# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Volunteer Military Organizations: An Overlooked Asset</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTC Brent C. Bankus (Cavalry, AUS-Ret.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Impact of the Military Emergency Management Specialist (Mems) Academy on State Defense Forces</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command Sergeant Major Jeffrey A. Slotnick, WASG</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On Creating a Useful and Pleasing State Defense Force Website</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergeant First Class Finn Rye, ASDF</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Texas Medical Rangers and Thousands of Patients</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergeant First Class Brenda Benner, TXARNG</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homeland Security: The Military’s Confusing Role</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel Martin Hershkowitz (MDDF-Ret)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Twenty Questions for State Defense Force Leadership</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel R.W.P. Patterson (ALSDF-Ret)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contributors</td>
<td>43</td>
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VOLUNTEER MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS: AN OVERLOOKED ASSET

LTC Brent C. Bankus (Cavalry, AUS-Ret.)

With the current operations tempo for Federal forces, the availability of manpower for homeland security is a major concern. Today’s missions are full spectrum: traditional operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, peacekeeping in the Balkans and the Sinai, and defense support to civil authorities in hurricanes Katrina and Rita.

President George W. Bush’s National Security Strategy makes it clear that “defending our Nation against its enemies is the first and fundamental commitment of the Federal Government.” With the gradual reduction in force and increased deployments, however, commanders are asked to do more with less. As troops engage in overseas operations, for example, they are tasked with additional short-notice contingencies that further exacerbate the problem.

Given the needs of the Department of Homeland Security and U.S. Northern Command, the increased use of National Guard and Reserve units, and the many and varied asymmetrical threats confronting the Nation since 9/11, it is questionable whether sufficient forces will be available. Therefore, a serious study of expanding the use of legitimate volunteer military organizations is long overdue.

These groups are not new in America and are divided into state and Federally sponsored organizations. State-sponsored organizations include State Defense Forces (SDFs) and Naval Militias, while elements such as the U.S. Air Force Civil Air Patrol and the Coast Guard Auxiliary are sponsored by the Armed Forces.

History

From the colonial period through the early 20th century, militia or volunteer units shouldered much of the responsibility for national defense since the regular, or full-time, U.S. military was comparatively small. Militia units augmenting Active forces sufficed until the Spanish-American War in 1898. As the 20th century dawned and the United States became increasingly involved in overseas operations, decision makers began to reassess the capabilities of such units.

Several pieces of landmark legislation were passed to enhance the militia (for example, the Dick Act of 1903 and the National Defense Act of 1916). Through this legislation, the organized militia was renamed the National Guard, given the official role of America’s second line of defense, and provided Federal funds for training and equipment. Consequently, the Federal Government had a better-trained and more capable militia at the beginning of the 20th century than ever before. Federal service was quickly tested as most National Guard units were mobilized for the Mexican border campaign in 1916, and then all were activated for World War I. However, the prior legislation was a curse and a blessing.

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* Published herein with permission from the author. Initially published in the *Joint Forces Quarterly Forum*, Issue 43, 4th Quarter 2006, pp. 29-32. The version herein is the final version submitted for final publication; hence, there may be a few very slight modifications for printing purposes.
With the entire National Guard deployed, states were ill prepared for either self-defense or response to natural or manmade contingencies.

But the mobilization of the National Guard for World War I was not an insurmountable problem because 34 states organized Home Guard or State Guard units as replacements, allowed under Section 61 of the National Defense Act of 1916. These volunteer units used prior service personnel (Spanish-American War and Civil War veterans) as training cadre, performing duties mostly in a non-pay status. For example, well-trained Home Guard units from Connecticut and Massachusetts provided valuable manpower, transportation, and medical assets during the Spanish influenza outbreak in 1918. Texas also organized State Guard cavalry and infantry regiments to patrol the Mexican border. In all, State Guard units provided an additional 79,000 troops for state duty; however, they were never called up for combat operations in World War I and were quickly disbanded after the Armistice.

Volunteer military organizations were especially important early in World War II. As with our British colleagues, every available resource was used due to the huge mobilization effort, including Home or State Guard units and the fledgling Coast Guard Auxiliary and Army Air Force Civil Air Patrol. These latter two elements represented a phenomenon not seen before: volunteer military organizations sponsored by Federal branches of the U.S. military. Nonetheless, World War II represented a high-water mark for the use of voluntary military bodies, particularly the Home or State Guard.

By the fall of 1940, all National Guard units were again called to Federal service. Recognizing the impending dilemma, President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed the State Guard Act on October 21, 1940. Consequently, Home Guard units, composed of retired or prior service personnel, were again mobilized in all but four states. They were charged with protecting critical infrastructure sites under the direction of each state adjutant general.

Additionally, the Coast Guard Auxiliary and the Army Air Corps Civil Air Patrol provided value-added assets in the event of either prolonged air or amphibious attacks by submarine. As recently released archives prove, the Axis powers considered both concepts. Regardless, both state and Federal volunteer military organizations were valuable assets. In fact, the Civil Air Patrol was credited with sinking several German U-boats, and the Coast Guard Auxiliary rescued hundreds of stranded sailors.

While there are differences between present operations and those in World War II, there are also similarities. During the 2005 flood season, a substantial portion of the Louisiana Army National Guard was unavailable, so state and Federal assets from neighboring states were used in disaster recovery. In addition, the Coast Guard Auxiliary, Civil Air Patrol, and at least five states contributed their State Defense Forces to the relief effort, and all indications are that the volunteers were effective. Thus, to prepare for future contingencies, regardless of location, the increased use of volunteer military organizations seems a common sense approach to provide additional capable assets.

**Civilian Authority Support**

Since homeland security is the major focus of volunteer military organizations, missions may include meeting domestic emergencies, assisting civil authorities in preserving order, guarding critical industrial sites, preventing or suppressing subversive activities, and cooperating with Federal authorities.
For example, when National Guard units are mobilized, SDFs often assume control of their armories and assist with their mobilization. The Alaskan SDF also routinely provides security for the Alaskan pipeline and the harbors of Anchorage and Whittier, using four armed patrol craft. With an instructor cadre of current or former state troopers, graduates of the Alaskan SDF Military Police Academy have the same credentials as Alaskan state troopers. In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, Albany utilized the New York Guard Army Division’s Military Police Brigade as perimeter and infrastructure security at Camp Smith and within New York City. Similarly, Air Force SDFs in Texas and New York routinely augment base security forces along with assisting in administrative duties. In addition to the Coast Guard Auxiliary, Naval Militias add another dimension to state-sponsored volunteer military organizations, providing waterborne patrol assets for security missions.

With many retired or former National Guard personnel in their ranks, SDF assets represent an experienced force knowledgeable in local and state emergency operations policies and procedures. The Louisiana SDF, for instance, provides a team of Soldiers as desk officers for each county emergency operations center, consisting of subject matter experts in operations and logistics. Being an integral part of the Georgia Department of Defense, the Georgia SDF was also active during hurricanes Katrina and Rita and provided desk officers for the National Guard Joint Emergency Operations Center at Dobbins Air Force Base near Atlanta. Local volunteer organizations are indigenous to the area and therefore more effective than contract forces.

Today’s volunteer military organizations also provide manpower and specialized expertise as several SDFs have robust search and rescue, medical, religious, legal, and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) naval and air capabilities. SDF search and rescue capabilities vary from state to state but routinely include emergency medical technicians and enhanced search capabilities such as horses and fixed wing aircraft. The Tennessee SDF, for example, with former Special Forces and Ranger members, has a robust search and rescue organization somewhat modeled after a Special Forces “A” team. Its members include licensed paramedics, civilian structural engineers, and communications specialists, all both airborne and scuba qualified, as well as a canine section.

Several SDFs have privately owned fixed-wing aircraft detachments in their force structure. Virginia uses its aircraft extensively as drones for WMD scenarios and assists the Virginia Fish and Game Commission by flying reconnaissance missions over the Shenandoah Valley. While predominantly a ceremonial organization, the Connecticut SDF has occasionally used its cavalry detachment for cross country search and rescue missions.

The Georgia SDF shares robust chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear and explosives capabilities with the Centers for Disease Control and several hospitals in the Atlanta area. The force has acquired the skills of chemists, medical doctors, and other professionals to fashion an organization to advise, assist, and train with the specialized Georgia National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Team.\(^9\)
Alternatives to Service

The expanded use of volunteer military organizations provides an opportunity for increasing numbers of citizens to serve in a less demanding military environment than the Federal Active or Reserve military. Of those who enter the Active military, 14 percent leave during the first 6 months and over 30 percent before their first term is complete. Reasons for this attrition include inadequate medical and pre-entry drug screening. Moreover, recruits fail to perform adequately because they are in poor physical condition for basic training or lack motivation. Routinely, State Guard units during World War II took advantage of National Guard discharges from Active service due to stringent physical standards associated with overseas deployments. Approximately 3,400 National Guardsmen were discharged prior to deployment, providing trained resources capable of State Guard service.

Professionals in the legal and medical fields who desire continued service are finding SDF organizations particularly attractive. As doctors and lawyers often have their own practices or are part of small consortiums, the prospect of an extended deployment as part of a Federal force represents a significant loss of income, if not bankruptcy. Participation in an SDF represents a viable alternative, as units are designed strictly for state service and are not subject to deployments.

