Peacekeeping/Stabilization and Conflict Transitions: Background and Congressional Action on the Civilian Response/Reserve Corps and other Civilian Stabilization and Reconstruction Capabilities

Nina M. Serafino
Specialist in International Security Affairs

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Summary

The 111th Congress will face a number of issues regarding the development of civilian capabilities to carry out stabilization and reconstruction activities. In September 2008, Congress passed the Reconstruction and Stabilization Civilian Management Act, 2008, as Title XVI of the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 (S. 3001, P.L. 110-417, signed into law October 14, 2008). This legislation codified the existence and functions of the State Department Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) and authorized new operational capabilities within the State Department, a Civilian Response Corps of government employees with an active and a standby component, and a Civilian Reserve Corps.

S/CRS was established in 2004 to address longstanding concerns, both within Congress and the broader foreign policy community, over the perceived lack of the appropriate capabilities and processes to deal with transitions from conflict to stability. These capabilities and procedures include adequate planning mechanisms for stabilization and reconstruction operations, efficient interagency coordination structures and procedures in carrying out such tasks, and appropriate civilian personnel for many of the non-military tasks required. Effectively distributing resources among the various executive branch actors, maintaining clear lines of authority and jurisdiction, and balancing short- and long-term objectives are major challenges for designing, planning, and conducting post-conflict operations, as is fielding the appropriate civilian personnel.

Since July 2004, S/CRS has worked to establish the basic concepts, mechanisms, and capabilities necessary to carry out such operations. Working with a staff that has slowly grown from a few dozen to 112 individuals from the State Department, other executive branch agencies, and on contract as of January 30, 2009, S/CRS has taken steps to monitor and plan for potential conflicts, to develop a rapid-response crisis management “surge” capability, to improve interagency and international coordination, to develop interagency training exercises, and to help State Department regional bureaus develop concepts and proposals for preventive action.

In June 2008, Congress specifically provided $75 million for S/CRS and USAID S&R activities, including the establishment and implementation of the civilian response capabilities, in the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2008 (H.R. 4642, P.L. 110-252). This funding expires on September 30, 2009.

As of January 30, 2009, according to S/CRS officials, it is unclear how much funding S/CRS will receive in regular FY2009 appropriations.

Among the issues that the Congress will face regarding the development of civilian capabilities are the level of staffing and funding for S/CRS, and the means to develop, support, maintain, and deploy the civilian response and reserve corps.
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Introduction

For well over a decade, there has been widespread concern that the U.S. government lacks appropriate civilian “tools” to carry out state-building tasks in post-conflict situations. This concern grew from U.S. military operations in Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia, and elsewhere, where military forces were tasked with a variety of state-building tasks, such as creating justice systems, assisting police, and promoting governance. With the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, consensus increased that the United States must develop adequate civilian organizational structures, procedures, and personnel to respond effectively to post-conflict and other “stabilization and reconstruction” (S&R) situations.

The George W. Bush Administration launched several initiatives to do just that. The centerpiece of its efforts was the establishment of the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) in the Office of the Secretary of State. Created in mid-2004, S/CRS was tasked with designing, and in some cases establishing, the new structures within the State Department and elsewhere that would allow civilian agencies to develop effective policies, processes, and personnel to build stable and democratic states. Among other tasks, S/CRS developed plans for the creation of a civilian “surge” capability that could respond rapidly to S&R emergencies.

The Obama Administration has not made explicit its plans to support the development of civilian capabilities that could respond to S&R crises, but members of the Obama Administration have signaled their support for civilian S&R capabilities. In her January 2009 confirmation hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Secretary of State Hillary R. Clinton mentioned the State Department’s new S&R responsibilities, citing a Department need to demonstrate competence and secure funding to carry them out. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, while serving in that position under former President George Bush, urged the development of civilian capabilities in major speeches. As Senator, Vice President Joseph Biden was the co-sponsor, with Senator Lugar, of legislation, first introduced in 2004, to create an office within the State Department that would coordinate U.S. government S&R operations and deploy civilian government employees and private citizens to carry out state-building activities in crises abroad.

In its second session, the 110th Congress enacted legislation that “operationalizes” the Department of State and other federal agencies for S&R efforts by authorizing the creation of federal civilian “response” units, as well as the creation of a volunteer S&R civilian reserve force, akin to the military reserve force. This legislation advances the work of previous Congresses regarding Bush Administration initiatives to improve the conduct of (S&R) efforts. With the passage in September 2008 of Title XVI of the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 (S. 3001/P.L. 110-417 ), signed into law October 14, 2008, Congress took two important steps:

- It established S/CRS as part of permanent law.

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• It formally “operationalized” certain units in civilian federal agencies, most particularly the State Department, transforming it from an institution devoted to diplomacy to one that also would effect change through “on-the-ground” personnel and programs dedicated to promoting security and stability in transitions from conflict and post-conflict situations. This was accomplished by authorizing the creation of a two component “readiness response” corps consisting of a small active unit of federal employees drawn from several agencies and a federal standby unit, and a large civilian reserve corps, analogous to the military reserve.

The 111th Congress is faced with several remaining tasks. One is whether to create a mechanism, such as envisioned in early legislation, to create a flexible, no-year, discretionary Conflict Response Fund to be drawn upon by civilian agencies for S&R efforts. The other is the appropriate level of staffing and funding S/CRS, and the means to develop, maintain, support and deploy the Civilian Response Corps and Civilian Reserve Corps, as well as for S/CRS.

This report provides background on these issues. It also discusses proposals and tracks related legislative action. It will be updated as warranted.

Background

President Bush’s pledge, articulated in his February 2, 2005, State of the Union address, “to build and preserve a community of free and independent nations, with governments that answer to their citizens, and reflect their own cultures” cast the once-discredited concept of building or rebuilding government institutions, economies, and civic cultures in a new light. During the 1990s, many policymakers considered the establishment of new institutions in troubled countries to be an overly expensive, if not futile exercise. The use of U.S. military forces for such activities, particularly in the first half of the decade, was troubling to many Members. In the past few years, however, the Bush Administration, in response to concerns about the threats posed by weak and fragile states, refocused both U.S. security and international development policy and initiated dramatic corresponding changes in U.S. governmental structures and practices. These changes, the Bush Administration argued, would enable the United States to perform such tasks more efficiently and at a lesser cost, particularly in transitions from conflict and in post-conflict situations.

A key component of these changes was the establishment and reinforcement of new civilian structures and forces, in particular S/CRS and the civilian response/reserve corps. The Bush Administration made these new civilian entities a prominent feature in two initiatives: the National Security Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD-44) of December 2005 on the management of interagency reconstruction and stabilization operations and the “transformational diplomacy” reorganization of State Department personnel and practices announced in January 2006.

These initiatives were intended to enhance the United States’ ability to function effectively on the world scene in the environment, created by the terrorist attacks on the United States of September 11, 2001 (9/11). In that environment, many analysts perceive that the greatest threats to U.S. security often will emerge within states that are either too weak to police their territory or lack the political will or capacity to do so. To deal with that environment, in 2006 Secretary of State Condeleezzza Rice outlined a new U.S. foreign policy strategy focusing on the “intersections of diplomacy, democracy promotion, economic reconstruction and military security” and involving
extensive changes in government to carry that strategy out.\textsuperscript{2} State-building (or nation-building as it is often called) was at the center of this strategy. Both initiatives reinforced the important role that the Bush Administration gave S/CRS in policymaking and implementation dealing with conflict transitions and weak and fragile states.

