The shortcomings of the interagency process are highlighted by the recent experience of Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq and Afghanistan. While an effective component of stability operations, PRTs still suffer from a lack of clearly stated objectives, organizational structure, and prioritized resources. Teams often conduct operations independent of military operations and often with different overall objectives. Both the Department of Defense and Department of State have instituted significant organizational changes; however, there is not a parallel organization at the operational level. A non-traditional approach to adapt the nation’s national security organization is necessary to respond to the threats of tomorrow. Future challenges to U.S. security interests necessitate an organization responsible to the President for planning, synchronizing, and enabling military and non-military means to conduct global peacekeeping, stability, and humanitarian response operations.
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Putting the Operational in Stability Operations

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of
the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily
endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: ________________________

30 October, 2008
Abstract

_Provincial Reconstruction Teams – An Imperfect Model for the Future_

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THE CHANGING NATURE OF WARFARE

The United States undertook six stability and post-conflict reconstruction operations since 1991. These operations require a broad set of capabilities and coordination within not only the Department of Defense (DOD) but also with the Department of State (DOS) and other national agencies. After missions in Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq experts argue the United States reinvents the wheel on how to effectively conduct stability and reconstruction operations. This indicates a need for an institutionalized nation building effort to employ all elements of national power - - diplomatic, information, military and economic (DIME) - - to ensure success.

“Today’s challenges – such as winning the global war on terror and slowing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction – require multifaceted security strategies that take advantage of capabilities from across the full spectrum of national security agencies. Yet, while today’s challenges are vastly different from those of the Cold War, the structures and mechanisms the United States uses to develop and implement national security policy remain largely unchanged.”

The Department of Defense and other federal agencies attempt to coordinate whole-of-government efforts though various working groups, task forces, and teams. Each one is as different as the organization they represent. The U.S. demonstrated the need for a more coherent approach to stability efforts. Strategic level coordination between DOD, DOS, and other agencies is designed to occur through the National Security Council’s Principals Committee. At the tactical level, Special Operations Forces (SOF) Civil Affairs Teams (CAT) and Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) coordinate effects in stability operations. The U.S. government, by the very nature of its organization, is unable to bridge the operational capabilities gap between strategic intent and tactical execution.

The lack of interagency coordination at the operational level of war impacted the
effectiveness of Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan and Iraq. This paper will discuss the need for dramatic paradigm shift in order to attain unity of effort as well as synchronize interagency efforts across the operational space.

The security environment and U.S. national interests justify the need for an organization focused solely on planning, preparing, and synchronizing stability operations in direct support of both diplomatic and military objectives. Because a lack of operational level coordination, the Department of Defense should establish a functional combatant commander responsible to bridge the capability gap between full military crisis response and peaceful stability support and enhancement missions.

PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS, A MODEL FOR THE FUTURE?

In 2004 a Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force (CJSOTF), led by the 3rd Special Forces Group, conducted a series of counterinsurgency (COIN) operations focused on finding, fixing, and finishing the enemy and removing the causes of instability.iii Direct military action and civil affairs operations established security in Afghanistan’s Baghran Valley and along the border. Strike operations enabled the delivery of humanitarian supplies and hand-powered radios to remote areas previously under Taliban influence.iv SOF forces engaged in COIN operations to separate the guerrillas from the population and their underground support network. The CJSOTF linked distinctly different operations with an overall objective - create a secure environment to enable Afghan elections. Unity of command allowed the military commander to synchronize the effects of the civil affairs actions with strike operations and achieve desired operational objectives.
The Provincial Reconstruction Team concept evolved from SOF Civil Affairs Teams (CAT) by countering an insurgency through changing the underlying conditions enabling the movement. First fielded in 2003 in Afghanistan, PRTs are considered a model for civil-military cooperation. Provincial Reconstruction Teams extend the Afghan Central Government’s sphere of influence through a combination of quick impact reconstruction projects and security sector reforms. Provincial Reconstruction Teams regained control of Afghanistan one valley at a time however not without difficulties in interagency coordination. A recent study by the U.S. Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute highlights factors affecting PRT performance. Among these factors, key personnel lacked clear guidance and objectives. This sacrificed overall productivity and team cohesion. The rigid military-oriented structure of teams adversely affected coordination. Poor tour synchronization and team deployment policies resulted in teams losing critical experience-based knowledge. A lack of prior training for civilian agencies and key military figures comprising the teams represents another significant obstacle to interagency cooperation. The fundamental obstacle for is a lack of clearly stated operational objectives. The PRTs objectives must be actionable at the tactical level and linked directly to an overall strategy. Standardized training and manpower management for teams will increase the quality and duration of effects in the operational environment.

