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**NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
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Operational Diplomacy: The Missing Link


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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: 

31 October 2008

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Abstract

Many of the current difficulties with planning and coordination of American non-military efforts around the world stem in part from failure of the United States, specifically the Department of State, to plan and execute credible regional approaches to diplomacy and economic pluralism in support of United States National Strategy. Analysis of agencies involved with foreign policy shows that regional combatant commands have grown to incorporate almost all of the requirements and aspects of national power – diplomatic, informational, military and economic operations, while civilian foreign policy planning and execution capability has withered. This operational level capability is unique to the military; there is no similar civilian structure for planning and execution of foreign policy. This paper discusses the problems that arise as State is not capable of fully executing its foreign policy mission, and the United States military is not properly trained or structured to execute all of the “softer” components of national power. The primary focus is on the Departments of State and Defense in their roles of planning and executing American foreign policy. A review of recommendations for reforming the civilian aspects of our agencies, especially the Department of State is provided. Recommendations are made to create legislation similar to the Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 to help transform the Department of State through a coordinated approach to create a structure and cadre designed to plan, coordinate and execute foreign policy.

Introduction

Many of the current difficulties with planning and coordination of American non-military efforts around the world stem in part from failure of the United States, specifically the Department of State, to plan and execute credible regional approaches to diplomacy and economic pluralism in support of United States National Strategy. Assignment of geographic Areas of Responsibility (AOR) to combatant commanders (COCOMs) allows the military leadership to plan, resource and execute regional strategies as the military component of America's instruments of national power: Diplomacy, Information, Military, and Economics – (DIME). Unfortunately since the Department of State has no similar cohesive hierarchy or operational structure, many of the responsibilities for coordination (and sometimes, execution) of the D, I, and E functions fall back on the military. The United States is thus faced with the dual problems of a regional foreign policy effort dominated by the COCOMs and the lack of an integrated foreign policy structure at the organizational level within the Department of State.

Systemic failures may be traced back to an organization at State that in its current form was primarily designed to support American national interests at home and abroad during the Cold War era. During this period, much of the country's resources and efforts were focused on improving the capabilities and structure of the military to deflect Warsaw-pact influences and advances across the globe. As the old Soviet system collapsed and a new order of regional uncertainty and instability emerged, the only viable structures that existed at the operational level were the combatant commands. In recent years, many have begun to question the wisdom in placing so much of the nation's resources, power and authority with

the military, whose forces are designed primarily to fight and win the nations wars or to *support* the other instruments of national power in the efforts to achieve American strategic objectives. Dana Priest, a former *Washington Post* correspondent, has been raising the flag of concern since shortly before the current Gulf War when she first suggested that the office of the CINC¹ had evolved into the "... modern-day equivalent of the Roman Empire's pro-consuls – well-funded, semi-autonomous, unconventional centers of U.S. foreign policy."² Her three article series which ran in *The Washington Post* from 28-30 September 2000 was written after she spent months investigating the combatant command structure. She points out that, "CINCs [are] routinely received by heads of state who offer gifts, share secrets and give advice³.... [They] command so much respect in their theaters and in Washington that they often shape foreign relations strategy."⁴

Just as the Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 assisted in completing a major transformation of the military that began following World War II, similar legislation to help transform the Department of State should be considered to create a structure and cadre designed to plan, coordinate and execute foreign policy in a manner that is coordinated with the other instruments of national power at the local, regional and global levels to support 21st century American strategies.

This paper is organized in three main sections. First, a brief history of the Department of State and the combatant commands is presented to help illustrate why and

¹ Combatant commanders were called 'CINCs' (Commanders in Chief) of their respective commands until October 2002 when Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld ordered the title changed to 'Combatant Commander' as an acknowledgement that there is only one Commander in Chief – the President of the United States. (Vernon Loeb, "Others are out of CINC; President Alone has Title, Rumsfeld Says" *The Washington Post* (29 Oct. 2002), A 19.)

² Dana Priest, "A Four-Star Policy? US Commanders Wield Rising Clout, Autonomy," *The Washington Post* (28 Sept. 2000), A 01.

³ Ibid, A 01.

