HOW DOES THIS ALL END? CAMPAIGN PLANNING, PHASE TRANSITIONS, AND CONFLICT TERMINATION IN IRAQ.

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For the military commanders and staff planners at US Central Command and Multinational Force-Iraq Headquarters in Baghdad, the question of how and when will Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) end has lately become urgent due to events on the ground and political pressures. The political issue of how OIF ends is inherently wrapped up in the military issues of campaign planning, desired end states, centers of gravity, and operational phase transitions in the Iraq War over the next 12-24 months. The answer to this complex question is that OIF will end when the OIF operational commanders formally transition from the current Counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign to a sustained shaping campaign of Security Cooperation that includes the two pillars of Foreign Internal Defense (FID) and Counter-Terrorism (CT) operations. This change in operational focus can most effectively be done and signaled to US tactical units by removing the enemy Center of Gravity from the commander's operational vision and direction. Therefore, the conceptual key to ending the current OIF campaign is to integrate into commanders’ vision and operational planning the flexible use of operational Centers of Gravity depicted below to design the successful transition to long term shaping activities outside the current OIF campaign.
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CAMPAIGN PLANNING, PHASE TRANSITIONS,
AND CONFLICT TERMINATION IN IRAQ

By

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The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: _____________________

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Abstract

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INTRODUCTION

“Tell me how this ends…”
Major General David Petraeus in March 2003.¹

The Iraq War, now in its sixth year, has seemed at times to be endless because of its constantly shifting dynamics and the absence of a fixed and understood desired end state. Yet, for all the setbacks and violence in Iraq in the last few years, that end now seems in sight as security, economic, and political indicators all point toward the emergence of a relatively stable nation. Addressing this increase in positive trends, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates gave his assessment of the road ahead in Iraq to the Senate Armed Services Committee last month by asserting, “I believe we have now entered the endgame – and our decisions today and in the months ahead will be critical to regional stability and our national security interests for years to come.”² For leaders in Washington and Baghdad, the approach of this endgame has caused an increase in pressure to make these hard decisions on the future of U.S.-Iraq relations and Iraq’s re-emergence as a regional actor. For the military commanders and staff planners at U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and Multinational Force-Iraq Headquarters (MNF-I) in Baghdad, the operational aspects of how the war ends is equally complex and has lately become urgent due to events on the ground and political pressures.
To address this question of how and when will Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) end, these same military commanders will have to translate the shifting political and strategic landscape into changes to the operational design and commanders’ vision for the current OIF campaign. Specifically, they will have to propose to the U.S. political leadership how and when the operational commanders in Operation Iraqi Freedom (CENTCOM Commander and MNF-I Commander) should transition from the current phase of OIF (which is focused on Stabilization Operations and Enabling Civil Authorities) to a sustained and enduring Phase 0 (focused on Shaping). This change, or more accurately, this transition, will have to occur in the coming months in campaign planning and execution to address changes in strategic direction and conflict termination for the ongoing conflict in Iraq. Therefore, the political issue of how OIF ends can be seen as inherently wrapped up in the military issues of campaign planning, desired end states, centers of gravity, and operational phase transitions in the Iraq War over the next 12-24 months.

The answer to this complex question is that OIF will end when the OIF operational commanders formally transition from the current Counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign to a sustained shaping campaign of Security Cooperation that includes the two pillars of Foreign Internal Defense (FID) and Counter-Terrorism (CT) operations. More specifically, in order to make the transition from the current phase (Stabilization Operations and Enabling Civil Authorities) to Phase 0
(Shaping) in campaign planning and execution to address changes in strategic direction and conflict termination for the ongoing conflict in Iraq, the OIF operational commanders should conduct a formally transition in campaign design. This transition will be from the ongoing COIN operations to conducting all military missions in Iraq under the framework of either FID support to the Iraqi government or CT as part of the global campaign against Al Qaeda. This change in operational focus can most effectively be done and signaled to U.S. tactical units by removing the enemy from the threat Center of Gravity in the commander’s operational vision and direction. Therefore, the conceptual key to ending the current OIF campaign is to integrate into commanders’ vision and operational planning a more flexible use of operational Centers of Gravity to design the successful transition to long term shaping activities outside the current OIF campaign.

