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**THE NEED TO IMPROVE POPULATION AND RESOURCE
CONTROL IN THAILAND'S COUNTERINSURGENCY**

by

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December 2008

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**THE NEED TO IMPROVE POPULATION AND RESOURCE CONTROL
IN THAILAND'S COUNTERINSURGENCY**

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ABSTRACT

Since January 2004, southern Thailand has seen a return of the Malay Muslim separatist disagreement with the central government. In this new round of resistance, the insurgents' activities are well planned and well organized and have brought about heavy damage to property and life as well as created much confusion, making investigation and counter operations difficult. This thesis examines the root cause of the insurgency, errors made in the countering insurgency in the past, the insurgents' activities in this new round, and the performance of the Thai government in countering the problem. The argument is that the existence of "daily deadly incidents" in 2007 indicated that after four years of government suppression, the insurgents still had the freedom to maneuver. The government has not been successful in providing civil security and protecting the population from the insurgents.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

| | | |
|-------------|---|-----------|
| I. | INTRODUCTION..... | 1 |
| A. | HISTORICAL BACKGROUND..... | 3 |
| | 1. Langkasuka Empire..... | 4 |
| | 2. Sultanate of Patani..... | 5 |
| | 3. War with Siam..... | 6 |
| | 4. The End of Patani | 7 |
| | 5. Consolidation of Siam’s Rule..... | 9 |
| | 6. Nationalist Assimilation Policies..... | 11 |
| | 7. World War II..... | 13 |
| | 8. Cultural Integrations and Pattani Resistance | 15 |
| B. | SEPARATIST GROUPS..... | 17 |
| | 1. Barisan Nasional Pemberbasan Pattani (BNPP) | 18 |
| | 2. Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN)..... | 19 |
| | 3. Patani United Liberation Organization (PULO) | 21 |
| | 4. Gerakan Mujahideen Patani (GMP)..... | 22 |
| | 5. BERSATU..... | 23 |
| | 6. Gerakan Mujahideen Islam Patani (GMIP)..... | 23 |
| | 7. Other Resistance Groups | 24 |
| | <i>a. Permuda</i> | <i>24</i> |
| | <i>b. PANYOM.....</i> | <i>24</i> |
| | <i>c. Persatuan Mahasiswa Islam Patani (Selatan Thailand) di</i> <i>Patani (PMIPTI).....</i> | <i>25</i> |
| II. | THE INSURGENCY AND GOVERNMENT RESPONSES..... | 27 |
| A. | PRE 9/11 INSURGENCY..... | 27 |
| | 1. Personnel and Recruitment..... | 28 |
| | 2. Organization Structure and Logistics..... | 28 |
| | 3. Political Activities..... | 29 |
| | 4. Armed Struggle | 29 |
| | 5. Government Response | 30 |
| B. | POST 9/11 INSURGENCY | 33 |
| | 1. Revival of the Insurgency and the Government Response | 34 |
| | 2. Krue Se Mosque Incidents | 37 |
| | 3. Tak Bai Incidents | 38 |
| | 4. Daily Death Incidents | 39 |
| | 5. Mobilizing Population | 42 |
| | 6. BRN-Coordinate: The “Seven-Step Plan” Towards the Liberation of Patani Darussalam | 44 |
| | 7. Almost Losing the War..... | 45 |
| III. | THE COUNTERINSURGENCY MODEL | 47 |
| A. | THE DIAMOND MODEL | 47 |
| B. | STRATEGIC COUNTERINSURGENCY MODELING | 53 |

| | | |
|-----|--|-----|
| 1. | COIN Military Components | 53 |
| 2. | MIDLIFE, Assumptions | 56 |
| 3. | Accurate Assessment | 57 |
| C. | OEF – PHILIPPINES..... | 59 |
| D. | ASYMMETRIC CONFLICT | 61 |
| E. | THE MALAYAN EMERGENCY..... | 64 |
| 1. | The British/Malayan Response..... | 66 |
| 2. | Role of the Police..... | 67 |
| 3. | Role of the Military | 69 |
| 4. | Separating the Insurgents from their Popular Base..... | 70 |
| 5. | Mopping Up..... | 72 |
| IV. | ROLE OF THE MILITARY | 73 |
| A. | A TUG OF WAR..... | 73 |
| 1. | First Round: Advantage – Insurgents..... | 73 |
| 2. | Second Round: Disadvantage – the Government | 76 |
| 3. | Third Round – the Competition | 79 |
| B. | POPULATION AND RESOURCE CONTROL..... | 80 |
| 1. | Concept and Goals of PRC..... | 81 |
| 2. | The PRC Implementation | 83 |
| C. | SECURITY ENVIRONMENTAL FAILURE | 88 |
| V. | APPLYING THE COIN MODEL AND RECOMMENDATIONS | 93 |
| A. | THE DIAMOND MODEL | 93 |
| B. | COIN MILITARY COMPONENTS..... | 96 |
| 1. | Latest Information about the Insurgents..... | 97 |
| 2. | The Implementation..... | 98 |
| C. | OEF – PHILIPPINES..... | 100 |
| D. | ASYMMETRIC CONFLICT | 102 |
| E. | THE MALAYAN EMERGENCY..... | 103 |
| F. | SUMMARY RECOMMENDATIONS | 105 |
| VI. | CONCLUSION | 109 |
| | LIST OF REFERENCES..... | 113 |
| | INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST | 117 |

LIST OF FIGURES

| | | |
|------------|--|----|
| Figure 1. | Map of Siam in 1860 | 8 |
| Figure 2. | Southern Thailand Border | 11 |
| Figure 3. | Number of incidents (January 2004 – January 2007) | 41 |
| Figure 4. | Monthly death toll (January 2004 – June 2008) | 41 |
| Figure 5. | Death Statistics (January 2004 – June 2008) | 42 |
| Figure 6. | Consensus – Control Model | 48 |
| Figure 7. | Sequence of Counter State | 49 |
| Figure 8. | Incorrect State Counter | 50 |
| Figure 9. | Correct State Counter | 51 |
| Figure 10. | External Support from International Actors. | 52 |
| Figure 11. | The Diamond Model | 53 |
| Figure 12. | Wendt’s Three Desired COIN Military Components | 55 |
| Figure 13. | Percentage of Asymmetric Conflict Victories by Type of Actor in Four Fifty-Year Periods | 62 |
| Figure 14. | Arreguin-Toft’s Expected Effect of Strategic Interaction on Conflict Outcomes (expected winners in cells) | 63 |
| Figure 15. | Map Showing the Insurgents’ Attacks Three Weeks Before Tak Bai Incident. | 75 |
| Figure 16. | Map Showing the Insurgents’ Attacks Three Weeks After Tak Bai Incident. | 76 |
| Figure 17. | Map of district jurisdiction of the three southernmost provinces | 85 |
| Figure 18. | Obstacles to State – Facilitation to Counter State | 94 |
| Figure 19. | Facilitation to State –Obstacles to Counter State | 95 |

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LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. Number of district, sub-district, and villages in the three southernmost provinces of Thailand 84

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I. INTRODUCTION

The resurgent insurgency in the southern provinces of Thailand has been steadily escalating since early 2004. The situation, particularly the highly visible and violent activities which caused more than 3,000 deaths by the end of 2007, has come to the attention of scholars and political observers. The heavy-handed policies of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra (2001-2005 and 2006) further worsened the situation. With the revival of the insurgency, many observers say that the insurgent groups are stronger and better organized than in the 1980s. Although not the first of Thailand's' political upheavals, this one appears to be the most complex and brutal.

The Malay-Muslim insurgency in Thailand is unique. To explain it in short, the insurgency in southern Thailand was created by three major factors: first, the emergence of great power nation states from Europe into Southeast Asia in the early 19th century which subsequently changed the balance of power in the region and influenced Thailand to change its rule; second, mistakes made by the respective rulers and abusive government officials; and third, an existing separatist group which continues to reach out for the independence of Pattani.

Thailand has faced secessionist movements since it ended the sultanate of Patani in 1902.¹ The origins of the current violence lie in the historical grievances stemming from the lack of understanding about the Muslim way of life by the Thai Buddhist governments in Bangkok, resulting in several upheavals in the past. Moreover, the nationalist assimilation policies and the Cultural Mandates in the late 1930s, which required central norms, dress standards, and usage of the Thai language only, were viewed as an attempt to ruin the religion, language, and culture of the ethnic Malay Muslim population. Even though the problems of the past were solved, the government still had more to understand about the Muslims' way of life. The insurgency was seriously damaged in the late 1980s, but the insurgency leaderships' cells went "underground" and secretly continued their work which has resulted in today's turmoil.

¹ The conventional Malay spelling of the traditional sultanate and its capital city is Patani, while the modern Thai province and city is spelled Pattani.

Since January 2004, southern Thailand has seen a return of Malay Muslim separatist disagreements with the central government. Once again, the insurgents are launching their attacks, mostly against government officials and within the premises of the three southernmost provinces of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat, where a Muslim majority resides. The attacks range from arson and bombings to the targeted assassinations of law enforcement officials and soldiers. The insurgents also discredit the government by using “tricky” methods in order to gain the population’s support, such as generated rumors, calumny, and “black” propaganda to create misunderstandings between the population and government officials. The insurgents also use religion as a tool to break down the relationship between the Buddhists and Muslims in the region.

The insurgency groups’ members, tracing their origins from relatives of the former Sultan of Patani, believe that they not only have lost their status, authority, and benefits through the change of the regime, but also believe that the Buddhist government poses threats to Islam. While the separatist groups were organized and became active in the late 1950s, armed fighting occurred during the 1960s-1980s. There are several armed groups, but the salient group which is active and dangerous right now is the BRN-Coordinate (Barisan Revolusi Nasional –Coordinate). In this new round of resistance, the insurgents’ activities are well planned and well organized and bring about heavy damage to properties and life as well as create much confusion making to investigation and counter operations difficult.

The existence of “daily deadly incidents” in 2007 indicated that after four years of government suppression, the insurgents still have freedom to maneuver. Thus, the government must re-examine its strategy and eliminate flaws and weaknesses. The Thai government needs to apply the appropriate methods to provide a safe and secure environment for the lives and property of the people. If the use of force, as a direct approach, is not successful, the government should seek an alternative measure, such as an indirect approach. Another challenge for the Thai government is how to obtain the people’s co-operation while most of the population is heavily coerced by the insurgents.

This research will focus on the Thai government's counter insurgency in its three southernmost provinces. The study will examine the root cause of the insurgency, errors made in countering the insurgency in the past, the movement and characteristics of the insurgents, and the role of the military. The study will also introduce some counter insurgency models and case studies such as the "mystic diamond" by Dr. Gordon McCormick of the Naval Postgraduate School, the Counter Insurgency Military Components developed by Col. Eric Wendt, Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines in Basilan and Sulu Island, the strategic interaction of the direct and indirect approach by Arreguin-Toft, and the Malayan State of Emergency. These models and case studies will be used as guidance as well as a comparison with the Thai government's actions in order to identify strengths or weaknesses.

Finally, this research expects to identify areas for improvement and to uncover an appropriate methodology for military operations to establish control of the area; protect innocent lives and property; reduce violence; establish trust with the Muslim people; obtain the people's cooperation and support, including substantive information; eliminate the insurgents' influence; and destroy the insurgency's organizations.

A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The history of Patani is one of the significant issues resulting in insurgents wanting to separate Pattani from Thailand.² The present-day provinces of Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat and the western part of Songkhla, once were part of an independent sultanate of Patani during the 15th – 18th century. In 1786, there was a war between the sultanate of Patani and the kingdom of Siam (the former name of Thailand). Patani was defeated. During the following two hundred years under Thai rule, many problems occurred which, for the most part, came from a lack of understanding by Thai rulers toward a people dissimilar in culture, linguistics, race, and religion.

² Patani with one "t" is the Malay spelling; refer to the Malay sultanate of Patani. The modern Thai province and city is spelled Pattani.

1. Langkasuka Empire

Archeological evidence shows that Patani is located on the same site as an ancient city known in the 7th century as “Lankasuka.” The community was established near the Patani River on the east side of the Malay Peninsula. People earned their living by fishing and trading agricultural products. In that period, the population followed Hindu and Brahman practices.³ In the 9th century, the Buddhist Empire of Srivichai, which was centered on Sumatra Island became prosperous and expanded its territory into the Malay Peninsula. Therefore, during the 9th – 13th centuries, most of the people in Lankasuka and the Malay Peninsula changed their religion to Buddhism. Lankasuka at that time had two cities. The first one located on the East coast (which included, present day Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat and the western part of Songkhla) and the second one located on the West coast (which included, present day, Kedah and Perlis State of Malaysia). The city in the east was full of merchants and goods from China, Jampa (Southern Vietnam), and Java (Indonesia) while the city in the west was full of merchants and goods from Persia, Arabia, and India.⁴ Geographically, the location of Lankasuka was a suitable place for merchants from the Middle East/India and China/Indonesia to meet and trade their goods.

In the early 13th century, Siam came under the influence of Khmer (Cambodia), which at that time was the throne of King Suriyawaraman II who built Angkor Wat.⁵ By the mid 13th century, Siam was able to deter the Khmer and establish Sukhothai as the capital city. Sukhothai enjoyed a golden age under King Ramkhamhaeng who created the Thai alphabet and gradually improved and organized Thai society, economy, politics, culture, religion (Buddhist), and defense. Sukhothai traded goods with China, Japan, Java, and other empires. By the 14th century, the Sukhothai Empire was powerful and stable in the region.⁶

³ Surichai Hwankaew, eds., *Origin of Southern Fire* (Bangkok: Chula Press, 2007), 27.

⁴ Wisanti Srasrida, “Southern Problem aspect,” *Senathipat Journal*, Bangkok, (January-April 2008), 23.

⁵ Thai heritage, “Thai history pre Sukhotai era,” <http://www.tv5.co.th/service/mod/heritage/nation/history/hist1.htm> (accessed July 7, 2008).

⁶ Thai heritage, “Sukhotai Empire,” <http://www.tv5.co.th/service/mod/heritage/nation/sukhotai/sukhotai.htm> (accessed July 8, 2008).

2. Sultanate of Patani

In the 14th century, Islam was brought into the region after the decline of the Srivichai Empire. Islam had been introduced gradually to Patani, where subsequently, in the 15th century, King Napa of Lankasuka changed his practice from Buddhism to Islam when a Muslim doctor from Ache (Indonesia) cured him from a severe disease. He also changed his name to Sultan Ishmael Shah and changed the name of Lankasuka to Patani Darussalam.⁷ Patani shared its border with Siam in the North.

During the 16th – 17th centuries, Patani was in a golden age, not only because of prosperity. It was also a center of scholarships in Islam. The relationship between Patani and Siam at that time was smooth. Patani recognized itself as a smaller state and accepted the power of the bigger state through the giving of “silver and gold flowers” to Sukhothai and, subsequently, to Ayudhya (the second capital of Siam) in the 15th century, as a symbol of its dependent state.⁸ However, as a dependent state in that period, Patani had local autonomy, as did Laos and Khmer, which also were dependent states of Siam.

In the early 18th century, Ayudhya began to decline. Burma (Myanmar) saw an opportunity and attacked Siam. Finally, Ayudhya was defeated. But only seven months later, Phraya Vachiraprakarn (later King Taksin) gathered Thai armed forces and expelled Burma’s armed forces from Siam’s territory. However, in the following nine years (1767-1776), Siam and Burma waged another eight wars although Siam was able to defeat Burma every time. While Siam was fighting with Burma, Laos, Khmer and Patani ceased sending silver and golden flower to Siam. Therefore, after Siam finished its wars with Burma in the west, Siam’s interest turned to the east, toward Laos and Khmer. Both empires refused to be dependent states of Siam, so Siam waged war with Laos and Khmer for another five years (1777-1781) before conquering them.

⁷ Koyrin Anwa and Munsoe Salae, *Could Southern Fire Be Extinguished* (Songkhla, Southern Muslim Publish, 2004), 5.

⁸ In this region, before an empire wages war on another, they will negotiate first. If another empire recognizes that they are weaker and unable to win the war, they will agree to send silver and gold flowers including other valuable things such as gems and silk clothes, to the stronger empire every year. If the negotiations fail, war will occur. The loser still has to send silver and gold flowers to the winner and sometimes the winner takes some population from the losing state back to the winning state as hostages. In the case of Patani, there was no war with Sukhothai, but Patani submitted to Siam. During that time, the ruler state did not occupy land or directly rule the vassal states, but let the vassal rule themselves.

3. War with Siam

In 1782, King Rama I ascended to the throne and established Bangkok as the capital of Siam. Three years later, Burma dispatched the biggest armed force in history (nine armies with approximately 150,000 soldiers) to attack Siam.⁹ Burma split the troops and entered Siam through five different channels from north to south. With carefully maneuvered troops against Burma's attack, Siam was successful in counter-attack in every area. At the southern border, at the beginning of the conflict, Burma was able to hold Nakhon Si Thammarat and Songkhla. King Rama I decided to send the Crown Prince's armies to fight back. Siam also asked Patani to send some troops to help Siam fight Burma, but Patani refused. Finally, the armies of the Crown Prince defeated the Burmese troops.

By Patani refusing to cooperate with Siam, it showed that Patani did not accept Siam's power as in the past. So, Siam asked Patani again whether Patani wanted to resume its prior relationship with Siam or not, which meant, to continue sending silver and gold flowers to Siam. Unlike Kelantan, Terengganu, Perlis, and Kedah, Patani remained unwilling. At that time, Siam chose to wage war with Patani.

In 1786, Patani was unable to protect its empire and lost the war. Siam took approximately 4,000 people to Bangkok as hostages, assigned Tengku Lamidin as the new Sultan of Patani, and left the city ruined. At this stage, Patani still had local autonomy, but needed to send silver and golden flower to Siam once every three years.¹⁰ However, anger and hatred took root in the minds of Patani's people. Three years later, Tengku Lamidin rebelled. He sent a secret message to King Ya Long of Annam (Vietnam) which asked Vietnam to attack Siam from the east while Patani was to attack from the south. Unluckily, King Ya Long told Siam of the secret message. War between Siam and Patani occurred again, lasting for three years, and ending with the total defeat

⁹ Thai history, "King Rama I," <http://www.search-thais.com/thaihis/warrama1.htm> (accessed July 15, 2008).

¹⁰ Koyrin and Munsoe, *Could Southern Fire Be Extinguished*, 9.

of Patani. Siam assigned Dato Pangarun as Sultan and also assigned Phra Jana from Songkhla as state governor. Phra Jana was the first Buddhist governor of Patani designated by Siam to balance power in Patani.¹¹

4. The End of Patani

Conflict between the noblemen of Patani and Siam occurred frequently, especially over regulations and practices of the Royal Malaya culture which were quite different from Siam's culture. Patani maintained resentment for another twenty years until 1808 when Datoe Pangarun rebelled. Bangkok had to suppress the uprising. This turmoil made King Rama II decide to divide Patani into seven small cities with the objective of separating and ruling Patani more easily. Siam assigned city governors from local people and each city had its own autonomy. However, Siam kept sending more Buddhist officials who had little knowledge about Islam, the culture, and local language.¹² This caused more discontent among the people in Patani.

Siam's goal was to undermine Patani's strength by dividing it into seven cities. This not only lessened the armed forces but also decreased unity and economic stability. Patani and the other six cities needed time to organize to carry out another resistance. At that point, repeated war between Siam and Patani caused more intervention by Siam in Pattani's politics, military, economy and society.

¹¹Koyrin and Munsoe, 10.

¹² Local language of Patani is Malay which uses Arabic alphabet in writing; known as "Yawi."




Figure 1. Map of Siam in 1860 ¹³

In 1824, there was a conflict between Britain and Burma. Burma sent troops into Indian territory where British colonies had existed since 1818. Britain had limited knowledge about Burma's terrain. In order to compensate for this disadvantage, Britain induced Siam to cooperate in fighting Burma. King Rama III agreed and sent Siamese troops to join the British which overran many cities along the coast of southern Burma. In 1826, Siam and Britain signed an agreement of friendship. Britain also offered southern Burma to Siam in order to trade with Perlis and Kedah, but Siam did not agree.¹⁴

¹³ Source: Historical Maps of Asia, [http://cartweb.geography.ua.edu:9001/StyleServer/calcrn?cat=Asia&item=/Asia1860f.sid&wid=500&hei=400&props=item\(Name,Description\),cat\(Name,Description\)&style=simple/view-dhtml.xsl](http://cartweb.geography.ua.edu:9001/StyleServer/calcrn?cat=Asia&item=/Asia1860f.sid&wid=500&hei=400&props=item(Name,Description),cat(Name,Description)&style=simple/view-dhtml.xsl) (accessed July 8, 2008).

¹⁴ Thai history, "King Rama III," <http://www.search-thais.com/thaihis/warrama3.htm> (accessed July 20, 2008).

The emergence of great power nation states from the west such as Britain, France and the Netherlands into Southeast Asia in the 19th century dramatically changed the balance of power in the region. Each nation state in Southeast Asia had to defend its homeland from colonization. France occupied Annam (Vietnam) in 1862. Under coercion, Siam yielded to France in a gesture of dependency; as did Cambodia in 1863 and Laos in 1897.¹⁵ These events caused King Rama V to improve upon Siam's governance in order to be more centralized and to counter western colonization.

The change in the governing system had tremendous effects on Patani and the other dependent states in the south. In 1896, the Ministry of Interior had been established. Funds from taxation that used to belong to each city had to be sent to the central administration. According to the changes, Patani and the other six cities were to be under the Nakhon Si Thammarat Circle. Tengku Abdul Kadir Kumarudin, Sultan of Patani did not agree with the new system because he believed it would ruin the customs and culture of Islam. He sent a request to Bangkok to call off this change and pointed out problems that would occur, but Bangkok declined. In 1902, he sent a letter to the Regent of Britain in Malaya which brought about negotiation between Siam and Britain, but still he was not successful. Later that year, Tengku Abdul Kadir was charged with rebellion. He was arrested and put in jail for two years. In 1906, Siam dissolved the Sultanate of Patani and ended more than 600 years of history of that great empire.

5. Consolidation of Siam's Rule

Siam was not only under pressure from France to force Siam to cede dependent states in the east – Laos and Cambodia but also in the south, the pressure from Britain was increasing. Britain was requesting Siam to draw a clear borderline with British Malaya. Ultimately, in 1909, an Anglo-Siamese treaty was signed by which Siam was forced to give Perlis, Kedah, Kelantan and Terengganu to Britain in return for a loan (from Britain) to build a railroad to the Malaya frontier and to have authority granted to

¹⁵ Roeder G Philip, *Where nation-states come from: institutional change in the age of nationalism* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2007), 362.

