COUNTERING TERRORIST IDEOLOGIES:
A RATIONAL ACTOR AND GAME THEORETIC ANALYSIS OF
DE-RADICALIZATION PROGRAMS FOR
AL-JEMAAH AL-ISLAMIYAH PRISONERS
IN SINGAPORE AND INDONESIA

by

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December 2008

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ABSTRACT

Countering terrorist ideologies is a task that relies exclusively on trust in an authority and the matching of incentives to individual needs for any success to be realized. Broad messaging campaigns undertaken by both physically and/or culturally removed authorities have little impact due to credibility problems and tendencies to overgeneralize. This thesis, proposing that successful counter-ideology occurs at the level of the individual, constitutes a rational actor and game theoretic analysis of counter-ideology programs in Indonesia and Singapore, evaluating their unique, individually targeted approaches to the problem of terrorist detainee de-radicalization. A survey of the Al-Jemaah Al-Islamiyah (JI) terrorist group’s cultural elements provides specific vulnerabilities which are available be used against the individual detainee’s attraction to the JI ideology. While both programs rely upon the influence of an authority to de-radicalize prisoners, they achieve this goal through very different ways of targeting individual vulnerabilities, building trust, and administering incentives. In the end, establishing detainee trust in diverse authorities is shown to be plausible, as is using de-radicalized prisoners and the newly trusted authority to influence prisoners to give up at least portions of the ideology. The results are categorized with respect to design of future counter-ideology and de-radicalization programs.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The aftermath of the devastating 2002 attack in Kuta Beach, Bali, Indonesia, by the terrorist group Al-Jemaah Al-Islamiyah (JI) saw greatly increased counterterrorism efforts throughout Southeast Asia. Both Singapore and Indonesia eventually established terrorist detainee de-radicalization programs to defuse the JI ideology as an augmentation to their aggressive law enforcement crackdowns. These programs, however, differ greatly in the methods they use in countering radical ideologies, yet both are rooted in the need to address the needs of the individual prisoner.

This attention to the individual is justified in theory, as a survey of the literature of countering ideologies shows that messaging by distant or non-credible actors is ineffective. The most vulnerable “dimensions” of an ideology available for manipulation are the affective and evaluative dimensions, or the ideology’s appeal to an individual’s emotional and psychological needs and the ideology’s judgments leveled against outsiders, respectively. Other ideological dimensions may be addressed by other counterterrorism initiatives.

Convincing a detainee to de-radicalize, therefore, is to influence an individual’s decision making. The rational actor framework is a natural way to view this process. The rational actor model – along with its attendant, mathematical representations in game theory – cast an individual’s decisions as one of weighing the benefits and detractions of individual choices. Imperfect information and limits on an individual’s rationality may also affect an individual’s decisions, and these may be exposed after an in-depth survey of the decision-making context.

Such an analysis into the context of a terrorist group’s attraction to individuals and ideological judgments is required to influence prisoners’ decisions. JI detainees, the target of both de-radicalization programs, are shown to have unique characteristics which can be used by the de-radicalizing authorities. These characteristics can be divided into categories of trust and influence: trust in the group’s relationships which notes the JI social milieu; trust as a personality trait or personal enablers of trust which suggest
individuals’ preferences and psychological tendencies toward group identification; legitimate power or trust as a cultural rule which applies to intra-group influence; and referent power or in-group identity which defines how the group members think about themselves. Presumably, strong counter-ideology programs would address as many of these trust and influence elements as possible with respect to the two aforementioned dimensions of the ideology.

The Singapore effort, established by the Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG), comprehensively addresses two of the four trust and influence categories: trust in relationships and referent power. The RRG’s program casts the de-radicalization problem as one of misunderstanding of the tenets of Islam, and the resultant approach is one of reeducation in the correct understanding. This requires the establishment of trust between the detainee and the counselor (an Islamic scholar) and, with the exception of an unintended incentive in the form of family care administered by the same group, necessitates the surrender of the JI identity to be considered successful. To date, 44 of more than 70 detainees have de-radicalized to the point where an interagency panel has recommended that they be released from prison with monitoring.

The Indonesian National Police’s program, by contrast, uses senior police officers as handlers for high-status detainees. All four of the trust and influence categories are addressed. These detainees, influential to their subordinates, are targeted with efforts to build trust in the handlers but, crucially, are encouraged to keep their JI in-group identity. If they cooperate, these influential detainees can use their maintained identities to approach other, lower-ranking individuals and convince them to also de-radicalize. Only a small surrender of the evaluative dimension is required, however, as securing intents not to commit violence are judged to outweigh the value (and time and expense) of full de-radicalization. Heavy use of incentives is also central to the strategy, as family care, better living conditions, and access to perks like laptops and cell phones tempt detainees to cooperate. Out of a total of approximately 200 detainees approached, 100 are reported to have cooperated with 20 to 30 of this number representing the influential detainees.

After the in-depth analyses, three observations central to the conduct of these two de-radicalization programs emerge. 1. Establishing trust. Trust of the detainee in the
counselor or handler is crucial to the success of both programs. This trust is, in both programs, established through a volume of one-on-one contact and potentially through the administering of incentives. As the first decision in the process, establishing trust both confirms the handler/counselor’s credibility and enables further actions of influence.  

2. The role of incentives. While it can be argued that family care emerged as an unintended incentive in Singapore, it is evident that this incentive in both programs fosters a sense of indebtedness which is a powerful tool in generating trust. In Indonesia the addition of more tangible incentives also plays a role. Determining the likelihood of an incentive causing a decision to rehabilitate can be accomplished if enough is known about how a detainee values certain options and the context in which he makes his choice. This places a high priority on intelligence or other such efforts to gauge the needs of the individual. The use of a large amount of incentives to secure cooperation may, however, lead to a sort of false de-radicalization; with few other options, many detainees may be prone to appear to cooperate.  