PHASE TRANSITIONS AT THE END OF A CAMPAIGN

This issue of strategic-theater planning for the end of OIF is pressing and cannot be avoided as the situation on the ground in Iraq has combined with political and strategic pressure for changes to almost force the next transition in the OIF campaign. By nearly any standards and criteria, the current measures of success in Iraq is remarkable with nearly all trend lines going in a positive direction and the overall security situation being greatly improved. This success
has placed additional pressure on the current Status of Forces negotiations between the U.S. and Iraqi governments to determine the legal authorities and operational boundaries of U.S. military forces in Iraq. These negotiations to formalize bilateral relations have proven to be another mechanism for the government of Iraq to show its growing desire to affirm its sovereignty and independence.\textsuperscript{4} The results of these negotiations, however, have been a political recognition that Iraqi support for major U.S. military involvement has diminished and that many Iraqi political parties view the end approaching for any U.S. military presence in their country. This is adding pressure to end, or at least drastically scale back, the U.S. involvement in Iraq.

While this issue of conflict termination is a political decision, operational commanders must still shape the direction of operations and render advice and assessments based on how well the underlying conditions and objectives of the conflict are being addressed.\textsuperscript{5} However, U.S. military planners should not react by resisting this pressure for change as it actually represents evidence of decisive movement toward achievement of the desired end state of the OIF campaign. The \textit{National Strategy for Victory in Iraq} defines the desired end state in the medium term as “an Iraq that is in the lead defeating terrorists and insurgents and providing its own security, with a constitutional, elected government in place, providing an inspiring example to reformers in the region, and well on its way to achieving its economic potential.”\textsuperscript{6} Though much still must
be resolved, the framework for this new Iraq has emerged in the last year and real political, economic, and security progress has been made. Therefore, without losing sight of this desired end state, operational commanders have to address the issues of what is next in Iraq, how to transition to this new phase, and what should both trigger and signal this change.

The current Joint Doctrine on Conflict Termination and Phase Transitions is helpful in defining this challenging issue, but fails to present a clear structure for the next step due to the complex and irregular nature of the fighting in Iraq. Current Joint Doctrines define a “phase” as a definitive stage of a campaign during which a large portion of the forces and capabilities are involved in similar or mutually supporting activities for a common purpose. This idea of phase can be seen most easily in Iraq during 2007 when the majority of U.S. forces were focused on COIN operations. A clear phase will be seen in Iraq a year from now also, when any residual U.S. forces will be focused on a different common purpose. In this same doctrinal concept, Phase Transitions are needed when a major change in focus for the joint force is required and is therefore usually event and criteria driven. For all the reasons shown above, this idea of phase transition accurately describes the next step in OIF and can be used as a mechanism to visualize and plan for the required change in operational focus. However, even given the principle that doctrine should not be too prescriptive, there is little concrete guidance for how to transition and no techniques or processes for how to plan this transition are available in current Joint Doctrine.
In this way, existing doctrine shows that what is needed in Iraq is a planned phase transition, yet it fails to make clear conceptually what will be transitioned to. Doctrinally, possible next steps for US involvement in Iraq include either a transition to a new phase of OIF, or a transition to a new campaign (or steady-state) entirely that would signal the end of OIF. However, ending OIF is not the same as ending the Iraq War or ending U.S. military involvement in Iraq. While formal conflict termination is a political decision, OIF operational commanders must inform this decision with a recommendation on the strategic-theater goal of the next transition. As the current COIN phase of OIF is approaching the achievement of the strategic objectives (and has been demonstrated to be an effective approach to COIN), no “next OIF phase” is likely or needed.

Instead, what is warranted is a transition to a new “Phase 0” in Iraq that would signal the end of the current OIF campaign. According to Joint Doctrine, Phase 0 or the “Shaping” phase is described as continuous Joint and multinational operations, including routine day-to-day security cooperation activities, that are performed to deter potential adversaries and solidify and assure friends and allies – all done outside, but planned to support, contingency and crisis response actions. To re-establish or, in this case given all the strategic changes in the region, establish a coordinated Phase 0 plan for shaping activities should therefore be the goal in order to maintain support for a
democratic Iraq that is a partner in this volatile region. Because of this dynamic, what is required in order to transition to a new Phase 0 is a doctrinal approach that addresses the challenge of operational planning for conflict termination required for COIN that could be applied to OIF. The doctrinal mechanism to more effectively envision and explain this transition is for the OIF operational commanders to transition from the current COIN campaign to a sustained shaping campaign of Security Cooperation that includes the two pillars of FID and CT operations.