Siam's court.¹⁶ Siam was then recognized as a modern nation state with a rigid territory. Britain and France viewed Siam as a convenient buffer state for their rivalry in this region.¹⁷ The 1909 treaty definitely reformed the regime of the Sultanate of Patani into the "Pattani Circle," composed of four towns, Pattani, Yala, Sai Buri and Nara.

After 1909, there was resistance in Pattani, mainly from two groups: first, a group of former *Rajas* who were discontented by the changing of the regime which affected their status, power and income from taxation; second, a group of religious leaders, who were annoyed by Siam's rules and law, and viewed them as a threat to Islam and Malay-Muslim identities.¹⁸ Many problems still existed in the area especially with taxation, the court system and the new educational system. Finally, in 1921, rioting occurred at Namsai village, Mayo district, Pattani, where people refused to pay taxes and also fought against the Compulsory Primary Education Act which required Muslim children in the south to study the Thai language. The Act created dissatisfaction among religious leaders and Muslim dignitaries who perceived it as not only as an attack against the Malay-Muslim language, culture and religion, but also against the status of *Toh Guru* (religious teachers). Massive protests by villagers occurred; many were arrested including Ahwae Sador, the leader of the protest.¹⁹ The Siamese authority believed that the former sultan, Tengku Abdul Kadir, who was exiled in Malaya, was a master-mind and supporter of this upheaval.²⁰ This incident caused King Rama VI to amend rules and use a more gentle approach in the south. Any regulations that intimidated Islam were prohibited or adjusted. There was to be reasonable taxation, and the selection of efficient local authorities. Resistance during the next decades was reduced.

¹⁶ Before that time if British broke laws in Siam, he would be investigated in British court not Siamese court. After the 1909 treaty, any people who broke laws in Siam must go to Siamese court.

¹⁷ Max L. Gross, *A Muslim Archipelago: Islam and Politics in Southeast Asia* (Washington, DC., National Defense Intelligence College, March 2007), 62.

¹⁸ *Rajas* are known as Sultans.

¹⁹ Koyrin and Munsoe, *Could Southern Fire Be Extinguished*, 32.

²⁰ Surichai, eds., *Origin of Southern Fire*, 38.




Figure 2. Southern Thailand Border ²¹

6. Nationalist Assimilation Policies

In 1932, a bloodless revolution led Siam to a constitutional monarchy. The old bureaucracy was disbanded. Pattani Circle was transformed into four provinces: Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat, and Satun. In 1937, Abdul Yhalal Nasare was elected as the representative of Pattani.²² Tension at the southern border returned again when Colonel Plaek Phibunsongkhram became the third Prime Minister in 1938. Colonel Phibunsongkhram (later Field Marshal Phibunsongkhram) focused on the improvement of culture, social, economic and patriotic issues. There were twelve issues of “Cultural Mandates” throughout his rule. In society and culture, Phibunsongkhram’s attempt was to

²¹ Source: World Atlas, Map of Southeast Asia, http://encarta.msn.com/map_701516664/southeast_asia.html (accessed July 9, 2008).

²² Abdul Yhalal Nasare (a.k.a.: Adun Na Sai Buri) is son of former Sultan of Sai Buri, the authority believed that he has idea of seceding and cooperated with Tengku Mhamood Muhyideen (son of Tengku Abdul Kadir – the last Sultan of Patani).

change the ancient Siamese culture so that it could adapt well to the modern era and increase contacts with foreigners. He changed Siam's New Year's Day from April 1 to January 1. Men and women had to dress "properly" as indicated in the Mandates – loincloths were prohibited and a hat was compulsory. In addition, betel nuts were not allowed to be eaten in public. Regarding the economy, Phibunsongkhram urged people to buy and use commodities made in the country. In promoting patriotism, he changed the name of the state from "Siam" to "Thailand" in 1939, composed a national anthem, and specified the duties and rights of the Thai people. Thai citizens had to learn to read and write the Thai language correctly. The norms of the Thai culture were forced on every part of the country in order to develop a mono-ethnic character for the state, regardless of different cultures and customs of the people at the southern border.²³

Undoubtedly, the Cultural Mandates affected Muslim feelings in the south, especially issue #9 - Language, Thai books and good citizens and issue #10 - Dress code for Thai people. Problems occurred when Muslim men and women were not allowed to wear traditional Muslim-Malay dress in public. The Malay and Arabic languages were forbidden. The authorities arrested and fined people who disobeyed the Cultural Mandates. Displeasure and tension increased when the government promulgated civil and commercial codes in the areas of marriage, family, and inheritance to be used instead of Islamic law which had been used in the four southern provinces. Muslim people in the area were unable to accept the civil and commercial codes. According to Islam, they needed Muslim judges and an Islamic court. Thus, the people had to cross the border into Malaya's state of Perlis, Kedah, Kelantan and Terengganu in order to meet an Islamic court.²⁴ These changes by the government showed the Thai government unable to comprehend Muslim culture which, once more, brought about grievances for Muslim people. The nationalist assimilation policies of Phibunsongkhram not only critically affected the culture and religion of the southern Muslims, but also provoked the emergence of a resistance movement for freedom and the rights of Pattani's citizens.

²³ Surichai, eds., *Origin of Southern Fire*, 113.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 114 -115.

7. World War II

On August 8, 1941, the same day that Pearl Harbor was attacked, Japanese troops also invaded Thailand at Samut Prakarn province (near Bangkok) and in the south at Prachuabkirikhan, Chumpon, Songkhla and Pattani. At that time, the Thai Armed Forces were small and unable to wage war with Japan. Even though Thailand had decided to join Britain and the United States, both countries were busy and help would have been too late; Thailand would have been crushed by the Japanese invasion before help arrived. Ultimately, Prime Minister Phibunsongkhram yielded to pressure to ally with Japan. However, many Thai people did not agree with his decision and formed an underground resistance known as “Free Thai” to fight against the Japanese, led by Pridi Phanomyong. Free Thai cooperated with the United State’s Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and British Forces 136. Free Thai’s members conducted training of guerrilla forces, intelligence gathering, and made secret contact with the allied forces.²⁵

In Malaya, Tengku Mhamood Mahyiddin son of the last *sultan* of Patani, Tengku Abdul Kadir, who had been sent into exile by the Thai government, played a big role in countering the Japanese occupation. He recruited Malay volunteers for British Force 136 to fight the Japanese. Most of his activity took place in the Pattani region.²⁶ Mahyiddin also received support from Phanomyong, the leader of Free Thai, in his fight. Phanomyong also hinted that “an Allied victory would bring independence to Patani.”²⁷ However, Mahyiddin’s hope seem to be unfounded when the Japan successfully occupied Malaya in February 1942, and restored the territories of Kelantan, Trengganu, Kedah, and Perlis to Thailand.²⁸

In Pattani, during the war, many Muslim people felt deep regret when the Pattani provincial governor announced to Muslim leaders and clerics that he wanted Muslim people to pay respect to Buddha’s images in schools. He stated that Buddhism was the

²⁵ James F. Dunnigan and Albert A. Nofi, *Victory at Sea: World War II in the Pacific* (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc. 1995), 419.

²⁶ Gross, *A Muslim Archipelago: Islam and Politics in Southeast Asia*, 64.

²⁷ International Crisis Group, “Southern Thailand: Insurgency, Not Jihad,” *Asia Report No.98*, (18 May 2005), 4.

²⁸ International Crisis Group, “Southern Thailand: Insurgency, Not Jihad,” 4.

national religion of Thailand. Every Thai person was to pay respect to Buddha's images even if they were not Buddhist.²⁹ Abdul Yhalal Nasare, alias Adun Na Sai Buri, representative of Pattani, objected to the Thai government, mentioning that the Pattani provincial governor was overdoing the cultural mandates and hurting Muslims, and attempting to erase Islam from Thailand. Yet, in April, 1944, the government replied that "the Ministry of Interior has investigated this issue and found that the act of the Pattani provincial governor was correct and didn't bring any trouble or complication to the people."³⁰ Abdul Yhalal Nasare was very upset with the government's reply. He finally emigrated to Malaya. During that time, confidence in the government greatly decreased. In July 1944, Prime Minister Phibun Songkhram resigned. The conflict between the Pattani people and the Thai government was temporarily reduced because the new government took a more conciliatory approach to governing the southern provinces.

On August 15, 1945, Japan surrendered unconditionally subsequent to the attacks by atomic bombs at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. After the war, Thailand, which had changed to the allies' side during the war, returned Kelantan, Trengganu, Kedah, and Perlis to British Malaya. At this point, Mahyiddin saw a political opportunity for independence of Pattani. He sent a request to Britain, asking for help to liberate Pattani from Thai rule, or else for an affiliation with the Malay Federation.³¹ However, this was a difficult and critical issue for Britain when considering the status of Pattani as a reward to Mahyiddin and the Muslim people who helped the British during the war and also as a means of "punishing" Thailand for its stance in the war. In this case, Britain had the power to grant Mahyiddin's request, but Britain had many things to consider: Thailand's secret assistance to the allies against the Japanese was substantial for Britain; there were

²⁹ Surichai, eds., *Origin of Southern Fire*, 80.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 8.

³¹ Gross, *A Muslim archipelago: Islam and Politics in Southeast Asia*, 64.

friendly acts and favorable support from the U.S. to Thailand, and also the Anglo-Siamese treaty of 1909.³² Ultimately, when Britain gave no answer to Mahyiddin, his hopes fell.

8. Cultural Integrations and Pattani Resistance

During this time, the government's concept of building up a pattern of Thai identity by ignoring dissimilarities of local norms, cultures, and religions created a negative impact. The policy caused many Muslims to emigrate to Malaya. It also provoked Malay-Muslim nationalism, and a demand for both autonomy and a separation of Pattani from Thailand. The resistance movement divided into two branches. The first branch, the political movement, requested the world community to take action to change the territory and give liberty to Pattani or allow it to affiliate with British Malaya. This effort was led by Mahyiddin. The second branch was the local resistance movement led by Haji Sulong Tohmeena, a Mecca educated Islamic school teacher, who objected to the Buddhist judge system and wanted Muslim legal autonomy.³³

The request from Pattani for autonomy did not get enough support from the world community, and Britain was unable to push forward any amendment to the territorial boundaries because of disagreement by the US.³⁴ However, the problems were sufficient for the Thai government to change its policy. In 1946, Phanomyong, the Prime Minister, enacted the "Patronage of Islam Act" which integrated Muslim leaders into the state structure, headed by a *chularajmontri* (chief cleric) who was to give advice to the King on matters related to Islam. With the Act, a Provincial Council for Islamic Affairs was established. Two Islamic judges were appointed by the Ministry of Justice to advise the state courts on Islamic marriage and inheritance laws. Yet Thai Buddhist judges retained the ultimate authority. This retention of authority was unacceptable to the Muslim people.

³² Anglo-Siamese treaty signed between Siam (Thailand) and Britain; Siam was forced to yield Kelantan, Trengganu, Kedah, and Perlis to British Malaya. Since then, Siam was considered as a rigid territorial nation-state.

³³ Surichai, eds., *Origin of Southern Fire*, 42-43.

³⁴ Ibid.

In the mid-twentieth century, there was a wave of nationalism in Southeast Asia, especially in Indonesia and Malaya. This resulted in fighting for independence from western colonization. Since the situation in Pattani had still not improved, Haji Sulong Tohmeena, chairman of the Pattani Provincial Islamic Council and chairman of the “Pattani Ideology Association,” petitioned seven demands to the government in April 1947. Haji Sulong's seven demands were:³⁵

- The appointment of a single individual with full powers to govern the four provinces of Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat and Satun, and in particular having authority to dismiss, suspend, or replace all government servants -- this official was to have been born in one of the four provinces and be elected by the people;
- 80 per cent of government servants in the four provinces were to be Muslims;
- Both Malay and Thai were to be official languages;
- Malay was to be the medium of instruction in primary schools;
- Islamic law was to be recognized and enforced in a separate court other than a civil court where a *kafir* (non-believer) had sat as an assessor;
- All revenue and income derived from the four provinces was to be utilized within them; and
- There was to be the formation of a Muslim Board having full powers to direct all Muslim officers under the supreme head of state.

Luang Thamrong Nawaswat, the Prime Minister of Thailand, brought the seven demands to the cabinet meeting in mid-July. The seven demands did not mention seceding, but emphasized “local autonomy.” Still, the petition was more than the government at that time would accept, and the seven demands were rejected. With his unsuccessful demands, Haji Sulong made another move. He announced his support of Mahyiddin, at that time still in exile in Malaya, to come back and rule Pattani.³⁶ In November 1947, there was military coup in Thailand led by Field Marshal Phibunsongkhram.

³⁵ International Crisis Group, “Southern Thailand: Insurgency, Not Jihad,” 5.

³⁶ Koyrin and Munsoe, *Could Southern Fire Be Extinguished*, 41.

In January 1948, Haji Sulong and his party members were arrested. Muslim people were very displeased. Villagers protested in the Sai Buri district where Haji Sulong was detained. Subsequently, Haji Sulong was moved out of the southern provinces for trial, but the protest did not end. Tension was increasing in the three southern province of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat. On March 3, 1948, GAMPAR (Gabungam Melayu Pattani Raya – the Greater Pattani Malayu Association) was established at *madrasas* in Muhammadiyyah, Kota Baru, Kelantan, and Malaya. The leader of the group was Tengku Ismail bin Tengku Nik and the deputy leader was Abdul Yhalal Nasare, alias Adun Na Sai Buri – former representative of Pattani. Even though, Tengku Mahmood Mahyiddin did not hold an official post, he was a strong supporter of the Muslims movement. The group’s objective was to incorporate Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat and Satun into Malaya.³⁷ The GAMPAR mobilized the Muslim people in southern Thailand to protest against the government. Finally, on April 28, 1948, there was a clash between the authorities and villagers at Dusun Nyur village, Cha Nae district, Narathiwat. Around four hundred Muslims died and thousands more fled to Malaya.³⁸ The government declared martial law and deployed troops to control the situation.

In February 1949, Haji Sulong was sentenced to prison for seven years, but he was jailed for only three and a half years. In 1952, he was released, returned to Pattani and worked as a teacher in a *ponoh* (religious school).³⁹ But, in August 1954, he and his son, Ahmad Tohmeena, were called to meet the police in Songkhla and disappeared.⁴⁰

B. SEPARATIST GROUPS

As seen from the historical background, there were several important causes that created and increased problems in southern Thailand. First, the colonization era in the 19th century when the emergence of the western super power countries of Britain, France, and the Netherlands into the region changed the balance of power in Southeast Asia. In order to survive, Siam needed to improve its national bureaucracy to become more

³⁷ International Crisis Group, “Southern Thailand: Insurgency, Not Jihad,” 6.

³⁸ Koyrin and Munsoe, *Could Southern Fire Be Extinguished*, 43.

³⁹ *Ponoh* is a Patani Malay word. Malay equivalent is *pondok*. Indonesia word is *pondok pesantren*.

⁴⁰ Koyrin and Munsoe, 45.

centralized. This worked well in other regions, but not in the south in Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat, because it brought an end to their autonomy. Second, the instability of the Thai government in the 20th century caused a change in the governing system from an absolute monarchy to a constitutional monarchy. The new government changed many of the King's rules and laws. The southern policy administration enacted by King Rama VI was ignored. There was also competition among high ranking officers to achieve power and many coups occurred. The government changed frequently, along with its policies and laws, which caused many subsequent problems.

Third, the Thai government had little comprehension of Islam, and all legislation was from the central Buddhist government. Many rules and laws were based on Buddhist law, not Islamic. Government officials who worked in the south were in the majority Buddhist, and they did not understand Muslim customs and culture. The government in Bangkok did not pay serious attention to petitions from Muslims in the south. Many problems remained unresolved. The head of the government usually came from the military, sometimes the autocracy, and was hard-handed when dealing with the southern problem.

The disappearance of Haji Sulong and his son created more discontent for religious leaders and former rulers of Pattani. As the grievances of the Muslim people in the south were unsuccessfully solved by political means, ultimately, several armed groups were formed in order to achieve their goals.

1. Barisan Nasional Pemberbasan Pattani (BNPP)

Founded in 1959 by Abdul Yhalal Nasare, BNPP (Barisan Nasional Pemberbasan Pattani or Patani National Liberation Front) was the first armed group that rose against Thai authority.⁴¹ The group's objective was the independence of Pattani and not integration with Malaya. Militants were divided into small groups (about 10-20 men for each group) and operated throughout Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat under the command

⁴¹ Abdul Yhalal Nasare, alias Adun Na Sai Buri, is son of former *sultan* of Sai Buri. Today's Sai Buri is a district in Pattani province. Adun Na Sai Buri used to be a representative of Pattani during 1937-1944 before fled to Malaya.

of Deureh Madiyoh, alias Poh Yeh.⁴² As the strength of the group was definitely weaker than that of the authorities, the groups used guerrilla warfare. Recruitment was conducted through religious teachers. New members received basic military training in local areas and some of them were later sent to Libya, Syria, and Afghanistan for advanced training.⁴³ The BNPP also informed Muslim countries in the Middle East about Pattani's story and sent many Muslim youth from southern Thailand to study in Egypt and Saudi Arabia. The group received significant political and financial support from Malaysia's Parti Islam in Kelantan.⁴⁴

The BNPP began to lose its strength in 1972 due to heavy suppression by the Thai military. Five years later, the leader of the group, Abdul Yhalal Nasare, died. In 1978, Parti Islam ceased its financial support. Many members left the BNPP, but the rest gathered again under a Central Committee of fifteen, led by Badri Hamdan in Ban Panare, Pattani. Under Hamdan's leadership, more religiously-educated leaders came to dominate the BNPP. In 1984, Poh Yeh, the military leader died. The strength of the militants also decreased from the peak of around 300 men to about 50.⁴⁵ The group began to shift from armed fighting to political efforts. Ultimately, in 1986, the BNPP changed its name to Barisan Islam Pembebasan Patani (BIPP), in order to emphasize its own commitment to Islamism. In the 1990s, BNPP ceased its movement for a while, but returned again in 2002, after core members met in northern Malaysia. It was believed that the BIPP participated in attacking Thai security officials in 2002, but there was no compelling evidence of their participation in the 2004 attacks.⁴⁶

2. Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN)

The Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) or National Revolutionary Front was founded on March 13, 1960 at the Dhamma Wittaya School in Yala province. Founding

⁴² Boonrod Srisombat, eds., *Various Views: Terror war in Thailand* (Royal Thai Army, Command and General Staff College, 2007), II-28.

⁴³ International Crisis Group, "Southern Thailand: Insurgency, Not Jihad," 7.

⁴⁴ International Crisis Group, "Southern Thailand: Insurgency, Not Jihad," 7.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 10.

members included Abdul Karim bin Hasan, Haji Harun Sulong, Amin Tohmeena, and various other prominent *ponoh* (Islamic school) owners or *Toh Guru* (teachers).⁴⁷ The founding of the party resulted from anger about an educational reform program of the military government – led by Field Marshall Sarit Thanarat – forcing *ponoh* to take on a secular curriculum which was viewed as a direct attack on Malay-Muslim culture and identity in the region. Thus, the BRN was organizationally rooted in *ponoh* across the south. The aims and objectives of the group were to establish an independent state of Patani Darussalam. Its politics were heavily influenced by the pan-Malay Islamic socialism of Sukarno’s Indonesia.⁴⁸ Even though the BRN shared the BNPP’s goals the BRN ideas were against the reinstating of the sultanate.

In October 1968, the party set up a military wing called Angkatan Bersenjata Revolusi Patani (Patani Revolutionary Armed Forces or ABREP) led by Jehku Baku (alias Mapiyoh Sadalah). Its strength was around 150 men and it was based in the Budo mountain range in Narathiwat. The BRN also had close a relationship with the insurgent Communist Party of Malaya (CPM), which since 1960 had retreated into southern Thai territory.⁴⁹ In 1974, the BRN launched a successful attack against a Kabu police station, Raman district, Yala. The militants robbed the officials’ of their weapons and released many prisoners. However, the BRN focused more on political organization, especially in religious schools, than on guerrilla activities.⁵⁰ But in 1977, there was a major split in the organization caused by internal dissent. Ustaz Karim set up the Council for the Domestic Revolutionary Movement (Majlis Gerakan Revolusi Dalam Negeri) which became known as the BRN-Congress (armed efforts). “Haji M” set up a coordinating committee (Majlis Koordinasi) known as BRN-Coordinate (political and religious efforts). In the

⁴⁶ Surachart Bamrungsuk, “Insurgency in Southern Thailand,” http://www.isranews.org/cms/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2103&Itemid=56/ (accessed July 12, 2008).

⁴⁷ Abdul Karim bin Hasan alias *ustaz (Toh Guru) Karim*: owner of a *ponoh* (Islamic school) in Rueso, Narathiwat. Haji Harun Sulong: chairman of Dhamma Wittaya School. Amin Tohmeena: son of Haji Sulong Tohmeena, who disappear in 1952.

⁴⁸ Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism, “Barisan Revolusi Nasional Patani-Melayu (BRN),” <http://jwit.janes.com/public/jwit/index.shtml> (accessed July 27, 2008).

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ International Crisis Group, “Southern Thailand: Insurgency, Not Jihad,” 15.

1980s, the BRN-Congress' military wing began to decline. *Ustaz* Karim ultimately lost his leadership by vote to Jehku Peng (alias Poh Tua, alias Rosa Buraso, alias Abdul Razak Rahman) in 1984.⁵¹ However, *Ustaz* Karim and his followers later established a group known as the BRN-Ulama in Malaysia, which focus on religious activities until his death in 1996.

3. Patani United Liberation Organization (PULO)

The Pulo (Patani United Liberation Organization) was founded on January 22, 1968 in Mecca, Saudi Arabia. The PULO became the largest and most effective of the separatist movements during the 1970s-1980s. Its founding president was Tengku Bira Kotanila, alias Kabir Abdul Rahman, alias Adun Na Wangkram, who graduated from Aligarh Mualim University, India.⁵² The PULO's aims and objectives were the establishment of an independent Muslim Malay state to be comprised of the four majority-Muslim provinces of Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat and Satun along with several majority-Muslim districts of adjacent Songkhla province.

The PULO occupied the middle ground between the traditionalist BNPP with a leadership rooted in the former Pattani aristocracy, and the Islamic socialist BRN, which later suffered from severe internal factionalism. Recruitment was conducted in southern Thailand and northern Malaysia and focused on Patani Muslims studying in Malaysia and the Middle East, and on religious teachers. Bira was an expert publicist and fund-raiser. He received large amounts of financial support from the Middle East. During 1975-1984, many Muslim youth were sent to Libya, Syria and Palestine for guerrilla warfare training.⁵³ The PULO enjoyed rapid growth in its membership in the 1970s and several hundred guerrilla fighters were based mostly in the Narathiwat – Budo mountain range.

⁵¹ Ibid., 12.

⁵² International Crisis Group, "Southern Thailand: Insurgency, Not Jihad," 8.