Border Security Issues

The U.S. Border Patrol, part of the U.S. Customs and Border Protection Service, is responsible for detecting, interdicting, and apprehending those who attempt to enter the United States illegally or smuggle people or contraband, including weapons of mass destruction, across U.S. borders. These boundaries include official ports of entry in 20 sectors of the United States, both on the northern border with Canada (4,000–5,000 miles long) and the southern border with Mexico (over 2,000 miles long). Illegal immigration has received increased attention. Customs and Border Protection Commissioner Robert Bonner stated that some 10,800 agents currently are in the field, and the U.S. Customs and Border Patrol is exploring the use of volunteer organizations as augmentation.

In April 2005, a volunteer civic organization, the “Minutemen,” conducted a month long surveillance along the Arizona-Mexico border. These volunteers from various parts of the United States provided an “extra set of eyes” to the Customs and Border Patrol. Commissioner Bonner reported that the Minutemen facilitated the apprehension of over 300 illegal immigrants with no incidents or threats of vigilantism. The Minutemen were observers only and reported illegal crossings to the Border Patrol for action.

Cost Effectiveness

Since all land SDFs are strictly state organizations, their operating budgets are comparatively minimal. Moreover, today’s volunteers receive no pay or allowances for training and drill attendance, and, unless called to state. Active duty, mission support is also conducted in a non-pay status. Even when called to state Active duty, SDF personnel are paid a rate that is often not commensurate with normal pay for a Federal force, depending on rank. During 2002, for example, the Georgia SDF contributed more than 1,797 days of operational service, saving the state $1.5 million. In 2001, their
service saved over $754,000. During the 9/11 crisis, the 244th Medical Detachment of the New York Guard provided medical services not available from other organizations and saved the state $400,000. These are a few examples that prove that expanding the use of volunteer military organizations is economically attractive. Since SDFs possess little equipment, overhead costs are relatively small. Table 1 provides a comprehensive list of SDFs and their funding levels.

Table 1. State Defense Forces - Army

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Active Strength</th>
<th>Budget</th>
<th>Type Unit</th>
<th>Prior Service</th>
<th>Age Range</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alabama</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>30K</td>
<td>Support HQs</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>22-69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alaska</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>26.5K – 1 Mil</td>
<td>M.P.</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>20-72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>225K</td>
<td>Support HQs</td>
<td>80+%</td>
<td>18-62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connecticut</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Infantry/Cavalry</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>20-60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Infantry</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>18-64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indiana</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>40K</td>
<td>Support HQs</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>21-75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louisiana</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Admin HQs</td>
<td>96%</td>
<td>50-65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maryland</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Support HQs</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>17-70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Massachusetts</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Admin Det.</td>
<td>60-75%</td>
<td>18-65*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michigan</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Support HQs</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>20-70+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mississippi</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Infantry</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>18-78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Mexico</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>7K</td>
<td>M.P.</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>18-65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>75K</td>
<td>Support HQs</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>18-65*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ohio</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>14K</td>
<td>M.P.</td>
<td>50+%</td>
<td>17-67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oklahoma</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Support HQs</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>21-75+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oregon</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Infantry</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>18-65*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puerto Rico</td>
<td>1,630</td>
<td>300K</td>
<td>Support Det.</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>16-65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Carolina</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>100K</td>
<td>Infantry</td>
<td>45-50%</td>
<td>17-75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tennessee</td>
<td>990</td>
<td>53K</td>
<td>Light Infantry</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>18-70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>1,518</td>
<td>103K</td>
<td>Infantry</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>17-79</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vermont</td>
<td>326</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Infantry</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>17-70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virginia</td>
<td>774</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Light Infantry</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>18-70*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Infantry</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>18-64</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Challenges

While attractive, expanding the use of SDFs requires resolving several issues, such as the lack of Federal recognition of state sponsored volunteer military organizations. Although SDFs were designed for state service, the lack of Federal recognition has other effects. First, current laws prohibit SDFs from purchasing excess Federal field equipment of all types, such as uniforms, affecting unit morale. Second, SDFs lack an active authoritative command and control headquarters to provide strategic direction on unit types, table of distribution and allowances, readiness reporting, missions, training, and personnel policies. Standardizing policies and procedures is essential to ensure interoperability with other state or Federal agencies. Although the National Guard Bureau is the DOD executive agent for SDFs, and though National Guard Regulation 10–4 provides guidelines, the regulation lacks authoritative language to ensure compliance.
Most World War II State Guard units, for instance, were modeled after either a light infantry or military police organization. Today, some SDFs mirror that traditional structure, yet there is substantial derivation of unit types that demonstrates a strategic lack of interest. Conversely, the Coast Guard Auxiliary and Air Force Civil Air Patrol are well established and seemingly enjoy a better working relationship with their parent Federal service. They do not appear to suffer from the same fickleness of state politics that affects SDFs and Naval Militias. As state entities, and if allowed to exist at all, SDFs and Naval Militias function at the behest of each Governor and often are stifled by being at the mercy of the state adjutant general, a political appointee.

As demonstrated by the 2002 anthrax attacks against domestic targets, the ease of WMD acquisition causes constant questioning of whether sufficient manpower exists to defend against attacks. Information technology tampering is also a concern and is increasingly difficult to locate and eradicate. The importance of information technology cannot be overstated, as threats to computer security are a great concern. Again, questions regarding sufficient numbers of trained personnel are voiced at every level.

The lack of codified missions and unit types impacts SDF doctrine and training. It is essential to have a clearly established universal task list, approved mission-essential task list, and associated doctrine. To date, all 23 SDF organizations offer military training courses but are without established standards. For example, the Tennessee SDF’s basic noncommissioned officer and basic officer courses are approved through the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command at Fort Monroe, Virginia. Courses offered by the New York Guard Army Division are also well organized and designed by former nonresident Army Reserve instructors. However, SDFs are prohibited from participating in some nonresident training (for example, the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas). To educate their officers, then, states such as California and Georgia enroll their personnel in the U.S. Marine Corps Command and General Staff College.

Due to the homeland security focus of SDFs, another training venue is the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Web site. In fact, several states require FEMA courses as a prerequisite for promotion. Again, however, no standards exist to ensure a base level of education in military support to civilian authority subjects. Table 2 provides a comprehensive list of military courses that SDFs offer.

**Recommendations**

Volunteer military organizations are older than the United States itself and have proven themselves time and again. Their infrastructure already exists, and the process works despite political pressures. With the growing concern for securing the homeland, common sense should be applied to use these assets to their fullest extent. To do so, several actions are recommended.

Current laws must be changed to grant Federal recognition to state-sponsored SDFs. Denying volunteer access to basic equipment and necessities makes little sense. Also, the lack of Federal recognition impacts the ability to tap into existing nonresident military courses.

Since SDFs and several Naval Militias are strictly state supported, partial Federal funding should be initiated through the National Guard Bureau and the planning, programming, and budgeting system. Some civilian organizations (for example, the Citizen Corps and the USA Freedom Corps) already have
Table 2. State Defense Forces – Army - Schools

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Basic Training</th>
<th>PLDC</th>
<th>BNCOC</th>
<th>ANCOC</th>
<th>Sergeant Major</th>
<th>Officer Basic/Co Grd</th>
<th>Officer Advanced</th>
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Key: PLDC = Primary Leadership Development Course; BNCOC = Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course; ANCOC = Advanced Noncommissioned Officer Course; CGSC = Command and General Staff College; OCS = Officer Candidate School

access to Federal funding, and all legitimate volunteer military organizations should enjoy the same privilege. Trained volunteer organizations provide manpower and professional services that permit Federal forces to concentrate on other critical areas.

As the DOD agent for SDFs, the National Guard should be more proactive in providing guidance in conjunction with the Department of the Army and each adjutant general. Standardization would add further legitimacy to these organizations. Moreover, the National Guard Bureau should have an office staff to handle SDF matters that cannot be accomplished as an additional duty.

While volunteer military organizations present challenges, evidence suggests that their expanded use makes sense for several reasons. First, with the current high operations tempo, trained Federal forces are at a premium. By actively supporting volunteer military organizations, especially State Defense Forces, Governors have an alternative to provide a trained force at least in cadre strength.

Currently, SDF units operate in 22 states and Puerto Rico, with another handful maintaining a volunteer Naval Militia in addition to Coast Guard Auxiliary and Air Force Civil Air Patrol units nationwide. A volunteer force costs much less to maintain than a Federal force and provides trained personnel for state contingencies.
In the case of SDFs, their organization and use have too often been an afterthought. From the Mexican border expedition through the Korean War, and from the bombing of Pearl Harbor to the 9/11 attacks, State and Home Guard use has been a last-minute reaction to unexpected circumstances. With today’s increase in asymmetric warfare, exploring the use of all existing force structures and expanding volunteer military organizations and SDFs are steps in the right direction.