**Evolving Perceptions of Post-Conflict Needs\textsuperscript{3}**

The creation of S/CRS in July 2004 responded to increasing calls for the improvement of U.S. civilian capabilities to plan and carry out post-conflict state-building operations. Several factors combined after 9/11 to lead many analysts to conclude that such operations are vital to U.S. security and that the United States must reorganize itself to conduct them effectively, in particular by creating new and improving existing civilian institutions to carry them out. Foremost among these factors, for many analysts, was the widespread perception since 9/11 that global instability directly threatens U.S. security and that it is a vital U.S. interest to transform weak and failing states into stable, democratic ones. Related to this was the expectation that responding to the threat of instability will require the United States and the international community to intervene periodically in foreign conflicts with “peacekeeping\textsuperscript{4}” and “stabilization” forces at about the same intensive pace as it had done since the early 1990s. Because that pace stressed the U.S. military, many policymakers believed that the United States must create and enhance civilian capabilities to carry out the peacebuilding tasks that are widely viewed as necessary for stability and reconstruction in fragile, conflict-prone, and post-conflict states. Finally, numerous analyses distilling the past decade and a half of experience with multifaceted peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations raised hopes that rapid, comprehensive, and improved peacebuilding efforts could significantly raise the possibilities of achieving sustainable peace.

Post-conflict operations are complex undertakings, usually involving the participation of several United Nations departments and U.N. system agencies, the international financial institutions and a plethora of non-governmental humanitarian and development organizations, as well as the military and other departments or ministries of the United States and other nations.\textsuperscript{5} The United

\textsuperscript{2} Taken from a speech delivered by then-Secretary of State Condeleeza Rice. Remarks at Georgetown School of Foreign Service, January 18, 2006. Available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/59306.htm. This theme was reiterated by Stephen Krasner, director of Policy Planning at the State Department. Remarks at the Center for Global Development, January 20, 2006. Available at http://www.cgdev.org/doc/event%20docs/Krasner%20Transcript.pdf.

\textsuperscript{3} Parts of this Background section and the following section on S/CRS are drawn from a now archived CRS Report RS22031, Peacekeeping and Post-Conflict Capabilities: The State Department’s Office for Reconstruction and Stabilization, by Nina M. Serafino and Martin A. Weiss.

\textsuperscript{4} “Peacekeeping” is a broad, generic, and often imprecise term to describe the many activities that the United Nations and other international organizations, and sometimes ad hoc coalitions of nations or individual nations, undertake to promote, maintain, enforce, or enhance the possibilities for peace. These activities range from providing election observers, recreating police or civil defense forces for the new governments of those countries, organizing and providing security for humanitarian relief efforts, and monitoring and enforcing cease-fires and other arrangements designed to separate parties recently in conflict. (Many of these activities are often also referred to as “nation-building”; a better term, some analysts suggest, is “state-building.”) As used here, the term encompasses both “peace enforcement” operations, sent to enforce an international mandate to establish peace, and “peacebuilding” activities. Peacebuilding activities, usually undertaken in a post-conflict environment, are designed to strengthen peace and prevent the resumption or spread of conflict, including disarmament and demobilization of warring parties, repatriation of refugees, reform and strengthening of government institutions, election-monitoring, and promotion of political participation and human rights.

\textsuperscript{5} The term “post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction” is broad but is usually understood to encompass tasks and missions to promote security and encourage stable, democratic governance and economic growth following major hostilities. In the past, many of the “stabilization” activities were loosely labeled “peacekeeping.” Reconstruction (continued...)
States developed its contributions to the earliest international “peacekeeping” operations of the 1990s on an ad hoc basis, with little interagency planning and coordination, and often with the U.S. military in the lead. The military was called upon to perform such missions not only for its extensive resources but also because no other U.S. government agency could match the military’s superior planning and organizational capabilities. In addition, because of its manpower, the military carried out most of the U.S. humanitarian and nation-building contribution, even though some believed that civilians might be better suited to carry out such tasks, especially those tasks involving cooperation with humanitarian NGOs.

During the 1990s, many analysts began to perceive the need to improve and increase civilian contributions to peacekeeping operations, especially for those activities related to planning and conducting operations and to establishing a secure environment. An important Clinton Administration initiative was the May 1997 Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 56, entitled The Clinton Administration’s Policy on Managing Complex Contingency Operations. According to the white paper explaining it, PDD 56 sought to address interagency planning and coordination problems through new planning and implementing mechanisms. Due to what some analysts describe as internal bureaucratic resistance, PDD 56's provisions were never formally implemented, although some of its practices were informally adopted. (In December 2005, President Bush issued National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 44, which replaced PDD-56. For more information, see below.) The Clinton Administration also attempted to remedy the shortage of one critical nation-building tool, international civilian police forces, through PDD 71, which a white paper describes as outlining policy guidelines for strengthening criminal justice systems in support of peace operations. While never implemented by the Clinton Administration, PDD 71 has been partially put into force by the Bush Administration.

Improvements in the provision of social and economic assistance were also viewed as crucial to successful outcomes. Post-conflict populations need “safety net” and poverty alleviation programs, as well as technical assistance and advice on monetary and fiscal policy and debt management in order to create an environment conducive to democratization and economic growth. While the popular image of U.S. post-conflict assistance is the post-World War II Marshall Plan, through which the United States provided the foreign assistance needed for Europe’s post-conflict reconstruction, the United States is no longer the sole, and often not the dominant, donor in post-conflict situations. Multilateral institutions became increasingly

(...continued)

involves repairing (in some cases creating) the infrastructure necessary to support long-term economic growth and development. This infrastructure can be physical (e.g., roads and schools), or institutional (e.g., legal and tax systems) For additional background on various aspects of post-conflict reconstruction and assistance, see CRS Report RL33557, Peacekeeping and Related Stability Operations: Issues of U.S. Military Involvement, by Nina M. Serafino; and CRS Report RL33700, United Nations Peacekeeping: Issues for Congress, by Marjorie Ann Browne.


important during the 1990s, when small, regional conflicts proliferated following the collapse of the Soviet Union.

International organizations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund now play crucial roles, working with the U.S. government to provide economic assistance and technical advice on rebuilding post-conflict economies. (Nevertheless, although the United States has provided some funding for economic reconstruction multilaterally for the recent Afghanistan and Iraq operations, most U.S. funding for post-conflict operations is provided bilaterally.) Many analysts now judge that multilateral assistance is more effective for the recipient country than bilateral aid for two reasons. First, disbursing funds multilaterally through U.N. agencies or international organizations gives greater assurance that it will reach recipients than providing aid bilaterally with direct payments to individual governments or non-governmental organizations (NGOs). In addition, analysts find that bilateral aid is more likely to be apportioned according to the donor’s foreign policy priorities rather than the economic needs of the recipient country.

For many analysts and policymakers, the ongoing Iraq operation has illustrated a U.S. government need for new planning and coordination arrangements that would provide a leadership role for civilians in post-conflict phases of military operations and new civilian capabilities to augment and relieve the military as soon as possible, and greater international coordination. The perception of a continued need for such operations, and the perceived inefficiencies of the still largely ad hoc U.S. responses have reinvigorated calls for planning and coordination reform. The extreme stresses placed on the U.S. military by combat roles in Iraq and Afghanistan have pushed those calls in a new direction, to the development of adequate civilian capabilities to perform those tasks.

