Should the Department of Defense establish a Unified U.S. Logistics Command?

A Monograph

by

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Abstract

Should the Department of Defense (DoD) establish a Unified Logistics Command (USLOGCOM)? By LTC Frank Wenzel, U.S. Army, 52 pages.

This monograph asserts that DoD should establish a Unified Combatant Command (COCOM)-level USLOGCOM. DoD should begin a deliberate 10-20 year process to establish a USLOGCOM. As an intermediate and immediate step, DoD should make the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) an operational subordinate command of U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM). The monograph also makes additional recommendations that work toward an eventual USLOGCOM, including returning the Defense Contract Management Agency to DLA control and placing additional feeding and fueling functions in theater under DLA’s control.

The monograph relies on the large volume of existing work to arrive at the above recommendation. There is a clear majority of work calling for increased centralization of strategic logistics authorities. These previous studies were done by a wide variety of respected organizations including the Government Accountability Office, the Defense Science Board (DSB), the RAND Corporation, and monographs by graduate students. The DSB points out that recommendations for consolidation are consistent with their 1996, 1998, and 2001 studies on logistics transformation. The report pointedly asks, since these recommendations and the recommendations of other groups are consistent and not new, “Why has none of this been done before?” In an attempt to answer this question, they offer four possible explanations. First, stakeholders have felt no compelling reason (similar to a profit and loss statement in the private sector) to change to a more efficient organizational construct. Second, driven by risk avoidance and diffusion of authority in the logistics systems, decision times are too long. Third, the system is designed to focus on resource allocations principally to the Services rather than to mission priorities. Finally, the report states there is little incentive to use effective metrics to monitor resource utilization and then there is little, if any, consequence for not meeting or even setting targets.1 DSB points out that DoD has achieved only marginal progress on logistics reform and improvement despite decades focused on logistics reform and improvement. To combat this, they recommend DoD implement a single accountable authority to act as leader.

Appointment of USTRANSCOM as the Distribution Process Owner for DoD was an important step. The merger of USTRANSCOM and DLA is a logical progression and is in the intent of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation. U.S. Strategic Command provides valuable insights and a model to follow in making an agency a joint functional component subordinate of an existing COCOM.

Two NATO allies have already formed unified logistics organizations. The construct of the unified logistics branch of the German or British military goes well beyond what this monograph recommends, and well beyond any reputable proposal found in research for this monograph. While these allies’ experience is not identical to any reputable reorganization proposal for DoD, their experience is relevant as DoD considers a road map for potential strategic logistics reorganization.

The monograph prominently includes the perspectives of senior leaders on the question of forming a USLOGCOM. While the metric only includes the above-mentioned historical studies, the flag officer opinions on the topic obviously carry the most weight. These are the senior leaders who will recommend and eventually decide whether a USLOGCOM is formed.

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Introduction

The Department of Defense (DoD) should establish a 4-star unified U.S. Logistics Command (USLOGCOM) to increase strategic synchronization and command/control (C2) in order to allow combatant commanders (COCOMs) to focus on their core competencies and decrease demands on the nation’s resources. The thesis of this monograph is that DoD should use a deliberate process over the next 10-20 years and establish a Unified Logistics Command. As a first step in this process, DoD should immediately make the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) a subordinate operational command of U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM). This will make synchronization easier by consolidating meaningful authority in order to continue improving the level of joint support the sustainment systems provide the Geographic Combatant Commander (GCC).

As stated by Vice Admiral Keith Lippert, any “statement that the DoD logistics system is broken is inaccurate.” The U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps continue to provide all required support to deployed forces in Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. Their ability to support the warfighter wins accolades from multiple warfighter echelons. They also provide successful support to all other training and operational missions worldwide. The U.S. Armed Forces are stretched thin and are doing an incomparable job under severely demanding circumstances. The nation’s military forces are winning both battles and wars. However, DoD can certainly do an improved and more efficient job providing support to the fight. There are many barriers to this needed improvement, including institutional reluctance to change and a comfort level with what currently exists. These barriers drive continual changes around the margins rather than seriously consider major change. This monograph advocates evolution – not revolution. It would be easy to infer from past successes that the military must have it about right, so therefore

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2 The Army now commonly uses the term “sustainment” rather than “logistics” or “support” to annotate support functions. Colonel-level support organizations are now named “Sustainment Brigades.” In this paper, the terms are virtually interchangeable. As much as possible, the paper tries to be historically accurate in usage.

DoD should not consider change. However, as stated by former Chief of Staff of the Army GEN Gordon R. Sullivan, USA (ret), these arguments are like traps that are hard to see and even harder to extricate oneself from. Sullivan warns against not recognizing the need for change because things are being done too well, playing conservatively so as not to lose rather than simply playing to win, and mitigating risk by simply improving an old paradigm.

DoD currently lacks unity of effort in strategic logistics support. Because there is no single commander in charge of strategic logistics operations, the maneuver commander on the ground bears the weight of sorting out problems that arise from a lack of strategic logistics synchronization. The SECDEF/CJCS can rely on advice and recommendation from a variety of leaders, including Commander, USTRANSCOM; Director, DLA; or the Joint Staff J4; but there is no single head to deconflict, prioritize, and provide overall oversight of the execution of this essential support to the warfighter. DoD must provide the highest levels of the force structure with the same logistics authorities, abilities, and efficiencies as multiple subordinate levels.

The Services, COCOMs, agencies, and the significant contracted logistics base have multiple and largely successful initiatives in place to further increase logistics synchronization and deconfliction efforts in order to better support the GCCs. However, there is no central authority coordinating these fruitful actions. These peacetime and wartime systems are duplicative because each Service and GCC component commander strives to ensure flawless support to the COCOM. Duplication and inefficiency inevitably result because there is insufficient synchronization of these efforts. Working to unify these efforts by placing the supply chain under a single unified command will contribute to the creation of a seamless system able to manage scarce resources globally and coordinate support across all levels of warfare. Supply and

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7 With few exceptions, nations routinely provide their own sustainment support. Often, one component (often Army) will be named executive agent for a class of supply or system.
distribution should be handed over to a unified commander. This progression would yield one supply chain owner from acquisition to hand-off to the component customer in theater. Transportation and supply chain seams would become less visible as they would take place within one responsible organization.

Strategic and operational logistics responsiveness and synchronicity must be on par with the abilities of the warfighter. Joint doctrine gives GCCs sweeping powers and operational control over assigned forces: “Combatant command (command authority) provides full authority to organize and employ commands and forces as the combatant commander considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority).”\(^8\) However, DoD sub-optimizes this authority and C\(^2\) relationship with doctrinal statements specifying, “Operational control … does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics.”\(^9\) Setting key components of strategic/operational logistics essentially outside the GCC’s C\(^2\) seems geared toward allowing him to focus on his core competency and missions. However, it also works against unity of command and the lessons of history that teach the overall importance of logistics to operational success.\(^10\) This separation and subsequent fragmentation of logistics authorities preserves and paves the way for future expansion of the present system of expensive and burdensome logistics redundancy.

The total annual budget of DoD’s various logistics functions allocated to successfully sustain the armed forces of the United States is over $150 billion per year,\(^11\) and DoD manages supply inventory levels with a current value of over $85.6 billion. Because this is the largest logistics system in the world, it requires tremendous oversight. Currently, strategic logistics oversight is divided primarily among the heads of many organizations.

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\(^9\) Ibid., GL-9.


The unification of the distribution chain is a logical step. The intent of this monograph’s recommendation is to reorganize and consolidate to better support the warfighter and move toward better stewardship of the nation’s resources. Improvements in technological capabilities and experience since Goldwater-Nichols make possible what was unfeasible and unwieldy only a few years ago: joint logistics C² at the strategic level. The best way to accomplish this is not to create another staff organization reporting directly to the SECDEF; rather, DoD can most effectively move toward the goal by beginning to unify additional C² under a COCOM.

Jointness has come a long way over the past decades. DoD logistics is maturing. As stated by Gen Norton A. Schwartz, USAF, “In the 19 years since passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, DoD has made great strides in institutionalizing jointness and integrating unified, interdependent action within the Armed Forces.”¹² Technological advances; empirical evidence by thousands of leaders who were trained in the post-Goldwater-Nichols age; and ongoing cooperation between these leaders now assigned to the Services, COCOMs, Joint Staff, and supporting agencies have all yielded an environment where increased jointness is accepted and seen as beneficial history and thus a worthy goal. DoD should unequivocally state that establishment of a unified LOGCOM is a goal for the future and use it as a guiding principal for current initiatives and a future end state.

Logistics is the bridge connecting a nation’s economy to a nation’s warfighting forces. It is the process of planning and executing the movement and sustainment of operating forces in the execution of a military strategy and operations. Strategic logistics is that portion of planning and execution extending from point of materiel origin in the national economy to the point where movement and sustainment are handed over to units answerable to the combatant commander in the theater of operations.¹³

This monograph will examine studies completed since the end of the First Persian Gulf War and conclude that logistics $C^2$ consolidation and eventual establishment of USLOGCOM is a worthy goal. This move is a logical progression in the spirit and intent of Goldwater-Nichols. As jointness continues to mature over time, the strategic logistics structure will likely evolve into a USLOGCOM with very little resistance. As documented in existing studies, a single organization with $C^2$ over all strategic logistics will yield great savings measured in taxpayer dollars, uniformed billets, and cycle time.

There is not, however, unanimous agreement on the thesis of this monograph, though all interviewees, reports, and scholarly works recommend DoD seek increased unity of effort and synchronization. However, a majority of those consulted call for centralization of $C2$ or an actual USLOGCOM. This monograph includes all viewpoints encountered during research – it does not exclude any opposing recommendations or opinions encountered. This work opens by presenting senior leader perspectives on this much-studied issue. It then examines a large portion of the body of historical studies on the topic, DoD’s experience with the incremental solution of appointing USTRANSCOM as the Distribution Process Owner (DPO), the experience of another unified command (U.S. Strategic Command [USSTRATCOM]) when faced with a similar $C^2$ challenge, U.S. allies’ experiences with unified logistics, and the potential of a merger of a unified command with a DoD agency as the next step toward an eventual USLOGCOM. The monograph will include and critically examine these existing studies in order to determine if any recommendations have already been implemented and the results of these implementations.

Following the presentation of key excerpts from interviews with senior DoD leaders on the central question, this document examines, compares, and evaluates published results of reputable organizations, documented results of past initiatives including recent multi-command and agency efforts at joint sustainment, and the findings of independent past research and testing on this topic in order to apply a criteria of consensus as the metric used in formulating
recommendations for the road ahead. Although the senior leader interviews are a central feature of this monograph, the results of those interviews are not included in the metric.

