Welcome to the second edition of our Bulletin. Inside these pages, we take on the audacious challenge of suggesting those issues and topics the newly inaugurated and confirmed Administration needs to understand concerning stability operations (SO). The centerpieces of this edition are Mr. Richard Smyth’s “Some Thoughts about Stability Operations,” that provides a critical perspective from a seasoned Foreign Service Officer; and Mr. Roy Williams’ related piece, “Stability Operations and NGOs: What’s in a Name?” that offers observations from a recognized leader among our civil society organizations.

We include an update regarding the U.S. Army Action Plan-Stability Operations as well as the recently released Army proponency memorandum for Stability Operations. We also interview retired U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel Nate Freier, the author of the recently published PKSOI Paper, “Known Unknowns: Unconventional ‘Strategic Shocks’ in Defense Strategy Development.” He brings a unique perspective that challenges the conventional defense thought about the strategic environment in which we may conduct peace and stability operations in the future.

Be sure to check out our “New at PKSOI” section as well for the roll-out of our Stability Operations Lessons Learned Information Management System (SOLLIMS), our Peacekeeping and Stability Operations (PKSO) Research and Publication Topic List for this calendar year, and our Upcoming Events list. Follow the embedded links to submit information and/or papers to any of those venues.

Finally, we offer to the new administration the following “need to knows”:

**Sustain the Momentum.** You need to know that there is already much work in progress to assess the issues and challenges of a comprehensive approach to stability operations, which includes many initiatives that are nascent, but growing. Find out what is out there and what needs your continued advocacy. The inclusion of Secretary Gates in the new administration is key to providing continuity and bridging to the future requirements.
Welcome to the second edition of our Bulletin. Inside these pages, we take on the audacious challenge of suggesting those issues and topics the newly inaugurated and confirmed Administration needs to understand concerning stability operations (SO). The centerpieces of this edition are Mr. Richard Smyth’s “Some Thoughts about Stability Operations,” that provides a critical perspective from a seasoned Foreign Service Officer; and Mr. Roy Williams’ related piece, “Stability Operations and NGOs: What’s in a Name?” that offers observations from a recognized leader among our civil society organizations.
**Stability Operations is not a phase.** It is more than a phase of a military campaign plan (like the infamous “Phase Four”). Nor is it a trendy way to approach the world. Although stability operations is codified in military doctrine, it is also recognized as an integrated set of programs and activities that brings the ‘whole-of-government’ (US) energy and expertise to bear in a particular country or region in the interest of United States’ national security. Names may change in the future; but the concept of stability operations will not. Check y(our) history.

**Bringing the Most Stuff Doesn’t Mean You Have to Lead.** Whether we are describing the United States’ relationship in the multinational environment—or Department of Defense’s (DoD) interface with its Department peers—having all the “stuff” to do stability operations does not mean that international actions in stabilization of a region must be U.S.-led. Or that the U.S. efforts must be DoD-led. However, you do need to know that in the near-term, at least, much if not most of your capability to conduct stability operations resides in the Defense Department. That may change in the future—you will influence that—but in the interim, the U.S. military has to be trained and ready to conduct these operations as well as the traditionally understood “offense” and “defense.” Know that the military understands this, and has the doctrine and training manuals approved and published to support.

**It Takes More than the U.S. Government.** In fact, effective stability operations take more than governments in general, not specific to the U.S., can provide. With the focus in recent years on U.S. government interagency reform and process improvement, as well as our role and relationship in the global environment among nation-peers, we are in danger of losing sight of the capacities and capabilities of the “whole-of-society.” In particular, we must not overlook the impact and influence of civil society, often represented by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and private sector enterprises, such as multinational corporations. Know this: they haven’t forgotten their constituents and their charters. We need to know what they know, because they often get it right.

**Don’t Get Lost in Lexicon.** It is too easy to get confused by the terms of reference, the lexicon, the language (figuratively and literally) of stability operations. It is also too easy to have a policy or decision discussion never get to the issues at hand due to arguments of lexicon.

Of course, it is true that words are used to mean specific things and may mean different things to different audiences. However, what is important in any interagency, multinational, and multi-societal sector stability operations conversation is this: what do you want it to look like when it is done; to what purpose; and how long and what resources can we afford. Accept the differences and get past the language barrier—and carry a pocket translator or phrase book.

**Get Ahead of the Conflict.** One of the most interesting dynamics of all this attention to stability operations is this dawning recognition among many that the things we study and analyze as part of any number of criteria-based observances leading to transition from stability operations to “something-that-might-be-called-normal” governance operations are also the very things that may tell us when a country, area, or region might need stabilization—before the conflict occurs. However, determining whether, when, where, and how to apply the appropriate resources and capabilities in order to prevent a conflict is the art aspect to complement the science of the analyses. You will not get it right every time.

As Richard Smyth reminds us in his enclosed article, “If there is one thing the Obama administration has in abundance, it is this: advice.” We intend the advice presented here to distill some of the most complicated concepts to their basic essence in order to make it both readable—and usable.

