This paper draws conclusions and makes recommendations about the utility of the PRT model in various post-conflict situations based on the conditions that have facilitated or frustrated the development of stable, peaceful, and democratic states in the past. Drawing on a historical review of the U.S. experience with nation-building and development assistance, the paper concludes that the success of U.S. efforts will depend not on the “correct” design of a PRT, but rather on the host nation itself, specifically on: (1) its prior history of political and economic development, (2) the legitimacy of its government, and (3) the willingness of the government and population to take “ownership” of the nation-building effort. Therefore, as a component of the termination strategy for U.S. military involvement in post-conflict situations, the PRT model is limited in its applicability to only those countries where those three conditions exist. Since these conditions are unlikely to pertain in the “failed states” where the United States most likely will be involved in SSTR operations, alternative termination strategies are needed.
PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS AREN’T FOR EVERYONE:
When and Where PRTs can be a Useful Tool for SSTR Operations

by

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The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: _____________________

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Table of Contents

Introduction 1

Background 2

Discussion/Analysis 3

Conclusions 10

Recommendations 13

Notes 16

Selected Bibliography 20
Abstract

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This paper draws conclusions and makes recommendations about the utility of the PRT model in various post-conflict situations based on the conditions that have facilitated or frustrated the development of stable, peaceful, and democratic states in the past. Drawing on a historical review of the U.S. experience with nation-building and development assistance, the paper concludes that the success of U.S. efforts will depend not on the “correct” design of a PRT, but rather on the host nation itself, specifically on: (1) its prior history of political and economic development, (2) the legitimacy of its government, and (3) the willingness of the government and population to take “ownership” of the nation-building effort. Therefore, as a component of the termination strategy for U.S. military involvement in post-conflict situations, the PRT model is limited in its applicability to only those countries where those three conditions exist. Since these conditions are unlikely to pertain in the “failed states” where the United States most likely will be involved in SSTR operations, alternative termination strategies are needed.
INTRODUCTION

The U.S. Government as well as U.S. and foreign think tanks and academics are examining Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), a mechanism developed in 2003 for integrating military-civilian efforts in Afghanistan, as a possible model for future Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) operations. Most of the studies focus on the structure, leadership, staffing, training, funding, and concept of operations of the PRTs.¹ Their recommendations address ways the U.S. military and civilian agencies can better prepare future PRTs to achieve the stated goal of SSTR operations, namely, “setting the conditions for achieving stabilization, security, transition, and reconstruction objectives needed to create a new domestic order and a viable peace.”²

The underlying assumption of these studies is that the U.S. government, with the right mechanism, can provide post-conflict states with a “sustainable path toward peace, democracy and a market economy”³ and thereby reduce the threat of these states becoming breeding grounds for terrorism, international crime, humanitarian catastrophes, and destabilizing regional elements.⁴

However, an analysis of the U.S. experience with nation-building and development assistance suggests that the success of U.S. efforts will depend not on the “correct” design of a PRT, but rather on the host nation itself, specifically on: (1) its prior history of political and economic development, (2) the legitimacy of its government, and (3) the willingness of the government and population to take “ownership” of the nation-building effort. Therefore, as a component of the termination strategy for U.S. military involvement in post-conflict situations, the PRT model is limited in its applicability to only those countries where those
three conditions exist. Since these conditions are unlikely to pertain in the “failed states” where the United States will most likely be involved in SSTR operations, alternative termination strategies are needed.

At the operational level, this focus on the “conditions for success” in host countries could affect decisions about whether to employ PRTs in specific post-conflict situations and, if employed, the objectives to assign them; where PRTs are assessed as unlikely to succeed, commanders would need to identify alternative SSTR termination strategies.

This paper will focus on the conditions that have facilitated or frustrated the achievement of stable, peaceful, and democratic states in order to draw conclusions and develop recommendations about the utility of the PRT model in various post-conflict situations. It leaves to others the evaluation of the design of the PRT itself.