**Calls for Change**

The perception that international terrorism can exploit weak, unstable states convinced many policymakers and analysts of the need to strengthen U.S. and international capabilities to foster security, good governance and economic development, especially in post-conflict situations. The 9/11 Commission and the Commission on Weak States and U.S. National Security found that weak states, as well as unsuccessful post-conflict transitions, pose a threat to U.S. security. These groups argued that such states often experience economic strife and political instability that make them vulnerable to drug trafficking, human trafficking and other criminal enterprises, and to linkage with non-state terrorist groups (such as the links between the previous Taliban government in Afghanistan and the Al Qaeda terrorist network). Weak states also are unprepared to handle major public health issues, such as HIV/AIDS, that can generate political and economic instability. These commissions, and other analysts, argued for assistance to the governments of

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weak states and of post-conflict transitions regimes to help them control their territories, meet their citizens’ basic needs, and create legitimate governments based on effective, transparent institutions.

These and other studies recognized a need to enhance U.S. government structures and capabilities for conducting post-conflict operations. Although differing in several respects, the studies largely agreed on five points: (1) the ad hoc system needs to be replaced with a permanent mechanism for developing contingency plans and procedures for joint civil-military operations led by civilians; (2) mechanisms to rapidly deploy U.S. civilian government and government-contracted personnel need to be put in place; (3) preventive action needs to be considered; (4) the U.S. government needs to enhance multinational capabilities to carry out post-conflict security tasks and to better coordinate international aid; and (5) flexible funding arrangements are needed to deal with such situations. In addition, some urged substantial amounts of funding for flexible U.S. and international accounts.

Proposals for New Civilian Forces

A prominent feature of several of the reports on stabilization and reconstruction operations was a recommendation to develop rapidly-deployable civilian forces to undertake state-building functions, particularly those related to rule of law, even before hostilities had ceased. Many analysts view the early deployment of rule of law personnel as essential to providing security from the outset of an operation, which they argue will enhance the possibilities for long-term stability and democracy in an intervened or post-conflict country. Many view the development of civilian groups to do so as permitting the earlier withdrawal of military personnel than would otherwise be possible.

The concept of a cohesive, rapidly deployable unit of civilian experts for stabilization and reconstruction operations dates back at least to the Clinton Administration. In PDD-71, which dealt with strengthening criminal justice systems in peace operations, the Clinton Administration identified such an initiative as a high priority, according to the PDD-71 White Paper. Six studies


15 The July 2005 Council on Foreign Relations report recommends the establishment of a conflict response fund of $500 million, a five-fold increase over the amount requested by the Bush Administration for FY2006. In addition, the report recommends establishing a new $1 billion standing multilateral reconstruction trust fund under the auspices of the Group of Eight industrialized nations. This trust fund would be modeled on existing post-conflict trust funds located at the United Nations and the World Bank.

16 That white paper states that PDD 71 instructed that “programs must be developed that enable the U.S. to respond quickly to help establish rudimentary judicial and penal capacity during peace operations and complex contingencies.” PDD-71 White Paper, op.cit., p. 6.
between 2003 and 2005 endorsed the creation of cohesive, rapidly deployable units of civilian experts for stabilization and reconstruction operations.

- The November 2003 report of the National Defense University (NDU) recommended the concurrent deployment of civilian “stabilization and reconstruction” personnel with combat forces, in order to expedite the transfer of nation-building responsibilities to civilians. The report recommended the creation of a standing interagency stabilization and reconstruction team within the government, and the development of an “on-call” civilian crisis management corps of medical, legal, language, and law enforcement personnel from state and local governments and the private sector.17

- The March 2004 report of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) recommended the establishment of an Agency for Stability Operations reporting directly to the Secretary of State. The agency would be responsible for preparing for such operations, as well as the management and deployment of Civilian Stability Operations Corps of 200-300 U.S. government civilians, who are organized, trained and equipped for conducting such operations, and of a Civilian Stability Operations Reserve of an unspecified number of non-government civilians with related expertise who would be on-call for rapid deployment.18

- The April 2004 report of the U.S. Institute of Peace on the rule of law component of building civilian capacity recommended the creation of a reserve corps as well as of a separate office in the Office of the Secretary of State that would have authority to recruit, deploy, and manage constabulary police units, judges, attorneys, and other legal professionals.19

- A U.S. Institute of Peace analyst recommended the creation of a “U.S. Stability Force” comprised of (1) robust military forces, (2) civilian constabulary units, (3) civilian police, and (4) rule of law professionals (lawyers, judges, and corrections experts) that would deploy concurrently in order to provide the needed security from the outset.20

- The Defense Science Board 2004 Summer Study on transitions from hostilities recommended that the Department of State “develop and maintain a portfolio of detailed and adaptable plans and capabilities for the civilian roles in reconstruction operations” and that it “prepare, deploy, and lead the civil components of the reconstruction missions.... ” The study finds that the civilian police, judges, civil administrators, and technical advisors are needed to help build new institutions after a military intervention.21

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17 Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations, op.cit.
21 Transition to and From Hostilities, op.cit., p 58.
The establishment and deployment of such a corps, now in its initial stages (see below), would mark a substantial change from current practices. The United States deploys Civilian Police (contracted separately for each operation) to international peacekeeping and stabilization operations through the State Department’s CivPol program, run by the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL). The United States currently deploys other rule of law personnel, with experience in justice and corrections systems, through Department of Justice contracts, funded by INL. (The State Department’s civilian police program requests contractors to identify such personnel in an effort to create a capability within the CivPol to deploy them.)

To many analysts, even these recommendations do not provide for the full range of personnel needed in a timely manner. According to some experts, if the role of the military is to shift at the end of major combat operations from combat to providing perimeter security, then the United States must create constabulary units—either military or civilian—which would take responsibility for internal security. Some also argue the need for improvements in the U.S. Civilian Police system, regardless of whether a civilian reserve is established.22

Critics Respond

Some analysts have questioned the utility of S/CRS and of the rationale that underlines its creation and the adoption of the transformational diplomacy strategy more broadly. Two think-tank studies published in January 2006 dispute the concept that weak and failed states are per se among the most significant threats to the United States. They point out that weak states are not the only locations where terrorists have found recruits or sought safe-haven as they have exploited discontent and operated in developed countries as well. A report of the Center for Global Development states that many factors beyond the weakness or lack of government institutions—demographic, political, religious, cultural, and geographic—contribute to the development of terrorism.23 As a result, an emphasis on weak and failed states can lead the United States to give short shrift to more tangible threats and to areas of greater U.S. interest. The CATO Institute study worries that former Secretary Rice’s focus on promoting “responsible sovereignty” as an underpinning of transformational diplomacy may provide potential justification for eroding the current international norm of respect for national sovereignty, leading the United States into fruitless interventions.24

In addition, some analysts are skeptical that the problems of weak and failed states can be most dealt with through military and political interventions aimed at creating viable government institutions. The effectiveness of past efforts is a subject of debate, with differing views on the

22 For more discussion on issues regarding CivPols, constabulary police, and rule of law personnel, see CRS Report RL32321, Policing in Peacekeeping and Related Stability Operations: Problems and Proposed Solutions, by Nina M. Serafino.


