State Defense Force
Monograph Series

Fall 2007, Special Units

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As State Defense Force (SDF) units consider structuring themselves away from the traditional military police force and light infantry mission structure of World War II and the Cold War in order to meet today’s needs for support to the National Guard (NG) and homeland security, special units are beginning to offer a possible way to achieve that. Many SDF units have initiated medical support elements, some have legal, chaplain and finance elements to assist soldiers and their families, others provide direct support to homeland security activities, while others provide a communications link. In some cases they work side-by-side with their NG.

This issue of the SDF Monograph Series is designed to present some examples of special units across the country in hopes of interesting SDF units to describe their activities, thereby adding to the literature for other SDF units to research and adapt. Two mini-monographs in this issue are in that format. The other two differ in that they speak to the need for certain special units or activities rather than describing actual organization structure and missions performed.

Lieutenant Colonel Bankus’ article is unique in as much as he presents an overview of SDF units around the world. The fact that many are armed presents a unique view of their mission as so many U.S. SDF units and their State Military Department do not permit arming the troops. Although some U.S. SDF units do have specially armed subunits, they are small and rare.

Lieutenant Colonel (MD) Roberts’ article is likewise unique as it presents an active Cavalry Troop. Maryland Defense Force Cavalry Troop A is more than a ceremonial unit as they have been asked by the Maryland State Police to act in a surge capacity mode to assist in search and rescue efforts where the horse is more adaptable than motor vehicles. It’s Troopers are learning life-saving techniques in preparation for such a mission.

Colonel Brinkerhoff’s article is different as he does not describe the organization and operation of existing units. Rather, he faults the Congress, the military and the SDF leadership for not recognizing the need for certain special units. In many cases, even when the need is agreed to as a possibility, he faults them for not aggressively pursuing the establishment of these units. In his discussion he touches on a variety of reasons for this continuing failure, ranging from politics through budgeting to the simply talking about, but not doing anything syndrome.

The article by Major Hughbank and Colonel (MD) Hershkowitz is likewise different as the article presents a current major problem facing the American citizenry and a potential for addressing and hopefully reducing its potential impact. The article recognizes that, although it is probably a suitable mission for the SDF, it likewise recognizes that such a decision is unlikely. The recommendation then is to consider utilizing the volunteer spirit and military training of the SDF soldiers to form support units for homeland security first responders who do have that official mission.

The articles in this issue should stir discussions and questions concerning the feasibility of following through on some of the concepts presented herein.
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With the high Operations Tempo (OPTEMPO) in the current world environment, in addition to
the United States, other nations are also experiencing a reduction in force while mission requirements
are on the increase e.g., homeland security. However, a shortage in troop strength does not mitigate the
requirement to maintain security with the many and varied non-state actors who remain a serious danger
to the world at large. In addition, local, state, and Federal first responders are also challenged as mission
requirements dictate an ever widening range of contingencies of natural and man-made disasters ranging
from floods, hurricanes or a large significant event e.g., the September 11, 2001 attacks in addition to
the threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction/Effects.

To add troop strength, both the U.S. and other countries are again calling on their “Home Guard”
and other Volunteer Military Organizations as augmentation forces. Along with the federally sponsored
U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary and U.S. Air Force Civil Air Patrol, there are states within the U.S. who
have an active U.S. Code Title 32 authorized “Home Guard” or State Defense Force (SDF) unit and
several with active Naval Militias (22 states and Puerto Rico). These Volunteer Military Organizations
(VMOs) who much like their predecessors of World Wars I and II have a specific focus on homeland
security and other skill sets to assist the first responder community.

The Home Guard concept was started in the U.S. before World War I, when a preponderance of
Army and Air National Guard units were called to federal service. Beginning with the Dick Act of 1903
and the National Defense Act of 1916, each organized state Militia was transformed from a strictly state
funded and equipped force to the official second line of defense of the United States.2 As such the
organized Militia now called the “National Guard” was both a state and Federal asset and could be called
for a Federal emergency. So, beginning in 1916 then again in 1917 the National Guard was activated
for Federal service first for the Mexican Border Campaign then for World War I.

Transforming the National Guard into a dual force was both a “blessing and a curse” for the
United States. When activated for Federal service their absence effectively left states without the ability
to cope with any natural or manmade contingency. State governors quickly contacted the U.S. War
Department asking for troops to act in the stead of their departed National Guard units in 1916 and 1917.
Denied access to Federal troop strength by the War Department, governors were advised to re-constitute
replacement units and rename them the Home Guard. Legal authority to do so was provided by the
Section 61 of the 1916 National Defense Act, and stated “That nothing contained in this act shall prevent
the organization and maintenance of state police or Constabulary.” So, by the end of World War I in

1 Published with permission of the author, to be presented to Jane’s Information Group, The Royal United

2 COL Edmund Zysk, “Stay Behind Forces For the National Guard, Soldiers or Policemen?”, unpublished thesis,
U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, PA, 1 May 1988, p. 3
November 1918 no less than 27 states had organized, equipped and fielded an additional 79,000 soldiers, nation wide for strictly state service.³

World War II was the high point for the use of VMOs in the U.S.. As units of the National Guard were federalized in 1940, states were again left to their own devices to reconstitute a similar force to deal with contingencies, either natural or manmade in nature. Being better prepared than in the First World War, President Franklin Roosevelt passed the Home Guard Act in 1940 to help these state sponsored organizations by enabling them to make use of Federal arms and equipment when available. By the time of the Pearl Harbor Attack on December 7, 1941 at least 13,000 state Home Guard troops were on state active duty protecting critical infrastructure sites to include arms and munitions factories and critical sites e.g. power plants and strategic bridges and highways.⁴

By the end of the war all but four states raised and maintained Home Guard units, and their efforts paid off in several areas. First, by providing uninterrupted service to their state by being versed in and able to fulfill their role as replacement National Guard units and second by enabling federalized troop strength to be better utilized in more critical areas of the war effort. Similar to their World War I counterparts, the Home Guard units of World War II were composed of mostly prior or retired service personnel, who in many cases had extensive backgrounds in civil-military operations. Units were organized similar to their National Guard counterparts, with Infantry being the most prominent branch and the model most units were patterned after. Additionally, these volunteer replacement units conducted training on a weekly basis and participated in a one week annual training event usually during the summer months. As well, U.S. Home Guard units conducted their training in a non-pay status, but often times were paid for their annual training, and sometimes when required to attend a course of instruction, when money was available.

While these replacement units were never called upon to fulfill a combat role in addition to training for natural and man made disasters, they also received training on sabotage, small unit patrolling and other fifth column tactics, techniques and procedures. As National Guard units returned from federal service, these Home Guard units were disbanded in all but a few states and mostly forgotten until years later.⁵

The U.S. Home Guard renamed SDF experienced a resurgence beginning in the 1970s as a result of Defense Secretary Laird’s implementation of the Total Force. Today, approximately 22 states and

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⁴ COL Edmund Zysk, “Stay Behind Forces For the National Guard, Soldiers or Policemen?”, unpublished thesis, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, PA, 1 May 1988, p. 8
⁵ The Pennsylvania Guardsman Magazine, November 1948, p. 5; Pennsylvania State Archives, Harrisburg, PA
Puerto Rico still utilize SDF units in addition to the National Guard and have been used in a variety of contingencies to include the relief efforts for Hurricanes KATRINA, and RITA.\(^6\),\(^7\),\(^8\)

"The Canadian Rangers"

Our colleagues to the north, the Canadian armed forces also had a World War II version of the Home Guard as an early warning system particularly in the vast expanses of the Canadian tundra. They began as the Coastal Defense Guards and were finally recognized as the Pacific Coast Militia Rangers (PCMR), formed in early 1942 to protect British Columbia (BC).\(^9\)

By war’s end another group, the Canadian Rangers, was formally established in 1947 and similar to its World War II counterpart was and is currently responsible for protecting Canada’s sovereignty by reporting unusual activities or sightings, collecting local data of significance to the Canadian Forces, and conducting surveillance or sovereignty patrols as required. This volunteer force plays an important part in advancing public recognition of Canada’s First Nations and Inuit groups.

Currently there are 4,000 Rangers in 165 communities across Canada and by March 2008 they are targeted to increase their number by 800. There are Canadian Rangers in all provinces and territories except for Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island and New Brunswick. Canadian Rangers provide a military presence in the sparsely settled northern, coastal and isolated areas of Canada that cannot conveniently or economically be provided for by other components of the Canadian Forces.\(^10\)

With a motto of Vigilans, "The watchers," the mission essential tasks of the Canadian Rangers include reporting unusual activities, collecting local data of significance in support of military operations, conducting surveillance or presence patrols. They also assist the Canadian forces by


\(^10\) Canadian Rangers, Chief of Rangers and Cadets available at [http://www.rangers.dnd.ca/pubs/rangers/intro_e.asp](http://www.rangers.dnd.ca/pubs/rangers/intro_e.asp)
providing local expertise, guidance and advice, conducting Northern Warning System patrols, and assisting in local search and rescue (SAR) missions. Additionally, the Rangers have been invaluable by providing support in reporting unidentified vessels off the northeast coast of Quebec, participating as observers/guides for counter drug operations on the Canadian west coast, and disaster assistance situations such as downed aircraft in the far north. Given their hearty lifestyle and infinite knowledge of Canada’s vast expanses the Rangers perform their tasks exceptionally well and their value as an operational resource cannot be overstated.

All told, the Canadian Rangers belong to one of five patrol groups and are organized as follows:

- 1st Canadian Ranger Patrol Group is located in northern Canada with a total of 58 patrols in the Yukon, the Northwest Territories, Nunavut, Alberta, Saskatchewan and northern British Columbia;
- 2nd Canadian Ranger Patrol Group located in Quebec, with 23 patrols;
- 3rd Canadian Ranger Patrol Group located in northern Ontario, with 15 patrols;
- 4th Canadian Ranger Patrol Group located on the Pacific west coast and Prairies, with 38 patrols;
- 5th Canadian Ranger Patrol Group is located in Newfoundland and Labrador, with 29 patrols.

The Rangers have been recognized for their significant contributions to their communities in times of disaster such as providing relief after the avalanche in northern Quebec (Kangiqsualujjuaq). Additionally, much like their American counter parts in the Civil Air Patrol and Coast Guard Auxiliary who have similar cadet programs, many Canadian Rangers are involved as leaders and supervisors in their Junior Canadian Ranger (JCR) Program for youth ages 12 to 18 in remote and isolated areas of Canada.

Training for the Canadian Ranger is not mandatory other than the initial ten-day orientation or “Boot Camp” for new members. The 10 day training includes basic drill, rifle marksmanship, general military knowledge, navigation (map, compass and global positioning systems), search and rescue, wilderness first aid and radio communications. However, advanced training is required for Ranger Instructors and patrol leaders. Situation dependent, Ranger training schedules are flexible and can vary from patrol to patrol, or from one area to another.

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11 Ibid

12 Chief of Reserves and Cadets, about the Canadian Rangers available at http://www.rangers.forces.gc.ca/pubs/rangers/overview/about_e.asp

13 Chief of Reserves and Cadets, about the Junior Canadian Ranger Program available at http://www.rangers.forces.gc.ca/pubs/jcr/intro_e.asp

14 Third Canadian Ranger Patrol Group, A Proud History and Important Role available at http://www.army.dnd.ca/3crpg/English/history/history_e.shtm
Common task training for the Rangers includes flood and fire evacuation planning, area patrols, and major air disaster assistance. Since many areas are austere, there is an emphasis on self-sufficiency and leadership, as well as traditional skills – which are uniquely defined according to the cultural and historical practices in the local community. Periodic maintenance inspections of the North Warning System (NWS) is another invaluable mission conducted by the Canadian Rangers, whereas others conduct presence patrols in the remote and coastal areas of Canada. In terms of traditional Canadian Forces training, the Rangers are required to learn rifle marksmanship and the history and traditions of the Canadian Forces. Each Canadian Ranger is issued a .303 caliber Lee Enfield No. 4 rifle, with 200 rounds of ammunition each year, along with a colorful red Ranger sweatshirt, ball cap and a safety vest. Figures 1 & 2 provide photos of Canadian Rangers training events.