This change toward shaping would have to be formally made as CENTCOM and MNF-I are currently conducting a doctrinal COIN operation in Iraq with the operational control and execution still dominated by the US. All U.S. activities in Iraq, both military and non-military, are concentrated on fostering the development of effective governance and security opposed by various insurgent groups who resist these goals – this by definition makes the U.S. activities part of COIN operations. The current MNF-I activities in Iraq, from a joint doctrinal perspective, are predominantly characterized as a combination in activities and objectives of the two doctrinal phases of “Stabilize” and “Enable Civil Authorities”. However, given the recent security gains, growing economic strength, increasing political legitimacy, and growing Iraqi security forces, the COIN operations in Iraq can be judged to be in the final stage, “Outpatient Care – Movement to Self-Sufficiency,” where the multinational force can shift more and
more from direct operations against insurgents to a supporting role to the Host Nation. In this manner, success at the U.S.-led COIN operations have moved OIF closer to achieving the strategic-theater objectives (and the desired end state) and this has as expected modified the objectives being sought (and what is judged as the “hub” of resistance to these goals). This “movement to self-sufficiency,” however, will naturally not signal an end to the US military involvement because U.S. shaping activities will require a robust FID program for an ally or partner facing the level of internal instability and external threats that Iraq will for the near future.

Because of the diminished, but still potential for unrest, the latent threats from neighboring counties, and the continuation of insurgent movements, a major U.S. effort in Foreign Internal Defense (FID) will be required as part of any plan for sustained U.S.-Iraq security cooperation. FID will be required as part of the U.S. government effort to support the Iraqis with programs undertaken to protect their society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. Though FID in a shaping role is a State Department-led program, the military part of this, often called Security Force Assistance (SFA), will be robust and include both conventional and special operations forces to continue the institutional and organizational development of the Iraqi military and national police. This military aspect of FID can provide the framework for continued U.S. military involvement in the equipping, training, advising, enabling, and supporting missions both the
U.S. and Iraqis appear to envision for the future to address the myriad of threats facing the democratic government in Baghdad. Additionally, given the long successful US history of conducting FID to support host nation governments with their COIN efforts, and the diminishing Iraqi support for any U.S.-lead COIN efforts, FID offers the best framework for any continuing U.S. military role in Iraq.

Additionally, as Al Qaeda and Associated Movements (AQAM) in Iraq have been degraded but not eliminated, any U.S. security cooperation with Iraq will have a Counterterrorism (CT) element for years to come. The U.S. government has clearly expressed the principle that AQAM in Iraq cannot be won over and must be killed or captured through sustained counterterrorism operations. While this objective was established when AQAM in Iraq was a greater threat to Iraqi stability than its residual elements are today, there is a need for a continuing U.S. role in locating and defeating AQAM in Iraq and any transnational networks allied with AQAM in Iraq. However, inside Iraq, CT activities will be conducted as much as possible with Iraqi SOF in the lead or with U.S. SOF operating as agreed to by the Iraqi government. This increasing Iraqi role in CT in their country is only natural given the raising Iraqi sovereignty concerns and the increasing capabilities of Iraqi SOF. In conjunction to a SOF component of the FID plan to enhance the capabilities of Iraqi SOF, integrating (or better integrating) the CT missions into Iraq into the wider global campaign against AQAM can prove advantageous to the U.S. in the future and should
reduce some of the Iraqi concerns over sovereignty and focusing U.S. CT actions (and precious low density SOF elements) on some Iraqi insurgents with only indirect linkages to Al Qaeda.

As this depiction of the transition from a COIN focus to a two pillar (FID and CT) approach shows, a comparison of current U.S. military actions for COIN and future activities for FID and CT will have much in common because the transition in operational phases will not coincide with a sharp decisive change in the operational situation in theatre. A deliberate and phased drawdown of U.S. forces will likely occur, yet if the transition is planned and managed effectively, the US military will continue to support the Iraqi COIN efforts with training, advisors, enablers, logistics, and appropriate CT operations. In this way, many operational tasks will overlap the two phases, but signal a key transition in operational focus and a change in the operational Center of Gravity present the most appropriate mechanism to formalize and communicate this shift.