24 Justin Logan and Christopher Preble. Failed States and Flawed Logic: The Case against a Standing Nation-Building Office. CATO Policy Analysis Paper No. 560, Cato Institute, January 11, 2006. The authors make substantial reference to a Fall 2004 paper by Stephen Krasner, State Department Director of Policy Planning, that challenged the conventional sovereignty norms. Krasner argues that these norms are outmoded and an obstacle to dealing with the international threats caused by weak and unstable states. He argues for granting international acceptance to new norms of shared-sovereignty (more than one country) or international trusteeships following successful interventions, Stephen Krasner, “Sharing Sovereignty,” International Security, Vol. 28, No. 4, Spring 2004, pp. 5-43.
criteria for and the number of successes, draws, and failures, as is the best means to achieve success.

There is some skepticism that state-building efforts will result in success in most instances. In the words of one scholar, “barring exceptional circumstances (the war against the Taliban after 9/11), we had best steer clear of missions that deploy forces (of whatever kind) into countries to remake them anew.... The success stories (Germany, Japan) are the exceptions and were possible because of several helpful conditions that will not be replicated elsewhere.”

Others, however, point to cases such as Mozambique and El Salvador as examples that state building efforts can promote peace after civil strife.

Creating Civilian Reconstruction and Stabilization Capabilities: Congressional and Executive Actions, 2004-2007

The “Lugar-Biden” Legislation

On February 25, 2004, Senators Lugar and Biden introduced the Stabilization and Reconstruction Civilian Management Act of 2004 “to build operational readiness in civilian agencies....” (At the time, these senators were respectively the Chairman and Ranking Member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee [SFRC].) The bill provided concrete proposals for establishing and funding the two new “operational” entities that had been recommended in think tank reports. This legislation contained three main proposals: (1) establish in law and fund a State Department Office for Stabilization and Reconstruction, (2) create an Emergency Response Readiness Force, and (3) create and fund an annually replenishable emergency response fund similar to that used for refugee and migration funds. The SFRC reported S. 2127 on March 18, 2004, but it was not considered by the full Senate; its companion bill (H.R. 3996, 108th Congress, introduced by Representative Schiff) was not considered by the House International Relations Committee. In subsequent years, similar legislation was introduced, but until 2008 the only bill to pass either

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25 Rajan Menon, “Low Intensity Conflict in the Emerging Strategic Environment.” as reproduced in U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute. Strategic Requirements for Stability Operations and Reconstruction: Final Report. pp. 80-81. This report summarizes the result of a conference held April 19-20, 2006, and three preceding workshops, conducted under the aegis of the Dwight D. Eisenhower National Security Series. It also reproduces several papers presented at one workshop. The final report was distributed by e-mail in late 2006, but as of January 18, 2007, does not appear on either the PKSOI or Eisenhower Series website.

26 The emergency response fund would have been subject to limited conditions, but requiring extensive consultation with Congress, similar to spending authority provisions of Section 614 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended. FAA Section 614(a)(3) requires the President to consult with and provide a written policy justification to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs (now International Relations), the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Appropriations committee of each chamber. CBO estimated that implementing the bill would cost some $50 million in 2005 and $550 million from 2005 through 2009.

27 These include two similar versions of the original Lugar-Biden bill with same name: the Stabilization and Reconstruction Civilian Management Act of 2005 (S. 209/109th Congress, by Senators Lugar, Biden, and Hagel), and of 2006 (S. 3322/109th Congress by Senators Lugar, Biden, Hagel, Alexander and Warner, and H.R. 6104/109th Congress by Representatives Farr, Blumenauer and Saxton). Similar provisions were included in Title VII of the Senate version of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY2006 and FY2007 (S. 600/109th Congress). A related bill was the International Security Enhancement Act of 2005 (H.R. 1361/109th Congress, introduced by Representative Dreier), which also would provide authority for preventive action not included in the other bills. (H.R. 1361 would have allowed the president, acting through S/CRS, to authorize the deployment to a country likely to enter into conflict or civil strife in addition to countries emerging from conflict.) Related bills were: The Winning the Peace Act of 2003 (H.R. 2616/108th Congress, introduced by Representative Farr); the International Security Enhancement Act of 2004 (continued...)
chamber was a subsequent Lugar-Biden measure, the Reconstruction and Stabilization Civilian Management Act of 2006 (S. 3322/109th Congress). S. 3322 was introduced in the Senate May 26, 2006, and approved without amendment by unanimous consent the same day. It was received by the House on June 6, 2006, and referred to the House International Relations Committee. No further action occurred until the 110th Congress until the House passage of on March 5, 2008, of a House bill with almost the same title, the Reconstruction and Stabilization Civilian Management Act of 2008 (H.R. 1084), and the incorporation of a version of that bill into the conference version of the FY2009 NDAA, (S. 3001, P.L. 110-417, see below.)

S/CRS Start-Up and Early Congressional Mandate

S/CRS began operations in July 2004 on a somewhat more tentative status than that envisioned by the Lugar-Biden bill. The office was created by then Secretary of State Colin Powell without statutory authority and the Coordinator, appointed by the Secretary, was not given the rank of “Ambassador-at-Large.” By the beginning of 2005, S/CRS had a staff of 37 individuals from the State Department, USAID, and several other U.S. government agencies, including the Departments of Defense, Commerce, and the Treasury.

The U.S. military supported S/CRS’ creation and its mission. In prepared statement for testimony before the Armed Services committees in February 2005, General Richard B. Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, cited the creation of S/CRS as “an important step” in helping “post-conflict nations achieve peace, democracy, and a sustainable market economy.” “In the future, provided this office is given appropriate resources, it will synchronize military and civilian efforts and ensure an integrated national approach is applied to post-combat peacekeeping, reconstruction and stability operations,” according to General Myers.

S/CRS also received an endorsement from a task force headed by two former Members. The June 2005 report of the Congressionally-mandated Task Force on the United Nations, chaired by former Speaker of the House of Representatives Newt Gingrich and former Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell, recommended that the United States strengthen S/CRS and that Congress provide it with the necessary resources to coordinate with the United Nations.

2004 Congressional Mandate

Congress first endorsed the creation of S/CRS in 2004 as part of the Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2005 (H.R. 4818, P.L. 108-447), signed into law December 8, 2004. Section 408, Division D, defined six responsibilities for the office, the first five of which respond to the first need—to create a readily deployable crisis response mechanism—stated above. As legislated by P.L. 108-447, S/CRS’ functions are (1) to catalogue and monitor the non-military resources and capabilities of executive branch agencies, state and local governments, and private and non-profit

(...continued)


28 Posture Statement of General Richard B. Myers, USAF, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, before the 109th Congress. Senate Armed Services Committee, February 17, 2005, p. 31, as posted on the Senate Armed Services Committee website.

organizations “that are available to address crises in countries or regions that are in, or are in transition from, conflict or civil strife”; (2) to determine the appropriate non-military U.S. response to those crises, “including but not limited to demobilization, policy, human rights monitoring, and public information efforts”; (3) to plan that response; (4) to coordinate the development of interagency contingency plans for that response; (5) to coordinate the training of civilian personnel to perform stabilization and reconstruction activities in response to crises in such countries or regions”; and (6) to monitor political and economic instability worldwide to anticipate the need for U.S. and international assistance. In subsequent legislation (S. 3001, P.L. 110-417, the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009), Congress expanded this list of functions. (See below.)

Congress funds S/CRS under the State Department’s Diplomatic and Consular Affairs budget. S/CRS has received funding through annual appropriations and supplemental appropriations.

