence components), the RIC Reserve Force and RIC Auxiliary Division paramilitaries, and British regular military forces and intelligence components.

Additionally, the Dublin Metropolitan Police (DMP) and particularly its “G Division” (staffed by plain clothes detectives and charged with political intelligence among other tasks) was a major force to be understood and neutralized. The Irish makeup of the major police establishments offered Collins and his compatriots numerous opportunities to penetrate these bodies, which they exploited to great success.

A seminal event took place in early April 1919 according to Collins and his contemporaries. One of Collins’ most important inside operatives—a DMP “confidential typist” Ned Broy—allowed the Volunteer/IRA Intelligence chief and one of his intelligence staff to enter the headquarters of the G Division at midnight and spend hours reading confidential reporting and classified files by candlelight. What he saw of the systematized approach used by the DMP to track suspected IRA and Sinn Fein members—including a careful reading
of his own file—sharpened and hardened his views. It convinced him that British efforts to defeat Irish independence aims could be seriously or fatally damaged by attacking the Intelligence personnel and networks upon which British efforts depended. Central assumptions, tenets, and other dimensions of his approaches used in the 1919–1921 intelligence wars included the following (with some specific operations addressed later in the paper):

a. Informers and spies operating in behalf of the state—including those recruited from rival groups—pose the greatest threat against an armed resistance movement.

b. Friendly (republican militant) intelligence structures must be better prepared and organized than those of opponents and protected by organizing into cells, each with limited knowledge of the other participants.

c. Friendly spies and informers with good access must be placed or recruited among all communications, transportation, and other organizational (trade union) and infrastructure administrative elements.

d. Enemy intelligence itself must be studied and understood in every dimension, the better to protect one’s own resources and to exploit adversary vulnerabilities.

e. As a central guiding precept, it was stressed that while casualties among enemy soldiers could be replaced with relative ease, intelligence operatives and spies supporting British efforts were exceptionally high value resources whose loss would be difficult or impossible to offset.

f. The identification of key enemy intelligence personnel individually and groupings whose loss would be particularly harmful should be a priority task for IRA intelligence.

g. Once identified, enemy intelligence operatives should be threatened and coerced into stopping or compromising their activities.

h. If the threatened police operatives do not comply, they should be killed.

i. Police and paramilitaries who commit crimes against IRA personnel or advocate oppressive policies should be eliminated, even long after the fact.

j. A highly secretive assassination section was necessary to carefully study layouts, plans, timing, and personal attributes of the targets
before assassinations, with provisions made for the disposal of the weapons used.

k. Individual members should foster visual or other identification with British or non-republican perspective to ease movement and allay suspicion.

The consequences of Michael Collins' intelligence efforts were much as he had postulated. Anti-republican Intelligence networks—manned by Irish RIC, DPD, and the British alike—were severely damaged when key officers and operatives were physically eliminated (including the 1920 “Bloody Sunday” mass assassination addressed later). His efforts—by creating an atmosphere of coercion and fear—brought about numerous resignations and retirements, recruiting shortfalls, defections, the frequent “turning of a blind eye” on critical occasions, and overall organizational dysfunction. In addition, IRA penetrations of British intelligence, security, communications, and even political bodies often allowed it to stay a jump ahead of counterinsurgency initiatives that constantly threatened them, even as republican forces suffered serious attrition. Finally, his attacks so provoked and frustrated the British that they were tempted into over-reaction and excesses, thereby mobilizing additional support for the republican cause and creating additional pressure on the government for some resolution to the Irish problem.28

Because of the audacity and innovation of Collins' often dramatic successes, there may be a danger of overstating their impact. Certainly other factors also led to a July 1921 truce between the British and Republicans. Nevertheless, the intelligence war clearly played an important role in bringing about the truce and the subsequent December 1921 Anglo-Irish Treaty that established the Irish Free State and a separate six-county Northern Ireland that was allowed to opt out of the agreement and remain part of the United Kingdom. Collins' role in supporting the agreement, however, was judged by his more uncompromising colleagues as a sell-out since it did not achieve full republican goals. His assassination by fellow republicans 10 months later cut short whatever directions his leadership, political, and underground warfare skills may have taken him.29
Carlos Marighella: Guerrilla Counterintelligence in an Urban Environment

Brazilian insurgent practitioner and theorist Carlos Marighella, an admirer of Fidel Castro, was one of a significant handful of Latin American guerrillas who committed his ideas on the successful conduct of an insurgency to paper. Unlike General Bayo whose thoughts ran mainly to rural-based guerrilla warfare, he believed that revolution could be promoted most successfully in urban areas. After a long history of vocal dissent and political protest, Marighella helped form the Marxist armed group “Action for National Liberation” (ALN—Acao Libertadora Nacional) in the late 1960s. He was an active participant in a number of armed money-raising efforts—robberies and kidnappings—in Brazil until killed in a carefully prepared São Paulo police ambush in 1969. While his book *For the Liberation of Brazil* gained attention, his main contribution to the practice of guerrilla warfare was *Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla*. Marighella’s ideas inspired and guided the Communist Tupamaros insurgency in Uruguay, in the early 1970s, and was used by other groups around the world. During the 1970s at least, the tract was banned in parts of Latin America. *Minimanual*, familiar to most students of insurgency, was not a long or exhaustive work by any means, but it did distill some key lessons and truths that informed aspiring Latin American and other insurgents and made its way into government security forces training curricula. Among the topics he chose to cover was counterintelligence, the importance of which he stressed and the criticality of which had been demonstrated to him.

Marighella took cognizance of the resources that government security organizations would bring to bear on armed dissident groups in an urban environment. The environment he accurately perceived was one in which “the urban guerrilla lives in constant danger of the possibility of being discovered or denounced.” The continuing danger of infiltration by police or intelligence spies was judged to be the greatest single threat, the need to remain alert, “well hidden and well-guarded” was essential. Marighella outlined concerns associated with the most important threats he envisioned and recommended measures to mitigate them:

a. Ensure that recruiting is conducted in utmost secrecy.
b. Prohibit individual guerrillas from learning the identities of more than a few compatriots and limit knowledge of planning and structure—“a fundamental A-B-C of urban guerrilla security.”
c. Avoid carelessness, indiscipline, and lack of vigilance.
d. Guard against the possession of documents, addresses, marginal notes on any papers, telephone books, biographical information, maps, and planning materials or maps of any type.
e. Commit all needed information to memory.
f. Correct comrades who violate rules once and shun them if they commit such actions again.
g. Move constantly and carefully to avoid police identification of location.
h. Receive information on police and security movement, concentration, and activity daily.
i. Maintain security and silence following arrest, particularly in regard to insurgent identities or locations.
j. Overall, “the most important lesson for guerrilla security” in view of the threat—never allow stipulated security procedures to be violated or to be implemented sloppily.

Brazilian insurgent Carlos Marighella addressed urban guerrilla counterintelligence practices in his *Minimanual* that was used by many insurgent groups. He was killed in a police ambush when betrayed by two informants. Photo from www.terrorfileonline.org/es/index.php/Imagen:Carlos_Marighella.jpeg#file, used by permission of http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.5/.
As a consequence, he emphasized the early need for any guerrilla group to build a competent, structured intelligence service. While intelligence would be tasked on the one hand with acquiring “positive” intelligence (e.g., state planning, strength, location, support/financial systems, communications, and covert actions), guerrilla resources had to be devoted at the same time to prevent government forces from ferreting out information on their plans, fostering betrayal by group members and outside supporters, and infiltrating spies and informers into the insurgent structure. This focus, he insisted, should be in the form of a “counterespionage or counterintelligence service” that targeted specific enemy plans and activities. It also would incorporate all kinds of nontargeted information gathered in the course of daily activities to include what was observed of human interaction, attitudes, the content of overheard conversations, and the particulars of infrastructure sites that were observed. The careful reading and exploitation of public information—newspapers, magazines, and media broadcasts—were judged as contributive to an “urban guerrilla’s decisive advantage,” especially when reporting on police activities.

This effort would constitute, to paraphrase a much later U.S. intelligence formulation, not only an approach in which “every guerrilla was a sensor” but every sympathizer and supporter that could be tapped as well. In other words, Marighella proposed to harness the entire force of guerrillas and associates to providing a picture of enemy threats. He believed that in this way hostile security force actions in concentrated urban areas could be reduced as guerrilla popular support grew. He judged that a large, motivated population would provide more and more information on the activities of police agencies and contribute to misleading them. He expanded on this point by offering his view that government police and security forces—which would be closely studied by a reporting population sympathetic to the insurgency—could not know who among the people was actually passing information to the insurgents. Information gathering by all concerned would involve “observation, investigation, reconnaissance, and exploration of the terrain.” Further, “revolutionary precaution”—careful observation and wariness to include “eyes and ears open, senses alert, and his memory engraved with everything necessary”—was to overlay information gathering.

Marighella recommended a CI tactic against treachery that called for insurgent spokesmen “to denounce publicly the traitors, spies, informers, and provocateurs.” But his heart and confidence lay in guerrilla actions
that were far from such “soft” responses and countermeasures and more in keeping with his repeated call for revolutionary violence. Identified informers, spies, and traitors had to be “properly punished.” By this he meant physically eliminated—executed by a single or very few guerrillas “operating in absolute secrecy and in cold blood.” He judged it would substantially minimize enemy infiltration and spying. As he also put this explicitly, in the several times he addressed it, “the spy trapped within the organization will be punished with death. The same goes for those who desert and inform to the police.”

Islamic Insurgent and Terrorist Groups: Pervasive Counterintelligence Guidance

The variety of diverse armed groups and militant movements identified as “Islamic” terrorist organizations and/or insurgencies have incorporated a spectrum of defensive and offensive CI practices in their daily activities and operations. Those groups operating under the Al Qaeda umbrella, Afghan and Chechen groups, Filipino Abu Sayyaf and Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) organizations, Indonesian groups like Jemaah Islamiah (JI), and others groups around the world have become CI practitioners to one extent or another. In some cases, this attention to CI issues is manifested in formal organizational ways—for example, organized intelligence and counterintelligence sections, chiefs, and staffs; training or instructional programs designed to create at least security awareness among the general membership and sometimes more carefully honed CI skills; and active practice.

Depending on the group, observations and lessons are recorded, adjusted, studied, and in basic and more sophisticated ways incorporated in the planning and operations. Many of these groups and movements use historical, including quite ancient, examples. This practice is undertaken for the authority and legitimacy it lends to the lessons leaders are trying to instill and perhaps for real operational input as well. As with other groups around the world, a major concern has been treachery in the form of betrayal by members of the group, by the infiltration of police or intelligence agents, or by outside observers.

Ancient lessons and stratagems form a basis for admonitions to group members to act decisively when spies and informers are caught, as with the following 8th century instruction:
As far as people who have been convicted of spying, if they are foreigners from a hostile country, Jews, Christians, or Persians who are Arab subjects, they must be decapitated. If they are bad Muslims, one has to inflict painful punishment on them and put them into prison for a long term.32

At the same time, the most modern CI considerations are discussed and evaluated, sometimes using extensive foreign materials. A notable recent example is Muhammad Khalil Al-Hakaymah’s look at the U.S. Intelligence Community in *The Myth of Delusion*.33

The author, possibly killed in Waziristan by an airstrike in late 2008, was a long-time Egyptian Islamic radical and more recently an apparent Al Qaeda affiliate. In the monograph, Muhammad Khalil Al-Hakaymah undertook to survey and comment upon most components of the U.S. intelligence establishment. While not entirely accurate in fact and understanding and more descriptive than originally analytical, it was a serious effort based on competent, if not comprehensive, open sources. It probably serves as a useful primer for *jihadists*, and especially those concerned with threats to security and who require an overview of U.S. intelligence potential. Abu Bakr Naji’s *Management of Savagery* offers some more specific concerns couched in more original thinking.34

Abu Bakr Naji pointed to general operating principles as well as to some more defined current and future planning tenets. He provided some
defensive and offensive considerations including how Al Qaeda may consider approaches for neutralizing enemy spies and informers and defeating U.S. and allied efforts to infiltrate spies as well as to leverage or coerce informers. The work notes how the “horrors” of the jihadist struggles gradually reveal collaborators within the movement. These revelations become particularly more evident as jihadist ranks expand and as circumstances bring group members into close contact with the various peoples and societies where the movement operates. Developing close relations with the population has to be a priority because is essential for protecting the movement from infiltration. As the author put it, they can provide “good eyes and armor for us and protect us from spies” in ways that would be difficult or impossible to replicate with internal resources.