Norway also utilizes volunteer military forces or Home Guard, called the Heimevernet. Founded after World War II (1946), the organization is used to protect the local infrastructure and population, but could also be utilized as conventional forces. As members were of the resistance during World War II, these volunteers secured infrastructure sites, were a local and decentralized force, and had the ability to mobilize quickly.

During the Cold War period the Heimevernet was organized into 18 static districts within Norway. With an end strength totaling 83,000 personnel, their focus was on an invasion from Eastern Europe. Unfortunately, and much the same as reserve or volunteer forces elsewhere in the world, these volunteers fell victim to a poor grade of equipment that was handed down from the Army, Navy and Air Force.

Not unlike the militaries of other nations, to include the U.S., the Norwegian armed forces is going through a transformation as one with a Cold War focus of defense against an invasion to one that reflects the current world situation e.g., asymmetrical operations, non-state actors and unpredictable

15 Ibid


17 CPT. Christine Huseby interviewed by author, 25 October 2006, Carlisle Barracks, e-mail messages
short notice contingencies. As such, the Norwegian Home Guard is in the midst of transformation with emphasis on upgrading of arms and equipment, and procuring quality personnel focusing on their training and capabilities. Once complete, the Home Guard will have the responsibility to man 13 districts instead of the Cold War scenario of 18, with a reduction in force from the Cold War strength of 83,000 to 50,000, inheriting the responsibility of defending the homeland and a mission recently passed to them from the Norwegian Army. The current structure of the Norwegian Home Guard is divided into three components, Army (80% of the Home Guard Force), Navy (10%) and the Air Force Home Guard (also 10% of the force).\textsuperscript{18} The mission essential tasks of the Army Home Guard are critical infrastructure protection, force protection, and surveillance and control. The naval component is responsible for surveillance, maritime control, supplying boarding and coastal spotting teams and security divers, while the air component is focused on integration within their air force base structure\textsuperscript{19}

Under the new quality reform structure the Norwegian Home Guard is categorized into three components: The Rapid Reaction Force, The Reinforcement Force and Follow on Force. The Rapid Reaction Force part of the Norwegian Home Guard is composed of between 3,000-5,000 personnel who train regularly (4-60 days a year) are responsible for force protection, and anti-terror. This force is postured to be a mobile and flexible force with priority on new weapons, equipment and training. The Reinforcement Force is the second category of 25,000 personnel and is responsible for sustainment operations, is also second priority for training, equipment and weapons issue, and is required to train from 3-5 days a year. The final category, the Follow on Force, is proposed to be manned at 20,000, is responsible to secure critical infrastructure sites, and trains 3-5 days every six months. Figure 3 provides a pictorial of the recently updated Norwegian Home Guard structure and delineates the priorities of the force.

This volunteer force is the youngest branch of the Norwegian military and similar to the United States Army and Air National Guard have units stationed in local communities. As such, since most members of the Norwegian Home Guard are from the local community, they are well suited to conduct clandestine operations if the need arises. As well and similar to other VMOs in the United States and Canada, the Norwegian Home Guard has an active Youth Organization of approximately 1,200 members between the ages of 16-21. The training curriculum for the Youth Program includes subjects such as military skills, sports and athletics, first aid, rifle marksmanship and use of communications systems.\textsuperscript{20}

\textbf{“Danish Home Guard”}

Denmark is another Scandinavian nation who uses a Home Guard. The \textit{Hjemmeværnet} was founded in 1949, initially consisting of many former members of the Danish resistance movement active during World War II from 1940-1945. The year 1948 proved a banner year for the Danish Home Guard

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\textsuperscript{18} CPT. Christine Huseby interviewed by author, 25 October 2006, Carlisle Barracks, e-mail messages

\textsuperscript{19} Ibid,

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid, Slide 16
as the Danish Parliament passed the first Home Guard Act. Although updated on several occasions, the fundamental principles still remain the same as they were in 1948.21

Membership to the Danish Home Guard is open to both men and women with an age requirement to be at least 18 years old at application. While a military background is helpful it is not required, with the desire to participate being the driving force. There are four branches of the Home Guard to include:

- The Army Home Guard - 49,000
- The Naval Home Guard - 4,400
- The Air Force Home Guard – 5,700
- The Infra-structure Home Guard – 3,000 22

A volunteer force of approximately 61,000 personnel, the Home Defense Guard force, (including 800 civilian employees) and 40 Naval patrol vessels, during peacetime are under the command of the Home Guard Command. The Home Guard force is organized in territorially defined home defense companies, which in wartime forms part of the forces of the military regions, the naval home defense force, supports the navy, and the air force home defense component supports the air force Surveillance and Early Warning group by monitoring low-altitude air space, assisting with surveillance tasks, etc. Simply stated the primary mission of the Danish Home Guard is to reinforce and support the federal force e.g., the Army, Navy, and Air Force in fulfilling their missions. Specific mission essential tasks assigned to the Danish Home Guard include surveillance and reporting, static guarding and securing, protection activities, and limited and uncomplicated combat operations.23

With a primary focus on military operations, the Danish Home Guard can also be activated to support the private sector. In much the same way as their counterparts in other nations, the Danish Home Guard is called upon to render assistance during natural or manmade disasters e.g., assistance to the police during national disasters, search-and-rescue operations, etc.24 These fundamental principles form the ideological concept of the Home Guard which is: A citizen, as a member of the Home Guard, is able to demonstrate his right - voluntarily and unpaid - to participate in the defence of his country and its democratic values.

“Swedish Home Guard”

Sweden is the last of the Scandinavian nations to use Volunteer Military Organizations, called the Hemvärnet (or Swedish Home Guard). Similar to other nations, the Hemvärnet had its beginning during the trying times of World War II. As the war clouds gathered over Europe, the Swedish Rikstag

21 Hjemmeværnet, the Danish Home Guard available at http://www.hjv.dk/Eng/forside_engelsk.htm


23 Ibid

24 Forsværminsteriet, Ministry of Defence Denmark available at http://forsvaret.dk/FMN/eng/Total+Defence/The+Danish+Home+Guard/
(Parliament) passed legislation establishing the Swedish Home Guard in May of 1940, particularly due to the large numbers of men being drafted for service and being taken away for their local communities. As well, since these units were reserve forces, they were relegated with simple tasks and suffered from lack of military equipment and uniforms.\textsuperscript{25}

Since that time Sweden has maintained their Home Guard, which at its height in 1986 had 120,000 members.\textsuperscript{26} At present the Swedish Home Guard is experiencing a transformation and is being reduced from 70 battalions to 60 by 2008. Additionally, each battalion is slated to contain 325 soldiers and each company of the battalion will have approximately 100 personnel. As well, each battalion will have a “ready reaction company,” which will have a higher state of readiness in training, equipment and mobility, than the rest of the battalion with the ability to answer the call to emergency contingencies in minimal time.

The mission essential tasks assigned to the Hemvärnet include:

- Guards/protects the infrastructure that is most vital for Sweden's total defense; that is, power supplies, command and communication systems, communications and other installations against sabotage.
- Guards/protects important installations at airfields and naval bases against sabotage.
- Guards/protects ammunition and mobilization depots and sensitive entry points against sabotage.
- Assists in incident preparedness, surveillance of territory and in civilian disaster/rescue readiness.
- Water borne presence patrols of local archipelagos and along the Swedish coast.\textsuperscript{27}

The initial requirements to join the Swedish Home Guard include:

- Be a Swedish citizen,
- Have completed at least 85 days of military training,
- Be available for duty,
- Have been cleared through Military Intelligence and Security, the police and municipal authorities.

Once accepted soldiers are required to complete an introductory course of between 20-40 hours and are obligated to at least 20 training hours per year. Officers of the Home Guard are required to complete between 40-100 hours of annual service, and commanders spend even more time ensuring the successful completion of current operations and training. Commanders of the Home Guard normally are trained in the Swedish active forces, and can be conscripts, Reserve Officers or former career officers. Additionally, for training purposes within the Home Guard system, there is a specific National Home Guard Combat School which is located near the capital of Stockholm.

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\textsuperscript{26} Ibid

Volunteer Military Forces Provide Homeland Security Around the World

The future for the Swedish Home Guard appears to be even more dynamic since, in addition to a reduction in force currently being experienced by the force, plans of upgrading equipment and weaponry are well on the way e.g., night vision goggles, and GPS targeting systems to name a few. As well, new units such as search and rescue, clearance and rescue, field engineering, medical, NBC and observation/surveillance are slated to be organized and activated. Also, the mission task list for the Home Guard forces will have increased emphasis on supporting civil society in peace, largely due to the mission requirements of aiding with forest fires, flooding and search and rescue.28

“Indian Territorial Army”

Unlike previously cited examples, the volunteer Indian Territorial Army has a longer history being established by the British through the Indian Territorial Act of 1920. The organization was divided into two organizations, “The Auxiliary Force” for Europeans & Anglo-Indians, and “The Indian Territorial Force” for Indian Volunteers. After India gained independence, the Independence Territorial Army Act was passed in 1948 and the Territorial Army (TA) was formally inaugurated by the first Indian Governor General Shri C Rajagopalachari on 9 October 1949.29

Initially, the TA was composed of various units e.g., Armored Regiments, Infantry Battalions, Air Defense, Medical Regiment, Engineers Field Park Company, Signal Regiment, and Coast Battery to name a few. However, except for Infantry Battalions, by 1972 most units were either disbanded or incorporated into the Regular Army.

The TA is part of active Army and its primary role is to relieve the Army from static duties and assist civil authorities with natural or manmade contingencies, and provide units for the active Army when required.30

Presently, the Territorial Army has strength of approximately 40,000, which includes Departmental TA units e.g., Railway, Telecommunication, General Hospital and non Departmental TA units of Infantry Bn (TA) and Ecological Bn (TA) affiliated to various Infantry Regiments.31 Figure 4 shows TA units marching past India Gate on 9 Oct 1955.

Units of the Territorial Army have been involved in national contingencies during the 1962, 1965, and 1971 timeframe. Additionally, the TA has also taken part in a variety of other operations e.g., Operation PAWAN in Srilanka, Operation RAKSHAK in Punjab and J&K, Operations RHINO and BAJRANG.


29 Indian Army, Territorial Army available at http://indianarmy.nic/arta1.htm


31 Indian Army
in North East India. As well, TA Departmental units aided civil authorities during labor unrest and natural contingencies, the most notable being earthquakes in Latoor (Maharastra), Uttarkashi in Garhwal Himalaya, and a cyclone in Orissa province. Ecological units of the TA have also been active in stemming the tide of environmental degradation by planting 2.5 crore (i.e., 25-million) trees over 20,000 hectare of land in Mussoori Hills and Pithoragarh (UP), Bikaner and Jaisalmer (Rajasthan), and ravines of Chambal in Madhya Pradesh.