A large body of previous work exists on the central question of this monograph. This monograph is unique in that it does not seek to make a technical case to answer the central question. Rather, it canvases the existing work and presents the prevailing opinion. The criterion for the metric is a measurement of the prevailing opinion of the existing work on the subject. In other words, since the majority thinks it is a good idea, then it should be recommended/implemented. Ideally, all of the sources will agree. This would make the conclusion of this monograph quite simple. However, given the complexity of the issue and the obvious availability of sources with somewhat different viewpoints, a unanimous opinion will not be forthcoming. Rather, from the evaluation of the consensus that is present, the monograph will conclude that while the establishment of a USLOGCOM is a worthy goal for the distant (over 10 years) future, it would be too unwieldy to establish the organization now. However, as the monograph will show, few reputable voices call upon DoD to continue on the present path of overly diffused and fragmented logistics C². There are many reports, findings, and recommendations from reputable bodies that recommend changes to logistics operations, including recommendations for establishment of a USLOGCOM. Recent reports express frustration that their recommendations were not implemented, despite promises by various organizations, principally by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) staff, of never realized but always deemed imminent gains from various initiatives.

To lay the foundation for an eventual LOGCOM, DoD should immediately make DLA a subordinate organization to USTRANSCOM. This should be done not only because it is the next logical step on the road to USLOGCOM, but also because this change can improve support to the warfighter in the current fight, make synchronization easier by consolidating meaningful authority, and continue improving the level of joint support the sustainment systems provide.
While this monograph focuses on strategic logistics and our national logistics assets, it will on occasion comment on related in-theater organizations, assets, and practices as appropriate. Improvement and change are difficult in the fragmented environment of strategic logistics. Given the complexity and different cultures of various organizations, a list of primary strategic logistics stakeholders illustrates the challenge and complexity DoD presently faces in trying to improve logistics performance:

- U.S. Transportation Command
- Service Materiel Commands
- DLA
- Joint Staff J4
- Service Logistics Staffs (G4, N4, A4)
- Combatant Command Staffs and Executive Agents
- Industry Partners

This list above includes, but does not detail, many of the executive agents responsible for leadership of specific programs or capabilities within DoD. An organization chart including the above organizations and their dotted lines of coordination is far too complicated to be of use in this monograph. Additionally, there is no direct C^2 relationship between the above organizations. Making DLA a subordinate organization of USTRANSCOM will work toward decreasing current duplicative, competing, and often ad hoc logistics structures, goals, and outcomes which result from today’s many headquarters that have significant authority over strategic logistics actions; it will decrease demands on the nation’s resources; and will enable DoD and the COCOMs to focus more on their core competencies.

Many studies completed over the past several years report that DoD has been improving strategic logistics, shaving costs and redundancies when they are identified, and improving responsiveness for over 40 years. However, DoD continues to make changes only at the margin. Collaboration has its limits, and well-intended efforts to vastly improve strategic logistics support and efficiencies over the years have failed to meet DoD’s self-stated lofty goals. Just as GCCs have near-total authority and are able to command and control a vast organization in theater, so a single logistics COCOM should eventually command and control the strategic logistics system. It
is time to recognize the necessity that DoD will eventually establish a logistics COCOM. A unified USLOGCOM will not easily fix all problems. However, as reported in this monograph and confirmed by the numerous studies cited in this work, the present system of collaboration and executive agents is not sufficiently working to improve the situation at the strategic level. It is time to change course. As the next step, DoD should follow the recommendation of, among others, the DSB and consolidate USTRANSCOM and DLA by making the Director, DLA a subordinate joint functional component commander under USTRANSCOM. This change can and should happen immediately. After the consolidation of USTRANSCOM and DLA, the command should use their new organizational ability to expand their influence over sustainment operations.

Senior Leader Perspectives

Many uniformed senior leaders have published comments regarding a potential USLOGCOM. In addition to some of those published comments, this monograph also records their opinions on the topic obtained during private interviews. These senior decision-makers and influential voices reflect both the enormity of what is at stake as well as the wisdom that comes from decades of service. While they do not all agree on the specifics of the road ahead, all are immediately familiar with the central question: should the DoD establish a 4-star USLOGCOM? The issue/question has been on the table for decades. GEN Dwight D. Eisenhower touched upon it when appointing LTG General John C.H. Lee as his direct subordinate commander with overall responsibility for logistics, and RADM Admiral Henry E. Eccles continued wrestling with the issue in his work in the 1950s.\footnote{Henry E. Eccles, \textit{Logistics in the National Defense}, (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press Publishers, 1959).} A former Commander of U.S. Army Materiel Command, GEN Paul Kern, USA (ret), described current logistics interoperability issues as similar to “that faced by the U.S. government from the Civil War to the early 1900s.”\footnote{Christine Brim, \textit{Logistics Transformation: Next Steps to Interoperability and Alignment} (Arlington, VA: Lexington Institute, July 2005), 8.}

Over the past decade, one of the most vocal senior leaders calling for DLA to become a subordinate organization of USTRANSCOM has been Gen John W. Handy, USAF (ret). As a former CDR, USTRANSCOM and former Vice Chief of Staff, USAF, Gen Handy’s goal was to give the SECDEF and his fellow CCOMs a single point of contact for logistics matters. He asserted that the single point of contact needed to be a combatant commander – a leader operating at the peer level who was empowered to make decisions, allocate resources, and, as necessary, push hard changes in order to better support the warfighter while making wise use of resources.\footnote{General John W. Handy, USAF (ret), telephone interview by author, September 25, 2007.}

In order to have a logistics organization that is empowered to support the warfighter, one command – not one directorate or DoD appointed position – must possess the authority and control necessary to make concrete changes. Early in his tenure as CDR, USTRANSCOM, Gen
Handy went to the SECDEF and proposed that he combine DoD strategic logistics under a single commander:

SECDEF ought to combine DoD logistics under one person, one command – particularly a combatant command – and say, ‘Now work logistics for me.’ You can’t run logistics out of OSD or the Pentagon, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or any of the Services. There are Title 10 requirements that they have to fulfill, but there are joint logistics things that ought to be done by a combatant commander. I still believe there ought to be a joint logistics organization in the Department of Defense. Either TRANSCOM changes and assumes these roles – you see all kinds of studies now coming out of the woodwork suggesting this is the right thing to do – or some other organization assumes these roles.18

Gen Handy’s successor at USTRANSCOM, Gen Norton A. Schwartz, USAF, does not state that a USLOGCOM is the best option to achieve synchronization and efficiency in DoD's logistics operation. He points out that a USLOGCOM would be too large to manage. He favors surgical steps toward a more coherent logistics enterprise. For instance, carefully calibrated changes in the relationship between USTRANSCOM as the DPO and DLA can produce positive results. Consistent with his view that DoD should not move too quickly toward a USLOGCOM, Gen Schwartz said that if some form of a USTRANSCOM-DLA consolidation does occur, certain functions of DLA would be a valid candidate for merger. However, he cautions that before beginning any organizational changes, stakeholders must demand further information-technology (IT) solutions. Gen Schwartz stated that IT offers the greatest potential for improvement, and that is what he feels the DPO’s distribution portfolio management effort will produce.19

The Director of DLA, LTG Robert T. Dail, USA, stated DoD would be wise to set a unified COCOM-level USLOGCOM as a long-range goal – perhaps attainable fifteen years in the future. LTG Dail said that prematurely moving to completely consolidate all strategic/national logistics functions would have terrible consequences for two primary reasons. First, although technology improvements now make consolidations possible that would have been overly

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18 Requoted from Jay H. Smith and Lillian Nolan, General John W. Handy USAF Commander, United States Transportation Command and Air Mobility Command: An Oral History (Scott Air Force Base, IL: USTRANSCOM, June 2007), 135.
complex and unmanageable just a few years ago, LTG Dail concludes that DoD is not yet at the
point where it can reorganize the entire logistics C². Given that there is not even agreement on
how big all of DoD logistics really is, it’s logical that it would be difficult to direct it from a
single headquarters. Second, depot maintenance is a Service core competency. At this point, LTG
Dail maintains that “if it aint broke – don’t fix it.” As required in the latest Base Realignment and
Closure (BRAC) Report, DLA is taking over supply functions at Service depots, but the
maintenance “wrench-turning” work itself is a Service function and they do it very well.²⁰

LTG Daniel G. Brown, USA (ret), a former Deputy Commander, USTRANSCOM,
oberves that USTRANSCOM, “does not yet have the full set of tools to do its full distribution
mission.” He attests the present logistics organizations and financial systems add to the problem
as each command tries to optimize their part of the supply/distribution chain without the unity of
effort that comes with unity of command. As LTG Brown states in his Oral History,

One of the best ways to achieve unity of effort is through unity of command. We
would, in effect, integrate wholesale supply and strategic transportation. In my
opinion, you can’t have unity of command if the key functional command for
joint wholesale supply – DLA – answers to a non-military chain of command.
DLA … reports to a policy-making organization … in OSD. In effect, we have a
battlefield operating system, logistics, which is not directly responsible to a
warfighter. We will never fully integrate end-to-end supply and transportation
distribution if one segment of the supply chain answers to a policy-making
organization in OSD … . The question is do we create a command to coordinate
distribution or continue with what we have now: multiple commands, lots of
different working capital funds, many different information management and
billing systems, and high costs? The answer should be to create a command to
coordinate distribution.²¹

LTG Brown states that DoD will never have an optimal logistics system under the current
system of multiple working capital funds operated by different commands. He recommended
years ago for DLA to report to USTRANSCOM vice the current situation where DLA reports to
an OSD political appointee. He points out that this change would not only be cost free, but would
also encourage cultural change leading directly to business process change. As an interim step, he

²¹ Requoted from James K. Matthews and Margaret J. Nigra, Lieutenant General Daniel G. Brown
USA Deputy Commander in Chief, United States Transportation Command: An Oral History (Scott Air
Force Base, IL: USTRANSCOM, August 2006), 38-44.
recommends making the Director, DLA a joint functional component commander within
USTRANSCOM. LTG Brown points out that this is not without precedent – defense agencies
were made dual-hatted subordinates of USSTRATCOM.²²

The Director for Logistics, the Joint Staff (J4), LTG Claude V. (Chris) Christianson,
USA, does not envision a USLOGCOM, but he does call for increased unity of effort:

What’s wrong with the way we do business today is we don’t have unity of effort
across the DoD supply chain. Since we all know that unity of effort is best
achieved by unity of command, a single command would appear to be a good
solution … . I don’t think it’s realistic to think we can have a single sustainment
command for DoD. If we can’t, how can we better achieve unity of effort, absent
unity of command? I think we can, and I think that’s the question we have to
address.”²³

LTG Christianson cautions against creating a USLOGCOM. He recognizes that this is an
attractive option, but points out that it is more important to focus on:

Just what is it that’s wrong with how we do business today that would lead
anyone to consider a single unified command? If we can’t answer that question,
then we really can’t evaluate the goodness of that solution. From my perspective,
what’s wrong with the way we do business today is we don’t have unity of effort
across the DoD supply chain. Since we all know that unity of effort is best
achieved by unity of command, a single command would appear to be a good
solution. But, I’m not sure we can ever have unity of command over the supply
chain. First of all, the supply chain consists of the Services, industry, and the
joint commander. Those three elements could never be included in a single
command, no matter how hard we tried to make it happen.²⁴

Given that DoD cannot and should not move directly to a USLOGCOM, LTG Christianson states
it is important to determine how to better achieve unity of effort without complete unity of
command.