S/CRS Role in Interagency Coordination

The S/CRS role in interagency coordination was formalized under NSPD-44, issued by former President Bush on December 7, 2005, to improve conflict-response coordination among executive branch agencies. NSPD-44 assigns the Secretary of State the lead responsibility for developing the civilian response for conflict situations and related S&R activities; the Secretary may direct the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization to assist with those tasks. Under NSPD-44, the Secretary of State is also responsible for, and may delegate to the Coordinator, coordination of the interagency processes to identify states at risk, the leadership of interagency planning to prevent or mitigate conflict, and the development of detailed contingency plans for stabilization and reconstruction operations, as well as for identifying appropriate issues for resolution or action through the National Security Council (NSC) interagency process as outlined in President Bush’s first National Security Policy Directive (NSPD-1, “Organization of the National Security Council System,” signed February 1, 200130). NSPD-44, entitled “Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization,” expanded S/CRS activities beyond those conferred by the Congressional mandate (see above). (NSPD-44 supersedes PDD-56, referred to above.)

S/CRS developed the mechanism for interagency cooperation in actual operations, drafting the January 22, 2007, Interagency Management System (IMS) for Reconstruction and Stabilization, which was approved by a National Security Council (NSC) deputies meeting. This document lays out a plan for interagency coordination in responding to highly complex reconstruction and stabilization crises. Under the IMS, the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization is one of three co-chairs of the central coordinating body for the U.S. government response to a crisis. (The others are the appropriate regional Assistant Secretary of State and the relevant NSC Director.) Under the plan, S/CRS is charged with providing support to a civilian planning cell integrated with relevant military entities (a geographic combatant command or an equivalent multinational headquarters).

30 NSPD-1 established 17 NSC/PCCs to “be the main day-to-day fora for interagency coordination of national security policy,” providing policy analysis for more senior committees (the NSC Principals Committee and the NSC Deputies Committee) and ensuring timely responses to presidential decisions. Membership on the NSC/PCC is to consist of representatives from the departments of State, Defense, Justice and the Treasury, and the Office of Management and Budget, the offices of the President and Vice President, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the NSC. Representatives from the Departments of Agriculture and Commerce, and the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, are to participate when issues pertain to their responsibilities.
Codifying Civilian Reconstruction and Stabilization Assistance and State Department Capabilities: Title XVI, P.L. 110-417, October 14, 2008

The effort to expand civilian capabilities to perform stabilization and reconstruction tasks reached an important benchmark in October 2008. Through Title XVI of the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 (P.L. 110-417), Congress amended the basic foreign assistance and State Department statutes to (1) authorize the President to provide assistance for a reconstruction and stabilization crisis, (2) formally establish S/CRS and assign it specific functions, and (3) authorize a Response Readiness Corps (RRC) and a Civilian Reserve Corps (CRC). The authority to provide assistance for a reconstruction and stabilization crisis was created by amending chapter 1 of part III of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (FAA, 22 U.S.C. 2351 et. seq.) by inserting a new section. This authority is, however, subject to a time limitation: it may be exercised only during FY2009-FY2011. The new authority for S/CRS, the RRC and the CRC was created by amending Title I of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C..2651a et. seq.). These authorities are permanent.

Authorizes Assistance for Reconstruction and Stabilization Crises

Under the heading Authority to Provide Assistance for Reconstruction and Stabilization Crises, Section 1604 of P.L. 110-417 adds a new section to the FAA. Section 681 provides authority for the President to use U.S. civilian agencies or non-Federal employees to furnish assistance for reconstruction and stabilization in order to prevent conflict and to secure peace. The specific authority permits the President to “to assist in reconstructing and stabilizing a country or region that is at risk of, in, or is in transition from, conflict or civil strife... ” As passed in P.L. 110-417, this authority may be exercised for three fiscal years (FY2009-FY2011).

To provide such assistance, the President must determine that U.S. national security interests are served by using such personnel. The President may use funds made available under any other provision of the FAA that are transferred or reprogrammed for the purposes of this section, subject to the 15-day prior notification to congress required by section 634A, FAA. The President must also consult with and provide a written policy justification to Congress’ foreign affairs and appropriations committees (under Section 614(a)(3), FAA) prior to its use. The assistance may be provided notwithstanding any other provision of law, and on such terms and conditions as the President may determine. The section does not provided authority “to transfer funds between accounts or between Federal departments or agencies.”

Makes S/CRS a Permanent State Department Office and Assigns Specific Functions

A major objective of proponents of improving the civilian capacity to perform stabilization and reconstruction operations was to provide S/CRS with a permanent authorization and specified functions mandated by law. Such an authorization was a key feature of the initial and subsequent versions of the Lugar-Biden legislation. P.L. 110-417, Section 1605, codifies the existence of S/CRS by amending Title 1 of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2651 et seq.), which, among other functions, provides for the establishment of the higher level positions within the Department of State. This codification prevents the dismantling of the office without the legislative consent of Congress. It also assigns nine specific functions to S/CRS,
largely mirroring the functions assigned by Congress in its original legislation on S/CRS, as cited above. In general, these functions convey on the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization an overall responsibility for monitoring and assessing political and economic instability, and planning an appropriate U.S. response. Some of these functions are to be undertaken in coordination or conjunction with USAID and other relevant executive branch agencies.31

**Authorizes a Civilian Readiness Response Corps and a Civilian Reserve Corps**

Civilian personnel available through the U.S. government to perform S&R activities are scarce, decentralized in organization, and difficult to call up. Many analysts viewed the remedy to this situation as the creation of a corps of “on-the-ground” civilian personnel which could develop and implement state-building activities and interact with U.S. military personnel at all levels in order to foster security and stability in troubled situations. From the beginning, Luger\Biden legislation sought to authorize the establishment of such a corps. The Bush Administration began creating a small response cadre of government employees in its FY2006 and FY2007 budget submissions, and proposed a full-scale corps in its February 2008 Civilian Stabilization Initiative.32

P.L. 110-417 establishes the Response Readiness Corps and the Civilian Reserve Corps “to provide assistance in support of stabilization and reconstruction activities in foreign countries or regions that are at risk of, in, or are in transition from, conflict or civil strife.”

This civilian capability consists of two components:

- The Response Readiness Corps (RRC) of federal employees composed of active and standby components consisting of U.S. government personnel, including employees of the Department of State, USAID, and other agencies who are

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31 The specific functions, as detailed in xxxxxx, are: (1) “Monitoring, in coordination with relevant bureaus within the Department of State and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), political and economic instability worldwide to anticipate the need for mobilizing United States and international assistance for the stabilization and reconstruction of a country or region that is at risk of, in, or ... in transition from, conflict or civil strife”; (2) “Assessing the various types of stabilization and reconstruction crises that could occur and cataloging and monitoring the non-military resources and capabilities of agencies ... that are available to address such crises”; (3) “Planning, in conjunction with USAID, to address requirements, such as demobilization, rebuilding of civil society, policing, human rights monitoring, and public information, that commonly arise in stabilization and reconstruction crises”; (4) “Coordinating with relevant agencies to develop interagency contingency plans to mobilize and deploy civilian personnel to address the various types of such crises”; (5) “Entering into appropriate arrangements with agencies to carry out activities under this section and the Reconstruction and Stabilization Civilian Management Act of 2008”; (6) “Identifying personnel in State and local governments and in the private sector who are available to participate in the Civilian Reserve Corps ... or to otherwise participate in or contribute to reconstruction and stabilization activities”; (7) “Taking steps to ensure that training of civilian personnel to perform such reconstruction and stabilization activities is adequate and, is carried out, as appropriate, with other agencies involved with stabilization operations”; (8) “Taking steps to ensure that plans for United States reconstruction and stabilization operations are coordinated with and complementary to reconstruction and stabilization activities of other governments and international and nongovernmental organizations, to improve effectiveness and avoid duplication”; and (9) “Maintaining the capacity to field on short notice an evaluation team to undertake on-site needs assessment.”