In addition to traditional operations TA members have also taken part in various adventure activities, e.g., the climbing of Mt. Tengchen Khang (6010 Meters) in West Sikkim by Jt-Indo-British TA Mountaineering Expedition in May 98.32

Similar to other nations, India has established policies and procedures to join the TA. For example, Indian Nationals between 18 years to 42 years meeting a prescribed physical and medical standard are eligible for a commission in the TA. To take advantage of the already trained manpower pool the upper age limit for officer application is not a rigid requirement. Once screened and accepted, a commission is granted normally in the rank of Lieutenant. Former Army Officers are granted ante-date seniority for promotion.33

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

Further research suggests the aforementioned VMOs are not an all inclusive list of such organizations used in past or present operations. However, while they vary from country to country, in size, structure, and assigned missions, unlike the U.S. and their treatment of SDFs, other nations have taken an active interest in integrating VMOs into the overall defense of the state. That fact in and of itself is a testament to the degree of importance and confidence continually being placed on volunteers. Since the U.S. military began as volunteers and has over time evolved into one of excellence in both the federal active and reserve components, it is of little wonder that some question why interest in U.S. VMOs is mostly an afterthought. There are, however, some problems the US faces when joining active duty and reserve forces on homeland security missions due to conflicting mission, training and logistic issues34 and a recent SDF movement into military emergency management35

Additionally, other nations VMOs are fully integrated as far as training and equipment, in particular, individual and crew served weapons familiarizing and qualification. As well, since most other VMOs are integrated into the federal defense plan of their respective nation, funding for individual equipment and related ancillary equipment is not an issue, which is not the case in U.S. VMOs in particular SDFs, which are state organized and recognized.

32 Indian Army; Territorial Army; History available at http://indianarmy.nic.in/artal1.htm
33 Ibid
Given that many countries are experiencing downsizing in the respective militaries due to a variety of financial issues, but with an increase of mission responsibilities, particularly in the area of homeland defense and security, fully utilizing and integrating VMOs of all types indicates an intelligent and well thought out method of augmenting their federal forces. Those who utilize VMOs have learned from history that one can never have enough troop support to deal with all contingencies and given the volatility and uncertainty of today’s environment, using VMOs is a step “in the right direction” and should be applauded for their efforts.

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INTRODUCTION

For the most part the horse cavalry has passed into the history books. Once such an integral part of the forces of every army, they have been consigned to the elucidations of authors and the visual panorama of artists and film makers. Those World War Two soldiers for whom “taps” has not yet been sounded may still remember the day in the United States Army, when thousands of horse soldiers, dressed in khaki breeches and brown campaign hats, passed in review to the triumphant sounds of the military band.

This article is concerned with briefly discussing the role of cavalry in the armies of the 18th-21st centuries, and then making a connection with the modern day military emphasizing missions that can be successfully accomplished by the State Defense Force (SDF). Given the lack of equine expertise of most officers possess, the SDF might present a way for keeping the cavalry tradition alive.

These activities, though not regularly sanctioned, may be authorized given the appropriate situation. This article is not directly concerned with the author’s modern day unit, Cavalry Troop A of the Maryland Defense Force (MDDF) (Roberts, 2007). However, it is the intention of this article that other SDF units will see the benefit to be derived from constituting a horse formation and will emulate what has been done in the State of Maryland.

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE ROLE OF CAVALRY

1750-1854

As Napoleon stated so well, “Cavalry is useful before, during and after a battle” (D’Aguilar, 1902). The armies of the 18th and 19th centuries could not wage war successfully were it not for a proficient cavalry arm, and bold and courageous cavalry leaders. The armies of this time had many uses for cavalry, and some of these uses were paramount to winning not only a battle, but a campaign.

Reconnaissance

Where is the enemy? In what strength is he? Where are his weak points? What will the terrain be like that our army will have to traverse? These and a myriad of other questions will need to be answered by the leader of a cavalry troop that is scouting in advance of the army, gaining vital information to be transmitted to the commander.
Line of Supply Protection

Although armies of this time period occasionally “lived off the land,” which they passed through, an army’s line of supply and communications must be protected, as not all supplies are obtainable “on the spot.”

Flank and Rear protection

While some commanders of the period were not as concerned with protecting their flanks, cavalry functioned as a mobile force that can be rapidly moved wherever there is a weakness.

To fall on the enemy when he is wavering

An astute commander knew exactly the right time to employ his cavalry in a massed charge to break the enemy’s squares or line of battle. During the Napoleonic Wars in particular, massed cavalry charges influenced or decided the outcome of many battles. At the battle of Eylau in Poland in 1807, Napoleon ordered Marshal Joachim Murat to deliver such a charge when the French center was threatened. He charged the Russians at the head of 11,000 cavalrmen to stabilize the lines and preserve a sanguinary victory (Petre, 1901).

Pursuit of a beaten enemy

Cavalry is useful to follow up a victory by moving with swiftness, to capture demoralized prisoners and much needed supplies, often turning a defeat into a major rout.

This period, 1750-1854, was the height of the mounted cavalryman, where the charge with drawn saber would play a decisive role in the outcome of a battle and where the paucity of cavalry could lead to an army’s quick demise. There would be few times again where the cavalry would be utilized as the arm of decision, and could impact the outcome of the day of battle so decisively.

1854-1914

It began with one of the most celebrated and criticized actions in history, the Charge of the Light Cavalry Brigade at Balaclava in the Crimea, in 1854. Some of the finest light cavalry in the world charged into a valley bristling with Russian artillery and were subsequently decimated. French Marshal Pierre Bosquet, an eyewitness, commented “It is magnificent, but it is not war” (Woodham-Smith, 1953). Most of the British cavalrmen who participated in that action understood the recklessness of their charge, and many paid with their lives for the folly of the decision. It would not be the last time however, that cavalry would be used in a situation where the tactics were lagging behind.

the technology. With the advent of advanced weaponry (rifled artillery and small arms), with a greater range and rate of fire, the cavalry charge was a decidedly risky tactic that had to be used wisely, and at exactly the right moment.

The cavalry at this time period is characterized by and significant for the creation of the mounted infantryman, a highly mobile soldier with mounted skills, who can dismount and fight on foot. While there were some isolated charges during this period such as during the American Civil War and British Wars of Colonization, the cavalry charge was for the most part over. The armies of this period used their cavalry for screening and foraging operations and for scouting and raiding the enemy’s rear areas and line of supply such as General J.E.B Stuart’s famous raid around the Federal Army of General George McClellan in 1862.

1914-1945

The invention of the machine gun and the static trench warfare that developed in World War One heralded the beginning of the true demise of the cavalry on the modern battlefield. Barbed wire and quick firing artillery and rifles meant that the cavalry could only function in those theaters of war that had more open space, such as the desert or the vast expanses of Russia. By 1918 most of the European armies has dismounted their cavalry and used the vitally needed manpower as infantrymen. A notable exception was the four mile mounted charge of the 4th Australian Light Horse Brigade at Beersheba in Palestine in 1917 where they captured the town and routed the Turkish forces there. The 800 cavalrymen took 38 officers and 700 other ranks prisoner as well as four field guns. In the two regiments, only 31 men were killed and 36 men wounded (Bou, 2006). On the Western Front, the birth of the tank meant that a highly mobile and survivable force capable of breaking through the enemy line and causing havoc was now available to the commander who saw its worth. The cavalry’s historical role was passed on to the armored force.

In World War Two, many nations still saw the value in having mounted troops. Contrary to popular conception, most of the supplies and artillery of the armies of the world in 1941 were in fact horse drawn. Many countries in Europe continued to use horse cavalry, including Germany, Russia, Italy and Poland. A popular myth is that Polish cavalry armed with lances charged German tanks during the September 1939 campaign. This arose from misreporting of a single clash on 1 September near Krojanty, when two squadrons of the Polish 18th Lancers armed with sabers scattered German infantry before being caught in the open by German armored cars (Zaloga, 1990). Most countries by the end of the war had mechanized their cavalry. The United States began dismounting its cavalry in the 1930’s and the last unit was reorganized in 1944. The last charge of the U.S. Cavalry took place by the 26th Cavalry (Philippine Scouts) on the Bataan Peninsula in 1942 (Glueckstein, 2005).

This period was characterized by the use of large masses of cavalry in a mounted infantry role in coordination with motorized units, most primarily on the Eastern Front. Those enterprising and adaptable commanders utilized the horse, especially when the extreme weather of the Russian winter rendered the panzers and other vehicles immobile. The horses showed that they could still get through.
In the post World War Two era to the present day, some “low intensity” conflicts have seen the use of cavalry in challenging terrain and where the logistical or cultural situation makes it advantageous to use mounted troops. Examples of these would be the Portuguese army in Angola, Rhodesian cavalry and the Chinese army in Vietnam in the 1970’s. U.S. special operations personnel deemed it efficient to use horses in Afghanistan, as the terrain is difficult and it made them better able to assimilate with the Afghan tribes. Apart from ceremonial units which exist in many nations, China and many Central and South American countries still have active cavalry units.

This period was characterized by the innovative and limited use of the horse to meet the needs of a certain tactical situation with success and the formation of ceremonial cavalry units to carry on the tradition of the time when cavalry played an integral part in every army. At the present time, with the ongoing technological innovations that have shaped the battlefield, it is important to see that anachronisms such as horse cavalry will have a place when the correct situation presents itself.

DEVELOPMENT OF MISSION IDEAS FOR THE STATE DEFENSE FORCE

Ceremonial

As previously mentioned, many countries currently have ceremonial formations of cavalry. Two of the most famous are England’s Horse Guards (Life Guards and Blues and Royals) and France’s Garde Republican. Sadly, the United States, with its rich heritage of horse mounted units, has no officially recognized cavalry regiment, other than a few small detachments at the unit level, most noticeably that of the 1st Cavalry Division at Fort Hood, Texas. The United States Army does have an infantry unit, the 3rd U.S. Infantry Regiment (The Old Guard), which carries on the traditions and heritage with ceremony utilizing horses. They are most visible as the guardians of the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, as well as providing funeral duties for soldiers interred at Arlington National Cemetery. From 1921 until 1941, the 3rd U.S. Cavalry Regiment provided ceremonial functions at Arlington and for a time was under the command of Colonel George S. Patton, Jr.

It is advisable for any SDF unit that has an equestrian bent to begin by embracing a ceremonial mission. This is especially true of states with a pronounced military history or a large equine population. A ceremonial unit forges a link with tradition by continuing the history of a certain unit by maintaining the presence of it in the public eye. The SDF unit can have a spiritual connection to the original unit (difficult for a State Defense Force unit to prove) or can choose to honor the original unit by recreating the name, with or without the duplication of a historic uniform. It is recommended that the state begin by forming a ceremonial color guard. The advantages of forming a unit with a ceremonial mission are as follow:
Public Relations

It is generally accepted that horses are appreciated and respected by the general population. This fact serves to enhance and encourage interaction between the public and the military department in a friendly and non-threatening environment. This positive exposure will increase the unit’s public visibility.

Work with children

Children love animals and most have affection and interest for horses. Animals teach children responsibility and patience, as well as developing in them a work ethic. It is highly advisable that the unit engage in programs with children where the troopers model ethical behavior while teaching a no tolerance for drugs policy and other initiatives.

Military Department Recruiting

A mounted unit is immediately recognizable. The advantage for recruiting is that this serves to put the soldiers in the public eye. It is desirable that the unit liaise with the National Guard (NG) and SDF recruiting personnel so that appropriate materials and correct contact information can be forwarded to those interested parties.

Working with the Governor and other VIP’s

It is worthwhile that the SDF unit undertake missions for the Office of the Governor and other important personages. This will create goodwill and help to reinforce relations between the state administration and the military department. Recommended events include parades, ceremonies, historical activities, equestrian related competitions and exhibitions, school and summer camp programs, support for state military and political officials, and state and county fairs.

Rural Search and Rescue

Search and Rescue (SAR) is a humanitarian mission and can be immediately useful in those states which have terrain that is very rural, and where horses can be utilized to their best ability. In creating a Standard Operating Procedure, several important concepts come into focus. Firstly, it is suggested that certification for the members be pursued with a nationally accredited organization like the National Association for Search and Rescue (NASAR). Secondly, the training regimen should include emphasis on those essential skills that make up search and rescue. These include:

- Land Navigation with compass and hand-held GPS
- First Aid and CPR
- Wilderness survival and tracking
- Packing a 24 hour field load
- Search patterns and clue acquisition
- Communications

2 The National Association for Search and Rescue (NASAR) website can be accessed at www.nasar.org.
These subjects should be constantly reinforced by continued training to insure that a high level of competence is established, and continues to be met.