The Dutch PRT experience in Afghanistan proves challenges to interagency coordination are not a uniquely American experience. The lack of clear and useful military guidelines for civil-military cooperation resulted in no clearly set priorities, demarcation of activities, or formulation of a desired end-state or enabling objectives for Dutch teams. This made it difficult for strategic and operational level leadership to
determine when the objectives were met and redeployment could begin. Further complicating matters, several international organizations and humanitarian aid groups operated in the area. The military did not participate in coordination meetings. As a result they were not aware of the civil programs in the area. Some PRTs simply were not interested in civil programs. Additionally, team members did not transfer civilian contact information to subsequent relief teams. The Dutch lacked a structure that synchronized the actions of the PRTs with interagency and IGO efforts at the operational level. Without a synchronizing agent the Dutch could not achieve unity of effort. This directly increased the factor of time in the operational environment necessary to accomplish the overall objectives.

In Iraq conventional forces performed civic action as a component of a greater COIN effort. This was not due to a lack of PRTs, but a result of conventional forces embroiled in full spectrum operations. Soldiers conducted a mix of operations that required near-instantaneous transition from a non-lethal mission to high intensity combat. The population of Baghdad became discontent with the promised U.S.-sponsored reconstruction projects “…that were not kept - far from completion, or would never be completed.” In 2007 Multi-National Division, Baghdad conducted a variety of COIN and civic action operations to win influence over the area. Conventional forces conducted traditional COIN to root out pockets of insurgents. These forces also initiated citywide clean up and date-palm spraying programs aimed at instilling a sense of national pride. Like the CJOSTF in Afghanistan, the MND-B Commander effectively synchronized effects in the operational space because he commanded both civil affairs operations and counterinsurgency.
The driving element of COIN civic action programs is the military objective instead of a long-range social objective. The U.S. initiative to attempt long-range civic programs in Iraq is through a civilian-led PRT. Loosely modeled after the military-led predecessor in Afghanistan, the Iraq PRTs suffered a disunity of effort as the executive levels Department of State debated with DOD over security, support, and funding. The Iraq PRTs did not capitalize on lessons learned in Afghanistan. Each team was an ad hoc process heavily reliant on the relationship between civilian and military counterparts. As in Afghanistan PRT members did not have clearly defined objectives. There was no memorandum of understanding in place to clearly delineate the responsibility of each agency. State Department Foreign Service Officers who served in Iraq PRTs described reconstruction projects conducted with no oversight or accountability. For example, a U.S.–built school fell down after six months. Roads not built to standard in October washed away after the January rains.

Provincial Reconstruction Team, Ninawa operated out of Forward Operating Base (FOB) Courage in late 2005 and was part of a Regional Embassy Office (REO). The team shared administrative support, contracted security, and communications to the Embassy in Baghdad and to Washington DC with the REO. When control of base was turned over to Iraqi security forces, the PRT withdrew to FOB Marez. Regional Embassy Office support and security personnel transferred to Mosul instead of the new FOB. Because the PRT was no longer co-located with the REO, the team lost critical information connectivity and relied upon military links, which were intermittent. Additionally, the loss of contracted security forced the PRT to depend on the military component. Instead of complimentary efforts, PRT agendas competed against military
priorities. The result was the PRT had a reduced presence in the field, which negatively affected its ability to accomplish the mission. This highlighted another example of a failure at the operational level to plan, synchronize efforts, and consider the effects on the overall objectives.