Principles for discovering spies are set out in published mujahid “security reports.” When a spy or informer is identified and confirmed, he must be punished with the “utmost coarseness and ugliness” in order to deter “weak souls” and others tempted to follow a similar path of betrayal. Even if this means tracking a confirmed spy for years, should he happen to escape and flee initially, he still should be found and punished. An opportunity for confession and forgiveness should be available for unidentified informers who want to admit “mistakes” in dealing with the enemy. The use of rumors suggesting that spies have been caught and “turned” are employed to create uncertainty among adversaries. In language that replicates that of Michael Collins’ often articulated concept in some respects, the importance of neutralizing the informant or spy eyes and ears of the police and security forces is stressed. This point applies not just to those collaborators that have contrived to occupy higher positions among the mujahid but even the lowest level informers who are really those who enable police and security forces to conduct investigations and target mujahid facilities and individuals in their day-to-day operations. Media attention to such retribution is to be welcomed.

The dangers to the movement in the event a mujahid is captured by the enemy are manifest and obvious. Management of Strategy considers some options for various kinds of behavior during interrogation. Each has its own uncertainties and shortcomings whatever the intent of the captured mujahid. The author reaches a conclusion for what he thinks is the best solution: “Rather [than try to outwit the interrogator], a mujahid should not submit to capture in the first place. He should fight until death and not
be captured; he should turn that battle into a slaughterhouse for the forces who are conducting searches.”

Among the offensive CI approaches addressed is a *jihadi* imperative to infiltrate institutions, over the course of a long struggle, and the theoretical framework for actions that not only Al Qaeda but also various terrorist (and criminal) groups have undertaken. Specifically, Abu Bakr Naji indicates:

> Our battle is long and still in its beginning…. Its length provides an opportunity for infiltrating the adversaries and their fellow travelers and establishing a strong security apparatus that is more supportive of the security of the movement now, and later the state. [We] should infiltrate the police forces, the armies, the different political parties, the newspapers, the Islamic groups, the petroleum companies (as an employee or as an engineer), private security companies, sensitive civil institutions, etc. That actually began several decades ago, but we need to increase it in light of recent developments.

The application of this kind of instruction has been evident in the police, military, and security forces of many Islamic states as well as in those developing indigenous security forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. The potential represented by the CIA’s, FBI’s and U.S. Marine Corps’ employment of individuals with possible Hezbollah affiliations recently (addressed below) as well as among private security firms in the West suggests that the potential is not limited to countries with predominantly Islamic populations. Recent assessments of Al Qaeda and other *jihadist* recruitment efforts among Muslims who are resident in Western countries or converted westerners—as well as reports from at least 2004 of the recruitment and deployment of European or European-appearing *jihadists*—suggests a close association with the “infiltration” advice above.

Al Qaeda and other *jihadist* documents are sprinkled or suffused with advice and instructions for security and vigilance to protect friendly resources and planning, as well as conducting offensive CI initiatives. In addition to *Management of Savagery* and the *Myth of Delusion* addressed above, the now well-known lessons-learned tract, *Military Studies in the Jihad Against the Tyrants* prepared about a decade earlier, other writings, *jihadist* Internet postings, and captured documents address a number of precepts associated with CI concerns.
A variety of CI considerations, as well as more specific treatments of topics that fall directly into the CI venue, are woven through instructions and basic tradecraft. A few of these, principally from Military Studies but typical of issues addressed in other materials, are highlighted below. They are intended to convey a sense of the scope of CI functions considered. Interested readers can find more detailed discussions and numerous illustrative historical examples in this basic document, together with other closely related materials in the writings and speeches of prominent jihadists:39

a. **Keeping Secrets and Concealing Information.** With references to Quranic quotes (“Seek Allah’s help in doing your affairs in Secrecy”), note is made of the importance and difficulties of protecting information and use of codes and ciphers among other topics. This practice limiting the individuals who know operational details, even one’s closest colleagues and one’s wife (as Mohammed did with his wife A’isha in his undertakings).

b. **Surveillance.** Both friendly and enemy, including the various types and means used, are addressed. Also considered are a host of tradecraft topics associated with surveillance in different circumstances—for example, familiarization with the area and target, traffic flows, and location of police stations and security centers.

c. **Recruiting, Evaluating, Training.** A process with many CI sensitivities, this dimension receives the same emphasis that it does among so many other insurgent groups. The kinds of attributes that the jihadist recruit should possess include, among others, intelligence and insight; caution and prudence; ability to observe and analyze: an ability to act, change positions, and conceal oneself; and maturity and an ability to keep secrets. Also addressed are ways to “test” recruits for loyalty and competence and the specialized process of recruiting agents who will work in behalf of the movement.

d. **Financial Security Precautions.** Includes issues of handling and managing operational funds including the need for secrecy in location and avoiding the maintenance of all money in one location.

e. **Protecting Documents, Forged and Real.** Deals with the security of documents and the thorough familiarity with them in the event of questioning about particulars, as well as tradecraft-like strictures
on traveling to a country that purportedly issued the false passport one is using.

f. **Care with Aliases.** Avoidance of having more than one identity in the general area of operation and the need to ensure compatibility with the names of other members of the group.

g. **Arrest and Interrogations.** Discusses the various kinds of questioning and physical and psychological coercion a mujahid might be subjected to and ways that he should conduct himself to include making the charge that torture was used and demanding it be included in a formal record of his imprisonment and questioning.

h. **Security for Facilities from Infidel Surveillance and Actions.** Addressing the careful selection of safe houses and other facilities, primarily in urban environments, to include appropriateness, entry, and egress routes as well as emergency escape routes, concealed areas within for the secretion of documents, or other sensitive items.

i. **Communications Security.** Addressing detailed attention to the approaches and dangers of telephonic contacts, personal meetings, information delivered by messenger, letters, facsimile machine, wireless communications, radio, and TV. *Myth of Delusion* also discusses the topic in some detail in relation to intelligence capabilities.

The early–mid 1990s and later considerations referred to above continue to be supplemented by the new and sometimes innovative technological developments and updated warnings of enemy capabilities, dangers, and countermeasures. New techniques of computer encryption (including the software “Secrets of the Mujahideen”) and other developments are set out in instructional materials like the online *Technical Mujahid* that appeared for the first time in late 2006. The latter featured pieces on clandestine communications (including steganography and steganalysis), Web site design, and weapons technology among other topics. At least one subsequent issue has been published.

A general concern with unwanted associations and a need for overall watchfulness in everyday contact is emphasized for members. For example, in late 2006, a number of news organizations and specialized Internet information sites released the text of a Taliban “Layeha,” a term usually rendered in English as “Rulebook” or “Book of Rules.”
In Afghanistan, Taliban rules of conduct reflect a strong counterintelligence concern amidst other guidelines for members. Mohammed Naim Farouq, former Guantanamo detainee, earned a criminal reputation well out of accord with Taliban standards of conduct but is nevertheless now reckoned to be a Taliban leader. Travis Heying/Wichita Eagle/MCT photo, used by permission of Newscom.

In its Pashtu original, it was 15 pages in length and comprised a list of 30 “obligations” approved by the “Supreme Leader of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan” for those that had embraced jihad. The document was distributed to some 33 attendees at a Shura Council meeting during the Ramadan Muslim religious observance (which in 2006 was 5 September to 24 October).

Some of the items dealt with CI measures, comprising brief reminders to those that the need for security was continuing. While Mideast specialists may find the comparison ill-chosen, the resemblance of Taliban “rules” to those promulgated among Bandido motorcycle members (and the Sicilian Mafia as well) is evident. They are a reminder of the common, enduring considerations that influence security-aware organizations perceiving outside threats. Among several security-related examples from the “layeha” are the following:

a. Each mujahideen who is in contact with supporters of the current regime and who invites them to join the true Islam has to inform his commander.
b. Those who accept the invitation to join the true Islam but are not loyal and become traitors will lose their contract with us and not be protected by us. There is no way to give them another chance.

c. If someone who is working with the infidels wants to cooperate with the mujahideen, nobody is allowed to kill him. If somebody kills him, he will face the Islamic sharia court.

d. If a member of the opposition, or the government, wants to surrender to the Taliban, we can consider their conditions; however, the final decision has to be made by the military council.

e. Working for the current puppet regime is not permitted, either in a madrassa [religious school] or as a schoolteacher, because that provides strength to the infidel system. In order to strengthen the new Islamic regime, Muslims should hire a religious teacher and study in a mosque or another suitable place and the textbooks used should be from the mujahid [anti-Soviet war] time or the Taliban time.

f. Those who are working in the current puppet regime as a madrassa teacher or schoolteacher should be warned. If he does not stop, he should be beaten. But if a teacher is teaching against the true Islam, he should be killed by the district commander or a group leader.

g. The nongovernment organizations that came in the country under the infidel’s government are just like the government. They came here under the slogan of helping the people but in fact they are part of this regime. That is why their every activity will be banned, whether it is building a road, bridge, clinic, school or madrassa, or anything else. If a school matches these conditions, it should be burned. If it is told to close but does not, it should be burned. But before burning it, all religious books should be taken out.

h. Before someone is found guilty of being a spy, and can be punished, no commander or person of responsibility is allowed to interfere. Only the district general commander is allowed to do so. In court, evidence has to be brought forward that might prove the accused person to be a spy. The persons who bring forward the evidence should be mentally well and have a good religious reputation. They must not have committed a big crime. The accused should be punished only after the whole case is closed and he is found guilty.

i. Every mujahid group is committed to keep watchful guards on duty day and night.
Collectively, the issues addressed above convey a concern with counterintelligence measures that runs deep in jihadist thinking. The precepts and imperatives do not differ markedly from the approaches voiced by other insurgent groups, save for the religious context that underpins the do’s and don’ts of protection, personal conduct, and offensive action.

**Some External Influences**

The variety of counterintelligence approaches associated with insurgent groups is certainly home-grown in some cases, a legacy of tribal, ethno-national, and a host of time-honored regional approaches shaped by trial and error. Tribal warfare, simmering and intermittently acute ethnic tensions and violence, and smuggling and other criminal endeavors have among other factors developed and honed practices and contributed to more applied CI approaches. Many insurgent groups have benefited also from having members who served in their national militaries. They brought both formal knowledge of basic CI methods and techniques, as well as an understanding of the government intelligence services and forces they were engaging.

But there have been many external influences as well. Lessons and instructional materials from outside insurgent groups—some allied, others loosely supportive, and some having no discernible relationship beyond armed violence—have found their way into guerilla “libraries.” Even before the advent of the Internet, it had been a common occurrence to find such diverse materials in caches of guerrilla documents from all parts of the world. For many groups, the studied reading of foreign reporting and documents has proven a source for information, ideas, and instruction. The *Myth of Delusion* previously mentioned is a recent case in point.

It is clear that World War II contributed to the base of insurgent intelligence and counterintelligence skills and knowledge in at least some regions. Certainly, the experience in fighting the Japanese in southern, southeast, and north Asia was instrumental in providing the know-how that supported postwar guerrilla forces as they sometimes fought their way to national power or failed after long struggles. In Eastern Europe and Central Eurasia, partisan (guerrilla) groups engaged in some of the largest irregular
warfare operations in history, creating a base of intelligence and CI wisdom and practices that informed both the Axis combatants and the guerrillas themselves. The distinguished historian John Keegan, in his well-regarded work *Intelligence in War*, directly linked the experience of the U.S. Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and the British Special Operations Executive (SOE) to the tradecraft of postwar terrorist armed groups. He summed up this view, for which there is some evidence, as follows:

Like all post-1945 terrorist organizations, it [Al Qaeda terrorism] appears to have learnt a great deal from the operations of Western states’ special forces during the Second World War, such as SOE and OSS, which developed and diffused most of the modern techniques of secret warfare among the resistance groups of German-occupied Europe during 1940–1944; the copious literature of secret warfare against the Nazis provides the textbooks.

While some would find it provocative, Keegan takes specific note of techniques taught to the OSS and SOE for behavior by captured agents during interrogation. He observed that these techniques often failed when used against the tortures typically employed by the Gestapo against real and suspected OSS or SOE operatives—male, female, and the most youthful resistance fighters alike. However, he believes that these same techniques pioneered six decades ago work very well today against Western intelligence interrogation efforts that are constrained by laws of war, other international and domestic legal strictures, and U.S. and allied policies. Captured Al Qaeda militants, for example, have proved far more resistant to interrogation than did many of the extraordinarily brave and resourceful SOE and OSS operatives.

The extent to which current insurgent and terrorist groups would agree is unclear. But the many examples of OSS and SOE guerrilla operations recounted in recent works using newly declassified material suggest that Keegan may have a point (though some agents resisted everything and never revealed the identity, locational, and operational details sought). But more broadly than this were the other elements of tradecraft that were “diffused” following the war. These included the traditional techniques of secrecy and deception on the human intelligence side. In addition, it encompassed the technical side also, as with the famous “radio game”—or German designated *funkspeil*—involving the coerced control or impersonation of captured
agents paradropped and otherwise infiltrated into target areas; the countermeasures and double-crosses developed and employed; and the accompanying advances in radio direction finding, its neutralization, encryption, and other advances.46 While technology has changed, the principles and the culture of deception from the period, to whatever extent actually transmitted to armed groups, is evident in guerrilla CI discourses and activities.