The highly specialized field of equine SAR requires that team members and their mounts are adept at negotiating difficult terrain on horseback. It is the complex terrain normally encountered in wilderness areas and state parks in which persons normally get lost. To perform this mission successfully, specialized equine equipment, such as lightweight saddlebags, collapsible water buckets, electrolytes, and tools to either pull or tighten a loose shoe while in the field is necessary.

Finally, team members should take classes in the National Incident Management System (NIMS) (National Incident Management System, n.d.) and Incident Command System (ICS) (Introduction to Incident Command System, n.d.), which will facilitate integration of the team with other state agencies and their command and control system. A manageable and trainable structure, such as 2-3 man teams with base camp logistical and communications and information technology (IT) support should be established. A realistic response time, such as rider and mount departing the farm one hour after receiving the deployment order, should be implemented. The suggested sustainability of the teams in the field is 24 hours.

**Urban Crowd Control**

Some cavalry units, most prominently the excellent cavalry unit from the State of Connecticut, the Governor’s Horse Guards (The First Company Governor's Horse Guards, n.d.), do train for a mission of Urban Crowd Control. This is a mission that is most commonly utilized by federal, state and local law enforcement agencies that have mounted patrol units. It involves the control and manipulation of hostile crowds by forcing the horses in tight formations. This is obviously a mission that requires a great amount of training, both for the horses and troopers. Additionally, there is a risk to the safety and security of both in an intimidating environment. Some factors that must be considered are, first to train horses and riders in formation riding and then in special crowd control formations, as follow:

- Line
- Column
- Wedge
- Left and Right Diagonal
- Box
- Diamond
- Obliques
- Side Pass

Next, it is important to use desensitization training to familiarize horses to the sight and sounds of the crowd; any horse that has been conditioned to be comfortable with a multitude of distractions and frightening circumstances will be easier to deal with, no matter what his job (Pelican, 2004). Lastly, the command cadre must appreciate the need for specialized equipment to be able to carry out urban crowd control operations efficiently.

**Remote Access Medical Team**

The principal of the Remote Access Medical Team (RAMT) can be best utilized in a state that has a large amount of wilderness areas without easy access by improved roads. The RAMT would give

A four-man medical team the ability to provide medical and logistical assistance to those persons in need at the time of a state emergency. The Team principle is copied from the U.S. Special Forces Team, and cross training of the team members is a necessity:

- **Team Leader**: Responsible for decision making, expert at communications and land navigation, extremely competent equestrian

- **Assistant Team Leader**: Best equestrian, responsible for the horses’ welfare, trained as veterinary technician, handles pack animal

- **Physician**: Responsible for medical care, trained as equestrian

- **Nurse or EMT**: Assists Physician whenever needed, trained as equestrian, cross trained in communications.

A feasibility study was undertaken and it was determined should the need arise that it was possible to transport a four man RAMT team by airlift using a C-130E aircraft in the same way that sport horses are transported by passenger jet everyday around the world.

**Security and Homeland Defense**

With the current level of threats to America’s homeland, it would behoove the military hierarchy to take full advantage of the SDF as a trained pool of manpower within each state that maintains a United States Code Title 32 authorized SDF unit. It is especially noteworthy that the NG currently comprises approximately 40% of the deployed military forces. With the NG’s homeland mission being severely strained by these deployments, it is natural that the SDF within the state fill the void.

Specifically, a mounted unit could be used in a variety of ways: The unit could guard national and state monuments and historic sites; reinforce, at their request, the U.S. Park Police Horse Mounted Unit; guard sensitive sites where the visibility of a mounted patrol would be a deterrent; augment local and state police mounted patrols, at their request, to enhance those that have been stretched thin by budgetary constraints; augment, at their request, the NG and U.S. Border Patrol forces deployed during Operation Jump Start due to the rural nature of the terrain along the border with Mexico (and Canada as well).

Generally, SDF units are not armed and typically have been given missions that support the NG’s homeland security and disaster mitigation missions, which support this precept. The rules of engagement are so complex as to make the arming and training of these forces a prohibitive undertaking unless more means are made available, vis-à-vis, the State Defense Force Improvement Act H.R. 826 and there is support for this in the literature (Brinkerhoff, 2007). One source of literature presenting the history of the SDF movement, SDF activities, plans, and thoughts for the future can be found in the State Defense Force Publication Center (Hershkowitz, n.d.). One of those articles presents a guide to the many different homeland security activities for which a SDF unit might undertake in support of their NG unit (Hershkowitz, 2005).
Large Animal Rescue

During a state disaster, such as a hurricane, flood or tornado, that necessitates the evacuation of citizens homes, persons owning large animals (i.e., horses) would face the agonizing decision to abandon them. The other alternative is that they flout the local authorities’ edict, in which case their lives are in danger. In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, the fine Army Reserve cavalry unit from Michigan, the Blue Devils Horse Platoon, undertook to rescue these animals (Alan, 2005). They performed admirably, thereby presenting a mission concept that highly specialized cavalry personnel could perform competently. Increased training in handling animals and a thorough equine first aid course would be appropriate.

Cavalry Troop A, Maryland Defense Force, An Example

The Maryland Defense Force is part of the Maryland Military Department. Cavalry Troop A currently consists of twenty officers, troopers and their mounts, and reports directly to the Chief of Staff. The Troop has two missions: (1) Function in a ceremonial role for the Maryland Military Department as an aid in recruiting and public relations; and (2) Partner with Maryland agencies as a rural terrain mounted SAR asset.

It is advisable that the commander of a cavalry unit vary the unit’s training schedule so that mounts get exposed to different schooling opportunities. In this vein, MDDF Cavalry Troop A has developed a specialized and historical training program. The Troop is undergoing a saber qualification course based upon the 1926 U.S. Army course. This course has twenty targets and measures swordsmanship and horsemanship equally. Troop Deputy Commander Captain (MD) R. Hammond wrote “Troop A will never draw its M1913’s in combat, real or simulated, since the Troop members are neither combat soldiers nor living historians. Nevertheless, the Troop requires confident riders and obedient, fit mounts for the missions we do have. There is already a great deal of training in the Troop’s annual cycle, but there are few things that match the saber qualification course for confidence building and unit pride.” (Hammond, 2007). Furthermore, the United States Cavalry Association annually hosts a National Cavalry Competition. This is an event where riders can improve their equitation and skill-at-arms on horseback by competing against like minded individuals.  

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

Cavalry will continue to be of use, contrary to its detractors. Naturally, the cost of forming a mounted unit is considerable. It is this author’s opinion that the positives outweigh the negatives. While a logistically daunting undertaking, Maryland’s MDDF Cavalry Troop A began with one man and one horse.

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3 The United States Cavalry Association website can be accessed at www.uscavalry.org.

4 For further information, the Maryland Defense Force website may be accessed at www.mddefenseforce.org.
Safety should be the paramount consideration for those in a position of leadership of a fledgling mounted unit. This leader must possess a strong equestrian background of skills, and ideally should be a certified riding instructor or have a degree in an equine field as well as extremely strong organizational and communications ability.

The reinstatement of a US Army ceremonial cavalry unit, like the former 3rd U.S. Cavalry Regiment at Fort Myer, Virginia from 1921-1941 is strongly urged. Additionally, a national cavalry school and course could be constructed, not unlike in some respects the Army’s Basic Airborne Course. This intensive riding and leadership course would be no less challenging and it may be discovered that certain arcane arts, such as horsemanship and swordsmanship, can still imbue young leaders with élan and dash, just as subalterns of the cavalry have embodied for hundreds of years. The ceremonial unit and school could be housed in the same location, for maximum efficiency.

Hopefully, the horse cavalry can continue to serve a useful purpose within SDF units and in other areas of the U.S. military, carrying on the outstanding traditions of the United States Cavalry, of which this nation is so proud.

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Five years ago I addressed the State Guard Association Annual Conference in Charleston. At that time I spoke to the urgent need for tens of thousands of organized, disciplined, trained, and armed militia members to augment the National Guards of their respective states. I said that there would be emergencies that would require large numbers of armed personnel to provide for crowd control, evacuation, and maintenance of law and order. I urged the White House, Department of Defense, Department of Homeland Security, and Governors of the several states to take advantage of the low cost state defense forces to provide additional troops when needed. I charged the State Guard Association with the mission of reviving the State Defense Forces for Homeland Security. I assigned myself the same mission.

I have the unpleasant duty to tell you that I have failed, you have failed, we all have failed to accomplish the mission. In 2002, there were 11,000 active SDF personnel in 16 states and Puerto Rico. In 2007, there are 20,000 active SDF personnel in 24 states and Puerto Rico. This is some progress, but it is not enough.

There are still 26 states without state defense forces. Many of the existing state defense forces still consist mostly of senior officers and senior NCOs. Most states do not permit their state defense force members to bear arms. Some states keep their SDF units in cadre status. Not a single state has a state defense force that can provide an adequate number of organized, disciplined, trained, and armed troops to deal with a nuclear attack, an influenza pandemic, another Category Five Hurricane, a catastrophic earthquake in Missouri, or any other catastrophic emergency.

We tried. Many of you stepped up to the task and tried to gain support. Hall Worthington, Jack McNiff, Ron Markarian, Al Zapanta, John Stone, and many others of you spent valuable time in visiting the folks at the National Guard Bureau, the DOD, DHS, and the Congress. A lot of time and effort was expended.

We failed. We were unable to persuade the Federal government to take this program seriously. Despite excellent support from numerous members of Congress, we were unable to persuade Congress to enact the Home Defense Forces Improvement bill. We were unable to persuade many of the governors and their adjutants general to support the SDF. It is a sad fact that after five years of effort, most senior people in the Federal Government still have not even heard about the state defense forces.

Who opposed the SDF? As the Lord High Executioner said in The Mikado, I have a little list.

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1 The Role of the State Defense Forces in Homeland Security was presented as an address to the State Guard Association of the United States National Conference, Indianapolis, Indiana, 2007. The author required that several changes be made to the text for publication purposes.

2 Reprinted courtesy of U.S. Freedom Foundation, all rights reserved.
Strangely, the most fervent opposition to a robust SDF came from four groups that have most to gain from a robust SDF: The National Guard Bureau, Department of Defense, National Guard Association of the US, and the Adjutant Generals Association.

The most disappointing organization has been the National Guard Bureau. Although the Chief of the NGB still has responsibility for oversight of the SDT, nothing has been done so create an effective SDF program. We visited the NGB several times but to no avail. There was no interest in NGB to have a strong SDF. That meant that there has been no advocate for SDF inside DOD. Lack of NGB support has blocked progress and made it hard to obtain arms, equipment, and training support from DOD. In other respects, the National Guard has done a magnificent job in supporting overseas operations and providing for homeland security. The impromptu marshaling of NG units from other states to provide a timely military presence for the Katrina response was brilliant. The role, resources, and respect for the National Guard has grown. But The National Guard Bureau has failed us and the Nation by not finding time and energy to support a strong SDF.

Another big disappointment has been the Office of the Secretary of Defense—OSD. I visited a group of deputy assistant secretaries in the Reserve Affairs Office and presented the case for the SDF. Since I knew these people, had worked with them before, and was during my own career the acting deputy assistant secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, I assumed that they would agree with me that the need was important and that reviving to SDF to provide augmentation for the National Guard would be an easy sell. Instead, I was rebuffed rudely and my proposal was ridiculed. I can tell you I was not only disappointed but humiliated. These people laughed at the idea of allowing people like you to bear arms in defense of your home states. They have chosen instead to advocate a volunteer civilian reserve program that would stockpile specialists that could augment the military forces when needed. These civilians would, of course, be unarmed. That went nowhere, but so did DOD support for the SDF.