⁴ Dana Priest, "Standing-up to State and Congress," *The Washington Post* (30 Sept. 2000), A 01.

how the cultures and structures of the organizations have led to the present difficulties. Challenges arising from the disparities between State and Defense are described in light of foreign policy interventions in the 1990s and first decade of the 21st Century. Next, current thoughts in the literature on reformation are discussed in view of efforts to overcome the limitations that exist. Finally, recommendations are made to look at reform from a systemic viewpoint to avoid piecemeal efforts that may wither due to lack of interest or lack of supporting and coordinating personnel and structures. Reform should be placed in the context of creating a civilian operational-level, diplomatic and foreign policy capability that could be based, in part, on existing combatant command structures that have already been proven successful in many ways at the regional level.

A quick look at the past...

*In international affairs...the American people are asked to have a sustained interest in situations which they can influence, perhaps decisively, but never fully control.*⁵

Officially approved by Act of Congress in 1789, the Department of Foreign Affairs (later renamed Department of State) was created and led by the first Secretary of State, Thomas Jefferson. Its primary responsibilities were to correspond and execute Executive instruction with public ministers, consuls or other representatives from foreign states with regards to the foreign affairs of the United States.⁶ A Congressional Act in 1856 was intended to create a corps of consuls for the diplomatic service who would have permanent tenure. This early attempt to eliminate the already burdensome “spoils system” used by politicians to reward supporters with highly-sought ambassadorial appointments was

⁵ Arthur McMahon, *Administration in Foreign Affairs* (Birmingham, AL: Univ. of Alabama Press, 1953), iii.

⁶ Gaillard Hunt, *The Department of State of the United States* (New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press, 1914), 65-78.

defeated in its purpose.⁷ Similar attempts over the succeeding 150 years have likewise been sidetracked.⁸ Although the primary duties listed above include ‘correspondence’ and ‘execution’ of Executive instruction, there was very little in the way of ‘execution’ efforts as the Department of State was staffed to support consular missions and foreign policy development. Most attempts to actively implement foreign policy were performed by military means when communication of the US objectives did not yield the desired results with foreign parties.

Relatively little changed in the Department of State from the Civil War until World War II and its aftermath. The United States had emerged from that war as not only a superpower, but a nation with a keen and very much active interest in global affairs. The U.S. government scrutinized all of its departments related to national security and execution of foreign policy abroad. Arthur MacMahon described governmental involvement in foreign affairs during the 1940s and 1950s as a “...polygon of numerous sides of uneven length that indicate involvement in foreign affairs of nearly every part of the government...”⁹ Superimposed on this polygon is a triangle which represents the governmental elements of direct concern to foreign affairs. The three apexes of the triangle are foreign policy (as described in a purely political context), military forces (including coalitions and alliances) and the national economy (including its ability to support military forces or foreign aid).¹⁰ Even in the early 1950s, there was already discussion that the military was playing too large a role in the execution of foreign policy. MacMahon describes the crux of the dilemma:

⁷ Ibid, 334.

⁸ Jameson Doig and Robert Gilpin, “Personnel for Foreign Affairs: A Commentary on the Herter Committee Report” (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1963), 14-20.

⁹ McMahon, *Administration in Foreign Affairs*, 4.

¹⁰ Ibid, 4-6.

The issue is not the need to consider force in its complementary relationship to foreign policies. That necessity is assumed. The risk does not lie in recognizing military factors; it lies in distorted emphasis upon them.... What role does one assign force? When there is a mood of aggressive militarism, the idealization of force itself shapes the objective. It is possible, however, to develop defensive militarism by attributing too exclusive a role to military force, or particular kinds of force, in attaining the country's *peaceful* [emphasis added] objectives.¹¹

Of course, the extent of this role was abundantly clear in the aftermath of World War II as the military planned and executed the occupations of Japan and Germany. It should be noted that the military did not want to own the planning and execution of the occupation. President Roosevelt had told Secretary of War Henry Stimson that the occupation would be a civilian operation. He and others were very concerned because they saw the military had begun planning for the eventual end of the war with the establishment of a school of military government at Charlottesville, VA in May 1942.¹² He attempted in 1943 to have the State Department establish an Office of Economic Coordination (OFEC) that would be an inter-departmental coordinating agency responsible for formulation of economic policy in newly liberated countries. Secretary of State Cordell Hull declined the mission claiming that execution of that agency's broad mandate would require too radical a transformation of the State Department. OFEC never saw the light of day. President Roosevelt quietly directed the military to formally begin the planning for the occupation in November 1943 since no other civilian agency would step forward.¹³

In this post-war time, major pieces of legislation would be enacted in attempts to transform both the Department of State and the War Department (Department of Defense).

¹¹ Ibid, 6.

¹² Kenneth McCreedy, "Planning the Peace: Operation Eclipse and the Occupation of Germany," *The Journal of Military History*, Vol. 65 (July 2001), 715-717.