Perhaps the greatest outside influences on guerrilla CI approaches and activities are those dating from the Cold War. These are still pertinent since they became institutionally embedded in general guerrilla intelligence/CI tradecraft and activity, even as events and local conditions have modified them. It is well known and documented that Soviet and East European communist intelligence services played key roles in training guerrilla cadres of all types, including those engaged in insurgent intelligence and CI work. These complex, multifaceted support efforts—carried out clandestinely in insurgent host countries and in the USSR, Eastern Europe, and third country camps and facilities as well—trained several generations of insurgents and terrorists in pertinent skills including those of intelligence and counterintelligence. This history is too extensive to be addressed here but needs to be considered as a backdrop in more focused assessments of current approaches. One example is worth noting, however, since it contributed so much to guerrilla approaches in a region of the world.

The example is the role of the East German Ministry for State Security (Ministerium für Staatssicherheit—MfS), more commonly known as the Stasi. Stasi training and support efforts covered a number of areas of the world. Its influence, however, was particularly strong in Cuba, where the Cuban Ministry of the Interior (MINIT) was charged with a broad spectrum of internal and external security functions and became in many respects a close Stasi analog. The nature of the close relationship had been asserted and partially documented for years in Western assessments. The training of Cuban intelligence and counterintelligence officers in the techniques of the East German “counterintelligence state” was evident in many ways.

The demise of the German Democratic Republic in 1991 and consequent access to Stasi files confirmed and expanded the understanding of the relationship.

Regarding guerrilla CI, this relationship is important because Cuban trainers played substantial roles in passing on their knowledge to Latin American and other insurgent groups. Cuban researcher Jorge Luís Vázquez,
Soviet and Warsaw Pact intelligence services greatly influenced Marxist and other insurgent groups around the world. The opening of Stasi files confirmed the close relationship between the East German counterintelligence organization and the Cuban Ministry of the Interior, which adopted many of its CI approaches for further dissemination to Latin American and African insurgencies. AFP photo, used with permission by Newscom.

who has spent years examining Stasi files dealing with Cuba, judges that “what we see is a copy of the Stasi system that spread across the developing world—from Angola, Ethiopia, and Mozambique to Nicaragua, Guatemala, and El Salvador.” Cuban insurgent trainers and cadres trained by MINIT deployed to near and distant African conflict areas to train indigenous guerrillas in such skills as “observation, espionage, and interrogation techniques” supplementing what the German Democratic Republic (GDR), USSR, and other East European communist states did more directly.

In addition to state sponsorship provided during the Cold War by the USSR and East European allies, other communist states (e.g., the People’s Republic of China and North Korea) at times trained guerrillas and sent material support to them. So too have various authoritarian regimes to include, as is well known, Saddam-era Iraq, Libya, and others. In recent years, guerrilla groups have contracted for support from freelance or criminal organizations, though the CI dimension of such support has probably been minimal.
Cultural issues and their impact on intelligence are usually addressed in terms of unthinking government or foreign security force activities during insurgencies. However, they may in many cases fundamentally affect the security of insurgents as well. The competent treatment of tribal, religious, and ethnic groups—whose support and participation in an insurgency is a point of consideration—has sometimes been ignored by aspiring insurgents or terrorist armed groups. The much publicized disaffection and eventual intense hostility developing among some Iraqi insurgents and Al Qaeda in Iraq is only a recent manifestation of the problem faced by some insurgencies. While once making common cause against the U.S.-led multinational coalition, the later operational and intelligence difficulties encountered by foreign fighters have been manifest. This problem is recent but not unique to some insurgencies.

One consequence for guerrilla groups who were not properly prepared to deal with cultural issues has been to undermine the creation of informant networks and to leave an indifferent or hostile population base that materially harms guerrilla efforts. This appears to have been the case for Che Guevara in Bolivia—perhaps the best known popular illustration—where he noted in his diary that his group had learned Quechua, but that the local tribal language in his area of operations was Tupí-Guaraní. The consequence of this, as he noted, was a lack of rapport between the guerrillas and the Indians, great difficulties in recruiting, and the existence of a population base that might be inclined to inform authorities about his activities. This situation had a substantial impact on Che’s activities and could plausibly be judged as a significant factor in his eventual failure.

In Peru, during mid-1960s operations of the short-lived National Liberation Army insurgency (Ejército Liberación Nacional—ELN), language also presented a serious CI problem for the guerrillas. The ELN leader Héctor Béjar acknowledged in his “autocriticism,” written in a Peruvian prison, that a serious lack of rapport existed between his fighters and the Indian peasants. He identified the difficulties his guerrillas had in places like Ayacucho (the birthplace of Sendero Luminoso years later), where large numbers of Quechua speakers resided and where Spanish speakers like his men were regarded as outsiders and “bosses.” Further, he observed that it was far from sufficient to have just a few words of Quechua. Béjar’s look back at the failure of his insurgency made this point, which had deep CI implications. His judgment was that “for the guerrillas to gain the trust of the peasantry they
must be able to speak Quechua, and not just any Quechua, but the dialect spoken in the zone where they are operating…” 51

Hand in hand with the language shortfalls was the lack of appreciation for Indian customs. Béjar emphasized that simple good works were not enough, even though they might be appreciated. Good works could be negated, and were, by the guerrillas’ failure to exercise discipline in their conduct around the Indian populace. They did not steep themselves in Indian habits and offended them with seeming arrogance and unknowing insults to their feelings and sensitivities. This, like language deficiencies, created CI dangers for the guerrilla force, even as the guerrillas thought they were winning their appreciation by forming various services. According to Béjar’s judgment:

In spite of the goodwill that they earned, the guerrillas lacked a deep understanding of local customs. This would have allowed them to distinguish the traitors from their friends with greater precision and to obtain better and more pertinent information concerning the enemy’s movements.52

In Guinea-Bissau, the 1960s and early 1970s insurgency conducted under the African Independence Party of Guinea and Cape Verde (Partido Africano da Independéncia da Guiné e Cabo Verde—PAIGC) encountered cultural complexities in waging their fight against the Portuguese. One of these was the refusal of some tribal groups to deploy guerrillas to areas beyond their home territory, a concept that seemed unreasonable to men who wanted to protect their own homes, families, and fellow tribesmen. In addition, the increasing bloodshed of the insurgency tended to be interpreted in terms of supernatural reasons and led some villagers, including guerrilla fighters, to seek supernatural protection. Faith in fetishes, instead of training, cost the lives of many guerrillas who believed they would be protected by these traditional objects, while sorcerers possessed the authority to determine whether they would fight on a given day or move to an area designated by guerrilla leaders.

This problem was serious enough that it engaged the PAIGC leadership and the movement’s political mobilization cadres who tried to influence popular beliefs with alienating populations whose support was needed for intelligence, security, fighting strength, and sustainment. For example, rebel leader Amilcar Cabral sought, with some success, to imbue traditional spirits
like the forest spirit _irán_ with “nationalist sentiments” that would permit the establishment of guerrilla camps and movement routes under the safe cover of the forests.53 One specialist summarized the importance of this seemingly exotic problem, and an intelligent effort to achieve balance, this way:

> The repeated attempts to overcome these cultural constraints are an indication of the influence of such factors upon the development of a people’s war. Much of his [PAIGC leader Cabral’s] effort was devoted to understanding cultural influences and reducing their sway over the party leaders and fighters.54

The surprising and relatively complete PAIGC success in a long, bloody fight for independence was an unusual accomplishment in an African colonialist struggle. Soviet and Communist “bloc” support of the guerrillas (from the USSR, Cuba, and China) undermined its legitimacy as a “nationalist” movement. Nevertheless, Cabral’s balanced efforts in managing cultural differences among guerrilla fighters and population segments were based on avoiding heavy-handed assaults on the often frustrating tribal cultures. At the same time, the PAIGC was able to nudge them into views and decisions that more closely supported the insurgents’ requirements. Cabral’s killing by a rival no doubt contributed to a troublesome post-independence period including retaliation against those who had fought on the side of the Portuguese.

The general precepts and principles described in the sections thus far have been translated into action by disparate insurgent groups with varying degrees of success. Illustrations of this success are what follows.

**Counterintelligence Approaches and Effectiveness**

Most insurgent groups have applied variants of the kinds of guidelines, principles, and concepts previously addressed. Specific examples abound of how guerrilla groups have emphasized, modified, or ignored particular elements to their advantage or dismay and damage. Other groups have developed quite new approaches—at least in emphasis—that were stunningly successful at the time. Insurgent counterintelligence approaches have varied, of course, with the different levels of organization; resources; rural, urban and even international operational environments; and with the threats posed by state security forces or rival groups. Some past and
present insurgent organizations have organized intelligence and counterintelligence efforts that approached in structure and differentiation those of the states they opposed. Others have operated with relatively simple and minimally utilitarian in structure and initiatives. For some groups—and most today—leveraging technology for CI tradecraft and applications has been an important adjunct to their efforts, while others relied on the simplest approaches that nevertheless were sometimes effective. In most cases, however, CI activities from the basic defensive security and protection of personnel and assets to some form of offensive CI counterespionage initiatives have been evident. Some defensive and offensive cases—drawn from a purposefully eclectic base of armed groups around the world to illustrate their application in a variety of circumstances—are considered next.

Defensive CI Practice

A major effort of any insurgent forces requires a focus on denying enemy knowledge of its leadership, organization, location, support structure, and planning. Devastating failures are typically more notable than successes, and those guerrillas who survived or witnessed them have contributed to the accumulated guerrilla counterintelligence “wisdom” noted above. CIA officer Carlos Revilla Arango in his useful article “Insurgent Counterintelligence” identified several key defensive CI considerations. These included the recognized need for compartmentalization, careful security in recruiting, communications security, protecting identities, and exercising control over cadres as well as among the principal areas, and one may identify others as well.

U.S./Filipino Guerrillas—North Luzon, Philippines. These issues of internal security surface immediately, even for those occasions when life as a guerrilla arrives unexpectedly. A fine example is the experience of U.S. servicemen in the Philippines who escaped capture by the Japanese and dispersed to form resistance groups who fought the Japanese for some three years. U.S. Army Captain R. W. Volckmann (later colonel) had been an advisor to a Philippine division on Luzon, and after the surrender of U.S. forces at Bataan made his way north to join the guerrillas formed by U.S. and Filipino soldiers and recruits. In one of a number of memoirs and historical treatments of the U.S. Armed Forces in the Philippines, North Luzon (USAFIP,
Turbiville: Guerrilla Counterintelligence

NL) that controlled guerrilla operations there, Colonel Volckmann described the intelligence and counterintelligence dimensions of the fight to survive and inflict damage on occupying Japanese forces. His observation—“the duel between our forces and the Japs in the field of espionage and counter-espionage became intense, often quite complicated, but it always offered an interesting challenge”—was a clear understatement.57

The issues highlighted by Arango (and countless guerrillas who survived to write) were encountered, dealt with, and validated in the American guerrilla experience in the Philippines. They included the following central elements:

a. Establishing agent networks, guarding information (particularly the identification of guerrillas and acquisition of rosters that the Japanese sought assiduously), protecting message and other communications means, and vetting recruits
b. Allowing for the consequence of some out-of-the-blue, unanticipated development that adversely affected operations
c. Identifying and dealing with spies and informers.58

But returning to foreign insurgent perceptions, several illustrative cases involving foreign guerrillas are included next.

Tupamaros—Uruguay. In Uruguay during the 1960s and 1970s, the Movimiento de Liberación Nacional (National Liberation Movement—MLN) guerrilla movement was confronted by the state police and military forces increasingly intense and brutal efforts to destroy it. The Marxist guerrillas, better known as the “Tupamaros” after the 16th century Incan warrior and leader Tupac Amaru, were followers of the doctrines promulgated by Brazilian Carlos Margehelli and were a relatively disciplined movement. In accord with good practices of compartmentalization, the Tupamaros were organized into cells of two to six members who did not know each other’s real identities (using aliases or “war names” instead).

Cell leaders reported to a hierarchical leadership and had either combatant/commando or support responsibilities of various types. The arrest and successful interrogation of a single member or leader reduced the prospects of the entire cell or even several being rolled up. Intelligence was handled principally by cells of the latter “support” type but all components, regardless of orientation, developed their own sources and contacts. As Uruguayan
counterinsurgency crackdowns took a toll in attrition, and as imperatives for the guerrillas to increase their base also grew, recruiting became both more important and more dangerous. To avoid compromise by introducing informants into the structure, recruiters relied on personal sponsorship of recruits, detailed application information, and background checks with friends, neighbors, and others.