**BACKGROUND**

The United States inaugurated the first PRT in Gardez Province, Afghanistan, in January 2003. The PRT was the successor to the Coalition Humanitarian Cells, a counterinsurgency mechanism created after the fall of the Taliban to identify and implement small-scale humanitarian relief and reconstruction projects in an attempt to ‘win the hearts and minds’ of the Afghan population.5

The House Armed Services Committee concluded in April 2008, five years after PRTs were first established, that “there is no clear definition of the PRT mission, no concept of operations or doctrine, no standard operating procedures.”6 Nevertheless, while the approximately 50 PRTs now operating in Afghanistan and Iraq have no standard structure,
staffing, or operational concept, they are all military-civilian teams that share the fundamental goal of integrating military and civilian assistance in order to enhance security, reconstruction, and the reach and legitimacy of the central government. While PRTs were initially conceived as a trial program, these military-civilian teams have become a primary method by which the U.S., NATO, and Coalition partners pursue nation-building outside of Kabul and Baghdad.

How PRTs work to achieve this goal varies considerably based on their leadership, funding, the local conditions, and the concept of operations of the lead country. As of April 2008, thirteen countries led PRTs in Afghanistan or Iraq. Countries variously emphasize quick impact projects as part of a counterinsurgency strategy, local capacity building and security sector reform, or long-term sustainable development.

**DISCUSSION/ANALYSIS**

**PRTs as a Tool for Nation-Building**

According to *Department of Defense Directive/DOD 3000.05*, “military-civilian teams are a critical U.S. Government stability operations tool.” The long-term goal of stability operations is to “help develop indigenous capacity for securing essential services, a viable market economy, rule of law, democratic institutions, and a robust civil society.” In short, the goal of military-civilian teams such as PRTs is nation-building, which James Dobbins, in his *Beginner’s Guide to Nation-Building*, defines as “the use of armed force as part of a broader effort to promote political and economic reforms with the objective of transforming a society emerging from conflict into one at peace with itself and its
neighbors.”13 DOD 3000.05 ties the achievement of this goal to the termination strategy for the stability operation, stating that “successfully performing such tasks can help secure a lasting peace and facilitate the timely withdrawal of U.S. and foreign forces.”14

Historical Record on Nation-Building and Development Assistance

However, in the blunt words of Professor Stephen Fought of the Naval War College in 1994, “our military does have some history of nation-building. But it is not necessarily pretty.”15 He concluded that the U.S. record on nation-building was in fact “rather miserable.”16 Craig Cohen of the U.S. Institute of Peace contends that “faulty initial analysis that has overlooked the entrenched drivers of conflict and instability” is what has “severely hampered” previous U.S. nation-building interventions,17 a fact apparently recognized in the Joint Operating Concept for SSTR Operations, issued in December 2006, which stresses that “understanding the drivers of instability and/or conflict should be a central feature” in the first phase of the planning process for SSTR operations.18

A study of sixteen contexts in which the United States led a regime change in the last century showed that only four had stable democracies four years later: West Germany, Japan, Grenada, and Panama.19 Former Secretary of State and retired General Alexander Haig saw only two real successes for U.S. nation-building, Japan and Germany.20 In James Payne’s analysis of U.S. and British nation-building military occupations between 1850 and 2000, only 27 percent had resulted in democratic governments.21 Even Dobbins, whose Beginner’s Guide to Nation-Building sets out prescriptions for building a stable peace in post-conflict situations, only assesses one half of U.S. nation-building efforts as having led to sustained peace and continued democratic governance.22 Former Deputy Secretary of State
Stuart Eizenstat concluded that some U.S. nation-building efforts actually eroded the legitimacy and capacity of the states they purported to help. In 2003, the World Bank estimated that of the 52 post-conflict countries since 1960, the risk of relapse into violence was about 50 percent, and higher if the country had valuable and exploitable resources.

Given this historical record, some practitioners and scholars argue that nation-building simply cannot be done. General Haig lamented that the United States has “always been astonishingly optimistic about the potential for ‘new nationhood,’” despite the fact that “it rarely works.” Payne concluded that “the dirty little secret of nation-building is that no one knows how to do it.” Fought argued that “we have to face the fact that not all nations can be ‘built.’” He further observed that “nation building inevitably means nation destroying. Certain ethnic groups, social strata, and religious factions may build their nations with America’s help, but others will lose what little they have.”