Join us in our next Bulletin as we look at “Roles and Missions in Stability Operations.” Your comments and submissions are welcome.
Some Thoughts about Stability Operations
by Mr. Richard H. Smyth

If there is one thing the Obama administration has in abundance it is this: advice. For example, advice on improving the national security system (its practices, its procedures, and its missions); one bibliography lists over 32 blue-ribbon commissions, projects, panels, committees, or think tank publications dealing with just the imperative of reform of interagency processes reform. While some of these recommendations on interagency reform are marked by comprehensive analysis and a thoughtful focus on necessary, feasible, acceptable, and suitable recommendations, many of these reports are unfortunately revisionist in their approach to facts; seem motivated by the authors’ desires to shift responsibility for failures; are based on purely ideological or self-serving assumptions; do not provide feasible recommendations; or are frank attempts to simply justify additional funding for some favored agency. What the studies do have in common is an apparent genesis in the recent and ongoing interagency planning, stabilization, reconstruction, and development experiences – or lack thereof – in Iraq and Afghanistan. Just as issues regarding stabilization prompted much of the debate on reform of the national security system, general policy decisions made regarding structure, precedence, responsibilities, and funding of the national security architecture will have profound effects on America’s ability to conduct stabilization. The general policy decisions on that architecture need to be informed by certain objective principles for successful stabilization efforts. Some of those principles, along with associated caveats and capabilities, are the subject of this note.

“Define what you politically mean by the term “stabilization.””

Clausewitz may be a dead Prussian, but he remains a highly relevant dead Prussian. Just as he cautioned that “the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and the commander have to make is to establish . . . the kind of war on which they are embarking," it is critical that decision makers evaluate and provide clear political objectives and establish the kind of stabilization upon which the country is embarking.

In National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)-44, which established whole-of-government coordination and leadership responsibilities for reconstruction and stabilization as a new mission for the Department of State, President Bush broadly defined stabilization operations as:

... (assisting) in stabilizing and reconstructing countries or regions, especially those at risk of, in, or in transition from conflict or civil strife, and to help them establish a sustainable path toward peaceful societies, democracies, and market economies. The United States should work with other countries and organizations to anticipate state failure, avoid it whenever possible, and respond quickly and effectively when necessary and appropriate to promote peace, security, development, democratic practices, market economies, and the rule of law. Such work should aim to enable governments abroad to exercise sovereignty over their own territories and to prevent those territories from being used as a base of operations or safe haven for extremists, terrorists, organized crime groups, or others who pose a threat to U.S. foreign policy, security, or economic interests.

In a complementary manner, the U.S. Army defines “stability operations” in its Field Manual (FM) 3-07 as:

An overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.
The same source defines “stabilization” as:

The process by which underlying tensions that might lead to resurgence in violence and a breakdown in law and order are managed and reduced, while efforts are made to support preconditions for successful long-term development.

Both the State and the Defense Departments’ definitions recognize that stabilization covers a broad spectrum of activities. The fundamental, if subtle, difference between the two definitions is that the interagency approach emphasizes support of and coordination with, a presumably friendly foreign government. In contrast, military doctrine realistically if implicitly expands the scope of stabilization to include those occupation responsibilities mandated both by customary and codified international law (Geneva Conventions, e.g.) and the Army’s own doctrine of the Law of Land Warfare (found in FM 27-10) and executed as Civil Affairs Operations (FM 3-05.40).

As noted, events in Afghanistan and Iraq initiated much of the recent debate on stabilization and interagency operations. For strategic communication purposes, we referred to U.S. government and its military activities that followed main combat operations in those countries as stabilization efforts. Few doubt, however, that until a new government is able to exercise control and hence sovereignty, the Coalition efforts in those countries are necessarily more closely aligned with the responsibilities of an occupying force—and hence subject to the objectives, priorities, and policies of the Coalition members rather than the host government. Indeed, it could be argued that even an unopposed military intervention in a truly failed state constitutes more of an occupation than a projection of stabilization assistance. I suggest that the critical decision policy makers must make and convey is whether the stabilization efforts are to be unilateral and coercive, or cooperative and supportive; or whether the U.S. or the host nation set the priorities and program objectives. If we select the former, as in the case of an occupied territory, we must make a second decision to when and how the U.S. (or any other intervener’s) coercive stabilization efforts will transition to supportive stabilization programs in support of the host country programs and priorities.

These decisions not only shape the nature and mechanics (including command and control) of U.S. programs, but they determine the ultimate success of the efforts. (Here is a hint: A prolonged occupation mode, even with a nominal host country government in place, can be destabilizing in itself.)

Public Security is the sine qua non.

No matter your definitions, public security is the sine qua non prerequisite for successful stabilization. Afghan officials recognized this principle during their Civil War period (1992-1996), when provincial officials from throughout the country pressed donor organizations to accelerate or expand relief and development efforts in their particular provinces. Often their justification for a stabilization program expansion included their awareness of public security availability—at least in appearance. “You see,” they told donors, “We have excellent security here,” followed by one of two examples: “You don’t see any armed men on the streets,” or its counterpoint, “I have armed guards on every corner.”

With the absence of a perception of reasonable protection from criminal and insurgent threats, the population will believe an occupier or even a friendly host nation government is failing in this single-most essential task and a primary purpose of any government. Without adequate security of any type, infrastructure and human capital development efforts are constantly vulnerable to destruction. Without reasonable personal security, civilian officials – whether local or international – are unable to effectively perform their duties. Absent public security and rule of law hinders private investment availability—the usual driver of reconstruction and development—and normal commercial trade is virtually impossible. It is helpful to remember that Afghanistan’s Taliban movement began in reaction various former-Muj “commanders” engagement in criminal activities. This situation was in large part due to the fragmentation of government authority in the South, and much of the Talibs’ early financial support came from the commercial classes in an attempt to curb the criminal exploitation of selected former-Muj leaders.