¹³ Ibid, 717-718.

The Foreign Service Act of 1946 (later supplanted by the Foreign Service Act of 1980) addressed, in part, development of career personnel for the Department of State in an effort to build an organization of professionals dedicated to the new worldwide American outreach effort.¹⁴ The National Security Act of 1947 and its amendment in 1949 created the National Security Council “...to advise the President with respect to the *integration* [emphasis added] of domestic, foreign and military policies relating to the national security [of the United States]....”¹⁵ This act also began the unification process for the Department of Defense through formal establishment of a Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Army, Navy and Air Force were represented by service chiefs. In 1952, the Commandant of the Marine Corps was given status as a non-permanent co-equal when participating in meetings of the Joint Chiefs. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) was a non-voting member outside of the established national chain of command, primarily a security advisor to the national Security Council and the President.¹⁶ Additionally, the global, defense-oriented combatant commands were first established creating standing, operational-level organizations focused on specific regional missions.

In 1949, the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, chaired by former President Herbert Hoover (referred to as the Hoover Commission) found that there were over 40 different departments and other executive agencies involved with various aspects of foreign policy.¹⁷ As a result of the Hoover Commission’s report, the Department of State worked to streamline lines its of authority and

¹⁴ US Congress, “Foreign Service Act of 1980,” Public Law 96-465 (Washington D.C.: 17 Oct 1980), Sec. 101. <http://www.usaid.gov/policy/ads/400/fsa.pdf> (Accessed 6 Oct 2008).

¹⁵ MacMahon, *Administration in Foreign Affairs*, 48.

¹⁶ *Ibid*, 11.

¹⁷ Department of State (Historical Division), *The Department of State, 1930-1955: Expanding Functions and Responsibilities*, DOS Pub. 5852 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, Aug. 1955), 2.

responsibility for foreign affairs.¹⁸ It also grew its regional staffs to become much larger geographic bureaus that incorporated specialists in economics, intelligence, administration and public affairs along with foreign policy officers. Since it was understood that some amount of intelligence analysis would be required to assist in the formulation of foreign policy for the future, the Department of State absorbed most of the personnel from the wartime Office of Strategic Services (OSS).¹⁹ Integration or independence of operating branches (i.e., informational and economic-focused divisions) began to seem almost like a religious question within the State Department. There was clearly still a strong desire to remain as much as possible a service that did research, analysis and policy formulation rather than implementation of foreign policy directives. Although the organizational chart changed in minor ways from the 1950s to the start of the 21st Century, the main building blocks and structural philosophy did not change much within the Department of State.

The Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (also known as the Goldwater-Nichols Act) completed the organizational transformation of the armed services to the present unified command structure. In creating this legislation, Congress stated its intent thusly:

- 1) to reorganize the Department of Defense and strengthen civilian authority in the Department;
- 2) to improve the military advice provided to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense;
- 3) to place clear responsibility on the commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands for the accomplishment of missions assigned to those commands;
- 4) to ensure that the authority of the commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands is fully commensurate with the responsibility of those commanders for the accomplishment of missions assigned to their commands;
- 5) to increase attention to the formulation of strategy and to contingency planning;
- 6) to provide for more efficient use of defense resources;

¹⁸ MacMahon, *Administration in Foreign Affairs*, 73-78.

¹⁹ *Ibid*, 84.

- 7) to improve joint officer management policies; and
- 8) otherwise to enhance the effectiveness of military operations and improve the management and administration of the Department of Defense.²⁰

This was the result of a major effort to address concerns raised in the Packard Commission Report with: inter-service rivalry leading to problems with command and control in joint operations (i.e., Desert One, Grenada, and Beirut), acquisition of defense equipment and, effectiveness of joint preparedness throughout the combatant commands.²¹ Senator Les Aspin said of the law, it was "...one of the landmark laws of American history. It is probably the greatest sea change in the history of the American military since the Continental Congress created the Continental Army in 1775."²² Although the Defense Department recognized it had issues to overcome, it fought the bill every step of the way. From the military perspective, the service chiefs were concerned with the increased powers of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and of the Combatant Commanders (referred to as CINCs - Commanders in Chief- at the time). The CJCS and COCOMs were to be given additional authority over budget input to the separate service budget requests and operational control of assets within a theater of operations.²³ To address civilian concerns about the increased authority of these newly empowered joint commanders, provisions were included to strengthen the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Specifically, while all of the services were required to place their forces under the command and control of one or another combatant command, only the Secretary of Defense is authorized to permit transfer of command authority of forces between COCOMs. Additionally, civilian leadership at the

²⁰ US Congress, "Defense Reorganization Act of 1986" Public Law 99-433 (Washington, D.C.: 1 Oct. 1986), Stat. 994. <http://www.ndu.edu/library/goldnich/goldnich.html> (Accessed 29 Sept. 2008).