3. The role of influence. Both programs use influence to de-radicalize detainees. Singapore uses the newly established trust in the religious counselor as a launching point to influence the detainee’s understanding of Islam. Indonesia employs senior detainees who de-radicalize and cooperate to influence junior ones. The latter strategy works, at least in some cases, but also constitutes a security risk if the influencer’s actions are not controlled or if their intentions are not vetted. Of note, both programs make limited use of the trust as a personality trait category of ideological elements; more could be done here. 

While conditionally successful with respect to the countries’ individual security environments and their framing of the problem, the strengths and weaknesses of the RRG and Indonesian police’s programs should serve as guidance for other de-radicalization efforts. Designing a highly effective program would involve an interagency and closely controlled effort that addresses as many trust, influence, and ideological elements as is possible in the specific context. Additionally, the successes evident in these programs could only be amplified with a better understanding of a range of issues requiring further study like the role of peer influence, the relationship between de-radicalization and counter-radicalization, and the psychological power of matching incentives to needs.
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I. INTRODUCTION

_Fear can only prevail when victims are ignorant of the facts._

*Thomas Jefferson*

A. PURPOSE AND SCOPE

On the night of 12 October, 2002, a young man walked into the packed Paddy’s Pub in Kuta Beach, Bali, Indonesia at just after 11 PM. He was carrying a backpack; when he got close to the DJ booth he flipped a switch to detonate explosives that were concealed in the pack, instantly killing himself and creating panic among the bar’s patrons who began to flee the building. Meanwhile, another young man named was parked outside in a Mitsubishi L300 van, directly in front of the nearby Sari Club. Fifteen seconds after the backpack bomb was detonated and as the streets were filling with curious onlookers and the panicked who were running out of Paddy’s, the second man detonated more than a ton of explosives hidden in the van. The bomb’s damage was immense, leaving a one-meter deep crater in the roadway, destroying surrounding buildings, starting fires, and killing scores instantly. Others were not so lucky, succumbing to burns and trauma as the small local hospital was overwhelmed with the heavy casualty count. In all, 202 people died and another 209 were wounded in the attack.

The 2002 Bali bombing (there was another, smaller attack in Bali in 2005) jolted Indonesia “out of its denial” regarding the existence of a homegrown, Islamic terrorist threat, triggering the country’s robust counterterrorism response (“Indonesian court rejects final appeal for Bali bomber,” 2007, September 7). Attention was focused on a threat that the country had largely ignored to that point despite numerous warnings from the U.S. and other countries in the region. The terrorist group Al-Jemaah Al-Islamiyah (Islamic Community – JI), a virulent outgrowth of Indonesia’s Darul Islam movement with an Al-Qaeda-like goal of establishing a Southeast Asian Caliphate (Islamic state) under _sharia_ (Islamic law), was soon determined to be behind the attack. It became clear
that the two Bali suicide bombers did not undertake their actions alone, but were part of a much larger JI plot, having only been recruited for their “martyrdom” shortly before the event. Instead, the Bali operation was deliberately planned by a dedicated contingent of JI leadership who serve as the keepers and propagators of JI’s ideology. Members such as Amrozi, Abdul Aziz (a.k.a. Imam Samudra), Ali Imron, Hambali, Ali Ghufron (a.k.a. Mukhlas), and Dulmatin (many Indonesians go by just one name) were the main operational leaders in the Bali attack. They also formed the bulk of JI’s operational expertise and served as the keepers of JI’s extremist worldview through their shared experiences of ideological conversion and training in *jihad*.

In response to the Bali disaster, law enforcement responses throughout Southeast Asia have captured more than 400 JI operatives since 2002. Of those leaders responsible for the Bali blast listed above, only Dulmatin has thus far eluded arrest; Amrozi, Imam Samudra, and Mukhlas currently await implementation of their death sentences for their parts in Bali, Hambali was captured in 2003 and is in US custody at Guantanamo, and Ali Imron is in police detention but quietly spearheads a government-sponsored anti-violence campaign. Arrests and trials have not been enough to curb JI’s message of radical Islam, however, as plots and weapons caches continue to be unearthed, especially in Indonesia. Clearly, in addition to arrests, counterterrorism efforts that address the group’s motivating ideology are required to get at the root of JI’s extremist appeals.

This notion that terrorist groups’ ideologies are a key vulnerability is not a groundbreaking one. Terrorists have, in a sense, been entirely defined by their ideologies, spawning at least four ideologically themed “waves” of terrorist motivation in modern times (Rapoport, 2004). Like all political groups, ideology is crucial to the functioning of terrorist organizations as it provides the central *raison d’etre* from which groups’ programmatic elements take their purpose. An ideology – and this is not restricted to terrorist groups – is

> an emotion-laden, myth-saturated, action-related system of beliefs and values about people and society, legitimacy and authority, that is acquired to a large extent as a matter of faith and habit … ideologies have a high potential for mass mobilization, manipulation, and control; in that sense, they are mobilized belief systems (Rejai, 1995, p. 11)
The U.S., in its role as a leader in the global struggle against Islamic extremism, notes this importance of terrorist ideologies in its 2006 National Strategy for Countering Terrorism, stating that “terrorism ultimately depends upon the appeal of an ideology that excuses or even glorifies the deliberate killing of innocents. Islam has been twisted to serve an evil end.” In this statement one can see the elements of emotion, faith-based generation, and a mobilized belief system from the preceding quote. Even JI’s own documents call for the establishment of a Caliphate through religious “molding” of individuals, families, and the jemaah (group/Islamic community) in response to secular and corrupt governments and the necessity of military armed struggle to reach these ends (Pavlova, 2006, p. 90).