Notes


2 For more details, see Citizen Corps, available at <citizencorps.gov/about.shtml>.


4 Ibid., 13.


7 Zysk, 7.

8 Department of the Army, National Guard Bureau Regulation 10–4, Washington, DC, September 21, 1987, 3.


11 Stentiford, 94.

13 Ibid., 3.

14 After Action Review, Headquarters, Army Division, 244th Clinic, New York Guard, January 9, 2003.

15 Department of the Army.

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THE IMPACT OF THE MILITARY EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT SPECIALIST (MEMS) ACADEMY ON STATE DEFENSE FORCES

Command Sergeant Major Jeffrey A. Slotnick, WASG

CONCEPTS

Our world is changing every day. As a result of this change State Defense Forces are experiencing a period of dynamic change. As of this writing, (October 2006) several National events with significant impact are occurring.

The war on Terrorism is in full swing, Pandemic Flu is an emerging threat, wild fires are burning in many locations in the western United States, and the Gulf States are still trying to recover from the effects of hurricanes Katrina and Rita before the next hurricane season starts.

This does not take into account state-specific issues like security for major sporting events, Army and Air Guard units mobilized to support Federal missions overseas, and Homeland Security duty on US borders.

Strained resources are becoming more the norm than the exception.

How can State Defense Forces (SDF’s) support these various missions as a viable force multiplier? In response to these challenges, the State Guard Association of the United States (SGAUS) developed a specialized Emergency Management qualification program for State Defense Forces and other authorized individuals titled “Military Emergency Management Specialist (MEMS) Academy (http://www.sgaus.org/MEMS.htm). This program specifically prepares SDF personnel to effectively operate and function in a local or state wide military emergency management mobilization.

Individuals with MEMS qualification gain the knowledge, skills and abilities to effectively manage a comprehensive emergency management plan and achieve operational understanding of basic tenets in emergency management, including mitigation, preparedness, emergency response, and recovery. As Barrett Tillman observed, "You won't rise to the occasion - you'll default to your level of training." (The Sixth Battle, Bantam Books, March 1992).

TRAINING STANDARDS

MEMS Basic Level

Requirements include completing the Basic MEMS Academy Curriculum from The Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA’s) Emergency Management Institute (EMI) Independent Study Program (ISP). Students can also select practical assignments with a federal, state, or local Emergency Operations Center (EOC) and applicable written assignments.
MEMS Senior Level

Requirements include completion of the EMI ISP Professional Development Series and specific emergency response to terrorism courses. Additional core requirements include completing an emergency management project or practical assignments with a federal, state, or local EOC. Students must also complete comprehensive written projects.

MEMS Master Level

Requirements include completing a minimum of one hundred hours of resident advanced emergency management training, such as “Community Emergency Response Team (CERT)” qualification. Students must also complete a resident MEMS Academy training exercise or teach emergency management courses. Other requirements include completing an advanced Emergency Management project or extensive practical assignments with a federal, state or local Emergency Operations Center (EOC).

Training in the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and the Incident Command System (ICS) is pre-requisite for any of the MEMS certifications; these courses are available on line and free of charge at [http://www.training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/IS/crslist.asp](http://www.training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/IS/crslist.asp).

SDF Personnel should consider taking the FEMA Courses IS100, IS700, IS200 and IS800. Additionally there are a number of infrastructure specific courses free of charge at this same web site.

NEXT STEPS

Different States have different disasters. So how do we determine the training standards for all these varied assignments? There are two methods: Job Task Analysis and the Mission Essential Task Lists (METL) (pronounced metal) Approach.

Job Task Analysis

Job Task Analysis is the process of identifying and determining in detail the particular job duties and requirements and the relative importance of these duties for a given job. The purpose of a Job Analysis is to establish and document employment procedures such as training and selection. This usually will guide you towards developing your training program and allows you to consider the content of your training.

Determining Training Needs

Job Analysis can be used in training/"needs assessment" to identify or develop:

- Training content.
- Specific curriculums.
- Assessment tests to measure effectiveness of training.
- Equipment to be used in delivering the training.
- Methods of training (i.e., small group, computer-based, video, classroom...).
The Impact of the Military Emergency Management Specialist (Mems) Academy on State Defense Forces

(METL Approach) Mission Essential Task Lists (METL Approach)

The United States Military provides an excellent model for this method. The METL approach is a tool used by war fighters to link training to mission. **What is METL?** Army Field Manuals [FM 25-100, Training the Force](http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/NIPP_Plan.pdf), and [FM 25-101, Battle Focused Training](http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/NIPP_Plan.pdf), are Army’s doctrinal sources for METL. The METL ‘tool’ enables the war fighting commander to focus training on tasks essential to accomplishing the organization’s wartime mission. Specifically, the extended METL process enables commanders to identify those tasks most critical to wartime mission accomplishment, to assess the training level of soldiers against those tasks, and then to develop a training plan that focuses limited resources (time, people, and money) against those tasks. John Wooden, in quoting Benjamin Franklin, noted, "Failing to prepare is preparing for failure," (Benjamin Franklin’s speech to The New American Congress, 1706).

**SO WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?**

In the past several years the Federal Government has produced several documents which are integral to continuity of operations planning (COOP) and provide a template for action. These documents are the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) and the National Response Plan (NRP).

**National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP)**

The NIPP [http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/NIPP_Plan.pdf](http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/NIPP_Plan.pdf) provides a coordinated approach to critical infrastructure and key resource protection roles and responsibilities for federal, state, local, tribal, and private sector security partners. The NIPP sets national priorities, goals, and requirements for effective distribution of funding and resources which will help ensure that our government, economy, and public services continue in the event of a terrorist attack or other disaster. The plan is based on the following:

- **Strong public-private partnerships** which will foster relationships and facilitate coordination within and across critical infrastructure and key resource sectors.

- **Robust multi-directional information sharing** which will enhance the ability to assess risks, make prudent security investments, and take protective action.

- **Risk management framework** establishing processes for combining consequence, vulnerability, and threat information to produce a comprehensive, systematic, and rational assessment of national or sector risk.

Some of the principle imperatives of the plan include:

- **Implement measures to reduce risk and mitigate deficiencies and vulnerabilities corresponding to the physical, cyber, and human security elements of CI/KR protection**;

- **Maintain the tools, capabilities, and protocols necessary to provide an appropriate level of monitoring of networks, systems, or a facility and its immediate surroundings to detect possible insider and external threats**;
- Develop and implement personnel screening programs to the extent feasible for personnel working in sensitive positions; and

- Additionally the NIPP does not solely consider terrorist activities but includes an “All Hazards Approach” to resiliency. All hazards means that the Federal government weights a response to a natural or man made disaster equally to a terrorist or criminal event.

**National Response Plan (NRP)**

The NRP, [http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/NRP_FullText.pdf](http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/NRP_FullText.pdf), last updated May 25, 2006, establishes a comprehensive all-hazards approach to enhance the ability of the United States to manage domestic incidents. The plan incorporates best practices and procedures from incident management disciplines — homeland security, emergency management, law enforcement, firefighting, public works, public health, responder and recovery worker health and safety, emergency medical services, and the private sector—and integrates them into a unified structure. It forms the basis of how the federal government coordinates with state, local, and tribal governments and the private sector during incidents. It establishes protocols to help:

- Save lives and protect the health and safety of the public, responders, and recovery workers;
- Ensure security of the homeland;
- Prevent an imminent incident, including acts of terrorism, from occurring;
- Protect and restore critical infrastructure and key resources;
- Conduct law enforcement investigations to resolve the incident, apprehend the perpetrators, and collect and preserve evidence for prosecution and/or attribution;
- Protect property and mitigate damages and impacts to individuals, communities, and the environment; and
- Facilitate recovery of individuals, families, businesses, governments, and the environment.

**OTHER OPPORTUNITIES**

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Course, UNLV Frontline Responder Training Course Terrorism Awareness: Protecting Soft Targets [http://education.unlv.edu/Educational_Leadership/Ed_Leadership_web/cwd/frontline/course_info.html](http://education.unlv.edu/Educational_Leadership/Ed_Leadership_web/cwd/frontline/course_info.html). In this course you can gain knowledge in eight separate modules that can be delivered separately or as a package over two days. The course is realistic, written by subject matter experts in your industries. This course uses a blended learning methodology, combining instructor-led training, role-playing, scenario enactments, group discussions, and demonstrations.

The modules include:
• **Terrorism Awareness** - The definition of terrorism, categories and types of terrorism, targets, types of threats, and the DHS threat advisory system.

• **Homeland Security Role** - The DHS mission statement and strategies developed for domestic and national preparedness.

• **Weapons of Mass Destruction** - The properties, effects, and methods for delivery/dispersal of potential CBRNE agents. Personal protection principles for radiological and explosive incidents.

• **Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs)** - The basic design of IEDs including vehicle-borne IED’s, and suicide bombers.

• **Terrorist Planning Cycle and Suspicious Person Indicators** - The terrorist operational planning cycle and suspicious person indicators.

• **Suspicious Items Indicators and Types of Threats** - Common types of threats (bomb threat, found package, etc.) and practical ways to handle these threats.

• **Incident Scene Management** - The strategic goals of incident management, as well as an overview of the unified Incident Command System.

• **Soft Target Assets and Vulnerabilities** - An awareness of the physical structure, building grounds, occupant routines, and physical security systems in soft target properties.