²¹ Tom Morganthau, John Barry and Gloria Borger, "A Pentagon Manifesto," *Newsweek* (10 Mar. 1986), 38.

²² As quoted in: OpEd, "The Greatest Bill Since..." *The Washington Post* (24 Sept. 1986), A22.

²³ US Congress, "Defense Reorganization Act of 1986," Stat. 1007, 1012, 1016-1017.

head of the chain of command was reinforced by ensuring COCOMs report directly to the Secretary of Defense and not the CJCS.²⁴

The full impact of the Goldwater-Nichols Act emerged over the course of the following decade as the military became stronger, more joint-oriented and capable of better execution under the direction of the combatant commanders. Unfortunately, there was still a problem in that the Department of State could not effectively implement American foreign policy because it was not an execution agency. Thus, the initiative continued to pass to the military and the COCOMs, who had begun to demonstrate great enterprise and ability in mission execution. However, just as State was not properly designed to execute foreign policy, the military was never designed to execute the ‘softer’ side of foreign policy.

A new world (dis)order...

The other caution I gave [the Marines] was don't count on it when somebody tells you, 'Well, the State Department has got that' or 'OSD is planning for that.' Don't believe them. You're going to get stuck with it. So have a plan.²⁵

In the early 1990s the fall of the Berlin Wall heralded the end of the Cold War. There was an initial sense of relief, wonder and satisfaction that the world could finally be a much more peaceful place as the draw-down of troops following the first Gulf War seemed to signal an end to major land operations. This very short-lived notion gave way to bewilderment and consternation as a number of smaller, regional contingency actions in places such as Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia and Kosovo began to drive a new era of American military commitment and, thus, direct implementation of foreign policy with ships patrolling

²⁴ Ibid, Stat. 1013.

²⁵ GEN (Ret.) Anthony Zinni as quoted by: Thomas E. Ricks, *Fiasco: The Military Adventure in Iraq* (New York City, NY: Penguin Press, 2006), 71.

a foreign shore, aircraft overhead and boots on the ground. With the demise of the Soviet Union that left the United States as the only standing superpower, members of the U.S. government generally agreed to a policy of active engagement across the globe to reduce human suffering and plant the seeds of democracy in the period from 1991-2000.

Although it was generally understood that all of the components of national power needed to be brought to bear on international problems, it was clear at the onset of this new era in peacemaking and nation-building that major issues existed in coordinating the planning and execution of all the domestic and international moving pieces. The American departure from Somalia would be somewhat hasty and slightly ignominious in 1994 six months after the downing of a military Blackhawk helicopter and the ensuing firefight that left 18 soldiers dead. A very useful organization emerged from that conflict, however, that would play an important role in future operations involving non-military U.S. governmental organizations, inter-governmental organizations (IGOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) was created as a conduit for communication between the military security forces and the civilian agencies to exchange information and coordinate, if necessary, joint actions.²⁶

Intervention into Haiti in 1994 came after slightly better coordination between U.S. agencies as military planners involved representatives from the Department of State and the Department of Justice in the early stages of planning. While it may be argued that the outcome was not so successful in terms of changing the status-quo for the long-term, that had more to do with lack of cooperation by the Haitian government in making substantial reforms

²⁶ James Dobbins, et.al., *America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003), 61.

and a gun-shy American military looking to avoid mission-creep and a replay of the 1993 ‘Blackhawk Down’ incident.²⁷ It had much less to do with an honest attempt to bring the appropriate players to the table ahead of time for the planning effort.

Shortly thereafter, the international community embarked on a major effort to end the ethnic conflict tearing apart the Balkan region. The military, under the flag of NATO, executed its operations so as to adhere strictly to the military missions and mandates outlined in the peace agreement to avoid mission creep. The United Nations had named former Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt as the High Representative, with a mandate to facilitate reconciliation between the Bosnian parties and reconstruction of the region. Unfortunately he had very little real authority, almost no staff for planning and coordination, and lacked operational support to execute the mandate. Thus, the overall approach to implementation of civilian aspects of the Dayton Peace Accords was highly fragmented.²⁸

Since it was clear by this point in time that America would likely continue to be involved in efforts like these for a long time, President Bill Clinton ordered a review of policy concerning interagency coordination with respect to execution of foreign policy abroad. The result of that review was Presidential Decision Directive 56 (PDD-56). The directive was designed to force better interagency cooperation in the future and to specifically recognize that all of the key components of national power brought to bear on a specific problem must be engaged early in the planning process and throughout the execution phases of the process. The intent was to create an Executive Committee and interagency working groups during contingency planning and execution to:

²⁷ Ibid, 72-90.