⁵³ Jane's World Insurgency and Terrorism, "Patani United Liberation Organization (PULO)," <http://jwit.janes.com/public/jwit/index.shtml> (accessed July 28, 2008).

The Military wing was led by Haji Yuso Pakistan and Haji Sama-ae Tha-nam. Their peak of operations was during 1976 to 1982. The PULO began to decline due to broad amnesty and the political inclusion policies of the Thai government.⁵⁴

In the mid-1980s, PULO had been weakened by financial constraints. There were also differences among the leadership over rank, privilege and personality. Subsequently, in 1992, Arong Mooreng and Haji Rohman Bazo established a New PULO but did not formally break away until 1995. The New PULO was active in the Betong district, Yala and some districts of Narathiwat. Their tactics were to launch constant low-level attacks and minimize loss of life.⁵⁵ However, in late 1998, the Thai government with the cooperation of Malaysian authorities arrested four senior PULO leaders including Haji Rohman Bazo, chief of New PULO, his deputy Abdul Rahman Haji Yala, and the group's military chief, Haji Da'oud Tha-nam. Picked up separately was Haji Sama-ae Tha-nam, the military chief of "Old PULO." The loss of these leaders effectively disrupted the PULO network in both Thailand and Malaysia.

4. Gerakan Mujahideen Patani (GMP)

In the 1980s, the insurgency groups had been heavily suppressed by Thai authorities and began to lose their momentum. On 16 September 1985, lead members of BNPP/BIPP, BRN-Coordinate, BRN-Ulama, and PULO met together and discussed problems such as their operations, logistical support, and group disunity. Ultimately, the BBMP (Barisan Bersatu Mujahidin Patani) was formed as a coordinate operation center and symbol of their unity. However, it did not work out well. Then, in 1986, the GMP (Gerakan Mujahideen Patani), a splinter group from BBMP was founded. The GMP conducted its activities in northern Malaysia with emphasis on political efforts. Their significant efforts led to the consolidation of various insurgency groups working together again under the name "BERSATU" a couple of years later.

⁵⁴ Surichai, eds., *Origin of Southern Fire*, 229-230.

⁵⁵ International Crisis Group, "Southern Thailand: Insurgency, Not Jihad," 13.

5. BERSATU

The BERSATU (The United Front for the Independence of Patani) was founded on August 31, 1989 by consensus of the core leaders of BIPP, BRN, GMP, and PULO.⁵⁶ The founding members agreed to form an umbrella organization (*Payong* Organization) in order to strengthen their capabilities, operate in the same direction, and facilitate receiving international financial support. The BERSATU's aims and objectives were to fight for independence and liberate of Patani, while resisting Thai rules and policies. The group called for *jihād* with armed fighting, and requested support from Muslim countries.⁵⁷ The BERSATU was based in Malaysia; its leader was Dr. Wan Kadir Che Man (Dr. Fadeh). However, BERSATU could not command the various groups in conducting their operations, but defined policy and provide appropriate direction. The groups' member still carried out their activities freely, but with increased coordination.⁵⁸

6. Gerakan Mujahideen Islam Patani (GMIP)

The GMIP was founded in 1995 by Cheku Mae Abdul Rahman (alias Cheku Mae Kuteh, alias Abbas bin Ahmad) and Nasoreee Saesang (alias Awae Kaelae, Poh Wae, or Haji Wae). The group broke away from the older GMP (Gerakan Mujahideen Patani) and shared the aspirations of other Muslim Malay separatist groups for an independent Islamic state in southern Thailand, while seeking to draw inspiration from the wider currents of international jihad. The appearance of GMIP was almost simultaneous with the formation of the KMM (Kampulan Mujahideen Malaysia) which was set up by Afghan veteran, Zainol Ismael.⁵⁹

Nasoree had also trained and fought with Afghan mujahideen in the late 1980s, where he met Nik Adili Nik Aziz – son of *Parti Islam se Malaysia* (PAS) leader Nik Abdul Aziz Nik Mat, from the Kelantan state of Malaysia. Nik Adili Nik Aziz joined the KMM in 1996. It is possible that these two groups were allied and enjoy mutual support.

⁵⁶ BERSATU in Malay dialect means “united.”

⁵⁷ Boonrod, eds., *Various views: Terror war in Thailand*, II-31.

⁵⁸ Surachart Bamrungasuk, “Insurgency in Southern Thailand,” http://www.isranews.org/cms/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2103&Itemid=56/ (accessed July 12, 2008).

⁵⁹ Surichai, eds., *Origin of Southern Fire*, 238-239.

GMIP representative was present at meetings of the Southeast Asian pan-Islamic jihadist co-ordinating group Rabitat ul Mujahideen (RM) convened by Jemmah Islamiyya (JI) in Malaysia in 1999-2000.⁶⁰ In the late 1990s, New PULO, BRN, and GMIP claimed responsibility for 33 separate attacks from August 1997 to January 1998 resulting in nine deaths.⁶¹ The GMIP specialized in urban bombing using improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and raids by small groups of gunmen. Their movements were concealed within the crowded population, and they waited for a proper opportunity to launch their attacks.

7. Other Resistance Groups

Although the BRN, PULO, BERSATU, and GMIP were the principal resistance movements against continuing Thai rule in southern Thailand, a weakness of the resistance movement in general caused the emergence of other movements, either as break-away movements or as new initiatives in other sectors of Malay-Muslim Thailand. Among these were:

a. *Permuda*

Permuda (the youth wing of Patani liberation – Permuda Merdeka Pattani / PMP), formed by the BRN-Coordinate in 1992. Recruitment was conducted through *ponoh*, private schools teaching Islam (PSTI), some secular state schools, and also local mosques. The youth were provoked to perform jihad and trained in guerrilla warfare. Permuda has conducted some significant operations such as armed robbery and assassinations of government officials since 2001.⁶²

b. *PANYOM*

PANYOM (Patani National Youth Movement or Gerakan Permuda Kebangsaan Patani), began their first activity in 1997 by extortion of money in Pattani.

⁶⁰ International Crisis Group, “Southern Thailand: Insurgency, Not Jihad,” 13.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 14.

⁶² Surachart Bamrungasuk, “Insurgency in Southern Thailand,” http://www.isranews.org/cms/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2103&Itemid=56/ (accessed July 12, 2008).

In 1998, propaganda and provocation to fight for independence of Patani circulated through the internet. They also publicized the struggle of many separatist groups which aimed to receive international recognition.⁶³

c. Persatuan Mahasiswa Islam Patani (Selatan Thailand) di Patani (PMIPTI)

The Association of Thai Students in Indonesia (Persatuan Mahasiswa Islam Patani (Selatan Thailand) di Patani / PMIPTI), PMIPTI was founded in 1968 by Thais in the three southernmost provinces who graduated from religious schools in Indonesia. At the beginning, the group had normal functions such as educational coordination and student activities, but later it was infiltrated by BRN-Coordinate which distorted its objectives. The PMIPTI has been active in recruiting and fundraising.⁶⁴

⁶³ Surachart Bamrungsuk, "Insurgency in Southern Thailand," http://www.isranews.org/cms/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2103&Itemid=56/ (accessed July 12, 2008).

⁶⁴ Zachary Abuza, "The Role of Foreign Trainers in Southern Thailand's Insurgency," <http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2373451> (accessed August 2, 2008).

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II. THE INSURGENCY AND GOVERNMENT RESPONSES

Pattani's resistance continued for generations; beginning with the last *sultan* of Patani, Tengku Abdul Kade Kumarudin in 1902, followed by his son Tengku Mhamood Mahyiddin in 1946, a contemporary of Haji Sulong Tohmeena (who died in 1954), and Abdul Yhalal Nasare, alias Adun Na Sai Buri (who died 1975). The third generation consists of the separatist groups activated in the 1960s and ongoing until the present. From the past, we learned that the first two generations of resistance were fought through political ways and means, while the last generation added armed fighting. This chapter focuses on the third generation's insurgency activities which can be divided into two parts: first, from the 1960s – September 11, 2001 (Pre 9/11), and the second, after September 11, 2001 – June 2008 (Post 9/11). Overall, the salient difference in the insurgents' activities between the old - Pre 9/11 and the new - Post 9/11 is their tactics, which changed from "classic low-intensity conflict" to "terrorist urban combat." This change in tactics created a more complex situation, more difficult for the government to neutralize.

A. PRE 9/11 INSURGENCY

Various insurgency groups have become active in southern Thailand since the 1960s. Even though each group was different in its nature, such as the BNPP formed by the relative of a former *sultan*, the BRN by *Toh Guru*, the PULO by scholars, and the GMIP by Afghan veterans, they shared the same goals – to achieve independence of Pattani. These militant separatist groups also have their own agendas and characteristics in their activities. For instance, the BRN emphasized political activities rather than armed struggle, but the BNPP and PULO were focused more on guerrilla warfare. The BRN and BNPP had their networks and links mostly in local areas while the PULO and GMIP had more international links and networks for fund-raising.

1. Personnel and Recruitment

In personnel and recruitment, as the insurgency groups were quite small at the beginning, they needed more members to join their activities. Thus, the history of Patani and the coercions of Thai rulers to dissolve Malay Muslim identities were brought up and used as substantial reasons for recruiting. Two incidents that furthered the recruitment were the Dusun Nyur event in 1948 and the disappearance of both Haji Sulong Tohmeena and his son, along with their party, in 1954. The BRN was mainly recruiting and training youth from *ponoh* (madrasas) and private schools teaching Islam (PSTI), while the BNPP recruited through religious teachers who selected students and teachers as well as villagers in the vicinity of their schools. The PULO focused recruitment on Patani Muslims studying in Malaysia and the Middle East, as well as religious teachers in southern Thailand. The Mecca office was also used to recruit Thai pilgrims on the hajj.⁶⁵

2. Organization Structure and Logistics

The structure of each group was simple and similar, a pyramid hierarchy formation. In general, it consisted of a president, vice-president and secretary; a military affairs leader, a religious affairs leader, a logistics affairs leader and a comptroller. There were some slight differences such as the BRN also having an “intelligence affairs” leader and a “financial vice-president” while PULO had a “foreign affairs” leader. Some groups took sanctuary (meeting and planning) in northern Malaysia, but did not bring their arms with them across the border.⁶⁶ In military affairs, new members received basic training in local areas and some of them were sent to train abroad. In 1985, the BRN, PULO, and BNPP, together, sent around 30 militants to train with Mujahidin in Pakistan and another 40 militants to train in Libya.⁶⁷ Their financial support was obtained from many sources

⁶⁵ International Crisis Group, “Southern Thailand: Insurgency, Not Jihad,” 6-8.

⁶⁶ Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism, “Thailand,” <http://jwit.janes.com/public/jwit/index.shtml> (accessed July 28, 2008).

⁶⁷ Boonrod Srisombat, “Thai Terrorist History,” http://www.geocities.com/terrorismstudies/cbt_Thai_domestic_terrorism.htm (accessed July 28, 2008).

such as donations from members and from overseas, funding from charity organizations, moneys acquired through kidnapping for ransom, and some funds from the extortion of local business, rubber and coconut plantation owners, and also from villagers.

3. Political Activities

Even though each separatist group wanted Pattani to be independent, there were some different ideas about the governing system of independent Pattani. The BNPP wanted to revive the *sultanate* of Patani, but the BRN, who were more socialist, wanted an Islamic state, while the PULO were more ethno-nationalist than Islamist.⁶⁸ In the 1960s – 1970s, the BRN also maintained a close relationship with the communist parties of Malaysia and Thailand. This cooperation alienated some of its more conservative supporters in Malaysia and the Middle East. The BRN focused on political organization and continued to recruit members from religious schools, while PULO aimed to influence local leaders and clerics. However, each group tried to provoke the Muslim population to fight against the central government by conducting psychological operations, and propaganda to induce the villagers to rebel. The insurgents also looked for an opportunity to create turmoil in the area with violent protests which urged the authorities to use an excess of force. For instance, in November 1975, the Thai military allegedly murdered five Muslim youths in the Bacho district of Narathiwat, but for months the government made no attempt to investigate. The PULO used the murders to organize a mass protest. There were religious leaders, student groups, and political groups that joined the rally in Pattani. On December 14, 1975, a bomb was thrown into a group of demonstrators, killing 12 and injuring at least 30. The 12 were buried as *syahid* (martyrs) the following day, setting the stage for calls to jihad.⁶⁹

4. Armed Struggle

The insurgents' areas of operations were active in all four majority Muslim provinces of Yala, Pattani, Narathiwat, and some parts of Songkhla. At its peak, strength of the BNPP was estimated at 200-300 men; the BRN at 150-300 men; and the PULO at

⁶⁸ International Crisis Group, "Southern Thailand: Insurgency, Not Jihad," 6-8.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 9.

200-600 men.⁷⁰ Among these groups, the PULO was the best trained and equipped. Weapons were acquired in black-markets in the southern region and included pistols, shotguns, automatic rifles (M-16, HK-33, and AK-47), M-79 grenade launchers, and rocket-propelled grenades (RPG). Some of these weapons were smuggled from Burma and Cambodia. As the insurgency forces were much smaller than the government forces, they used guerrilla warfare and avoided direct contact with the authorities. The insurgents split into small groups of around 10-15 men, carried out their attacks, and ran away. Violent actions included ambushes, sabotage, assassinations, bombings and the arson of government schools. Most of the targets were police/military and/or government buildings. The insurgents also kidnapped for ransom, and extorted local businesses and villagers. Most of the armed struggle was conducted in rural areas and rarely in a city. The Budo mountain range, which lies across the region, was the perfect place for the insurgents to hide, train, and from which to attack government officials.

5. Government Response

The late 1960s-1980s, was a time of communist issues in Thailand. In the South, there was overwhelming number of government forces which conducted suppression of both the Muslim insurgency and of the communists. In addition, from 1948-1960, the British and Malaya had also contained a communist insurgency in Malaya and asked Thailand to help them seal the border, as it had been reported that Malaya communists sought sanctuary in southern Thailand. In this case, armed struggle by the Muslim insurgency was at a disadvantage at the beginning because the government was already focused on this region. However, guerrilla warfare tactics were able to compensate for this unfavorable circumstance, as the insurgents operated in the jungle areas of the Budo range which they knew better than the authorities. They used all kinds of booby traps, land mines, and ambushes. The conflict was protracted for decades. In 1972-1974, the government conducted heavy campaigns which were able to weaken the insurgents'

⁷⁰ International Crisis Group, "Southern Thailand: Insurgency, Not Jihad," 6-9.

strength. In May 1975, 77 BNPP members turned themselves in.⁷¹ Being heavily repressed in the rural areas might have pushed the insurgents to operate in the cities. The authorities implicated the BRN in terrorist bombings in Yala and Songkhla in 1979.⁷²

For almost two decades in dealing with the communist insurgency, the Thai government gradually adapted its strategy to cope with insurgents more effectively. From lessons learned, military repression solely was not able to quell the insurgency movement, and actually pushed more of the population into the arms of the insurgents. For instance, if soldiers killed one insurgent, maybe ten relatives of the dead person would join the insurgency. Thus, to end the situation it was necessary not to kill the insurgents but to stop the killing. At the same time, other measures needed be added such as disconnecting the links and supports between the local people and the insurgents, changing an armed struggle into peace talks or negotiation by opening an opportunity for political inclusion, opening amnesty programs, ending injustice, and creating economic development. This new strategy caused hundreds of Communists to give up their armed struggle. This doctrine later became known as Prime Minister's Order 66/2523, better known as "The Policy to Win Over the Communists." This order was under the direction of then Prime Minister General Prem Tinsulanonda and the Army Operations Center Director Major General Chavalit Yongchaiyudth. Two years later in 1982, Prime Minister's Order 65/2525, also known as the "Plan for the Political Offensive," was announced. Order Number 66/2523 should be seen as establishing the political offensive to be used against the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT), while 65/2525 provided for implementation.⁷³

Although, the Prime Minister's Orders 66/2523 and 65/2525 worked well in dissolving the Communist problem, they might not have worked as well with regards to the southern separatist problem because of the different conditions. Thus, Prime Minister Tinsulanonda and Lieutenant General Harn Leenanon, the 4th Army Commander in the

⁷¹ Boonrod Srisombat, "Thai Terrorist History," http://www.geocities.com/terrorismstudies/cbt_Thai_domestic_terrorism.htm (accessed July 28, 2008).

⁷² International Crisis Group, "Southern Thailand: Insurgency, Not Jihad," 11.

⁷³ USCINCPAC, "Muslim Separatism in Southern Thailand", http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2002/Muslim_Separatists_%20Primer_Jul02.doc (accessed 19 August 08).

South during the period Oct 1981 to Sept 1983, established a new administrative system called “Civil-Police-Military Joint Headquarters (CPM 43) to coordinate security operations, which up to that time had not been synchronized and, therefore, created problems in implementation.⁷⁴ One of the most important things that CPM 43 emphasized was to cease extra-judicial killings and disappearances. The government also launched a Policy of Attraction, aimed at drawing off sympathy from separatist groups by increasing political participation and lavishing economic development projects on the region. Large infrastructure projects, electricity and running water were brought into remote areas. Military personnel and government officials helped establish committees at the village level to promote economic development and security.⁷⁵

Another significant mechanism that reduced violence in the South during that time was the establishment of the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Center (SBPAC) in 1981. The SBPAC was formed to facilitate correction of major problems in the administration, especially poor coordination among agencies, corruption and prejudice among officials. Corrupt and abusive behavior on the part of officials had been a significant source of grievance since the 1940s.⁷⁶ The SBPAC was empowered to reward, punish or remove officials on the basis of performance. Besides government officials, the SBPAC was comprised also of local religious leaders, local community leaders, and scholars. There was an emphasis on understanding Malay Muslim culture. The center also held regular seminars for Malay Muslim leaders to air their grievances.

The new approach seemed to work; violence dropped off significantly in the 1980s and early 1990s. The Government’s strategy of increasing Malay Muslim participation in politics also undercut support for armed struggle. Many separatist fighters took up amnesty offers and abandoned their fight to participate in development programs. There were also other reasons for the decrease of violence in that period which included, first, the death of BNPP leader, Tengu Yalal Nasaie, in 1977 and the subsequent death of

⁷⁴ USCINCPAC, “Muslim Separatism in Southern Thailand”, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2002/Muslim_Separatists_%20Primer_Jul02.doc (accessed 19 August 08).

⁷⁵ International Crisis Group, “Southern Thailand: Insurgency, Not Jihad,” 11.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

BNPP military chief, Poh Yeh, in 1984; second, a major split in the insurgency organization caused by internal dissent in the BRN in 1977, and in the PULO in 1992; and third, financial support for the groups dried up. The combination of these reasons significantly weakened the armed insurgency movements.

In the decade of the 1990s, there was no significant insurgency activity such as attacks or demonstration. Things seemed quiet. On the other hand, this was a “hibernation period” of the insurgents who had been heavily damaged and lost their impetuses after twenty years of continuous fighting. However, some separatist groups that ran short of funds relied increasingly, again, on extortion and other criminal exploits. Security measures, once again, were transferred from the military to the hands of the police. The government’s projects, which attempted to improve living conditions and the quality of life of the villagers, were able to gain popular support and trust from Muslim people.

The Thai government and the military were able to maintain peace and control over the South for many years up through the late 1990s. Yet, under this quiet and calm on the surface, the government knew that the insurgencies still secretly carried on their missions, particularly the BRN-Coordinate and the GMIP. The BRN-Coordinate focused on consolidating and expanding its network within Islamic schools. It was also believed to have begun recruitment of a large youth wing (known as *Pemuda* – youth in Malay).⁷⁷ The GMIP (Gerakan Mujahidin Islam Patani), established in 1995 had close relations with the KMM (Kampulun Mujahidin Malaya – a terrorist group in Malaysia), and was believed to pursue jihad in southern Thailand. The KMM was linked with the JI (Jemaah Islamiya – a terrorist group in Indonesia) and the JI linked with Al Qaeda which emerged in Southeast Asia in the mid 1990s.⁷⁸

B. POST 9/11 INSURGENCY

For almost twenty years, people in the three southern border provinces lived in peace and harmony from 1984 until the early 2000s. However, even though since 1983 the government had been able to tear down an armed struggle and destroy the insurgency

⁷⁷ International Crisis Group, “Southern Thailand: Insurgency, Not Jihad,” 11.

⁷⁸ Gross, *A Muslim archipelago: Islam and Politics in Southeast Asia*, 74.

structure,, the insurgencies were not fatally weakened. They lost forces but not ideology. Some of the insurgents, especially the leaders, fled to Malaysia or other countries and continued their fight from there. Some of them were still in Thailand and lived like normal people on one side, but on the other side, they quietly carried on preparation for the next round of revolution. During this period of time, the insurgency secretly conducted propaganda, aimed at persuading the Muslim community to take action against the Thai government. They recruited many young Muslims from *ponoh* (Islam boarding schools) including people from religious associations and villagers. These people were trained in guerrilla warfare and terrorist operations. Before the end of their training, members were given the ultimate test, such as attacking government officials or robbing weapons. The insurgents attempted to establish the biggest forces they could. Finally, when everything was ready, the time came for revolt.

1. Revival of the Insurgency and the Government Response

After 9/11, the global community focused its efforts on combating terrorism. Thailand and the United States had a positive long-standing relationship. Thus, the Thai government expressed the will to cooperate closely with the United States and other nations in fighting the global war on terrorism. Thailand's intelligence agency worked closely with the U.S. in sharing information and in tracking Al Qaeda and affiliates operatives who passed through Thailand. This enhanced coordination resulted in the arrest of Jemaah Islamiyah (terrorist group link to Al Qaeda) leader Riduan Isamuddin, also known as Hambali, in August 2003.⁷⁹ Designated as a major non-NATO ally in October 2003 by President Bush, Thailand supported U.S. operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq with troops.⁸⁰ Thailand also authorized the U.S. military to use Utapao airbase in Sattahip to establish a logistics hub to support forces in Afghanistan and the Middle East. The Thai administration's decision to dispatch troops to the Middle East and assistance to the U.S. in capturing Al Qaeda's link member, possibly led to the country being targeted by jihadists.

⁷⁹ Emma Chanlett-Avery, "Thailand: Background and U.S. Relations," *CRS Report for Congress*, (February 21, 2008).

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

The 9/11 incident not only provoked the Muslim community around the world, but also the small Muslim communities in southern Thailand. Yet, nobody knows for sure whether the revival of southern Thailand's insurgency is connected with the stream of global jihad. However, the first signs of a return to violence were the well-coordinated attacks on five police posts in Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat in December 2001 which left five officers and one village defense volunteer dead. In 2002, the insurgent-initiated activities such as attacks on government officials and stealing weapons continued sporadically in the region.