Conventional forces and SOF have conducted stability operations in the same area as PRTs. When civic action was subordinate to the military commander effectiveness increased as the commander synchronized effects in his area of operations. When civilian-led civic action was not coordinated with military efforts, the operational commander could not synchronize effects to achieve the desired end state.

A FAILURE TO PLAN IS A PLAN FOR…

The planning process for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) demonstrates the need for a unified agency to plan, train, and synchronize stability operations. U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) worked through a litany of plans in the days leading up to OIF but only a fraction of the attention from staff planners was given to the post-conflict period. Some have asserted that insufficient effort was placed on post-conflict planning. The post-conflict planning suffered a disunity of effort between the Office of the Secretary of Defense and senior military leadership. The planning process for OIF was broken with extensive “adaptive” changes from DOD’s civilian leadership. The civilian stabilization and planning process was even more challenging as it lacked the “unity of effort and purpose defined by a single commander and an explicitly articulated plan.” The friction between leadership at the strategic level only further added to an already complex scenario. Gregory Hooker asserts a prolonged reconstruction in the face of an
unplanned insurgency was beyond the scope of CENTCOM’s planners. He also believes they never could have anticipated the implications of uncoordinated civilian decisions, such as de-Baathification or disestablishing the Iraqi security forces. Adding to CENTCOM’s challenge, “the military commander has little power to compel agencies outside the Defense Department to act in ways that increase the chances for success in any given enterprise.”

U.S. Central Command’s pre-OIF contingency plan for a post-regime change Iraq was wargamed extensively in 1999 with Washington D.C. civilian counterparts. A consensus resulted to initiate the formal mechanism of President Clinton’s 1997 policy on managing complex contingency operations, Presidential Decision Directive 56. Hooker assesses little work of substance resulted because the effort lacked a single agency to provide leadership for interagency coordination. Upon taking office, President Bush’s National Security Presidential Directive 1 (NSPD-1) cancelled all preceding directives from the Clinton Administration. NSPD-1 does not identify a specific committee focused on stability operations.

“The U.S. government lacks doctrinally recognized institutions with a clear mandate and sufficient authority and resources to conduct post hostility planning and administration…the post hostility planning phase lacked such a strong leader supported by a professional institution with an independent staff.”

UTILITY, ADVANTAGE & THEORY

Provincial Reconstruction Teams shape the factor of space in the operational environment by creating political, economic, agricultural, sociological, and transportation effects. A key institutional challenge is Civil Affairs teams and military-led PRTs target near-term military effects whereas civilian-led teams focus on long-term development. The challenge of interagency stability operations is to produce unity of effort absent unity
of command. Success depends upon the collective actions of separate organizations, each with their own cultures, interests, and sources of power.\textsuperscript{xxiv} The necessity for unity of effort in stability operations encounters a paradoxical conflict between near-term and long-term, between stability and development.

The requirement for a persistent presence in stability operations makes it a manpower intense requirement and not an economy of force. A greater amount of manpower is required to engage in civic action and provide a secure environment than is necessary to win a decisive victory. Because stability operations can never be an economy of force operation they demand an economy of effort. Milan Vego discusses economy of effort as it pertains to logistics – providing support at the least cost.\textsuperscript{xxv} In stability operations, it is the synchronization of actions to reduce work and maximize effects. Economy of effort affects the factor of time in the operational environment - the greater the economy of effort, the less time is required to accomplish the objective.

The Center for Strategic and International Studies determined, “past operations have suffered from poor interagency planning, slow response time, insufficient resources, and little unity of effort among agencies.”\textsuperscript{xxvi} The stove-piped and parochial organization of the U.S. government has been an impediment to attaining unity of effort. Bureaucracies are considered the best possible organization to manage a well-understood task.\textsuperscript{xxvii} The existing U.S. bureaucracies are not organized to handle the varied layers of complexities of stability operations. Stability operations have three very simple overarching pillars: security, governance, and reconstruction. Building those pillars in a turbulent environment is an ill-structured, complex and wicked problem.\textsuperscript{xxviii} Contingency theory emphasizes the fit between the organization's structure, its size, its
technology, and the requirements of its environment are what are important.\textsuperscript{xxix} The right organization to successfully meet the challenges of stability operations does not reside in the existing organization of the U.S. government.