Two unique initiatives to counter this state-threatening ideology have appeared in Singapore and Indonesia: religious rehabilitation of detained JI members and co-opting the group’s leadership for de-radicalization, respectively. The former is implemented by the Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG) which is comprised of 30 volunteer members of the Singaporean ulama (Islamic scholars) who provide religious counseling sessions for the detainees and their families with the goal of releasing the prisoners back into society. In Indonesia, the National Police’s de-radicalization program uses repentant JI leaders to co-opt other detainees into a counter-ideological program with the goal of interrupting the transmission of the ideology. Both programs are unique in that they avoid the obvious response of broad, counter-ideological messaging campaigns to compete with the group’s “story,” focusing instead on changing the beliefs of individuals in the JI network.

This thesis uses a survey of counter-ideology theory combined with case-study evidence in an attempt to advance the understanding of how to best counter the ideological attraction at the level of the individual. The pragmatic task at hand is to answer the following question: are real-world applications of the strategies of reforming or co-opting detained extremists effective in reducing the number of adherents to ideologies of Islamic terrorist groups? Using evidence from the programs in Singapore and Indonesia to reform and co-opt detained members in the JI terrorist network, this thesis asks how valuable these strategies are in reducing the attraction of terrorist
ideologies to the point of reducing group membership. Using the rational choice approach as specified in its political science guise and applying game theory methodology where competition between two or more parties is observed, success is judged by measures of the status (“quality”) of those who reform (i.e., value to the organization and/or influential effect on others), numbers of total defections from the terrorist group, and the comprehensiveness of the programs relative to their processes and targeted ideological elements. The ultimate value of such programs rests, of course, in a reduction of terrorism’s strategic effects, therefore the level of violence existing since the programs’ inceptions must also considered. In short, this thesis examines the efficacy of counter-ideology strategies that are focused on each individual terrorist member’s unique circumstances as opposed to tactics that target the group as a whole.

It is important to also note what this thesis does not address. Counter-terrorism is a widely inclusive discipline; this study only analyzes a small and unique issue in the repertoire. While important in certain scenarios external to the concerns of individual terrorists, the use of broad information operations or strategic communications to wage a war of ideas targeted at broader swaths of the population is not studied and is indeed shown in Chapter II to be largely ineffective in counter-ideology efforts. Similarly, traditional law enforcement methods of capturing/killing terrorists is important to this thesis only in the basic sense that the detainees provide the starting point for a counter-ideology program. The Singaporean and Indonesian programs are also examples of “de-radicalization” efforts which target individuals’ subscription to the ideology instead of “counter-radicalization,” a related method which targets larger, at-risk audiences with different strategies (Schulze, 2008). Again, more about this distinction may be found in Chapter II.

B. OUTLINE

This study uses a mixed-methods approach to determine the effectiveness of the unique Singaporean and Indonesian strategies in countering JI’s extremist ideology. Qualitative methods are used in Chapters II and III, with Chapter II serving as the point of departure for the understanding of the rational choice model and the component parts
of Islamic terrorist group ideologies. This model is compared to other extant methods that suggest the importance of group dynamics, and the follow-on presentation of the important dimensions of ideologies then lays the groundwork for a more detailed consideration of a specific case. Chapter II’s theoretical discussion is followed by a presentation of the JI background and context in Chapter III. This chapter examines the current status of the group and its ideological tenets, the rise of the ideology as it developed during founders Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir’s own radicalization, and the dynamics of group identity, trust, and influence within the network. At the end of the chapter, the evidence is categorized with respect to the theoretical concepts from Chapters II – components of ideologies and trust and influence within the group – for use in the analyses of the remaining chapters.

Chapters IV and V constitute the bulk of the empirical investigation of the counter-ideology strategies in the Singapore and Indonesian cases. These chapters use both qualitative and quantitative methods – the latter in the form of game theory analysis – in analyzing the categorized variables as developed in Chapters II and III (presented at the end of Chapter III) to measure effectiveness. The evidence is used to model each program’s processes, capturing the choices and considerations facing detained JI members and the techniques that the Islamic scholars and government officials use to gradually discredit the group’s ideology. These choices are then quantified to depict simple preferences and valuations and subjected, along with the context of the available options, to analysis using methods from game theory which are discussed at length in Chapter II. The results of this analysis, empirically tested given discrete assumptions which are presented in each scenario, are then used to show the nuances of each program’s strategies.
II. COUNTERING TERRORIST IDEOLOGIES: THEORY AND METHODOLOGY

Tis a kind of good deed to say well, And yet words are no deeds.

William Shakespeare, from Henry VIII

A. IDEOLOGIES OF “FOURTH-WAVE” TERRORIST GROUPS

While the concept of terrorism may initially seem to be an easy one to grasp, its definition is sufficiently fraught with difficulties to the point that there is not one that is universally accepted. Arriving at a “correct” definition of terrorism is beyond the scope of this thesis, but to study the ideologies behind this phenomenon it is necessary to understand at least some of the basic components. An act of terrorism includes the actors involved such as the terrorist group, the population, and the government, a certain amount of violence, and the terrorist group’s political goal that is sought after through psychological coercion of an audience (M. Freeman, class materials, Naval Postgraduate School). While there is debate about what constitutes the difference between terrorism, crime, and insurgency and whether an attack is terrorism if it targets anything other than the population, for purposes here it is sufficient to say that terrorism is a violent act perpetrated by a relatively small and tightly knit group against a deliberate target, the audience of which is a target of political influence.

If terrorism is a means to achieve a political end, what then are the components of a group’s political motivation, or ideology? Mostafa Rejai (1995) provides a framework for the analysis of more traditional political ideologies such as communism and nationalism which he also extends to apply to newer ideologies like environmentalism and feminism. This framework breaks down groups’ ideologies into component parts which address different aspects of the driving purpose behind political action. Rejai proposes that five “dimensions” comprise an ideology: the cognitive dimension, or a group’s knowledge and beliefs that form its worldview; the affective dimension, or the “emotive content” that deepen the ideology and also characterize its flexibility; the
evaluative dimension, or methods a group uses to make positive or negative value judgments; the programmatic dimension, or actions specified to keep or change the social order; and the social-base dimension, or the organization of popular support that powers the ideology (pp. 4-10). These components serve to organize the belief system as it “proposes to move toward a ‘good society’” (p. 8).