I also tried to get the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense to become our champion. The staff officers there were unwilling even to raise this issue with the Assistant Secretary because they told me that he had a bad experience with a senior officer of the New York Naval Militia officer right after the 911 attacks and was dead set against the SDF.

The National Guard Association did not help us. I went to the leaders of this organization and begged for their support. They turned me down and treated me to a recitation of the customary anecdotes about renegade militias and too many generals and colonels. I did hope that the NGAUS could see the merit in the SDF, but they did not then and do not to this day.

The greatest obstacle to the development of a strong SDF has been the Adjutant General Association composed of all 54 adjutants general. Even though half of the TAGs have SDF units under their command, the association has opposed the expansion of the SDF. This is a case of unwarranted solidarity that does damage to the SDF program.

Only one organization in DOD provided significant support for the SDF. The Reserve Forces Policy Board under the leadership of Al Zapanta worked hard on our behalf. Al was a magnificent leader and along with Bob Fiedler and others on his staff, was untiring in his support for the SDF. The RFPB sponsored a major event in Washington DC that ought to have sparked some interest and, but the RFBB could not prevail over the anti-SDF attitudes of officials in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
We also tried to elicit support from several of the Washington think tanks and military organizations. This effort was not successful. Most of the organizations had no idea of what we were talking about. Each had an agenda to promote and was unwilling to take on another issue. One major think tank agreed with the need for more armed troops, but wanted a federal force under DHS control instead of state troops under control of the Governors. Many simply were unwilling to credit the thought that you SDF people could be trusted to bear arms in defense of your localities.

We did try to obtain support from the Department of Homeland Security. Hall, Jack, and I visited a senior official at DHS headquarters, met with him, and never heard from him again. I recently raised the issue with senior people in FEMA and also in DHS headquarters, to no avail.

At this point it is probably a good idea to say to the representatives of the organizations that I have cited for failing to support a robust SDF program that there is nothing personal about my remarks. As Tony Soprano might say, it is just business. Actually, I speak more in sorrow than in anger. It is just that it is hard to understand why any sensible person can oppose this legal and inexpensive expansion of the Nation’s military forces in a time of grave danger.

WELL, WHAT IS THAT DANGER?

There is a significant probability of another catastrophic emergency in the near future, whether it is a terrorist attack or a natural disaster. I have spent a great amount of my time in the past five years analyzing these catastrophic emergencies. A catastrophic incident or emergency is defined in the National Response Plan as follows:

Any natural or manmade incident, including terrorism, that results in extraordinary levels of mass casualties, damage or disruption severely affecting the population, infrastructure, environment, economy, national morale, and/or government functions. A catastrophic event could result in sustained national impacts over a prolonged period of time; almost immediately exceeds resources normally available to State, local, tribal, and private-sector authorities in the impact area; and significantly interrupts government operations and emergency services to such an extent that national security would be threatened.

The Catastrophic Incident Supplement to the NRP says further that a catastrophic emergency will require immediate and proactive action by the Federal Government.

I am going to discuss five potential catastrophic emergencies in brief. The scenarios I will mention are a nuclear attack, an influenza pandemic, the New Madrid Earthquake, a prolonged power outage in a metropolitan area, and prolonged disruption of electronic communications.

A Nuclear Detonation

The most serious threat is a nuclear attack on a major metropolitan area. This is Scenario Number one of the fifteen standard national planning scenarios issued by the Homeland Security Council to provide a common basis for national planning and preparedness.

The concept of operations for managing the consequences of a nuclear detonation calls for organizing the space around the point of detonation into three zones.
The Primary Zone will encompass the direct blast and thermal effects of the detonation and also the primary alpha, gamma, and beta radiation. During the response, this Primary Zone will be defined and sealed off with a cordon to prevent egress by untrained and unequipped persons and to receive and process survivors who can leave the primary zone. The Primary Zone will contain the bulk of the structural damage and the immediate fires from the thermal effects, although there may be secondary fires outside the Primary Zone. For a 10kt weapon, the Primary Zone will have a radius of about two miles. Depending on population density for a city and the time of detonation, about 200,000 people will be killed inside the Primary Zone. In effect, the idea is to lay siege to the Primary Zone and move the perimeter inward as the radiation decays.

The Fallout Zone will encompass the area affected by gamma radiation emanating from fallout particles borne aloft. The explosion will cause small particles to be borne by winds aloft and deposited there. The radiation intensity is greatest near the point of detonation and decreases thereafter. There is no physical damage in the Fallout Zone. Again depending on population density, there could be about one million people or more who have to take shelter or evacuate the Fallout Zone. The major thrust of the entire response operation is to help these million people avoid a dangerous dose of ionizing radiation. That means that we have to be able to measure the intensity of radiation, predict the path of the fallout plume, and establish cordons around the Fallout Zone to prevent people from moving into the radiation and provide a means of processing, decontaminating, and treating people who evacuate the Fallout Zone. We advocate a mixed survival strategy for people in the Fallout Zone that includes both sheltering and evacuation in an orderly manner. This requires that we be able to communicate with the people and conduct a phased evacuation. For a 10kt weapon, the length of the Fallout Zone could be as great as 200 miles. The idea is to get as many people as possible out of the zone before they receive a dangerous dose of ionizing radiation.

There is also a Secondary Zone that will serve as a base area to support the response operation and to shelter the people who are evacuated from the Fallout Zone. This area will also be cordoned off to limit the movement of evacuees, who might be suffering from radiation illness from leaving the Secondary Zone and to prevent entry into the Secondary Zone of unauthorized persons who will increase workload in that zone and complicate the working of the response operation. The secondary zone population could be as much as six million people, who would have to be able to accommodate the one million refugees. The idea is to limit the effects of the explosion so that the rest of the Nation will not be impacted.

The parts of the United States outside the Secondary Zone will be in a state of increased alert and even panic. Authorities will anticipate a second attack and citizens will be afraid. This means that lateral reinforcement programs such as the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) that draws forces from other states will not work.

Managing the response to this nuclear detonation will require 200,000 or more organized, trained, and disciplined responders, about half of whom would have to be armed to do their jobs. Armed personnel are needed to form and enforce the cordons around the Primary Zone, Fallout Zone, and Secondary Zone, to manage the evacuation, secure response personnel processing evacuees, protect shelters and camps for evacuees, and maintain law and order within the Secondary Zone. This demand can be met only by law enforcement officers, active duty and reserve military troops, National Guard troops, and armed members of State Defense Forces.
In the response to a nuclear detonation, the first few hours are of critical importance. The response operation will essentially be over after the first 48 hours. All who can be saved will have been saved by that time. The rest will die of injuries or exposure to radiation—sooner or later. This reality places a premium on rapid response. The first actions will be taken by the local responders. The initial reinforcements will be state resources, including nearby National Guard elements and SDF units. Federal resources will arrive on the scene as rapidly as they can. They cannot wait until asked for but must as proceed instantly and automatically as soon as the nuclear weapon detonates.

At present there are too few organized, trained, and disciplined responders available to meet the demand in the first 48 hours. There are not going to be enough armed troops available rapidly to provide an adequate response when they are needed most. Filling that gap in armed responders is the duty of the State Defense Forces. Local militia units organized, equipped, trained, and armed can provide what is essential for the first hours after a nuclear detonation. Acting on pre-scripted assignments, these units can help the local and state police set up the cordons, patrol the evacuation routes, respond to civil unrest, and secure key facilities. It might be possible also to enable the local SDF units to help in measuring radiation intensity and delivering emergency public information. This is the most demanding emergency the nation faces.

The Government is making a great effort to interdict nuclear weapons before they can get into the United States. However, let me tell you that it would be foolish to assume that dedicated terrorists would not try to do this. It would be doubly foolish to assume they cannot succeed. If they do detonate a nuclear weapon in the United States, and we have not prepared to minimize the effects of the explosion, we will have failed the nation.

I want to explore for a minute why we do not prepare for this emergency or for other catastrophic emergencies. It is a matter of attitude. Many people would rather deal with the known and familiar hazards and are reluctant to address the big ones. It was obvious for years that a Category Four Hurricane would strike New Orleans and that the levees were weak, but only a few hard core members of the Emergency Management Community took that possibility seriously.

I want to share with you’re a story that illustrates the difficulty of getting people to support an armed SDF.

In November 2005 I went to Columbus, Ohio at the request of Michael Moran, a member of the Ohio Military Reserve Association, to support the efforts of Moran and others to improve the Ohio Military Reserve. The occasion was a hearing of the Ohio Military Reserve and Homeland Security Study Commission. The objective of this exercise was to persuade the Ohio General Assembly to provide for modernizing the authorizing legislation for the Ohio Military Reserve and provide funding for expansion of the strength of that organization. My role was to testify before the Commission and advise them of the need for Ohio to have a strong SDF. The Commission included the Director of Homeland Security, the Adjutant General, Director of Public Safety, two Senators, and three Representatives.

I told the Commission that a strong, organized, disciplined, trained, and armed Ohio Military Reserve was essential in an age of terrorism. I spoke about the effects of a 10kt nuclear detonation in Chicago. I explained that the Fallout Zone for such an attack would extend eastward from Chicago across Northern Indiana and Ohio to Toledo, Ohio. Thousands of Hoosiers and Ohioans would be fleeing southward to escape the radiation threat. I had done my homework and pointed out that the combined resources available to the Governor of Ohio in the form of state police and National Guard
would be inadequate to manage that situation. I said the Ohio needed a strong, armed SDF of tens of thousands of armed troops to deal with that kind of emergency. I also noted that such a volunteer force would be of great value to Ohio for lesser emergencies.

The efforts Mike Moran and his colleagues were to no avail. The leadership of Ohio would not support a strong SDF. All that Moran wanted was to achieve legitimacy and have a cadre force of about 1,500 unarmed members and a miniscule budget. I had suggested an armed force of about 30,000. None of this was achieved. The Commission decided not to do anything for the Ohio Military Reserve. The greatest opponent of the enhanced SDF for Ohio was the Adjutant General, who said that he could do it all with the National Guard and did not need any help. I was distressed by this view. Upon reflection, I concluded that in addition to turf and money problems, the Adjutant General and most of the others did not believe there would ever be a nuclear attack in Chicago.

The problem is with attitude. Complacency is not a virtue for those charged with defending the United States. To be truly effective, responders have to believe that emergencies will truly occur.

**Influenza Pandemic**

An Influenza Pandemic with the Avian Flu H5N1 virus could be more devastating than even a nuclear detonation. We know the Avian Flu virus has infected a lot of birds and that it has already been transmitted from birds to other animals and in a few cases from birds and animals to humans. When that happens, it is possible for the Avian Flu to affect the entire country very quickly. The pandemic will spread in two waves. The first wave will last about three months and attack mostly healthy young adults. There will be an inter-pandemic period of about three months, and then the second wave will start and last about two months and attack mostly older adults. As it spreads, the virus will mutate and shift to new forms that cannot be predicted in advance but can be determined only by isolating and identifying each new strain. Depending on the number of patients that become infected, the effects will range from 90,000 to 210,000 dead, 300,000 to 700,000 hospitalizations, 18 million to 40 million outpatients, and total infections of from 38 million to 93 million people. Whether the workload is the upper limit or the lower limit or something in between depends on how the response is conducted.

The public health and health care delivery system cannot deal effectively with this kind of pandemic. Vaccinations will not stop the spread of the disease because the correct vaccine cannot be made until the exact virus is identified. Once the causal virus is isolated, it will take six to nine months to produce the appropriate vaccine. Even if an H5N1 vaccine is stockpiled in advance, it might not be effective. Even if it is effective, it will be impossible to vaccinate more than about 10% of the population.