Clark Murdoch observes, “the Department of Defense often finds itself with the lead role in stability operations – despite the fact that it has no comparative advantage.”\textsuperscript{xxx} Comparative advantage is the ability of a group to carry out one particular activity more efficiently than another activity. This theory is relevant in the context of stability operations in order to assess the best way to achieve desired results. It highlights the importance of an organization specializing in production of the task in which it has a comparative advantage.\textsuperscript{xxxi} It is important to recognize that in order to produce the desired results in stability operations a blend of security as well development operations must be performed in unison. Civilian organizations generally cannot manage the security aspect of a situation, but they can address many of the grievances of a population that create instability. Use of the military will result in a more efficient production of overall results even though it is less efficient at the other aspects of stability operations. Overall efficiency is enhanced when resources are fully employed together. While demonstrated at the tactical level, there is still no unity of effort at the strategic, theatre strategic, or operational level.

Colin Gray’s theory of strategic utility is defined as the contribution of a particular kind of military activity to the course and outcome of an entire conflict.\textsuperscript{xxxii} Used to frame the proper understanding and employment of SOF, the question of strategic utility is applicable to any organization. Assessing an organization’s strategic utility and its significance poses two questions about the strategic relevance of the
organization. How important is the organization to the solving of particular problems? How important was the solving of those particular problems to the course and outcome of a conflict? An organization that provides a combatant commander reach-back capability to employ the nation’s diplomatic, economic, and informational power not already in the theatre of operations has a strategic utility. The measure of its utility would be through a greatly improved economy of effort and a reduced the factor of time necessary to attain a secure and stable operating environment.

THE EMPTY MANDATE AND A FLAWED PLAN

The Department of State Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) is designated the national lead in reconstruction and stabilization operations. It was intended to synchronize U.S. government and international organization actions to anticipate and avert state failure and to assist post-conflict crises. To that end, S/CRS has five core functions: monitoring, mobilizing, building surge capacity, learning, and coordinating with international partners. The DOS plans to establish regional bureaus to plan and coordinate individual operations. These bureaus, or Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Groups (CRSGs), will coordinate the deployment of personnel and resources in support of reconstruction missions. These groups are to have both regional expertise and specialized stabilization and reconstruction skills in governance, economic development, humanitarian assistance, and infrastructure development.

The master plan also envisions a response corps, a cadre of personnel available for recall similar to the military’s reserve component. This Active Response Corps
would respond to emerging crises. These interagency teams would deploy as first responders to augment embassy staffs or deploy with the military or multilateral peacekeepers to lead diplomatic and reconstruction efforts. Mandated in 2004, this capability is still not realized.

The June 2007 report to Congress on improving interagency operations describes the aim of the Interagency Management System (IMS) for Reconstruction & Stabilization is to integrate military and civilian planning. This whole-of-government interagency implementation and planning process is intended to identify additionally planning requirements, potential obstacles and assumptions about the operating environment. This plan should establish an implementation timeline, prioritize and sequence tasks, identify lead and supporting agencies. However, this process is not taught at the Service Colleges and future planners are not educated in how to integrate this whole-of-government approach with the existing Joint Operational Planning Process. Further, this concept addresses only contingency and crisis action planning at the strategic level and not at the operational level.

Separately, the Joint Chiefs of Staff 2008 Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan provided general planning guidance for stability operations, however the major tasks are beyond the scope of DOD capability. The military is directed to be able to provide a safe security environment, essential government services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. They are additionally directed to identify interagency solutions for broader elements of stability missions to include: economic development, rule of law, and establishment of an effective representative government. Combatant Commanders are directed to synchronize stability operations to attain a whole-of-government response.
They are to ensure plans include employment of the IMS. Implementation of the IMS is designed to trigger a deployable Integration Planning Cell (IPC) to join operational level command and ensure coordination of civilian and military plans. This IPC has deployed three times in support of U.S. Southern Command exercises, but has not yet been employed in Iraq or Afghanistan. This is an admission that the scope of current operations exceeds S/CRS planning and coordination capabilities.