While Rejai’s dimensions of ideologies aren’t specifically applied to terrorist ideologies, it is clear that the belief systems of the current wave of terrorism – what David Rapoport (2004) labels the historical “fourth wave” of religiously inspired terrorism – follow most of these tenets. Religion itself, as a motivation for political change, can qualify as an ideology in peaceful groups; evidence of the political stances of religious groups surrounds us everyday. The specific ideologies of violent groups, however, warrant special consideration (as befits this thesis) as they are particularly constructed to overcome the individual’s natural abhorrence of indiscriminate killing and the limited public attraction of their radical goals (Crenshaw, 1998, and Moghaddam, 2005).

While there are scattered instances of non-Islam religious terrorism in the fourth wave, Islam remains the most pervasive motivation. Islamic terrorist groups have produced the biggest attacks and are the biggest strategic concern of the U.S.-led global struggle against religious extremism (Rapoport, 2004). Al-Qaeda’s ideology provides a good representation of the general characteristic of Islamic terrorist groups vilifying the West. Following the ideas of Egyptian Islamist Sayyid Qutb and others, Al-Qaeda views the West and Israel as a threat to the sanctity of Islam and demands *jihad* against the West’s corrupting influence. The goal is the eventual founding of a worldwide Caliphate under *sharia* to recreate the perceived golden age of early Islamic rule. By focusing on these core beliefs, Al-Qaeda’s (and, by extension, similar groups’) political influence is less about the individual’s actions and more about the dominance of the ideology (Hassan, 2006).

Obviously, ideas themselves aren’t deadly, so the translation of the ideas into action is a critical part of the ideological process. For instance, recruiting for JI as well as the Abu Sayyaf Group and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in the Philippines
involves the gradual introduction of spectacular evidence that “prove” that the West and the Zionists are in a crusade to eliminate Islam (Ressa, 2006, and Singapore “White paper,” 2003). This stokes the emotional responses of the recruit to the point that, if managed well, elicits an individual’s vengeful reaction that begets membership in the terrorist group (affective dimension). Additionally, Al-Qaeda relies upon familial and other close social connections to operate its decentralized network, further strengthening its already-strong in-group identity and out-group hatred (evaluative dimension) (Sageman, 2004). Close social ties are also evident in the diasporas of marginalized second or third generation Muslim immigrants in the UK, as they form loosely knit cells from which radical mosques can recruit operatives and secure operational support (social-base dimension) (Hoffman, Rosenau, Curiel, & Zommermann, 2007). Finally, the programmatic dimension is obvious in all of these groups – killings, bombings, and other violence are used toward the goals of weakening target governments and advancing the cause of *sharia* and the Caliphate.

**B. COUNTERING IDEOLOGIES: ACCESSIBLE DIMENSIONS**

If ideologies are the mechanism by which radical ideas are translated into motivations for terrorism, it follows then that influencing ideologies should be part of any state’s efforts to counter terrorism. Simply applying coercive power to arrest or kill terrorist group members may have the practical impact of limiting a group’s operational capacity (affecting the programmatic dimension) but it does nothing to curb the ideological translation process; in fact, the repressive use of force may further entrench an extremist or counter-state ideology (Goodwin, 2001, p. 26). Chapter III covers this phenomenon more thoroughly. Unless the ideology that gave rise to the terrorism dies out on its own, the root cause of the violence will persist.

If a state decides to counter an ideology, it may be natural to assume a primary strategy of discrediting the group’s skewed worldview. Such suggestions permeate the literature of counter-ideological work, as recommendations that Western countries use “strategic communication” to reach mass audiences in order to discredit terrorist groups at the population level abound. Suggestions that using Western-generated messaging to
emphasize “simple, situation-specific interpretations,” apply the right “lexicon,” and “avoid engaging in debate on any particular religious claims” would seem to imply that the simple act of properly constructing a message can mitigate extremism. In such views, while other actions on the ground may be undertaken in support of the intended message, the best and therefore primary strategy is assumed to be one of mass communication, as “good communicators reveal … that they understand the motives and aspirations of their audiences – and it is via this understanding that they gain their sympathies” (Zalman, 2008). This line of thinking can lead to resulting propositions aimed at restoring the “trust in America’s word” in order to stave off a looming “clash of civilizations,” with examples ranging from establishing “C-SPANs for the Muslim world,” beefing up the U.S.’s public diplomacy efforts, and investing in establishing “American Centers” to disseminate pro-U.S. messages in contested regions (Amr & Singer, 2008).

Such initiatives to counter the ideology’s cognitive dimension, however, are unlikely to be effective at the group level where radical ideologies are maintained. While methods of communication or even capacity-building may indeed have positive effects on large portions of the population, the impact of mass messaging on existing bands of radicals with strong in-group ties is likely to be weak. These broad strategies often tend to over-generalize specific concepts like the impact of madrassahs (Islamic schools) and Salafism, while paying little attention to root grievances and building trust in government (Hassan, 2006). Mohamed Bin Ali (2008) also addresses this in a general sense when noting that “winning the hearts and minds of Muslims cannot be achieved by western-style television or radio stations, which appeal only to tiny, secularized minorities. It can only be done through the authority and legitimacy of Islam itself.” This is presumably due to the questionable credibility of an outsider administering of the message. In both of these contexts, even though messaging may be appeal to the moderate majority, the radical worldviews of a tiny minority in the population are unlikely to change. Thus, while terrorist groups are insulated in choosing extremism in otherwise moderate populations, a lack of popular support (social-base dimension) is not likely to affect the groups’ actions.
To be sure, this is not to say that communicating with populations can be ignored when contemplating certain types of information campaigns. In cases where the difference between a marginalized extremist group and an expanding insurgency hinges on popular support, attention to the populace can be a crucial detail in tamping down violence. Colonel Ralph Baker (2005) notes as much in his documentation of lessons learned from the early days of the U.S.-led occupation of Iraq. His information operations (IO) strategy against a potentially explosive insurgency evolved from an ineffective method of using centrally controlled, universal messaging to become specifically targeted, timely (at the expense of central control), and focused on building popular trust. Instead of “winning the hearts and minds of Iraqis,” an unlikely proposition, Baker documents that a more practical “earning the trust and confidence” strategy allowed for incrementally small but eventually significant gains in public cooperation.