As satisfying as it may be to carry the war to the enemy and destroy insurgent threats in their safe-havens, such active long-term campaign efforts need to be secondary
to the immediately essential task of providing public security, suppressing crime, and preventing insurgent activity in secured territory.

Make Sure Planners and Operators Know the Context for Stabilization.

Stabilization operations take place in some fairly exotic locations, with unique language, customs, economic bases, societal relations, institutions, and historical narratives unfamiliar to most outsiders. Sun Tzu’s admonition to know your adversary equally applies to knowing your potential allies, and in any case is a sound principle to apply in strategic and campaign planning of both combat operations and stabilization. In the run-up to Operation Enduring Freedom, staff members of Central Command (CENTCOM) announced, “We have all the Afghan expertise we need.” This statement—and the attitude it represented—puzzled the relatively small universe of Afghanistan watchers in the government and academic communities, whose response to that assertion was, “Oh—who?” It is apparent now in retrospect that CENTCOM’s Afghanistan expertise base at the time could have been broadened and deepened to provide greater understanding of the human and social terrain and insights into the objectives and capabilities of both the opposition and potential allies. As one example, more than seven years after 9/11, there are still policy makers and ranking military officers who do not know what to call the Afghan people. Misuse of the word Afghani is not just a trivial grammatical issue; it indicates an abject lack of understanding of one of the critical issues of national identity that stabilization operations in that country need to address. A better practical understanding of the Afghan context would have logically led to more effective combat operations and more efficient and effective non-kinetic stabilization efforts.

There are a couple of caveats to share, however, with the imperative to gain an understanding of the foreign context. One is that the inherent complexity of a culture may lead to “over-analysis,” a search for first principles and syntheses that may be so time consuming and rife with irrelevant conclusions as to be impractical. The other is that our desire for simplicity, understanding, and swift resolution, may lead us to rely on limited sources—such as a familiar wise man—who can explain things according to his particular perspective, and according to his particular agenda, of which we may be totally unaware.

There is some evidence that we fell into this particular pitfall in both Iraq and Afghanistan, an observation that contributes to the next principle.

Exploit – don’t duplicate – Agencies’ Core Competencies.

The United States has a superb military, second to none in its abilities to inter alia conduct combat operations; deter or defeat an enemy; protect personnel, material, territory, and lines of communication; sustain forces through its logistics capabilities; manage civil affairs at the tactical level; provide emergency medical care; rapidly deploy; and collect technical intelligence. These are competencies the U.S. government, specifically the Executive Branch, leverages on the behalf of its national security interests.

However, the U.S. military is not the only U.S. government capability. The United States also has a Foreign Service stationed at over 260 overseas locations, collecting and analyzing information regarding the conditions, intentions, and capabilities of other countries, representing, promoting, and protecting U.S. interests, and developing the area expertise necessary for crafting and managing contextually appropriate engagement programs to further U.S. policy. In Washington, these personnel engage in policy and strategy formulation to advance America’s foreign affairs interests. These are also competencies available to the Executive Branch.

Another agency with vital competencies for U.S. government use is the Agency for International Development (USAID). There we have a corps of officers highly trained and experienced in the theory and practice of modifying complex social, infrastructure, and economic systems to pre-empt situations of instability as well as respond to the humanitarian needs of natural or man-made disaster. These are but two additional agencies resident in the U.S. government—beyond the Department of Defense—with unique, discrete, yet reinforcing and complementary capabilities. Given the responsibilities inherent in the U.S. role in world leadership, it is not only appropriate but critical that we not only retain these competencies, but that we expand or reinforce them. Where we fell short in the past is in effectively exploiting and nurturing these capabilities and pre-empting redundancies. Illustrative examples of these failures include:

◊ Having the US Embassy in Kabul, the local symbol of the United States and center for projecting U.S. interests in Afghanistan, guarded by mercenaries rather than military personnel;
Requiring military personnel, with no training or background, to plan for development of complex civil systems and services normally the province of USAID;

Excluding civilian personnel, with area and policy expertise and a long-term perspective on US objectives, from the planning processes for Afghanistan and Iraq and thus requiring military planners to largely rely on ideological assumptions and only sketchy ideas of context;

Needing Foreign Service officers, trained to act on political, economic, and social issues at the national and regional level, to act as local administration mentors while the military’s Civil Affairs capabilities remain primarily part of the reserve component and subject to deployment limitations;

Relying on Commander’s Emergency Response Funds, which are meant to be tactical in application, for financing development projects independently of integrated strategic national development plans, thus minimizing the tactical effect while contributing little to coordinated stabilization efforts;

Requesting personnel from domestic agencies without providing funding and with little regard for capabilities. For example, commanders in Afghanistan and Iraq as well as DoD civilian leadership called for USDA personnel to be deployed when in fact what were needed were not, say, USSA milk price support program specialists or agriculture marketing experts, but working agronomists which have historically been provided for stabilization programs by USAID through contract arrangements.