The public health and health care delivery systems will be overwhelmed. The number of physicians, nurses, and other health care professionals is finite and cannot be expanded enough to cope with the workload. The number of hospital beds with supporting paraphernalia in the United States is also finite, and there will be too few beds to cope with the workload. There are only about one million hospital beds in the United States, and almost all of these are already occupied.

Medical professionals realize they cannot stop this pandemic. Their best advice is to wear a mask and wash your hands frequently. Even the palliative medicines, such as TamiFlu are inadequate to the task.
This means that a major emphasis has to be made on stopping the transmission of the virus and reducing the rates of infection at least to a manageable level and perhaps stopping the spread of the virus entirely. The experience with the Spanish Influenza Pandemic of 1918 suggests that quarantine or isolation works well in stopping the spread of the disease.

Present plans call for states to call for voluntary quarantines. I suspect that in the real event, the states will impose mandatory quarantines. When quarantine is imposed, the major problems are how to sustain the people after stocks of food are exhausted, how to distribute medicines, and how to perform vaccinations. Doing these things will be a major challenge for emergency managers and medical people.

The law enforcement community with the help of the National Guard and State Defense Forces will have to enforce the quarantines and maintain law and order. Foolish people will refuse to obey the rules of the quarantine and wander about carelessly spreading the virus. Desperate people will use force to obtain scarce vaccines and medicines. Hungry people will take it upon themselves to obtain food for themselves and their families. Angry people will take out their anger on medical and other people trying to help them. Criminals and street gangs will take advantage of the situation to enrich themselves.

During such a pandemic each governor will need a large number of organized, disciplined, trained, and armed troops to help law enforcement agencies enforce the quarantines and provide security for those who the spread of the disease and see that supplies of scarce commodities are distributed fairly to all. A strong SDF will be needed.

The New Madrid Earthquake

This is a very real possibility. If a magnitude 8.0 earthquake occurs along the central portion of the Mississippi River Valley, the consequences would be wide-ranging and serious. This has been a concern of emergency managers for years, and FEMA is now engaged in preparing a plan to deal with it.

The consequences will be severe. All the bridges across the Mississippi River from Cairo to St Louis will be down. Roads and bridges in seven states will be damaged. Pipelines and electrical cables will be down. Transportation will be at a standstill. Millions of people will be left without essential services. Thousands will be injured by collapsing structures, and many more will be left temporarily homeless. The damage and disruption will be great.

A good concept for managing this catastrophic emergency is to ask all residents to remain in their localities instead of trying to move outside of the affected area. Search and rescue operations will be conducted on a local basis, and localities will have to deal with casualties from the effects of the earthquake. Essential supplies and services and additional responders would be brought into the affected states from outside private sector and federal resources and private sector resources under Federal management. This will preclude having thousands of persons on the highways trying to leave and making it difficult for outside help to get to the survivors inside the affected states.

In this kind of situation, there will be numerous instances of violence. The local police will be overwhelmed, and the governors of the affected states will have to provide National Guard and SDF forces to assist in the immediate response tasks and in the subsequent delivery and distribution of essential goods and services. While Federal forces will be used, much of their effort will be on the logistics of providing support. Responsibility for maintaining law and order and securing the responders
will fall on the governors. They will need to have strong SDF units with organized, disciplined, trained, and armed troops to augment the police and National Guard forces.

A Prolonged Power Outage

It would be relatively easy for a terrorist group to cause a widespread power outage either by physical means or by a cyber attack. If this occurs, there would be widespread disruption of essential services and distribution of essential goods. We all depend on electrical power for what we do. We cannot pump gas without power. We cannot work in offices, keep cool, or keep warm without power. We cannot communicate or do business without power.

If such an outage lasts for a few hours, it is a nuisance. If the outage lasts a few days, it is an irritant. If the outage lasts for a few weeks, it is an emergency. If the outage extends over a large region, those in the interior will not have recourse to support from areas with power. A few families and a few businesses will have backup generators. People living in houses with solar panels can get by. But the rest of us will have to do without.

Imagine if you will what your neighborhood would be like if the power were out for six weeks. Cars will run out of gas. Food would spoil. Neighbors could turn mean. Street gangs could rove the streets doing bad things. After food, water, and medicine, your most important need would be for security, which can be provided only by the police or troops.

The concept of the response operation for this catastrophic emergency is to provide essential survival goods—food, water, and medicine—to those without power. The policy will be to ask people to stay in their homes and wait for help to come to them. Large numbers of people will try to self-evacuate to areas with power, thus impeding the influx of supplies and workers and equipment to restore the power supply. So a major challenge for the authorities will be to enforce the stay in place policy, assure fair distribution of essential supplies, and maintain law and order. The police will be overwhelmed. Governors will have to deploy their National Guard and State Defense Forces to augment the police within their respective states.

A Prolonged Disruption of Electronic Communications

The final catastrophic emergency I will address is a prolonged disruption of electronic communications. This would be similar to the prolonged power outage but greater in scope and even more disastrous in its consequences. It is possible to survive for a time without power using the old fashioned way. Few of you can even envision what it would be like to live without the internet and cell phones for a long time.

We are very vulnerable to the failure of electronic devices. We have abandoned the old methods that were used before electronic devices appeared. Most of us have lost the skills necessary to function in a non-electronic world.

As a society we have become very dependent, perhaps overly dependent on the internet and electronic systems to manage data and to communicate. When those systems fail massively it would be a catastrophic emergency.
It is no secret that our systems are subjected to millions of cyber attacks daily. Most of these are thwarted before they can do great harm, but some do cause damage and money.

If our economy and society are suddenly deprived of electronic communications, the disruption of will provoke disorder and provide a fertile field for criminals and some normally law abiding citizens driven to rage by frustration. This condition on a regional or national basis will soon become too hard for the police, and troops will be needed to help maintain order and provide security while we reestablish systems and learn to cope with a world without the internet, cell phones, and electronic systems of all kinds. This is yet another situation for which the existing of a strong SDF with organized, disciplined, trained and armed troops would be very useful.

There are other catastrophic and lesser emergencies in which the SDF can play an important role. But in order to have an adequate SDF, some things have to be done.

**WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE**

There certainly is a persuasive case for having a large number of SDF troops available to the Governors to deal with catastrophic emergencies as well as lesser emergencies. It is up to all of us to see that this case is made the basis for persuading the governors to sponsor and fund such a program.

I will address three of the controversial issues that plague the SDF community. They are whether the SDF is to be armed or not; whether the SDF is to be a cadre or at full strength; and the overall strength of the SDF.

**Arming the State Defense Forces**

To Arm or not to Arm? That is the question that gets to the bottom of what the SDF is to be. Some TAGs want the SDF to be nothing more than a source of low-cost help to perform administrative work and provide support services. They perceive the proper role of the SDF is to do some low priority programs for the Guard such as taking care of the armories—sort of a supplementary caretaker group. That is not my image. An unarmed SDF cannot perform the security and response missions for which the SDF is needed and which is the sole basis for having the SDF in the first place. An unarmed militia is an oxymoron.

Except for the Naval Militia, which truly has the right idea on this issue, none of the numerous competing volunteer organizations envision arming their members. They resemble what we old soldiers would characterize as camp followers whose duties were to wash the clothes and cook the food for those in the ranks. Indeed, it may be a good idea to provide unarmed civilians to provide some of the support for the National Guard that DOD has failed to provide, but that is not the proper role of the State Defense Forces.

The Nation has many law enforcement officers to enforce the law and maintain order. There are about a million sworn police officers in the United States. This number has remained stable for a decade despite increasing population and crime. There are also almost a million criminals and members of violent street gangs in the United States. The balance between the cops and the criminals is precarious even in normal times. When a catastrophic emergency occurs, the police will need help. That help can be provided only by military forces trained and armed to perform security duty. These military forces can come from Federal active duty and reserve units, from the National Guards of the several states, and
from the State Defense forces—provided the SDF troops are trained and equipped with weapons appropriate for their role.

Numerous other volunteer organizations exist to provide specialized services for emergency response. The Red Cross is one. The Disaster Response Medical System is another. The Neighborhood Watch is still another. The Civil Air Patrol and the Coast Guard Auxiliary perform valuable services and can do so without being armed. The Citizen Corps sponsored by DHS offers willing Americans an opportunity to participate in Homeland Security programs by performing a variety of jobs—none of which require them to be armed. If an individual objects to serving in an armed force, he or she should join one of these civilian organizations.

Often, when I mention the need for armed SDF, someone says that you SDF members are not to be trusted with weapons. One retired regular major general said he doubted whether you SDF members would be capable or qualifying with your weapons on a range. Another senior person said that arming you would be a threat to the nation. Many members of the National Guard and some Adjutants General with SDF units oppose arming your troops.

Those who oppose arming the SDF also offer some practical objections. There is the additional burden of storing arms and ammunition, conducting weapons training, and assuring that weapons safety is maintained. Some fear consequences of accidents and the liability issues that could result from them. Some fear that armed militia men will go on a rampage in the woods and kill or wound civilians. These arguments appear to be excuses to avoid arming the SDF. These same objections apply to the National Guard itself. None of the objections are sufficient reason either to disarm the National Guard or deny weapons to the SDF.

All of these are excuses to avoid arming the SDF, but they are not good enough to offset the need for organized, disciplined, trained, and armed troops when they are needed. Such arguments reflect badly on you. You have among your ranks veterans of active and reserve duty with many years of military service and experience. How do you feel about being labeled as either too incompetent or too untrustworthy or both to command and train your soldiers to bear arms in defense of the Nation?

The US is awash with handguns, rifles, and even some heavy weapons in the hands of gangs, illegal militias, and other unauthorized criminal groups. The bad guys will have arms, and experience indicates they will use them for their own advantage. Sworn law enforcement officers are responsible for maintaining law and order, but there will be too few of them to maintain law and order during and after a catastrophic emergency. National Guard troops will have arms, but they also will be too few to do it all during and after a catastrophic emergency. Federal troops will be armed, but they will arrive at the scene after a delay. The need is for more organized, disciplined, trained, and armed troops—and that is the role of the SDF.

I said before and I say again that sending unarmed SDF troops out to enforce cordons, secure critical assets, manage evacuations, provide security for firefighters and medical teams, and suppress civil disorders would amount to criminal negligence.

Finally, I ask that you ponder this proposition. It is far better to have arms and not need them than to need arms and not have them.
Cadres or Full Strength?

I note with sadness and disbelief that some states have adopted a policy of maintaining their SDF units at cadre strength with the expectation that they will be able to recruit, train, and bring their units to full strength in time to do some good. This will not work.

I can just picture it now. And I want you to think about it also. A nuclear weapon has just detonated in Washington DC. The chief of staff of the Virginia National Guard rushes into the AG’s office and says breathlessly: General, Washington DC has just been attacked with a nuclear weapon. What do we do now? The AG then says, “Send out the recruiters to bring the Virginia Defense Force to full strength!” I think not.

It is the nature of catastrophic emergencies to be unforgiving of delayed responses. The attacks will occur without warning or with little warning. There may be warning of some disasters but too little advance notice to spend six to ten weeks bringing the State Defense Force to full strength.

The only pseudo-advantage of cadre units is to provide the illusion of readiness without the reality.

For catastrophic emergencies in particular and for lesser emergencies as well, it is absolutely necessary to be fully prepared in advance. That means that the SDF units must be at full strength, fully equipped, have access to stockpiled supplies, and trained and rehearsed on pre-scripted responses to catastrophic emergencies.

Strength of the SDF

Finally, there ought to be some strength goals to pursue. The present situation of 25 units sharing 20,000 active members is unsatisfactory. That amounts to an average of 800 active members per state. This is far too few members to provide adequate support for a response to a catastrophic emergency.

My own initial strength goal would be to have 300,000 armed active members of the SDF nationwide. This is an average of only about 6,000 per state. Surely that is a feasible goal.