However, other experts, drawing lessons from U.S. nation-building efforts and development assistance programs, argue that nation-building can be done, but only given certain conditions in the host country.

Haig and Fought both attribute the success of nation-building in Germany and Japan to the fact that both countries had been fully functioning modern societies, with political and physical infrastructures that were mature and robust. “Germany and Japan were actually re-built rather than built.” John Schmidt, a founding Deputy Coordinator in the Department of State’s new Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), agrees, but draws two broader conclusions about the factors most responsible for successful nation-building efforts. First, he observes that the most successful nation-building interventions
were in societies, such as Germany and Japan, which had a relatively high per capita GNP and a diversified middle class. Second, he attributes successful interventions to the host nations’ “underlying political culture,” a view similar to that expressed by Ronald Spector, who, in writing about postwar Japan, observed that “the ultimate fate of nations under military occupation seems to depend more on the fundamental political, social, economic and ideological forces in those countries than it does on the plans and policies of the occupying force.” According to Payne, while nation-building usually fails, when it does succeed it “owes more to historical evolution and local political culture than to anything the nation builders might have done.”

A review of U.S. development assistance experience offers additional lessons regarding the decisive role of the host country in determining the success or failure of U.S. assistance efforts.

The National Security Strategy of the United States of America issued in 2002 concluded in damning terms that “decades of massive development assistance have failed to spur economic growth in the poorest countries.” As a result, President Bush introduced a new approach to development assistance, the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), which was based on the recognition that development is achieved by a country’s own efforts, policies, and people, and that aid is most effective when it reinforces a host nation’s efforts to achieve good governance, economic freedom and investments in people. The basis of the MCA was the recipient country’s “ownership” of the funded programs and its accountability for achieving results.
This new approach highlighted “ownership,” the “first principle of development and perhaps the most important,” according to Andrew Natsios, former Director of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). “Ownership” requires that a country drive its own development needs and priorities. According to Natsios, “it is essential that a country’s people view development as belonging to them and not to the donor community; development initiatives must meet the country’s needs and its people’s problems as they perceive them, not as distant policymakers imagine them.

Even when a host nation has met the conditions for successful nation-building, the effort still has required a long-term commitment of significant resources. Dobbins attributes “mismatches between inputs, as measured in personnel and money, and desired outcomes, as measured in imposed social transformation,” as the most common cause for the failure of nation-building efforts. While disputing the notion that resources alone are the decisive factor in successful nation-building, others echo his view that nation-building requires enormous effort and staying power. Haig assessed that “nation-building requires a vast commitment of resources over a lengthy time for very meager results.”

The CORDS program in Vietnam suggests the massive scale of the human resource needs required – by 1969, almost 8,000 advisers had been fielded to 44 provinces and 250 districts to provide advice to local officials on military operations and development. David Passage, who served as a CORDS adviser, noted that this extensive presence in the countryside would not have been possible if the Vietnamese people had not seen the program as legitimate, a fact that kept the Viet Cong from targeting CORDS personnel. In contrast, Rick Olson, then Chief of Staff of the State Department’s Office of the Special Inspector...
General for Iraqi Reconstruction, told the House Armed Services Committee in 2007 that one of the top challenges for the PRTs in Iraq and Afghanistan was that the demands of geography exceeded their reach. Unlike Vietnam, however, the security environment in these countries, characterized by routine and indiscriminate attacks by insurgents against American military and civilian personnel, has limited both the number of PRTs and their ability of PRT members to interact freely with local leaders and the local population.

Natsios similarly identified the need for a strong presence on the ground in order to build credibility, trust, and consensus in the local population. Ironically, this very need for a long-term, large-scale effort to achieve nation-building can become the “Catch-22” preventing its success. The Joint Operating Concept warns that “the provision of large scale assistance by the U.S. and other foreign militaries within SSTR operations will almost certainly prove acceptable to the local populace for only a limited period of time, after which external troops may increasingly be viewed as hostile imperial intruders rather than as a force for assistance and progressive change.”