32 In its FY2006 and FY2007 budget requests, the Bush Administration’s budget proposed funding for S/CRS to establish a 100-person ready-response cadre of government employees. Congress has not yet provided funds for establishing such a cadre or a civilian reserve corps: although in 2007, Congress approved $50 million in supplemental funds (available through FY2008) to establish and maintain a civilian reserve corps, the release of these funds was made contingent on a subsequent authorization of the corps. (Section 3810, [U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans’ Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act, 2007, H.R. 2206, P.L. 110-28, signed into law May 25, 2007.]}
recruited and trained to provide reconstruction and stabilization assistance when deployed to do so by the Secretary of State. No specific number is provided for members of these components. The legislation notes that members of the active component would be specifically employed to serve in the Corps. The Secretary of State is authorized to establish and maintain the SRC, in consultation with the Administrator of USAID and the heads of other appropriate U.S. government agencies. The Secretary of State alone is authorized to deploy its members.

- The Civilian Reserve Corps (CRC) of individuals with “the skills necessary for carrying out reconstruction and stabilization activities, and who have volunteered for that purpose.” The Secretary is authorized to establish the Corps in consultation with the Administrator of USAID, and is authorized to employ and train its members, as well as to deploy them subject to a presidential determination under the proposed Section 618 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended. No size was specified for the Civilian Reserve Corp. For the Corps to deploy, the President must issue a determination that U.S. national security interests would be served by providing assistance for a reconstruction and stabilization crisis (see above).

Development of the S/CRS Office, Responsibilities, and Capabilities

Since 2004, S/CRS has worked to develop the knowledge, capacity, procedures to ably respond to the needs of countries at risk of conflict, in transitions from conflict, and in the early stages of recovery from conflict. S/CRS has grown from a few dozen to a staff of 112, as of January 30, 2009. Of that current staff, a little over half are State Department personnel: 36 Foreign Service officers on one-year tours, 22 State Department permanent civil service employees, and an additional three State Department personnel on detail. Another nine are on detail from other executive branch agencies: Commerce (1); Justice (1); Office of the Director of National Intelligence (1); USAID (2); and DOD (4). (Of the four from DOD, one is from the Joint Staff, one from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, one from the Army Corps of Engineers, and one from the Air Force.) In addition, 36 contractors work for S/CRS, as do six fellows and interns. S/CRS carries out a range of activities: monitoring potential conflict, planning for U.S. responses to conflict, and evaluating and initiating programs to prevent conflict or the spread of conflict, among others.

Monitoring and Planning for Potential Conflicts

To monitor potential crises, S/CRS asked the National Intelligence Council (NIC) to provide it twice a year with a list of weak states most susceptible to crisis, from which S/CRS chooses one or more as test cases to prepare contingency plans for possible interventions. S/CRS also has worked with the USAID Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation, which develops techniques for preparing highly detailed assessments of current and impending conflicts. In addition, S/CRS has worked with the U.S. military’s Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) to develop a common civilian-military planning model for stabilization and reconstruction operations. S/CRS also assists U.S. embassies abroad in assessing the potential for conflict in individual countries.
Developing and Carrying Out Conflict Response Activities

S/CRS takes a lead in planning, developing, and implementing most of the small conflict response programs that are carried out with funds and other assistance provided under DOD’s “Section 1207” authority. Since FY2006, “Section 1207” authority has been used to carry out conflict prevention and response efforts in 11 individual countries and two regions. These targeted programs to address specific problems range from $4 million to help provide basic health, education and infrastructure in areas recently reclaimed from insurgents in Colombia, to a $5 million to improve the Lebanese Internal Security Force communications capacity, to $30 million to assist internally displaced persons in Georgia.

Establishing and Deploying the Response Corps Components

Well before Congress authorized the creation of a Civilian Response Corps (see above), S/CRS took the first steps in the lengthy process of creating integrated and coherent groups of crisis-response personnel from executive branch agencies. This “surge capacity” enables the U.S. government to deploy rapidly civilians to address emergency stabilization needs. It consists of an active and stand-by component. On July 16, 2008, then Secretary of State Rice formally launched the Civilian Response Corps with a speech thanking Congress for the passage of funding in the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2008, H.R. 4642, P.L. 110-252 to establish and implement a coordinated response capability at the State Department and USAID.

In 2006, S/CRS created a small nucleus of active and retired government employees to deploy to operations. S/CRS began deploying members of the Active Response Corps (ARC) during the last half of 2006. In 2006, ARC members were deployed to Darfur, Lebanon, Chad, and Nepal. About ten other deployments have followed, some with standby component members and other members of the S/CRS staff.

As of January 30, 2009, the ARC is comprised of eleven members of the S/CRS staff, two foreign service officers and two civil service personnel. As contemplated by the Bush Administration’s 2008 Civilian Stabilization Initiative (CSI), submitted with its February 2008 budget request for FY2009, the ARC would ultimately consist of 250 members from various executive branch agencies. To date, seven executive agencies have signed Memoranda of Agreement with the State Department regarding their contributions to the ARC (the departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, and Transportation,.

33 For more on this program, see CRS Report RS22871, Department of Defense “Section 1207” Security and Stabilization Assistance: A Fact Sheet, by Nina M. Serafino.

34 Afghanistan, Colombia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Georgia, Haiti, Lebanon, Nepal, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Yemen, Southeast Asia region and Trans-Sahara region.

35 The first ARC member was deployed to Lebanon, to assist with efforts to train and equip additional Lebanese Internal Security (LIS) forces. (The purpose of this effort is to enhance LIS ability to replace the Lebanese Army Forces which had been maintaining law and order in conflictive areas such as the Bekaa Valley before being deployed to southern Lebanon.) Several SRC members also deployed to post-conflict situations in 2006. The first person from this group was deployed to Eastern Chad and two more began working in Nepal on demobilizing and reintegrating Maoist rebels. In the course of early 2007, several ARC members deployed to Kosovo to help prepare for the status settlement process, one deployed to Beirut to help coordinate reconstruction assistance, and one to Chad to monitor activities on the Chad side of the border with Sudan. Other response corps deployments were to Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Cuba, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Georgia, Haiti, Iraq, Liberia, and Sri Lanka, as well as to work with the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM).
and USAID). In P.L. 110-252, Congress provided FY2008 supplemental appropriations and FY2009 bridge funding that would pay for 100 ARC slots, according to S/CRS.36 (See below for details on CSI funding.)