We could cite many more examples of the failure to exploit existing functional capabilities across the interagency world and instead rely on in lieu personnel and ad hoc missions for much of the non-kinetic stabilization effort. Rather than enjoying the synergies that result from the coordinated operations of experts, we suffered from perceived and real inefficiencies and an enormous amount of frustration across the interagency universe in trying to develop expertise, already resident in the U.S. government, while in contact with the population. The lesson for policy makers and strategic planners is to know what capabilities are available throughout the government and how to exploit those competencies rather than dispersing responsibilities regardless of established capabilities. This observation leads to the next principle.

Exercise and Exploit Host Country Capabilities from the Start – Not Every Wheel Needs to be Re-invented.

Very few venues for potential stabilization efforts have no institutional capabilities. Even among the states with no standing government capability, most have at least a recent memory. Afghanistan, despite over 30 years of almost continuous warfare and the overthrow of eight national governments—generally through extreme violence—still retained institutional capabilities in education, in governance, in planning, in public health, and even some limited capabilities in public safety. While these institutions eroded during the Taliban era, many of the institutional structures and personnel remained. On a long-term basis, those institutions or the institutions of any country requiring stabilization assistance could well require reform and modernization. However, unless the institution itself is contributing to instability (i.e., corrupt and oppressive security forces or established religious institutions fomenting ethnic strife), we can and should utilize existing institutional frameworks from the beginning. In order to do so, we must secure the willing and able support of the institution’s personnel. The easiest way to do so, while lending legitimacy to both stabilization efforts and to the supported host country government, is to ensure that salaries are paid and regular operating expenses are funded. Upfront transfers of funds, to individuals or to the state, are skeptically viewed by Congress and are not, in fact, required of an occupying power by international law. However, they may make eminent sense. Therefore, we must design stabilization operations with a funding stream for immediate use that in order to energize existing host country institutions to work toward stabilization goals.

In conclusion, the new administration is getting plenty of advice on domestic and international priorities; making stabilization programs more effective may not be a front burner item, but as a critical component of our diplomatic toolkit must be considered as part of any reform package. The important thing is that any general interagency reform, or specific reforms of our stabilization processes, be guided by objective analysis of strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats that bound the stabilization issues universe.
Interview on “Known Unknowns”
by Mr. Nate Freier

In November, Nathan Freier, a Visiting Research Professor with PKSOI and a Senior Fellow with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, published “Known Unknowns: Unconventional Strategic Shocks in Defense Strategy Development.” The monograph generated enormous interest and attention. Colonel Lorelei Coplen, chief of PKSOI’s Policy and Knowledge Management Division, asked Mr. Freier to discuss “Known Unknowns,” its implications, and wider reaction to its publication.

How did you become interested in the concept of “strategic shocks”?

Most of my recent research springs from previous work on the 2005 National Defense Strategy (NDS 05). As we developed NDS 05, it was apparent to me that the defense enterprise tends to focus attention and effort in one of two areas: 1) fixing its current problem or 2) ensuring that it persistently revisits how it might better address those problems it is culturally and structurally best organized to confront. Today, DoD corporately expends a great deal of effort on classical counterinsurgency (COIN), counterterrorism (CT) and the legacy threat of future conventional major combat operations (MCO). This is true in much of DoD’s “futures” work as well, as defense “futures” are often linear extrapolations of current priorities — i.e., the next insurgency, the next terrorist escalation, or the next MCO. While both of these are important, they also leave DoD vulnerable to dislocating surprise.

Sometime in 2006-2007, DoD Policy Planning broke with tradition and began a thoughtful exploration of “strategic trends and shocks.” The latter “shocks” were speculative events that would have a disruptive impact on DoD’s strategic orientation, mission, and capabilities. Given painful adjustments forced on DoD by 9/11 and the Iraq insurgency, I thought this was important work meriting deeper academic investigation. I wanted to reinforce and advocate for embryonic DoD work clearly focused on an unconventional strategic future.

What are your key conclusions about “strategic shocks” impacting DoD?

Future strategic shocks will be unconventional. Should they come to pass, they will demand the full attention and commitment of defense leaders, institutions, and resources in response. They are “unconventional” because they fall outside the parameters of contemporary defense planning. They are “shocks” because their radical and disruptive impact forces fundamental change on affected institutions.

Unconventional strategic shocks will originate in irregular, catastrophic and hybrid threats of “purpose” or “context.” The former emerges from hostile design. The latter arrives in the absence of hostile design altogether. Of the two, the potential impact of future “contextual threats” — e.g., pandemic disease, natural or human disaster, un- and under-governance, strategic state collapse, etc — is the least well understood.

“Shocks” are not merely “surprises.” Surprise forces institutions to act earlier than anticipated — often in unfamiliar or unexpected operating space — but still within established conventions. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the U.S response are classic examples of strategic surprise. Though strategic surprises may be unanticipated, both the nature of the threat and that of the U.S. response fall well inside DoD’s traditional wheelhouse.

Strategic shocks, on the other hand, are complex, hyper-surprises. Like more traditional strategic surprise, they too force institutions to act earlier than expected. Yet, they are distinct from them in that affected institutions like DoD are forced by circumstances to respond according to vastly different rule sets and in fundamentally different ways than previously accounted for in strategic planning. Surprise triggers evolutionary change in an institution’s outlook and mission. Shock sparks sudden revolutionary change in the same. Here the attacks of 9/11, the Iraq insurgency, and the subsequent U.S. revolution in CT and COIN are instructive.

What should the incoming administration to know about “strategic shocks”?