GEN Leon E. Salomon, USA (ret), addressed the issue of a potential unified
USLOGCOM when he was commander of Army Materiel Command in 1995. Capabilities have
changed in thirteen years, and the acceptance of jointness has also grown through time, but his
views remain relevant to the central question of this monograph:

²² Lt. General Daniel G. Brown, USA (ret), e-mail interview by author, October 14, 2007.
Discussed further in USSTRATCOM and MEDCOM sections of this monograph.
²³ Lt. General Claude V. Christianson, USA, e-mail interview by author, October 5, 2007.
²⁴ Lt. General Claude V. Christianson, USA, e-mail interview by author, electronic mail, October
In my view, the only way to encourage such innovation is to decentralize and empower people . . . . I do not believe that a unified logistics command is capable of performing such complex integration in a timely manner which is critical to the readiness of weapon systems and their efficient management, not to mention streamlining our acquisition cycle . . . . While there are some efficiencies to be gained through streamlining and consolidation of a limited number of functions, the logistics organizations must have a Service orientation, while jointly integrated, to provide responsive, efficient support to the warfighter.  

The thread of consistency running through all of these senior leader comments is that DoD cannot and should not rush to create a USLOGCOM. However, all agree there are efficiencies to gain through increased unity of effort.

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Historical Studies

There have been many studies completed over the past decades on our strategic logistics performance, the topic of a USLOGCOM, increased unity of effort in logistics, and even the possibility of a USTRANSCOM-DLA merger. While these studies do not unanimously agree on recommendations, a majority calls for centralization of logistics authority. A 2004 Chief of Staff of the Army chartered task force on logistics noted the following in their report on strategic logistics:

- A lack of global joint logistics C²
- No total synchronization or integration of DoD logistics in support of force commanders
- A lack of formal joint C² structure to support the GCCs
- The capacity to sustain in joint, interagency, and multi-national operations is not commensurate with, as effective as, or as efficient as the capability to employ joint forces
- Without joint logistics C², synchronization and integration of priority of support with priority of effort is ad hoc and creates vulnerable seams, therefore the tactical end suffers

These are the challenges that prompt the central question of this monograph. Many studies were undertaken by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) at the request of Congress to examine the resource-intensive logistics operations of DoD. GAO reports follow a multi-year trend of uncovering inefficiencies in logistics operations that are acknowledged by DoD executives with well-intentioned promises to collaborate with all stakeholders on vast improvements. The trend is that after a few years, GAO routinely investigates the same issues, finds no or little real progress, and DoD executives again respond with well-intentioned promises to collaborate with all stakeholders on dramatic improvements. As the years pass, GAO grew more impatient and eventually suggested that:

Decision makers may need to reexamine fundamental aspects of DoD’s programs by considering issues such as whether current organizations are aligned and empowered to meet the demands of the new security environments as efficiently as possible and what kinds of economies of scale and improvements in delivery

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support services would result from combining, realigning, or otherwise changing selected support functions, including logistics.27

Congress and the GAO have documented concerns with the performance of DoD’s strategic logistics system. Since 1990, GAO has designated DoD supply chain management as a high-risk area due to ineffective and inefficient stock systems and practices and due to weaknesses in DoD’s management of supply inventories and responsiveness to warfighter requirements. GAO reports state that unspecific long-standing problems28 in the supply distribution system have impeded the ability of DoD to provide effective and timely support to the warfighter.29 Because of ongoing problems in DoD’s organizational logistics structure, congressional investigators state that DoD faces challenges in attempting any coordinated and systemic approach to improving the distribution system. As a result, GAO maintains there is little assurance that warfighters in future conflicts will have more effective and timely logistics support. Following DoD’s numerous actions and initiatives over 10 years, DUSD (L&MR) requested in December 2006 that the GAO remove DoD supply chain management from its list of high-risk areas. However, GAO decided that supply chain management should remain a high-risk area until DoD can successfully demonstrate improvements.30 This decision was partly due to a history of well-intentioned road maps, partnering, and collaboration yielding less than the promised vision. For instance, in 2001, DoD issued a logistics vision that stated by fiscal year 2006, “the joint logistics process will be a highly efficient, integrated system that ensures required support to the warfighter.”31 In a separate report, DoD recognized that its logistics system was

28 This monograph does not list specific historical failures in strategic or operational logistics support. Numerous historical examples of strategic and operational logistics problems are available. See http://www.almc.army.mil/alog/issues/JulAug04/distribution_jul_aug.html.
designed decades ago to support the armed forces in a global conflict and is slow, complicated, redundant, and overly costly.\footnote{GAO Report, \textit{Logistics Planning: Opportunities For Enhancing DoD’s Logistics Strategic Plan}, GAO/NSIAD-97-28, (December 1996), 1.} Despite this recognition, the organizational structure remains largely unchanged. In 2003, GAO noted in testimony before Congress that DoD failed to apply lessons learned from the first Persian Gulf War and Kosovo. While specifically detailing the failures, GAO states that these failures to improve led to a repeat of the same errors during Operation Enduring Freedom in Iraq. There is ample evidence that the current organizational constructs are not working.

Clearly, deployed forces continue to receive all sustainment support necessary to complete their operational missions. However, there is no dissent to the opinion that the system can be more efficient. Since 2002, independent federal audit organizations have made more than 400 recommendations that focus specifically on improving DoD’s logistics systems.\footnote{GAO Report, \textit{DoD High-Risk Areas: Progress Made Implementing Supply Chain Management Recommendations, but Full Extent of Improvement Unknown}, GAO-07-234, (January 2007), 1.} GAO consistently finds that DoD agencies, usually DUSD (L&M), will respond to GAO findings and concerns by planning initiatives which yield long-term time frames and consistent delays in meeting their own milestones. DoD is unable to sustain progress in implementing their self-mandated programs. This illustrates the inherent difficulties staff agencies have in taking the lead in operational issues such as logistics. Without requisite authority, which is always missing in staffs but is inherent in command, improvements will be lacking. GAO found that efforts to adopt a coordinated and comprehensive approach within DoD are hampered by the diffused organization of DoD’s logistics operations: “The Department’s ability to make coordinated, systemic improvements that cut across the multiple organizations involved in the distribution system is stymied because of problems in defining who has accountability and authority for making such improvements.”\footnote{GAO Report, \textit{Defense Logistics: DoD Has Begun to Improve Supply Distribution Operations, but Further Actions Are Needed to Sustain These Efforts}, GAO-05-775, (August 2005), 1.}
GAO also notes “several recent studies of DoD’s logistics system have recommended changes to DoD’s organizational structure for providing joint logistics and supply support to military organizations.” These investigators found that efforts to develop and improve the diffused organization of logistics systems are fragmented among various DoD components with a lack of specific goals and strategies, a lack of enforceable accountability for achieving results, and a lack of set and useful outcome-oriented performance measures. In short, DoD has not assigned meaningful accountability.

According to Title 10, U.S. Code, the Services have responsibility for sustainment (supplying, equipping, and training) of their respective Services. This provision has not changed since the implementation of Goldwater-Nichols in 1986; since the Services had this responsibility before 1986, being responsible for logistics is a macro-example of the strength and pull of the old adage, “that’s the way we’ve always done it.” There are many instances of the Services sharing their logistics responsibilities, such as the DLA for common-user items. Much can be accomplished in the consolidation of strategic logistics support without modifying Title 10. However, any proposed change to DoD's strategic logistics system should not view Title 10 as an impediment. Although this monograph does not examine Title 10 in detail or propose a revision to the statute, those studying this issue should not allow the difficulty of changing a statute to become an excuse to avoid needed action. Congress can certainly modify the U.S. Code when necessary.

A Lexington Institute report states that Title 10 of the U.S. Code can be invoked as a roadblock by those opposed to improvements in order to prevent joint logistics transformation.

37 Various provisions of Title 10, US Code establish responsibilities and authorities for supplying and equipping the Armed Forces. See Title 10 U.S. Code §§ 3013, 3062, 5013, 5062, 5063, 8013, and 8062.
and interoperability. The Lexington Institute contends Congress may need to amend Title 10 because transformational changes may not be possible without amending existing laws. The immediate recommended action of making DLA a subordinate command of USTRANSCOM should not require any modification of Title 10. However, there are differing viewpoints on this opinion. LTG Peter Cuviello, USA (ret), a former Army Chief Information Officer, states that Title 10 may serve as a limit on USTRANSCOM. Likewise, MG Wade McManus, USA (ret), envisions a need to revise Title 10 in order to allow logistics coordination at a level other than within the individual Services. Of course, Title 10 should not be viewed as only a barrier to potential changes. While the Services and Committees can use it as protection from change, Congress can also use it to leverage change by forcing joint C\(^2\), just as Congress forced joint C\(^2\) with the passage of Goldwater-Nichols.

GAO states that the systemic supply chain problems resulting from multiple strategic logistics organizations detailed in the above paragraphs are still present. The problems are exacerbated by a lack of interoperability among essential IT systems. As stated earlier by Gen Schwartz, IT will certainly remain an area of emphasis in any endeavor to improve logistics, and rapid advances in this area are what enable realistic discussion of consolidation of strategic logistics organizations. It is likely that, over the next decade, IT changes necessary to enable increased span of logistics control will occur at a faster pace than will the potential changes to the organizations they were designed to support.