Another flawed aspect of this plan is Advance Civilian Team (ACT). The plan envisions deployable field management, planning, and coordination teams to support military commanders in the field. These Field ACTs are the next generation PRTs and SOF Civil Affairs teams. While the IMS will designate lead and supporting agents, the ACTs are intended to support the military commander. The intent is “the ACT and its operations will integrate with existing Embassy and USAID mission structures and personnel. However ACTs are structured based on the objectives outlined by the U.S. strategic plan.” This plan further intends that when there is no diplomatic presence in country, the military commander will lead the ACT and when required the Field ACTs will integrate with the military to achieve optimal at the provincial and local level.

The end result would be a civilian team responsible for executing strategic objectives. However these teams are supporting the tactical military commander in the field and integrating directly with the Embassy, but not with the IPC resident in the Combatant Command. Further, when there is no civilian presence, the ACTs are subordinate to and integrated into the military to achieve unity of effort. Integrating two organizations under a single authority mitigates the inability to attain unity of effort, as there is unity of command. However, this will likely be a source of friction that could
AN ALTERNATIVE COA

The proposed 2009 National Defense Act mandates DOD improve interagency coordination and PRT performance. The bill requires the development of a performance monitoring system for PRTs. “The system should include PRT-specific work plans, comprehensive performance indicators and measures of progress, performance standards and progress goals, with a notional timetable for achieving these goals.” Additionally the bill addresses concern about PRT readiness and training. Congressional leadership believes training for PRT personnel should be more integrated and standardized and teams should be built as early in the pre-deployment schedule as possible to facilitate training together. Congress acknowledges the progress DOD has made in stability operations, but also recognizes that success depends upon the interagency process. The Department of Defense is required to provide an updated report on these evolving efforts, including: efforts to identify stability operations capabilities, both military and civilian, needed at every phase of an operation; the development of measures to evaluate progress in achieving these capabilities; steps taken to integrate civilian personnel more fully into military planning; efforts to update DOD’s planning guidance to require that the SSTR planning process include lessons learned from PRTs in Iraq and Afghanistan; and methods for achieving greater interagency participation in the development of military plans.

One possible solution to achieving truly synchronized efforts in stability operations is to establish a single organization responsible to the President for planning,
coordinating, and enabling United States military and non-military means to conduct global peacekeeping, stability, and humanitarian response operations. The U.S. Government is changing due to national security needs, but these changes must overcome tremendous institutional inertia. This change however still falls short of the nation’s needs. A dramatic revolution is necessary to address the true root cause of inefficient and ineffective execution of stability operations. Currently there is no centralized agency to plan, prepare, and coordinate all elements of national power to enable strategic objectives.

The Department of Defense is moving piecemeal towards effective stability operations management organization. U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), the newest combatant command, is focused on partnering for security and stability in the region. Realizing the importance of the other aspects of national power necessary to accomplish strategic objectives, AFRICOM is unique in having two co-equal deputies, one civilian and one military. United States Southern Command has established a Directorate of Interagency Partnering (J9), which is headed by a senior DOD civilian and has a senior Foreign Service officer as deputy director. The directorate has representatives from U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the Department of Commerce, the Treasury Department, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Representatives from the various agencies comprise one third of the directorate staff while the remaining military staff all have experience in the Washington DC interagency process as a prerequisite for assignment. The State Department’s initiative for a deployable CRSGs and ACTs is headed in the right direction, however it will compete for resources in an already resource constrained agency and still won’t be a
fully integrated planning organization.

The Goldwater Nichols Act mandated sweeping changes in DOD. There have been suggestions to draft similar legislation to force better interagency coordination. The creation of U.S. Special Operations Command is an excellent demonstration of the strategic utility an organization designed to plan, train, and equip the nation’s SOF to support national security objectives. The strategic importance of stability operations necessitates an independent, autonomous, fully resourced organization that plans, trains, and synchronizes all aspects of national power in a clear manner to compliment national security strategies.