Termination Strategy for Nation-Building Operations

According to Department of Defense Directive/DOD 3000.05 and the Joint Operating Concept, the termination criteria for SSTR operations are tied to the achievement of nation-building goals, specifically, “setting the conditions for achieving stabilization, security, transition, and reconstruction objectives needed to create a new domestic order and a viable peace.” In an illustrative vignette, the Joint Operating Concept describes the final stage of a hypothetical SSTR operation:
the Joint Force successfully culminated its efforts to have the host nation be able and willing to accept responsibility for the conduct of activities across all the major mission elements. This transition was based on the new host nation government’s capacity to sustain the rule of law, meet humanitarian needs, provide essential services, foster economic development, and govern responsibly without substantial external assistance. In the final months of this last transition stage to host nation self-reliance, the Joint Force withdrew in substantial numbers until only a modest routine military assistance team remained in the host nation.49

Neither the Department of Defense Directive/DOD 3000.05 nor the Joint Operating Concept addresses termination criteria for SSTR operations in host countries where the prospect for this type of successful nation-building outcome is remote. The cases of Afghanistan and Iraq are suggestive of the dilemma. Neither meets the “conditions for success” identified from previous nation-building or development experiences; rather, they fall into the category of countries where nation-building interventions have failed, namely, those that are “the poorest, most corrupt and demographically disadvantaged societies, whose political cultures proved highly resistant to democratic change, or in states which, although somewhat more prosperous economically, were beset by intractable religious or ethnic animosities.”50

In its April 2008 report, the House Armed Services Committee criticized the lack of an “ends, ways, and means” approach to determining and measuring the PRTs’ progress and effectiveness. It concluded that “the United States must define the conditions under which PRTs are no longer needed [in Afghanistan and Iraq] and more traditional diplomatic and development platforms can be used,51 and called on the Departments of Defense and State to adopt milestones for such an eventual transition.52
CONCLUSIONS

While their ultimate success cannot yet be determined, after six years in Afghanistan and four years in Iraq, PRTs have not yet secured the conditions for “a lasting peace” that can “facilitate the timely withdrawal of U.S. and foreign forces,” the goal set out in the *Department of Defense Directive/DOD 3000.05*. The *Joint Operating Concept* states that future SSTR interagency teams will be developed using the lessons learned from the PRTs in Iraq and Afghanistan, *inter alia*. The U.S. experience with these PRTs and previous nation-building and development assistance efforts leads to three principal conclusions about when and where PRTs can be a useful tool for SSTR operations.

First, PRTs intended to engage in nation-building are not appropriate for every, or even most, post-conflict situations. The historical record on successful nation-building is not encouraging. Based on where it has worked in the past, the key indicators of “good candidates” for PRTs are countries that: (1) had a relatively high level of political and economic development before the conflict; (2) a willingness to take “ownership” of the nation-building effort; and (3) a legitimate government. However, very few of the countries where the United States is likely to become involved in SSTR operations meet these conditions. As a result, PRTs will not be able to achieve the desired end state described in *Department of Defense Directive/DOD 3000.05* and the *Joint Operating Concept* in the places the United States will most likely be involved in SSTR operations. In 2005, Eizenstat calculated that there were about 50 low-income nations that were weak in a way that could threaten U.S. and international security -- precisely the countries where the United States would be most likely to intervene and where PRTs would be most ineffective.
Nor should the United States expect to be able to “convince the local populace to recognize the legitimacy of the existing or new government and to actively support the government’s efforts to build a ‘new domestic order,’” as the Joint Operating Concept proposes.\(^5\) In practice, such “convincing” has proven difficult. Entrenched local elites often challenge U.S. goals, especially if those goals seek to undermine their role in society. As Eizenstat observes, the United States cannot simply “wish away” their existence, for it is the local elites who ultimately will strengthen or undermine institutions after the United States departs.\(^5\) Local populations who reject the international presence are also unlikely to be convinced to take “ownership” of the PRTs’ objectives, as Matthew Jackson concludes from his study of British-led PRTs.\(^5\) Even when an elected national government takes “ownership” of the nation-building process, legitimacy is not guaranteed; the “Afghan Compact”\(^5\) between the Government of Afghanistan and the international community failed to contribute to the perceived legitimacy of the national government outside Kabul.