Many independent studies conclude that a unified logistics organization is a worthy goal. These recommendations appear in various forms, with some focusing on policy functions rather

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41 Ibid., 13.
than the operational functions this monograph focuses on. A 2005 Center for Strategic Studies and International Studies (CSIS) report recommended forming an integrated logistics command that would report to the USD (AT&L). This organization would be formed by combining the office of Deputy Undersecretary of Defense (Logistics & Materiel Readiness) with much of the Joint Staff J4. However, this approach would not improve the situation and would likely lead to future studies similar to those of the cumulative GAO conclusions: that an OSD and Pentagon lead is not the answer. What is required is command emphasis and leadership, not staff action.

The CSIS report points out the inherent weakness in having logistics control vested in the OSD. Unlike defense ministries in European governments, the ranks of political appointees in the U.S system run deep into departments. There is a bureaucratic effect on performance in those departments since the average political appointee stays on the job less than three years. This relatively quick turnover at the top makes it difficult to sustain improvements in an inherently slow-moving field that requires long lead times for program development. This report points out that personnel making up a bureaucracy tend to slow the implementation of new ideas. This is one reason why real improvements in DoD logistics have not been forthcoming from OSD.

Simply telling existing organizations to “do better” or “act differently” without providing capabilities consistent with responsibilities will never work. Power comes from the ability to decide and execute, not from a process used to support those functions. Organizations that are given roles and responsibilities must have the ability to execute those responsibilities. Command inherently has those necessary powers.

This CSIS study also points out that loyalty to the Services is beneficial. However, the parochialism attendant to that loyalty must be carefully managed. This is important to remember when evaluating executive agency agreements as an alternative to moving down a path toward a unified command. The lead-agency approach is normally not effective on the national level, since

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44 Ibid., 18.
agencies will resist risking resources by taking direction from one another. This is illustrated numerous times in various GAO reports when Service components in GCCs resist taking direction from a separate component command at the same level when potential long-term losses of resources are at stake. GAO and military leaders both raise questions about the true effectiveness of agreements with organizations that lack the ability to exercise command. The executive agent model does work at the tactical level where the capabilities of a single agent are obviously more suited to the task in question.

The 2005 Lexington Institute Report on Logistics Transformation reviews previous calls for a logistics command, recalling a 1995 report recommending formation of a USLOGCOM and a 1999 report calling for a merger between DLA and USTRANSCOM. The report also notes that no single office currently has a comprehensive view across DoD. No one is in charge of DoD logistics. The Lexington Institute also observes that existing funding mechanisms act as disincentives for joint logistics transformation and interoperability.

Congressional investigators and other non-audit organizations reported on DoD logistics numerous times over the past decade. The conclusions were often remarkably similar, and grew in conviction that the current organizational structure is incapable of overseeing necessary changes. The most recent reports quoted and concurred with studies such as the prestigious Defense Science Board (DSB) calling for a USLOGCOM. In a 2006 DSB report, the group states that DoD’s system is sub-optimized and that logistics performance is well behind accepted worldwide industry standards. To address this, the DSB called for the creation of a USLOGCOM to ensure end-to-end optimization of the management of the DoD supply chain. The DSB task

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46 Ibid., 18-20.
48 Ibid., 23.
force recommended an immediate first step toward this end by coalescing the functions of USTRANSCOM and DLA. The DSB points out that these findings and recommendation are consistent with their 1996, 1998, and 2001 DSB studies on logistics transformation. The report pointedly asks, since these recommendations and the recommendation of other groups are consistent and not new, “Why has none of this been done before?”

In an attempt to answer this question, they offer four possible explanations. First, stakeholders have felt no compelling reason (similar to a profit and loss statement in the private sector) to change to a more efficient organizational construct. Second, driven by risk avoidance and diffusion of authority in the logistics systems, decision times are too long. These lengthy decision cycles result in an unresponsive and slow-to-improve strategic logistics system. Third, the system is designed to focus on resource allocations principally to the Services rather than to mission priorities. Finally, the report states there is little incentive to use effective metrics to monitor resource utilization and that there is little, if any, consequence for not meeting or even setting targets. 50 DSB points out that DoD has achieved only marginal progress on logistics reform or improvement despite decades focused on logistics reform and improvement.

To combat this, DSB recommended DoD implement a single accountable authority to act as leader:

To move forward, the DoD must streamline command of the supply chain and logistics operation in order to ensure adequate visibility and authority to effectively orchestrate change … . Once a chief supply chain commander is appointed to lead both DLA and … USTRANSCOM … a strategy can be developed to improve the logistics system and sustain the forces … . A comprehensive vision of the supply chain will allow the assessment of risk across the supply chain, while providing flexibility and mitigation to these risks. 51

The report further states that “logistics is the combat enabler, and failure to transform logistics now will relegate DoD logistics to the Achilles heel of net-centric operations.” 52 As

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51 Ibid., 15.

52 Ibid.
evidenced in DoD’s responses to the multiple GAO reports, DoD does not believe that consolidation of command is necessary to achieve the results called for in the DSB report. DoD feels that common thinking that progress can be made through collaboration of stakeholders. However, history proves that while a measure of progress is always possible – especially when supported by self-designed metrics – real transformation of a system that needs reform does not automatically occur through collaboration.

The DSB report presents several metrics and examples that support their case for consolidated logistics C². Of course, researchers must use caution and reason when comparing private industry standards with DoD performance. It is extremely difficult to claim any apples-to-apples comparison with private industry and the most strenuous aspects of DoD’s reality. For example, when FedEx delivers to General Motors, GM is always in the same place. DoD must deal with major customers that move, train in remote locations, or even deploy overseas to an austere environment. “Profit is not our bottom line,” explains Allan A. Bagnart, director of enterprise transformation for DLA, “the ability to perform in combat is our bottom line.”⁵³ Of all segments of the logistics system, the strategic portions are the closest in performance and function to those of private industry. Mr. Bagnart’s comment is correct and especially applicable to forward logistics functions. Although the strategic system is not insulated, most effects of deploying units’ logistics support are felt at the operational or tactical level.

A 2003 USTRANSCOM-DLA Task Group headed by LTG Gus Pagonis, USA (ret), recommended against combining USTRANSCOM and DLA. The group held that the roles, missions, and competencies of the two organizations are too diverse to create a constructive combination and that the organizational merger would not significantly facilitate broader transformational objectives of supply chain integration. The board stated that both organizations perform unique activities and functions in the supply chain. They stated that the real problem is

not that the two organizations are separate, but that their activities are not well integrated. This USTRANSCOM-DLA Task Group recommended that the SECDEF create a new office reporting directly to the SECDEF: Under Secretary of Defense for Global Supply Chain Integration. This new office would take control of both USTRANSCOM and DLA.\footnote{William G. Pagonis, \textit{TRANSCOM-DLA Task Group Report to the Senior Executive Council, Department of Defense}, Report FY03-3 (Washington, DC: Defense Business Practice Implementation Board, June 17, 2003), 2.} This recommendation runs counter to the recommendation of this monograph. This monograph maintains that it is necessary to take control out of the Pentagon and place it in the hands of a COCOM. Placing more logistics execution authority in the OSD staff does not facilitate effective command and control – command requires a commander. The USTRANSCOM-DLA Study Group was the only major report available that called for further consolidation for \(C^2\) on the OSD staff.

COL Robin B. Akin, in a 2005 U.S. Army War College monograph, points out that there is no one commander in charge of the entire logistics process. Stating that unity of effort must start at the top of the logistics pyramid, COL Akin calls for the establishment of a unified logistics organization. “By taking the logistics management requirement from the USD (AT&L) and making logistics a separate and equal agency at the strategic level, all levels of logistics will become more efficient and have less redundant capabilities.”\footnote{Robin B. Akin, \textit{Joint Logistics Cannot Work Without Legislative Enforcement of Title 10, and the Goldwater-Nichols Act and Logistics Reorganization} (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, March 2005), 11.} This is consistent with the recommendation in a 2004 article calling for the creation of a unified COCOM-level logistics organization.\footnote{Larry D. Harman, “The ‘Short List’ for Achieving a Logistics Revolution,” \textit{Army Logistician} 36, no. 2 (March/April 2004): 34-37.} DoD’s problem is that there is no single joint leader for defense logistics responsible to ensure the efficient and effective employment and utilization of assets and capabilities. This means that, while the GCC has sweeping powers to control combat and support organizations in theater, he loses all unity of effort and synergy in his support base because his command directive authority takes effect only when his resources and logistics arrive in his area.
of responsibility. This leads to duplication of effort and lack of confidence. The interface problems resulting from too many involved organizations create and perpetuate enormous inefficiencies. A 2003 GAO study found that over $1.2 billion worth of supplies accounted for as delivered by the Services and DLA went missing and were unaccounted for by USCENTCOM. Having a single point of contact for strategic logistics will decrease the interface problems created by the current organization which requires the GCC staff to coordinate daily with over a half-dozen logistics agencies that have no common organization binding them.

In his 2005 Army War College monograph, LTC Victor Maccagnan, Jr. states that the major obstacle DoD must overcome is ownership. Someone must be truly in charge of the process and the systems. He shows a general consensus continuing throughout OEF and OIF that no one agency, command, or other organization exercises overall control of the logistic process. His monograph was written just after SECDEF designated USTRANSCOM as the DPO, and there was hope this would be the answer to the problems detailed at the beginning of this paper. However, as discussed in this monograph, a lack of authority to accompany that designation stymied results. After considerable effort, USTRANSCOM later received approval of an updated DoD Directive that codifies DPO roles, responsibilities, and relationships.

An earlier U.S. Army War College monograph by LTC Rembert M. Keith recommended establishment of a USLOGCOM. His work laid out a detailed recommendation for subordinate planning and coordination cells at each GCC and a joint logistics support command at the theater level. While his recommendations for operational and tactical cells are beyond the scope of this monograph, LTC Keith correctly recognized that the present system is inherently duplicative

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since individual Services are responsible for providing logistics support to their own deployed forces.  

Each of the Services largely builds its own unique bridge to its deployed forces. As a theater matures, this system consolidates as executive agent responsibilities begin to take root, but any degree of directive authority for logistics the GCC exercises does not relieve the Services of their Title 10 responsibility. GCCs remain dependant on the various and diffused logistics organizations. “The nation ... cannot afford multiple defense establishments.”