With 9/11, the last national security team faced a game-changing unconventional “strategic shock” in its first eight months. The current team would be well-advised to expect the same. It strikes me that DoD should revisit “first principles” on where, when, under what circumstances, how, to what extent, and toward what end the defense enterprise as a whole is likeliest to be employed in the future. By necessity, this must include deliberate consideration of the most plausible defense-relevant “strategic shocks.”

In your view, what is likely to be the next “strategic shock” and how will it impact the stabilization and reconstruction (S and R) community?

A speculative “strategic shock” of particular concern to me is sudden failure of a large and important state whose stable functioning is critical to U.S. security. Here, the most important commitment of U.S. military forces in the future might be minimum essential “armed stabilization” of crippled strategic states.
Failure to optimize key pieces of the Joint Force for this is a recipe or failed intervention. There are three important defense implications embedded in this conclusion. First, DoD must prepare now to lead a rapid, multi-point, whole-of-government intervention in large and important states suffering widespread civil disorder. Second, the complexity, scope, and hazards associated with interventions like this might preclude the revolutionary political, economic, and social transformation envisioned by the S and R community. This indicates that effected national security institutions — e.g., DoD, State, USAID, and the intelligence community — should game the prospect for large-scale (and limited) “armed stabilization” to identify and build requisite capabilities. Finally, DoD and the wider S and R community should explore some of the “darker” prospects for the “armed stabilization” — e.g., intervention in foreign internal conflicts involving nuclear use or nuclear-armed opponents, pandemic, and/or stabilization of a crippled state whose population and elites remain inherently hostile to the United States.

What surprised you most about the public response?

I was purposefully provocative in my illustrations of speculative “strategic shocks.” The vignettes were selected not because of their likelihood but instead because of their dramatic deviation from current defense thinking. None reflect official USG policy and none have any connection with current USG thinking. An illustrative homeland security scenario requiring use of military force inside the United States was particularly controversial. Remember unconventional “strategic shocks” forced institutions to respond according to vastly different rule sets and in ways well-outside established defense convention. In this regard, there would be no greater “shock” to DoD than large-scale support to civil authorities in an extraordinary domestic crisis. Unfortunately, some saw the homeland security vignette as active planning or advocacy for a wider role for the armed forces in domestic security. A more careful reading of “Known Unknowns” demonstrates that this is not the case.

Where are you going now with your research?

I currently have a joint PKSOI/SSI monograph in pre-publication. It should be out within the next month. The monograph is tentatively titled “The New Balance: Armed Stabilization and the Future of U.S. Landpower.” It argues that U.S. land forces should experience an “unconventional revolution” in the next administration. This revolution should result in land forces optimized for foreign contingencies where violence or the threat of violence remains quite high and a pre-existing indigenous order has been seriously undermined or incapacitated. I conclude that defeat of violent threats to basic public order and restoration and maintenance of minimum essential political, security, and economic conditions within victim states is the new landpower MCO.

That work is complete. My next project tackles the lingering problem of engineering whole-of-government responses to complex contingencies. I intend to take a detailed look at the current Unified Command Plan and its utility in the contemporary operating environment.

“Stability Operations” and NGOs:
What's in a name?
by Mr Roy Williams

"What's in a name? That which we call a rose
By any other name would smell as sweet."
William Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet
(II, ii, 1-2)

The Bard of Avon reminds us that what matters is what something is, not what it is called. However, in the case of the lovely rose flower, just about everyone knows what it looks like. Therefore, a reference to “a rose” will likely evoke essentially the same image for everyone. Unfortunately, a reference to the phrase “stability operations” will not have the same result of shared understanding. Even among the communities and organizations that have a similar level of program involvement and activity intensity in post-conflict environments will describe those actions in strikingly different ways. This lack of shared language is often reflective in the inability to martial resources in an effective manner. Or, more importantly, results in the inability to solicit collaborative engagement from organizations whose own terms of reference do not include the phrase “stability operations.” The obvious question then is this: does there exist sufficiently common ground for presenting a shared view when we do not have a shared language?

We now recognize that the iconic images that invariably accompanied the end of conflict between nation-states—complete with the usual ceremonial marking of the event—are descriptive of a reality that no longer exists.
With the end of the straight-forward dichotomies of the Cold War, and the advent of both state- and principal (if you will)-sponsored terrorism, what we used to call simply “post-conflict reconstruction” has seemingly become something else. However, accepting the shared image of an increasingly fragile international framework has not led to acceptable or common language by different communities when referring to what happens when major combat ends. Most importantly, this shared acceptance of a world-view says little about how different groups see their respective roles in addressing the reconstruction and humanitarian needs that both inevitably emerge as well as addressing any overlapping concerns.

The phrase “stability operations” is but one example of this dichotomy. Currently it is in use by the U.S. government and its military, while it is essentially ignored by the non-governmental organization (NGO) world. One could be forgiven if led to believe the NGO community is not involved in the post-conflict (generally post-combat operations) phase of recovery. Why, then, should this be the case? Ironically, the existing and emerging U.S. government and military policy and doctrine reflect an appreciation of both the tangible as well as the intangible benefits of NGO-community contribution to the stabilization efforts. Security permitting, they are an essential part of the reconstruction and stabilization process, especially at the local level. Is it simply a matter of a breakdown in communication between communities? Or, perhaps, and more of concern, does the lack of common language signify a situation in which there is no consensus on what is being discussed, much less resolved?