This was accomplished through the pertinent cells, but also used supporters outside the regular structure who did not live clandestinely and who typically worked only part time for the guerrillas. The Tupamaro recruiters sought to identify what might be called the presence of a “guerrilla temperament” to a greater extent than many other groups, assessing psychological traits as well as competence in basic skills needed by insurgents. Recruits were provided with written instructions on how to conduct themselves and cautions on the need for discreteness. Tupamaros were successful for a while with increasingly violent attacks made in an effort to prevail. Despite more intense operations and sound CI efforts, government forces eventually prevailed as a consequence of shortfalls in guerrilla planning and strategy and a police and Army program of mass arrests, brutal interrogation, and leadership arrests and killings.59

Cuban Guerrillas—Bolivia. Ernesto “Che” Guevara’s failed 1966–1967 effort to promote and lead a revolution in Bolivia presents mainly examples of ineffective and sometimes inexplicable CI practices.

The overall events of the Bolivian initiative from Che’s arrival between September and November 1966 to his execution in La Higuera on 9 October 1967 by a Bolivian 2nd Ranger Battalion sergeant, are too well known to require elaboration here.60 However, the consequence of many damaging CI failures are
worth noting specifically, since they tend to be so woven into the overall narrative as to be obscured as distinct counterintelligence shortfalls.

Cuban Revolutionary General Bayo, who died an old man the same year Che was executed, must have lamented whatever he heard about the mounting CI failures associated with his former protégé’s Bolivian adventure. While Guevara had a justified reputation from the Cuban Revolution for harsh “revolutionary discipline” at any suspicion of disloyalty—to include ruthlessly shooting suspected spies, collaborators, and defectors—the conduct of his 50–60 fighters in Bolivia were characterized throughout by extreme carelessness and a failure to observe the most basic kind of prudence. The general indiscipline among those fighters who accompanied him, and especially among the relatively few Bolivian recruits that joined him, allowed even the poorly trained Bolivian Army to press the guerrillas and build a picture of their presence. But some of the failures approached “strategic” setbacks and included the actions of dubious associates who were allowed to know of Che’s location, force makeup, and planning. They exercised sloppy tradecraft and on occasion suffered from clear or ambiguous betrayal.

A case in point was the popularly known “Tania the Guerrilla” (birth name of Haydée Tamara Bunke Bider), an Argentina-born German who the Stasi recruited after she moved to the GDR with her communist parents in the 1950s. As a GDR “interpreter” for foreign visitors, she linked up with Che during a 1960 visit to East Germany and subsequently moved to Cuba working under MINIT and other auspices and advancing her relationship with Che and his Latin American revolutionary planning. In whose behalf she worked remains a question still.

While Che undertook activities in Africa and elsewhere, Tania departed for La Paz in 1964 where she was assigned to:

a. Gather intelligence from acquaintances she made among the capital’s partying social set.

b. Develop infrastructure there in preparation for the phased arrival of Che’s cadres beginning in early 1966.

However, when she undertook to meet with elements of Che’s guerrillas in the field, near the remote Ñancahuazú (Nacaguazu) camp in March 1967, she committed an inexplicable error for a Stasi and Cuban MINIT-trained operative. She left her vehicle, a rented jeep, unattended in a rented garage
at Camiri. It was discovered by the Army and found to contain documents describing the guerrillas, her contacts, and associates in La Paz and other material about her activities. This find substantially advanced Bolivian Army knowledge of the guerrillas and their whereabouts, resulting also in arrests that damaged what there was of Che’s urban support infrastructure and requiring Tania to remain with the guerrillas in the field.

Another embarrassing exposure of guerrilla secrets—one that provided final confirmation of Guevara’s presence in Bolivia at the head of the guerrillas—featured the Army’s April 1967 capture of the internationally known French “leftist intellectual” and guerrilla enthusiast Régis Debray, whose sympathies had led him to Havana where he taught philosophy at the university. Also arrested with Debray in the little Bolivian settlement of Muyupampa was Giro Roberto Bustos, a leftist guerrilla sympathizer sometimes described as a mediocre Argentine painter. The two were delivered to a meeting with Che at the camp via the redoubtable Tania a few weeks before her own security mishap in making a similar linkup.

After spending some time in the guerrilla camp and learning many details about operations, both visitors decided that guerrilla life was best enjoyed vicariously from the relative comfort of Havana or another urban area. Upon an attempted exfiltration, however, they were caught. They were charged with being guerrillas, and under extended questioning by the Bolivian authorities Debray provided information about Guevara and the group, while artist Roberto Bustos obligingly drew pictures of the guerrillas. Their claims
that they were journalists fell apart upon the recovery of documents from Guevara’s camps, but they were released under international pressures.  

The guerrillas suffered a major blow to their identities, size, and structure in early August 1967, again with the help of deserters who led the Army to caves where Che’s group had cached quantities of equipment, medicine, and clothing. But from a CI standpoint, the Army also found detailed documents describing the guerrilla urban infrastructure that allowed its further roll-up. In addition, and again inexplicably, they found many photos of the guerrilla participants—allowing for their easy identification—as well as passports and other material that further incriminated Debray and Bustos, who could no longer claim they were only journalists.

Finally, to wrap up a last example of fatal and needless compromise, a ten-person guerrilla detachment, which had been separated earlier from Che’s main group, put their trust in a peasant-grocer from whom they had been buying food. That the man had been the cause of some past suspicion evidently did not influence a guerrilla inquiry. The insurgents asked about the best place to ford the Rio Grande stream. The grocer willingly obliged with an accurate answer while also notifying the Army. The group accepted the peasant’s offer to lead them to the water crossing. When all were in the water or just emerging, the waiting company-size Army unit killed all but one who was captured. Tania was among those who died.

**FARC—Colombia.** The many visible blows dealt over recent months to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), and the less visible but building pressure on FARC operations for the last several years, have been accompanied and propelled by counterintelligence shortfalls and failures. The FARC had enjoyed a long life and considerable success since its creation in the mid-1960s. The Marxist insurgent organization had a heritage of violent revolutionary antecedents and movements that prepared it well in both intelligence and counterintelligence skills. In addition to a long, indigenous revolutionary history, the FARC had been the beneficiary of Cuban and Soviet sponsorship; funding from drug trafficking; additional profits from a host of other criminal enterprises; and the use of terrorist training and arms trafficking networks that brought it into association with organizations as diverse as the IRA and Sri Lankan Liberation Tigers.

The FARC had leveraged technology for years, albeit imperfectly, and had been among the early users of propaganda Web sites, e-mail, portable
computers, and some encryption. They had recognized accompanying intercept dangers as well and had exercised some caution in electronic transmissions and communications. The chief of the Colombian General Staff had noted, for example, that USB flash/thumb drives and computer disks have been disseminated by messenger rather than transmitted out of fear of interception (a sound enough practice). However, the intelligence and counterintelligence successes that were more manifest in earlier years began to fray visibly in the 21st century.

This failure has been a consequence of enduring, high-quality U.S. support of the Colombia security establishment; the perseverance, effective response, and improved intelligence and operational capabilities of the Colombian armed forces, police, and state; the criminalization and apparent lack of focus by the FARC as profits loomed larger as a motivation than ideology or old political goals; and perhaps the sloppiness of an aging and tired organization that had undergone two or three generational changes among some members and leadership. In the counterintelligence area, the deterioration of the old discipline and attention began to be fatal.

The loss of recently deceased FARC leader Manuel Marulanda to a heart attack in late March 2008 brought an abrupt end to many decades of successful evasion. FARC chief Marulanda’s death came in a month where Colombian military forces had closely pursued and periodically struck guerrillas in a continuing effort to eliminate key cadre.
The 76-year-old Marulanda had exercised a combination of caution and experience-based fieldcraft that neutralized two generations of pursuers, despite numerous reports of his death, and earned recognition as “el guerrillero más viejo del mundo” —the oldest guerrilla in the world.67 “He [did] not sleep more than two or three days in the same place,” according to Colombian Defense Minister Juan Manuel Santos in regard to the elusive habits of the FARC chief, who in addition to his Manuel Marulanda Vélez war name and his Pedro Antonio Marín birth name, was nicknamed Tirofijo (or Sure Shot).

While he was a hunted man since he served with aspiring Colombian guerrilla elements in the 1940s, and was tracked by government forces with special intensity since he founded the FARC in 1964, the 76-year-old Tirofijo lived to his natural end. That was not the case for others. His senior deputy Raúl Reyes was killed in early March 2008 when his camp was located and targeted by Colombian aircraft on Ecuadorean territory. Later that month, FARC Secretariat member Iván Ríos was killed (according to Colombian reporting) by his own security chief who delivered his severed hand and FARC laptop computers and documents to Colombian authorities as proof and for their exploitation.

Most recently, the FARC’s extraordinary setback with the 2 July 2008 rescue of 15 FARC hostages seemed to mark its growing intelligence and leadership disarray. In substantial ways this was a multiple counterintelligence failure for the FARC just as it was a success for Colombian military intelligence.68 Codenamed Operation Jaque (Check [mate]), the hostage rescue appeared to highlight Colombian intelligence/CI innovation and FARC intelligence/CI indiscipline. The Colombian intelligence penetration of the FARC Secretariat and lower levels, exploitation of communications indiscretions, computer forensic and document exploitation, psychological manipulation, and the final deception of the FARC group assigned to guard the hostages would have seemed highly improbable a few years ago.69

On the FARC’s part, this damaging setback was not due to a single lapse but a chain of information losses and security compromises that spanned several intelligence disciplines. The final Colombian military deception that saw the consolidated hostage group loaded on a helicopter and flown to freedom by Colombian security personnel impersonating guerrillas, media, humanitarian workers, and hired flight crew successfully capped the complex operation.70 While reports that some impersonators wore Che
Guevara-emblazoned t-shirts were a nice touch, the irony of Che’s own CI failures was likely lost on the duped FARC members.

While the operation will be examined closely and new details and interpretations emerge, the CI object lesson for guerrilla groups seems clear enough and are echoed in the calls for tight discipline, continuous suspicion, protection of all forms of communications, review of personnel qualities, and other imperatives practiced by most surviving or successful groups. Cuban mentor Alberto Bayo, obsessed with counterintelligence, would no doubt have reiterated some of the specifics he taught like “the group must be alert to enemy forces masquerading as supporters,” and that in some cases at least “more wars are won through cunning and shrewdness than by pulling the trigger…” 71

**Huks—Philippines.** Surveillance of meeting places, safe houses, camps, and other locations makes a list of concerns for most insurgent groups. For the most astute and experienced groups, the requirement to maintain a near paranoid suspicion of everything in one’s environment has also been acknowledged. Failure in these things has been commonplace, however, typically caused by inattention, overconfidence, miscalculation, or just bad luck. The Filipino Hukbalahap—usually shortened to Huk—was a communist guerrilla movement that emerged in the post-World War II period suffered often from a lack of training and adherence to defensive CI efforts in the face of tightening counterinsurgency pressures.

Intelligence gathering enjoyed some success, including the creation of a network of informers and even the penetration of Philippine Police Constabulary and Army forces. 72 The limited numbers of radios available
to the Huks were more often than not put to use as intelligence collection tools and a way of countering government counterinsurgency moves rather than a means of tactical communications. But while many Huks had fought against the Japanese as guerrillas, and with their central Luzon-centered force approaching 13,000 members by 1950, little systematized internal security existed of the type undertaken by more successful groups. An example of “overconfidence”—really inadequate preparation and carelessness—was described by one participant. Following a successful Huk operation, it was decided to dispatch young couriers with messages and operational money into an area further south in Luzon. They judged that it was not really necessary to conduct surveillance given recent successes and the past security of the area. Nevertheless, the meeting spot had been compromised or was at least guarded, with the consequence that two of the three young couriers were captured by Police Constabulary personnel, and the badly needed money was lost.73 Government counterinsurgency efforts had essentially destroyed the Huks by the mid-1950s, although groups that might be construed as successors (e.g., the Communist New People’s Army) appeared later.

**Action for National Liberation—Brazil.** Carlos Margehelli’s 1969 ambush and death at the hands of Brazilian police—a reminder that his “avoid carelessness, indiscipline, and lack of vigilance” imperative is not always enough—provides one example that underscores the dangers of treachery among insurgents. Marighella fell victim to Brazilian security’s arrest and coerced cooperation of two Brazilian priests that he trusted and who had helped him on previous occasions. When the priests asked for a meeting with him, he was willing to follow through, but also took precautions. The meeting was to take place in a parked car. Before the appointed time, Maighella donned a wig for disguise and went with one man for security to the area where the meeting was to take place. The security man, Marighella’s long-trusted bodyguard, studied the surrounding area.