²⁸ Ibid, 94-96.

- 1) identify appropriate missions and tasks, if any, for U.S. Government agencies in a U.S. Government response;
- 2) develop strategies for early resolution of crises, thereby minimizing the loss of life and establishing the basis for reconciliation and reconstruction;
- 3) accelerate planning and implementation of the civilian aspects of the operation;
- 4) intensify action on critical funding and personnel requirements early on;
- 5) integrate all components of a U.S. response (civilian, military, police, etc.) at the policy level and facilitate the creation of coordination mechanisms at the operational level; and
- 6) rapidly identify issues for senior policy makers and ensure expeditious implementation of decisions.²⁹

Improvements in the coordination and execution efforts paid off with much more success in terms of civil-military cooperation and unity of effort one year later in Kosovo. IGOs were subordinated to the United Nations, and NATO coordinated with the United Nations to avoid gaps between civilian and military efforts. Kosovo is considered the most recent successful example of how to synchronize all of the elements of international and national power.³⁰

President George W. Bush campaigned in 2000 on a plan to reduce U.S. military participation in peace-keeping and nation-building to allow the focus to return to deterring and fighting wars in global hotspots.³¹ His new administration was almost immediately faced with the Global War on Terror, which would start with major military operations but once again require a shift toward nation-building. Even with the experiences from the prior decade, the U.S. Government seemed destined to relearn the lessons of interagency cooperation for civil-military operations. While there have been significant improvements since 2006 for the stabilization and reconstruction efforts in Iraq, the timeframe prior to that

²⁹ The White House, “The Clinton Administration’s Policy on Managing Complex Contingency Operations” Presidential Decision Directive 56 (Washington, D.C.: May 1997).

³⁰ Dobbins, *America’s Role in Nation-Building: from Germany to Iraq*, 114.

³¹ Michael R. Gordon, “The 2000 Campaign: The Military; Bush Would Stop U.S. Peacekeeping in Balkan Fights” *The New York Times* (21 Oct. 2000), <http://www.nytimes.com> (Accessed 24 Oct. 2008).

was illustrative of problems with overall coordination at the operational level and resistance at the cabinet level to bring other agencies into the Department of Defense planning efforts, especially in the period prior to the invasion of Iraq. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld ordered the CENTCOM Commander to keep the post-conflict phase planning in-house, withholding authority to coordinate with outside agencies until it was almost too late to have any impact. According to one RAND study after the fact, “Overall this approach worked poorly, because the Defense Department lacked the experience, expertise, funding authority, local knowledge, and established contacts with other potential organizations needed to establish, staff, support and oversee a large multi-agency civilian mission.”³²

As a result of these missteps, President Bush ordered a review of policies and issued National Presidential Security Directive 44 (NSPD-44) in December 2005 to provide new guidance for the requirement to synchronize agency efforts going forward. This directive supersedes PDD-56 and clearly identifies the two lead agencies in coordinating and conducting stability and reconstruction as the Department of State (DoS) and the Department of Defense (DoD). While the NSPD provides guidance for both DoS and DoD, the majority of the guidance is reserved for DoS. The most substantial changes are seen in specific guidance for the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (O/CRS). This office was created under the Secretary of State in July 2004 and is headed by a career member of the Foreign Service holding the rank of Ambassador.³³ The directive calls for some of the following specific actions to be performed by the Secretary of State in conjunction with the O/CRS:

³² RAND, *Iraq: Translating Lessons into Future DoD Policies* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, Feb. 2005), 9.

³³ Department of State website, <http://www.state.gov/s/crs/66427.htm> (Accessed 13 Oct. 2008).