The Stand-by Response Corp (SRC) of active and retired foreign service officers numbers some 365 members, of which six are Foreign Service officers currently serving on “active” duty with the ARC. All of the federal agencies, except Homeland Security, which signed MOAs for the ARC have also signed MOAs for the SRC, as of January 30, 2008. As of that date, most of the stand-by reserve was comprised of State Department personnel (252 members). Others are employed by USAID (76), Justice (32) HHS (3), and Commerce (2). No members have joined from Agriculture, Homeland Security, or the Treasury, as of January 30, 2009. Funding provided through the 2008 supplemental appropriations act would maintain 500 standby unit members for the year. The CSI contemplated expanding the SRC to 2,000.

Planning for a Civilian Reserve Capability

S/CRS has developed a general concept for an S&R Civilian Reserve Corps (CRC) component of retired government personnel, personnel from state and local governments, private for-profit companies and non-profit NGOs, to carry out rule of law, civil administration, and reconstruction activities. Two outside studies forming the basis for planning for the reserve were completed in 2006.37

In his January 23, 2007 State of the Union address, the President pointed to the need for a civilian reserve corps as a tool in the generational struggle against terrorism. “Such a corps would function much like our military reserve,” he said. “It would ease the burden on the armed forces by allowing us to hire civilians with critical skills to serve on missions abroad when America needs them. It would give people across America who do not wear the uniform a chance to serve in the defining struggle of our time.”38

The Bush Administration’s 2008 CSI called for a Civilian Reserve Corps of 2,000. In the CSI budget request, the Administration requested $86.768 million for S/CRS to support recruiting, hiring, and training, as well as to acquire and preposition vehicles and equipment needed to support the deployment of up to 500 reservists per year. Under the CSI plan, the CRC would include personnel capable of performing the full spectrum of activities needed for stabilization and reconstruction operations, including policing, other rule of law (judicial and prison) functions, public administration, and infrastructure assistance. S/CRS anticipates beginning recruitment soon. Each civilian agency would conduct its own recruitment for reservists in its area of expertise.

According to S/CRS, no action has been taken to standup the reserve corps, as S/CRS attention to date has focused on standing up the response corps components. The Obama Administration has not announced its own plans for a civilian reserve capacity.

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38 According to the 2006 National Security Strategy, the civilian reserve would also be used for both post-conflict reconstruction and international disaster assistance, p. 45.
Other Activities

To address the need for greater interagency, particularly civil-military, planning and coordination, S/CRS worked with the military entities to develop civilian-military training exercises for stabilization and reconstruction operations. It has entered into an agreement with the U.S. Army to train civilian planners. And, among other activities, it has developed ties with other international participants to coordinate and enhance civilian capabilities for stabilization and reconstruction activities.

Issues for Congress

Enhance S/CRS Capacity and Status

Some observers argue that the magnitude of the S/CRS mission requires improved capabilities within the office and enhanced status, if it is to provide adequate direction and personnel for an interagency response to stabilization and reconstruction crises. “It is not clear that S/CRS is large enough, well enough funded, or sufficiently high in rank to pull an interagency effort together,” according to a 2008 MIT Security Studies Program report.

Such reservations persist about the office’s ability and capacity to carry out its mission, despite widespread support for S/CRS. Especially in the early years, some observers argued that S/CRS had not moved expeditiously in carrying out its functions. This perceived lack of initiative has often been blamed on an “anti-operational” social culture of the State Department and a lack of support from top State Department leadership. Given that perspective, some observers question whether all of the functions assigned S/CRS are appropriate for that office. For instance, some contend that an office with the mission of mobilizing civilian personnel for stabilization and reconstruction missions would be better placed in USAID, which fields disaster response units (the Disaster Assistance Response Teams), or even as a new unit within the Department of Defense. Others, however, fault a lack of adequate resources for any S/CRS shortcomings.

Some urge firm support for S/CRS. With the passage of the Civilian Stabilization and Reconstruction Assistance Management Act of 2008, see above, Congress appears to have mooted the debate on which agency is best suited to accomplish the S/CRS mission, although the issue may resurface within the context of a larger debate on interagency reform.

For the moment, the most salient question seems how best to enhance S/CRS capabilities to carry out assigned functions. Some proponents of S/CRS argue that the office’s ability to perform its

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functions could be enhanced through changes in funding and budgeting practices that would provide the stability and transparency, needed for long-term planning and the implementation of current plans. In particular, some argue that S/CRS should have its own account in the annual budget. (According to S/CRS, the Bush Administration’s February 2008 budget submission for FY2009 contemplated the creation of a separate S/CRS account in the State Department budget.)

S/CRS funding for office operations is currently included under the State Department’s Diplomatic and Consular Programs (D&CP) budget account. If that practice continues, and Congress does not provide the full amount requested for the D&CP account, the S/CRS allocation may be affected. Because much of the funding for S/CRS and its operations has come through supplemental appropriations, S/CRS officials argue that they have not been able to fully staff permanent positions in the Civilian Response Corps. Stable funding through the annual budget would allow S/CRS to hire permanent career civil servants for the Civilian Response Corps active component, according to S/CRS officials. In addition, a dedicated S/CRS account would allow S/CRS to track systematically the funding that DOD transfers to the State Department for “Section 1207” S&R programs. Currently, according to S/CRS officials, Section 1207 funds are deposited in various State Department accounts, hampering S/CRS oversight.

In June 2008, Congress specifically provided $75 million for S/CRS and USAID S&R activities in supplemental appropriations (the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2008, H.R. 4642, P.L. 110-252). This is less than the $248.6 million that the Bush Administration requested in February 2008, for its “Civilian Stabilization Initiative” (CSI), which rolled into one its request for funds for continued operations of S/CRS, funds for a 250-member interagency Active Response Corps and a 2,000-member Standby Response Corps, and a 2,000-member Civilian Reserve Corps, and money for deployment of experts. The P.L. 11-252 funding expires on September 30, 2009.

As of January 30, 2009, according to S/CRS officials, it is unclear how much funding S/CRS will receive in regular FY2009 appropriations, whether these funds will be appropriated to the D&CP account or to a new S/CRS-dedicated account, and if these funds will continue to be split between the State Department and USAID.

Another improvement suggested would be to extend the period of Foreign Service officer (FSOs) tours with S/CRS. FSOs now serve on one-year rotations with S/CRS, rather than the two to three year rotations standard for other assignments.

To provide the head of S/CRS with greater clout within the State Department and in dealing with other departments and agencies, some suggest that rank of that official or the Status of the Office itself, be upgraded. Some suggest that the Coordinator’s functions be assigned to an Under

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42 Of that amount, $30 million was a FY2008 supplemental appropriation for the State Department and $25 million was a FY2008 supplemental appropriation for USAID. The remaining $20 million was part of FY2009 supplemental bridge fund appropriations for the State Department. More specifically, this sum included up to $30 million in FY2008 supplemental appropriations “to establish and implement a coordinated civilian response capacity the United States Department of State” under State Department Diplomatic and Consular Programs, up to $25 million “to establish and implement a coordinated civilian response capacity at the United States Agency for International Development” under Operating Expenses of the United States Agency for International Development. (122 Stat.2328-2329.) The $20 million in FY2009 bridge fund supplemental appropriations for the State Department was provided as part of a lump sum for State Department diplomatic and consular programs. The conference report on the amended bill to provide supplemental appropriations for FY2008 and FY2009 specifies that $40 million of those funds is for new positions in the diplomatic corps and for “civilian post-conflict stabilization initiatives.” According to S/CRS, the funding is intended to be split evenly between the two purposes.
Secretary, or that S/CRS become a State Department bureau headed by an Assistant Secretary. (The “Coordinator” position is the equivalent of an Assistant Secretary, according to an S/CRS official.)