This particular course is invaluable to those who are charged with the protection of soft targets and critical infrastructure.

Finally, as another resource, many States have Emergency Management Agencies and Colleges that sponsor Homeland Security Centers of Excellence. These organizations generally host a number of DHS funded training courses that are specific for our industry. The only expense is the time to get trained.

In closing, the status quo is no longer acceptable and no one knows when a disaster, either man made or natural, will occur. State Defense Forces can become a ready source of highly trained volunteers to support response operations. By preparing in advance, we lend credibility and purpose to our organizations. Participation in the MEMS Academy identifies you as being representatives for excellence and facilitators of change.
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ON CREATING A USEFUL AND PLEASING STATE DEFENSE FORCE WEBSITE

Sergeant First Class Finn Rye, ASDF

Some State Defense Force (SDF) brigades still do not have web sites, while others that do are poorly maintained. It would behoove all SDF brigades to keep their web pages relatively professional in appearance and up-to-date. Professional looking web sites would improve public perception in addition to avoiding the appearance of “warrior wannabees,” as described in a 2003 USA Today article.

There are a few SDF brigade websites that stand out above the rest, including California, Maryland, Indiana, Alaska and, one of the best, Georgia, which not only has a great looking web site, but posts excellent material. This opinion is based on the fact that those SDF websites on the aforementioned top five (5) list meet several critical criteria that includes modern appearance, current content, ease of use and creativity. Many SDF brigades trying to maintain a website may not have the in-house expertise or resources to facilitate the nature of a professional web page; however; if a SDF brigade is planning to start a website or is presently maintaining a site, here is some information that should prove to be helpful.

The first recommended course of action for any website administrator would be to regularly evaluate the unit’s current needs for the website.

- To make the website an information repository for the unit’s personnel, consider the following:
  - Identify forms and other documents that the unit’s personnel need access to on a regular basis.
  - Obtain permission to post any documents as they could be considered confidential and determine that the forms are always the latest revision.
  - Post an accurate calendar of training and drill dates for use by the troops and training officers.

- To make the website a public relations tool, consider the following:
  - Work with the Public Information Officer to decide what types of information are important for the general public.
  - Identify and make contact with the various local, municipal and organizational print media to determine what they are interested in seeing and to routinely send informational notices.

\(^b\) The Alaska State Defense Force website is located at [http://www.ak-prepared.com/asdf/](http://www.ak-prepared.com/asdf/). Other website addresses can be obtained through a simple “Google” search.
Establish links with all local retired military, medical, legal and law enforcement groups; however, avoid similar contact with any militant “militia” or rump “SDF wannabees.”

Designate a Public Information Office staff member to respond promptly to inquiries to ensure that the website is responsive to the public.

To make the website a recruiting tool, consider the following:

- Provide an accurate and easy to find recruiting section, including appropriate forms.
- Provide clear and easy to follow instructions for a potential recruit to follow in order to submit an application.
- Indicate an appropriate and current recruiter for both officers and enlisted personnel, with both an E-mail address and a telephone number.
- Ensure that a response is auto-generated to inform the sender that the inquiry has been received and is being processed.
- Designate a recruiting staff member to respond promptly to inquiries.

Web pages should be continually updated with news, articles, photos, and current forms.” If the content is not continuously kept up-to-date then the site will inevitably become an unused relic of the past.

To make the website pleasing to the eye and organized in such a way as to make it easy for the visitor to find information consider the following:

- Maintain a common design theme, font size and font/color selection.
- Ensure that the text contrasts with the background; for instance, a light colored text with a light colored background will make it difficult to read.
- Use a plain, non-elaborate page background to eliminate clutter and confusion.
- Strike a good balance when applying graphics to the website; graphics that are too large add additional wait times and bandwidth usage to the visitors browsing experience, graphics that are too small or of low quality create a poor overall effect.
- There are many different varieties of software for creating a website over a wide spectrum of cost, selection is a matter of personal preference coupled with a concern for cost; many “Web Masters” prefer Microsoft Frontpage, while there is a major push in the website design industry to use Adobe Dreamweaver.

With regard to Web Master assignments, it is best to appoint at least two people who can make changes to the website content. That way the website is not dependant on a sole person in case
of an emergency, a separation or just general workload issues. If the unit does not currently have a second person with the technical skills to act as a backup, assign a person to be trained. Typically, it is not difficult to train someone in the basics of content revision on the average website. In practice it is a good idea to have a website committee that meets to discuss any proposed changes; however, this is not always feasible.

Several years ago the Alaska State Defense Force (ASDF) underwent a major web site revision. Due to considerable time and energy expended by a dedicated website staff and ongoing assistance from the State of Alaska Department of Military and Veterans Affairs, who supplies the web hosting space, the new and improved ASDF website can be considered on the top five list.

Nevertheless, it is challenging to maintain the site due to time constraints and lack of feedback.

Perhaps the most critical and immensely important first step is to get the support and buy-in from the organization’s leadership when creating or making significant changes to a Brigade website. A recommendation with regard to this need is to request regular input and feedback from Headquarters staff and unit commanders, through the Office of the Chief of Staff, in the form of news bites, articles and occasional meaningful pictures (in a .jpg file). This keeps everyone engaged and cultivates a sense of ownership in the website. Just remember, make your web site a tool that serves your SDF goals.

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c The author is the ASDF Web Master.

d The author invites inquiries and requests for guidance on constructing a website through the following E-mail address “SFC Finn Rye, ASDF” <finnrye@gmail.com>.
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THE TEXAS MEDICAL RANGERS AND THOUSANDS OF PATIENTS

Sergeant First Class Brenda Benner, TXARNG

In 2006, medical professionals from the Texas Army National Guard, the Texas State Guard and numerous local and state agencies offered thousands of low-income Rio Grande Valley residents an opportunity to see a doctor, dentist or nurse during the seven year old annual summertime humanitarian mission known as Operation Lone Star.

For those who lack access to affordable health care, Operation Lone Star provides basic dental care, medical exams, blood pressure and diabetes screenings, and also timely immunizations for children preparing for school. Temporary on-site pharmacies offered limited prescription medications at no charge to patients that could not otherwise afford them.

The Texas State Guard provided many of the personnel needed to keep up with the flow of thousands of patients divided among several makeshift clinics, most of which were set up at local elementary schools.

The Medical Reserve Corps (MRC), an organization within the Texas State Guard, was first activated in February 2003. The first unit was based at the University of Texas Health Science Center-San Antonio. Since then, regional groups have been established in Houston, Dallas-Fort Worth, Tyler and San Antonio among others. Recruitment is approaching 400 members.

A component of the Texas Military Forces, the MRC serves under the Adjutant General of the State of Texas and at the discretion of Texas Governor Rick Perry. It consists of medical professionals who volunteer their valuable skills to support public health agencies in times of statewide emergencies. Known informally as Texas Medical Rangers, they train for a variety of public health emergencies ranging from natural disasters to outbreaks of contagious diseases, to the effects of chemical or radiological attacks. The volunteers augmented medical service to people who evacuated to Texas last year from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita evacuees. The Texas Medical Rangers also provide medical support during large-scale public events such as the annual multiple sclerosis 150-mile bike ride from Houston to Austin.

During the 2006 Operation Lone Star mission, Medical Rangers worked side-by-side with other nurses, doctors, therapists, public health officials and even students from several medical specialty training colleges. They helped patients with their in-processing paperwork, recorded their medical histories, took their blood pressure readings and temperatures, performed blood sugar screening, filled prescriptions, administered immunizations and provided medical exams.

“It’s nice having all of the military people here helping us,” said Rosie Bryan, a public health specialist from the Hidalgo County Health Department. “They helped us process hundreds of patients at this site in one day.”

For additional information about the Texas State Guard Medical Reserve Corps, The Texas Medical Rangers, go to www.texasmedicalrangers.com. The authors of this article may be reached at National Guard Public Affairs, P.O. Box 5218, Austin TX 78763-5218; (512) 782-6242 or (512) 657-8654 (cell).
The humanitarian mission gains momentum every year as more Rio Grande Valley residents utilize the clinics and more volunteers offer their medical expertise. This year, during a nine-day treatment period, more than 7,000 patients sought and obtained assistance. Nearly 4,000 immunizations were administered while approximately 4,500 diabetes screenings were performed. Approximately 2,000 patients received free prescription medications.

“Our success is due to teamwork,” said Texas Medical Ranger 2LT Sharon Bayer, a licensed vocational nurse from Boerne, near San Antonio. “We get a lot of support from the various county and city organizations, like the school districts that let us use their buildings.”

Medical Ranger MAJ Deborah Brooks, a chief nurse with the Tyler-based unit, said the integration among the Texas Army National Guard, the Texas State Guard and the medical personnel from the civilian health agencies was going well.

“I can tell there’s mutual respect among everyone I’ve encountered,” Brooks said. “I haven’t seen any ‘turf wars’; we’re all one big family.”

The commanding general of the Texas State Guard MRC, BG Marshall H. Scantlin, expressed his satisfaction during a visit to the make-shift clinic at Chapa Elementary School in La Joya.