- 1) Develop and approve foreign assistance strategies especially with respect to stabilization and post-conflict transition operations.
- 2) Ensure program and policy coordination between departments and agencies of the U.S. Government in conducting foreign assistance.
- 3) Coordinate interagency process to identify states at risk; lead interagency planning and to prevent or mitigate conflicts, and develop detailed contingency plans that are integrated with military plans for reconstruction and stabilization efforts in specific regional scenarios.
- 4) Provide senior-level decision makers with options for contingency responses related to stabilization and reconstruction activities.
- 5) Coordinate with the Secretary of Defense to facilitate integrated military and civilian agency planning and response during reconstruction or stabilization activities.
- 6) Coordinate reconstruction and stabilization activities with foreign governments and IGOs.
- 7) Lead U.S. Government efforts to develop a strong civilian reserve capability to respond quickly with necessary surge capacity in required technical skill sets designed to support activities during stabilization and reconstruction activities.³⁴

Funding for this new office and the Civilian Response Corps has been dramatically increased recently in an effort to initiate the requirements outlined in NSPD-44. The State Department launched the new Civilian Response Corps officially in the summer of 2008. The initial goal is to have a team of 100 full-time members from several federal agencies augmented by standby members who can be deployed within 48-72 hours in response to a crisis.³⁵

Are we there yet?

*...US leaders have been turning more and more to the military to solve problems that are often at their root, political and economic.*³⁶

*As a nation, we have come to rely excessively on the military instruments of power, and have let the weeds grow in the garden of diplomacy and development/ foreign assistance.*³⁷

³⁴ The White House, "Management of Interagency Efforts During Reconstruction and Stabilization" National Presidential Security Directive 44 (Washington, D.C.: 7 Dec. 2005).

³⁵ Department of State, "Secretary Launches Civilian Response Corps," *State Magazine* no. 526 (Sept. 2008): 5.

³⁶ Dana Priest, *The Mission: Waging War and Keeping Peace with America's Military* (W.W. Norton & Co.: London, England, 2004), 11.

It would appear that the tide is finally beginning to turn. The leadership in the U.S. Government is beginning to act on what has long been a recognized problem by putting some real dollars behind the rhetoric. The lack of integrated global foreign policy implementation has hurt our national credibility and security posture abroad. We still have a very long way to go, and many of the measures being put into place recently lack the structure of a well-designed solution. We must begin to address two problems simultaneously: the current domination of regional foreign policy effort by the COCOMs and the lack of an integrated foreign policy structure at the organizational level within the Department of State. The seeds for the solutions lie within the two areas at issue.

In an effort to provide some global regional structure to foreign policy implementation, the military has continued to step-in where the civilians have not. What that has meant is the military has worked to train its leaders more and more on the non-military aspects of foreign policy implementation. Soldiers are widely viewed as “ambassadors” for the American people in addition to being the warriors at the sharp-end of the spear for coercive foreign policy. The Combatant Commanders have also taken advantage of the enormous resources available within their headquarters to reach out across their regions to integrate efforts across the spectrum of DIME. Top military leaders, especially the COCOM Commanders, have grown more knowledgeable and sophisticated in the international dealings while this same capability has withered in the civilian agencies responsible for

³⁷ Gordon Adams, “Establishing the next president’s national security agenda: strengthening the civilian instrument,” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* (8 Sept. 2008) <http://www.thebulletin.org/node/4300> (Accessed on 4 Oct. 2008).

foreign policy and diplomacy.³⁸ Jeff Bradford, a military officer, argues that the problem isn't necessarily with COCOMs that are too powerful, but with an ineffective National Security structure. He feels that the comparison of COCOM commanders to Roman pro-consuls was overstated because of the strength of civilian control in the U.S. Government system and the fact that there still is a requirement to coordinate the implementation of instruments of national power between multiple civilian agencies.³⁹

When Priest was conducting her research on the COCOMs, she interviewed and traveled with four of the most influential Combatant Commanders at the time: GEN. Anthony Zinni (CENTCOM), GEN. Wesley Clark (EUCOM), GEN. Charles Wilhem (SOUTHCOM) and ADM. Dennis Blair (PACOM). She was told by U.S. officials in the Middle East that no one from the State Department spent more time trying to build relationships in the region than did GEN. Zinni. He was one of the first at such a senior level to point out a glaring problem with the mis-match between the regional bureaus at DoS and the boundary lines of the COCOMs when he said, "The geography of the agencies [doesn't] even match up. If I go over to [the] State Department, I have four bureaus to visit."⁴⁰ A map of the world with the mis-matched boundaries is shown in Figure 1. The COCOM Areas of Responsibility are divided by red lines; the State Department bureaus' regions of responsibility are highlighted in color. It is clear that part of the solution will require aligning these mis-matched AORs.