Some also urge the expansion of the active response corps and the standby response corps if the performance of S/CRS and the response corps in FY2009 justifies robust funding in FY2010 and beyond. “Positive results from a review of 2008 and 2009 performance and further clarification of the purposes to be served by the surge teams could justify enactment of a 2010 program similar to that requested in 2009 [i.e., the Bush Administrations Civilian Stabilization Initiative],” according to a study co-sponsored by the American Academy of Diplomacy and the Stimson Center. “The magnitude of growth beyond FY2010 will depend largely on the experience gained based on deployments in that year. For the purposes of projection, we propose that the active response team would grow to 500 by FY2014, the standby response corps would remain at 2,000, and the civilian reserve [see below] would grow to 4,000.”

Establish an S&R Conflict Response Fund

For many years, proponents of “operational” civilian capabilities for S&R operations have urged Congress to provide the State Department with a flexible conflict response fund that would allow U.S. government civilian agencies to respond rapidly to S&R emergencies. The Bush Administration repeatedly requested such a fund, and proposals for a flexible, replenishable fund were included in early versions of the Lugar-Biden legislation and subsequent related legislation. But Congress, which has long resisted the provision of “blank check” pots of money as an abdication of constitutional appropriation and oversight powers, turned down several Administration requests for more flexible S&R funding mechanisms in the State Department budget.

Proponents of a flexible conflict response fund argue that it is needed because many crises that demand a U.S. rapid response cannot be foreseen and thus planned for in annual budget submissions. In addition, they argue, the existing mechanisms for transferring funds to an emergency situation are too time-consuming to provide an immediate response. Some Proponents have argued for a mechanism like the automatically replenishable Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance (ERMA) emergency relief account, funded through foreign operations appropriations. Many proponents suggest that ERMA provides a model for a conflict response fund. Several bills were introduced that would, among other provisions, permanently establish a conflict response fund, but none passed Congress.

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44 A provision for a flexible, replenishable fund was included in early versions of the Lugar-Biden legislation. Most recently, some legislation in the 110th Congress contained provisions for a $75 million replenishable fund that could be used by the President to respond to crises in countries or regions at risk of, in, or in transition from conflict or civil strife. Of that, some $25 million could be used for expenses related to the development, training, and operations of the Response Readiness Corps.

45 These requests were contained in both annual and supplemental appropriations measures) for no-year funds to be used for conflict emergencies in foreign countries or regions, and proposals in previous iterations of the Lugar/Biden legislation to establish a replenishable conflict response for a conflict response fund.
(In December 2007, the HELP Commission recommended the establishment of two rapid-response crisis funds. One would be a permanent humanitarian crisis response fund to meet the needs of natural disasters. The other would be a foreign crisis fund to meet security challenges. No recommendation was made regarding the agency responsible for these funds.46)

Since 2006, the funding that Congress has made available through the DOD budget for conflict response has served as a de facto response fund for small S&R projects. Section 1207 of the conference version of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 (P.L. 109-163, H.R. 1815/S. 1042; signed into law January 6, 2006 and subsequently amended) authorizes the Secretary of Defense to provide the Secretary of State with up to $100 million in services, defense articles and funding for reconstruction, security, or stabilization assistance to a foreign country per fiscal year. This authority expires in FY2009.

**Further Authority and Funding for the Civilian Reserve Corps**

The 2008 authorization of a Civilian Reserve Corps (P.L. 110-417, see above) may provide impetus for the development of a reserve that could substitute for military troops in a wide variety of state-building activities. Although S/CRS developed plans for a reserve (and the Bush Administration’s CSI plan contemplated a size of 2,000 members) no steps implementing those plans have been taken, according to S/CRS. President Obama’s campaign information spoke of a 25,000 civilian reserve, but this number is much larger than previous Bush Administration plans, and no concrete Obama plan has been advanced. (The legislation contains no details on the desired size or composition of the force.)

Proponents of the creation of a civilian reserve corps foresee a variety of advantages from the creation of such a corps. DOD promoted the concept on the grounds that it would free military personnel from state-building tasks during military operations, thus increasing the personnel available for combat and other more strictly military tasks.47 Proponents also view such a corps as a means to enhance prospects for success in S&R operations as the personnel who would be sent to perform such tasks would in general have a much higher level of expertise and depth of experience than soldiers and could, unlike many military personnel assigned to such tasks, perform at peak efficiency from the outset. Many view this as particularly true at the national level, where extensive experience with developing national-level structures is desirable over the long run. (Although military Civil Affairs officers are largely reservists whose civilian jobs are relevant to state-building tasks, many analysts state that there are too few civil affairs personnel to


47 However, DOD Directive 3000.05, *Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSR) Operations*, issued November 28, 2005, states that many stability operations tasks “are best performed by indigenous, foreign, or U.S. civilian professionals,” but nonetheless “U.S. military forces shall be prepared to perform all tasks necessary to establish or maintain order when civilians cannot do so.” Among the tasks listed are the rebuilding of various types of security forces, correctional facilities, and judicial systems, the revival or building of the private sector, and the development of representative governmental institutions. (Points 4.3, 4.3.1-4.3.3. Access through http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/html/300005.htm.)

Some military analysts argue that at the beginning of an operation or in extremely volatile situations the use of U.S. troops to perform nation-building efforts may be considered highly desirable as they can “multi-task,” performing combat missions in one area while switching quickly to state-building efforts in another. In addition, some believe that it will always be desirable to have trained military civil affairs officers who can deal with civilian leaders and populations involved in state-building efforts at the local level, as a means of demonstrating goodwill toward such populations and enhancing the image of soldiers, especially in counterinsurgency operations.
provide the depth needed to deploy the appropriate person in most circumstances.) Many argue that civilian personnel are also preferable for symbolic reasons, as they may signal a greater commitment to the construction of a democratic state.

Skeptics look at the concept of a civilian reserve as untested and potentially unfeasible. Some wonder whether qualified experts would sign up in sufficient quantities to make the corps an effective replacement for military troops in S&R operations. Some question whether the existence of such a corps would provide an incentive to interventions of various types that the United States otherwise would not have undertaken.

Cost is likely to be a major issue. In 2008, the Congressional Budget Office assembled a cost estimate for the Bush Administration’s CSI. Its estimate for the recruiting, screening, enrolling, training, and equipping the 2,000 members contemplated by the CSI would be $87 million in FY2009 and $47 million in 2010. While some may view the potential cost of the civilian corps as high, some proponents argue that the costs of deploying civilian personnel would result in a net savings to the military. (It is likely, however, that any possible savings would depend on the circumstances in which such civilian personnel were deployed and the effect of their deployment on the number of military personnel needed.) Proponents also maintain that even if high, the monetary cost to maintain and deploy civilian reservists would still be relatively inexpensive when compared to the multiple costs, both tangible (such as money and lives) and intangible (such as domestic and international political support and loss of strategic leverage) of prolonged or failed military interventions.

Author Contact Information

Nina M. Serafino
Specialist in International Security Affairs
nsafino@crs.loc.gov, 7-7667


49 The Congressional Budget Office estimated the cost of implementing the Civilian Reconstruction and Stabilization Management Act, H.R. 1084 (110th Congress), if “employed in a manner consistent with the [President’s] Civilian Stabilization Initiative.” (The estimate is included in H.Rept. 110-537, 110th Congress.)