“The teamwork between the units of the joint medical task force is obvious,” he said.

Medical professionals don’t join the Texas Medical Rangers for the money, but rather for the opportunity to help others while they increase their overall public health knowledge while working outside their normal job positions.

SGT Olivia Anderson, an emergency room paramedic at the Medical Center of Lewisville, meticulously poked and squeezed patients’ fingers for the tiny bead of blood she needed for their glucose readings. Sergeant Anderson, who is used to more drama and more blood than she encountered at her screening station, said that even performing a simple task is worthwhile.

“I joined the Rangers so that I could have part-time ties with the military and still have my civilian life to complete all of my medical training,” Sergeant Anderson said. “I love this; it’s rewarding. I’m able to give of myself, to use my medical skills to help others.”

With reliable support from the Texas Medical Rangers, Operation Lone Star’s annual success will undoubtedly continue in the tradition of “Texans serving Texans.”

\(^1\) For pictures of some of the Texas Medical Rangers in action see the Attachment below.
APPENDIX

Colonel Snavely, D.D.S., TXARNG, Chief Dental Officer, OLS

Rear Admiral Andrus, M.D., Texas Maritime Regiment

Lieutenant Colonel Fernandez, M.D., Commander, Tyler, Texas Medical Group,

Lieutenant Colonel Bobbit and Sargent Bobbit, TXSG Medical Reserve Corps
HOMELAND SECURITY: THE MILITARY’S CONFUSING ROLE

Colonel Martin Hershkowitz (MDDF-Ret)

Editorial: This article is in the form of an editorial based upon three United States Air Force’s Air University (AU) “CADRE Quick-Look” articles or “dialogs” by Colonel John L. Conway III (USAF-Retired). Colonel Conway is a military defense analyst assigned to the Air University. “CADRE Quick-Look” serves as a catalyst for air and space power research dialogue. In these “dialogs” Colonel Conway examines the roles of the military and civilian “coalition partners,” in particular that of the U.S. Air Force, in meeting the mission requirements of homeland defense (HD) and homeland security (HS). The CADRE Quick-Look dialogs deal with the dual HD and HS roles of NORTHCOM \(^8\); the competing combat and HD roles of the Air National Guard \(^b\); and the possible use of the State Defense Force by the Air Force in support of its HS role \(^i\). All three CADRE Quick-Look dialogues by Colonel Conway are contained herein.

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) expects and depends upon the military to undertake a significant role in protecting our homeland; however, they are only one of many agencies and organizations that have such a role. The totality of these diverse agencies and organizations are identified by Colonel Conway as the “coalition of the willing.” He points out that the number of federal, state and local agencies, bureaus and organizations involved in homeland security (HS) is huge. Now, add to that coalition the number of universities and industrial organization who provide, at the least, research, development and advisory services, and under some conditions fulfill operational roles, and the number grows without real bounds. The result, a very complex and difficult mission management situation. Finally, as anyone who has chaired a large committee knows, within the coalition is a subgroup who perceives that their turf is being threatened and becomes a subliminal “coalition of the unwilling.” Consider the complexity and possible confusion that can result from such a mission management situation.

NORTHCOM’s role is twofold, on the one hand it is responsible for the defense of the homeland, preventing an attack from outside the borders; on the other hand, it is responsible for assisting federal, state and local governments in providing security within the borders, as a force multiplier. Colonel Conway stated it well when he said that NORTHCOM “must understand whom it works for, who works for it, what it can do, what it cannot do, and when it can do all of these things.” Until this is fully understood and internalized, NORTHCOM’s interaction with its coalition partners will lead to misunderstanding, confusion and possible faulty mission management.

An example of the above is the use of the phrase “first responder.” Different agencies have different operational definitions for the phrase. In this situation, the civilian agencies would be in position to respond first to a situation, while NORTHCOM would fill any gaps in response with their

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own capabilities. Typically, the emergency services are the first responders, yet NORTHCOM has such emergency services fully capable to respond immediately should the situation warrant such action and, in at least one case this has happened. State Police consider themselves as the emergency first responder, yet so do the local police, so is this a jurisdictional problem or a definitional one?

Yet another problem Colonel Conway points out is communication. Where does mission control sit when the police, fire department, Air Force and ground troops all use different frequencies to communicate? Who has control of the ground situation? Who controls on-site tactics? How can the coalition partners be coordinated into a single, well directed effort?

If NORTHCOM’s role can be confusing, the competing roles of the Air National Guard raises even greater concern. As Colonel Conway notes from a General Accounting Office report, the competing requirements of combat and HS missions “have significantly reduced Air Guard unit training effectiveness and thus, its overall combat effectiveness.” For discussion purposes, he suggests that some Air National Guard units be assigned to fully support HS missions only; however, he further notes the many pros and cons associated with such a decision, some of which are:

- The sole HS mission simplifies training and provides the Governor with an “at home” force for state emergencies; however, it requires that the remaining Guard and Reserve flying units pick up the slack and removes the HS units from the Total Force.

- A Guard unit flying in its Title 32 role eliminates Posse Comitatus concerns; however, Northcom believes that the Act provides it that authority.

- Separating the two roles could simplify lines of authority and responsibility, and shorten response time in a crisis; however, geographic location of Air Guard units may not meet NORTHCOM/NORAD plans for fighter coverage, possibly requiring Air Combat Command (ACC) to provide adequate coverage, reducing ACC’s aircraft availability and most likely increase Temporary Duty assignments and deployment costs.

Colonel Conway suggests a solution, which is to assign the Guard HS squadrons to NORTHCOM/NORAD, make their responsibilities part of the Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) cycle to spread responsibility for the HS mission throughout the fighter force and create “blended/integrated” fighter units to increase available manpower for both AEF and HS missions while utilizing the same airframes.

Colonel Conway’s third Cadre Quick-Look article looks at the State Defense Force’s (SDF’s) role as a partner in the “coalition of the willing.” He notes that, under HR2797 – “State Defense Force Improvement Act of 2003” (and its subsequent reintroduction to the Congress), the SDF would be inserted into the Total Force in a HS role; however, due to the nature of the SDF, this coalition could be complicated and unwieldy. Some examples are:

- The typical SDF trains for some 12 half days and one full day each year, with some additional time for attending Academies, other training and occasional mission opportunities; thus, it would be unlikely for one to achieve the acceptable proficiency levels required by the Active and Reserve Force.
Variation in state physical fitness requirements and age limits raises questions about individual SDF members’ ability to fully function in strenuous assignments.

SDF forces can neither command or be commanded by federal forces, thus causing delays and confusion as orders in a NORTHCOM/Homeland Security environment would have to include each state’s adjutant general staff.

Personnel within NORTHCOM Headquarters work with sensitive information; however, there is no provision for SDF personnel to obtain background investigations.

Many of the public view the authorized and approved SDF as being very little or no different from the self-proclaimed militias or survivalist groups and would hesitate or even fear to accept guidance from them.

Colonel Conway suggests that the National Guard Bureau Regulation 10-4 be rewritten to clearly spell out roles and responsibilities, and to include fiscal guidelines and command and control protocols. Although the need to rewrite such material is clear, the traditional “turf wars” within a government agency would cause this action to take years; thus, delaying any integration of the SDF as a homeland security force multiplier.

Colonel Conway’s three Quick-Look articles yield excellent insight into NORTHCOM’s confusing role in homeland security, particularly with regard to the U.S. Air Force; however, it does not end there. The concern raised by the articles holds true for all the armed forces, Active and Reserves. The Army and Navy clearly encounter the same problems when dealing with the “coalition of the willing” (and “unwilling”); they suffer the same limitation of resources when faced with training versus mission activities; and would face the same complicated and unwieldy situation when attempting to integrate the SDF into the total force structure.

What then is the answer? How can the SDF participate in homeland security given the complexities discussed above? What role(s) can the SDF undertake to support their communities in homeland security?

The answer is quite simple to state and quite complex to implement. The SDF command within each state and community must examine the specific needs within their domain and seek out the gaps that exist within the state and local homeland security plans. With these gaps as a target, they must then examine their force structure and the extent to which that force can cope with the gaps. This internal examination might lead to the need to restructure their force, say away from light infantry and toward emergency medical support for an example. Clearly, there are many scenarios that will assist the SDF to meet and fill those gaps; however, another “small p” political specter needs to be faced while considering restructuring the force, the will of the State Adjutant General and the protectionism of the State National Guard Command. Years of experience have caused the SDF Command to be very sensitive to these needs.