³⁸ Margo Hammond, "The Military's Silent Takeover of U.S. Diplomacy" *St. Petersburg Times* (6 April 2003) http://www.sptimes.com/2003/04/06/news_pf/Perspective/The_military_s_silent.shtml (Accessed 29 Sept. 2008).

³⁹ Jeffrey A. Bradford, "Proconsuls and CINCs from the Roman Republic to the Republic of the United States of America: Lessons for the Pax Americana," School of Advanced Military Studies, US Army Command and General Staff College (FT. Leavenworth, KS: 5 Jan 2001), i-32, <http://www.dtic.mil> (Accessed 29 Sept. 2008).

⁴⁰ Dana Priest, "An Engagement in 10 Time Zones; Zinni Crosses Central Asia, Holding Hands, Building Trust," *The Washington Post* (29 Sept. 2000), A 01.

U.S. Department of Defense Commanders' Areas of Responsibility




Figure 1. Global areas of responsibility for COCOMs and Department of State regional bureaus.⁴¹

Priest is not the only voice in the wilderness cautioning against the waning influence of the State Department relative to the military when it comes to U.S. foreign policy. Gordon Adams points out similar concerns as he notes that while there have been rising military budgets and structure to deal with foreign policy problems, the DoS has over the same period seen its resources slashed. He calls for State Department authority to “set policies and budget for the growing portfolio of foreign assistance programs in the Defense Department.” He also notes the need for strategic direction in coordinating the widely dispersed and uncoordinated State Department initiatives.⁴² He and others have called for a complete review of the Foreign Service cadre itself to identify necessary skill sets and put into place

⁴¹ US Naval War College, PowerPoint briefing on “Interagency Coordination,” 2008.

⁴² Adams, “Establishing the next president’s national security agenda: strengthening the civilian instrument.”

viable career paths to promote success within the organization, so that the DoS has a group of well-trained officers who can shape, implement and evaluate foreign assistance programs.⁴³ But, they should be able to do so beyond the beltway of Washington and beyond the walls of the embassy compound to reach out to local populations. A detailed study by RAND includes a look at not just the skill sets, but the structural personnel program changes required to revamp the current system to begin the major changes to shift away from a system that is primarily focused on diplomats and analysts.⁴⁴

Since the NSPD 44 guidance is being implemented, and the O/CRS along with a Civilian Response Corps is being funded and stood-up, one might be tempted to say the government is doing all it needs to at this point. Well, not quite. The problem isn't with the individual parts and pieces that are crafted as portions of the solution. The problem is the process by which this fragmented set of solutions was developed in the first place. Look for example at the O/CRS. This office reports directly to the Secretary of State and is in no way integrated with any other agency; it stands alone. MacMahon points out that this long-standing tradition in the Department of State when looking to improve during a reorganization of functional structure should be avoided. "The illusion to be resisted is the ever-beckoning notion that if the particular thing you are interested in could somehow be cut off from everything else and organized by itself it would suddenly become clean, competent and vigorous."⁴⁵ By separating this office from the other foreign policy offices in DoS, it may become simply another fiefdom to be guarded jealously as opposed to a truly integrated and functional aspect of American foreign policy.

⁴³ Terrence Kelly, et.al., *Stabilization and Reconstruction Staffing: Developing US Civilian Personnel Capabilities* (RAND: Santa Monica, CA, 2003), 1-23.

⁴⁴ Ibid, 45-75.

⁴⁵ MacMahon, *Administration in Foreign Affairs*, 93.

Recommendations

As I said earlier the seeds to the solution lay within the existing system and organizations. The Department of Defense has created a global system of regions designed to plan and execute regional military operations. This operational level of command is the keystone in transforming U.S. National Strategy into plans and operations that are executed on the ground. The Department of State is completely missing this operational level of diplomacy. The State Department is now receiving the funding to staff the O/CRS and begin staffing and training a Civilian Response Corps. However, these agencies stand to be less integrated and therefore less efficient and ultimately more vulnerable to future funding cuts within the organization. The State Department should focus on the operational aspect of its challenge to become the lead once again in U.S. regional diplomacy. It could start by taking a look at the military structure to borrow the best of what might work for a civilian agency. Creation of an operational-level organization should begin with the regional bureaus. They should be grown from policy research cells with a regional focus to fully staffed, planning and coordination cells. These staffs should interface directly with the COCOMs to support or be supported depending upon the mission. To do this one would have to give great authority to the bureau directors for both planning and execution of policy. This authority should be commensurate with the authority granted to the COCOM commanders for military operations in a region. That was a key point of the original Goldwater-Nichols Act; it recognized that at the regional-level there is tremendous responsibility. The military assigns four-star generals to these posts; State needs to grow and train a cadre of foreign policy *leaders* to the same level of ability and authority. This would also require a major policy shift for the chain of authority from the embassies to run through the regional bureaus to the