Another factor that might have fostered the upheaval was that in early 2003, Prime Minister Thaksin declared a "War on Drugs" which brought about approximately 1300-2500 extrajudicial killings in the country.⁸¹ As the southern border is a region also known for its prevalent drug trade, many extrajudicial killings occurred in the region. The issue about the massive human rights abuses resulting from the drug suppression activities of the Thai police, created discontent among southern Muslims. In late 2003, there were several attacks on police posts wherein many policemen were assassinated. A number of government schools except for Islamic schools were also burned. However, the Thai government did not have a serious interest in the increased violence. Instead, Prime Minister Thaksin downplayed the incidents as "petty crimes" and mentioned that these were the handiwork of the opposition groups in order to discredit his government. Thaksin directed local police forces to deal with the situation.

Approximately around dawn of January 4, 2004, a major incident occurred when over 50 militants raided the Royal Thai Army's 4th Engineering Battalion in Cho Airong district, Narathiwat province, killing of four soldiers, and seizing some 400 weapons, including assault rifles, machine guns, pistols and rocket launchers.⁸² There were also diversionary attacks launched simultaneously such as arson attacks on twenty schools and three police posts, and the burning of tires on highways. The operation was well-planned

⁸¹Emma Chanlett-Avery, "Thailand: Background and U.S. Relations," *CRS Report for Congress*, (February 21, 2008), 12.

⁸² Investigation by the Fourth Army Region concluded that at least 50 people were involved in the raid. According to the army's count, the haul consisted of 366 M16 rifles, 24 pistols, seven rocket-propelled grenades, two M60 machine guns and four rocket launchers (Source: International Crisis Group Report, "Southern Thailand: Insurgency, Not Jihad," 17).

and was completed within twenty minutes.⁸³ The insurgents also felled trees and scattered nails on all avenues of approach to the Army post in order to protect the insurgents' withdrawal.

Prime Minister Thaksin reacted to the attacks by declaring martial law in the three provinces and dispatched a large number of troops and law enforcement forces into the region in order to arrest the perpetrators. However, most of the military and police that responded did not have a clear idea about the situation in that region. There had been questions and debates for months about whether the insurgency had returned to that region. Although the government continued to downplay the possibility of a resurgent separatist insurgency, it issued 33 arrest warrants including the five senior separatist leaders.⁸⁴

One indication that the government was not aware of the resurgence of the insurgency occurred when Prime Minister Thaksin made a critical executive decision in 2002 to dismantle the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre (SBPAC) and CPM-43 (43rd joint Civilian-Police-Military Command). The Thaksin administration thought at that time that the secessionist struggle was over. Yet these agencies performed critical functions necessary to addressing the problems of the south. In fact, the SBPAC provided a profound mechanism to promote coordination among government agencies, to reduce corruption and to address prejudice against Malay Muslims in the government. The SBPAC had an active advisory board of religious and community leaders whose own networks often reached down to the village level and served as a useful source of intelligence. It also provided opportunities for local leaders to engage with government officials on a regular and systematic basis and offered local residents a venue for their grievances.⁸⁵ The dissolution of SBPAC did not cause an outbreak of violence, but it certainly weakened the government's ability to handle the situation in southern Thailand.

⁸³ Gross, *A Muslim archipelago: Islam and Politics in Southeast Asia*, 78.

⁸⁴ International Crisis Group Report, "Southern Thailand: Insurgency, Not Jihad," 17.

⁸⁵ International Crisis Group, "Thailand: Political Turmoil and the Southern Insurgency," *Policy Briefing*, (August 2008), 9.

Thus, unaware of the return of the insurgency, the government was forced to become “reactive” instead of being “preemptive,” since it did not have a good grasp on the worsening situation.

2. Krue Se Mosque Incidents

Three months later, on April 28, 2004, ten small cells of militants congregated before dawn in several mosques across Yala, Pattani and Songkhla provinces. After their prayers, they launched simultaneous pre-dawn raids on rural check points, police stations and army bases. Many of the confrontations took place in or near the mosques. The simultaneous attacks across the three provinces showed the existence of effective insurgent networks. At Pattani’s historic Krue Se Mosque, two groups of around 30 men attacked the security checkpoint near the mosque from opposite directions, killing one soldier and one police officer. During the exchange of fire, the assailants ran back towards the mosque. This forced the soldiers to blockade the mosque but they failed to entice the militants to surrender. The militant leader repeatedly stated through the mosque’s loudspeaker that they would fight to their deaths, after which they kept firing with assault rifles and M79 grenades from the mosque and killed two more soldiers. As a consequence, Thai troops stormed the mosque and killed all 31 militants. All in all, the battle at Krue Se Mosque and the other separate clashes resulted in the killing of 105 attackers in a single day.⁸⁶

This deliberate use of force and indiscriminate targeting of Muslims deeply angered the Muslim people. However, there were credible reports that pointed to the fact that the “Krue Se incident” was deliberately planned and set up by the insurgents in order to create a social movement. The Krue Se Mosque was chosen because it is the symbol of the former Patani Empire. In a sense, the death of the militants was considered as martyrdom. Even though this incident did not create a lot of protests in the streets, it caused a decline in cooperation between villagers and government officials. Many relatives of the killed militants accused the soldiers and policemen of mass murder.

⁸⁶ International Crisis Group, “Southern Thailand: Insurgency, Not Jihad,” 23.

3. Tak Bai Incidents

Six months later, another incident occurred on October 25, 2004 at Tak Bai district, Narathiwat province. Around 1,500 people gathered in front of a small police station. They gathered supposedly to protest the custody of six village defense volunteers who gave their government-issued weapons to militants. The protesters claimed that the men were innocent and had been detained unjustly. It turned out that many of those who protested did not even know anything about the arrests. Through the use of informal networks, the protesters were encouraged by their friends, village heads, and imams, to join for a host of different reasons.⁸⁷ An international crisis group described the critical moment: ⁸⁸

Around 11:00 a.m., some protesters tried to enter the police station but retreated when soldiers fired warning shots....Demonstrators continued to demand their release and refused to disperse.” and “At around 3:00 p.m., some protesters allegedly tried to break through the police barrier. At this point, General Phisarn gave the order to forcibly disperse the crowd. Fire engines arrived, and about half an hour later, water cannon and tear gas were used to disperse the crowd, which prompted some protesters to throw rocks, bricks and bottles at the police and soldiers. Many people ran to the river to wash off tear gas. Until then, the security forces seemed to be doing their best to control a large and increasingly unruly crowd by peaceful means. But five minutes after the water cannon and tear gas was used, shooting started.

Although without an order to fire, some soldiers opened fire on the crowd, killing seven people. The soldiers ordered protesters to lie face down on the ground and tied their hands behind their backs. Around 1,300 men were loaded into 28 army trucks and taken to the army base in Pattani for questioning. Since the people were piled in the trucks like logs of about five to six layers deep, 78 protesters died of suffocation during the 150 kilometer journey.⁸⁹

Several factors suggest that the protest was organized, and not spontaneous. However, this incident ultimately created discontent to majority of the Muslim people.

⁸⁷ International Crisis Group, “Southern Thailand: Insurgency, Not Jihad,” 27.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 28.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 28-29.

More importantly, it provided the insurgents an adequate master frame to create a social movement aimed at pursuing an Islamic revolution for an independent Pattani. The above event also further strengthened the insurgency and undermined the government's legitimacy. The Thai government did not realize that the adversaries were using tactics to mobilize the people. As a result, the reactive repression applied by the Thai authorities caused more dissatisfaction and violations of human rights which further aggravated the problem.

4. Daily Death Incidents

Since late 2004-2007, there had been “deathly incidents” occurring almost every day in the three southern-most provinces. The insurgents used terror tactics to create fear and chaos. In this decade, insurgents' attacks were more violent and brutal than in the prior three decades. The insurgents' targets were not limited to only soldiers or policemen, but included children, women, teachers and even Buddhist monks. The insurgents used four fundamental kinds of attacks: targeted assassinations, attacks using improvised explosive devices (IEDs) against a range of targets, arson, and harassment of security forces by small groups of gunmen. Since 2004, assassinations have increased from a focus on policemen to include virtually any representatives of the Thai state, whether Buddhist or Muslim. A pattern that insurgents usually use to carry out murder is “gunmen on motorcycle,” as it provides the fastest and safest way to escape. Teachers in government schools also became insurgents' targets because government schools are considered central to the integration of the Malay-Muslim community into the Thai-Buddhist national mainstream. Subsequently, Buddhist monks were murdered as the insurgents wanted to create a rift between Buddhists and Muslims. Violence definitely increased; the insurgents used barbarian methods in killing by beheading. In November 2004, three people were beheaded.

The IEDs were largely used to target security force patrols (roadside bombs), police stations, government offices, railways, and banks, as well as restaurants and bars. The IEDs were ignited by mixed methods: remote control, watches, and manual switches. They were used across the three provinces of Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat, and also in Songkhla province where many tourists congregated. Bombs create psychological effects,

especially “fear.” The insurgents were so evil, they set up “delay bombs” to kill further groups of people/medical/authorities who come into the bomb site to help the victims (from the first bomb). In some places, they set up three or four rounds of bombs and used remote control or manual switches to kill more people.⁹⁰

Arson was often carried out by youngsters who were members of militant support units. Government schools were favored targets. Since 2004, 224 state schools were burned. Arson later expanded to include other government facilities, such as local administrative offices, health clinics, electricity offices, telecommunication infrastructure and public phone booths. The insurgents also set fire to economic targets such as car dealer show-rooms (the same brand name that was used by the authorities), rubber factories, and Thai-Chinese business interests. To harass security forces, the insurgents usually ambushed road patrols with fire arms and IEDs. Sometimes they blew up officials’ vehicles by IED, followed by rifle attacks until the officials were killed and then stole their weapons.⁹¹

From statistics collected within four and a half years of unrest (January 2004 – June 2008), there were 8,178 incidents, 3,017 deaths, and 4,986 injured.⁹² In 2007 only, there were 2,025 incidents, 867 deaths, and 1,720 injured. It seems as if the number of incidents has decreased since September 2007, but the number of deaths did not drop much. The average monthly incidents during January 4, 2004 – Oct 31, 2007, were 153 incidents (5.1 per day), 51 deaths (1.7 per day), and 97 injuries (3.2 per day). Peak incidents occurred from during January 1, 2007 to October 31, 2007 with 212 incidents (7.06 per day), 78 deaths (2.6 per day), and 160 injuries (5.3 per day).⁹³

⁹⁰ Observations derived from author’s mission assignment in the three southernmost provinces, 2006.

⁹¹ Interview with military officials, Bangkok, June 2008.

⁹² Deep South Watch, “Southern Fire: Four and a Half Years,” <http://www.deepsouthwatch.org/index.php?l=content&id=265> (accessed 28 July 2008).

⁹³ Interview with military officials, Bangkok, June 2008.




Figure 3. Number of incidents (January 2004 – January 2007) ⁹⁴




Figure 4. Monthly death toll (January 2004 – June 2008) ⁹⁵

⁹⁴ Source: Deep South Watch, Violence-related Injury Surveillance – March 2008, http://medipe2.psu.ac.th/~vis/report/VIS_Report_Mar08.pdf (accessed August 12, 2008).

⁹⁵ Source: Deep South Watch, <http://www.deepsouthwatch.org/index.php?l=content&id=265> (accessed August 12, 2008).

The number of 3,017 deaths from January 2004 – June 2008 were 63% civilian, 12% military, 10% police, 3% village chief, 8% other government officials, and 4% village volunteers.




Figure 5. Death Statistics (January 2004 – June 2008) ⁹⁶

5. Mobilizing Population

In 2005, many incidents indicated that the separatists were building up networks and successfully mobilizing the Muslim people to protest against the authorities. In 2006, a new pattern of protest emerged, with women leading the actions to demand the release of suspects. The tactic has been used when the government reviewed its policy of refusing bail for suspects in a conflict-related case. In at least seven cases since December 2006, suspects have been freed on bail under the pressure from groups of women numbering about 50-300. These protests, almost certainly organized by militants, also secured a psychological victory against the government.⁹⁷

The groups of women and children also blocked the officials' access to villages and even forced security forces to withdraw. For example, on November 6, 2006, around 300 women and children, mostly trucked in from outside the area, protested at Ban Bajoh school in Yala, accusing the border patrol police stationed there of killing a local man.

⁹⁶ Source: Deep South Watch, <http://www.deepsouthwatch.org/index.php?l=content&id=265> (accessed August 12, 2008).

⁹⁷ International Crisis Group, "Southern Thailand: The Impact of the Coup," *Asia Report No. 129*, (March 15, 2007), 10-12.

Nails were scattered on the road. After about 200 security personnel failed to control the crowd, the authorities agreed to withdraw the 30 border patrol police from the village. Intelligence officials believe that an active women's wing of the separatist movement has cells in hundreds of villages and is deployed systematically for these protests.⁹⁸

The following are some details about the protests during 2004-2007:⁹⁹

- October 25, 2004: around 1500 protestors demanded release of detainees at Tak Bai district, Narathiwat.
- August 28, 2005: around 200 protestors (with women and children) accused officials of shooting a man to death at Lahal village.
- September 20, 2005: around 200 protestors (with women and children) accused soldiers of shooting a man dead and injuring four at the tea shop at Tanyong Limor village.
- February 9, 2006: 100 protestors demanded the release of detainees at Daruliesan village.
- May 19, 2006: 500 protestors demanded the release of detainees at Kujinreupa village.
- November 6, 2002: around 300 protestors (with women and children) accused border patrol police of killing a local man at Ban Bajoh school in Yala, and demanded the withdrawal of 30 border patrol police from the village.
- November 20, 2006: 100 protestors (with women and children) demanded the withdrawal of border patrol police from Sapong village.
- November 21, 2006: 200 protestors (with women and children) demanded the withdrawal of paramilitaries from Koraemae village.
- November 22, 2006: 300 protested as a man was shot to death by officials at Sa Koe village (extra judicial killing upon arrest).
- November 22, 2006: 100 protestors (with woman and children) demanded the withdrawal of security forces from Bunnag Sata district, Yala.
- November 23, 2006: 60 protestors were protesting as a man was killed by officials at Tharn Toe village (extra judicial killing).
- January 4, 2007: 150 protestors (with woman and children) demanded the release of detainees from Ka Pho district, Pattani.
- January 26, 2007: 40 protestors (with woman and children) demanded the release of detainees in Yala district, Yala.

⁹⁸ International Crisis Group, "Southern Thailand: The Impact of the Coup," *Asia Report No.129*, (March 15, 2007), 10-12.

⁹⁹The Royal Thai Army Military Intelligence.

With this kind of situation, there is a need to exercise the utmost care in handling the problems. In addition, this situation seemed to be more complex and posed a high risk. The police were frustrated by their inability to respond more effectively to the protests. They were afraid that a Tak Bai-like incident might occur again, so they were forced to release suspects on bail even if some of them escaped and never returned for judicial action.

6. BRN-Coordinate: The “Seven-Step Plan” Towards the Liberation of Patani Darussalam

On May 1, 2003, Thai authorities searched the house of Masae U-seng, a BRN-Coordinate’s core member and teacher at Sampan Wittaya School in Narathiwat province and found important documents about the structure of the United Front Council (*Dewan Pimpinan Parti – DPP*) and the seven-step plan towards the liberation of Patani Darussalam. Military intelligence believed that the president of the United Front Council was Sapaeing Basau, former principle of Dhamma Wittaya School in Yala province. The DPP has two parts: a higher level – policy/administrative and a lower level – local practices. The higher level consisted of a president and vice president and foreign affairs leader, military affairs leader, youth affairs leader, economic affairs leader, public relations affairs leader, and religious affairs leader. The DPP divided the southern border area into three zones, each zone with three kinds of forces – city forces, village forces, and jungle forces. The authorities believed that BRN-Coordinate was the lead organization and controlled all activities, while the GMIP and New PULO supported their men and equipment, especially with weapons and explosives. From interrogated detained insurgents, it was learned that the insurgency groups convened in late 2003 to coordinate their activities such as recruiting more members, weapons training, acquiring more equipment and planning to revolt in 2005, according to the seven-step plan towards the liberation of Patani Darussalam. But they were not ready and needed to shift the plan to revolt in 2007 instead.¹⁰⁰

¹⁰⁰ Interview with military intelligence, Bangkok, June 2008.

The plan can be summarized as follows:¹⁰¹

- Creating public awareness of Islam (religion), Malay (nationality) and the Patani homeland; the invasion/occupation (by the Thai state); and the struggle for independence.
- Creating mass support through religious teaching at various levels, including *tadika* (Koranic elementary schools), *ponoh* (Islamic boarding schools), private Islamic colleges and through various Islamic committees.
- Setting up secretive organizational structures and the BRN will back up and help in the establishment.
- Recruiting and training of ethnic Malay Muslim youth to become militant, aiming to have 300 well-trained, 3,000 trained, and 30,000 ethical members.
- Building nationalism by focusing on ethnic Malay Muslims. Patani's people must be fighters/warriors, including people who are government officials or live in Malaysia.
- Launching attacks by 30,000 youth militants, 3,000 youth commandos, and 300 cadre, almost all funded by donations from charity.
- Setting the stage for revolution by establishing a power within the military, the political mass (people), and the economy, in order to achieve self-reliance.

In launching an attack, the insurgents plan to attack government targets in every zone as much as they can. They wish for the media to report the news globally. The insurgents also want the UN, international government organizations, and NGOs to become involved and solve the problem similarly to their actions in East Timor and Aceh in Indonesia. Finally, the insurgents think that, ultimately, there will be a demand for a referendum and that there is a chance for Patani Darussalam to achieve its autonomy or separation.¹⁰²

7. Almost Losing the War

In order to counter the insurgency, the government established the Southern Border Provinces Peace-Building Command (SBPPC) and National Reconciliation in late 2004. The SBPPC acts as a joint command & control for inter-government agencies in the South, focusing on military operations and southern border region development,

¹⁰¹ Surichai, eds., *Origin of Southern Fire*, 228-229.

¹⁰² Interview with military intelligence, Bangkok, June 2008.

while the National Reconciliation focuses on the peace process. However, the SBPPC has faced many obstacles since the beginning, such as the frequent changeover of the Director of the Command, frequent changing of the organizational structure, and inconsistencies in personnel. When violence increases, there have been discrepancies between the SBPPC and the National Reconciliation. Besides, Thaksin's administration always treated the problem in a hard handed way, which caused more discontent in Muslim people in the South.

As people are considered as center of gravity in a war by insurgency, the insurgents are not only trying to influence the people with propaganda and coercion, but also attempting to create a rift between the Thai Buddhists and Thai Muslims in the region. It seems that the government did not have any "preemption plan" to deal with this kind of problem. The government usually reacts indiscriminately and sometimes with low-legitimacy. As violence escalated, the Buddhist church and Buddhist monks became targets of the insurgents. Many government schools (Buddhist schools) was burned, teachers were assassinated. The insurgents also coerced Buddhist to leave the three provinces by killing and vandalizing properties. The insurgents continued killing local people who cooperated with the authorities. Many people became fearful and were under the insurgents' influence. A counter-insurgency by means of obtaining valuable intelligence from local people seems to be very difficult. Soldiers and police were attacked by IEDs ambushes. There were bombs everywhere. The loss of lives and properties has increased, yet the government seems to be unable to correct the situation.

III. THE COUNTERINSURGENCY MODEL

There are some counterinsurgency models that can be used as principles. Each model provides a guide for implementation in a counterinsurgency. The model in this chapter has some similarities and some difference in context which have been modified to fit the nature of each insurgency. Yet, although insurgencies in many places look alike, they are not the same. Each has different backgrounds, grievances, and internal and external environmental factors that shape their unique characteristics. Thus, an insurgency that occurs in a different place, time, and circumstance may not fit the exact models in this chapter. However, this chapter will give a fundamental overview of various counterinsurgency models and discuss in later chapters the using each of these models for the counterinsurgency in southern Thailand.

A. THE DIAMOND MODEL

The Diamond Model was developed by Dr. Gordon McCormick of the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS). The Diamond Model illustrates interactions between a host-nation government, the insurgents, the local populace, and international actors or sponsors. In this concept, people are the center of gravity. The state needs to build legitimacy and control over the population to include focus on the people's needs and security. Substantial information derived from the people about the insurgency will support the state in targeting the insurgents' infrastructure, safe havens, and support. Ultimately, this model can help planners develop a coherent and holistic counter insurgency effort.

Dr. McCormick also mentioned the consensus-control theory in his course on "Seminar in Guerrilla Warfare." This theory is an important tool for conquering the insurgents. In insurgency warfare, the state and the counter-state need to have a mass support base (people) in order to win the war. They are competing to seize the support of the population. For the state, policies that meet the expectations of the people in order to

gain legitimacy are needed. The theory says that the degree of control is dependent on the consensus that a group has on the population.¹⁰³ For example, a high degree of consensus by a government on its people translates to a high degree of control.




Figure 6. Consensus – Control Model ¹⁰⁴

The ability of the government to establish control over a population and a territory enhances its legitimacy. When a government is perceived as legitimate, it would be very difficult for an insurgent group to diminish that legitimacy. On the other hand, an insurgent group similarly establishes consensus from a population in order to gain support. The insurgents could build master frames by exploiting the grievances of the people. In this way, insurgents attempt to sway the support of the people from the government to their insurgent group.

According to McCormick, at the beginning, a counter state or insurgent group is usually a small group of people. This lack of forces is their disadvantage. Yet, this disadvantage can be compensated for by recruiting new members and sympathy from the population. Although the state has advantages of military strength, it has a disadvantage in intelligence which blinds the state to the enemy's movements. The first step (1) of the insurgent group is to do everything possible, such as exploiting grievances or using

¹⁰³ Gordon McCormick, Lecture on Guerilla Warfare Course, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, July 2007.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

coercion, to control and manipulate the population (see Figure 7). If this stage is successful, the counter state will gain support (people, guns, and money) which will enhance the growth of the counter state.




Figure 7. Sequence of Counter State ¹⁰⁵

The second stage (2) of the insurgent group's development involves trying to bargain with the state's control, break down connections and relationships between the state and the population. This can be accomplished by propaganda or threatening the people to not cooperate with the authorities. In the third stage (3), the insurgents use violence in operations, which may begin on a small scale such as assassination or ambushes, to attack the state's officials. The insurgents may launch a large attack on the government when they are strong enough to do so, or when the government becomes weaker.

Now, in countering, if the government loses the population's support, it will be difficult to win the battle. However, many states or military leaders usually think that they must attack the insurgents first (1) to win the war, and focus on the population later (see Figure 8). The more the state focuses on finding, following, and finishing the insurgents, the more time is lost with a low rate of capture or killing of the insurgents. The insurgents are much more difficult to find than an enemy in conventional warfare. The government will spend years and years attempting to find the enemy and will ultimately fail.