BEGINNINGS. Arguments in support of military involvement in post-conflict recovery often assert that military assumption of these types of tasks is not new. The reconstruction of post-World War II (WWII) Germany and Japan are often raised as clear illustrations. From there it follows, according to some, a train of logic that directly relates to today’s post-conflict actions; now referred to as stability operations. Beyond a doubt, the military involvement in those historic operations was extensive and all-comprehensive. However, before one accepts the post-WWII European and East Asian reconstruction scenarios as direct analogies to our current environment, it is important to consider the differences.

First, it was a different military—comprised of an exceptionally large body of military men that were only a few months or years from their own civilian jobs who could fairly readily assist in governance and economic operations—from basic subsistence to wholesale commercial distribution—from their own experience and education, Second, and most importantly, it was a military that was addressing nation-states that had not lost or had even really questioned their national identity. In other words, while defeated in combat, they were a long way from reflecting the hallmarks of fragile states. These nations had strong and supportive influential middle classes and viable civil societies—elements inconsistent with internal instability.

Further, the industrial base of these countries, while significantly affected by the conflict, was far more integrated into the very nature of both local and global society, than is the case with today’s conflict and post-conflict areas. Educational, financial, and political systems were all still woven into the very fabric of these countries. While there were underprivileged parts of the population, there were sufficient counterbalancing elements to reduce their potential negative impacts. Finally, it is also fair to say that, in both cases, reconstruction was very much in our national interest and the involvement of the various branches of government clearly reflected a general acceptance of that recognition.

Therefore, the usefulness of the post-WWII reconstruction story is more parable than analogy. The point is that defining stability operations in terms of these historical events, correctly or otherwise, presents an understanding of the term and roles that is inconsistent with the way NGOs see themselves, and therefore serves to confuse more that it does to enlighten. While the eminent organization, CARE, traces its origins to the post-WWII era (see http://www.care.org/about/history), most of the NGOs of today do not share in that organizational memory. Further, while the role CARE played with its famous packages was critical, it is not likely that its efforts were integrated as a planning assumption in a U.S. government reconstruction strategy.

In short, the premises incorporated into the present understanding of stability operations are at odds with the more limited sense of mandate and objectives common to NGOs.
The world of NGO work is enormously fragmented as it is so closely connected with specific community concerns of their constituents, both client and donor. Given these differing perspectives, there is little chance that a common frame of reference will develop amongst civil society writ large.

CONCLUSION. Despite the language-barriers, NGOs are stakeholders in reconstruction. It is therefore important that NGO input—originating from all levels from local through international—be incorporated into any inclusive understanding of stability operations. It is equally necessary that we maintain an ongoing dialogue on this issue as every post-conflict situation is different and decisions on priorities must take these differences into account.

For example, there will be times when resolving major power-grid issues will be significant while at other times, the reestablishment of local health facilities will be seen by the populace as the major concern. One example of achieving and maintaining this dialogue is the extended working group process, led by the United States Institute of Peace and the NGO consortium, Interaction, which resulted in civilian-military guidelines for interaction during conflict. The outcome of two-plus years of meetings was a document specifying agreed upon common terms of reference presented as operational guidelines that is now found throughout many of the Combatant Commands as well as local NGO field operations offices.

What is meant by the term “stability operations” is very relevant to today’s military and political environment. Ensuring that all the actors can enter into meaningful exchanges is critical.

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What Is Next for the Army Action Plan for Stability Operations?

by Captain Paul Lang, U.S. Army

Beginning in spring 2007, the Army Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7, initiated the development of an action plan to focus, integrate, and institutionalize activities designed to improve the Army’s capability and capacity to conduct Stability Operations in a joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM) environment. As conceived, the Army Action Plan for Stability Operations (AAP-SO) directs the development of doctrinal, organizational, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) solutions to build or enhance the Army’s ability to effectively conduct Stability Operations.

The Army Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7 tasked the Stability Operations Division (DAMO-SSO) with both the AAP-SO development and implementation oversight. The plan includes higher headquarters’ direction as well as recommendations from a series of related studies. The Army-wide Stability Operations Conference of March 2007 provided several significant insights resulting in stability operations-related issue staffing across the entire Army. By November 2007, the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army (VCSA) approved a three-phase implementation plan for the AAP-SO, which was articulated in the Army Campaign Plan under Decision Point 105.

During the second phase (Prepare) of the AAP-SO implementation, representatives of some 40 Army organizations—across the Department of the Army, Army Major Commands, Direct Reporting Units, and Army Service Component Commands—reviewed 147 initiatives related to stability operations with the Army Stability Operations Office. The review process derived 367 stability operation tasks for the Army at large and provided the associated metrics to measure subsequent implementation. Tasked organizations conducted detailed mission analysis of the broad AAP-SO initiatives against current stability operations doctrine encapsulated in both FM 3-0 (Operations) and FM 3-07 (Stability Operations), which amplify the roles and relationships of stability operations as an element of full spectrum operations conducted by the Army. The Stability Operations Division then evaluated both the tasks as well as the associated metrics for final approval, completing the phase in December 2008.
What is next? The AAP-SO moves to the final implementation phase (Execute). In the near future, the Stability Operations Division of the Department of the Army will transition the full responsibility for the execution phase to a designated Army Stability Operations proponent, yet to be announced. Regardless, the Stability Operations community can expect the Army to conduct periodic review of the metrics across its reporting organizations. This will continue to provide a quantitative basis for assessing progress toward the achievement of the AAP-SO end state: an Army with sufficient capabilities and capacities to conduct and support Stability Operations as a core mission, in conjunction with JIIM organizations or alone as the situation dictates. The Army Campaign Plan will hold higher updates.