Second, SSTR operations that do not have achievable goals cannot develop realistic termination strategies; they risk an indeterminate and inclusive presence in the host country. In countries lacking the “conditions for success” for nation-building, SSTR operations should define and plan for achievable, alternative end states, rather than the unlikely goal of a “viable market economy, rule of law, democratic institutions, and a robust civil society” described in Department of Defense Directive/DOD 3000.05. As Schmidt rightly cautions, “the danger for outsiders is that they may set unachievable goals.”\(^6\) He suggests that SSTR operations focus on the tasks needed to end the conflict, rather than promote democracy (although the goals need not exclude democracy promotion). He notes that at least half of UN interventions have succeeded in ending the conflicts that precipitated the peacekeeping
operation, although most have failed to produce democracy. Jackson similarly posits that stabilization should be seen as separate and distinct from either “development” or “quick impact projects” designed to “win hearts and minds.”

Third, successful nation-building experiences have all involved long-term commitments of resources and an extensive in-country presence, even when the host nation is a “good candidate” for nation-building. Successful conflict termination requires that the objectives and resources be harmonized. Or, as Morton Abramowitz, former President of the Carnegie Endowment of International Peace, observed, nation-building requires “pragmatism and political staying power, which combine to produce the ability to spend lots of public money freely, over a long period of time, on sometimes unsavory means towards modest ends.”

Even if the conditions in the host country are appropriate, PRTs cannot become a “driving force” in stabilization and reconstruction unless their reach extends deep into the countryside. However, as the U.S. experiences in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan suggest, any large-scale presence requires that the U.S. efforts be seen as legitimate by the local population. Local “ownership” of the nation-building effort could help mitigate the two risks identified in the Joint Operating Concept: that the host nation population will turn against a prolonged foreign presence, and that the level and quality of U.S.-provided services will not be sustainable by the host government, thereby creating popular dissatisfaction.
RECOMMENDATIONS

1. **Look before you leap into nation-building.** The PRT model is not appropriate for every post-conflict situation. Before embarking on a nation-building enterprise, the United States should assess the potential host country in terms of: (1) its prior history of political and economic development, (2) the legitimacy of its government, and (3) the willingness of the government and population to take “ownership” of the nation-building effort. This complex assessment need not await a crisis; it could be done on a contingency basis in much the same way as other deliberate planning efforts. If the host country is a good candidate for nation-building, be prepared for a long-term commitment of significant human and financial resources to make it happen.

2. **Downsize Expectations.** Most of the post-conflict situations that the United States will confront will not be in countries that are “good candidates” for nation-building. Develop alternative SSTR models that focus more narrowly on the essential tasks involved in reducing the means for violent conflict in the society and in building local and national capacity to maintain stability. Broad political, economic, and social transformations may neither be achievable nor necessary to restore order and transition responsibilities to national and international humanitarian and development agencies. The British PRTs in Afghanistan offer one possible model; they focus primarily on integrated military-civilian assistance to improve the general security situation through security sector reform activities, such as support for the deployment of newly-trained national police and armed forces and support for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programs. In other post-conflict situations, SSTR operations might have as their goal the provision of enabling services for NGOs and international organizations. Make sure the name of
the SSTR mechanism reflects its purpose; “PRTs” may be a misleading term that raises false expectations about U.S. intentions and capabilities.

3. **Tie Goals to Resources.** Given the long-term nature of nation-building, ensure that the goals for the SSTR operations are commensurate with the human and financial resources likely to be available over the projected lifespan of the operation. Assess the extent to which a society will have to be transformed in order to evaluate the level of international commitment and resources that will be needed commensurate with that challenge.68

4. **Know When To Leave.** Regardless of whether the goals established for the SSTR operation are expansive (nation-building) or restrictive (security), establish termination/transition criteria during the planning process. Focus on developing milestones related to the removal of the opponents’ will and capacity to overturn the peace69 and the host government’s capacity to maintain the peace. The termination strategy should identify the point at which the military participation will end and the PRTs can transition into a primarily if not exclusively civilian operation under U.S., international, or local control. The goal should be to make this transition as soon as feasible, since the longer the U.S. military presence, the greater the likelihood of a popular backlash.