REMOVING THE ENEMY FROM THE COG

The most appropriate signal for this change would be for the operational commander to formally remove the enemy from the threat operational center of gravity for MNF-I and coalition forces. In current Joint Doctrine, a COG is described as the set of characteristics, capabilities, and sources of power from which a system derives its moral or physical strength, freedom of action, and will
to act, and can be expected to change over during the course of a campaign.\textsuperscript{16} The current operational COG is enemy focused, specifically on AQAM, selected regime remnants, and militia groups who oppose the current government. For the operations that MNF-I has been executing for the last few years this made perfect sense, as is traditionally the case that almost invariably some element of the insurgent force is the operational COG for a COIN operation.\textsuperscript{17} However, this does not mean that no transition can take place until these enemy insurgent groups are destroyed. For the current OIF (COIN-focused and U.S.-led) mission to end, these anti-government insurgent forces need only be degraded to the point of being containable and not a direct threat to the stability of the country.

If this point is reached and the operational commanders removed these enemy forces from the operational COG, what would then be the logical operational COG? As reflected in U.S. Joint Doctrine, Clausewitz described the Center of Gravity as “the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends.”\textsuperscript{18} Given the progress and politics in Iraq today, for the U.S. to successfully achieve of its objectives in Iraq, this “hub” in measuring progress toward U.S objectives is no longer the insurgents but is in fact the Iraq government and its security forces. Therefore, the answer to this is again to think of a FID framework, where the Host Nation security forces become the COG, reflecting a change in operational focus toward supporting the Host Nation as it wages its own COIN campaign – and therefore the Iraqis themselves would select the appropriate operational COG for the insurgency they face.
Consequently, this signal change in operational focus, as represented by changing the operational COG, would also indicate and mark a shift in operational C2 for COIN as MNF-I also transitioned from leading operations to a supporting role for all missions (other than some specific U.S.-led CT missions). In this way, this key change would trigger a transition for U.S. forces from OIF and COIN to sustained shaping and FID and CT. This transition would also serve as the first major step and a bridging mechanism toward long-term Security Cooperation and the normalization of the U.S.-Iraqi military-to-military relationship. What emerges next is the unavoidable challenge of determining when to do this transition and what should form the basis of the operational commander’s assessment of conditions required for the shift.

As the current focus of MNF-I operations is COIN, and the insurgents clearly mark the main obstacle toward reaching the strategic desired end state for the U.S., the metrics for determining when this transition can take place have to be focused on the relative strengths of the insurgent groups and the government and its security forces. While the National Command Authorities will have the final say on the validity and achievement of these criteria, senior military commanders must still present their advice on defining military transition conditions and on the appropriate ways and means to achieve them. However, the assessment should not be based on whether insurgency is destroyed, but rather when the insurgency is degraded enough to be within abilities of Iraqis to defeat (with continued U.S. assistance) because a low level of popular support
for the remaining anti-government groups in Iraq will surely outlast popular support for continuing large-scale U.S. military involvement.

For these reasons, the U.S. operational commanders must assess the relative advantage of Iraqi national government and its security forces over the various remaining insurgent groups as the U.S. and Iraqi successes at COIN have modified the path toward the strategic-theater end state. In Joint Doctrine, the appropriate assessment criteria used to determine the progress of an operation toward achieving campaign objectives, and therefore the suitable triggers for phase transitions, are Measures of Effectiveness (or MOEs).\textsuperscript{20} This MOE assessment would have to be carefully planned to be relevant, measurable, responsive, and comprehensive, so there is no false impression of success or failure, or uncertainty in the level of accomplishments.\textsuperscript{21} While the MNF-I planners could best determine these criteria, the MOE triggers could be built on the following assessments:

- No Iraqi areas under insurgent control and no persistent access to safe havens.
- Iraqi security forces deemed capably, with limited U.S. support, of providing internal security and stability.
- Iraqi military forces deemed capably, with limited U.S. support, of planning and conducting operations against remaining insurgent groups.
- Insurgent forces fractured to the point that majority of members have or could be co-opted at some level into the political process.
- U.S. has an operational transition plan and the Iraqi government has a COIN plan that are mutually judged to both be effective and synchronized.
• U.S. and the Iraqi government have agreement on a FID program to build up capabilities of Iraqi forces to defend against internal and external threats.