The answer then is for each SDF Command to seek out these gaps, prepare a force structure plan that will assist their NG and HS organization in mitigating a spectrum of natural and terrorist sponsored disasters, and convince their Adjutant General that they can indeed bring the SDF to bear on these problems. Assuming approval, the next problem is to actually seek out and recruit the necessary professionals to staff and build the “new” SDF organization. Here there is some form of help as there
are several SDF units around the country who have already faced this problem, developed their solution and are most willing to share their knowledge base with fellow SDF units: Maryland with medical and legal; Texas with medical; South Carolina with homeland defense and communications; Alaska with a Constabulary Academy for a sparsely populated large land mass; a number of SDF units with a Chaplaincy unit; and New York, New Jersey and Michigan with a Naval Militia; to name just a few.
Homeland Security—NORTHCOM’s Coalition War

John L. Conway III

**Issue.** The United States has entered into a new phase in its military history, passing quickly through “joint” warfare into the realm of “coalition” warfare. Indeed, it is postulated that coalition warfare will be the only way we will conduct future fights. Coalition warfare has many facets: it involves the blending of different cultures, multiple languages, dialects, and disparate weapon systems, as well as differing perceptions of end states and how to achieve them. In the wake of 9/11, HQ Northern Command (HQ NORTHCOM) was created to accomplish two goals: to provide the military response to attacks within the United States at the request of the newly formed Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and to perform the National Security mission of air defense of the North American continent through HQ NORAD.

As Steve Flynn from the Council on Foreign Relations has observed: “We do National Security very well and Homeland Security very badly.”

NORTHCOM’s National Security role is, for the most part, a continuation of NORAD’s successful alliance with Canada; a 50 year relationship that has transcended the Cold War and has moved toward the new air defense realities *i.e.*, defense within the borders as well as outside them, post 9/11.

In its Homeland Security role however, NORTHCOM is part of a “coalition of the willing,” much like the one CENTCOM fulfills. But unlike CENTCOM’s dozen or so international coalition partners, NORTHCOM’s are the numerous federal, state and local agencies, bureaus and organizations involved in Homeland Security; many more partners than any international coalition would ever envision. For example, just within the law enforcement community, there are 600,000 police in 18,000 police departments, and 31,000 separate sheriff’s departments.

**Background.** The creation of the DHS was the largest reorganization of the government since the National Security Act of 1947. Overnight, agencies changed hands, functions were removed from their traditional management chains, and an entire new government agency was created. Twenty-two government services were moved into five directorates under the newly minted DHS. This is still a work in progress. A telling milestone is that within DHS there are still three separate pay systems, down from over a half dozen two years after its creation.

In the same time frame, NORTHCOM was created as a new Unified Command, taking resources from US Space Command and Strategic Command, as well from the Army’s US Forces Command (USFORCOCOM). However, unlike DHS, NORTHCOM has relatively few organic resources.

The real challenge is executing NORTHCOM’s role as DOD’s force provider for all natural or man-made *i.e.*, terrorist, disasters within the United States. It must understand whom it works for, who works for it, what it can do, what it cannot do, and when it can do all of these things.
**The Way Ahead.** NORTHCOM must approach the war on terrorism as a coalition war *e.g.*, a war of disparate partners with a common goal. To be effective, it must learn the language, customs, and goals of its domestic coalition partners just like CENTCOM must do with its international partners.

Establishing common terminology is a first step. For example, the term “first responder” has different connotations for different agencies. Local, municipal and state emergency personnel would be “first responders,” with the military called in if these resources were overwhelmed. However, many fire and rescue elements from Tinker AFB immediately responded to the explosion at the Alfred P. Murrah Federal building in downtown Oklahoma City. Presidential authority for federal aid was given within three hours of the blast. Who then, is really a “first responder?”

Communications is another issue. On 9/11, the New York City Police and Fire Departments could not communicate with each other because their radios were preset to different frequencies. At Oklahoma City, a similar situation occurred. Given the number of potential agencies and departments responding to any domestic Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) scenario, frequency management could be a major problem. Frequency allocation and discipline will be keys to success.

Another concern will be the Common Operating Picture: what is the real tactical situation? “Ground truth” must be available to NORTHCOM so that reliance on the media won’t be necessary to obtain an accurate picture of ongoing operations. Given the high probability that convoys, airlift sorties, and significant personnel movements will comprise the DOD response, clear and continuing understanding of what is happening will be of paramount importance to NORTHCOM decision makers.

All of these challenges to success—and more—will stem from a coalition of disparate partners who will want to achieve the same goals, but who literally speak different languages.

To understand how to successfully traverse this rocky ground, NORTHCOM planners should become familiar with the planning principles used by the Multinational Planning Augmentation Team (MPAT) in the Pacific Rim. MPAT currently has 31 participating nations whose goal is to minimize “spin-up” time in an emergency by agreeing to create a series of common starting points *e.g.*, decision making process, organizational structure, C2 architecture, etc. Understanding how to adapt MPAT for Homeland Security response planning is an important first step. It will not replace headquarters elements, but will provide the framework for a rapid start.

Waiting to be invited to the coalition—even of the willing—is too late to effect changes.
**AEF and Homeland Security:**
The Air National Guard’s Competing Roles

**Problem:** The continuing requirements of AEF and Operation Noble Eagle (ONE) will test the limits of the Air Guard’s fighter resources. Finding a balance between the two is a difficult task that may require tradeoffs in mission, equipment, and even geographic beddowns.

**Background:** AEF rotations have always incorporated the Total Force, with the Air Guard and the Air Force Reserve as full participants.

After 9/11, Homeland Security became an important and very visible Air Force mission. Recently, this mission has become almost exclusively the purview of the Air National Guard, with 17 of the 18 steady state alert sites to be manned by the Air National Guard squadrons in the near future. Day to day, the Air Guard pulls the short notice taskings, while active duty aircraft accomplish long duration airborne patrols. These practices follow the Air Guard’s “Vanguard Engagement Strategy,” which envisions shared missions, bases, and aircraft within the Total Force.

However, the GAO reported that the competing requirements of AEF rotations and Homeland Security missions have significantly reduced Air Guard unit training effectiveness and thus, its overall combat readiness.

**Discussion:** To meet the expanded requirements of Operation Noble Eagle, some ANG fighter units should be pulled out of their AEF commitments to solely support Homeland Security. While this may make sense in the short run, this proposed action has many pros and cons:

*Pro:* Focusing a Guard fighter unit solely on the Homeland Defense mission would simplify its training requirements, focus the unit’s mission in only one direction, and provide an “at home” force for the governor and the state for emergencies.

*Con:* To do so would further complicate AEF rotations and place additional burdens on other Guard, Reserve and active duty flying units to pick up the slack.

*Con:* A solely “at home” flying unit may seem less of a “Total Force” asset, since it presumably would not be available for worldwide deployment in the larger Air Force.

*Pro:* Unlike active duty and Air Force Reserve units, use of the Guard for Homeland Security missions in its Title 32 (state active duty under the command and control of the state governor) role eliminates *Posse Comitatus* issues regarding use of the military for law enforcement.

*Pro:* The NORTHCOM commander believes the *Posse Comitatus* Act provides NORTHCOM the authority to do its job and that “… no modification is needed at this time.”
Pro: Keeping Guard fighter units training/deploying for AEF as well as pulling air defense alerts and patrols at home station ensures a fully engaged force.

Con: The time and sustainability to support both missions has already strained aircraft utilization rates and manpower (full-time and part-time) availability, and created shortfalls in fulfilling recurring training requirements.

Pro: An exclusively Homeland Security mission for a Guard flying unit, assigned to NORTHCOM, may imply that the unit would not deploy overseas. This might prove to be an incentive for recruiting and retention.

Con: While a Homeland Security mission fulfills the intent of the “well regulated militia,” the Air National Guard has transitioned to a full partner in the Total Force in the past three decades. Another shift would appear to be a withdrawal—in part—from that hard-won role and could have the opposite effect on recruiting retention and morale.

Con: To date Guard reenlistment rates don’t support that theory. Some data suggests that reenlistments are up in units that do deploy vice those that don’t.

Pro: Re-rolling Guard fighter units to Homeland Security, gained by Northern Command (NORTHCOM), could simplify lines of authority and responsibility in a national emergency and shorten its response time in a crisis.

Con: The current geographic location of Guard fighter units may not meet all of the NORTHCOM/NORAD’s plans for fighter coverage. Active duty and Air Force Reserve units may also be needed from ACC to provide adequate coverage throughout the country. This would tend to perpetuate the problem of dual commitments while reducing the number of aircraft available for AEF.

Con: This addition would most likely result in increased TDY and deployment costs.

Solutions:

- Assign Guard Homeland Security squadrons to NORTHCOM/NORAD.
  -- NORTHCOM/NORAD could be a force provider for AEF in the same way as EUCOM and PACOM.

- Since AEF rotations provide Air Force units with predictable periods of deployment, make Homeland Security fighter responsibilities part of the AEF cycle.
  -- This would spread responsibility for the mission throughout the fighter force. Units could periodically deploy in CONUS to pre-determined CONUS locations just as they do to overseas locations.

- Increase ONE tasked Guard fighter units from 15 PAA to 18-24 PAA to take advantage of some of the F-16s slated to retire from the active inventory.
  -- Make these units “blended/integrated” units by adding active duty pilots and increase aircrew ratios from 1.32 to 2.0.
  -- “Blended/integrated” fighter units would increase available manpower for both AEF and Homeland Security missions while utilizing the same airframes.
  -- AFRC’s Reserve Associate program has been a success story for the past 30 years and could be used as a framework for integrated Homeland Security/ONE squadrons.

John L. Conway III

**Issue.** One true thing since 9/11 is that the Air Force and her sister services will never function unilaterally again. “Coalition warfare,” “joint operations” and a host of similar terms are shaping our view of our allies.