The activity appeared well within normal bounds (e.g., workers unloading supplies at a construction site, others engaged in building activity, and a young couple embracing in a parked car). Satisfied, the bodyguard indicated to Marighella that everything was clear, and the guerrilla chief approached the two familiar priests who were waiting in a parked Volkswagen. As he entered the car, however, the laborers and the couple in car dropped their pretenses, grabbed their weapons, and fired many rounds in the direction
of the car for some five minutes. Marighella had had no time to draw his own weapon, and he was shot five times and killed at the scene. Police fire also killed a policewoman and an uninvolved man who happened to drive by at the time. While Marighella’s caution may have seemed adequate, its failures reinforced the points on security, informers, and the constant threat faced by guerrillas in the field.74

Mau Mau—Kenya. As counterintelligence organizations and approaches go, the Kikuyu-based Mau Mau insurgency ranks among the more rudimentary efforts. Nevertheless, it is worth noting one societal dimension upon which the loyalty of the members was based in the effort to oust the British colonial government and win independence. Obvious protections against organizational penetration and spying were provided by the circumstances of tribe, family relationships, language, and race. But not all Kikuyu supported the Mau Mau, and many supported the British. Internal rivalries and disaffection, British support incentives, and especially penalties ranging from internment to execution constituted dangers that put constant pressure on the movement.75 British innovations in Kikuyu-manned “pseudo-operations” (of the type warned against by Alberto Bayo) enjoyed success as did efforts to turn Mau Mau groups and individuals away from the movement. General Sir Frank Kitson addressed the latter dimension in describing three factors that could be used to induce a man to shift his loyalty and that he tried to apply:

a. A “carrot” in the form of a positive incentive that has real attraction
b. A “stick” in the form of a disincentive, which makes him realize that continuing on the same course will result “in something very unpleasant happening to him”
c. A chance to demonstrate to his family and friends “that there is nothing fundamentally dishonorable about his action” of turning against the Mau Mau, and that he retains his self-respect.

Kitson enjoyed successes in applying this kind of approach, and it added to the other threats directed against the Mau Mau cohesion and activities. While strong organizational measures were lacking for Mau Mau internal security, an effort to win and enforce loyalty was embodied in elaborate and powerful oath-taking ceremonies, rituals, invocations of magic, songs, and bloody threats. Former Mau Mau described these ceremonials in detail. While exotic and curious to Westerners, former members recounted the
seriousness of their impact, and among their many elements were quite typi-
cal counterintelligence measures common to most insurgent movements.
Once active Mau Mau Karari Njama (interviewed by U.S. anthropologist
Donald Barnett) recounted the vow he took in a gathering for the purpose.
After preparations involving animal parts, bloodletting, and being marked
with goat’s blood in various places, the oath administrator began the indoc-
trinations as follows:

May this blood mark the faithful and brave members of the Gikuyu
(Kikuyu] and Mumbi Unity: may this same blood warn you that if
you betray our secrets or violate the oath, our members will come
and cut you into pieces at the joints marked by the blood.76

Following more ritual that need not be elaborated here, the actual oath
was taken by the initiates facing Mount Kenya (preceded by a curse that in
part declared “let this oath kill he who lies!”) The oath itself presented 21
rules of conduct (not unlike that of the Bandido Motorcycle Gang, Taliban,
and many other groups) that stipulated strict guarding of secrets on penalty
of death, cooperation and readiness to work, generous donations, obedi-
ence to leadership, never spying or informing to the government, and other
points. Later, a second oath was administered with requisite curses that reit-
erated some of the points of the first, but with more specifics on obligations
to fight and reemphasis on the death that awaited anyone who betrayed the
movement or did not fulfill his obligations. The second oath allowed full
entry into the Mau Mau movement.77

The oath was considered as a serious obligation by many who took it
and it influenced their actions. Karari Njama gave his specific views on the
consequences of disobeying the oath. As he judged:

In my opinion, though the oath itself may have no reaction, I con-
sider that I have repeatedly vowed under God’s name and that if I
disobeyed the oath, my lies would anger God whose wrath might
result in all the curses I have made … and most likely I would meet
a death penalty from our society.78

British efforts to undercut the magical and religious imperatives of the
rituals, oaths, and ceremonies included the use of “witch doctors” (as they
were termed at the time) to perform ceremonies that made the abandonment
of the movement more acceptable.
Offensive CI Practice

Offensive counterintelligence activities by guerrillas and other armed groups fall most closely into what the U.S. joint military definition terms counterespionage—the component of CI concerned with various kinds of aggressive and more subtle actions aimed at detecting, destroying, neutralizing, or otherwise influencing hostile intelligence activity aimed against them.79 While guerrilla groups have not crafted the kinds of careful definitions and legal strictures found in the U.S. and the West, the offensive CI concepts and activities developed convey the same general spirit and goals.

Tupamaros—Uruguay. Many insurgent groups have used direct attacks and coercion against opposing intelligence and security personnel. The Tupamaros, for example, had a concept of “direct” and “indirect” approaches that to most eyes would both seem rather direct. In the former, a primary insurgent CI target like a government intelligence officer would be shot or otherwise killed. In an indirect approach, someone close to the target would be eliminated—for example, a bodyguard or assistant. The idea of the latter was to coerce the target into abandoning, or at least reducing, his efforts against the group while at the same time alienating him from colleagues and friends who would worry about their own safety brought about by any association.80

Abu Sayyaf—Southern Philippines. In a far different theater, the Moro-based Abu Sayyaf Group in the southern Philippines has long bribed and coerced local police officials. The Islamic group claims a heritage from the mujahedin in Afghanistan, and while it can demonstrate ruthlessness and a kind of rough competence on occasion, its structure is poorly developed. “Intelligence chiefs” have been identified, but focused CI efforts of the type associated with some other guerrilla groups are not much in evidence. Nevertheless, security force pressures in the fall of 2004 appeared to have generated a series of direct actions against intelligence personnel. These involved the kidnapping of three suspected intelligence personnel and informants and execution of another. Some observers thought that this pattern could constitute a trend in the elimination of intelligence and espionage threats, a judgment bolstered by the fact that no ransom demands were made before the hostages were executed.81 Highlighting the lack of
careful intelligence, however, police concluded that Abu Sayyaf militants had missed the mark abysmally. Three of the executed men turned out to be salesmen that Abu Sayyaf had apparently mistaken for military intelligence personnel, and the fourth man assassinated was not a suspected intelligence officer as supposed but the provincial director of the Philippine Coconut Authority. The lack of competence that these actions represented seems well in accord with Abu Sayyaf’s level of organizational development.

Chechen Mujahideen—North Caucasus. Competence in identifying and eliminating enemy intelligence operatives, spies, and informers—and its status as an essential element of Chechen resistance—has been a hallmark of Chechen insurgents since the early days of organizational activity. A Chechen guerrilla “intelligence service,” together with specialized counterintelligence personnel, developed early in the existence of the Chechens claiming independence from Moscow. Guerrilla CI entities have been associated with the senior Chechen Republic of Ickeria (CRI) leadership, as it has developed over the last decade and a half. They have also been found among some of the various larger bands and groupings as well. These assets set out to identify Russian intelligence personnel from the military (Main Intelligence Directorate—GRU) and security services (the Federal Security Service—FSB and Ministry of Internal Affairs—MVD) as well as Chechen and other North Caucasus intelligence entities serving Moscow’s interests. Ferreting out spies and informers has been a central task, but it was in the elimination of intelligence operatives in which the Chechen CI effort excelled. Rebel forces claimed with some plausibility that Russian security structures had been penetrated.

The clandestine head of a Chechen counterintelligence “special unit” claimed that the mujahideen had reliable agents operating in virtually all Russian special services and in other units working actively against them. These included “good channels of intelligence information right up to Putin’s closest circle, not to mention secret aides and officers who have been infiltrated into the so-called Chechen police and puppet ‘government.’” Such claims—and this was one of many—were buttressed by the Russians themselves, who indicated, for example, that the problem of leaks, especially with the admission of ostensibly loyal Chechens into some Russian military and security forums in Chechnya, was a “nightmare.”
The identification and execution of an especially effective FSB specialist was reported by a guerrilla group operating in the village of Karabulak, Ingushetia. The target was a female agent, a native of Ingush, who had been responsible for the arrest and killing of 15 Chechen and Ingushetian mujahideen as well as the capture of others. The guerrilla effort then turned to tracking and eliminating her network of informers. In 2005, agents of the CRI (guerrilla) counterintelligence service identified and killed two intelligence operatives who were alleged to be Israeli Mossad agents. The Israeli interest in the region was alleged to have been sparked by the interaction among Chechen and Middle Eastern mujahideen groups. Whether Mossad agents or not, the elimination of suspected enemy intelligence operatives has been an active effort. One year for which statistics are claimed is 2005, where:

… the Chechen special services … exposed, arrested, or shot 23 agents of the Russian secret services among Chechens. Some of them were re-recruited. Throughout this period of time 6 agents of Russian nationality, 4 Daghestanis, 3 Ingush, 2 Uzbeks, 2 Kabardins, 2 Tatars, 1 Karachai, 1 Ossetian, 1 Bashkirian were seized or eliminated.

**U.S./Filipino Guerrillas—North Luzon, Philippines.** The critical problem of dealing with the threat of informants and spies, working in behalf of an enemy determined to destroy them, generated analogous approaches for U.S. military personnel who were forced to operate as guerrillas. Six decades ago the U.S. servicemen—who with Filipino allies formed guerrilla units under the aforementioned USAFIP, NL—encountered an informant and espionage danger that compelled uncompromising countermeasures.

The Japanese used a more or less uniform system of creating North Luzon informer networks. As described, they would typically buy off or otherwise win the support of a community leader or village mayor. After consolidating their influence over such individuals, they would use them to hire many local members of the population who, with the promise of additional reward, would gather any information on guerrilla sympathizers or the guerrillas themselves. Japanese punishment of those identified was quick and typically fatal. As a consequence, the local populace became extremely reluctant to engage in any cooperative efforts with U.S./Filipino irregular warfare groups, making some areas dangerous or untenable.
The USAFIP, NL General Headquarters issued orders calling for the elimination “of all persons found to be dangerous to the resistance movement” by members of the five district guerrilla groups operating under the headquarters.88 The effort was characterized by the U.S. commander as a “relentless trackdown” with special emphasis put on executing the main informant leaders. The operations were so intensive and so successful that most spies and informants fled their areas of operation and sought shelter near strong Japanese garrisons. This was not always sufficient. In one instance, a group of Filipino agents working for the Japanese was tracked by North Luzon First District guerrillas to the town of Cervantes in Ilocos Sur. The guerrilla unit attacked the Japanese garrison there that night, in the process burning the building where all of the informants had hidden. In addition to physically eliminating Japanese spies among the populace, the success in providing a safer environment for villagers brought many of them to the side of the guerrillas.89

**Popular Revolutionary Army—Mexico.** The Mexican Popular Revolutionary Army (Ejército Popular Revolucionario—EPR) appeared publicly for the first time in August 1996 in Guerrero state and while not a large movement, operates in many states today. It soon demonstrated its presence in at least rudimentary forms in a number of other Mexican areas though numerous, scattered small-scale attacks and bombings against police, military, government, and civil targets and media events. The group and its political arm, the Popular Revolutionary Democratic Party (Partido Democratico Popular Revolucionario—PDPR), were descended from other Mexican insurgent organizations in the region that were largely destroyed in the 1970s by mass arrests, interrogations, torture, and killings. They understood from the onset that Mexican intelligence, military, and police forces would be arrayed against them and their supporters.

Just how well they seemed to understand the threat environment, and the ways the PDPR-EPR planned to use a combination of intelligence collection and defensive and offensive CI approaches, was evidently a surprise to the government when they became aware of the details in 2008. It was also impressive for a rural guerilla movement that was certainly not in the league of its better resourced counterparts in other areas of Latin America and the world. At the very beginning, in the middle 1990s, the PDPR-EPR established an intelligence and counterintelligence component (Servicio
de Información or Information Service) that was heavily concerned with countering the plans and operations of the Government’s “main hunters of revolutionaries.” These were the military intelligence establishment of the Secretariat of National Defense and the roughly equivalent CIA analog, the National Center for Investigation and Security (Centro de Investigación y Seguridad Nacional—CISEN).90

The EPR’s Information Service was charged with establishing networks of informers, infiltrating state bodies, intercepting communications (telephone, mail, and penetrating government computer systems). Its roles and functions were set out in a 100-plus page document entitled “The Manual for PDPR-EPR Intelligence” (Curso de inteligencia PDPR-EPR), circa mid-1990s or later. The publication described the plan to establish an ambitious and extensive network of spy and informer cells including the capability to conduct special operations in behalf of information collection efforts. Included among the targets of infiltration were the military, police, CISEN, media, and federal, state, and local agencies. However, the information network was intended to extend to the common people and even the marginalized parts of the population.