¹⁰⁵ Source: Gordon McCormick, Lecture on Guerilla Warfare Course, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, July 2007.




Figure 8. Incorrect State Counter ¹⁰⁶

With this kind of approach, it is very difficult for the state to succeed. The state cannot “see” the counter state and consequently is unable to destroy its forces. The government’s frustration in failing to find the enemy will pose a potential risk to innocent people; the state may resort to human rights abuse, torture, the capturing of the wrong people and, in the worst case, killing innocent people. These are caused by a lack of substantial information needed to identify the insurgent group’s members.

In insurgency warfare, populations are the key to solving insurgency problems because people “see” the insurgents. People are the bridge by which the state can “meet” the insurgents. People own information about the insurgents that the government needs. Thus, the correct way to deal with an insurgency problem is (1), for the state to focus on the population first, and (2), while trying to control the situation and mitigate insurgency incidents, the state must sever the links between the population and the counter state. When the insurgents become weaker because of losing population support and information about the insurgents is known, the state will then be able to (3), attack the insurgents and win the war (see Figure 9).

¹⁰⁶ Source: Gordon McCormick, Lecture on Guerilla Warfare Course, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, July 2007.




Figure 9. Correct State Counter ¹⁰⁷

Sometimes, there is external support involved with the counter state which definitely strengthens the insurgency. The external support can be from other insurgency groups, bandit organizations, rogue states, or international terrorist/insurgency groups. Besides, the international community, religious organizations or nations may sympathize with the insurgents if the government brutally suppresses the insurgents or carries out mass murders without discriminating between the people and the insurgents.

The state needs to determine if the insurgency has external support or not. If an external sponsor is involved, the state should attack the conduits which pour in finance and supplies to the insurgents. Meanwhile, the state must build legitimacy in the eyes of these international actors or partner nations. If the insurgents received external support from a rogue state, the state might attack that rogue state and sever links between the insurgents and the rogue state at the same time. Figure 10 illustrates the sequence of a state's operations which can be performed by dealing with international actors first and cutting off links later, or cutting off the link first, and dealing with international actors later, or doing both at the same time and then attacking the counter state last.

¹⁰⁷ Source: Gordon McCormick, Lecture on Guerilla Warfare Course, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, July 2007.




Figure 10. External Support from International Actors.¹⁰⁸

Furthermore, in dealing with international actors, the state needs to implement diplomatic operations to gain support from other governments, non-government organizations, or international organizations. Collaboration between neighbors, such as by sealing borders, will definitely weaken the insurgents.

Finally, if all figures are connected, the “Diamond Model” will emerge and can be used to explain the principle of counterinsurgency. This diagram is relatively easy to understand and contains all the key players of insurgency warfare. It obviously can help planners develop a logical and holistic counter insurgency effort (see Figure 11).

¹⁰⁸ Source: Gordon McCormick, Lecture on Guerilla Warfare Course, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, July 2007.




Figure 11. The Diamond Model ¹⁰⁹

B. STRATEGIC COUNTERINSURGENCY MODELING

In 2005, Colonel Eric P. Wendt wrote “Strategic Counterinsurgency Modeling.” ¹¹⁰ In his article he mentioned several important factors needed by a counterinsurgency. These include the military component forces, accuracy assessment, and proper use of national power in its various forms— military, informational, diplomatic, law-enforcement, intelligence, financial and economic – or MIDLIFE. The combination of these factors is a powerful tool to increase consensus and control of the population, obtain vital information, sever links between the insurgents and the people, and finally enable the state to capture or kill the insurgents.

1. COIN Military Components

The COIN Military Components are based partially on operations during the Malayan insurgency (1948-1960). The first component is the constabulary force. The

¹⁰⁹ Source: Gordon McCormick, Lecture on Guerilla Warfare Course, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, July 2007.

¹¹⁰ Colonel Eric P. Wendt, “Strategic Counterinsurgency Modeling”, *Special Warfare magazine*, (September 2005), <http://www.soc.mil/swcs/swmag/05sep.pdf> (accessed September 25, 2008).

constabulary force needs to live and operate in the local area with the people. Special Forces soldiers (SF) are ideal for leading the constabulary force because of their special skill in communicating with people, their cultural awareness, their local language capabilities, and their light-infantry skills that allow the SF detachments to defend themselves for a short period of time. The mission of the constabulary is to stay in the local area, get to know the people, observe the people's movements, develop small human intelligence networks, and small SWAT-type teams that can target members of the insurgent infrastructure once they have been identified and exposed.

The constabulary force also conducts population and resource control (PRC) measures. The constabulary has to make sure that PRC measures are proportionate to the level of insurgent movement in a local area. If an area is heavily influenced by insurgents, the constabulary must use rigorous PRC measures such as registration and pass systems at checkpoints, and search suspected residences. However, if conducting strict measures for a long time will cause negative effects on the population, some measures must be lifted when the situation permits. Sometimes, the conventional forces are needed to establish local control before and while the constabulary conducts its work in an area with the deepest insurgent support. Once the constabulary begins operations, all military forces operating in the constabulary's area of operations should fall under the constabulary's operational control for unity of command and unity of effort.




Figure 12. Wendt's Three Desired COIN Military Components ¹¹¹

The second component of COIN is the quick-reaction force (QRF). The QRF must be able to aid the constabulary force as soon as possible when it is attacked. The QRF may stay near or between villages and keep radio contact with the constabulary force 24 hours a day. The QRF should be skilled in offensive urban operations, have high mobility and be ready to operate by day or night. Rangers, Marines, SEALs, and Stryker units are ideal QRF elements.

The movement-to-contact (MTC) force is the final component of the model. Wendt explained that:

Ideally, the MTC force operates along the seams of constabulary AOs and along key avenues of enemy external support (country borders, inbound flow from sanctuaries, etc.). Its mission is to gain and maintain contact with the enemy outside the areas in which the constabularies are working. Relentless in nature, the MTC force must move aggressively and continuously, forcing the enemy to either engage or move. Host-state or U.S. conventional infantry, armor and aviation forces are superb tools for the MTC force.¹¹²

¹¹¹ Source: Colonel Eric P. Wendt, "Strategic Counterinsurgency Modeling", *Special Warfare magazine*, (September 2005), <http://www.soc.mil/swcs/swmag/05sep.pdf> (accessed September 25, 2008), 7.

¹¹² Ibid.

In counterinsurgency action, once the MTC force engages the insurgents, the insurgents might retreat to a place where they can get support. The MTC might pursue them along with the constabulary force which keeps watch over an area and will detect the insurgents' force that comes into a village to hide or obtain logistical support. This will enable the security force to capture or kill the insurgents. If the insurgent force is too robust, the MTC or the constabulary force will call the QRF for assistance. The three components must operate in an area until there is no insurgent movement which means the area is "under control."

Normally, there are many areas which have been under the influence of the insurgents. In order to expand the control area, Wendt suggests that the three component forces should initiate in one area and then slowly build and expand to geographically linked areas rather than to geographically separate areas. However, it is important to remember that the QRF and MTC forces are supporting efforts. The constabulary element, which specifically targets the infrastructure, must provide the main effort.

2. MIDLIFE, Assumptions

According to Wendt, elements of national power consist of the military, informational, diplomatic, law-enforcement, intelligence, financial and economic, or MIDLIFE. To conquer the insurgents, these assets must be used as counterinsurgencies in both direct and indirect approaches. Following the principle of the "Diamond Model," the planner should consider how to use these assets effectively along with Leg 1 to Leg 5 in the Diamond Model. For example, in Leg 1 (actions of the state to the people), the planner has to think about what kind of military actions will help increase legitimacy and control between the government and the people.

In informational actions, the planner must consider how the message can reach the target audience. As Wendt stated about informational actions:

How can the message be translated? By radio? By television? Does the population have television sets? Is the population literate? Can local newspapers be used, or should cartoons be developed that will inform an illiterate population? These questions continue in exhaustive detail until

the list of feasible informational actions is developed. Next come diplomatic actions, and so on, until the entire analysis of MIDLIFE assets for Leg 1 of the diamond is complete.¹¹³

In Leg 2, similarly, the planner should consider MIDLIFE elements, one at a time, to determine what method or tools can be used to sever links between the insurgents and the population and then produce a list of possible actions. The same method should be applied to legs 3, 4, and 5 of the Diamond Model. At the end, Wendt explains that:

The planning is exhaustive, the lists of feasible actions for each element of national power are long, and the planning group must not take shortcuts. This methodology should be applied for all five legs of the diamond, methodically and sequentially, war-gaming every element of MIDLIFE against each leg of the diamond....Once MIDLIFE actions of each individual diamond leg have been identified, they should be war-gamed to determine the effects that actions taken in one area will have on other legs of the diamond. Once this dynamic phase of war-gaming is complete, we will have a list of untailed but feasible actions that address the MIDLIFE spectrum.¹¹⁴

3. Accurate Assessment

The need for accurate assessment is also found in Col. Wendt's article "Strategic Counterinsurgency Modeling." In it, he stresses that it is important to know exactly what the people need in order to effectively tailor national resources into a specific area. In order to know the people's needs and obtain correct information in an area, the most important thing that the government must have are assessment teams. Accurate assessment and the correct kind of national asset support will improve the situation and finally help the government to control the area. Wendt explains that:

The best way to tailor resources for local implementation is to conduct a census and an assessment of each area identified as an area of active or passive insurgent support. Broad, national-level census and assessments are not sufficient; local census and assessments must be conducted so that

¹¹³ Colonel Eric P. Wendt, "Strategic Counterinsurgency Modeling", *Special Warfare magazine*, (September 2005), <http://www.soc.mil/swcs/swmag/05sep.pdf> (accessed September 25, 2008), 9.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 10.

area-specific results can be captured....Intelligence gathering from the populace will vary from village to village and neighborhood to neighborhood. Therefore, localized assessments are a must.¹¹⁵

Thus, in order to obtain an accurate assessment, assessment teams that operate in the local area of assessment are needed. In this case, the SF team working as the constabulary force in the village should be an ideal assessment team. In conducting assessment in a host state, the assessment team must know well the local language, customs, and culture in that area. Additional requirements for the assessment team are expertise in different areas: for example, engineers to assess bridges, wells, roads and other structures; doctors to assess medical needs ranging from dentistry and veterinary medicine, to food storage and hygiene.

Another necessary element in conducting assessment is an assessment tool. Planners have to develop an assessment tool that will provide the “ground truth,” which is needed to apply feasible MIDLIFE actions. Wendt explains that:

To develop the assessment tool, planners start with the list of untailed but feasible MIDLIFE actions. Then, for each feasible action, they develop a list of questions and further indicators that will show the best way of locally tailoring and applying local MIDLIFE-resource carrots and sticks.”¹¹⁶ Wendt also said that “When the assessment tool is complete, it is distributed to the assessment teams throughout the entire insurgent area. Each team will answer the questions in detail and return the assessment. Consolidating and tabulating the data from the teams produces a matrix that compares assessed areas throughout the insurgent battlespace.”¹¹⁷

Information derived from an assessment team by this method is essential and able to provide the ground truth. If the government fails to obtain and use ground truth, the misapplication of resources will result. The assessment should not be conducted only one time, but periodically, which allows the officials to observe and act on any changes.

¹¹⁵ Colonel Eric P. Wendt, “Strategic Counterinsurgency Modeling”, *Special Warfare magazine*, (September 2005), <http://www.soc.mil/swcs/swmag/05sep.pdf> (accessed September 25, 2008), 10.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., 11.

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

C. OEF – PHILIPPINES

Operations Enduring Freedom – Philippines (OEF-P) is found in Colonel Gregory Wilson’s article “Anatomy of a Successful COIN Operation: OEF-Philippines and The Indirect Approach.”¹¹⁸ The OEF-P was a successful operation against Abu Sayyaf on Basilan Island in 2002, led by Brigadier General Donald Wurster and Colonel David Fridovich. The OEF-P planners created their guiding strategy using principles from the Diamond Model of Dr. Gordon McCormick. The OEF-P focused on three interconnected lines of operation: building Philippine Armed Forces (AFP) capacity, focused civil-military operations, and information operations (IO). This operation has come to be known as the “Basilan Model.” Wilson describes the general information on Basilan Island as follows:

Basilan Island is located 1,000 kilometers south of Manila at the northern tip of the Sulu Archipelago in the war-torn Southern Philippines. Basilan is 1,372 square kilometers in size and home to a population of just over 300,000 people. As the northernmost island in the Sulu Archipelago, Basilan is strategically located. It has traditionally served as the jumping-off point or fallback position for terrorists operating in Central Mindanao, and its Christian population has long been prey to Muslim kidnapping gangs. In the 1990s, Abu Sayyaf established a base of operations there and began a reign of terror that left government forces struggling to maintain security as they pursued an elusive enemy.¹¹⁹

In October 2001, the U.S. Pacific Command deployed a Special Forces assessment team to the Southern Philippines. The team assessed an area and collected all necessary information in the local area (village level) about people, terrain, infrastructure, economics, education, government services, and enemy situation. This vital information allowed planners to know details of the area of operations and the terrorists/separatists’ movements. These assessments also provided critical information concerning the root causes of civil unrest at the village level.

¹¹⁸ Colonel Gregory Wilson, “Anatomy of a Successful COIN Operation: OEF-Philippines and the Indirect Approach”, *Military Review*, (November-December 2006).

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 6.

The OEF-P planners and the Philippine team worked closely together, which enabled them to facilitate problems arising from multi-agency planning and synchronization. They applied principles from the Diamond Model and laid out three interconnected lines of operation consisting of, building the Philippine Armed Forces' (AFP) capacity, while focusing on both civil-military operations and information operations (IO). These lines of operation helped the Philippines security forces operate more effectively. These operations aimed to increase legitimacy and control of the region, reduce the insurgents' local support, deny the insurgents' sanctuaries, and disrupt the insurgents' operations.

The United States dispatched the Joint Task Force (JTF)-510, comprised of 1,300 U.S. troops, to the Southern Philippines in February 2002. The decisive weapon of the U.S. was 160 Special Forces soldiers. The SF teams, with their language and cultural skills, worked smoothly with the AFP military counterparts and local villagers. The first and important goal was to establish a secure environment and protect the local populace. The SF teams trained and built up the AFP capacity, and accompanying units (as advisers only) on combat operations. The AFP increased patrolling in the area, which enabled them to seize the initiative from the insurgents. The team realized that the foundation for all other activities was to reestablish security and protect the Basilan people.

After security was established, the civic-action projects started working which targeted meeting the basic needs of the local population based on assessment results. Later, the U.S. Naval Construction Task Group deployed to the island to execute larger scale projects. Humanitarian and civic-action projects on Basilan improved the image of the AFP and the Manila government. When security in the area was improved, villagers became more comfortable and openly shared information on the local situation with the AFP and U.S. forces.

During OEF-P in Basilan, intelligence collection and sharing was also critical to the operation. The SF advisers conducted extensive information collection activities to gain situational awareness. The SF shared intelligence with the AFP and developed a clearer picture of the insurgents' organizational structure. Some important information on

Abu Sayyaf was derived from the local people. This intelligence was used to conduct later combat operations against the Abu Sayyaf. As Wilson describes,

By August 2002, just six months later, the synergistic effects of security, improved AFP military capability, and focused civil-military operations had isolated the insurgents from their local support networks. As the security situation on Basilan continued to improve, doctors, teachers, and other professional workers who had fled the island began to return, and the Philippine Government, the U.S. Agency for International Development's Growth with Equity in Mindanao Program, the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao, and various non-governmental organizations brought in additional resources to further address the root causes of the civil unrest.¹²⁰

After the successful operation on Basilan Island, the U.S. reorganized the JTF-510 into a much leaner organization called the Joint Special Operations Task Force, Philippines (JSOTF-P), which assisted the AFP to operate against terrorism in Central Mindanao and Sulu Island. The SF advisory teams advised and assisted AFP units in planning and fusing all sources of intelligence to battle insurgent/terrorist organizations. There was also increasing use of information operations (IO). The JSOTF-P was able to create stability in the region and received a warm welcome from the local people of the southern Philippines.

D. ASYMMETRIC CONFLICT

In 2001, Ivan Arreguin-Toft wrote an article "How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict."¹²¹ His article states that when the strong meet the weak in asymmetric armed conflict, strategy is more important than power. His studies showed that not only did weak actors have sporadic successes in asymmetric conflicts, but also that the trend of their successes was increasing. Arreguin-Toft argues that "the best predictor of asymmetric conflict outcomes is strategic interaction."¹²²

¹²⁰ Colonel Gregory Wilson, "Anatomy of a Successful COIN Operation: OEF-Philippines and the Indirect Approach", *Military Review*, (November-December 2006), 8.

¹²¹ Ivan Arreguin-Toft, "How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict," *International Security*, (Volume 26, Number 1, Summer 2001).

¹²² *Ibid.*, 95.

The author states a strong actor uses attack strategies, direct attack and barbarism. The weak actor uses defense strategies, direct defense and guerrilla warfare strategy. Arreguin-Toft states that:

The universe of potential strategies and counterstrategies can be reduced to two distinct ideal-type strategic approaches: direct and indirect. Direct approaches target an adversary’s armed forces in order to destroy that adversary’s capacity to fight. Indirect approaches seek to destroy an adversary’s will to fight.¹²³

Arreguin-Toft adds that, “In asymmetric conflict, the longer a war drags on, the greater the chances are that the strong actor will simply abandon the war effort, regardless of the military state of affairs on the ground.”¹²⁴

Arreguin-Toft’s case studies in asymmetric conflict which date from the early 19th century to the end of the Cold War show that, “First, weak actors were victorious in nearly 30 percent of all asymmetric wars....Second, weak actors have won with increasing frequency over time,”¹²⁵ as shown in Figure 13.




Figure 13. Percentage of Asymmetric Conflict Victories by Type of Actor in Four Fifty-Year Periods ¹²⁶

¹²³ Ivan Arreguin-Toft, “How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict,” *International Security*, (Volume 26, Number 1, Summer 2001), 105.

¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ Ibid., 96.

¹²⁶ Ibid., 97.

Intuition might tell us that a strong actor’s power should overcome weak actors, but Arreguin-Toft notes that “history suggests otherwise.”¹²⁷ In his study of strategic interaction and conflict outcomes, there are five hypotheses:¹²⁸

Hypothesis 1: When strong actors attack using a direct strategy and weak actors defend using a direct strategy, all other things being equal, strong actors should win quickly and decisively.

Hypothesis 2: When strong actors attack with a direct strategy and weak actors defend using an indirect strategy, all other things being equal, weak actors should win.

Hypothesis 3: When strong actors attack using an indirect strategy and weak actors defend using a direct strategy, all other things being equal, strong actors should lose.

Hypothesis 4: When strong actors employ barbarism to attack weak actors defending with guerrilla warfare strategy (GWS), all other things being equal, strong actors should win.

Hypothesis 5: Strong actors are more likely to win same-approach interactions and lose opposite-approach interactions.

| | | Weak-Actor Strategic Approach | |
|--|----------|--------------------------------------|--------------|
| | | Direct | Indirect |
| Strong-Actor Strategic Approach | Direct | Strong actor | Weak actor |
| | Indirect | Weak actor | Strong actor |

Figure 14. Arreguin-Toft’s Expected Effect of Strategic Interaction on Conflict Outcomes (expected winners in cells) ¹²⁹

¹²⁷ Ivan Arreguin-Toft, “How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict,” 94.

¹²⁸ Ibid., 107.

¹²⁹ Source: Ibid., 108.

In the process of his research, he tested this hypothesis against 196 historical cases of asymmetric conflict. His summary of that research to support strategic interaction theory is a feasible analysis tool. The results show strong support for his thesis. Strong actors lose asymmetric conflicts when they adopt the wrong strategy vis-à-vis their weaker adversaries. Same approach interactions – whether direct-direct or indirect-indirect – favor strong actors because they imply shared values, aims, and victory conditions. Opposite-approach interactions – whether direct-indirect or indirect-direct – favor weak actors because they sacrifice values for time.

This analysis suggests key policy implications for both weak and strong actors. For weak actors, successful defense against strong actors depends on an indirect strategy. Because indirect strategies such as guerrilla warfare strategy (GWS) rely on social support, weak actors must work tirelessly to gain and maintain the sympathy or consent of a majority of the population. For strong actors, the strategic interaction thesis suggests that weak adversaries employing an indirect defense will be difficult to defeat. In the end, Arreguin-Toft suggests that:

An ideal U.S. strategic response in an asymmetric conflict therefore demands two central elements: (1) preparation of public expectations for a long war despite U.S. technological and material advantages, and (2) the development and deployment of armed forces specifically equipped and trained for COIN operations....The United States must be prepared to fight and win both conventional and asymmetric or “small” wars. The strategic interaction thesis shows why the two missions demand two kinds of armed forces: one to defend U.S. interests in conventional wars, and one to defend them in asymmetric wars.¹³⁰

E. THE MALAYAN EMERGENCY

Three years after the end of WWII, Malaya faced an internal insurgency conducted by the Malayan Communist Party (MPC). It took twelve years for the United Kingdom and the Government of Malaya (U.K. /GOM) to ultimately win the war in 1960. The Malayan Emergency is a very interesting case study and definitely a good

¹³⁰ Ivan Arreguin-Toft, “How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict,” 123.

model for counterinsurgency. The following brief story of The Malayan Emergency is based on R. W. Komer's book, *The Malayan Emergency in retrospect: organization of a successful counterinsurgency effort*.¹³¹

From the reading, we learned that in 1930, the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) was founded and most of their members were ethnic Chinese. During WWII, the MCP formed the Malayan Peoples' Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA) to fight against Japanese troops. At the war's end, the British reestablished their control of the country in September 1945. There was a discrepancy between the MPAJA and the British. The MPAJA's leader, Chin Peng, turned the MPAJA back to the MCP and aimed to bring down the government.

In 1947, the MCP was gaining control of the Pan-Malayan Federation of Trade Unions and led 291 strikes. As the resistance was escalating; the MCP turned its attention to terror. During October 1945 – December 1947, there were 191 murders and abductions by insurgents; during only the first six months of 1948, there were 107.¹³² In the first week of June 1948, seven persons were killed and ten wounded in a riot. An atmosphere of bitterness and defiance grew rapidly. On June 19, 1948, three European plantation owners were killed. Under considerable pressure from the situation, the United Kingdom and the Government of Malaya (U.K./GOM) declared a State of Emergency.

The MPC's guerrilla forces estimate, in the early years, was around 12,000 equipped with rifles, pistols, and light automatic weapons – largely from wartime British supply drops during WWII. The guerrillas lacked a radio which made them highly dependent on very slow courier communication.¹³³ Their movements were on a systematic strategy of a classic Maoist pattern. Supporting the guerrillas was the Min Yuen (or People's Movement) organized clandestinely cell by cell, largely in the Chinese squatter villages. The guerrillas operated largely in the jungle. In late 1949 and 1950, insurgent incidents rose sharply. In October 1951, the British High Commissioner, Sir Henry Gurney, was assassinated.