In January 2004, the Chief of Staff, Army (CSA) chartered a group under the direction of the Commanding General of Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) to examine strategic logistics support. This group noted the challenges presented by the lack of a single joint logistics commander at the COCOM level and the reality of multiple process owners and numerous stakeholders with no common metrics to measure success. These conditions result in a current doctrine relying on *ad hoc* joint logistics operations. The study notes that SECDEF tried to alleviate some of these stresses by designating DUSD (AT&L) as the Supply Chain Integrator, U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) as the Joint Deployment Process Owner, and USTRANSCOM as the DPO. While each of these designations has resulted in success, the system remains sub-optimized by the fragmentation of these efforts and the lack of C². This CSA study presented a notional Global Logistics Command to be formed as a specified command. This command would provide C² at the national level, prioritize support across the GCCs, serve as the technical channel for logisticians in the field, and combine all common items and joint support elements of the Services.

The majority of studies on the topic were critical of the current situation, history, and prospects for real improvements within the current construct. As the GAO concludes in a 2007 report, “critical to successful reform are sustained leadership, organizational structures, and a sustained commitment to leadership development.”

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62 Ibid., 4.
clear strategic and integrated plan that encompasses all major business areas, including supply
chain management … . The department lacks a comprehensive, integrated strategy to guide
logistics programs and initiatives.”65 Experience has shown that OSD is not capable of providing
this sustained direction. However, a COCOM’s authority can provide this leadership. As British
Defence logistics consultant George J. Murphy states, the organizational aspect of distribution “is
the most difficult because we are now dealing with people, not abstract ideas.”66

65 GAO Report, DoD High-Risk Areas: Progress Made Implementing Supply Chain Management
Distribution Process Owner

A major step toward unifying logistics efforts was the formal appointment of the DPO. In a short September 2003 memorandum, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld named the Commander, USTRANSCOM as the DPO for DoD.\footnote{Secretary of Defense Memorandum, \textit{Distribution Process Owner}, (Washington, DC: GPO, September 16, 2003).} USTRANSCOM became the single entity to direct and supervise execution of the strategic distribution system and improve overall efficiency and interoperability of distribution related activities. USTRANSCOM believed they were to lead distribution process improvement within DoD, provide one “distribution” face and peer accountability to GCCs, respond to their issues and challenges, and integrate logistics and distribution processes from factory to foxhole. In Senate testimony, Gen Norton Schwartz, the CDR, USTRANSCOM stated that process ownership means bringing synchronization and alignment to what historically was a piecemeal process with multiple, accountable parties.\footnote{Armed Services Committee, \textit{General Norton A. Schwartz, USAF Confirmation Hearing}, 109\textsuperscript{th} Cong., 1\textsuperscript{st} sess., July 28, 2005, 7.}

The SECDEF memorandum also tasked CDR, USTRANSCOM to draft and submit a proposed charter defining authorities, accountability, and responsibilities of DPO. Aware of past attempts at process improvement, the then-commander of USTRANSCOM, Gen Handy, directed that the USTRANSCOM-authored draft must contain language ensuring authority was commensurate to the task. As DPO, CDR, USTRANSCOM recognized what the GAO had been consistently saying for years: collaboration has its limits. As the Army's Chief Information Officer, LTG Peter Cuviello stated, “The bureaucracy will wait until the individuals who are pushing change leave, and then logistics transformation efforts, including any joint efforts, could slow down.”\footnote{Christine Brim, \textit{Logistics Transformation: Next Steps to Interoperability and Alignment} (Arlington, VA: Lexington Institute, July 2005), 19.}

Gen Handy, however, did not believe this was a time for more studies and roadmaps. What he felt was needed was true authority to go along with the responsibility the SECDEF was
conferring on this COCOM. Nothing forces true collaboration more than command authority over a process. Gen Handy was ready to take responsibility and begin real change. As Gen Kern pointed out, “Jointness in logistics is about the coalition of the willing, and some are more willing than others. The biggest cultural problem is Services who say, ‘I’m joint enough as it is.’…We need new leadership to rethink jointness.” Gen Kern adds, “There is no enforcement mechanism.”

The draft charter met stiff resistance in the Pentagon. DUSD (AT&L) maintained that the DPO title only conferred an advisory role and did not merit any new authority. Congressional investigators, in a summer 2007 report, found that because of a multi-year dispute over the charter and role of DPO, accountability and authority for improving the distribution system remained unclear. DoD logistics cannot experience real improvement without a single command authority to force real action. GAO recommended – but DoD did not concur – that the SECDEF clarify the scope and responsibilities of USTRANSCOM as DPO, especially as related to other DoD components with significant logistics responsibilities. In response to this report, DoD stated that the responsibilities, accountability, and authority of this role were already clear. Congressional investigators maintained that this impasse and lack of clear authority for improving the logistics system presented a significant challenge to USTRANSCOM’s ability to correct long-standing problems that date back at least to the Persian Gulf War.

While the DSB reports the naming of USTRANSCOM as the DPO was a significant step, they recognized – even in 2005 – it did not truly cover the full logistics or distribution system. DSB reports this designation did not “go nearly far enough to achieve significant transformation

of the Department’s business processes to align resources with the Department’s mission.”

GAO concluded that assigning DPO authority to USTRANSCOM was an important step toward an overarching process change, but it did not go far enough. The congressional investigators maintained that the necessary step is to assign a USLOGCOM the authority and accountability for providing this essential support to global operations.

Despite the absence of an approved formal charter, USTRANSCOM and DLA worked together on over a dozen very successful initiatives, including the highly publicized and successful Deployment and Distribution Operations Centers (DDOC) in each COCOM. DDOCs enable the COCOM to gain effective visibility of inter-Service deployment and distribution.

After considerable effort over the past year, USTRANSCOM received approval of an updated DoD Directive that codifies DPO roles, responsibilities, and relationships. USTRANSCOM is using the clarification provided by this directive to examine and modify doctrine, business practices, information technology tools, and procedures across the military to better serve the GCCs. As Gen Schwartz states:

> The old way of thinking about these activities led to a mindset that this is a unique thing. That running a port for the Army is unique, that running an Air Force port is unique. But it’s not; 90 percent or more of the functions are identical. So the question is – and this is true throughout the supply chain – how many times do we have unique applications for tasks that really are more common than maybe we thought true in the past?

Gen Schwartz says that USTRANSCOM is looking to reduce the current number of unique distribution information technology systems from 300 to 100 in the coming years. It is

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79 Ibid.
obvious that Gen Schwartz, like Gen Handy before him, means business. It is remarkable what a commander, especially a COCOM, can accomplish with their vast resources and senior staffs.

SECDEF’s appointment of USTRANSCOM as DPO was a major step toward unity of effort and an eventual LOGCOM. However, there are limits to what even the most dynamic of commanders can accomplish if not given authority commensurate with their responsibility. DoD must make DPO meaningful. The only way this can really happen is with changes in the organization chart and consolidation of command over the logistics processes. As evidenced in the many GAO reports over the years, continued collaboration will only yield limited results. If there is to be real change, DoD must insert real C² into the equation.
USSTRATCOM and MEDCOM examples

The proposed subordination of DLA to USTRANSCOM has precedent in the recent actions of Gen Cartwright, Commander, USSTRATCOM. Many participants in the Lexington Study recommended that any plan for a USTRANSCOM-DLA merger or any other logistics consolidation look to USSTRATCOM’s actions as a model. They also looked to USSTRATCOM for an example of the proper level of authority to be given to a logistics COCOM. This would be a logical next step in the progression toward joint logistics, and it would clearly protect the Services and their Title 10 responsibilities. The Lexington Institute concludes, “A 4-star COCOM – USLOGCOM – in charge of logistics needs to be created, following the example of USSTRATCOM.”

After examining his mission, Gen Cartwright recognized that USSTRATCOM did not have all the necessary tools to complete what was required. He was forced to reorganize his organization and gain additional capabilities. Gen Cartwright worked with other senior leaders across DoD to gain access to resources (organizations) and capabilities he required. This move avoided standing up new and duplicative organizations – a step that would have further complicated mission accomplishment. Instead, he stood up a new subordinate organization named Joint Force Component Command (JFCC). Subordinate commanders in JFCC remain directors of their pre-existing agencies, and they also have been operationalized as subordinate commands of a COCOM. For instance, the USSTRATCOM subordinate CDR, Joint Force Component Command, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (JFCC-ISR) also serves as the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). As a commander, CDR, JFCC-ISR possesses authorities he likely lacked in his extant role of Director, DIA – and, his organization is now part

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81 Ibid., 23.
of a COCOM and aligned to USSTRATCOM’s mission. This arrangement is present in all of the new subordinate commands (JFCCs) in USSTRATCOM: Integrated Missile Defense (JFCC-IMD), Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (JFCC-ISR), Network Warfare (JFCC-NW) and Space & Global Strike (JFCC-SGS). These commanders are dual-hatted as Commander, U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command/Army Forces Strategic Command; the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency; Director, National Security Agency and Commander 8th Air Force. The parallels to a proposed dual-hatting of Director, DLA as a subordinate commander of USTRANSCOM are evident.

In contrast to the successful C² work undertaken at USSTRATCOM, the attempted establishment of a unified Medical Command (MEDCOM) presents some lessons in over-reaching too soon in an evolution, which has often been the bane of past proposals to consolidate strategic logistic organizations. The creation of MEDCOM, it was hoped, would create an organization to take charge of all direct-care health operations for the Services. This proposal gave the new unified command control of the fixed military hospitals and clinics. Medical care in support of front line units and field hospitals, however, remained the purview of the Services. MEDCOM aimed to streamline medical logistics, purchasing, IT, research and development, facility operations, and the education, training, and assignment of medical personnel. If approved, this change would be the most sweeping reform and change in military medicine C² in over 60 years. This consolidation was planned to save up to $500 million annually. However, stiff opposition by the Air Force placed the eventual implementation of the MEDCOM plan in doubt. The Air Force stated its care issues related to pilot and flight surgeon duties were unique and could not be adequately combined into a joint health care organization. The problems facing the champions of a unified MEDCOM are similar to the resistance encountered by those proposing sweeping changes to the strategic logistics infrastructure. There are always going to be

naysayers with valid, but not insurmountable, reasons to stymie change. As DoD establishes LOGCOM as a goal for the future, it’s important to remember the lessons learned from this attempted establishment of MEDCOM. It is unwise to try and consolidate too quickly.