WHY IT WON’T WORK

Some would assert that President George W. Bush’s National Security
Presidential Directive – 44 (NSPD-44) aligns the efforts of the executive branch in stabilization and reconstruction efforts. It directs the Secretary of State as responsible to “coordinate and lead integrated United States Government efforts, involving all U.S. Departments and Agencies with relevant capabilities, to prepare, plan for, and conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities.” Some also argue that an organization focused solely on planning, preparing, and synchronizing stability operations in direct support of both diplomatic and military objectives already exist within the Department of State Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) which has been designated as the national lead in reconstruction and stabilization operations.

The intention is S/CRS will have an expeditionary Active and Reserve response corps of interagency and civil specialists. This will take hundreds of millions of dollars
per year, which so far Congress has been unwilling to appropriate. It is well-intentioned plan that will take several years to fully implement. It neither answers the immediate need nor addresses the potential to respond to another near-term stability or relief operation. An expeditionary corps of trained and skilled civilians in agriculture, municipal administration, medical, and infrastructure will not form overnight to respond to the next de-stabilized region that threatens national interests. The military is able to fill the gaps in civilian capacity in the near-term. Long-term success will be dependent upon both a significant increase in resources dedicated to making civilian agencies operational and expeditionary as well as a well-defined organizational structure for unified civil-military action. Failing to invest in this capability, S/CRS and the entire conceptual system that has been built up around it will remain a hollow shell, an office with an impressive name but no resources.

Additionally this civilian-led reconstruction fails to address the plan when the security environment is not supportive of reconstruction efforts. Joseph Collins assessed, “...the insurgents decided after a few months that they had to defeat reconstruction in order to force the evacuation of coalition forces and discredit the people who worked with the coalition. In both conflicts, counterinsurgency, stabilization, and reconstruction have become strands of the same rope.” The interdependent nature of counterinsurgency, stabilization, and reconstruction require a new approach to plan, train, and coordinate a whole-of-government response at the operational level that affords an economy of effort.

Since 2001 $609 billion war-related appropriations have been issued with over 93% for DOD and only 7% for foreign aid programs and embassy operations. If a key
to success in the war to win the hearts and minds is use of aid and infrastructure investment to quickly build stability and confidence in the governance one would expect greater resources allocated to that end. Some would debate that this cannot be done until the environment is secure however if we look at root causes of the security issues, many stem from the lack of basic human needs like electricity, sanitation, medical care, and food, the sooner those needs are in place the sooner the environment will move from secure to stable. It is a proverbial Catch-22 with security needed to bring stability and infrastructure to a region but the lack of stability and infrastructure fuels insurgencies.

Some would argue that the Department of Defense already has sufficient measures in place to respond to the future organizational challenges posed by stability operations. In an effort to restructure to add greater focus on stability operations the U.S. Army G-3/5 have established a division dedicated to stability operations. The Department of Defense report to Congress claims, “restructuring has contributed to improvements in the areas most likely to generate change in DOD, including doctrine, training, education, experimentation, and planning.” This however misses the mark as an exclusive Army Staff organization that does not include the remainder of the joint services in the development process, nor does not include the expertise of U.S. Special Operations Command. Further, it does not integrate the capabilities of U.S. Joint Forces Command which provides for “mission-ready joint-capable forces and supports the development and integration of joint, interagency, and multinational capabilities to meet the present and future operational needs of the joint force.”

Some would argue that the creation of another unified command to focus on theatre-specific security issues would not have the same level of awareness as the
Geographic Combatant Commander (GCC) and stability operations are a portion of the commander’s shaping and engagement plan with states in his respective area of responsibility through Theatre Security Cooperation Plans. Some would also argue that coordination groups and Joint Task Forces are the way to address stability situations as they arise.