If these above criteria show the existence of a significant overmatch advantage of the Iraqi government and security forces over the various anti-government groups, then it is likely that conditions are in place to change the MNF-I enemy COG and as a result ready to transition from current OIF phase and COIN. As this is happening or is likely to happen in the next 12 months, it is very likely that OIF needs to be formally ended and a traditional (yet very robust) security cooperation relationship has to be established with Iraq during this same period – and planning for this must start immediately.

IS IT TIME FOR A CHANGE?

This approach toward viewing operational transition as pressing and required can be challenged by the assertion that the U.S. cannot halt OIF and the COIN campaign as this would leave Iraq at the mercy of a resurgent Al Qaeda. However, this assertion does not recognize the strides the US and Iraq have made in degrading the membership and capability of this violent extremist group. This remaining mission against Al Qaeda in Iraq can best be described as a CT operation, and part of the US global campaign against AQAM and violent extremists, rather than as a conventional COIN operation because AQAM is part of a global insurgency and is not simply an enemy of the current Iraqi
government. Additionally, as AQAM continues to be degraded and the Sunnis further their integration into the government in Baghdad, this CT mission would only continue within acceptable levels for Iraqi government. This need for the Iraqi government to support any further US involvement in actions inside Iraq against AQAM show how pressure domestically inside both U.S. and Iraq for at least a partial U.S. withdrawal as soon as possible could, counter-intuitively, be more constructive than destructive in the long-term. As the U.S. agrees to shift the lead for COIN and CT more to Iraqis, the government in Baghdad could likely generate political support to a smaller but sustained U.S. CT role as long as its had decreased domestic visibility from the current level of CT activities.

Expressing the need to end the U.S. COIN campaign in Iraq also is open to the argument that the Iraqis are simply not ready to take the operational lead against AQAM, selected former regime remnants, and militia groups who oppose the current government. There is a sound analytical basis for this argument because, for all the progress that the Iraqi Army is making in operational capabilities, both the Iraqi Ministry of Defense and most senior U.S. military advisors agree that timelines like 2011 or 2012 are realistic for when the Iraq Army could likely conduct large scale operations without US support and enablers. However, ending OIF does not signal an end to the training and advising the US military is doing as extensive FID will continue at the level acceptable to both partners. But U.S. will have to leave at some point. President George W. Bush stated on February 26, 2003, “...we will remain in Iraq as long
as necessary, and not a day more.” An extended U.S. training and advising mission, under a mutually agreed FID program, would likely be more acceptable to the Iraqis as long as it was planned for diminishing levels until U.S. support was no longer needed – and as long as Iraq has the lead in their own security operations. As an independent and stable Iraq that can defend itself is the U.S. objective, this approach should be acceptable to the U.S. keeping in mind the warning from the famous Prussian military prophet Clausewitz against “overshooting the target” in military operations and pushing for more well past an achievable and desirable end state.25

Those who argue that the Iraqis are not ready to take the lead also can assert that this type of operational transition is not urgent as the U.S. can simply continue the COIN operations until the insurgency in Iraq is defeated. However, this ignores the growing U.S. and Iraqi political pressure for a diminished (or completely diminished) U.S. military role and this is a warning long known about. The new CENTCOM Commander, General David Patraeus, wrote as one of his COIN principles the observation that any liberating force must “act quickly, because every Army of Liberation has a half-life” before resentment grows against an “occupier.”26 Trying to maintain the current COIN focus, operational tempo, and troop levels in Iraq will likely prove counter-product as this could remove the operational commander’s initiative in OIF and allow political pressure (from Baghdad or Washington or both) to abruptly signal the end of OIF at some politically expedient point. As a recent CSIS study so accurately judged, “the U.S.
‘occupation’ is so controversial and unpopular that the cost of staying long enough to do every job right could be higher in terms of Iraqi resentment and political backlash than the security benefits would be worth.27 Again, if the pressure will continue to build for withdrawal, and all indications point to this being true, then it is time to determine when and how the operations will transition and the most effective next phase.