The experiences of USSTRATCOM and the proposed MEDCOM provide valuable lessons when considering USLOGCOM formation. USSTRATCOM provides valuable insights into dual-hatting agency heads, and MEDCOM provides a startling example of the hazards of over-reaching. Decision makers are certainly aware that a unanimous road-map is not possible given the large number of significant stakeholders in the process. Even this monograph’s relatively conservative recommendations are certain to encounter well-thought-out opposition and valid counter-arguments. There is no definite transformation road-map. However, what is certain is that the road traveled for the past decades is not yielding sufficient results. The DoD logistics community cannot wait for unanimity before progressing to a new organizational construct. If they do, stakeholders will in the future still be re-stating RADM Eccles arguments from a half-century ago on the necessity to consolidate strategic logistics support.85 As LTG Christianson states, it is important to continue moving forward. “We cannot wait to make decisions until every issue is resolved.”86

Allied Experiences with Unified Logistics

The construct of the unified logistics branch of the German or British military goes well beyond what this monograph recommends, and well beyond any reputable proposal found in research for this monograph. While these allies’ experience is not identical to any reputable reorganization proposal for DoD, their experience is relevant as DoD considers a road map for potential strategic logistics re-organization.87

The German Army of the early 20th century was masterful in the science of mobility. However, they failed to anticipate the significant logistics challenges enhanced mobility would present. After World War I, their senior leadership prepared a monograph that examined the issues they faced during the war. The authors determined that the German Army was so logistically challenged they could not support themselves unless they were within 25 miles of a rail line. They also determined their logistics failures were a major factor in the German Army’s defeat during World War I. The lessons were not adequately applied, and at the outset of World War II, Germany’s world-class mechanized armor force was supported by a distribution system largely made up of horse-drawn wagons.88

These experiences drove the post-World War II German Army to partner with its sister Services in later years and create their unified logistics command, the Streitkraftebasis, or Joint Support Service (JSS), in 2000. The JSS falls under the Bundeswehr and is headed by the dual-hatted Vice Chief of Staff, Bundeswehr, and Chief of Staff, JSS. LTC Olaf Manhenke, a staff officer in the German Operational Command and a career logistics officer, reports that the JSS is considered a great success by the German Ministry of Defense (MoD).89

88 Paul W. Rodgers, Battlefield Distribution: A Systems Thinking Perspective (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, USCGSC, 2005), 9-10.
89 Lt. Colonel Olaf Manhenke (GS), Bundeswehr, interview by author, Potsdam, Germany, October 26, 2007.
The plan for the JSS was originally drawn up following the end of the Cold War, when the Bundeswehr went through a large drawdown and began restructuring. Logistics organization structures during the Cold War reflected the assumption that war would be fought on German soil, so an expeditionary or deployable capability was not necessary. The Germans, therefore, had focused their logistics preparations on their responsibility to act as the host nation during any war. Besides the challenges of reorganizing to a more deployable organization and capability, the German Army also faced the task of integrating two separate systems – recalling that the Socialist Party and East German military had operated immeasurably different from the Federal German military. The Bundeswehr, heeding policy recommendations from U.S. consulting firms, formed the JSS with a strict eye toward fulfillment of only those tasks which are a part of the military’s core competencies. Functions which could be outsourced were contracted out.

Besides being responsible for strategic logistics planning and execution, the JSS encompasses a number of other functions, including Military Police, Signal Corps, Electronic Warfare, Psychological Operations (PSYOPS), parts of the Corps of Engineers, and Military Intelligence, as well as the traditional logistics functions of supply and maintenance. This is in addition to being responsible for the guard battalion at the MoD and overseeing many other departments and schools such as military counter-intelligence, the Universities of the Federal Armed Forces, the Federal Academy for Security Police, the Logistics School, and the Command Support School. Many of the functions the JSS performs in support of the German Army are reflective of the small scale (compared to U.S. standards) of the Bundeswehr. As stated earlier, there are no reputable proposals calling for DoD to consolidate training or personnel functions currently performed by the Services. In the U.S. Army, many of these functions are performed by Human Resources Command or TRADOC.

90 Lt. Colonel Olaf Manhenke (GS), Bundeswehr, interview by author, Potsdam, Germany, October 26, 2007.
92 Lt. Colonel Olaf Manhenke (GS), Bundeswehr, interview by author, Potsdam, Germany, October 26, 2007.
Due to their European Union (EU) commitments, much of the Bundeswehr’s effort is currently focused on multi-national logistics. As there is no lead EU nation during deployments, each nation is responsible for providing their own logistics support to their deployed forces. Thus, interestingly, the EU is experiencing stove-piped national support similar to what some see as stove-piped Service support to U.S. armed forces. There are areas where select EU nations are working cooperatively on logistics issues, such as the combined effort between Germany, France, and the Netherlands to obtain a strategic lift capability. As this structure and these agreements are still developing and evolving, conclusive lessons learned and recommendations are elusive. However, the leadership of the JSS quantifiably reports their consolidations have been beneficial. The initial reduction in inventory resulting from central management of stocks exceeded 1.2 billion Euros.

The British have also consolidated their strategic logistics structures. LTC Forrest Burke, former Chief, Logistics Network Task Force, U.S. Army G4, said the British logistics organization can serve as a useful model for the U.S. military. The UK MoD requires each Service to adhere to national logistics standards, with exceptions granted as needed with a focus on function rather than Service. Air Chief Marshal Sir Anthony Bagnall, British Royal Air Force (ret), a former Vice-Chief of the British Defence Staff, reports that the formation of the UK’s unified logistics command, the Defence Logistics Organization (DLO), was – like the German Army’s – born out of the downsizing that occurred in the 1990s. Senior officers were against this consolidation, but the British military leaders recognized that if they did not come up with a plan for change and consolidation, the politicians would. Air Chief Marshal Bagnall was a proponent of the DLO, and drove the consolidation in order to provide unity of effort to British forces. To organize the consolidation, they followed the model of UK intelligence consolidation which had taken place years earlier. DLO had a rocky start, owing at least in part to the stiff

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93 Lt. Colonel Olaf Manhenke (GS), Bundeswehr, interview by author, Potsdam, Germany, October 26, 2007.
94 Ibid.
resistance received from the Services. Like the Germans, the British were aided by U.S. civilian consulting firms in this transition.96

The British DLO is a far-reaching organization that oversees all aspects of logistics, including tactical sustainment. For instance, each fighter base has a Colonel as Commander and two Lieutenant Colonels. One of those Lieutenant Colonels works for DLO and is responsible for all logistics support to the organization. The DLO is led by the Chief of Defence Logistics, a four-star officer. He is supported by three-star flag officers from the Services functionally assigned as DLO deputy commanders. They are dual-hatted and also have offices in their respective Services: Army, Navy, and Air Force. Since procurement functions were merged into DLO one year ago, the organization now has the ability and responsibility to manage material procurement, storage, and transport from cradle to grave.97

With over 28,000 personnel, the British DLO is the largest organization in the MoD. Like the German JSS, it was formed in 2000. Following its formation, the DLO’s increased span of control enabled a dramatic reduction in stock, resulting in a one-time savings of over 2.8 billion British Pounds. The DLO is divided into five functional project teams: Equipment Support (Land), Equipment Support (Air), the Warship Support Agency, the Defence Communication Support Agency, and the Defence Supply Chain. Having consolidated the basic support tasks and gained additional responsibility for procurement, the DLO’s goal is to transform its core competency from being a provider to an intelligent decider, enabling front line forces to gain maximum benefit from its expertise and be unencumbered by support considerations.98

Air Chief Marshal Sir Anthony Bagnall, who served as Vice Chief the Defence Staff in the United Kingdom for four-and-a-half years, believes that any significant change to the current U.S. logistics support arrangements must be led by SECDEF and the CJCS and ideally supported by the Service Chiefs. He does not foresee a successful reorganization or consolidation with any

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97 Ibid.
less of a driving influence. He states that cultural and organizational changes are very difficult, and what this monograph is proposing certainly challenges both accepted culture and organization.99

While the structure, experience, and size of allies’ unified logistics organizations do not provide a clear road map for USLOGCOM formation, their leaders do offer valuable insight and potential influence as DoD considers present and future logistics consolidation and C². Both militaries officially state that the formation of their unified logistics organizations was a positive step.

99 Air Chief Marshal Sir Anthony Bagnall, RAF (ret), e-mail correspondence, January 31, 2008.
USTRANSCOM-DLA Merger

A merged USTRANSCOM and DLA will form the nucleus of DoD’s future USLOGCOM. USTRANSCOM has been remarkably successful since being given significant functional authority following Operation Just Cause and then again following Operation Desert Storm. However, there were initially strong arguments in protest by the Navy and Marine Corps against a single unified command to integrate air, land, and sea transportation. The recommendation by the 1986 Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management to establish USTRANSCOM met with resistance and arguments similar to those put forward today against consolidation of strategic logistics organizations. Most experts agreed that process change was needed, not organizational change.100 USTRANSCOM would not have been feasible in 1920, but technological gains in control such as the Global Transportation Network made it possible when the time was right. Likewise, there was a lot of uncertainty during 1945-1947 when Congress was debating GEN Marshall’s proposal for the creation of a Defense Department.101 The histories of DoD and USTRANSCOM show the benefits of timely consolidation despite early concerns to the contrary. Changes in power structure will always encounter opposition.

Formed in 1961, DLA is the largest agency in DoD. The agency provides materiel commodities and supply chain management for items of supply and services appropriate for integrated management on behalf of all DoD components, and maintains a DoD worldwide distribution system. The Director, DLA reports to DUSD (L&MR), under USD (AT&L).102 It is a legal requirement for a civilian officer within OSD or the OCJCS to supervise defense agencies.103

103 Title 10 U.S. Code § 192.
USTRANSCOM and DLA have worked closely together over the past decade on a number of initiatives that have benefited the warfighter and provided better stewardship of resources. DDOC, pure pallet packaging, in-theater container management teams, systematic diversion of large items from air to sea lines of communication, development of logistics IT systems, and a deployable theater distribution center capability are all examples of what this partnership has been able to achieve.

USTRANSCOM and DLA are both operational organizations. Their unification would further bring together complementary capabilities and skills to effectively and efficiently support the military Services. The merger is logical as DoD seeks to join private industry partners in creating seamless supply chains. Despite the teamwork between USTRANSCOM and DLA over the past decade, a C² gap between these two operational partners still remains. DLA was originally formed as an administrative organization, not as an operational command. As an administrative agency (as opposed to a command), it made sense initially to have DLA be a subordinate organization to the DoD staff. Because it has evolved into an operational organization, DLA should be part of an operational command in order to better accomplish present and anticipated missions. It is time to recognize that this organizational construct is no longer sufficient for the logistics requirements of the 21st century. DoD should recognize DLA’s operational character by making the Director, DLA, the Commander of a joint functional component of Distribution Command – a subordinate command of USTRANSCOM. Director, DLA will be dual-hatted. This will likely prove temporary and evolve in coming years to DLA being solely a subordinate command of USTRANSCOM. The purpose of the dual-hat is to

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104 The combination of the Integrated Data Environment and the Global Transportation Network to better support deployment and distribution operations.


facilitate a change in response to what has already occurred: the change within DLA from being an agency to an operational command.