5. **Support the Locals.** PRTs are most likely to be successful if they support national and local initiatives and local priorities, rather than pursue an independent agenda. PRTs should demonstrate the host nation’s lead by including host nation nationals in leadership positions within the PRT. Channel U.S. assistance funds through the host government institutions to the extent possible. As in the case of Afghanistan, where 75 percent of aid
is provided directly through foreign government institutions, the host government neither gets popular credit for the assistance nor feels accountable for its effective use when it is not the conduit for that assistance. As Natsios concluded, “while it is harder to engage national and local leaders in their own development rather than impose it from the outside quickly, the result makes all the difference,” since it is ultimately their behavior once the international community leaves that will determine the extent and sustainability of change in the society.
NOTES

1 See the House Armed Services Committee Report, Agency Stovepipes vs Strategic Agility: Lessons We Need to Learn from the Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq and Afghanistan, 110th Cong., 2nd sess., 2008, H. Doc. 41-409. See also U.S. Government Accountability Office, Stabilization and Reconstruction: Actions are Needed to Develop a Planning and Coordination Framework and Establish the Civilian Reserve Corps" (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2007). See also the studies by Abbaszadeh et al., Jackson et al., McNerney, and Gauster.


4 Ibid.


8 Diprizio.

9 House, Agency Stovepipes vs Strategic Agility, 29. Those countries include: United Kingdom, Italy, Korea, Turkey, Germany, Norway, Sweden, Hungary, Spain, Lithuania, Canada, the Netherlands, and the Czech Republic.


12 Defense Department Directive/DOD 3000.05, Sec. 4.2.


14 Defense Department Directive/DOD 3000.05, Sec. 4.3.


16 Ibid., 24.


22 Dobbins et al., vi.


24 O’Brien et al., 17.

25 Haig, 7-8.

26 Payne, 604.

27 Fought and Holman, 20.

28 Ibid., 31.

29 Ibid., 27.

31 Ibid.


33 Payne, 607-608.


38 Ibid.

39 Dobbins et al., xxi.

40 Haig, 9.

41 The CORDS (Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support) counterinsurgency program in Vietnam, established in 1967, placed U.S. civilian and military advisers in provinces and districts of Vietnam to advise and assist provincial and district chiefs on military operations and development programs. The goal was to pacify the insurgent-infiltrated countryside and return it to government control. The program was largely judged a success in depriving the Viet Cong of sanctuary and recruits; some argue that it was begun too late to affect the outcome of the conflict.


46 Natsios, 7.


48 Ibid., 9.

49 Ibid., 54.

50 Schmidt, 119.


52 Ibid., 35.

53 Defense Department Directive/DOD 3000.05, Sec. 4.3.


55 Eizenstat, 136.


57 Eizenstat, 138.


59 Barnett R. Rubin, “Testimony,” House, *Afghanistan: Is the Aid Getting Through?: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the Committee on International Relations*, 109th Cong., 2nd sess., 2006. See also [http://www.un.org](http://www.un.org), document SC 8634 of 10 February 2006, for background on the Afghan Compact, which was launched at an international conference in London on 31 January and 1 February 2006. The Compact established a framework of cooperation between the Afghan government and the international community to consolidate state-building efforts in Afghanistan, including enabling the nascent democratic institutions to meet the basic needs of the country; curbing insecurity; controlling the narcotics industry, which was addressed as a cross-cutting theme; stimulating the economy; enforcing the law; and protecting human rights.

60 Schmidt, 119.

61 Ibid., 119-120.
62 Jackson and Gordon, 660.


65 McNerney, 45.


67 Schmidt, 122.

68 Cohen, 7.


70 Rubin, “Testimony.”

71 Natsios, 7.

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