It is important to realize, however, that even Baker’s IO lessons don’t address the root issue of the existence of an extremist element, instead settling on mitigating the appeal to the wider population. This study addresses the former concern with the resultant goal being that the extremists’ level of popular appeal never approaches what Baker experienced. What, then, can be done in attempts to chip away at the entrenched ideologies around which terrorist groups coalesce? The answer lies again in two of Rejai’s (1995) dimensions. If attempting to influence the cognitive dimension through mass appeals is unlikely to have significant effects due to terrorist groups’ independence from the larger social-base dimension, and if the programmatic dimension falls more under the purview of law enforcement’s more direct actions, the answer, then, lies in the affective and evaluative dimensions. In short, what is needed is a specifically targeted approach in which potential or current terrorists are introduced to ideas that credibly counter an ideology’s emotional appeal, inflexibility, and judgments.

The affective dimension of ideologies, as already noted, is the appeal to emotion that deepens the appeal of the worldview and constrains its flexibility. Both heightened emotion and inflexibility of beliefs are central to terrorist groups’ operations. Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, a former member of Indonesia’s Darul Islam movement and the founder of JI
and the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI – Indonesian Mujahidin Conference), expresses both of these extremist ideological characteristics routinely in public speeches. A Ba’asyir sermon from 2002 notes the following in addressing the Western enemy:

we reject all of your beliefs, we reject all of your ideologies, we reject all of your teachings that are associated with social issues, economics or beliefs. Between you and us there will forever be a ravine of hate and we will be enemies until you follow Allah's law.

Such statements represent the strengthening of the worldview within the circle of jihadis. The Singapore “White paper” (2003) documents the application of this dimension with respect to the country’s JI arrests. The paper notes that the recruitment process for JI’s Singapore cell involved two distinct phases, both of which used emotion to transmit an inflexible ideology. In the first phase, cell leaders who were leading mass Islamic study groups inserted quotations denoting the worldwide suffering of Muslims into the lectures. Students who expressed additional interest were then ushered into the second phase, an extended period – up to 18 months – in which students were exposed to the “secrecy over the true knowledge of the jihad” and finally indoctrinated into the exclusive group. To leave the group was to be branded an infidel, and rigid adherence to the ideology was ensured through oaths of allegiance, appeals for martyrdom, and emotional sermons.

If the affective dimension is internally focused, then the evaluative dimension is focused externally. Recalling Rejai’s (1995) definition, this dimension represents a group’s value judgments. Fourth wave terrorist groups use this dimension as the impetus for action, casting sentence on Islam’s “enemies.” Perhaps the best known example is Osama bin Laden’s 1996 “declaration of war,” accusing Americans of “aggression” and injustices that requires violent opposition to correct (Ibrahim, R., 2007, pp. 11-.14).

Often these judgments come from a group’s leadership, the structure of which often imitates the hierarchy of the ulama, the group of Islamic scholars who interpret Islamic law and issue verdicts. In many cases, terrorist group leadership supplants the authority of the ulama and may even consider mainstream Muslim leaders as apostates. An example of this is the 1998 fatwa (religious decree) by the World Islamic Front that
establishes the offensive nature of the worldwide jihad. In what would become the central core for the worldwide jihadi ideology of attacking the “far enemy” in order to expose traitorous nature of allied Muslim governments, the verdict sentences “Americans and their allies” to death for occupation of sacred lands, support for Israel, and general war against Muslims (Sageman, 2004, pp. 19, 22).

Thus, the two main areas in which ideologies spread among the individual members of terrorist groups are through the affective and evaluative dimensions. Terrorist group leaders use manipulated emotion to instill hatred of the enemy and secure dedication of recruits and use their in-group, legitimated worldview to cast judgments and sentence the enemy to violent reprisals. The question then is how to specifically counter these two ideological dimensions.

Subversive groups like terror organizations are more vulnerable than single individuals, suffering an increased potential of compromise with an increase in membership. These groups need, however, to transmit ideologies to new recruits and maintain ideologies within the membership. To protect themselves, groups exhibit tendencies of cliques which are small groups “built on human similarities.” This close networking of members puts pressures on prospective participants to join, defines a certain social reality for the ever more intimate friends, and facilitates the development of a shared collective social identity and strong emotional feelings for the in-group. (Sageman, 2004, pp. 152-154)