While this political pressure is a challenge, it should also be viewed as an opportunity as a formal end to OIF could have the advantage of demonstrating progress, while simultaneously satisfying Iraqi concerns on sovereignty and facilitating a lower visibility role in FID and CT for remaining U.S. forces. As General Patraeus stated in his MNF-I COIN Guidance, “look for sustainable solutions,” and if the current COIN-focused operation is not sustainable, now is the time to assess and shift to what is sustainable.28 This is the key issue for the operational commanders’ in assessing the risks of transitioning in Iraq: MNF-I must ensure that OIF formally ends under conditions that allow critical CT and FID missions to continue with support from both Baghdad and Washington. This issue of a realistic plan for sustained support to help steer Iraqi development in line with U.S. regional goals has to be the key consideration for the CENTCOM and MNF-I Commanders as they look to the road ahead.
CONCLUSION: PLANNING FOR THE END

This doctrinal approach to the complex question of how OIF will end demonstrates the need for OIF operational commanders to formally develop plans for this transition from the current COIN campaign to a sustained shaping campaign of Security Cooperation that includes the two pillars of FID and CT operations. The flexible use of operational Centers of Gravity to design the successful transition to long term shaping activities outside the current OIF campaign provides the mechanism to visualize, plan, and execute this challenging strategic-theater transition. In this way, the current Joint Doctrine for campaign planning can be seen as relevant for planning conflict termination in Irregular Warfare campaigns such as the ongoing conflict in Iraq but must be applied flexibly to match the wicked nature of these operations and the required transitions in political and operational objectives from defeating an insurgent threat to fully supporting, and entrusting, Host Nation authorities with this fight.

This issue is both relevant and pressing for military professionals because the current military situation in Iraq posses a challenge to our National Security and, as a non-traditional military environment, also is a challenge for Joint Doctrine. The current Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES) does not recognize a formal step for the operational commander and the National Command Authority to discuss and agree on transitional and termination criteria, but this still must be done, and done soon, in Iraq to reach a decision on the way
ahead and communicated it both politically and militarily. As this paper shows, there is a way to plan this transition that is operationally sound and in line with current Joint doctrine. Joint Doctrine stresses how selecting and effecting the correct operational COG is the most direct path to accomplishing the mission and achieving the objectives of the campaign. This doctrinal model is a realistic way ahead for operational planning in an Irregular warfare environment like Iraq.

The U.S. operational leadership in Iraq cannot stay wedded to the current operational COIN efforts just because this approach is showing such success because the next step in OIF is critical and must be planned and timed appropriately so as to foster a seamlessly transition to the next phase – and maintain seamless pressure on AQAM, Baathist regime remnants, and militia groups who oppose the current Baghdad government. Therefore, a realistic and effective model for conflict termination and transition planning such as the one outlined above must be developed to address this challenge. Secretary Gates stressed this point to the Senate Armed Services Committee on 23 Sept 08 by stating, “As we proceed deeper into the endgame [in Iraq], I would urge our Nation’s leaders to…take into account the advice of our senior commanders and military leaders.” Therefore, this planning and advice on the way ahead must be offered by operational commanders and is expected by Secretary of Defense Gates. As the U.S. Marine Corps Campaigning manual states, “Every campaign and every strategic effort have a goal. Every military action eventually ends,” and it is time to finalize the plan for the end of OIF.
NOTES


4 Ibid., vii.


10 Joint Publication 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*, IV-35.


13 Department of the Army, *Counterinsurgency*, FM 3-24/USMC 3-33.5, 5-2.

14 In Joint Doctrine, FID is defined as “the participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization, to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.” Joint Publication 3-07.1, *Joint Doctrine for Foreign Internal Defense* (Washington, D.C.: Joint Staff, 30 April 2004), I-1. See also Department of the Army, *Counterinsurgency*, FM 3-24/USMC 3-33.5 (Washington, D.C.: Dept of the Army, 15 Dec 2006), 6-4, 6-12, 6-22.


16 “Given their potentially transient nature, analysis of both friendly and adversary COGs is a continuous process throughout a joint operation.” Joint Publication 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*, IV-8 – IV-9.


20 These MOEs can be used to assess changes in system behavior, capability, or operational environment. Joint Publication 3-0, *Joint Operations*, IV-32.


23 Ibid., x.

27 Anthony H. Cordesman and Adam Mausner, iii.
30 Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations, IV-10.
31 American Forces Press Service. “Gates: Iraq mission in ‘endgame’.”
32 United States Marine Corps MCDP 1-2, Campaigning (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Navy, 01 August 1997), 50.
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