This holds just as true for the Homeland Security mission. Our Homeland Security “partners” will come from local, municipal, and state agencies, as well as other Departments of the Federal government. Understanding how to work with each will ensure that the Air Force is correctly postured and trained to support this emerging mission.

How these new “coalition” partners would work with NORTHCOM, as the DOD agent for Homeland Security, or with the Air Force, as one of its force providers, is ill defined and uncertain.

Potential new players in this mix are the State Defense Forces (SDFs); those forces organized at the state level to augment or replace National Guard units called into federal service. The number of National Guard units called up after 9/11 have fueled concerns that no state military forces will be available to respond to any natural disaster or Homeland Defense scenario. As a result, a number of states have revitalized these State Defense Forces for Homeland Security duties; this despite an assurance from the Chief of the National Guard Bureau to the Conference of State Governors in February 2004 that at least 50% of all Guard personnel will remain at home at all times.

Nevertheless, just as we must understand other members of any coalition of the willing, we must understand State Defense Forces and their potential role in Homeland Security.

**Discussion.** “State Defense Forces” is a generic term used to describe militias under the several states organized under the Constitution’s call for a “well regulated militia” in Article 2. Specific justification for them is contained in USC Title 32, Section 109 (c), “Maintenance of Other Troops.”

Other terms for SDFs include: “State Guards,” “State Military Reserves,” “State Military Forces,” and “National Guard Reserves.” Precise terminology to define them is the prerogative of each state. However, these units organized under the auspices of the states are not to be confused with the so-called “State Militias.” These “militias” typically run the gamut from merely Civil War reenactors to survivalist and ultra right wing organizations.

SDFs are typically organized as Army units e.g. MP companies or light infantry, suitable for constabulary duties, while several also have aviation battalions. Four states—Alaska, Texas, New York, and Virginia—have also stood up Air Sections to augment their state’s Air National Guard units.

Nationwide, SDF total numbers are somewhat misleading: although 22 states and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico have recognized State Defense Forces, they total only around 11,000 personnel.

**Disclaimer:** Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of CADRE, Air University, the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US Government agency. Cleared for public release: distribution unlimited.
SDFs are funded entirely by their states and subject to call-up only by their Governor and Adjutant General. No federal funds can be used and no federal oversight or tasking is allowed. The National Guard Bureau (NGB) provides general oversight via NGBR 10-4, “State Defense Forces, National Guard Bureau and State National Guard Interaction,” as well as some limited funding.

However, since 9/11, SDFs have begun shifting their focus from strictly National Guard support to the Homeland Security mission. SDFs are being reorganized to support local FEMA centers, augment command and control centers, provide medical support, and support installation security as well as other Homeland Security missions.

A bill to grant federal recognition of SDFs as a part of the Homeland Security effort, HR 2797 – “State Defense Force Improvement Act of 2003,” is currently in review. SDFs would be inserted into the Total Force in a Homeland Security role and would be allowed to receive surplus federal equipment if requested by the state, giving them entrance to federal resources and changing the paradigm for state forces. This could also mean additional federal funding would have to provided to the Guard to make up Guard funds expended the SDFs in an expanded role.

At first glance, the introduction of SDFs into the Homeland Security mission appears to have but a minor impact on the Air Force, but as any other “partner” in a coalition, SDF roles will have to be understood and addressed.

Due to the nature of SDFs, this coalition could be complicated and unwieldy.

Perception: SDFs, by their own admission, suffer from the public perception of a “state militia,” with all of its anti-government (think “Ruby Ridge”) connotations. This association could create a negative public perception of the Air Force i.e. condoning and supporting ultra-conservative groups, without full public understanding of these groups.

Training and Fitness: SDF training periods are unpaid and typically consist of only one day a month and five days of annual training. Given the current high OPSTEMPO throughout the Air Force, it is unlikely that SDFs can train to an acceptable proficiency level to provide any meaningful support. Physical fitness standards (and even maximum age limits) vary widely by state, with no assurance that individuals in the SDFs would be “Fit to Fight.”

Authority: Since SDFs can neither command federal forces nor be commanded by them, lines of authority and responsibility must run through the states’ Adjutants General. In a joint (NORTHCOM/Homeland Security) environment, this could result in delays and confusion of orders unless carefully crafted lanes of the road are created.

Security: There is no provision to conduct background investigations for SDFs and previous military or Civil Service security clearances for SDF personnel are not valid. This poses an additional limiting factor SDF personnel working within NORTHCOM headquarters or any location requiring work with sensitive information.

Recommendations. The Air Force must understand SDFs as they become coalition partner of the Homeland Security mission.

As a start, NGBR 10-4, written in 1987, must be revised to reflect present roles and missions and anticipated lanes of the road. It should clearly spell out roles and responsibilities, to include fiscal guidelines and command and control protocols.

If federal resources become available to SDFs, the Air Force must assume a greater oversight role, even if such role must be vetted through state Adjutants General.
The Air Force Office of Public Affairs should familiarize itself with SDFs and their legitimate role within the state construct. It should prepare clear PA guidance regarding the Air Force’s association with them in order to preclude public perception of military support to so-called “militia” groups.
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TWENTY QUESTIONS FOR STATE DEFENSE FORCE LEADERSHIP

Colonel R.W.P. Patterson (ALSDF-Ret)

The following series of questions are directed to you and your state’s leadership responsible for the State Defense Force (SDF) in your state. These are direct questions that call for direct answers. If the responses are positive, then your state is most certainly on the right track. Press forward! If the responses are not positive, and they probably aren’t, then there is work to be done and you are late in getting started. Failure to be willing to even seriously address these issues is just what is says…failure.

Consider:

1. Does the leadership of your state, to include the Governor, The Adjutant General (TAG), the SDF Commanding General (CG), and major SDF unit commanders consider your state seriously involved in the War on Terrorism beyond just providing National Guard troops when called to do so?

2. Is your State Defense Force at its authorized strength for the current war time scenario? If not, why not?

3. What is the military mission of your State Defense Force during this time of war? Has it changed since the attack of 9-11 or since major terrorist groups openly declared war on the US?

4. Have senior members or leadership of your SDF requested a current mission review and subsequent reorganization to meet a changing world’s demands? If so, what happened to such recommendations? If not, why not? (See question #1.)

5. Is there a true military role for your SDF at this time in the war on terrorism? If so, where is this spelled out?

6. Has an official study recently been done to assess the threats possible against your state during this War on Terrorism? If so, who did it and when? Was your SDF involved? (See question #1.)

7. Is your SDF armed? If not, why not? If your state’s citizens can be armed after a background check and payment of a fee, why isn’t your state military force trained and allowed to carry personal side arms to protect themselves during emergencies or when guarding state facilities? (See question #1.)

8. To whom does the Governor turn for support in meeting state Homeland Defense missions such as increased state security needs, damage assessment, or additional law enforcement support if the National Guard is federalized? (See question #1.)
9. The active military and National Guard have responded to the present threat by accomplishing several major reorganizations since 9-11 and they continue to do so even now. Has your SDF been reorganized to face this new and current threat to your state? If not, why not? (See question #1.)

10. How much of a budget (if any) does your SDF get each year from your state? How is it spent? Is this public knowledge?

11. As states are allotted additional Homeland Security grants from the federal government, does your SDF receive any of these funds? If so, how are these funds spent?

12. Does your SDF have access to any surplus radios, vehicles, trailers, emergency operations shelters, etc? Has SDF or civilian leadership tried to obtain any equipment from the state surplus system for SDF use?

13. What assistance does your state military department provide for the volunteer SDF to operate as a military organization?

14. According to a DOD paper dated Nov 2005 and posted on the State Guard Association of the US (SGAUS) web site, DOD says money for training materials (courses, books, films, etc) and surplus equipment is available for SDF units for use in Homeland Security and your TAG can request such assistance. Has your state’s military HQ done so? Has it asked its SDF command for requirements and needs so such items can be requested? (See question #1.)

15. Are there any centralized training programs (on-site or on-line) set up at state level for your SDF? (Officer’s training programs, NCO training programs, MOI, CERT, Communications, etc.)?

16. Do you know what the percentage of personnel turn-over is for your SDF?

17. Do you know what the average age and experience level is for the SDF? Is it out of line with what is needed at this time in history? If age, physical conditioning, and other requirements are indeed out of line with needs and requirements, why doesn’t your state HQ reorganize and mandate new standards to meet its needs?

18. How is you state’s unit military training planned and accomplished if there is no specific military mission for which to train? (Parking cars and taking names are not military tasks.)

19. If after examination, it appears that your SDF is not now organized, trained, or directed to assist in the War on Terrorism, nor are there active plans to accomplish this, then does your SDF have any real function or purpose as a state military force? (See question #1.)

20. Would it not be prudent to create a Commission of law makers, National Guard, and SDF personnel to work out and recommend a current, realistic SDF military mission with supporting standards for your state in this critical time?
The questions posed here may indeed make many of us a bit uncomfortable, but tough problems call for tough questions. Our states and our nation simply can not afford to waste such a potentially valuable asset as its authorized State Defense Force. As leadership, we must not tolerate being part of a process that does not address these issues. Rather than give up and just walk away, we must set about to create change. We must simulate discussion, call for dialogue, and become part of the process to change how the SDF serves our various states.