There are already additional actions underway within DLA that move logically toward more unified logistics support. Besides the recommended changes in organization charts and C^2, and as directed by the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure report, DLA is assuming responsibility for all supply, storage, and distribution of repair parts and depot-level reparable procurement in support of the Services’ depot maintenance operations. This change took place at Air Force depot operations in October 2007, will occur at Navy operations in 2009, and Army depots in 2010. All maintenance, production, and planning will remain the responsibility of the Services; while all distribution of parts – moving, storing, and delivery to production lines – will become DLA functions.

With its DLA component, USTRANSCOM will further enhance the initial improvements outlined in the preceding paragraphs. The DPO will efficiently plan the complete acquisition, initial movement, storage, and secondary movement of repair parts to the Service customer.

The intent of the USTRANSCOM-DLA merger is to form an enterprise to better support the warfighter, not to simply change organization charts for change sake. The changing of organization charts, especially at the strategic level, is a significant event with residual effects and justifiable only when the changes will better support the warfighter. However, it is wrong to assume that existing organizations should never be changed. As stated by organizational consultant Ralph J. Cordiner, “The work of organization is never done, and the structure has to be continually adapted to new and anticipated conditions.”

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The entire logistics process is made up of six major interrelated steps, primarily performed by four major responsible organizations:\textsuperscript{110}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Process:</th>
<th>Performed by:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation</td>
<td>Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acquisition</td>
<td>Services/DLA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Storage</td>
<td>DLA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inter-theater movement</td>
<td>USTRANSCOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intra-theater movement</td>
<td>COCOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical movement and distribution</td>
<td>COCOM</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Essentially, the recommendation to make DLA a subordinate command of USTRANSCOM would join the acquisition, storage, and inter-theater movement steps in the distribution process. This illustrates that this move is a logical step in the evolution of logistics jointness. Although this is obviously a macro-view and an over-simplification of an extraordinarily complex process, it illustrates how much of the distribution system a USTRANSCOM-DLA joint venture can influence. This has been proven by the success of the DDOC in CENTCOM.\textsuperscript{111} The existing span of influence will become true C² if DLA is a subordinate command of USTRANSCOM. As already established, collaboration and influence have limits. True, lasting, and improving change will come through command authority.

COCOM-to-COCOM relationships are vitally important – this is the level that drives change and effectiveness at the strategic level. Placing essential logistics functions under a supporting COCOM (USTRANSCOM) will improve the support given to the GCC. It likely made sense to establish a USLOGCOM long before the present day, but technological advancements and maturity in the intent of Goldwater-Nichols have only recently made these unified logistics discussions possible. Building on gains made in the past decades, the logistics community must extend unified support as far forward and as far down organizational structures as possible. This will help reduce the seams, gaps, and redundancies that unavoidably plague logistics operations. As noted in earlier chapters, the DoD logistics community has tried multiple

\textsuperscript{110} U.S. Transportation Command, \textit{CDDOC-Bridging the Gap} (Scott Air Force Base, IL: USTRANSCOM, 2005), 6.

\textsuperscript{111} U.S. Transportation Command, \textit{CDDOC-Bridging the Gap} (Scott Air Force Base, IL: USTRANSCOM, 2005), 7.
times to improve interoperability, efficiency, and support through collaboration with only marginal success. It is necessary to establish $C^2$ in order to achieve success. Such changes were unthinkable in years past due to the immense scale of logistics operations. However, technological gains now make such changes feasible and attractive.

Currently, there are multiple independent supply chains operating and too many owners of those supply chains. Beginning to consolidate these under one owner would increase efficiency by placing the supply and distribution functions under an already existing COCOM. This places a single entity, USTRANSCOM, in charge.

After the consolidation of USTRANSCOM and DLA, the command should use their new organizational ability to expand their influence over sustainment operations. For instance, presently there are too many contracting agencies competing for scarce resources. The Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA), other joint contracting, and Service contracting are often competing for resources. Often this artificially drives prices up – particularly within an immature theater of operations. As a first step to minimize this problem, DoD should again make DCMA a subordinate agency to DLA. This should happen at the same time that Director, DLA is made a subordinate to CDR, USTRANSCOM. Obviously, this places DCMA under control of USTRANSCOM – another logical incremental step on the road to a potential USLOGCOM. DCMA was not originally organized to deploy and oversee contracting activity in theater. Placing them back under DLA will help rectify this, as DLA is a forward operating operational organization. USTRANSCOM, with its extensive responsibilities and experiences with deployment will also support DCMA’s deployability and efficacy.

There has been a natural progression over the past several years within USTRANSCOM and DLA that moved DoD to the point where a merger is not only logical, but has already proven its worth. The work of Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC), a component of USTRANSCOM, and their close working relationship with DLA; the successful work of the

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113 DCMA was a subordinate organization of DLA until 1988.
DPO and one of their most successful ventures: the DDOC, first deployed to CENTCOM and now in all COCOMs; the BRAC reorganization effect on USTRANSCOM and DLA (consolidation of SDDC at Scott AFB [home of USTRANSCOM]); pure pallet packaging; and DLA’s assumption of supply functions at maintenance depots are examples of the success of USTRANSCOM cooperation and collaboration with DLA. The consolidated USTRANSCOM-DLA can follow this up by closer integration of Joint Task Force Port Opening capabilities and the immediate opening of a distribution, acquisition, and contracting center in theater. This is possible and likely with DLA (including having a contracting agency as a subordinate command) as a subordinate command of USTRANSCOM.¹¹⁴

For the foreseeable future, the Services should retain responsibility and control of maintenance and readiness issues. These functions are core competencies. However, supply and distribution should be handed over to a unified commander. This progression would yield one supply chain owner from acquisition to hand-off to the component customer in theater. Transportation and supply chain seams would become less visible as they would take place within one responsible organization. There will certainly be issues arising from this change, but they will be invisible to the outside observer.

Of course, merging DLA into USTRANSCOM will not prove to be a panacea. The growing pains of increased jointness will endure throughout consolidation. An example of growing pains is seen in what happened when prime vendors began using government carriers to transport goods into the theater of operations. Goods were still the property of vendors when damaged en route to theater aboard government-responsible vessels. Although the U.S. Government had not yet taken ownership of the property, the goods were damaged while on a SDDC contract vessel. The vendor felt the damage was the government’s responsibility since the goods were damaged while on board a government carrier. However, the government felt the

¹¹⁴ Lt. General Robert T. Dail, USA, VTC interview by author, September 19, 2007
vendor was responsible since the government had not yet taken ownership of the goods.115 This is one example of the kind of challenges that are expected as DoD improves support to the pointed end of the spear. As stated by Joint Staff J4, Vice Admiral Holder, USN (ret), “Some hole in the logistics supply chain will always exist; 100% performance will never happen.”116

As mentioned previously, the Services should retain C² of their depot maintenance operations. However, there are Service functions that should move to DLA (as a subordinate of USTRANSCOM). These “low-hanging fruit” items include management of food and fuel. Presently, the Army manages troop-feeding operations in theater. This function has outlived its usefulness, as the Army neither actually procures food (DLA does) nor prepares or serves food (contractor operated). DLA has contractual relationships to deliver food from the source to the dining facility. The Army has responsibility for the dining facility itself. As noted above, there is no usefulness in making the Army run the dining facility. The dining facility should be turned over to the owner of the remainder of the food supply chain: DLA. DLA should be responsible for running or contracting the entire operation. Instead of the Army contracting out the operation of the dining facility, place the entire operation, from acquisition to service, on DLA.

Likewise, bulk fuel storage executive agent responsibility should shift from the Army to DLA. DLA currently has responsibility for the supply chain all the way into Bagram Air Base. DLA then hands off the fuel to Service drivers. As in the above food example, this supply chain should be given to DLA. This would unencumber the Services, allowing them to focus on their core competencies. Joint warehousing, food, fuel, repair parts acquisition and movement should all be the responsibility of USTRANSCOM – including, of course, its subordinate organizations – one of which should be DLA.

USTRANSCOM and DLA developed and are routinely using automation systems that are now essential to their operations. Technology advances and maturity in these existing systems

115 Ibid.
will present opportunities for merging or leveraging of capabilities to provide better visibility throughout the supply chain. Just as the fruitful current work done in the field of radio frequency identification (RFID) with USTRANSCOM as the proponent and DLA as the executor has yielded decreased wait time for the warfighter, there are many potential gains to be made in a convergence of in-transit visibility (ITV) capabilities and other residual efforts of the Defense Transportation Coordination Initiative (DTCI). Like their other joint ventures, DTCI still yields benefits that can be accelerated when all functions of USTRANSCOM and DLA are under a single command.

USTRANSCOM and USJFCOM have also signed a joint vision statement designed to enable the two COCOMs to work together to improve deployment and distribution processes. According to the joint vision statement, the two commands plan to transform deployment and distribution into an interoperable, synchronized, responsive, and seamless process. DoD’s naming of USTRANSCOM as the DPO enabled this.117 While these are certainly positive developments – and the power of a COCOM will certainly make things happen – it does not go far enough. As stated previously, collaboration has its limits, and this transformation requires true C^2.

Movement toward a strategic logistics command will be a major step in DoD logistics and the idea is certain to garner increasingly close scrutiny. However, this level of C^2 has long been the norm in combat arms. A GCC has full authority across multiple echelons – from strategic/operational to tactical – within the theater. This kind of authority and structure facilitates unity of effort and discourages sub-optimization.118 With this significant organizational change, there will be intra-organizational communication between the supply and transportation arms of distribution. By making USTRANSCOM the COCOM responsible for strategic and operational-level acquisition, supply, transportation, and distribution, DoD will create an environment for accountable and actionable analysis and improvement in these systems. Formal alignment of

118 Cofield Bleu Hilburn, Transforming for Distribution Based Logistics (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, USCGSC, 2005), 42.
USTRANSCOM and DLA is a natural progression in the spirit and intent of Goldwater-Nichols. DLA has grown in stature and importance in the years since its establishment in 1961. It now makes sense to recognize this change by giving the Director of DLA the command authorities he should exercise as head of an increasingly operational organization. Making DLA a subordinate command of USTRANSCOM is a logical step toward eventual establishment of a USLOGCOM with full command responsibility over strategic logistics within DoD.
Conclusion

DoD should use a deliberate process over the next 10-20 years to establish a Unified Logistics Command. As a first step in this process, DoD should immediately make the DLA a subordinate operational command of USTRANSCOM. This will immediately improve the support given to the GCCs.