¹³¹ R. W. Komer, *The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect: Organization of a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort*, (Santa Monica: Rand Corp, 1972).

¹³² *Ibid.*, 5.

¹³³ *Ibid.*, 8.

1. The British/Malayan Response

The British had several important factors working for them from the outset. As Komer describes in his book, there were five significant factors that gave advantage to the government:¹³⁴ first, long experience of the British in Malaya – knowledge of the country, control of influence over the local government, and traditional local respect for impartial justice under rule of law. Second, a workable administrative structure – well organized territorial machinery with a long tradition was in place before the insurgency; both army and police had mostly British officers. Third, Malay loyalty – Malaya’s 49 percent Malay population firmly supported the government. Much anti-Chinese sentiment existed, and a 12 percent Indian population crucially weakened the insurgents’ popular appeal. Fourth, anti-colonialism was not a major issue – early independence for Malaya was not in doubt, the GOM in 1948 being Malayanized, which definitely took the insurgent movement of this element of appeal. Fifth, economic constraints – the U.K./GOM was almost bankrupt after WWII, and needed to choose a long-haul, low-cost counterinsurgency strategy with the maximum use of locally available assets.

During the early years (1948-1950), the U.K./GOM response was quite inadequate, and it looked as though they were losing. The unified top-level command was lacking good intelligence; guerrilla contacts largely failed. Coordination between the military and police was still poor. Komer quotes Clutterbuck’s description of the early years saying:

The soldiers and police were killing guerrillas at a steady 50 or 60 a month, and getting 20 or 30 surrenders, but the Communists were more than making up for this by good recruiting.... The guerrillas were murdering more than 100 men a month, and the police seemed powerless to prevent it...There was a growing danger that the police and the civilian population would lose confidence in the government and conclude that the guerrillas in the end must win....The main reason why we were losing was that the guerrillas could get all the support they need – food, clothing, information, and recruits – from the squatters.¹³⁵

¹³⁴ R. W. Komer, *The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect: Organization of a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort*, (Santa Monica: Rand Corp, 1972), 12-14.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, 18.

In 1950, Lieutenant General Sir Harold Briggs became Director of Operations. He was the former commanding general in Burma and had experience in guerrilla warfare. He developed what is known as the “Briggs Plan,” which, with later modifications, lasted throughout the Emergency. His plan included: ¹³⁶

- separating the guerrillas from the people
- formalizing and strengthening the COIN management system
- strengthening intelligence as the key to anti-guerrilla operations
- deploying the security forces on a primarily territorial basis ¹³⁷

Briggs favored distributing a brigade to each state and a company or so per district for small-unit operations instead of the heavy emphasis on large troop sweeps. After Briggs retired in November 1951, General Sir Gerald Templer was appointed Director of Operations.

2. Role of the Police

The police played a key role in providing local security, enforcing the rule of law, and acquiring intelligence. In 1948, the police force was weak and inadequate. Most of the police were Malay with a small number of British officers. Chinese speakers were needed but lacking; in 1947 the force had only 24 Chinese inspectors and 204 policemen.¹³⁸ When the Emergency was declared in 1948, the first major step was to expand the police force and also create large paramilitary forces. Because the U.K./GOM wanted quality officers rather than quantity, an extensive new training program was developed, with emphasis on civil police duties and good relations with the populace. By the end of 1952, the police force had risen to some 28,000 – including 2,488 Chinese.¹³⁹ Komer states that:

¹³⁶ Komer, 19.

¹³⁷ Briggs gave first priority to a massive scheme for resettling the 500,000 Chinese squatters in “new villages” where they could be better protected and more closely watched and far better cared for.

¹³⁸ Komer, 38.

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*, 38-39.

In the early days the weakly manned village police post became a favorite target of guerrilla groups. But these posts were to be quickly strengthened. Gradually the local security force in each Chinese village came to be a police post of ten to twelve Malay constables, supported by a part-time Home Guard of about thirty-five men, of whom normally five were on duty patrolling the perimeter at night. Most villages also had a Chinese Special Branch sergeant....In 1949 the police also formed their own platoon-size 'jungle squads' for jungle patrolling – a total of 253 by the end of that year. These men later were organized into a Police Field Force of about three thousand, specially trained to man posts in the deep jungle. The police conducted a significant proportion of total patrols and ambushes, perhaps as many as a third of the total.¹⁴⁰

There was a need to reinforce the police in their local security role, thus special constables groups were formed and received training. The number of special constables rose to 40,000 by the end of 1951 and was kept stabilized.¹⁴¹ Komer states:

Their chief role was local protection of mines and plantations. As security improved, many of the special constables were later organized into Area Security Units of twenty-one men whose primary task was enforcing food control, and Police Special Squads whose role was reconnaissance and patrol for the District Special Branch Officer. They were completely phased out in 1960.¹⁴²

In September 1950, General Briggs created the volunteer, part-time Home Guard as part of his squatter resettlement program. In late 1951, the number of Home Guard had reached 99,000 men. A three-phase training program was launched and in the final phase, the guards could be armed – usually with shotguns. The Home Guard operated under the police; its roles were very useful. By 1953, some 50,000 Chinese were serving in it and protecting their own villages.¹⁴³

During 1948-1950, good intelligence was lacking. Little was known about the insurgency's order of battle or command structure. Thus, in August 1948, a Malayan

¹⁴⁰ Komer, 39.

¹⁴¹ Ibid., 40.

¹⁴² Ibid.

¹⁴³ Ibid., 41.

Special Branch was reestablished under the Deputy Commissioner of Police. There was also a Chinese contingent in the Special Branch. The Chinese contingent missions were surveys and patrols only, not targeted operations and they were very successful.

In April 1952, Templer brought in Mr. John Morton, an experienced civilian who had been chief of MI-5 in Singapore.¹⁴⁴ Captured documents, and prisoners were sent to the Special Branch for exploitation. Thirty special military intelligence officers were attached to the Special Branch at various levels. Komer states that:

Morton created an interrogation center staffed largely with ex-insurgents. As other measures took effect, the flow of intelligence from the ethnic Chinese population gradually increased and permitted much better targeting of security force operations. Many surrendered enemy personnel were successfully turned into agents and informers.¹⁴⁵

3. Role of the Military

At the beginning in 1948, there were only 5,784 combat troops and 5,660 service troops in Malaya. In 1952, the combat troops were increased to 22,000 (around 23 infantry battalions); its peak in 1956 was 22,500.¹⁴⁶ Although the military role in COIN was essential to success, it was limited. In the early years, the military had to assist the police and paramilitary forces in static security missions. But later on these tasks were gradually taken over by police and auxiliaries. Then, the military could turn to suppressing the guerrillas in the jungle.

The military role in the Malayan Emergency was not of a typical character. Instead of operating as a large force and having their own command, units were dispersed and used in support of civil authority. Komer states that:

Tactically, they never operated as divisions, and infrequently even as brigades or even battalions, but mostly in dispersed company and smaller units. Instead of having their own intelligence, they depended mostly on that from the police.¹⁴⁷

¹⁴⁴ R. W. Komer, *The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect: Organization of a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort*, (Santa Monica: Rand Corp, 1972), 43.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid., 45.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., 47.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid., 46.

However, the military adapted themselves well from conventional WWII style to small unit jungle warfare. The “jungle operations training” was set up and emphasized patrolling. Overall, ambushes and patrolling by using smaller forces was very successful in countering the guerrillas.

Another measure that could push guerrillas out of the jungle was the “food control” program. Food and medicines were strictly controlled. The food control programs came along with curfews and checkpoints. The military checked the amounts of food and supplies that the people purchased and kept records. The military carefully conducted inspections of roads and rail traffic at checkpoints. All vehicles, men, women, and children were searched each time they left the villages. Komer describes that:

Over time, this complex of food and resource controls together with the food denial operations seem to have done a great deal to sap insurgent strength. It forced the guerrillas to expose themselves to patrols and ambushes, and eventually to surrender in increasing numbers under the pressure of hunger.¹⁴⁸

4. Separating the Insurgents from their Popular Base

It is clear that one of the most effective U.K. /GOM counterinsurgency techniques was the breaking of the links between the insurgents and the Chinese community, especially the squatters. This was done through a series of carefully coordinated civil programs which consisted of: ¹⁴⁹

- registration, travel control, curfews, ID card checks;
- resettlement of the great bulk of the squatter population in new protected villages;
- pervasive food and drug controls in “black” areas to deny the guerrillas access to food supplies;
- accelerated social and economic development;
- steady movement toward self-government and independence;
- public information and psychological operations programs designed to keep the population fully informed of what was under way.

¹⁴⁸ Komer, 61.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., 53.

These programs were essential for counterinsurgency in Malaya and enable the U.K. /GOM to control the population. Komer explains that:

Each of these programs reinforced the others. Moreover, all were conducted within the framework of a rule of law which carefully spelled out what the government and security forces could and could not do....These programs reflected a dual strategy of control and accommodation – control of those people and resources which could fuel the insurgency and accommodation to those popular aspirations which were seen as helping rob the insurgency of its political appeals....This has been loosely called the carrot and stick approach. ¹⁵⁰

There were also six main features that the U.K./GOM counterinsurgency policy and strategy that gradually developed after an initial period of confusion:¹⁵¹

- balance – multifaceted response – balanced civil/police/military operations;
- territorial framework – war management followed existing administrative lines from village to district to state to Federation level;
- unified management – a British-style committee system, top policy direction became centralized, execution was decentralized to state and district level or even below;
- reliance on intelligence – the U.K./GOM emphasized it as crucial to success. Instead of building up a big new military intelligence structure, expansion of the Police Special Branch was chosen as by far the best for the purpose. Major reliance was placed on inducing defections and on other forms of psychological warfare;
- separating the insurgents from the people – launching a series of major programs such as registration, resettlement, and food control to deny men and resources to the guerrillas;
- satisfying popular aspirations – improved economic and social services which is essential to victory. At the same time, the British made every effort to bring the ethnic Chinese fully into Malayan political life, as a viable alternative to revolt. Phased steps toward independence further undercut the MCP contention that revolt was the only road to this goal.

¹⁵⁰ Komer, 53.

¹⁵¹ Ibid., 14.

5. Mopping Up

By Mid-1954, the new Director of Operations, General Bourne, modified the “Briggs-Templer strategy” from “rolling up the insurgents from south to north” into destroying the insurgent organization in the weakest area first.¹⁵² An area clear of the insurgents would be declared as “white.” The government force then moved to other “black” areas and cleared each of them. This strategy gradually worked. By mid-1955, a third of Malaya’s population lived in cleared “white” areas, and the security forces were gradually being phased down. There was a mass surrender during 1957-1958. The few tough black areas were finally cleared in 1959. The Emergency was officially terminated in July 1960.¹⁵³

¹⁵² Komer, 21.

¹⁵³ Ibid.

IV. ROLE OF THE MILITARY

In the southern Thailand insurgency, the military is one of the government's assets which has to work in synchronization with other government agencies. In a counterinsurgency, the military provides the main effort of the government in suppressing the insurgents. Even though military officials are dedicated to working on this complex insurgency problem, unfortunately, the problem is not easy to solve. After four and a half years, insurgency incidents still continue. The insurgents are using guerrilla warfare and terrorist's tactics as vital tools to conquer the government. Many government officials and innocent people have become victims of the insurgents. As civil security is crucial in an insurgency war; the military needs to protect the people from the insurgents' influence. This chapter will examine the military's role in achieving a safe and secure environment by using the "population and resources control measure" in order to find weak points and areas for improvement.

A. A TUG OF WAR

During the four and a half years of unrest, the government and the insurgents have been competing to control the population. Sometimes the government has gained popular support but sometimes so have the insurgents. In countering the insurgents' activities, if the government's response was too high (exceeding appropriate response – brutal) or too low (lower than local populace anticipated – ignoring), the government would lose the support of the masses. Similarly, the insurgents needed to control their attacks and to try not to exceed the local populace's acceptance. In order to control the population and gain popular support, the government needed to implement only high legitimacy suppression and focus on the people's needs and security while the insurgents obtained control of the population and gained popular support by using coercion and propaganda.

1. First Round: Advantage – Insurgents

Policing was attempted by the government as the main effort to solve the situation after the insurgency broke out on January 4, 2004. The police obtained the power to arrest without a court warrant in eight districts of the three southernmost provinces where

martial law was imposed. Under pressure from Prime Minister Thaksin, who set a seven-day deadline to capture the perpetrators, the police arrested five suspects in early February. The detained confessed that they had been hired for \$200 each by leaders of the insurgency groups – BRN and GMIP. However, it was later revealed that the confessions were extracted under police torture.¹⁵⁴ Mr. Somchai Neelaphaijit, the suspects' lawyer, had dedicated himself to helping people who had experienced injustice from the authorities. He had been a focus of assistance to people in the three southernmost provinces but had been kidnapped and disappeared the day after he called for an investigation into the torture of the suspects. Rumor spread that it was the police who kidnapped Somchai and later killed him.

This sensitive issue caused dissatisfaction throughout the southern Muslim community. Furthermore, as the police had killed many people during the drug suppression in the south provinces one year before, it caused the people to feel uncomfortable with the police. They believed the rumor that the police really killed lawyer Somchai. The police were losing the trust of the population and were also being hated because of this incident. There were protests from Muslim people in some areas. The insurgents took this chance to use propaganda about the injustice and launched a series of attacks. Many police were murdered and police stations were bombed. The insurgents gained the advantage in this situation as most of the population had a bad feeling about the authorities. At the very early stage, the police, one of the most essential mechanisms in a counterinsurgency, was breaking down.

Moreover, in the year 2004, there were two major incidents which caused a “serious impact” to the cooperation between local people and the authorities. First, was the storming of the *Krue Se* Mosque in April 28, 2004, where 32 Muslim militants were killed by the soldiers inside the historic mosque. Second, was the outcome of the *Tak Bai* protest on October 25, 2004, which ended with the deaths of 78 demonstrators.¹⁵⁵ Because of Prime Minister Thaksin's slow reaction in which he showed no responsibility for the deaths of these people in these two incidents, more discontent filled the Muslim

¹⁵⁴ International Crisis Group, “Southern Thailand: Insurgency, Not Jihad,” 17.

¹⁵⁵ Details of the two incidents were mentioned in chapter 2 of this thesis.

people's hearts. With these situations, the insurgents again found an opportunity to exploit. They turned these issues to propaganda, gained more recruits, and used the issues as justification for launching more attacks against the authorities. From statistics, three weeks before the Tak Bai incident, there were 19 murders, five bombings, and one act of arson – a total of 25 incidents. But three weeks after that, there were 45 murders (included three beheadings), 11 bombings, and 12 incidents of arson – a total of 68 incidents.¹⁵⁶ The attacks increased by a rate more than double that of three weeks earlier.




Figure 15. Map Showing the Insurgents' Attacks Three Weeks Before Tak Bai Incident.¹⁵⁷

¹⁵⁶ ISRA News, "Southern Thailand situation 2004," <http://tjanews.org/cms/images/stories/doc/southreport2547.doc> (accessed February 15, 2008).

¹⁵⁷ Source: Author (illustrated point of attacks using Geographic Information Systems (GIS) map).




Figure 16. Map Showing the Insurgents' Attacks Three Weeks After Tak Bai Incident.¹⁵⁸

The Krue Se and Tak Bai incidents caused the government to lose trust and legitimacy in the eyes of the people. Also many recruits joined the insurgents. These two incidents apparently caused a wave effect in the process of solving the problem. It made it more difficult to win the hearts and minds of the population. In late 2004, the government deployed eight Army Infantry Battalions, two Marine Infantry Battalions, Army Special Operations Task Forces, three Border Patrol Police companies, and six Paramilitary companies (*Taharn Pran*) into the region.

2. Second Round: Disadvantage – the Government

The military and police who were deployed to the southernmost provinces did not have a clear idea or clear mission of what they had to do. It had been about twenty years before that the military had conducted a counterinsurgency against the communists. In 2004-2005, the conventional soldiers were planning to conduct direct attacks against the insurgents, but failed, because the soldiers could not find or identify the insurgents. The

¹⁵⁸ Source: Author (illustrated point of attacks using Geographic Information Systems (GIS) map).

insurgents recognized the soldiers, because of their uniforms, but the soldiers did not know who the insurgents were. Insurgency warfare was not the war that the new generations of soldiers were trained for or could cope with. There were a couple of weak points about these conventional soldiers. They lacked counterinsurgency training, could not speak the local languages, and did not understand the Muslim's culture and customs. Special Forces soldiers seemed to have more understanding of the counterinsurgency context and were capable in languages, but they were limited in numbers. Most of the insurgents' areas of operations were in the cities not in the jungle any more. With "hit and run tactics," the soldiers or police had a difficult time to counter the insurgents and instead became victims. Thus, at the outset, the police and soldiers were concerned with their own security, seemed to be less focused on the people, and did not understand the context of insurgency well.

In 2005, the insurgents put more pressure on the government by targeting tourist sites and airports with the goal of damaging the economy in the area. On February 17, 2005, one of the biggest bombs exploded at the Sungai Kolok Hotel, a famous hotel for tourists in Narathiwat. An authority said that this was the first time that the insurgents had used a high volume of fertilizer explosives (estimate 50 Kg. of ammonium-nitrate). On April 3, 2005, the Hat Yai International Airport, Carrefour Store, and Green World Palace Hotel in Songkhla province were bombed.¹⁵⁹ The insurgents continued their attacks by targeting local leaders and village volunteers who cooperated with the authorities, employees in the government's priority employment projects,¹⁶⁰ and police and soldiers while patrolling. In July 2005, a series of bombs blasted in Yala district, Yala province causing an electric down time of three hours. Fertilizer explosives were put into fire extinguishers and were used as deadly attack weapons. The insurgents tried to obtain mass support by killing people who cooperated with the authorities and then spread rumors that the authorities were the murderers. The insurgents also wanted to create a rift between Buddhists and Muslims by targeting Buddhist monks. The insurgents handed out leaflets in many areas, induced Muslim people to stop working on

¹⁵⁹ The Royal Thai Army Military Intelligence.

¹⁶⁰ In order to improve economy, the government hires unemployed citizen in the area and assigned specific work for them.

Fridays (in accordance with the practice of Muslim holy prayer every Friday) and forbid people from cooperating with the government. The psychological operations (PSYOP), although not entirely successful, did have significant success in countering the insurgents' propaganda and creating understanding between the people and the authorities.

In 2006, the insurgents continued their attacks, and the authorities seemed to be blind to counter-attacks and the need for creating a secure environment in the area. The aggressive manner of Prime Minister Thaksin and his judges, accusing the insurgents of carrying out only petty crime, only added fuel to the flame. On January 18, 2006, the insurgents sabotaged 101 telephone repeater towers across the four southern provinces on the same day (48 in Pattani, 27 in Yala, 17 in Narathiwat, and 9 in Songkhla).¹⁶¹ Violent incidents continued to occur, bombings, ambushing and attacks on soldiers and police. The insurgents also focused on targeted state school's teachers. During 2004-2005, 46 teachers were killed. In 2006 alone, there were 70. Some schools had to close down from time to time and reopen only when the authorities were able to provide security. Guarding schools and school teachers became important missions for the security forces. On August 31, 2006, the insurgents bombed 22 banks in Yala province in one day, but fortunately all of the bombs were small in size. However, it definitely created chaotic conditions. In propaganda, the insurgency usually distorted information and sent out rumors such as soldiers raping Muslim women or soldiers arresting and killing innocent Muslims. There were an increasing number of Muslim protestors (women and children included) in many areas, demanding the authorities retreat from their villages and release detainees. It seemed like the insurgents were able to mobilize some groups of the population. The insurgents also resorted to acts of vandalism such as chopping down rubber trees and burning houses of Buddhist people. In the Bannang Sata and Than To district, 52 Buddhist families had to leave their homes and stay together in a Buddhist church area for more security.

¹⁶¹ The Royal Thai Army Military Intelligence.

3. Third Round – the Competition

In September 2006, a military coup ousted Prime Minister Thaksin. The new interim government, led by (retired) Gen. Surayud Chulanont, changed strategy to be more conciliatory. Surayud traveled to the southern area many times, met with local religious leaders, community leaders and also convened with the authorities. In October 2006, he apologized to the southern Muslim people for the wrong implementation of the previous government's policy, which he characterized as being "hard-handed" about the problem and human rights abuses. He assured the southern Muslim people of the dismantling of the "black list" and permitted bail for many detainees. The Muslim community seemed to be satisfied with his policy. The government executed many development projects ranging from education to economics, politics, culture, religion, society and environment to improve the status quo. Surayud also revived the SBPAC (Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre) and CPM-43 (43rd joint Civilian-Police-Military Command) which was dissolved by Thaksin in 2002.

In 2007, the government and the insurgency were competing for control of the population. The insurgents had the advantage in this competition because they could coerce people by using terror, while the authorities had to create consensus in order to gain control and trust. With the new policy of the government, the insurgents knew that there was a chance that they might lose many people under their control to the government, so the insurgents increased attacks and tried to intimidate the people as much as they could. Thus, the year 2007 had the highest statistics for insurgency-related incidents. There were 2,025 insurgency incidents with a total of 867 deaths and 1,720 injured.

In the past four years (2004-2007), the military has tried hard to counter the insurgents' activities as best they can by, with, and through many counterinsurgency measures such as psychological operations, civil affairs, population and resource control, information operations, offensive/defensive operations, and intelligence.¹⁶² However, the military has not been able to improve the situation. Daily deathly incidents still threaten

¹⁶² Royal Thai Army, *Counterinsurgency Field Manual 100-20* (Army Training Command, Bangkok, 1997).

the morale of the population. The officials have arrested only few insurgents. Most of the people still have not cooperated with the government because of fear of being attacked by the insurgents. Substantial intelligence has not been obtained. Thus, the government needs to be seriously focused on civil security. Once the people are secure, the government should receive the people's cooperation. In considering the military counterinsurgency measures, "population and resources control" seemed to be the best measures among the many that were able to provide security for the people and control of the area of operations. Thus, if the government can continue to improve the population and resources control measures, it will improve the situation.

B. POPULATION AND RESOURCE CONTROL

In order to conquer the insurgents, information about the insurgents' organizational structure and movements is needed. This information can be derived mainly from the local population. Yet, the insurgents usually have the advantage in controlling the population. In order to protect their organization and keep their secrets, the insurgents must not allow any cooperation between the people and the authorities, and usually, the insurgents target people who cooperate with the authorities. So, to obtain the information, the authorities must protect the people from the insurgency's attacks, intimidation, or reprisals. In short, the authorities must create a secure environment for the people.