The active force structure is strained, the National Guard has moved from a strategic reserve to an operational reserve if not to now actually being part of the regular force structure. State missions are at higher risk than ever before. In case of a full Homeland Security crisis, governors will have almost no options for military assistance after the Guard is federalized, and this does not even account for those Guard units that are activated and deployed overseas. The SDF is a federally authorized, state approved, low cost asset that can work, IF it is trained and made ready. In light of these 20 Questions, can you say that your SDF up to filling the breach?

Why not make some or all of these questions topics at your next staff meeting? SGAUS President MG (TN) Whitworth was on target when he said, “…enter and influence the process…take the initiative…. ”¹ To this I would only add, if you don’t take these questions seriously, then who will?

There IS a war going on right now and it could be on your state’s doorstep tomorrow. The real question leadership must answer is, are we planning a response to a very real threat using all the assets available, or are we just going through the motions and watching to see what will happen? (See question #1.)²

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² The author, recently retired from the Alabama SDF, invites comments and discussion on this topic, and may be reached by email at K5DZE@ARRL.NET.
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Contributors

Author(s)

Bankus, Lieutenant Colonel Brent C., (Cavalry, AUS-Ret)

Lieutenant Colonel Brent C. Bankus is the former Senior National Guard Advisor to the Director, Strategic Studies Institute and has served in command and staff positions with the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment and 8th Infantry Division (3-68 Armor) and in the Reserve Components as a rifle company commander and battalion motor officer in the 1/314th Infantry, 157th Separate Infantry Brigade (USAR). Colonel Bankus also served as an Administrative Officer, Battalion S-1; S-4 and Training Officer in the 28th Infantry Division (M). Additionally, he served on Title 10 Active Guard Reserve status as an ROTC Assistant Professor of Military Science and detachment commander at Bloomsburg University; staff officer in the Reserve Components Automation System; staff officer in the National Guard Bureau Readiness Division, and Information Management Officer and Executive Officer for the National Guard Bureau Counter Drug Directorate. Colonel Bankus is a graduate of the U.S. Army War College, the U.S. Army and Marine Corps Command and General Staff Colleges and holds several Masters Degrees, one from the U.S. Army War College in Strategic Studies and one from Strayer University. In retirement, he is a consultant to SERCO, North America; Jane’s Information Group; Northrop Grumman and Blackwater USA. Colonel Bankus currently works for the Director, National Securities Issues Branch, U.S. Army War College. He has published articles in the U.S. Institute for Peace; Military Review; Homeland Defense Journal; The Small Wars and Insurgency Journal; and Joint Forces Quarterly. Additionally, Colonel Bankus, was project officer and Co-Author for the recently published Tactics, Techniques and Procedures manual, FM 3-07.31, Peace Operations.

Benner, Sergeant First Class Brenda, TXARNG

Sergeant First Class Brenda Benner has served in the Texas Army National Guard (TXARNG) for the past 20 years and is assigned to the 100th Mobile Public Affairs Detachment at Camp Mabry, Texas. She has provided local and overseas public affairs coverage for the TXARNG and has earned several National Guard Bureau awards for her photography and writing. Sergeant First Class Benner’s work has been published in many civilian and military newspapers, magazines and websites. She and her fellow unit members recently returned from their deployment to Iraq.
Hershkowitz, Colonel Martin (MDDF-Ret)

Martin Hershkowitz, OCP, served in the Maryland Defense Force, with assignment as Special Advisor to the Commanding General. He is currently the Editor of the State Defense Force (SDF) Publication Center, producing both the SDF Journal and the SDF Monograph Series, and is a member of the Executive Council of the Military Emergency Management Specialist (MEMS) Academy sponsored by the State Guard Association of the United States, from which he was awarded the Master MEMS Badge. Within and for the U.S. Government, Colonel Hershkowitz has served for 17 years as a Senior Security Officer for Nonproliferation and National Security concerned with the safeguards and security of nuclear weapons and the mitigation of the “insider threat”; as an OPSEC (OPerations SECuriity) Certified Professional; and for an additional 30+ years in military weapons analysis, educational research and evaluation, and management improvement. He is also Executive Consultant for Hershkowitz Associates and Senior Homeland Security Advisor for the Greenville Group, LLC. Colonel Hershkowitz has published extensively on State Defense Force Missions, critical site security and training. He is also a Certified Master Facilitator and a Certified Safeguards and Security Instructor. Colonel Hershkowitz served as Ad Hoc Advisor to the Delaware National Guard Command Coordinator for establishing a Delaware State Defense Force.
Patterson, Colonel Robert W.P. (ALSDF-Ret)

Colonel Patterson served as Brigade G-3 in the Alabama State Defense Force. He served in the Regular Army, retiring as a Lieutenant Colonel and Senior Army Aviator, and is branch qualified in the Infantry, Signal Corps, and Aviation. Colonel Patterson’s assignments included Infantry Platoon Leader, Aviation Platoon Leader, CH-47 Flight Commander, two assignments as Company Operations Officer (CH-47s), Instructor Pilot (CH-47), Assistant Branch Chief of Multi-Engine Helicopter Branch - Army Aviation School, Battalion Signal Officer (Pershing Missile BDE Germany), Senior Aviation Advisor to Arkansas Army National Guard, Assistant DIV Signal Officer 2d INF DIV (Korea), interim BN CDR 122d SIG BN, and Tactical Air Traffic Liaison Officer to FORSCOM HQ. He is a graduate of numerous service schools including Infantry OCS, Infantry Advanced Course, Army Aviation Helicopter, Fixed Wing, Multi-Engine, CH47 Flight Instructor courses, Aviation Commanders Course, Signal Officer Staff Course, Satellite Communications Officer Course, and the US Army Command and General Staff College. Colonel Patterson served four tours of overseas duty, including two tours in Vietnam as Operations Officer for the 147th and 213th Aviation Companies (CH-47), a tour in Korea and one in Germany. He has over 31 years of military service including the Mississippi National Guard, five years with the US Marine Corps Reserve and 16 months in the Alabama State Defense Force. Following retirement from active military service, Colonel Patterson became Business Administrator for a large church in Atlanta for 2-½ years and then as Vice President of Finance and Administration (VP Operations) for Central Bible College. He has published numerous articles on a variety of military subjects in aviation training, communications training, antennas, radio astronomy, military organizations, church administration and the American Civil War, including a Civil War novel, Deo Vindice.

Rye, Sergeant First Class Finn, ASDF

Sergeant First Class Rye serves in the Alaska State Defense Force (ASDF) assigned to the 2nd Battalion Signals Operations and is currently the webmaster for the ASDF Brigade web site. His additional duties include Battalion Deputy S1 and technical support for various computer systems. Recently, Sergeant First Class Rye was appointed by the Military Emergency Management Specialist (MEMS) Academy of the State Guard Association of the United States as Acting Academy State Director for Alaska and as an Academy Instructor, and was awarded the Senior MEMS Badge. He has a degree in microcomputer support, is certified in network design, network management, network security and teaching, and holds an amateur radio technician class license. Sergeant First Class Rye is a graduate of the ASDF Military Police Constable Academy. He is a computer network engineer for a telecommunication company and teaches at the University of Alaska.
Slotnick, Command Sergeant Major Jeffrey A, WASG
Command Sergeant Major Slotnick serves in the Washington State Military Department, responsible for training and professional development of personnel in skills relating to Domestic Terrorism, Instructor Development, Crowd/Riot Control, Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT), and Emergency Management. He also serves as a Reserve Law Enforcement Officer for the City of Centralia. Command Sergeant Major Slotnick is the President of "Setracon Inc." an Investigative consultancy focused on the professional development and training of security, law enforcement, and military personnel, the provision of quality security services, protective services, and the conduct of risk, vulnerability, and threat assessments. He is a security industry consultant with more than 26 years of experience in providing professional development and training to security, law enforcement, military personnel and conducting Security Risk Assessments, and has extensive experience in the Public Works and Utilities field, including involvement in the Homeland Security effort, managing and conducting training in the protection of critical infrastructure. Command Sergeant Major Slotnick is a member of the Washington State Governor’s Homeland Security Council as a consultant to the Infrastructure Protection Sub-Committee and recently was appointed to Board of Governor’s for the Federal Bureau of Investigations’ NWWARN HSIN-CI/USP3 and the Washington Law Enforcement Executive Forum. His expertise in Improvised Explosive Device Avoidance and Recognition has been recognized through recently published articles for Scotti Driving Schools and his selection as a guest speaker for ASIS International’s Emerging Trends Conference, the 50th Annual Conference in Dallas, Texas, and Conference Chair for Global Defense Industries International Conference on IED’s. Command Sergeant Major Slotnick serves on the ASIS International’s Private Security Services Council, Secretary for the Physical Security Council, and as faculty for the ASIS Board Certified Physical Security Professional Certification. Locally Jeff is the ASIS International Assistant Vice President for Pacific Northwest Region 1. He is an Adjunct Instructor for the Washington Criminal Justice Training Commission where he was recently awarded a certificate of Excellence.