Such groupings may serve as replacements for individuals’ social alienations, forming strong bonds of trust among the members as they share “virtual bonds to abstractions such as God and the umma” (Islamic society) as reactions to missing bonds to Muslim mainstream society (pp. 146-149). These bonds may eventually grow to be deep enough that individuals surrender much of their personal identity and instead assume the in-group identity as expressed by group norms. This is especially true when, as in the case of terrorist groups, the collective identity is the key to groups’ effectiveness (Taylor & Louis, 2004, p. 180). The cohesiveness of a group, therefore, strengthens the dimensions of its ideology.
Thus, to be effective in countering an ideology is to be effective in weakening the ideological resolve of the group’s members, not in the larger population. Only when individuals with close ties to and credibility within the group begin to question the ideology can it be weakened. This, in turn, can breed sufficient credibility in a counter-ideology campaign that may induce the participation of others in a sort of positive feedback loop. The problems of implementing such a strategy are compounded by the fact that terrorist groups manipulate available information to their members to perpetuate their ideologies. By introducing carefully selected information that emotionally agitates members and using manipulated teachings to justify negative judgments against outsiders, terrorist groups essentially impose limits on the options of their members and recruits. As would-be terrorists proceed higher on the narrowing “staircase to the terrorist act” during recruitment and ideological buy-in, there are “fewer and fewer choices” available to them, represented by fewer branches of the individual’s “decision tree” (Moghaddam, 2005). Such a control of information serves as a constraint on the membership’s available options. Countering terrorist group ideologies therefore, in addition to the requirement of changing individual valuations, also requires the elimination of the artificial bounds placed on individual choice that are emplaced by terrorist groups; only when those vulnerable to such strategies have all available information can they begin to rejoin the mainstream.

C. RATIONAL CHOICE IN COUNTERING IDEOLOGIES

The problem in any counter-ideology program is, of course, how to “turn” individuals. Possible methods a state might use are co-opting terrorist leaders, reeducating extremists, fostering political divisions between individuals within the group, or highlighting the negative impacts of a terrorist group’s methods in order to convince individuals that they are on the wrong path. The methods to affect these individual conversions must, as already noted, also address the affective and evaluative dimensions of the ideology.

What is missing up to this point is a guiding political theory that can be used to organize an ideological response by best considering these conditions. If the most
effective approach to countering ideologies lies at the level of the individual terrorists –
considering the limits on their available options, their valuations, and the need to address
the affective and evaluative ideological dimensions – then such requirements support the
utilization of the rational actor model of decision making. This model assumes that an
individual seeks to maximize his or her utility after careful consideration of the costs and
benefits of available options. In the traditional application of this approach to decision
making,

the rational decision problem is reduced to a simple matter of selecting
among a set of given alternatives, each of which has a given set of
consequences: the agent selects the alternative whose consequences are
preferred in terms of the agent’s utility function which ranks each set of
consequences in order of preference. (Allison & Zelikow, 1999, p. 17)

This model of rational choice assumes “comprehensive rationality” which assumes near-
ideal access to information and does not account for limitations in the individual making
the decision (pp. 19-20). Limitations of this approach are traditionally proposed to stem
from the unpredictability of specific contextual factors and the flaws introduced by the
individual’s efforts at strategic interaction (i.e., the amount of risk he or she is
comfortable in assuming) (p. 23).

In contrast to comprehensive rationality, however, the concept of bounded
rationality, or the act of rational decision making without perfect access to information, is
more in keeping with the notion of terrorist groups as controllers of information. It
accounts for the “inescapable limitations of knowledge and computational ability of the
agent” (p. 20). Bounded rationality best defines a potential inductee’s situation at the
moment he or she decides to join a terrorist group – as opposed to the moment of
committing the terrorist act as Moghaddam (2005) suggests – as the terrorist group has
manipulated information and restricted available alternatives through a carefully executed
process of recruitment. Specifics of the group’s appeal to the individual are addressed
later in this study, but the individual’s departure from societal norms and the rule of law
for an existence of greatly increased personal hardship constitutes what George Tsebelis
(1990) calls an “apparently suboptimal choice” (p. 5). Such choices, though, reflect an actual or “realistic” response to missing/omitted information or manipulations of informational meaning.

“Non-actor theories,” or those political theories that posit effects from effects of “classes or groups,” are also rational but explain the existence of small groups less effectively than theory focused on individuals (p. 21). Attempting to explain a terrorist ideology using sociology or structuralism, for instance, inevitably leads to generalized conclusions, and such generalizations can miss considering the roots of the group’s cohesiveness. Studies at the group level of analysis can reveal the structure and dynamics of the collective as the relationships define it, but cannot account for individual values or motivations. The usefulness of such studies to counter-terrorism lies in the ability to identify major nodes of coalescence which can be compromised. Stuart Koschade’s (2006) social network analysis of JI, for example, provides an excellent operational snapshot of the network employed for the 2002 Bali bombing but accounts little for the contextual dynamics behind JI’s operations. Other social network analyses have gone as far to specify the nature of JI’s intra-group social links, but again there is a limitation in that these studies cannot produce the individual’s vulnerabilities required to counter ideologies.

For social movement theorists like Doug McAdam (2003), group-level models invariably rank the power of group identity as the most important factor, with the social attractions of a situation are generalized to mean “the central sources of meaning and identity” while presumably minimizing the importance of other utility or contextual factors. This ranking of “solidarity incentives above all others” is tied closely to “mechanisms” by which a potential recruit considers issues of identity alone when deciding on whether or not to participate in a social movement (p. 287). Consideration of group identity is undoubtedly important in shaping individual valuations – this is covered in depth in Chapter III – but this argument falls short if other factors besides identity are more valued by the individual with respect to membership in a particular group. That some terrorists in Singapore and Indonesia defect from the group during counter-radicalization programs suggests higher values placed on factors other than group
solidarity. Herein lies the strength of rational choice and bounded rationality in particular; it allows for the assignment of values to any variables present in the scenario to determine the specific social dynamics of the singular event without assuming the *a priori* primacy of any one consideration. Rational choice provides an approach to analyzing the costs and benefits of the individual terrorist’s decision as closely as possible while acknowledging imperfect access to information and considering the effects of context.