In creating a secure environment and civil security, the military must focus on the population and resources control (PRC) which is one measure among many in counterinsurgency operations. The Royal Thai Army is using five measures in coping with insurgency problems; intelligence, psychological operations, civil affairs, offensive operations (capture or kill), and PRC. As the safety and security of the people is crucial, PRC measures are the method that enables creating a secure environment in an area of operations. The people will cooperate with the authorities or not, depending on their security. Yet, providing civil security is the most difficult, but the authorities must do their best to achieve this. A secure environment leads the way to conquering an insurgency.

1. Concept and Goals of PRC

The PRC activities focus on control of the people and resources in the areas of operations. If the insurgents are able to access people and resources, they will sustain their status or become stronger. Even though most of the people do not want to support the insurgents, they are coerced. Thus, the PRC measures aim to deny support and sanctuaries for the insurgents. But this can not happen if the people are not secure. In the *U.S. Army Field Manual 31-20-3*, the stated goals for the PRC are to¹⁶³

- Sever the supporting relationship between the population and the insurgents.
- Provide a secure physical and psychological environment for the population.
- Detect and neutralize the insurgent apparatus and activities in the community.

In order to sever the links between the population and the insurgents, the authorities must be able to first identify who the insurgents are and their movements in the community, and later to figure out the insurgents' organizational structure. Yet, to identify the insurgents' movement and structure, the authorities mostly rely on substantial intelligence from the people. Thus, the authorities need to protect the people, build a secure environment, and focus on the people's needs. This will allow the silent majority of the people to cooperate with the authorities and reject the insurgents.

In general, police and security forces are the main forces in PRC. The police must continue to enforce laws and order, and arrest criminals and outlaws. Police performance is a significant tool to increase legitimacy in the area of operations. However, there is a high potential for harm if power is used excessively or incorrectly. Assistance to the police is provided by the military and other security forces such as paramilitary or defense volunteers. These forces should have knowledge about basic laws, receive police training and police personnel should accompany them. In conducting PRC, there are many measures. However, each measure must be adjusted to fit with the present situation

¹⁶³ Department of the Army, *FM 31-20-3: Foreign Internal Defense TTP for Special Forces* (Washington DC, September 20, 1994), 3-23.

and area of operations. Failure to amend PRC measures will result in ineffectiveness in counterinsurgency. The PRC's measures include¹⁶⁴

- Suspension of habeas corpus.
- Curfews and blackout.
- Travel restrictions.
- Excluded or limited access areas.
- Registration and pass systems.
- Declaration that selected items or quantities of items, such as weapons, food, and fuel, are contraband.
- Licensing, rationing, and price controls.
- Checkpoints, searches, and surveillance.
- Censorship.

In conducting these measures, the normal daily life of the population will be affected, so the government should explain why it is necessary to use PRC measures. These measures can be conducted at the same time, not in sequence, up to the insurgency events. When the situation improves, the government should lift these restrictions. The authorities should prepare to relinquish some of the PRC measures to segments of the local populace such as defense village volunteers, who could carry on in their own way when the situation permits. This will allow the authorities' freedom to move to another area of operations.

However, these measures only are not sufficient to provide a secure environment. The most important thing is the need for the security force to stay in a specific area to secure and assist the people. The security force, which can be soldiers, police, border patrol police, or paramilitary forces, should stay in the village or city long enough to know the people, places, and terrain. This force is an important mechanism in creating trust and securing the environment for the people. The security force has to observe the people's movements by both overt methods and covert methods. The idea behind using

¹⁶⁴ U.S. Army, *Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, FM 100-20 / AFP 3-20*, (1990), http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/100-20/10020ape.htm#s_80 (accessed September 14, 2008).

this force, which can be combined with other forces, is to hold an area and establish a strong sense of immunity that, in turn, enables the insurgents influence to be repelled.

In 2006, the U.S. Army released a new field manual *3-24 Counterinsurgency*. This manual called for an implementation of PRC as “stability operations.” Overall, the definition of PRC is almost the same as stated in *FM 100-20 Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict* but provides more techniques, tactics, procedures, and consideration. The concept of stability operations was written as ¹⁶⁵

Stability operations focus on security and control of areas, resources, and populations. Civil security and civil control are types of stability operations. Army commanders expect a mission of protecting and providing security for a population to be expressed in terms of civil security or civil control.

The new *FM 3-24* provided some considerations when conducting civil security operations. The guidance is to learn the environment as much as possible, disrupt base areas and sanctuaries, deny external support, and to treat people with respect to avoid alienating anyone.¹⁶⁶ This guidance is essential in doing PRC because the authorities have to have frequent contact with the population. Thus, it would be better if the authorities possessed a cultural and religious awareness, free of emotional bias, and understood the rules of engagement.

2. The PRC Implementation

The area of operations (AO) in the southernmost provinces of Thailand, which is about 1,000 kilometers south of Bangkok, consists of Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat and another four districts of Songkhla (Chana, Depha, Nathavi, and Sabayoi) with a total area of 13,904.2 square kilometers. ¹⁶⁷ Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat are the areas of main focus while the four districts of Songkhla are areas of interest. The terrain is mixed between tropical jungle in the mountain areas and flat surface areas in cities. There are two main rivers – Pattani and Sai Buri. Thailand and Malaysia share 506 kilometers of

¹⁶⁵ U.S. Army, *Counterinsurgency* (FM 3-24 / MCWP 3-33.5, December 15, 2006), 5-11.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 5-12.

¹⁶⁷ Pattani has an area of 1,940.9 sq.km., Yala 4,521.1 sq.km., Narathiwat 4,475.4 sq.km., and four districts of Songkhla is 2,966.8 sq.km.

border. There is a population of 2,052,376 (1,017,966 men and 1,034,410 women) in the AO; 75 percent are Muslim, and most of the rest are Buddhist.¹⁶⁸ The local dialect is Malaya (*Yawi*). But, in general, people under the age of 50 are able to understand and use the Thai language well. There are around 300,000 Buddhist people living in the three southernmost provinces. There are 33 districts in the three focused provinces and another four districts in the area of interested of Songkhla province. Over all, there are 37 districts, 330 sub-districts, and 2,027 villages as shown:

| Province | # of district | # of sub-district | # of village |
|------------|---------------|-------------------|--------------|
| Pattani | 12 | 58 | 365 |
| Yala | 8 | 155 | 635 |
| Narathiwat | 13 | 77 | 670 |
| Songkhla | 4 | 40 | 357 |

Table 1. Number of district, sub-district, and villages in the three southernmost provinces of Thailand¹⁶⁹

The economy relies heavily on agriculture products, particularly rubber. The price of rubber depends on the global market. People also work in small to medium enterprises in the area. In terms of education, most of the people have had a traditional curriculum of Muslim study in *ponoh* (madrasas) religious schools. Modern subjects or secular study are taught in “private schools teaching Islam,” which offer a combined curriculum of Islam and secular subjects. There are also state schools that teach a secular curriculum only.

The Army has been reinforced from eight battalions in the late 2004 to eighteen battalions in late 2007. Other forces that operate in the area include three Marine Infantry Battalions, four Border Patrol Police Companies, 84 Paramilitary Companies (*Taharn Pran*), Army Special Operations Task forces¹⁷⁰ and approximately 3,000 local police,

¹⁶⁸ Wisanti Srasrida, “Southern Problem aspect,” *Senathipat Journal*, (Bangkok, January-April 2008), 28.

¹⁶⁹ Source: Wisanti Srasrida, “Southern Problem aspect,” *Senathipat Journal*, (Bangkok, January-April 2008), 28.

¹⁷⁰ Special operations Task forces includes: 36 Special Forces Operation Detachment A, two Quick Reaction Forces Company, and Psychological Operations Task Forces.

3,000 full-time district defense unit personnel (known as *Or Sor*), 50,000 village defense volunteers (known as *Chor Ror Bor*), and 20,000 village security volunteers (known as *Or Ror Bor*).¹⁷¹ These forces conducted counterinsurgency together in southern Thailand in late 2007. However, during 2004-2005, there were very limited numbers of forces, which consequently allowed freedom of movement for the insurgents.




Figure 17. Map of district jurisdiction of the three southernmost provinces ¹⁷²

In performing PRC measures, checkpoints and roadblocks are commonly set up in every area. Each district has at least two checkpoints for entering and departing. Officials at checkpoints or roadblocks are mainly police and soldiers. In some places they are mixed together and in some places, not. At village levels, trained village defense volunteers equipped with shotguns help soldiers secure their own villages under the

¹⁷¹ Or Sor fall under Minister of Interior authority. Chor Ror Bor are make-up broadly reflects the demographic balance of the people in the region while Or Ror Bor is mostly exclusively Buddhist, often tasked with protecting Buddhist communities some of them stationed in Buddhist temple compounds.

¹⁷² Source: No Author, “No one is safe: Insurgent Attacks on Civilians in Thailand’s Southern Border Provinces,” *Human Rights Watch*, (Volume 19, No.13 (c), August 2007), 3.

control of soldiers or police in that area. At checkpoints, the officials conduct identification card checks, and random vehicle searches. Officials also conduct road patrolling (vehicle-patrol) and, later, on-foot patrolling. The officials do not use many of other measures such as curfews, travel restrictions, limited access areas, or control of resources. The officials used to force curfews in two districts of Yala, but just for short periods of time. There are restrictions on registering and using mobile phones, as the insurgents used mobile phones to ignite their IEDs, but later on the insurgents turned to alarm clocks and batteries to detonate the bombs instead.

In offensive measures, the military conducted four main operations: search and destroy armed insurgents: cordon and search; strengthen the status of local leaders such as village heads, and dissolve the insurgents' structure on the village level.¹⁷³ In searching for and destroying armed insurgents, soldiers did not have much success because of a lack of information. Typically, there is the pursuit of escaping armed insurgents after a crime has been committed. But when the officials are able to arrest the insurgents, usually, a murder weapon is not found because after killing a victim, other insurgents' members will receive the weapon from the shooter somewhere near the crime scene and hide it. Then, the shooter will continue to escape without the weapon. In conducting cordon and search, many problems were created during the initial period because the officials lacked appropriate evidence to show when to search a suspected house,¹⁷⁴ especially when searching a house of an imam or *uztaz* (religious teacher) who was respected by the people in a community. If the officials found nothing after the search, it created discontent in the population. The use of working dogs (police – K9) has been prohibited because such use is against Islam culture. However, in the first half of 2008, cordon and search operations began to succeed because the officials were able to obtain sufficient intelligence.

In taking defensive measures, the military conducts personnel and place protection. There are many places that need to be secured, such as electric stations, railroads, rail stations, dams, and typical roads. In the past four years, electric stations,

¹⁷³ Interview with Military Officials, Bangkok, June 2008.

¹⁷⁴ There is no need of a search warrant because the government proclaimed “martial law” in the area of operations.

railroads, and rail stations have been attacked by bombs many times. Some bridges have also been attacked. Thus, the officials have had to take measures to protect these infrastructures, as damage to them may directly affect the daily lives of the people. Regarding personnel protection, the officials needed to focus on protecting teachers and Buddhist monks' because many teachers and monks were killed by the insurgents. In the AO, there are 291 Buddhist temples with 1,326 monks, which require 2,200 officials to provide protection. There are 1,102 schools with 16,440 teachers which require 3,700 officials to provide security to them each day.¹⁷⁵ Apart from this, the officials have to provide security in municipal areas and Buddhist community areas. Police are mostly assigned to perform urban protection while the military provides a secure environment in the rural areas.

In the early years, the military set up base camps at places where conditions permitted and maintained at least a company size of around 150 men. Checkpoints were usually automatically set up on the road in front of the base camps. Infantry soldiers and Marines entered nearby villages by car and tried to know the people, but none of the military personnel stayed inside a village. Only Special Forces, who have special skills in making contact with the people, stayed with the people in a village. There are many tasks for the Special Forces such as surveillance, area assessment, psychological operations, intelligence, information operations, and conducting civil security as well. The Special Forces also added some more tasks to include training conventional troops in counterinsurgency and training village volunteers in self defense. The Special Forces' missions are essential in counterinsurgency, but unfortunately, there are a limited number of Special Forces soldiers.

In this new round of the insurgency's revival, the insurgents are more sophisticated than in the past. They are well organized, able to access resources, and plan effective political and armed struggle activities. Their attacks have been switching between urban and rural areas; when the officials focus on urban areas, the insurgents then launch attacks in the rural areas, which force the officials, in turn, to move forces out of a city to secure the countryside. But when the officials are able to control the rural

¹⁷⁵ Interview with Military Officials, Bangkok, June 2008.

areas, the insurgents then change to attacking inside the urban areas again. At the beginning, the police and soldiers were targeted by the insurgents, but when the police and soldiers became more cautious and became “hard” targets, the insurgents changed to attacking teachers. Similarly, when the officials focus on protection of the teachers, the insurgents then attack Buddhist monks, but when teachers, monks, and people have been protected, the insurgents turn to attacking the officials again. Furthermore, terrorist’s tactics such as bombings and assassinations are very difficult to counter. Thus, without taking the population and resources control seriously, the government will be unable to control the situation.

C. SECURITY ENVIRONMENTAL FAILURE

In 2005, there were 134 officials and 330 civilians killed by the insurgents. The death toll increased to 206 officials and 402 civilians in 2006. In 2007, there were 2,025 insurgency incidents with total of 867 deaths and 1,720 injured. During the first half of 2008, there were 563 incidents with 302 deaths and 517 injured. These statistics show that even though population and resources control measures have been conducted, they were not effective enough to create a secure environment for the people and to control an area. The situation is still worrisome and unsafe for both lives and property.

The officials failed to obtain substantial information from the people. In the past four and a half years, the military has worked very hard in the southern border provinces. At the beginning, there was no clear strategy to cope with the violence and turmoil. With long preparation, good organization, and good planning, the insurgents had the advantage over the government. Thaksin’s administration led an implementation effort to correct problems in a wrong direction which created more discontent among the Muslims. The authorities were blind in that they were working without substantial information from the people. Extrajudicial killings and arrests of suspected Muslims made the people lose trust in the authorities. After long periods of hard work and sacrifice led by the Army, the trend of violence seemed to have decreased since October 2007. However, in the first half-year of 2008, insurgency-related incidents still existed and threatened the government, even though the Army deployed more troops to the south.

In an insurgency state, the population is considered the center of gravity and is capable of giving valuable information about the insurgents. In order to defeat the insurgents, local people should cooperate with the authorities while opposing the insurgents. If people in the area do not provide any information about the insurgents, then the authorities must re-assess the situation. From the author's experience in dealing with the insurgency in southern Thailand, there are five categories of people in the area of operations (AO). First, in the worst case, are those who are inclined to support the insurgents. This does not mean that these groups of people help the insurgents in conducting their operations, but that they are sympathetic, agreeing with the insurgents and not cooperating with the authorities. This group may have had bad experiences with the government and share some part of the ideology of the insurgents. People in the second group are those who are deceived and influenced by the insurgents' propaganda. These groups of people do not oppose the government at the beginning, but may eventually be persuaded by the insurgents, and are at risk of becoming insurgents themselves.

The third group of people are those who do not want to be involved with the situation. They wish to ignore it and stay away from the problem, so they cooperate with no one. The fourth group, which can be a majority, are those who are intimidated by the insurgents. There are examples every day of people who cooperate with the authorities and are killed. So this group will stay away from the officials, even though they know of the insurgents' movements. Lastly, are those who cooperate with the authorities. This group of people will be a minority if the authorities cannot provide a secure environment. Or, they can be a majority if they feel safe. Some people assist the authorities because their families were harmed or killed by the insurgents. Overall, among the five groups of people, there are four out of five that do not want to cooperate with the authorities. This gives a simple vision of how difficult it is to get information from the people in the AO.

The authorities have often failed to identify the insurgents. Even though an intelligence community uses many tools to collect information, the insurgents have improved their skills to conduct counterintelligence. They know how to perform covert operations which make it hard for the authorities to track them. They carefully use

cellular phones and the internet by talking or writing in code. Over all, they “cover” their organization well. Even though the Special Forces put more effort in building relationships with the people, very little information about the insurgents is usually derived. It is possible that the population may know very little about the insurgents because the insurgents are good at keeping secrets. Captured insurgent members can be of benefit if they cooperate with the authorities, but most of them do not.

The officials have failed to protect the population and create a secure environment. The authorities know that reducing and eliminating the daily rate of deadly incidents is the key to creating a safe and secure environment, but it is not easy. Most of the time, the insurgents make headway by launching deadly attacks and successfully escaping. The increased attacks against teachers and Buddhist monks forces the soldiers to set up many security units to guard them, and so those units lose their strength to perform other missions. The insurgents’ multi-attacks on many targets in many provinces on the same day not only create chaos, but also show that they are well organized in structure. The insurgents’ cells are able to work both independently and cooperatively, which is very difficult for the government to counter.

In the south, there are two main areas where the insurgents launch their attacks; urban and rural. The government has assigned responsibility to the police in controlling urban areas and assigned rural areas to the military. In the city, the insurgents usually launch bomb attacks, and in the rural areas the insurgents frequently ambush officials and assassinate people with small arms. These tactics have given the advantage to the insurgents. First, by using bombs in the city instead of guns for murder, the insurgents can cover themselves well and need not escape from many eye witnesses. Second, ambushing and murdering with small arms in rural areas make it easier to escape into the jungle. Ultimately, most of the times, the authorities fail to pursue or arrest the insurgents.

The authorities have failed to control certain area. Even though the military has dispatched constabulary forces to stay in the villages, set up QRF forces, and conducted patrols, insurgency incidents still occur. The incidents happen because there have been insufficient SF on the ground, laxness at checkpoints, and inadequate patrolling. The

PRC measures have not been strict enough in an area of insurgents' influence. Besides, the government has lacked accurate assessments and the ability to assign proper national assets into specific areas. Therefore, the government can not control an area.

In late 2007, military intelligence informed the (active) military that there were around 500 villages out of 1,670 villages, or just about 30 percent of the three southernmost provinces, which had been influenced by the insurgents.¹⁷⁶ Among the 500 villages, there were approximately 50 villages that were very highly influenced, 25 villages that were highly influenced, 200 villages that were moderately influenced, and 225 villages which were partially influenced. While there was a need to provide security for the remaining 1,170 villages, the military faced a difficult time controlling the 500 villages first mentioned. However, with this information, the military seems to “see the light at the end of the tunnel” if proper methodology is applied.

In sum, in order to win the battle, the military must control the areas that have been influenced by the insurgents, establish a secure environment and expand the area of security. But the key to achieving this result is for the military to improve the population and resources control measures.

¹⁷⁶ Interview with Military Officials, Bangkok, June 2008.

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V. APPLYING THE COIN MODEL AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Insurgency-related incidents in the first half of 2008 indicate that the insurgents will continue to launch other attacks against the government's agencies and the population. Thus, the government needs to improve any strategical, operational, and tactical weak points and rethink PRC measures. The following discussion in this chapter will apply the COIN Models in Chapter Three to the southern Thailand insurgency and determine what the military needs to consider and to implement in order to improve the PRC measures.

A. THE DIAMOND MODEL

In population and resource control, the Diamond Model provides the warning signs for the military to consider more effort in dealing with the people, rather than mainly looking forward to attacking the insurgents' forces. The military needs to improve implementation in its efforts to cut the links between the people and the insurgents. Furthermore, the area of operations is close to the border in the south and the ocean in the east, so external support or logistics routes can be easily reached by the insurgents. The military should put more focus on securing the border and denying illegal crossings, while the government should continue creating good relationships, understanding, and cooperation with international countries that will support Thailand's efforts to conduct counterinsurgency.

In the past four years, there were many obstacles which stood in the way of the authorities approaching the people. Some of the obstacles that blocked the officials from getting close to the population were caused by the insurgents, and some were caused by the reactions of the government. The insurgents used their advantage as Malay Muslims who speak the same language as the local people to provoke the revolution. They planted the seeds of resistance among students in the *madrasas* and "private schools teaching Islam." The insurgents also coerced and manipulated the people. Thus, the obstacles to the officials' approaching the people were founded in religion, language, culture, and the resistance ideology.

The government's implementations also created obstacles. The government must generate consensus in order to control the people. The government's methods of suppression, based on unclear information, created bad results, especially when the officials operated with low-legitimacy, and were reactive and indiscriminate. Examples of such as cases included detaining persons without sufficient evidence, torture, disappearances and extrajudicial punishment. So, the authorities need to improve their efforts to insure that their operations are highly-legitimate, pre-emptive, and discriminating. The government should bring justice to the people and cease every option that brings about injustice, because the insurgents will use the injustice of the government as an important condition to provoke the people to rebel.

All of the discussed obstacles block the officials from approaching the people. But, on the other hand, they facilitate the insurgents' efforts (see Figure 18). Thus, in this case, the government needs to improve its strategic implementations in order to reduce these obstacles.




Figure 18. Obstacles to State – Facilitation to Counter State ¹⁷⁷

¹⁷⁷ Source: Author

In order to sever links between the insurgents and the people, what the government needs to do is not only reduce and clear the obstacles, but it must figure out how also to build obstacles between the insurgents and the people. Thus, the government must focus on the people's needs and security, and correct the flaws of its own implementation. If the government does so correctly, it will create obstacles between the insurgents and the population instead, as shown in Figure 19.




Figure 19. Facilitation to State –Obstacles to Counter State ¹⁷⁸

As Figure 19 illustrates, the government should conduct preemptive repression, not reactive repression, discrimination not indiscrimination, and highly-legitimate actions only. This behavior will restore trust with the people. Similarly with other operations, if the government improves the educational system and focuses on madrasas and private schools teaching Islam where the insurgents obtain their recruits, it will block new recruits from the insurgents. Issues of culture, language, and religion still facilitate the insurgents' efforts. But, if the officials can improve cultural awareness and learn the local

¹⁷⁸ Source: Author

language, such awareness and learning will facilitate the officials' efforts as well. Lastly, the government must improve the PRC measures which will not only be able to create a secure environment but also sever links between the insurgents and the people.

Other government measures such as political inclusion, improvement of economics and other military measures such as information operations and civil affairs will support the above efforts to decrease obstacles between the state and the people. If everything goes well, all the measures mentioned above will increase the people's trust. The increasing of the people's trust means the ability to control the people and delegitimize the insurgents. But, as of this writing, the PRC is not going well and needs to be improved in order to establish civil security.

B. COIN MILITARY COMPONENTS

The Royal Thai Army (RTA) has also used Special Forces as a constabulary force, used Ranger units as quick reaction forces (QRF), and has used infantry as movement-to-contact forces (MTC), similar to Wendt's COIN Military Components. However, problems have occurred because of an inadequate number of SF soldiers. In one province, there were only twelve SF detachments available, which meant one SF detachment had to work for the whole district of about 5 to 10 villages. There was only one company of QRF in a province, which was insufficient. The MTC force usually performs patrols in vehicles, not on-foot. Furthermore, the military forces have routinely reshuffled in a period of every twelve or six months, which reduces the opportunity for the soldiers to become acquainted with the people, routes, and terrain in the area. Even though the military has been reinforcing more conventional troops every year, the number of SF is still inadequate. The PRC measures are not strong enough to limit the freedom of maneuvers of the insurgents and to protect the populations.