The primary goal was to know ahead of time the counterinsurgency plans and policies of the military, police, and other security forces.91 The extent to which this CI plan has been implemented and successful is far from clear. Nevertheless, the continued existence and operation of the EPR and its spinoffs suggests that it has developed mechanisms for identifying spies and informers as well as gaining some cognizance of the intelligence and counterinsurgency initiatives directed against them.92 Long-term survival of

Masked members of Mexico’s Popular Revolutionary Army (EPR) receive a welcome from local residents in the central plaza of Teconoaga, a Guerrero State town located about 55 miles southeast of Acapulco. AFP photo, Matias Recart, used by permission of Newscom.
an insurgent group typically indicates a strong measure of CI discipline, and the EPR had defied what seemed to be the likelihood of an early demise.

**The “Twelve Apostles” of Irish Republican Brotherhood/Irish Republican Army.** Few armed groups have translated a concept for offensive counterintelligence into practice as well as Michael Collins and the Irish republican militants. His rationale was reasoned, clear, and intensely personal about his targets:

>To paralyze the British machine it was necessary to strike at individuals. Without her spies, England was helpless. It was only by means of their accumulated and accumulating knowledge that the British machine could operate.93

An accompanying goal was to so outrage and frustrate British security officials that reprisals would be out of proportion and would alienate even larger segments of the Irish populace. More details have become available about the intelligence and counterintelligence organization that implemented the Collins concepts as oral, transcribed interviews, and writings by participants have been released. Michael Collins’ intelligence organization was well designed and manned for this principal purpose—to collect key information through its networks of well-placed typists, clerks, policemen, businessmen, waiters, desk clerks, transportation workers, and others who provided the most sensitive inside information from the British security together with outside observations that were essential too. All of the limited technical means available at the time were used. The information provided enabled the Volunteers (IRA) operational arm to attack and eliminate not just intelligence personnel in general but those individuals most important to the British intelligence-gathering operations.

To accomplish this mission, every Volunteer company had a dedicated intelligence officer who reported to a brigade intelligence counterpart. The latter was subordinate to the man who ran the day-to-day operations at Volunteer intelligence headquarters, this under the oversight of Michael Collins. The subordinate officers recruited agents and informers who fed information to HQ used in targeting key intelligence personnel. At intelligence HQ—which was nicknamed the “Brain Center” and where key staffers became known as the “Inner Circle”—intelligence officers had specific areas or businesses to know about and assess, and fragmentary information was pieced together and analyzed.
As a consequence, while their Volunteer/IRA intelligence affiliations might have been deeply hidden, members might be quite visible in the normal workaday world. One prominent staffer, often involved in planning and supporting assassinations, wore a red- and blue-ribboned British Army badge in his lapel bearing the inscription “For King and Country.” The fear eventually inspired by Michael Collins allowed him to travel with a measure of freedom. Though he might be recognized, even some police officers who knew him on sight were reluctant to report his location. There was an effective “open source” component in which newspapers were carefully read for any information on RIC and British personnel, their assignments and positions, transfers, clubs, social activities, and photographs. Pertinent items were clipped and incorporated into card files and centralized in a database at intelligence HQ.94

Assassinations were carried out by a group that came to be known as the “Squad” and also nicknamed the “Twelve Apostles” in a touch of black humor. The group functioned as a subcomponent of the Volunteer/IRA intelligence staff and was made up of local Dublin men who had worked regular jobs of one sort or another. Some core members were required to quit their regular jobs and became full-time compensated members of the team. They guarded their identities, sympathies, and affiliations carefully even from other Volunteer/IRA members. Squad members themselves were astonished to learn eventually that there were actually two groups of execution operatives within the organization. Even after the 1921 treaty establishing the Irish Free State, some Squad members did not speak out for decades, and if then, it was only with the proviso that their words not be released until they had died.

Police intelligence and a few others who were identified as being particular threats were warned to cease their activities or at least to become far less diligent. If they acquiesced, they were spared, but if not cooperative they were selected for execution. Target areas were reconnoitered, and the subjects of the executions identified by one or more people who recognized them. Squad members typically operated in from one to several pairs of assassins for each target and might have several support personnel for surveillance, identification, and logistics. After an intelligence officer identified a target for assassination, shooters followed or approached him at an opportune place and killed him with handguns. While many variants were in practice, one shooter would fire in an effort to stop and disable him, and the other would shoot
him in the head to ensure he was killed. Sometimes the shooters addressed the targeted police intelligence officer or official and sometimes not.

Targeted CI executions added to the larger, broad casualties from sectarian violence directed against British security forces. From just January to 11 December 1919, some 169 policemen were killed and 245 wounded throughout Ireland, with 52 military personnel killed and 108 wounded. Though relatively few in number, the highest visibility casualties were among those political intelligence detectives targeted by Collins’ Twelve Apostles. Police retirements grew rapidly in number, and demoralization was evident in both the DMP and RIC. While the impact on the G Division and the British security services was substantial, the most dramatic and devastating operation was the near-simultaneous execution of more than a dozen British secret intelligence operatives that (with reprisal killings by RIC Auxiliaries at a soccer stadium later that same day) came to be called “Bloody Sunday.”

The deep-cover British intelligence unit known as the “Cairo Gang” (since a number of the members had been secretly phased into Ireland from intelligence work in Egypt) was established in Dublin in 1919 as British frustrations mounted.

The Cairo Gang was nearly all killed by Michael Collins’ assassination teams and selected republican volunteers early one Sunday morning in Dublin. Based on a careful CI analysis to identify undercover members, the counterintelligence operation was designed to destroy the most effective of British intelligence operatives who had been closing in on Collins and other members of the leadership. Public domain image from Wikipedia.
Their purported aim was to reorganize British intelligence efforts in Dublin and to track down and kill members of the Inner Circle if not Michael Collins himself. Collins and the intelligence staff, however, became aware of their presence and purpose. Informers reported on the existence of the group and some identities, while the alarming, but temporary, detainment of several Inner Circle members highlighted a growing British threat. As a consequence, an operation to eliminate the Cairo Group was developed by Collins and the Inner Circle.

Studying known Cairo Gang members, additional names were added together with addresses and other targeting information. The overall identification process included the comparison of typefaces on typewriters, “intercepting correspondence, examining contents of wastebaskets, tracing laundry markings, duplicating hotel room keys, and similar efforts.” ⁹⁸ To carry out the operation, eight execution teams were formed from the Squad/Twelve Apostles as well as other Volunteer members selected for the purpose. They initiated the operation in the early morning hours of 21 November 1920, killing eleven of the targeted British officers around the city and several others. A substantial number of men designated for assassination escaped, but the core of the Cairo Gang was destroyed, leaving only one member of the leadership alive.⁹⁹

British authorities were initially incredulous at the scope, coordination, and success of the operation, and members of the security establishment with families fled for safety within headquarters at Dublin Castle. But British reaction came later that same day when RIC, auxiliaries, and some military elements raided a football game under Gaelic Athletic Association auspices, an organization known for republican affiliations. Accounts of the exact course of events vary, but British forces fired into the crowd—killing or fatally wounding 15 people. This effectively accomplished another of Collins’ goals—provoking an overreaction—and the bloodshed on both sides that day contributed immeasurably to the pressure for a settlement as described earlier.

**Hezbollah—Lebanon.** Hezbollah’s intelligence and counterintelligence establishment, built with the heavy investment and other direct support of Iran, approaches that of a state in the early 21st century.¹⁰⁰ The full extent of the development of Hezbollah capabilities were either hidden or underappreciated, however, as they took shape in the 1990s and particularly after
Israel’s May 2000 withdrawal from southern Lebanon. The 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah war revealed a vastly changed Hezbollah intelligence establishment. On the one hand, the extensive and effective efforts to harden and bury communication lines all the way up to forward positions practically on the Lebanese-Israeli border itself changed the nature of the battlefield. Israeli plans to close down or severely degrade Hezbollah command nets with sophisticated electronic warfare systems were at least partially neutralized by Hezbollah improvements. At the same time, improved Hezbollah communications and other signal intercept capabilities allowed Hezbollah to eavesdrop on Israeli tactical communications to an extent unimagined prior to hostilities. These were not “counterintelligence” developments of course, but the major Hezbollah CI achievement was protecting these intelligence developments from the usually efficient and persistent efforts of the Israelis to monitor them. The level of communications security for some years was clearly the result of tight discipline.

Observers have pointed to the establishment of effective Hezbollah HUMINT networks. An early indication of this developing network was the arrest of an Israeli Defense Force lieutenant colonel in 2002. He was ethnically a Bedouin Arab, and his indictment with four others highlighted the existence of a 10-person intelligence-gathering ring that traded information “for money, hashish, and heroin.” Some information
passed was “positive intelligence,” and some was more typical of CI targets like surveillance-device locations. While this betrayal was understandably presented as an anomaly—in part to avoid offending the loyal Arabs who served Israel in the military—in retrospect far more was underway in the CI dimension than supposed. Had the war not taken place, CI and other initiatives probably would have progressed even further, a possibility suggested by reports of Hezbollah off-the-shelf technology acquisition and the employment of an unmanned aerial vehicle that supposedly flew for an hour over Israeli airspace.

Israeli reporting indicates that Hezbollah has used the popular social networking system “Facebook” to gather information on Israeli Defense Force (IDF) personnel. IDF members have been cautioned about posting personal and potentially compromising information online, and the dangers have reportedly been incorporated in security awareness training. An IDF soldier who served in an intelligence unit was sentenced in the late summer of 2008 to 19 days in a military jail for posting a photo of his base on Facebook. A further concern has been the possibility of terrorists establishing online friendships or arranging direct meetings with military personnel to all the attendant dangers this would pose. The further use of Facebook by Hamas terrorists and supporters during the IDF punitive operation in Gaza, to end rocket attacks, reinforced the concern. Facebook was used for disinformation purposes as well as for fund-raising.

Just a few months before the 2006 war began, Israel suffered a loss of resources with the arrest of what some sources claimed to be “80 Lebanese Christian, Sunni Muslim, and Druze agents” in Lebanon. The arrests were reportedly based on a joint Lebanese Security Service-Hezbollah counterintelligence operation. Overall, these Hezbollah advances were accomplished in low-key, incremental fashion over several years in ways that did not attract undue attention—at least public attention—and apparently did not alter Israel’s fundamental assumptions about relative Israeli and Hezbollah military and intelligence capabilities. A 2007 U.S. Army assessment of the war as a whole reached conclusions similar to those reported elsewhere in Israeli and international reporting and added some details on the arrest of Israeli-controlled assets.

Between 2000 and 2006, Hezbollah also purportedly mastered the delicate art of counter-signals intelligence (C-SIGNET), a capability that would pay huge dividends in future wars with Israel. In the HUMINT arena,
Hezbollah also proved highly successful. Working with Lebanese intelligence officers, Hezbollah managed to “turn” Israeli agents in southern Lebanon and dismantle a sizable Israeli spy ring. “In some small number of crucially important cases,” wrote Crooke and Perry, “Hezbollah senior intelligence officials were able to ‘feed back’ false information on their militia’s most important emplacements to Israel with the result that Israel target folders identified key emplacements that did not, in fact, exist.” It also appears likely that Hezbollah succeeded in placing its own agents in northern Israel. Overall, while many gaps exist in what is known of Hezbollah CI initiatives, the growth of capabilities and the existence of a disciplined framework to promote and guide new developments gets little dispute.

The offensive CI potential of Hezbollah infiltration of even major Western states—despite indifference to earlier calls for vigilance from some intelligence professionals—received more serious attention in the wake of the Nada Nadim Prouty incident. The case is well enough known to require little recapitulation here. In brief, Prouty was a Lebanese-born illegal alien who gained U.S. citizenship through a bogus marriage (i.e., carried out just for purposes of gaining citizenship). Possessing Arabic language skills and citizenship, she was hired as an agent for the FBI initially in 2003 and subsequently the CIA, working at the latter from 2003 to 2007 when she resigned.

During this tenure, Prouty reportedly gained Top Secret compartmented clearances, had access to many sensitive cases, traveled abroad and was assigned to duties in the Middle East, and participated in the interrogation of Al Qaeda terrorist suspects in Iraq. She also improperly accessed FBI files on a Hezbollah case involving her sister and brother in law as well as searched her own personnel records for indications of FBI interest. These activities and her relationship to Lebanese nationals of dubious affiliation eventually aroused FBI suspicions in late 2005 and ultimately resulted in charges being brought against her for fraud, improper official computer access, and immigration offenses.