The current small strength of the SDF is due to more to self-inflicted budgetary wounds and worries about administrative burden rather than difficulties of recruiting and retention. Recruiting will succeed if it is tried. Retention will succeed if the troops are given realistic training and important missions.

There are large numbers of trained veterans of the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan that have left active duty, do not want to join the National Guard or a Federal Reserve Component, but would like to help provide for the security of the United States in some way. These prior-service personnel could be integrated into SDF units, undergo some refresher training, and be ready to serve. Many of these people will be NCOs and junior officers, but the tables of organization can be modified to have a grade structure that could accommodate them.

The rationale for the initial goal of 300,000 active members is that this is about half of the strength of the Army and Air National Guards. The future employment of the National Guard on Federal active duty to support the conduct of the war on terror is not known, but the policy has been that each governor will have at least half of his or her National Guard available for Homeland Defense and Civil
Support missions. We don’t know the future, but it is prudent to assume that the National Guard will continue to contribute large numbers of units and individuals to the Army and Air Force respectively.

A strength of 300,000 active members will solve a lot of problems. The SDF will become a recognized and reputable contributor to Homeland Security instead of a little known, ineffective fringe group. The stigma attached by some to a force considered by some to consist mostly of self-styled generals and colonels will vanish. As the strength of the SDF increases, the value of this military force in lesser emergencies will be even more apparent. The National Guard may even recognize the value of their SDF units and accept the SDF soldiers as comrades.

In particular, the increased strength at low cost will be welcomed by Governors when they face emergencies beyond their capacity to manage. If Louisiana, Alabama, and Mississippi had large SDFs, the late arrival of Federal troops for the Katrina Emergency would not have been so damaging to the response. As it was, the use of 5,000 SDF personnel mostly from other states was very useful in the Katrina response operation.

A strong SDF would or should be welcomed by DOD. The increased capability of Governors to deal with attacks and disasters would allow the states to deal with more emergencies without needing federal help. When, as will be the case for catastrophic emergencies, Federal resources and troops will be needed immediately, the presence of strong SDF units in the incident area will fill the needs until the Federal troops arrive.

Another factor is that the ability and perhaps the intention of DOD to have the President federalize all of the National Guard elements in an affected state will strip the governors of any resources needed to support his or her own operations. In that event, the SDF will be the only military forces available to the Governors. If that occurs, a governor is certain to wish that he or she had done the right thing for the SDF before the emergency occurred. It is up to us to relieve governors from that prospect.

WHAT DOES THE FUTURE HOLD FOR THE SDF?

The SDF program is at a critical juncture. The State Guard Association has to take some action. You have to decide whether you are in business to advocate and lobby for a strong, armed militia or to continue to maintain an unsatisfactory status quo. Taking action for a strong SDF will not be an easy task. You have few allies. You need to develop champions for a strong SDF. There are individuals out there, some with great stature, that realize the importance of a strong SDF and will work with you to make that happen. You need to provide leadership and a focal point for all of individuals. In particular, you have the ability to influence the governors and the adjutants general who can make their SDFs valuable assets if they want to.

The title of this talk is The Role of the State Defense Forces in Homeland Security. In my view, that role is to provide large numbers of organized, disciplined, trained, and armed troops to augment the police, National Guard troops, and federal troops in anticipation of and in response to catastrophic emergencies. It is up to you members of the State Guard Association to assure that the State Defense Forces are adequate to perform this role.
GENERAL

The American public is besieged with the uncertainty of terrorism and the next terrorist attack. Is the reason economic, social, political, religious, or is there no reason at all for it? Steven Deitz, American playwright and dramatist suggests that “A people who’s primary aims are driving, shopping, and television are subject to terrorism at any time.” 1 Unfortunately, whatever the reason, there are global Salafist extremists who have already attacked America and are regularly threatening to continue their acts of terror. What’s to be done, what’s to be done?!?

Fortunately, the American public has an option for combating all forms of terrorism. It begins with learning about and understanding the terrorists’ mode of organization, their motivation, where they congregate and recruit, and how they select their targets. Once equipped with this understanding, the citizen volunteer must learn how to observe and recognize possible terrorist activities and to differentiate between innocent members of the community and the truly potential terrorist activity. Finally, the citizen volunteer must know who to contact with this information and how to present that information (also known as intelligence) in a way that the proper authorities can make use of that intelligence.

INTRODUCTION TO TERRORISM

Imagine three males of seemingly Mid-Eastern descent seen driving around locally in a late model van, stopping periodically for no apparent reason, or walking in the local mall or sporting event acting suspiciously. What to do? What should be done?

These, and many other questions, have been asked by average citizens and students during lectures on terrorism, and its continued and ever increasing presence here in the United States. As local and state law enforcement agencies begin to train on identifying, preventing and reacting to the militant Islamic extremists, it is becoming more apparent that this newest threat to our homeland will require a tremendous amount of assistance from the average citizen. This much needed support from the citizens of the various communities can only come as a result of education in the identification phase of our homeland security measures.

Defining Terrorism

As this newest threat continues to penetrate our porous borders and the terrorist leaders assimilate themselves within the general public of our society, it becomes necessary to find a working definition of terrorism to have and use as an effective tool. It is this elusive definition that has had a direct and debilitating impact on the struggle to identify and defeat terrorist attacks thus far. At every level of

government, there are multiple definitions for the act of terrorism leading to considerable confusion. Instead, it is possible to identify this new enemy through the application of terrorist-guerrilla warfare, which is, “...the deliberate use of violence against a person or persons using guerrilla warfare tactics in an effort to achieve political, ideological, or religious goals.” With this working definition, it is possible to more readily identify the forms of terrorism facing this country and develop a proposal at the strategic and tactical levels to combat any terrorist operation within the U.S.

Operational Phases of Terroristic-Guerrilla Warfare

Now, with a good starting point, it would serve to better understand a theoretical approach as to how terrorist cells penetrate a particular community and patiently plan and execute their future attacks. Terrorist cells within the U.S. operate under the following seven phases in preparation of executing their terrorist-guerrilla warfare tactics (Note: All seven phases might not be used all the time and some of them might occur out of the order presented in this article.):

Preparation  –  Terrorist groups look for a location from which to base their operations and begin recruiting. Community selection and socioeconomic structure are two critical factors in their choice of location. The socioeconomic structure of a community is crucial to a cell’s intelligence preparation in a given area of operation. Understanding the sociological elements of a given city, along with its economical structure, is critical for terrorists attempting to exploit and undermine a social system while recruiting for their cause. People from every level of the social strata, from the educated to the unschooled and from the social elite to the criminal derelicts are potentially subject to the recruitment techniques of these local cells. Location is critical as they require an environment conducive to recruiting as well as privacy for planning their attacks.

Initial Contact  –  Over time, the organizational structure begins to take shape and positions within the cell are filled with recruits from the local community. In order to recruit locals to meet their specific needs, cell members set clandestine operations in motion to begin identifying those who meet the special needs within a particular cell. While looking for those individuals who might meet their strategic and tactical needs for future terrorist operations, cell members integrate themselves into the daily lives of their target population with absolute discretion, giving the appearance of the average U.S. citizen residing in “Anytown, USA.” Once they have comfortably maneuvered themselves into the everyday events of their chosen community, then, and only then, will they begin their initial contact.

Infiltration  –  Infiltration is defined as complete submersion into a society. A critical factor for the development of the cell’s structure in this stage is the process of isolating promising recruits in U.S. society who may harbor ill feelings toward either the current government or Christians and Jews. They begin to quietly spread their religious and political ideologies as a more

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acceptable alternative to the democratic governments in the evil empire of the Western world. Militant Islamic terrorist cells are building mosques and other infrastructures designed to quietly train U.S.-born Muslims and others throughout the U.S. to engage in a continuing jihad (holy war) against the U.S. way of life in order to impose a worldwide Islamic rule.

Organization – Once the infiltration phase has been positively established in an area of operations deemed satisfactory to the needs of the newly formed insurgent group, the terrorist cell’s organization begins to take shape. With decentralized cells working toward a common objective, those caught during the commission of an illegal act are unable to give any operational intelligence on other sections of their cell or on the existence of other cells. A terrorist cell evolves in both size and sophistication as new recruits enter their training and progress to any of the cell’s three organizational forces: auxiliary, intelligence and operational. A cell’s organizational structure can vary from this suggested configuration but will have similar characteristics, regardless of the structural framework.

Buildup – Although the name of this phase implies there is a massing or increase in size of the cell, the size will vary with each location (and sociological environment), organization and intended mission. Twenty-first century terrorist cells located within the U.S. are organized in small and illusive elements more suitable to meet their needs for conducting covert operations at every phase of their insurgency. Furthermore, recruits with special skills are also scrutinized more heavily when considered for recruitment, unlike the average guerrilla fighter in previous wars. Understanding this philosophy is critical for law enforcement agencies throughout the country that must identify and disrupt terrorist cells within their jurisdictions. On the basis of its beliefs, leadership, teachings, training, and geographical and social conditions, each organization will adapt to its natural surroundings and begin to take its own shape over time.

Combat Employment – Once a cell has determined that it is time to conduct combat operations, plans will become actions set into motion with finite precision, leaving little room for identification or interception by first responders. The asymmetric actions of typical guerilla warfare are a product of months of detailed planning, resourcing, organizing and rehearsing. Once this phase has begun, law enforcement agencies and other first responders enter a mode of emergency management, while the perpetrators - if not killed in the attack themselves - take measures to avoid capture or any lasting damage to the remaining terror network members.

Demobilization – Demobilization during guerrilla warfare is more likely to occur in the form of a dismembering of the operational cell responsible for the actual terrorist attacks -that is, if the members do not die for their cause (e.g., homicide bombings) or are caught during the commission of their criminal act. It could also be concluded that the parent cell itself could stand down and relocate to another area or region if the situation proved dangerous to its existence and execution of Usama bin Laden’s second fatwa. The organization’s decentralized operational control allows the separate cells to function independently, providing uninterrupted and continuous operations. To successfully terminate a local cell’s operational status, a way must
found to demobilize the actual base facilities (e.g., mosques, school and training camps) where they recruit, train, plan and project terror against their intended targets.

**HOW TO IDENTIFY A POTENTIAL TERRORIST**

During any of the beginning phases of a terrorist operation, there is a chance one or more of their cell members can be identified and apprehended as they move about freely. Most citizens might be convinced that a definitive profile would prove the easiest way to find and identify a terrorist, but a qualitative profile (e.g., male, of Muslim descent, between 21-40 years of age) is all but impossible to offer up to the general public without the fear of causing undo problems with those innocents living in the Muslim-American communities. While this type of profiling has worked in the past with serial rapists and killers, hostage takers and potential suicide victims, it is not advisable to rely on the same identifying factors for terrorists; thus, it is possible to profile terrorists and their organizations with quantitative data. Such numeric data does not necessarily provide law enforcement and other first responder agencies with enough information to definitively identify a potential attacker.

Another concern in offering the general public a profile of a potential terrorist directly relates back to the “Red Scare” of the McCarthy era from 1950-1954. The thought that neighbors and fellow workers fall within the general profile of a terrorist is exactly what must be avoided. What should be determined is suspicious activity, things that look out of the ordinary from everyday occurrences. Situational awareness of the neighborhoods and new individuals seen around businesses and housing areas are a couple of examples of how the citizen volunteer could potentially identify terrorists living among the citizenry and studying their cultural and daily habits. By this time, the profile may sound exactly like the characteristics of a stalker, a rapist, or a serial murderer. The point is that while all criminals are not terrorists, all terrorists are in fact criminals and will display the very same discriminative qualities to the average citizen.

**PROTECTING AGAINST BECOMING A VICTIM**

On several occasions, the terms antiterrorism and counterterrorism have been used as exchangeable terms, but they are distinctly different. Antiterrorism is defensive and passive in nature and includes physical security measures such a lighting, fencing, alarms and security guards. Counterterrorism, on the other hand, is more offensive and active, almost aggressive. In protecting against becoming a victim, the citizen is enacting antiterrorism measures in his daily life and he should begin with his own domicile.