Secretary of State then to the President. Award of certain ambassadorships to key political supporters is a practice that has long outlived its usefulness. If America is serious about foreign relations, then only career Foreign Service officers should hold any of these billets. These recommendations would contribute to the alignment of the planning, funding and execution functions to ensure that the efforts are truly integrated across a region. One shouldn't forget that the United States does have some experience with a regional bureau led by civilians and working to implement all the aspects of DIME in intimate coordination with the military – NATO. While the NATO model is not directly applicable, since it incorporates many member nations, there are 60 years of lessons that have been learned about how to best structure such an organization to integrate the civilian and military capabilities.

I have made several proposals to support my argument for the creation of an operational-level of command and control within the State Department hierarchy. I feel this is the critical missing link. One must look no further than Congress to see that this is already necessary. In the current round of budget discussions, the newly formed AFRICOM saw its funding slashed to 1/10th of its original request. In recommending the cut, the Congressional sub-committee report states, “AFRICOM’s leadership has acknowledged that successfully addressing [Africa’s] challenges will require diplomatic, economic, humanitarian and development efforts to lead the way....The committee strongly endorses this approach, which has yet to be reconciled with the creation of a high-profile military command to take the lead in U.S. engagement with Africa.”⁴⁶ The Congress recognizes and endorses a regional

⁴⁶ House Appropriations Defense Sub-committee, as quoted in “Lawmakers’ Questions About Military’s Role in Africa Spur Steep AFRICOM Cuts,” *The Insider* (9 Sept. 2008), <http://www.insidedefense.com> (Accessed 10 Sept.2008).

strategy but wants to see a civilian face put forward on the effort. This won't happen by merely making a civilian the deputy COCOM commander as is the current case with AFRICOM.

In addition to my call for creation of a diplomatic operational-level command and control structure, it should be clear that the maps in the agencies must have regions aligned to support integrated efforts. The creation of the O/CRS and its mission to coordinate interagency aspects of stability and reconstruction operations is a positive step but should be supported with further restructuring. Before we find ourselves too far down the road with inefficient and duplicative processes, I would suggest we take a more holistic approach to this process rather than the piecemeal approach the government is currently pursuing. I would strongly recommend a commission be empanelled to take-up the question of how best to structure our agencies to support foreign policy planning and implementation. This panel could review all of the many recommendations that are currently being discussed to recommend which should be incorporated and how to do so in an integrated fashion. This panel should include former Secretaries of State (i.e., Colin Powell, Madeleine Albright, James Baker, Christopher Warren and Henry Kissinger), former Secretaries of Defense (i.e., Donald Rumsfeld, William Cohen, William Perry, Richard Cheney) and former Combatant Commanders (i.e., Anthony Zinni, Wesley Clark, Dennis Blair, Norman Schwarzkopf) along with key players from the Department of Treasury, the Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland Defense. By creating a non-partisan panel to take-up the question of how to best plan, integrate and execute the national instruments of power, the chances are increased that a more efficient, sustainable and fundable solution will emerge.

Concluding Remarks

Our increasingly interlinked world requires policy implementation that is coordinated and integrated across regions small and large. Just as the military has an operational level of command and control to translate strategic objectives into regional planning and operations, it is critical that this capacity be developed within the Department of State. By creating this authority and capacity at DoS, the U.S. military will be able to act in a *supporting* role when called upon to assist with a civilian-led diplomatic effort instead of having to take the lead as has been done time and again in the past. While this paper focused primarily on the operational-level aspects missing at State, it does address some of the problems due to a lack of operational capability in the field, in terms of execution. In this light, the term ‘operational’ points out two very different, but glaring deficiencies that must be addressed.

A holistic approach through a blue-ribbon committee to recommend transformative legislation to restructure our key foreign policy agencies is a critical first step. Alignment of regional AORs, training and career paths for Foreign Service personnel, interagency cooperation, diplomatic hierarchy and integration of military capabilities should all be addressed. This will help ensure success for efforts to create a structure designed to plan, coordinate and execute foreign policy in a manner that is coordinated with the other instruments of national power at the local, regional and global levels to support 21st century American strategies.

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