The charges against Prouty resulted in only a $750 fine and no prison time. Whatever else may have transpired is purely speculative, but the entire experience underscored the potential, at least, of a foreign national with terrorist-group affiliations penetrating two of the allegedly most security-conscious Intelligence Community organizations in the U.S. Government, and with relative ease. As a consequence, the terms “counterintelligence
and Hezbollah” have gained a much closer association for U.S. security personnel as they have for Israel and other states in the region and abroad.

Conclusions

The guerrilla movements addressed herein often differ in historical background, goals, ideology, race, religion, resourcing, and sophistication. Nevertheless, the hostile and violent environments within which most groups must operate means that the insurgent—whatever his or her background—“lives in a world of security arrangements and survives by observing them.” Government intelligence and security initiatives “force the insurgency to conduct intensive security investigations, reorganize components, relocate assets, revise its communications, or reeducate its membership” among other measures that require continuous monitoring if disaster is to be avoided.

Despite the disparate nature of groups and areas of operation, common problems generate quite similar counterintelligence responses, as they seem to have done since the earliest recording of history. In addition, the widespread accessibility of information on techniques, the sometimes common sponsors and trainers from the past and present, and the not infrequent serious study by guerrilla groups of CI requirements has added to the adoption of common concepts.

Guerrilla counterintelligence efforts most typically have both defensive and offensive components. Neither one component nor the other is usually judged adequate for providing the operational freedom and security required to pursue active initiatives. On the defensive side, sometimes elaborate guidelines dealing with general conduct as well as with specific operational security requirements are developed and incorporated into recruiting and training programs. More sophisticated groups use background and character investigational approaches that may be as strenuous as government security vetting and perhaps more so given the consequences. Insurgent and terrorist groups actively obscure their locations, capabilities, planning approaches, and intentions from active and potential adversaries. The practice of deception, cover story fabrications, forged papers, false identities, and the many other tradecraft practices have become systematized in some groups and practiced with skill.
The serious and sensitive danger of infiltration and betrayal hangs over the heads of most guerrilla organizations. Frequent loyalty tests and vigilance approaching paranoia are real survival skills. While it hardly bears noting—they given the richness of precedent from European, Asian, Latin American, Middle Eastern, and African groups—identified informants or spies are almost always killed as a matter of course. Some groups have elevated the need to make torture and the extreme violence of punishment for treachery so severe that these acts serve as object lessons for others who might contemplate straying. Security guidelines and procedures are as often as not written documents. They serve as training and reference sources for the guerrilla, on occasion seeming like the rules of normal fraternal or social organizations into which large doses of violence, deception, and uncompromising hatred have been blended.

Offensive components of guerrilla counterintelligence are in their most aggressive forms aimed at infiltrating vulnerable parts of government, military, and police intelligence organizations; buying, blackmailing, or otherwise coercing members; and in some cases targeting specific individuals or any member for execution. Old approaches like those of Michael Collins from eight decades ago may seem like ancient history, but the approaches used by Israeli Mossad against selected Islamic terrorist leaders and those used by terrorist groups themselves are striking in their similarity of process and technique. The focused study and assessment of government, military, and police intelligence is highlighted particularly in Jihadist writings, but guerrilla and terrorist groups—and even organizations like outlaw motorcycle gangs and animal rights advocates—have for years studied and tried to anticipate the approaches used by their adversaries.

Guerrilla targeting of state intelligence and security forces may come to be a larger part of insurgent practice. Government analytical techniques, surveillance, and intercept capabilities and technological advances generally has made insurgent and terrorist group safety tenuous and operational freedom more and more constrained. As Michael Collins advocated with some success, not only does eliminating an enemy intelligence officer by coercion or assassination demoralize the security forces but it creates a greater reluctance among the population to cooperate with state authorities. From this perspective, what a state or populace may justifiably characterize as a terrorist event and coldblooded murder may in its more complete
context be understood from the guerrilla insurgent’s perspective as part of a “rational” counterespionage strategy. There is value in recognizing this context and any trends for a fuller understanding of guerrilla intentions and CI planning.

Many specialists and numerous government studies and commissions have sought reforms to improve government intelligence collection and analysis that better counter insurgent and terrorist threats. Historian John Keegan, for example, reflected on what he believed to be the changed nature of intelligence requirements in the post-9/11 world and the intelligence challenges presented by networked organizations like Al Qaeda. He suggested some approaches to intelligence that many others have expressed in recent years. With an appreciation for the successes enjoyed during the British colonial period, he harked back to the great Rudyard Kipling espionage novel, *Kim*. He saw the half-English/half-Indian central character of that name as the ideal intelligence agent for today, where “brave individuals, fluent in difficult languages and able to pass as native members of other cultures, will have to befriend and win acceptance by their own societies’ enemies.” For CI purposes, this kind of person is clearly not the native Western graduate of a military language school or the most intense regional studies training. But the skills would better serve the recruitment, vetting, and productive handling of agents with native understandings, who themselves would have a difficult enough time surviving in any of the insurgent CI environments addressed above.

Keegan’s study of intelligence in war over some 200 years—and what he saw in the threat of distributed, networked insurgent/terrorist threats—led him to believe that a return to the methods “which have come to appear outdated, even primitive, in the age of satellite surveillance and computer description” would be productive in intelligence/counterintelligence returns. He saw advantages that could be had “only by recourse to the oldest of all intelligence methods, direct and personal counter-espionage.” These are fine ideas in many ways and are partially reflected in the current U.S. military’s intensified emphasis on language and regional studies training, cultural intelligence initiatives, red-teaming approaches, “human terrain system” development, and efforts to bolster human intelligence capabilities. But they are easier to advocate than to implement in a CI sense and
do not take full note of the expanded and expanding perspectives of many insurgent groups and individual members alert to the potential of deception or treachery in its various forms.

The acquisition and application of CI-enhancing technology is commonplace for insurgent groups today and recognized in the intelligence planning of most governments. Most recently, this has come to include the exploitation of social networking sites such as Facebook, YouTube, MySpace, and Twitter among others. They have proven to be of some utility to insurgents and terrorists in gaining knowledge of government security and other personnel—as noted earlier in regard to the IDF—as well as recruitment and alternate communications. While reports have not surfaced publicly on the guerrilla use of link analysis tools or more advanced software to better evaluate opposing intelligence organizations, no serious impediment prevents it. Information management tools will further enhance the long-demonstrated capabilities of guerrillas to observe and understand the local activities of military and security forces, leverage information from a supportive populace, even place spies in government organizations. Insurgent/terrorist study of adversary intelligence and security systems continue to become more systematic and developed than generally recognized. A number of groups diligently incorporate observations and lessons learned into recruiting and training programs; and some benefit from direct experience, intimacy, and immersion in the cultures of enemies that in early times may have seemed remote and unknowable, let alone open to the intimate understanding that globalization of information sometimes brings.

Among other recent manifestations of CI-enhancing technology are results from U.S. fingerprinting programs aimed at “insurgents, detainees, and ordinary people in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Horn of Africa.” It appears that many hundreds of these individuals had been arrested earlier in the United States for various criminal acts, minor and major. Despite being detained in Iraq, Afghanistan, or elsewhere as a consequence of U.S. residency, these people clearly had a far deeper understanding of the United States than might be supposed. Further suggested was that foreign insurgent and terrorist support structures in the U.S. and probably elsewhere could be quite developed. The CI implications of this are readily apparent.

All of this raises the complexity of the CI “shadow battles,” as one specialist termed them. Insurgents and terrorists—including those whose responsibilities are in counterintelligence areas—may know and understand as much
about a government and its foreign allies as governments and coalitions know about them. Gaps in technology for intelligence and information handling remain vastly superior for most government, but in some cases—for the better resourced groups—have the prospect of narrowing, given the availability of hardware and software. The time-honored frameworks for insurgent counterintelligence incorporate new developments quite effectively as the last several decades have shown.

But despite a legacy of several thousand years of “CI wisdom” and the addition of the most modern innovations, insurgents are subject to many lapses in the face of unrelenting pressure. Not infrequently, these can be huge mistakes resulting in the loss of major leadership figures, areas of operation, key information, or psychological blows. Weaknesses in insurgent CI systems result from indiscipline and inattentiveness, fluctuating morale, internal rivalries, deterioration of goals, motivation (including criminalization), and always the pure happenstance and bad luck that Alberto Bayo cautioned about nearly 60 years ago.

Counterinsurgent governments and allies can exploit these lapses and create them if prepared and persevering as history has demonstrated. CIA officer Arango, in his look at both insurgent and counterinsurgent CI problem sketched what is still the most effective basic approach: active CI officers, armed with carefully developed data, a continuous study of their guerrilla adversaries, knowledge of their ideology and tradecraft, a carefully worked out CI program, analytical drudgery, and aggressive actions to promote insurgent dysfunction. The continuing danger, however, lies in insurgent and terrorist CI initiatives that are based on analogous approaches, which have the same goals, and may at times be implemented with greater effectiveness.
Appendix

Excerpt from Counterinsurgency, Field Manual 3-24/
Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5

Section IV. Counterintelligence and Counterreconnaissance
(pages 3–30, Headquarters Department of the Army, December 2006)

3-155. Counterintelligence counters or neutralizes intelligence collection efforts through collection, counterintelligence investigations, operations, analysis and production, and functional and technical services. Counterintelligence includes all actions taken to detect, identify, exploit, and neutralize the multidiscipline intelligence activities of friends, competitors, opponents, adversaries, and enemies.

3-156. Insurgents place heavy emphasis on gathering intelligence. They use informants, double agents, reconnaissance, surveillance, open-source media, and open-source imagery. Insurgents can potentially use any person interacting with U.S. or multinational personnel as an informant. These include the same people that U.S. forces use as potential HUMINT sources. Operations security is thus very important; U.S. personnel must carefully screen the contractors, informants, translators, and other personnel working with them. Failure to do so can result in infiltration of U.S. facilities and deaths of U.S. personnel and their partners.

3-157. Background screenings should include collection of personal and biometric data and a search through available reporting databases to determine whether the person is an insurgent. (Biometrics concerns the measurement and analysis of unique physical or behavioral characteristics [as fingerprint or voice patterns].) Identification badges may be useful for providing security and personnel accountability for local people working on U.S. and host-nation (HN) government facilities. Biometric data is preferable, when available, because identification badges may be forged or stolen and insurgents can use them to identify people working with the HN government.

3-158. Insurgents have their own reconnaissance and surveillance networks. Because they usually blend well with the populace, insurgents can execute
reconnaissance without easily being identified. They also have an early warning system composed of citizens who inform them of counterinsurgent movements. Identifying the techniques and weaknesses of enemy reconnaissance and surveillance enables commanders to detect signs of insurgent preparations and to surprise insurgents by neutralizing their early warning systems.

3-159. Insurgents may also have a SIGINT capability based on commercially available scanners and radios, wiretaps, or captured counterinsurgent equipment. Counterinsurgents should not use commercial radios or phones because insurgents can collect information from them. If Soldiers and Marines must use commercial equipment or unencrypted communications, they should employ authorized brevity codes to reduce insurgents’ ability to collect on them.
Endnotes

1. The term insurgent or guerrilla group as used here includes organizations that may variously be designated as “terrorist” and/or “insurgent.” Whatever distinctions some may make in the two categories, most foreign states struggling with armed groups consider them terrorists even if the international community does not. Colombia’s Revolutionary Armed Forces, for example, is considered by both the U.S. and Colombian governments as an insurgent and a terrorist organization. Mexico’s People’s Revolutionary Army (EPR) guerrillas are not U.S.-designated terrorists; however, the government of Mexico considers them to be “terrorists and assassins.”

2. U.S. and western definitions of “counterintelligence” have varied in detail, depending upon the service or national intelligence entity proffering the definition. For example, in the military joint community, counterintelligence (CI) is considered to be “Information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons, or international terrorist activities.” See Department of Defense, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Pub 1-02, 12 April 2001, updated 4 March 2008, p. 129.

3. For a concise description of U.S. counterintelligence in counterinsurgency operations, see the appendix herein for the pertinent excerpt (“Section IV. Counterintelligence and Counterreconnaissance” from Headquarters Department of the Army, Counterinsurgency, Field Manual No. 3-24/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication No. 3-33.5, Washington, DC, December 2006, pp. 3-30). In addition, as addressed in Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, “offensive” counterintelligence is for the U.S. Joint Military Community deemed “counterespionage,” which is designated as that aspect “designed to detect, destroy, neutralize, exploit, or prevent espionage activities through identification, penetration, manipulation, deception, and repression of individuals, groups, or organizations conducting or suspected of conducting espionage activities.”

4. Attributed variously to 16th century Italian political schemer Nicolo Machiavelli, 17th century French poet and fabulist Jean de La Fontaine (“C’est double plaisir de tromper le trompeur”), and perhaps others, the thought certainly has counterparts dating back to earliest human organization.