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CCO Ministerial Advising Workshop (10 Feb 09):
-- PKSOI to participate during the workshop at the National Defense University (NDU) in a Lessons Learned panel. The Panel will be moderated by CAPT Steve Camacho from OSD(P)/Stab Ops. Other Panelists include Col (P) John DeJarnette from Stab Ops – to discuss the recent OSD/JS MODA survey, a representative from USDA, and Mr. Dan French, Lessons Learned Branch, PKSOI – to demonstrate PKSOI’s Stability Operations Lesson Learned Information System (SOLLIMS). The Workshop is being co-hosted by CCO and NDU. To gain more information, visit the CCO Portal (http://www.ccoportal.org). The CCO POC is Jacqueline Carpenter (SAIC) – (703) 602-3431x113, Jaqueline.Carpenter.ctr@osd.mil

Joint Center for Operational Analysis (JCOA) Spring 2009 Lessons Learned Conference (17-20 Mar 09):
-- JFCOM/JCOA will host the Spring 2009 Lessons Learned Conference at the Virginia Shipbuilding and Carrier Integration Center (VASCIC), Hampton, VA from 17-20 Mar 09. To obtain more information the JCOA POCs are:
  Mr Al Musgrove - (757) 203-7618, albert.musgrove@jfcom.mil
  Mr Mike Barker - (757) 203-7270, hugh.barker@jfcom.mil
  JCOA Office E-mail: jcoa.ed@jfcom.mil

-- On 23-25 Mar 09, Joint Staff (JS) J-7, USJFCOM and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) will functional working groups and JLLIS/JTIMS system training during the WJTSC. The Conference is taking place at the Crowne Plaza Hotel, in Colorado Springs, CO. The purpose of this conference is to discuss new and ongoing Joint Training and Exercise issues and work issue resolution. The Joint Lessons Learned Program (JLLP) Working Group will be conducted 23-24 Mar. The JLLP WG provides a venue wherein military and civilian agencies within the USG and multi-national partners can share ideas to improve lessons learned programs. PKSOI will present a demo on the SOLLIMS initiative during the JLLP WG. Full information available in WJTSC 09-1 Message 2.

Events and exercises continued on last page.
PKSOI supports the peace and stability operations research community by providing experts for exercises, experiments, conferences, doctrine development, and guidance to researchers; also, by means of direct research sponsorship, distribution of research products and lessons learned assessments. PKSOI’s strategic issues topic list frames a research and lessons learned program that addresses challenges identified through engagement with practitioners and scholars. The topic list intends to promote the development of peace and stability operations knowledge, education, training and doctrine, interagency assessment, and planning and operations. The 2009 Topic List is focused on themes identified in the October 2008 Army Field Manual 3-07 Stability Operations, emphasizing comprehensive and whole-of-government approaches to stability operations. …

PKSOI 2009 Research and Topic List

PKSOI is officially “rolling out” our Stability Operations Lessons Learned Information Management System (SOLLIMS). SOLLIMS is open to the entire Stability Operations community – military and civilian; the site is not restricted to CAC or other certificate review requirements. Current users include DoD, USG (non-DoD), NGOs, IOs, and multinational partners. The site provides the capability to capture, analyze and disseminate key Observations, Insights and Lessons (OIL) of interest to Peacekeeping and Stability Operations (P/SO) practitioners, policy makers and doctrine developers. The site is Password and I/D protected to control user access / membership by appropriate representatives of the P/SO community.

SOLLIMS contains several online tutorials to help you navigate within the site as well as providing better understanding on how to formulate “good” data entries. Users can create personal areas called “Binders” within which to consolidate specific items of interest. Users can also specify keywords to use to form their own “Daily Digest” – a tool that recognizes when new entries have been submitted based on their keywords and automatically notifies the user, via e-Mail, that new information is available.

Click on logo the above to go to the site and register for access. We look forward to your contributions to SOLLIMS and helping to create a robust, helpful Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Knowledge Base. We would also like your input on the configuration of the site and how we can make it better.

ANNOUNCEMENT OF CAC AS ARMY’S FORCEMOD PROPONENT FOR SO AND SFA

The Army Deputy Chief of Staff G-3/5/7 recently designated the Commander, United States Army Combined Arms Center (CAC), as the Army’s Force Modernization (FORCEMOD) Proponent to perform all doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) functions associated with both Stability Operations (SO) and Security Force Assistance (SFA) as required by Army Regulation 5-22. This appointment demonstrates the Army’s enduring commitment to maintaining a relevant and ready force for the 21st century across the full spectrum of operations in service to our Nation. [Go to complete Article]
**Challenges…**

International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations:

The International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations is currently comprised of 17 partner nations and seeks to promote and broaden the international dialogue between key stakeholders addressing peace operations issues and matters in a timely, effective and inclusive manner. The Challenges Forum formed as a result of Sweden’s Military College roundtable on peace operations in 1995. In 1997, Stockholm, Sweden, was the site for the first international seminar of a series known as the “Challenges of Peace Operations Project.” The U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) was one of the founding partners. [Go to complete Article]

**Austere Challenge**

Austere Challenge 09 (AC09) is a traditional annual Geographic Combatant Commander (GCC) confederated War-game. AC09 will train the European Command (EUCOM) staff and certify United States Army Europe (USAREUR) as a Joint Task Force (JTF) Headquarters in both Combat and Stability Operations.