There was an idea proposed of assigning military forces to "cover" an area but not "control" an area. The military just set a base camp near certain villages. However, this was an unsuccessful deterrence. Special Forces, which are fewer in number, are the only security force that stays in the villages. Therefore, this effort to control an area has been unsuccessful. In some places, the insurgents manipulated the people to protest against the security forces. For example, the insurgents spread rumors that the soldiers raped a

Muslim woman. The villagers demanded the soldiers draw back from the village, which resulted in the officials retreating. The increase of daily deadly incidents shifted the focus of the military from “covering” an area into providing security for schools, teachers, monks, roads and railroads. The SF were also busy training the village defense volunteers and paramilitary forces. Thus, the implementation of “control” of this area was unsuccessful.

1. Latest Information about the Insurgents

In late 2007, military intelligence informed the (active) military that there were approximately 500 villages that had been influenced by the insurgents and that each village had at least one commando detachment – RKK (*Runda Kumpulan Kecil*). The RKK is a small unit of militants consisting of six men. The militants are trained in guerrilla tactics to attack officials and carry out other insurgency incidents. The officials knew that RKK forces had around 3,000 men in 500 villages, but that these did not include supporters (*tolongan*) who are estimated at around 10,000 – 20,000.¹⁷⁹ The supporters are the group which observe and notify the RKK about the officials’ movements, move weapons for the RKK before and after operations, scatter nails or chop down trees to block roads, and help the RKK to escape. The BRN – Coordinate is the insurgency group which established the RKK force and also set up a “shadow government” to facilitate counter-state operations. At the village level (*ar-yoh*), the head of the village is called *ar-yoh* and controls the RKK, the supporters, and the village’s committee which consists of a religious board (*ulama*), youth and women’s board (*permudor*), logistics board (*logistik*), and finance board (*kurwagan*).

Above the village level is a sub-district level (*lingkaran*). The head of the *lingkaran* is called a *gumit* who commands and controls the *ar-yoh* level. At the district level (*daerah*), a *sakom* is the head. At the province level (*wilayah*), a *sakomvel* is the head and at the region level (many provinces) a *gus* is the head. The insurgents within

¹⁷⁹ Interview with Military officials, Bangkok, June 2008.

this organization operate in both political offense and military operations.¹⁸⁰ Thus, with this vital information, the military should deliberately consider how to deal with these insurgents and how to control an area effectively, not just to cover an area.

2. The Implementation

In controlling an area, the RTA does not have problems with the quick reaction forces (QRF) or movement-to-contact forces (MTC) but with the constabulary. The Royal Thai Army Special Forces (RTASF) has only 150 SF detachments and SF soldiers cannot be mass produced in a short period of time. So, there are two options available for conducting these missions successfully. First, to train other forces and use them as constabularies to compensate for the SF detachment shortage. Second, to start work with the number of forces available by making the village clear of the insurgents' movements or activities and sustaining that status to establish security, village by village, until the last one is "clear."

The first choice can be performed, but there will be a lack of effectiveness. The constabulary force is the most important and must possess high-level skills in the execution of its operations. The second choice is more feasible, but some problems might occur if it is not well planned. For instance, if "red" villages are more dispersed than in a nearby area, more QRF and MTC forces will be needed in operations.¹⁸¹ Moreover, the RTA needs to protect other "green" villages (about 1,000) while repelling the insurgents from "red" villages. If the "green" villages that are not secure, or the insurgents will move from the "red" villages to the "green" villages instead. The RTA must make sure that the "green" villages have sufficient ability to protect themselves. Besides, the insurgents might move from "red" villages into the city, too, so the officials also need a plan to protect rural areas.

¹⁸⁰ Interview with Military officials, Bangkok, June 2008.

¹⁸¹ "Red village" means villages that were highly influenced by the insurgents. "Yellow village" means villages that were moderately influenced by the insurgents, and "green village" means villages that were clear from the insurgents' influenced.

As the insurgency situations in southern Thailand do not only occur in rural areas such as small town or villages, but in the crowded city areas where a district or a province is situated, counterinsurgency in the city area is another big challenge for the officials. The police have the responsibility to secure the city area, but events in the past have shown that the police are not capable of controlling the area of responsibility, even if there are many surveillance cameras. The bombing of 22 banks, airports, shopping centers, restaurants and hotels occurred in city areas. During 2005-2006, there were few police who conducted foot-patrol in the cities.¹⁸² Thus, the police should increase on-foot patrols in the city areas. If there is not sufficient force, the military should provide support personnel to the police. Police in the city should perform the same task as the constabulary does in the villages and make sure that there are officials to monitor the surveillance cameras. The police should establish and train “city volunteers” in order to increase “eyes and ears.”

The officials who work at the border should be cautious and alert while the other officials are working in “red” villages. The border officials should focus on legal and illegal border crossings to neighboring countries because many of the Thai Muslim people in the south have two nationalities. The wide openness of the border just increases difficulties for the officials to capture the insurgents. However, if the officials were able to build “strong” villages that could resist the return of the insurgents effectively, the border problems would not be an issue.

Accurate assessment is another field in which the RTA needs to improve. Most of the questions that an assessment team, (mostly the SF detachments) ask the people are about the insurgents’ movements and activities. They also collect details of an area of operations, but ask few questions of the people themselves about what they really need. Another unit that conducts the assessment is the psychological operations units, but their questions are mostly about people’s attitudes to the insurgents and attitudes toward the government. However, the information is valuable. It needs to be updated periodically.

¹⁸² Observations derived from author’s experience while working in the area of operations.

The RTA has lacked a good process in assessment. Until 2007, there was no clear answer as to whether every village in the AO had been assessed.¹⁸³ There are no assessment teams that consist of psychologist, doctor, cultural and regional experts, rather most teams consist of soldiers solely. Some of the assessment teams do not live or operate in the areas they are assessing, so it is difficult to have an accurate assessment which can result in the wrong application of MIDLIFE resources. In the past, some village's projects did not come from the people's needs, but from local government agencies and local politicians. Thus, the military should focus on an accurate assessment in order to correct and improve any erroneous MIDLIFE actions.

C. OEF – PHILIPPINES

The Basilan Model is a good model that can be used to deny terrorists occupation areas and some parts can be used for counterinsurgency as well. The model illustrates that the first and the most important thing is to create a secure environment for the people. There is a need to increase patrolling to seize the initiative from the insurgents. Once security is established, the government can bring in development projects that meet the basic needs of the communities. When people feel comfortable, safe, and trust the authorities, they will give vital information to the authorities, which will lead the government to capturing or killing the insurgents. Thus, the Basilan Model does prove that if the government is able to provide civil security, there is a chance to conquer the insurgents.

However, Basilan Island and the southernmost provinces of Thailand are quite different in context, especially with regards to the conditions which led to the conflict. The Abu Sayaff is a terrorist organization, the goal of which is not necessarily to start a revolution. Thus, the organizational structure of the Abu Sayaff is different from a revolutionary organization. An insurgency needs mass support, but terrorists do not. In addition, the issues involving history, religion, or ethnicity are different from those on Basilan. The people involved have different grievances, ideas, and interests. The area of operations, the size of the population and the number of the insurgents are also all

¹⁸³ Interview with Military Official, Bangkok, 2008.

different. Basilan Island has 1,372 square kilometers and around 300,000 people, while southern Thailand has 13,904 square kilometers and around 2,005,000 people. Thus, basically, a smaller area and smaller population should be easier to work with. Furthermore, Basilan is an island, a feature which hinders both external support and escape.

Still, The Basilan Model provides an example of a successful operation using the indirect approach. It showed important steps in the areas of area assessment, planning, execution, and the invaluable work of SF soldiers. Thus, in conducting PRC, the Thai government should adopt these steps and apply them. The government should keep in mind that civil security should come first. The Thai military must be embedded in the community, just as the U.S. SF soldiers were, in order to increase legitimacy, and provide security for the people while the government prepares to render support and executes projects that benefit local people and improve their living conditions.

In conducting an indirect approach in southern Thailand, there are some areas which could generate indirect assistance to the counterinsurgency. Those areas include education, law and order, healthcare, civil rights, religion, and politics. For example, in education, many schools in the south have been infiltrated by the insurgents who plant the seeds of hatred for the government and recruit new members. The government must protect students from being recruited by the insurgents, especially in madrasas and “private schools teaching Islam.” In regards to law and order, for decades, southern border provinces have had a reputation of being governed by abusive officials. Many innocent people were put behind bars. Social grievances and discontent gradually increased, leading many to resist the authorities. Thus, the government should provide justice and assure no excessive use of power. If the government fails to do so, more recruits will be lost to the insurgents.

In order to counter the insurgency in the long-term, supportive religious leaders are essential. Religious leaders who strongly believe that Islam is a religion of peace and refuse to use violence or to kill people to change the status quo could help the state to deal “indirectly” with the insurgents. Most of the people in the Muslim community pay

respect to the Imams. But in the past, the insurgents have also infiltrated and contaminated the religious organizations. So, the government should protect religious leaders from the insurgents.

Lastly, the head of the village is another important person. If every village has an effective village leader who is dedicated to creating peace and prosperity for his community, the province should have peace. Unfortunately, many village leaders have been induced by the insurgents to join the southern secession. Thus, the government should work in two directions; first, to identify good village leaders and support their roles to establish trust and respect from the villagers. Second, to identify village leaders who were influenced or coerced by the insurgents, then sever those links to the insurgents, and free the village leaders from intimidation. Most of the village leaders are born in local areas and know the details of the village, so the officials should use them as vital tools to create stability in the villages. The village leader will stay in the village for good, but the military will draw back.

D. ASYMMETRIC CONFLICT

Arreguin-Toft's articles illustrate that to conquer a small actor who uses an indirect approach; the strong actor should use the indirect approach against that small actor. Thus, the Thai military should use an indirect approach towards the insurgents in order to win the battle. In this case, to some degree, the military has been blocked by stereotyping. In general, high ranking Thai officers are mostly acquainted with conventional warfare and possess Cold War experience. They tend to embrace a common theme of using overwhelming force to crush the insurgents. But, when the troops are deployed into an area of operation, the troops cannot find the enemy as easily as in a conventional war. Furthermore, the population typically will not have provide any substantial information about the insurgents, resulting in unsuccessful operations. Experience from the Cold War, particularly in fighting communism is quite different from experience in fighting an insurgency. The communists have bases in the forests outside of villages or cities, while today's insurgents are living in houses similar to those of normal people. Some high ranking officers think that capturing or killing more insurgents means that the government is winning the war, yet, nobody knows how many

insurgents there are. Signs of winning should be observed by the cooperation extended by the population, the decrease in insurgency incidents, and the increase in the number of insurgents surrendering. Thus, the conventional soldier should avoid stereotyping and use a more indirect approach than a direct approach.

In conducting PRC, to provide civil security and a secure environment by using an indirect approach, the military may use “invisible tactics” while patrolling and controlling an area. One of the disadvantages for the officials is that the officials have to work in uniform, which can make them easy targets for the insurgents. Thus, to compensate for this disadvantage, the officials should increase the number of civilian uniform officials. Officials who work in civilian clothes will conduct surveillance, identify and track the insurgents’ movements.

In the city, the police can disguise themselves as taxi or bus drivers. This is very helpful because the officials are patrolling and surveying an area without being noticed by the insurgents. The officials can use their skills in observing unusual things in a city. Apart from taxi drivers, the officials can be disguised as homeless individuals or beggars, in order to collect information. In the rural areas, the officials may disguise themselves as school teachers, postmen, or small business merchants. The tactics they can employ may include sending spies into suspected organizations such as schools, charity organizations, mosques, coffee shops, markets and other easily accessed areas. The officials can use local people (after examining their personal history and information) as reporters who continually look for suspected acts or suspected persons and report to the officials. These measures should compensate for the officials’ disadvantages and increase the probability of creating a safe and secure environment in the area of responsibility.

E. THE MALAYAN EMERGENCY

The United Kingdom and the Government of Malaya’s (U.K. /GOM) response toward the insurgency problem during 1948-1960 was an excellent model. Many PRC measures were seriously conducted, particularly in area control, food control, and separating the guerrillas from the people. The advantageous part of this operation was that the U.K. /GOM seriously trained and increased the number of the police instead of the military, enabling the government to enforce law and order in rural areas and carry

out repression with a high degree of legitimacy. Using small military units, rather than large units, is appropriate to deal with the insurgents who have dispersed into many areas.

Lessons learned from the Malayan Emergency, in PRC, are that the Thai military should consider spreading out its battalion or company bases into platoon level bases. The dispersion of force will increase the capability of observation and surveillance as well as limit the freedom of maneuvers of the insurgents. The military should increase on-foot patrols, rather than vehicle patrols, because vehicle patrols are less effective and provide more conspicuous targets. Paramilitary forces can reinforce the military in patrolling and ambushing, but it must be insured that such paramilitary forces understand the rules of engagement. The operations of the paramilitary forces must be conducted in highly legitimate areas only. The village defense volunteers (*Chor Ror Bor*) and village security volunteers (*Or Ror Bor*) need to protect their people and their villages seriously. The officials should use countermeasures against the insurgency's spies that infiltrate the village defense volunteers and village security volunteers.

A checkpoint is one of the official's weakest points in PRC. In most areas, checkpoints do not operate in the morning and evening during rush hours. In some places, checkpoints operate only at night. Many checkpoints are placed in front of military base camps or in front of police stations where they cannot effectively control the direction of vehicles on the roads. Most of the checkpoints never change their locations. "Hasty checkpoints" are rarely used. A weakly functioning checkpoint can open the door of opportunity for the insurgents to move illegal objects through checkpoints during the non-operating time. Most of the checkpoints have not had on-line computer systems that enable the officials to check license plates immediately in order to examine stolen vehicles or suspected persons.

The government should consider increasing the number of police in the area, but the increase should not jeopardize the quality of the police force. At the same time, the police must work with a high degree of legitimacy. The Muslim people in the south still have bad memories of how the police abused their power in recent years. The police are an essential mechanism in a counterinsurgency, as exemplified by the Malayan Emergency. Thus, if the Thai government is able to balance civil/police/military in

operations, that balancing should improve the situation, as opposed to increasing the military and paramilitary forces which may risk further human rights violations and abuses of power. The government must focus on psychological operations and information operations to create understanding and cooperation between the population and the authorities. When the situation improves, the government should decrease the power of the officials and reduce various martial laws in order to protect the people's civil rights. The military should improve PRC measures which will ultimately create a secure environment for the people and separate the insurgents from the people. A deliberate plan is needed to control an area; protect the "green" area, clear and hold the "yellow" and "red" areas – eventually turning them into "green" areas, and lastly, after establishing security areas, expanding them all over the area of operations.

F. SUMMARY RECOMMENDATIONS

As discussed above, in order to win the battle, the government must improve the PRC measures which will create a secure environment where people will receive protection. This is the most important fundamental of operations before the government focuses on other fields. In the past four years, the government has failed to provide security and has lacked substantial information from the people. The war has been protracted. It is not too late for the government to seriously conduct PRC and bring back peace to the southern region. The author's recommendations are:

- The government must implement PRC to "control" an area, not just "cover" an area. In the past, the military saw the necessity of having security forces in an area to control the situation, but the safety of the population and a secure environment could not occur if the security forces did not strictly control and hold an area.
- Controlling an area and annihilating insurgent members in an area is the most important thing to do, because there are many villages to control and it is impossible to control them all at the same time. Thus, the government should:
 - Strengthen "green" villages, aim for self protection, the ability to detect, deny, report and arrest intruders.
 - Consider which "red" or "yellow" villages need to be controlled. The number of villages should be in an acceptable ratio with the troops available: better if beginning with a group of adjacent areas, not a remote area.

- An SF detachment should be the main force of constabulary which is supported by police and paramilitary forces.
 - Paramilitary forces can be used as constabularies after the village is secure and the SF need to move to another area.
 - Strict PRC measure must be conducted in those “yellow” and “red” areas.
 - Conduct a census in each village to know exactly who belong in the village.
- Focus on border crossings both legal and illegal, to identify insurgent members.
 - Request the Malaysia government to record addresses in Malaysia of Thai travelers to Malaysia.
 - Sever support and logistics from external areas.
 - Strict control of IEDs’s compound.
 - Increasing “on-foot” patrolling, avoid routine vehicle patrols.
 - Improve performance at checkpoints:
 - Checkpoints should operate 24 hours a day. During rush hours the official need not stop and search every vehicle but must randomly search or search suspect ones. Closing operations during rush hour will cause ineffective results.
 - Checkpoints should be located at proper points which enable controlling the entrance and departure from specific locations. On a main road, a checkpoint should have enough space for a holding area and search area.
 - Provide on-line computer systems at checkpoints to immediately detect suspected vehicle and persons.
 - Increase performance of hasty checkpoints.
 - Increasing the control over the people by increasing consensus.
 - The government should conduct repression with preemptive not reactive measures, be discriminate not indiscriminate, and only act with high-legitimacy.
 - Increase number of officials in civilian uniform; do not expose them to the public.
 - Establish and train “city volunteers” in order to increase “eyes and ears” in the city.
 - Conduct accurate assessments in order to correct and improve any error in MIDLIFE actions.
 - Support village leaders’ roles and increase cooperation with village leaders to control village area.

- Use an indirect PRC approach such as using local people for secret surveillance and as reporters.
- Disperse military forces into smaller units such as platoon levels. The SF might stay with an infantry platoon for more security.
- Detect insurgency's spies that infiltrate village defense volunteers and village security volunteers.

Effective PRC measures may have more details and tactics than discussed in this thesis. Thus, the military, police or village defense volunteers should convene and exchange experience, pro and con, or differences in implementation in different areas in order to collect all important information and improve PRC measures. Other government efforts and all government agencies should support PRC operations and consider PRC operations as priority missions to execute.

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VI. CONCLUSION

Establishing civil security and a secure environment are substantial in insurgency warfare. If the insurgents can not easily commit their violent crimes against the people and the authorities, the insurgents' influence will decrease. The government should hold an area and keep the people free from the insurgents' coercion. As peaceful environments are established, the people's trust in the government will increase, which will bring about cooperation and the secrecy of the insurgents will be exposed. However, security cannot be achieved unless the government focuses on the population and resources control measures.

Pattani's resistance has continued for generations, since the 1900s. But during the 1960s to 2000s, we have learned that there have been prominent differences in the insurgents' activities and their tactics. Armed struggle had changed from "classic low-intensity conflict" which had guerrillas operating in the rural areas into "terrorist urban combat" which has the insurgents' members operating in the city. The insurgents are more sophisticated, they plan well, and deliberately execute. This change in tactics is more difficult for the government to neutralize effectively. After four and a half years, since the revival of the insurgency began in 2004, the insurgent incidents still continue. The existence of "daily deadly incidents" in 2008 indicates that the insurgents still have freedom of maneuvers despite heavy government suppression.

Although there are many measures and many practices to a counterinsurgency such as information operations, civil affairs, intelligence, political, and economic measures, these efforts do not directly create safe and secure environments for the people. Population and resources control are the most essential to providing civil security which is the most important thing for the government to acquire in order to win an insurgency war.

The Thai government already applies both direct and indirect approaches to cope with the southern insurgency but has not achieved a satisfactory outcome. Even though the interim government, led by (retired) Gen. Surayud Chulanont, changed its strategy to one of conciliation, dissolving the black list, improving legitimacy, and reviving the

SBPAC (Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre) and CPM-43 (43rd joint Civilian-Police-Military Command), the insurgency situation still continues. The security of the people and officials is still at risk. This indicates that there must be a flaw or weakness in the implementations. The government has failed to identify the insurgents and failed to protect the people. The government has failed to annihilate the insurgents because there has been insufficient intelligence about the insurgents.

While the government conducts psychological operations, civil affairs, and improves the living conditions of the population in order to obtain mass support, at the same time, the government must establish civil security and sever the links between the insurgents and the people. Once the people are secure, other measures can be continued. Lessons learned from the counterinsurgency models of the Diamond Model, COIN Military Components, the Basilan Model, A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict, and the Malayan Emergency are definitely essential to helping the Thai government improve its population and resources control.

The Malayan Emergency and the Basilan Model did prove that if the government is able to separate the insurgents from their popular base, and is able to provide civil security, the government will conquer the insurgents. There is a need to place strict PRC measures in an area of active support of the insurgency. There is a need to increase patrolling and surveillance to limit the freedom of the insurgents. There is a need to establish secure areas and expand them to the last village.

In approaching the people, the officials must break down obstacles that have been creating blocks between the people and the officials. If the officials are able to dissolve these obstacles—distrust; perceived low-legitimate operations; injustice; coercion by the insurgents; and new insurgent recruits; as well as language, cultural and religious differences—and operate with a perceived high-legitimacy, dissolve the insurgents' coercion (by improved PRC measures), cease new recruiting, enhance justice, and improve cultural awareness; trust will be restored the people. The government will obtain “consensus” and finally “control” the people.

Weak points of the military in PRC implementation must be corrected and improved as soon as possible. Routine change and insufficiency of the constabulary force seems to be an important problem apart from inaccurate assessment, laxness at checkpoints, infiltration of the insurgents into village defense volunteer forces, and problems in providing a secure environment in rural areas. Without a dedicated and skilled constabulary force and its components, the government will be unable to turn “red” villages into “green.” Without creating “green” villages, the government will fight this war without victory.

In its history, the Thai government has had little comprehension of Islam, and all legislation has originated from the central Buddhist government. Many rules and laws were based on Buddhist law, not Islamic law. Government officials who worked in the south were, in the majority, Buddhist, and did not understand Muslim customs and culture. The government in Bangkok did not pay serious attention to petitions from Muslims in the south. The head of the government usually came from the military, sometimes the autocracy, and was hard-handed when dealing with the southern problem. All of these issues together created grievances which are the root cause of the insurgency.

The revival of the insurgency today not only stems from the perpetual ideology of secession, but also is added to by the global trend of jihad and abusive government officials. Moreover, the wrong handling of the government initially caused an escalation of the situation. After almost twenty years of peace and an absence of any insurgency problem in the southern border and all other regions in Thailand, the government and the new generation of the military now are having a difficult time dealing with the insurgency. The reinstallation of a secure environment in the three southernmost provinces is the key to ending this situation of unrest.

Thus, even if the government is able to conquer the 2000s insurgency, a long term plan and implementation to sustain the peace and prosperity in the southernmost provinces must be provided. The long term plan might be a good thesis topic for other scholars who are interested in the southern Thailand insurgency.

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