DoD should eventually establish this 4-star unified USLOGCOM to increase strategic synchronization and C^2 in order to allow COCOMs to focus on their core competencies and decrease demands on our nation’s resources. An intermediate step that DoD should take immediately is to make the Director, DLA a subordinate joint functional component commander to CDR, USTRANSCOM. This near-term actionable recommendation makes good operational sense, and the present assignment of senior leaders makes this a very logical time to make this change. The current director of DLA, LTG Dail, is uniquely qualified to oversee this change, as his previous two assignments were Deputy Commander, USTRANSCOM and Director of Operations, USTRANSCOM. DoD will be hard-pressed to find a time when there is a more qualified individual leader in such a key position to effect a smooth transition to a consolidated logistics organization.

DoD lacks unity of effort in strategic logistics support. There is no single commander in charge of strategic logistics operations; the maneuver commander on the ground bears the weight of sorting out logistics problems that arise from a lack of synchronization.119 Despite the enormity and essentiality of logistics operations, there is no one commander for the SECDEF or CJCS to consult for logistics issues. Below the SECDEF/CJCS on the organization chart, no one has complete authority over logistics operations. The lowest ranking uniformed officer with overall authority over all logistics operations is the CJCS. The SECDEF/CJCS can rely on advice and recommendation from a variety of leaders, including Commander, USTRANSCOM;

Director, DLA; or the Joint Staff J4; but there is no single head to deconflict, prioritize, and provide complete oversight of the execution of this essential support to the warfighter. Unlike 4-star Service Chiefs and commanders down to O-6 level, the highest reaches of DoD have no subordinate logistics commander. Likewise, the GCCs have no single peer point of contact to turn to for logistics issues. All must rely on the advice and planning of the Services, subordinate commands, the DoD staff, the Joint Staff, and the indispensable civilian partners in the supply chain. There is a subordinate logistics command at every level from Brigade up to Service: Brigade Combat Team commanders have Brigade Support Battalions, and the Chief of Naval Operations has Naval Systems Command. However, there is no subordinate command at the COCOM level to which the SECDEF, CJCS, or GCC may turn for a unified logistics opinion or command and control.

There is no single USLOGCOM supporting the GCCs. The Services, DLA, and other stakeholders coordinate with the COCOM staffs, but there is no single logistics command overseeing or coordinating the entire peacetime or wartime process. A GCC routinely will appoint a single point of contact in theater for logistic coordination, but there is no one point for directive logistics authority in support of the GCC outside the theater. Recognizing the complexity of the mission, the immense logistics functions of our armed forces must keep unity of effort and C$^2$ as worthy goals. DoD must provide the highest levels of the force structure with the same logistics authorities, abilities, and efficiencies as multiple subordinate levels.

This lack of unity of effort becomes most apparent and acute in times of war. In times of multiple theater war, there is no commander with authority to strategically allocate resources between theaters. Creation of a unified command with authority over strategic logistics operations will allow the GCCs to focus more on core competencies instead of the current requirement to coordinate with, rely on, and monitor the supply and distribution systems of each of the Services.

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This new command may also decrease the overhead and overall manpower requirements and expenditures of current systems.

Services, COCOMs, agencies, and the significant contracted logistics base have multiple and largely successful initiatives in place to further increase logistics synchronization and deconfliction efforts in order to better support the GCCs. In addition to this central purpose, supporting goals of these efforts are to unencumber GCCs and to better shepherd the nation’s resources. However, there is no central authority coordinating these fruitful actions. There are undoubtedly vast savings to be realized from C^2 of these efforts, as ongoing routine logistics systems require immense effort and resources. There are far more individuals and dollars involved in logistics than in direct combat missions, especially in wartime.\(^\text{121}\)

Peacetime and wartime systems are duplicative because each Service and COCOM component commander strives to ensure flawless support to the COCOM. Duplication and inefficiency inevitably result because there is insufficient synchronization of these efforts. Working to unify these efforts by placing the supply chain under a single unified command will contribute to the creation of a system better able to manage scarce resources globally and coordinate support across all levels of warfare.

The total annual budget of DoD’s various logistics functions allocated to successfully sustain the armed forces of the United States is over $150 billion per year.\(^\text{122}\) Supply inventory levels have a current value of over $85.6 billion. In addition, DoD invests billions of dollars in information technology systems that support supply chain management and other business operations.\(^\text{123}\) Because this is the largest logistics system in the world, it requires tremendous oversight. As stated, currently the lowest ranking officer with authority over all logistics functions is CJCS. Given that his and his staff’s attention is rightfully diverted to core

competencies, strategic logistics oversight is divided primarily among the heads of
USTRANSCOM, the Services’ own logistics commands, and DLA.

Strategic logistics cannot be run from the OSD staff. DoD must begin implementing
recommendations of the Defense Science Board, among many others detailed in this
monograph, calling for consolidation of the strategic logistics enterprise. Making DLA a joint
functional component command of USTRANSCOM is the first step in this process. This
consolidation/merger should commence almost immediately. DLA is a remarkably successful
organization. It has undergone many changes in its scope and purpose over the years due to the
changing conditions since its establishment at the end of World War II. Recognizing these
changes and placing DLA in an organizational chain-of-command is a logical next step. DLA
currently falls under a structure that “represents compromises reached some forty-five years ago
among competing military bureaucracies.”

Making DLA a subordinate organization of USTRANSCOM will decrease current
duplicative, competing, and often ad hoc logistics structures, goals, and outcomes which result
from today’s many headquarters that have significant authority over strategic logistics actions; it
will decrease demands on the nation’s resources; and will enable DoD and the COCOMs to focus
more on their core competencies. The migration to a USLOGCOM should be a deliberate
process, ensuring the pace of supporting legal and cultural changes match the pace of changes to
the organization chart. A significant cultural shift will occur throughout this process as DoD
continues moving logistics responsibility from the Services to the joint community.

Many studies completed over the past several years report DoD has been improving
strategic logistics, shaving costs and redundancies when they are identified, and improving
responsiveness for over 40 years. However, DoD continues to make changes only at the margin.

124 U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Science Board 2005 Summer Study on Transformation: A
Progress Assessment, Vol. 2 (Washington, DC: GPO, April, 2006), 31; U.S. Department of Defense,
Defense Science Board 2005 Summer Study on Transformation: A Progress Assessment, Vol. 1
125 Thomas Owens Mackubin, “Accountable vs. Strategists: The New Roles and Missions
Collaboration has its limits, and well-meaning efforts to vastly improve strategic logistics support and efficiencies over the years have failed to meet their lofty goals. Just as GCCs have near-total authority and are able to C² a vast organization in theater, so a single logistics COCOM should eventually C² the strategic logistics system. It is time to recognize DoD will eventually establish a logistics COCOM. A unified USLOGCOM will not easily fix all problems. However, as reported in this monograph and confirmed by the numerous studies cited in this work, the present system of collaboration and executive agents is not sufficiently working to improve the situation at the strategic level. It is time to change course. As the next step, DoD should follow the recommendation of, among others, the DSB¹²⁶ and consolidate USTRANSCOM and DLA by making the Director, DLA a subordinate joint functional component commander under USTRANSCOM. This change can and should happen immediately. After the consolidation of USTRANSCOM and DLA, the command should use their new organizational ability to expand their influence over sustainment operations.

Appendix: Metrics

A large body of previous work exists on the central question of this monograph. This monograph is unique in that it does not seek to make a technical case to answer the question. Rather, it canvases the existing work and presents the prevailing opinion. The criterion for the metric is a measurement of the opinion of the previous work on the subject. In other words, if the majority thinks it is a good idea, then it should be recommended/implemented. Applying a metric to the 34 historical studies consulted in the preparation of this monograph reveals an overwhelming collective opinion that change is needed. While there is not unanimous agreement on this point or unanimous agreement on the exact nature of the problem or the proposed change, it is obvious that the logistics community knows they can do better and that C² is the road to that end. The senior leaders’ interviews are not counted in the metric. The flag officer opinions are stated in the monograph only to provide the perspectives of the senior leaders who will influence any decision on strategic logistics reorganization.

The enormity of the issue, the potential for parochial responses, the congressional politics involved in any major change to logistics support systems or organizations, and the lack of agreement on standards of measurement all combine to make this an easy-to-stymie issue. Although the majority agrees there is room for improvement, any dramatic efforts to do so are easily stalled by invoking the realities listed above.
There were 34 studies, articles, and investigations consulted in the preparation of this monograph. No work was overlooked simply because it disagreed with the thesis of this paper.

Below is a recapitulation of the positions of these works:127

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<th>Problem areas/observations re: strategic logistics:</th>
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<td>Insufficient coordination</td>
<td>17</td>
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<tr>
<td>Current construct is insufficient</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current proposals for improvement are insufficient</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inability to agree on metrics128</td>
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</table>

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Recommended method to address above problems:</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<tr>
<td>Additional authority to Under Secretary of Defense (A,T&amp;L)</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-specific call to Centralize129</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Create Unified Logistics Command or Agency</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Although there is no clear consensus for creation of a USLOGCOM, there is a plurality of opinion calling for centralization of authority to address the issues facing our strategic logistics system. The recommendations of this monograph are consistent with the plurality of opinion identified above.

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127 Totals exceed 34 because many of the works stated multiple positions. Works include a wide variety of sources: GAO reports and studies, academic works (similar to this monograph), task forces, commercial studies, and service studies. Senior leader perspectives are not included in the metric.

128 This inability to agree on metrics stifles the ability to evaluate, prioritize, take initiative, and improve.

129 Includes all recommendations for consolidation other than calls for a unified command. The majority of these calls are vague or non-specific in recommendations for a lead service, agency or office. They merely call for centralization or consolidation.


Manhenke, Olaf, Lieutenant Colonel (GS), German Bundeswehr. Interview by author. October 26, 2007.


*U.S. Code Title 10. §§ 192, 3013, 3062, 5013, 5062, 5063, 8013, and 8062.*