“Although regional COCOMs are charged with integrating the activities of the U.S. military in their areas of responsibility, there is no standing mechanism for integrating the activities of all U.S. government players in a given region. Moreover, each of the key national security departments defines the regions differently, creating sometimes-troublesome seams and overlaps in the policy implementation process. As a result, U.S. government programs and actions in a region are often uncoordinated (as in the right hand not knowing what the left is doing) or entirely incoherent (as in one agency’s actions contradicting or conflicting with another’s). Strengthening the link between policy made in Washington and its execution in the field requires greater integration of U.S. government programs and activities on a regional basis.”

This argument is shortsighted as with the notable exceptions of Commander, U.S. European Command and Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, all of the unified commands are physically located within the continental United States. The mechanisms to collect and assess the conditions internal to the theatre remain the same. They actually may be enhanced by an organization that incorporates assessments from the National Ground Intelligence Agency and Marine Corps Intelligence Agency as well as DOS, USAID, and other executive agencies to include the co-opting of prominent academics as relevant. This would provide the GCC and country ambassador a cogent analysis of the not only the observed situation on the ground but an assessment of potential effects resulting from varying courses of action.

This paper does not refute the responsibility of the GCC to plan an engagement strategy through out his respective area of responsibility. It also does not refute the need to establish a JTF to respond to contingency operations. There is however an alternative way to intelligently manage limited resources, to effectively integrate and plan for the
inherent capability gap between major combat operations and permissive assistance missions, and lastly to provide an enhanced capability to respond to crises. The focus of the geographic combatant commanders is to plan, support and conduct the range of military operations within their area of responsibility. Large staffs specialize in each aspect of conducting those operations and coordinating some civilian support to military objectives. When the objectives are largely civilian in orientation where the military supports, adding to the existing organization actually diminishes the capacity of the combatant command. “Increasing size is also related to increased structuring of organizations activities but decreased concentration of power.”lviii The existing organizations have established additional planning divisions to focus specifically on stability operations and have detracted from the organization’s original purpose. Moreover, the multitude of groups within DOD alone attempting interagency coordination for stability operations is contradictory to DOD’s stated desire for greater unity of effort.

CONCLUSION

Since the early 1990’s, the United States has been involved in stabilization and reconstruction operations every 18 to 24 months. These operations typically last five to eight years.lix The underlying conflicts are politically motivated with a group seeking to de-legitimize and exploit failing state authority, often under the guise of an ethno-religious struggle. While Clausewitz’ definition of the nature of war remains valid, the nature of warfare continues to evolve. Gray differentiates between war and warfare, “…war is a total relationship – political, legal, social, and military. Warfare is the conduct of war, generally by military means.”lx As a military leader, being able to
respond to the evolution of the nature of warfare should be sufficient motivation to
change the current way of doing business. If not, then being prepared to effectively
respond to the next stability operation should be impetus to change.

America will likely find itself intervening in a failed or failing state in the near
future, which will necessitate stability operations. The response will likely have a
predominately military face since DOD has a greater capability to respond to
contingencies. Currently, the nation does not have the right organization to respond to
these situations. Regardless of this capability gap at the operational level, “the American
people have every expectation that the military will succeed when committed. They hold
the military accountable for achieving victory. Yet the military does not command or
control the elements of national power (diplomatic, information, and economic) essential
for achieving victory.”

President Bush’s directive, the Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning
Reconstruction and Stabilization, mandates DOS and DOD “develop a general
framework for fully coordinating stabilization and reconstruction activities and military
operations at all levels.” That framework may best exist in a stand-alone organization
resourced to respond to the most prevalent security requirement our nation faces,
ensuring global security and stability.

A non-traditional approach to adapt the nation’s national security organization is
necessary to respond to the threats of tomorrow. “In the next decade, the need for
effective joint, combined, and interagency planning and policy execution will remain
salient. Major institutional planning changes will require complementary changes in
training, resource allocation, and organizational cultures.” Future challenges to U.S.
security interests necessitate an organization responsible to the President for planning, synchronizing, and enabling military and non-military means to conduct global peacekeeping, stability, and humanitarian response operations.


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