5. The excellent work compiled and annotated by Charles E. Lathrop, The Literary Spy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), presents a wealth of quotes, observations, and insights on intelligence (including counterintelligence) spanning several thousand years.

6. In Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. by Lionel Giles, Forgotten Books, 2007, p. 50, the attention given to espionage generally and counterintelligence specifically is too lengthy to even synopsize here. Modern readers will be much taken with treatment like Sun Szu’s “five types of spies” (local, inward, converted, doomed, and
surviving) and the “divine manipulation” that could create a near-impenetrable secret system. Available at www.forgottenbooks.org/ (accessed November 2008).


8. The tribal kingdom was called Chalda, and the king was named Merodach-Baladan. The spy was targeted against the city of Larak, believed to have located on the west bank of the Tigris River—east of the ancient Sumerian capital of Kisk, between the Tigris and the Euphrates. The captured spy told his captors the location of Merodach-Baladan himself, the king who had sent him on his mission.


11. Ibid., p. 5.


13. Information in this section has been drawn from including analyses and assessments prepared and presented by a law enforcement officer (names withheld here) operating under the overall auspices of the West Texas High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA).


Other outlaw motorcycle gangs purportedly have analogous enforcement/coercion components to include Hell’s Angels “Filthy Few,” the Outlaws’ “SS,” the Pagans’ Black T-Shirt Squad” according to Information from the Southeastern Connecticut Gang Activities Group posted under “Motorcycle Gangs” at http://faculty.missouristate.edu/m/MichaelCarlie/Storage/motorcycle_gangs.htm (accessed November 2008).


16. This excerpt from the short poem within the novel has appeared in many languages (e.g., “bajo el costano de las ramas extendidas, yo te vendi y tú me vendiste” in Spanish, or “v teny kashtana, ya prodal tebya, a ti prodal menya” in Russian). The longer version, a recurring theme, reads “Under the spreading Chestnut tree, I sold you and you sold me; there you lie and here lie we, under the spreading Chestnut tree.” Outside mentors—such as the East German Stasi that with Russian and other East Bloc security services trained many Cold War insurgent groups in the craft of intelligence and CI—seemed to take the 1984 novel as a how-to manual or inspiration, rather than a cautionary tale of totalitarian oppression. Stasi chief, Erich Mielke, made a point of having his office suite numbered “101” from the novel’s much feared location of “the worst thing in the world.” According to the researcher and author, Anna Funder, Mielke wanted this number so much that “even though his office was on the second floor, he had the entire first floor renamed the Mezzanine so that he could call his room 101.” See the interview with Funder by Sarah Coleman, *World Press Review*, 2 July 2003, at www.arlindocorreia.com/081203.html (accessed November 2008).

17. See, for example, the entry for “theory” at *WordNet: A Lexical Database for the English Language*; available at http://wordnet.princeton.edu/perl/webwn?s=theory (accessed November 2008).

18. Bayo was transferred to the Spanish Foreign Legion as a consequence of his severely wounding a fellow officer in “the last sword fight” in Spain. Because the officer that he ran through was a favorite of the Spanish King, Bayo faced repercussions that, whether legal or not, helped shape his future guerrilla revolutionary career.

19. It was especially important for a generation of Soviet special operations and intelligence personnel who built on Spanish Civil War lessons in World War II and later trained thousands of Third World insurgents and terrorists within the USSR and in camps around the world.


23. Notable among these was former Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, a principal figure in the Urgun and Stern Gang fight against the British and Arab opponents prior to Israeli independence, and later chief of an important Israeli Mossad operations component. It is widely reported that Prime Minister Shamir took the code name “Michael” in honor of Collins whose successes against a greatly superior force he admired.

24. In December 1918, British general elections saw Sinn Fein win the majority of Parliamentary positions from Ireland. However, Sinn Fein members refused to go to London to take their seats, instead setting up an Irish Parliament in Dublin. For the British this was an act of treason and, together with a Volunteer ambush of policemen and other developments, precipitated full-blown conflict.

25. Both the RIC Reserve Force and the smaller RIC Auxiliary Division paramilitaries (composed mainly of former British soldiers including World War I veterans recruited in England) were sometimes loosely called “Black and Tans.” However, the notorious designation was applied most usually and specifically to the Reserve Force. They gained an enduring reputation for brutality among Republican militants, supporters, and civilians swept up in the conflict.

26. Broy, assigned to the Detective Division, was sometimes termed a “detective,” but is more accurately described as a typist assigned to prepare reports on IRA and Sinn Fein activity in T. Ryler Dwer, *The Squad and the Intelligence Operations of Michael Collins* (Dublin: Mercier Press, 2005), p. 10.


28. Dwer, *The Squad*, p. 7 makes the point about a premeditated provocation on the part of Collins.


30. The *Minimanual* has been published in a number versions ranging from reproduced typescript translations to bound commercial volumes—for example, *Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla* (Montréal & Toronto: Abraham Guillen Press/Arm the Spirit, 2002)—and several digital versions. For the latter, see www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-carlos/1969/06/minimanual-urban-guerrilla/index.
htm (accessed November 2008), and www.usma.edu/DMI/IWmsgs/LowProfile-

31. All quotations are taken from the Marighella, Minimanual version found on
the U.S. Military Academy site. See www.usma.edu/DMI/IWmsgs/LowProfile-
InsideOut.pdf.

32. This quote is from an 8th century Arab political treatise noted by Francis Dvorik,
Origins of Intelligence Services (Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1974) as cited
in Lathrop, The Literary Spy, p. 47.

33. The publication—Muhammad Khalil Al-Hakaymah, The Myth of Delusion:
Exposing the American Intelligence (al-Maqreze Center Site, 11 September 2001)—
is available in translation at http://cryptome.org/mod-usintel.htm (accessed
November 2008). Also a discussion and assessment of the work is found at Brian
Fishman, “Al-Qa’ida’s Spymaster Analyzes the U.S. Intelligence Community, 6
2008).

34. Abu Bakr Naji, Management of Savagery: The Most Critical Stage Through Which
the Umma Must Pass, sponsored by the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies,
Harvard University, trans. by William McCants, 23 May 2006, as presented at
www.wcfia.harvard.edu/olin/images/Management%20of%20Savagery%20-%20

35. Ibid.

36. Ibid., pp. 67–68 in the original and as annotated on the referenced translation.

37. Ibid.

38. Mitchell D. Silber and Arvin Bhatt, “Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown
Threat,” New York City Police Department Intelligence Division, New York, 2007; and
Pierre Thomas and Jack Date, “Intelligence Officials: Dozens of Europeans
2008).

Against the Country’s Tyrants Military Series,” a document entered in evidence
at the trial for the African Embassy bombings, Southern District Court, New
York City Attorney General’s Office, circa early to mid-1990s, in translation from
Arabic.

40. Jon Swartz, “Terrorists’ use of Internet spreads,” USA Today, 20 February 2005,
available at www.usatoday.com/money/industries/technology/2005-02-20-cyber-
terror-usat_x.htm (accessed November 2008).

for Jihadis” Jamestown Terrorism Monitor, vol. 5, Issue 6 (29 March 2007), avail-
able at www.jamestown.org (accessed November 2008).

42. Christopher Dickey, “The Taliban’s Book of Rules,” Newsweek, 12 December 2006,
43. The Sicilian Mafia guidelines for conduct, several related to internal security, were discovered during the Italian police’s arrest of Salvatore Lo Piccolo, who is alleged to have been the new head of the Sicilian Mafia. According to BBC media reports, they were as follows:
   a. No one can present himself directly to another of our friends. There must be a third person to do it.
   b. Never look at the wives of friends.
   c. Never be seen with cops.
   d. Don’t go to pubs and clubs.
   e. Always being available for Cosa Nostra is a duty—even if your wife’s about to give birth.
   f. Appointments must absolutely be respected.
   g. Wives must be treated with respect.
   h. When asked for any information, the answer must be the truth.
   i. Money cannot be appropriated if it belongs to others or to other families.
   j. People who can’t be part of Cosa Nostra: anyone who has a close relative in the police, anyone with a two-timing relative in the family, anyone who behaves badly and doesn’t hold to moral values.


45. Ibid., p. 316.


48. Ibid. See also Jorge Luis Vázquez, “El Archivo del MINIT y el Asesoramiento de la Stasi” (The MINIT Archive and Stasi Consultation), Misceláneas de Cuba, 24 February, available at www.misceplaneasdecuba.net/web/article.asp?artID=14131 (accessed November 2008). This site for the Switzerland-based Cuban publication also lists many of the articles written about the MINIT and Stasi connection by the same author.


52. Ibid.

54. Ibid., p. 81.

55. Good cases in point are the Irish Republican Army and offshoots, Sri Lanka’s Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (Tamil Tigers), the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), Lebanese Hezbollah and Palestinian groups, and the Kurdish (Kurdistan) Workers Party (PKK).


60. Among the many books dealing with Guevara’s Bolivian adventure:
   c. The many declassified CIA, State Department, and other documents now found at Peter Kornbluh, “The Death of Che Guevara: Declassified,” *National Security Archive*— www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB5/index.html (accessed November 2008)—provide a more complete picture with primary source documentation from the period.

61. The extensive volumes of Soviet partisan CI tradecraft and lessons from a huge World War II irregular warfare effort—and especially rural guerrilla operations—were apparently not shared by a Moscow leadership that took an increasingly dim view of Cuban revolutionary adventure in Latin America.


63. In the spring of 1967, for example, the poorly hidden diary of one of the Cuban fighters was discovered at the guerrillas’ main camp, which had been located for the Army by guerrilla deserters who led them to it. See the reproduced introduction to Harry Villegas Tamayo, *Pombo: A Man of Che’s guerrilla*: *The Story of an Epic Chapter in the History of the Americas* as presented at www.blythe.

64. A book dealing with Tania’s life was written by her Cuban paramour and MINIT trainer Ulises Estrada, under the title *Tania: Undercover with Che Guevara in Bolivia*, Ocean Press, 2005. As would be expected, it presents an admiring view of Tania that is questionable in many respects. Ocean Books typically publishes radical tracts, mainly dealing with Latin America (including the 2008 Che Guevara Calendar).


66. The peasant-grocer, Honorato Rojas, was himself executed by remnants of Guevara’s supporters about two years later. For one of many accounts of the ambush, see Henry Butterfield Ryan, *The Fall of Che Guevara: A Story of Soldiers, Spies, and Diplomats* (New York: Oxford University Press, USA, 1999), Chapter 5, “Guerrilla Triumph and Trouble,” especially pp. 118-121.


68. The FARC hostages included three U.S. military contractors held since 2003, international figure and former Colombian presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt held for 6 years, and eleven Colombian military and police personnel.

69. A reading of Mark Bowden, *Killing Pablo: The Hunt for the World’s Greatest Outlaw* (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2001), gives considerable insight into the communications intercept capabilities available to the Colombian Government, as the successful and violent drug trafficker Pablo Escobar was tracked and killed. This was in 1993, a decade and a half ago. Both skills and technology have vastly increased, as has U.S. security assistance under Plan Colombia.

70. See the following:
   b. “Rescatan a Betancourt y otros secuestrados por FARC” (Betancourt and Other Hostages Ransomed from the FARC), *El Universal*, 2 June 2008
71. See the prior section on Alberto Bayo.


77. Ibid., pp. 142-143.

78. Ibid., pp. 144-145.


81. See Zachary Abuza, *Balik-Terrorism: The Return of the Abu Sayyaf* (Carlisle, PA: Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, September 2005), p. 12, which cites the following as the original sources addressing these incidents:

   a. “Reward Offered for Hinolan’s Attacker” *MT*, 16 November 2004

82. Ibid., p. 12.


84. Andrey Soldatov and Irina Borogan, “Tyazhel’iy Feys’ i drugiye: Taktika spetssluzb posle Beslana: stavka na likvidatsiyu” (Heavy face and others: tactics of the special services after Beslan: a staff for liquidation), undated circa late


87. Ibid.

88. Volckmann, We Remained, pp. 125-126.

89. Ibid., p. 126.


91. Ibid.


95. The early use of .38-caliber revolvers was abandoned for .45s or other more powerful rounds when the 38s failed on the first assassination to have the requisite stopping power.

96. Ibid., p. 73.

97. The British officers were also said to frequent the Cairo Bar in Dublin. Other members of the group came from service in Russia and apparently other locations as well.


111. Keegan and others have pointed to the Israelis, with a population base well suited for recruiting operatives from an array of cultures as being a particularly good example. Keegan, Military Intelligence, p. 316.

112. Ibid.

113. The programs are apparently having a substantial, positive impact in interacting with foreign nationals in counterinsurgency environments.