A significant aspect of this exercise is that the first elements of the Civilian Response Corps – Active will participate. The exercise will train Active component new hires in advanced Whole of Government (WoG) planning and operations. Additionally, this is the first time that Stability and Support Operations will be exercised in such a complex and integrated manner during a live simulated war-game. The State Department’s Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (R&S) through the R&S Policy Coordination Committee has produced the Interagency Management System (IMS). This system allows for a Whole-of-Government approach to solving or preventing conflict around the world. AC09 will use the IMS to integrate and assess parts of that system particularly the Integrated Planning Cell (IPC) (team that deploys to the GCC to synch the WoG Strategic Plan with Operational orders) and the Advance Civilian Team (ACT) (team that deploys to R&S to support an Embassy or civilian capabilities if no Embassy exists – coordinates with the JTF). These teams will also continue to build a partnership with EUCOM, foster better civ-mil integration practices, and develop and exercise the ACT operational concept and planning framework. The exercise will focus on three Major Mission Elements. The first involves Humanitarian Assistance with PRM, USAID, and DoD oversight. The second will be Economic Reconstruction involving Commerce, Treasury, USAID and DoD. The third will focus on Security Sector Reform/ Rule of Law issues that will be considered by INL, DoJ, JCSFA, and DoD.

As the Obama Administration develops WoG initiatives to promote Global Stability and integrate Military and Civilian Efforts AC09 will take an important step towards accomplishing those objectives.

**PKSOI in Action!!!**

CNA-PKSOI Reconstruction Workshop Series: Implementing Security Sector Reform

Key Security Sector Reform (SSR) stakeholders met for a one-day workshop co-hosted by the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) and the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute in Alexandria, Virginia, on October 16, 2008. The participants represented the United States government and military, partner states, and interested academics. This workshop closely followed the early October publication of the U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) on stability operations, FM 3-07, and focused on SSR implementation by both U.S. government and our international partners. [Go to complete Article]
Peacekeeping in the Americas (PK Americas) Conference (2-6 Mar 09).
-- For the meeting with the Americas representative Peacekeeping Training Centers PKSOI present on the lessons that the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute has learned as an institute in trying to accomplish its mission and recommendation on how to improve the performance of like institutions. Additionally we will discuss lessons learned process and how to improve the value of collective lessons learned across the Americas community. The conference is being conducted in San Antonio, Texas.

Experiments / Exercises:

~~ Austere Challenge 09 –~~
Austere Challenge (AC09) will be used to certify United States Army Europe (USAEUR)/Seventh Army as a Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTF HQ) and for US European Command (EUCOM) to exercise its response procedures to future crises. The EUCOM Commander has directed AC09 to focus on concurrent combat and interagency stability operations. Upcoming milestones/spiral events include:
24 Jan-4 Feb: Scripting Conference
(Graffenwohr, Germany)
9-13 Mar: Final Planning Conference
22 April-7 May: Exercise

~~ Unified Quest –~~
Unified Quest 09 is an Army war game -- co-sponsored by the Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) and Special Operations Command (SOCOM) -- that looks at what the world might be like in five to 25 years and looks at how best to respond to crises that might become a reality. The US Army War College (USAWC) is hosting Unified Quest 09 which includes military leaders old and new from around the world as well as representatives from academia, industry and several different government agencies to discuss responses to global conflicts of the future. Upcoming milestones/spiral events include:
29 April-3 May: UQ09 STAFFEX / Carlisle Barracks, PA
4-8 May: UQ09 Future Game / Carlisle Barracks, PA

USAWC Events of Interest:

~~ National Security Seminar (NSS) –~~
The National Security Seminar (NSS) takes place at the US Army War College (USAWC), Carlisle Barracks, PA, the first full week of June, immediately preceding USAWC annual graduation, and serves as the capstone event of the academic year. This event provides a forum for distinguished speakers to discuss their views on issues of importance to the nation's security and welfare with USAWC students, International Fellows, and faculty of the Army War College as well as new members invited from across the country. The Seminar provides an extended opportunity for free and candid dialogue. Approximately 160 new members join student seminar groups during the NSS. They come from a cross-section of American life and represent as broad a range of occupations, geographic regions, and age groups – all with interests in how our nation forms its National Security plans and policies.

~~ Strategic Decision Making Exercise (SDME) –~~
The SDME is a political-military decision-making collective simulation exercise designed to provide USAWC students an opportunity to role-play strategic leaders and staffs as they integrate and apply knowledge acquired previously in the USAWC core curriculum. The SDME is a joint and multinational exercise that includes political and military play at the high operational and strategic levels, all set in the year 2021. It is intended to place USAWC students in a volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous virtual environment, aided by appropriate information technology tools and models, in which they apply Service and Joint doctrine within the framework of the interagency, military contingency planning and execution, military resourcing, and multinational coordination processes. The SDME 09 occurs from 4-11 March 2009 at the US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA.

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