Simple things such as protecting a home with alarm systems, living in gated communities with contracted security, increasing outdoor lighting at night or fencing in the yard will increase the odds against potential terrorist activity. While traveling away from home, try varying daily routes to work and school. Also consider changing times of travel. Pay attention to the surroundings and take note of anything out of the ordinary. Ensure that a cellular phone is readily available to call first responders if needed.

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THE CITIZEN'S ROLE IN FIGHTING AGAINST TERRORISM

All of these suggestions might appear sophomoric at first glance, but the average citizen is not trained in these fundamental security and observation skills. Notice that everything suggested is preventative. The average citizen can assist local law enforcement agencies to collect intelligence that might prove valuable in a collective effort. Any information gathered and shared could lead to a potential investigation of a local terrorist cell.

That average citizen, while possibly alert to his surroundings, is not trained to prevent a terrorist attack once an overt act has been initiated. It is during the prevention stage where the volunteer citizen can play a critical role in protecting neighborhoods and cities. By acting together, the volunteer citizens can become an impromptu community policing agency in direct support of the local law enforcement agency. In a collaborative effort to protect the infrastructure and citizens of a given community, these volunteers, with the proper training, can become an extension of any local law enforcement agency.

This particular effort directly relates to the ability of citizen leadership to properly train the citizen volunteer in the understanding of terrorism and its mujahiden warriors, and in how to identify, deter and subsequently defeat this national enemy. This training should include areas such as communications, threat identification, weapons proficiency and less than lethal courses of action. To better facilitate this training, police departments should welcome the opportunity to conduct joint operations in conjunction with these citizen volunteers and seek the appropriate state and/or local legislation affording the much needed directives to enable this inevitable blanket of protection.

Therein lies the problem. Unless such legislation is already in effect, the likelihood of being passed is low. What is needed is a recognized group of citizen volunteers already covered by such legislation. The State Defense Force (SDF), a United States Code Title 10 authorized volunteer military unit, which reports to the Governor through the State Adjutant General, meets that criteria.

THE STATE DEFENSE FORCE AS A SOURCE FOR COMBATING TERRORISM

Although the SDF would be an excellent choice for such an assignment, it is highly unlikely at the present time that such an assignment would be approved. There are already many National Guard and the state Emergency Management Agency needs for which the SDF can provide support. Most SDF units do not have sufficient personnel to perform these identified critical missions to permit this new concept of supporting local police departments in community based anti-terrorism activities.

There are some SDF units that do perform homeland defense missions; however, the literature only contains one article that describes the activities and performance of a homeland security mission. This article relates how the South Carolina State Guard’s Homeland Defense Brigade determined the need for statewide support for public safety, public health and emergency preparedness. The result of their effort was the development of a database of community volunteers for police chiefs, sheriffs and emergency preparedness agencies across the state.5

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There are, however, examples in the literature of SDF units providing medical and health support. It is based on this history of community support by citizen volunteers that it may be possible to support a community based anti-terrorism program.

**Volunteer Citizen Soldiers**

Even though it is unlikely at the present time for a SDF unit to undertake an anti-terrorism effort, the demonstrated desire to support and protect the community and its citizens is a resource that should be considered. These citizen soldiers are all proven volunteers and have the discipline that allows them to accept and complete the mission.

State and/or municipal officials should consider forming a group of SDF personnel in their civilian capacity as a part of their local police department within one of the department’s divisions, possibly entitled the Volunteer and Community Services. This group can then obtain the necessary training, prepare a community plan for observing and for reporting what may be critical intelligence.

**Training the Citizen Volunteer in Anti-Terrorism**

Training can come from the military to local police departments and to civilian contractors. While military training has proven the most viable form of preparation in overseas operations, it has had minimal, if any, impact in protecting against terrorism in the U.S. What has been validated thus far are the tactics used by law enforcement agencies. By taking their current techniques to identify and apprehend the average criminal and making the necessary adjustments to apply that template to terrorist operations, local police have identified the necessary steps to prevent the next attack through the use of community policing.

The “X” factor in training to defeat terrorism is the civilian contractor. In the age of the September 12th terrorism expert, multiple agencies have opened for business with the intent of sharing their ideas of what a terrorist threat looks like and how this nation can prevent future attacks. Finding a company that has a thorough understanding of the psychological perspective of an Islamic extremist and the ultimate goals of an attack against innocent civilians is the key to successfully preparing your

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forces to protect porous U.S. borders. In preparing to successfully defend against terrorism, the following areas should be covered:

- Understanding the methods and mindset of a terrorist
- Identifying Salafi networks in the United States
- How to properly gain and use intelligence
- How Jihadis recruit
- The potential for terrorist organization to work with local gangs
- Tactical responses specific to terrorist situations
- Crisis management operational phases
  - Prevention
  - Response
  - Recovery

**Application of the Training**

This impromptu group of volunteer citizen soldiers should petition the local or regional police department to establish a Volunteers In Police Service (VIPS) Project in support of the local or regional homeland security effort. The expanded project effort could be referred to as the Volunteers In Police Service for Homeland Security and would be responsible for integrating all volunteer efforts in homeland security within the area. Once established, the police department leadership should enable the following activities, some of which are required under the VIPS grant (suggested activities are adapted from a proposal to the COPS Program):

- Appoint a police officer who will then register the program with the USA Freedom Corps.
- Identify a law enforcement officer familiar with tactical and strategic planning activities associated with homeland security to be assigned the additional duty of project Coordinator of Law Enforcement Activities. The Coordinator will arrange for a law enforcement response to observed potential threats to homeland security.
- Arrange for two senior project members to attend the mandatory COPS Office VIPS-related training.
- Identify suitable training sources in accordance with the seven (7) areas identified above for the citizen volunteers and appropriate police officers.
- Survey and integrate all volunteer homeland security activities within the police department.

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Determine events that may pose a homeland security danger within the local or regional area that can be readily identified and reported by the citizen volunteers.

Identify and meet with community groups to explain the potential dangers to homeland security that certain events might pose and to solicit volunteers for the VIPS project.

Develop a 311-style reporting system utilizing a web-site to report observations and a dedicated telephone line.

Purchase off-the-shelf portable computer hardware, software and a projector to develop and maintain the reporting system, and to enable automated presentations for briefing and training.

Train other volunteer groups to identify and report suspicious activity.

Train the VIPS project personnel, including Reserve Officers and volunteers, on how to receive, review and report observed events to the project Coordinator.

Obtain police department wind breakers and caps, appropriately marked with the letters VIPS in clearly recognizable color, to be worn by the citizen volunteers when assisting law enforcement officers in homeland security activities.

Make it very clear that VIPS citizen volunteers will not represent themselves as law enforcement officers or carry a sidearm, nor will they commingle with law enforcement officers except when required to do so as part of their Project assignments.

Develop statistical measures that will enable evaluation of the VIPS project’s success.

Prepare a final report documenting how the COPS funding directly enhanced the volunteer program and its overall benefit to the police department.

Additional activities that citizen volunteers may undertake in support of the police department’s homeland security activities are:

- Establish an advisory council of businessmen, educators, and retired military and public safety leadership to assist in the volunteer effort.

- Identify federal, state, municipal and business groups that provide security efforts within the county for possible volunteers.

- Inventory of all bridges, tunnels, highways, hospitals and public buildings within the local or regional police department’s area of responsibility that could be damaged by terrorist action.

- Outline an in-depth, integrated information technology approach addressing intelligence, data search, cross-referencing and analysis of information, and recommend computer, system programming and data entry.

The success of the citizen volunteer project is dependant on four critical actions:
- Establishing an operational milieu between the citizen volunteers and the police department project coordinator to ensure that designated events and reported observations are meaningful and will be pursued by police officers.

- Identifying and recruiting community volunteer groups who appreciate the danger to the community from terrorists and who are willing to observe and report events that have been identified as critical to homeland security. They may include Explorer Scouts, secondary school Junior ROTC units, Civil Air Patrol, retired military and police groups, businessmen, community organizations, educators, and Neighborhood Watch groups.

- Developing and conducting meaningful training for the identified volunteer groups.

- Preparing a reporting system that properly collects and coordinates citizen volunteer observations, and reports the information to the project coordinator in a usable form.

The police department must commit itself to implement the VIPS project in such a manner that these four critical actions will be fully and faithfully implemented as the damage that may occur from a failed program is totally and unequivocally unacceptable.

FINAL THOUGHTS

As the movement of global Salafist jihadi terrorism continues to emanate inside the United States and other Western countries, citizen volunteers must continue to educate and protect themselves to assist federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies identify and prevent against other attacks. While the citizen volunteers are not going to prevent all future terrorist attacks, they can strive to harden their particular homes, buildings, and cities to the extent that future terrorist cells are forced to move on to other, softer targets. The only question left to ponder is whether the community has chosen to become the tiger or remain the sheep?

Consider once again, for the moment, the SDF as the penultimate uniformed citizen volunteer. If the SDF unit’s Commanding General might consider this anti-terrorism effort as a suitable activity and the state Adjutant General sees the value of such a mission supporting the goals of the military department, it becomes a suitable activity to undertake as a SDF project. The planning, organization, training and operational aspects are precisely what the SDF volunteer citizen soldier excels at.

BIBLIOGRAPHY


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The views expressed herein are those of the authors’ and do not purport to reflect the position of the United States Air Force Academy, the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, the Maryland Defense Force, or the Maryland Military Department.
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<tr>
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<td><img src="image1" alt="Colonel Bankus Photograph" /></td>
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HERSHKOWITZ, Colonel (MD) Martin

Martin Hershkowitz, OCP, has been recalled from the retired list to serve as Special Advisor to the Commander, 10th Medical Regiment. Colonel Hershkowitz is currently the Editor of the State Defense Force (SDF) Publication Center, producing both the SDF Journal and the SDF Monograph Series; is a member of the Executive Council of the Military Emergency Management Specialist (MEMS) Academy sponsored by the State Guard Association of the United States, from which he was awarded the Master MEMS Badge; is a member of the Federal Bureau of Investigation InfraGard Program; and is an affiliate of the Aleph-Institute providing Jewish Chaplains for the SDF, with assignment to support the non-deployed National Guard units. Within and for the U.S. Government, Colonel Hershkowitz has served for 17 years as a Senior Security Officer for Nonproliferation and National Security concerned with the safeguards and security of nuclear weapons and the mitigation of the “insider threat”; as an OPSEC (OPerations SECuriity) Certified Professional; and for an additional 30+ years in military weapons analysis, educational research and evaluation, and management improvement. He is also Executive Consultant for Hershkowitz Associates. Colonel Hershkowitz has published extensively on SDF missions, critical site security and training. He is also a Certified Master Facilitator and a Certified Safeguards and Security Instructor.

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<td>Ron Roberts commands the Maryland Defense Force (MDDF) Cavalry Troop A. In addition to teaching physical education in the Baltimore County Public School system he is a reenactor and living historian, with an emphasis on mounted cavalry, formed and commanded many reenactment units, trained numerous soldiers in the military seat and is currently the President of the First Battalion, Maryland Cavalry, Inc, a non-profit living history corporation. Lieutenant Colonel Roberts’ other equestrian pursuits include foxhunting and showing, acting in numerous historical movies and documentaries, and teaching as a certified riding instructor (ARIA). He has been a consultant and lecturer on military history, edited a book, <em>Historique du 7ème Hussards</em>, and is in the process of manuscript research on another. Colonel Roberts is also a certified scuba diver (NAUI) and certified military parachutist (Poland, Slovakia). His military awards include the Maryland Meritorious Service Medal, Maryland Commendation Medal (1 OLC) and the Maryland State Service Medal.</td>
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