This study is thusly focused on the important topic of countering the ideological attraction of terrorism at the level of the individual. This is to say that the *content* of the worldview, or the ideological “story,” should not necessarily be the prime target of efforts, but rather that the individual’s *valuations* placed on variables during the decision are the logical points of contention to ultimately discount the appeal of terrorist group membership. Possible variables that a potential inductee could values might include religion, economic well-being, support for the Islamic community, or personal psychological needs for, among other things, a “no fuss path to heaven” (Singapore “White paper,” 2003). These form the context in which the final joining decision is framed. If a source from outside the group (i.e., governmental authority or reform effort) can introduce information from outside the bounds of the individual’s rational universe, these variables may potentially be reinterpreted and hence revalued, possibly causing the abandonment or modified acceptance of the extremist ideology. The de-radicalization programs in Singapore and Indonesia, detailed in-depth in Chapters IV and V, represent such efforts.

**D. METHODOLOGY**

In effect, understanding how individuals maintain their terrorist ideologies can provide a blueprint for use in developing a program to effect the relinquishment of the ideologies. Such counter-ideology campaigns represent a relatively new development in the realm of counter-terrorism, as research has historically focused on terrorist recruitment and involvement, leaving a “significant gap in our knowledge.” There has been little effort to “facilitate or promote disengagement at any level” of the terrorist
process (italics original). Note that this concept of “disengagement” is not necessarily a result of the surrender of the ideology; terrorists can abandon the strategy of terror without de-radicalizing (Horgan, 2008). The literature reflects this assertion, as effort has been devoted to the making of a terrorist (Crenshaw, 1998, and Moghaddam, 2005) and even defining a “life cycle” of a terrorist that ends in the terrorist act (Davis & Jenkins, 2002).

In agreement with John Horgan (2008), this thesis addresses this emerging issue of disengagement from terrorism, but from an opposing standpoint that the two main counter-ideology case studies do indeed represent the de-radicalization of detained terrorists. Both the Indonesian and Singaporean programs address how individuals can be convinced to give up aspects of the ideology, in part or in full. While Horgan and Zachary Abuza (2008) may argue that these programs do not constitute de-radicalization and instead simply represent disengagement due to the many cases of limited individual conversions, it becomes clear after analysis that the surrender of pieces of the ideology – even in small amounts – is central to both programs. Note too that de-radicalization is not necessarily the same as counter-radicalization; de-radicalization is “targeted at rehabilitating radicalized individuals” and counter-radicalization “involves preventing individuals from being drawn into radical movements” (Hafez, 2008). The two categories are not mutually exclusive, however, as there is a potential for de-radicalized individuals to have counter-radicalization impact in broader audiences. Again, these concepts are further demonstrated in the case study Chapters IV and V.

De-radicalization, as examined by this study and in accordance with the broader requirements of counter-ideology, requires in-depth knowledge of motivations of and forces that act on the individual terrorist. Because of this, a significant amount of background investigation is required regarding the characteristics of both the individual and the closely knit “in-group” to which the terrorist belongs. Group identities, maintained by the exclusiveness of the in-group, can become at least as important as individual motivations to an individual’s esteem and the perception of his own self (Taylor & Louis, 2004, p. 182). This information, serving in much the same way a
psychological profile or an anthropological study would for their respective disciplines, allows for a tailored approach to the problem of finding vulnerabilities in an individual’s adherence to the ideology.

Chapter III constitutes this thesis’ background study. Important evidence of trust and influence is unearthed from multiple sources to determine vulnerabilities that could be targeted in the specific case of the JI network. Every effort is made to keep the investigation as specific as possible and to avoid errors inherent in excessive generalization. As Paul Davis and Brian Jenkins (2002) note, the usual conception of influencing terrorist group behavior (and indeed counter-terrorism at large) is often “confused by overaggregation.” “Elements of [a] … system” are more likely to be influenced than the group as a whole (p. 22), echoing the warnings of Hassan (2006) and Bin Ali (2008) about the dangers of over-generalization from earlier in this chapter.

After specific elements signifying vulnerabilities in the network are presented, they must be compared with the two accessible dimensions of the ideology to give a holistic picture of the available approaches to de-radicalization. A matrix-style framework is therefore presented which depicts the intersection of the trust and influence elements with the affective and evaluative dimensions of the ideology. This framework constitutes the limits at which JI de-radicalization programs can be administered.

Each case study chapter is organized to tie the elements of trust and ideology that affect the ideological dimensions to the methods used by each program. To accomplish this, a study of each program’s strategies is first completed by using game theory – discussed in the next section – to map processes and analyze the strategies used. Then, using the process analysis as a guide, a version of the matrix framework is filled in to heuristically depict what elements the program uses to change the behavior of its radicalized detainees. Combining an analysis of both the programmatic elements and processes gives a comprehensive understanding of each program that can then be judged against the effectiveness criteria set forth in the previous chapter.
E. GAME THEORY AND NESTED GAMES

Since this thesis takes a rational choice approach in analyzing the de-radicalization cases, a natural extension of this method, game theory, can be used to specifically analyze each program’s strategies. In this methodology, scenarios involving interactions between opposing parties are quantified to represent “situations involving both conflict and cooperation” between at least two opposed parties. As an extension of rational choice, game theory analyzes “how players select strategies” in distinct situations or “games,” to “obtain preferred outcomes” (COMAP, 2003, p. 561-563). Interactions between the players are often presented in a matrix format for analytical purposes. Consider the simple example of a conflict between a hypothetical terrorist group member who has been arrested and the opposed government (Figure 1). The conflict represented is a general governmental choice of whether to attempt to reform/co-opt the terrorist or simply to detain the individual, while the jailed terrorist’s choices are whether to cooperate with the government’s reform program or not. Resultant intersecting strategies are initially denoted by the notations in the matrix blocks (e.g., “AC” and “BD”) which are later given ordinal rankings to represent preferences; in this case ordinal rankings 1 through 4 match the available strategies, so a block value of “1,3” would represent the government’s lowest value choice (1) and the terrorist’s third highest preference (3).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Terrorist Group Member</th>
<th>A. Co-opt and release</th>
<th>D. Don’t cooperate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C. Cooperate</td>
<td>AC</td>
<td>AD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Keep in prison</td>
<td>BC</td>
<td>BD</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1. Hypothetical Basic Game

Before assignment of ordinal values and subsequent analysis, a list of initial assumptions must be generated. For this thesis, the following general assumptions apply to all games: higher ordinal rankings denote higher preferences as cardinal values
(i.e., a “4” ranking has four times the value of a “1” ranking) which allows the comparing of multiple strategies through value-based analyses when the actual assignment of utilities isn’t otherwise possible; an individual’s preferences appear rational to that person even if they are “apparently suboptimal” to others, thus possibly representing bounded rationality; and preferences of one person/group don’t directly represent those of another, but they may be qualitatively compared for illustrative purposes in this study. It is important to note that the assumption that ordinal preferences represent cardinal values constitutes limitations on this type of analysis; the assumption basically suggests that each option has a scaled value that can be conceived as a “payoff.”

Additionally, each game begins with specific assumptions. In this game, these are: releasing the terrorist involves a risk of return to radical action; the terrorist remains absolutely dedicated to the cause; and (as the counter-ideological programs assert) the prisoner will likely be effective in de-radicalizing others if co-opted/reformed.

Next, the matrix blocks are assigned an ordinal value to indicate the ranking of preference which are given brief explanations. Figure 2 depicts the game with values assigned.

**Figure 2. Hypothetical Basic Game with Ordinal Rankings**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Terrorist Group Member</th>
<th>Government</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A. Co-opt and release</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Cooperate</td>
<td>4,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Don’t cooperate</td>
<td>3,1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Government:**

1. AD: Won’t release uncooperative prisoner
2. BD: Status quo
3. BC: May still be some use in jail
4. AC: Maximum utility for program

**Terrorist:**

AD: Released without compromise
BD: Status quo
AC: Secures release
BC: Compromised but not released

In analysis, the arrows in the matrix denote one player’s higher ranked preference given the other player’s discrete choice, e.g., given the terrorist’s choice to cooperate, the
government prefers the co-opt and release strategy as due to its higher ordinal value which reflects its higher valuation (“4” is a higher value than “3”). The terrorist has a dominant strategy of D. don’t cooperate as the higher-valued preferences are in this strategy given either of the government’s strategies. Conversely, the government has a mixed strategy, favoring co-opt only if the terrorist is cooperative and keep in prison if the terrorist isn’t cooperative. As the arrows of preference converge at block BD (a “saddlepoint”) we note a Nash equilibrium, or the point when no actor “can benefit by departing unilaterally (i.e., by itself) from its strategy associated with an outcome” (COMAP, 2003, p. 582). Thus, without intrinsic changes to the actors’ preferences or administered payments to effect such changes, the likely outcome is that the government will keep the terrorist in prison (without attempting co-opting) and that the terrorist will continue to counter the government.

Games such as this simple, hypothetical contest can be seen as one in a series of games that together, with the additional consideration of context, define a complex situation. Choices available and likely player moves in this single game may result from previous events and the game’s surrounding environment which can shape the players’ value assignments, and the results may then generate new options for future games. The concept of nested games, in which an individual sub game “can be completely isolated from the games around it and can be solved (that is, the equilibria can be computed)” independently can account for these complexities of environment and context (Tsebelis, 1990, p. 55). In this way, game theory can account for the traditional utility judgments made about decisions to join or separate from terrorist groups, including the power of group identities and factors that may negate these identities. The assumption of rationality is implicit in this approach (and can include the aforementioned concept of bounded rationality); all players calculate the payoffs, or outcomes, from a series of moves, with the maximum payoff determining a player’s strategy. The hypothetical game in which a terrorist faces the choice to resist or cooperate with a detaining government given above may, for instance, be nested in the context of follow-on effects for the grander co-opting scheme (Figure 3). In this case, the government’s decision to co-opt or detain – one choice resulting in the left game and one in the right – has effects
on follow-on options. The values “A” through “H” – with suffixes 1, 2, and 3 – represent the values of players 1, 2, and 3, respectively. For instance, player 2’s preferences may be G2>A2>B2>E2>D2>H2>F2>C2 given the specific options facing each player and personal valuations. The focus of the analysis then becomes how this order of preferences might be changed. Note, too, that in subsequent games in this thesis, each branching point of this extensive game form game may represent a different player or a different decision point. The latter scenario implies a sequential decision process, where decisions made at the higher level of the tree affect the available decisions at the next level.

In the end, the rational choice approach can lend powerful analysis to the study of individual decisions within a group structure. This is the central point of this thesis; after identifying the network’s vulnerabilities, this approach can assist in exploiting these weaknesses by providing clues about individuals’ motivations and strategies. Incentives can then be applied to leverage the in-group trust between accessible members against the radical ideology. Analysis of the Singaporean and Indonesian programs provides a compelling statement regarding the effectiveness of this approach.

Figure 3. Sample Nested Games Structure (After Tsebelis, 1990, p. 54)
F. SUMMARY

This chapter has proposed a different approach versus traditional thinking about counter-ideological work by claiming that broad messaging strategies or information campaigns are unlikely to be effective in reducing the attraction of ideologies. This chapter has shown these approaches to suffer from tendencies to over-generalize issues, the ignorance of specific grievances, and credibility problems. The implications of this assertion are far-reaching, as most Western governmental-level strategies of counter-ideological work rely on strategic communications or public diplomacy that attempt to convince radicals of the errors of their ways.

Instead, a survey of ideological theory shows that a strategy focused more on the individual is needed. Of Rejai’s (1995) five dimensions of ideologies, the two most “accessible” from a programmatic standpoint are the affective, or emotional and internally focused, dimension, and the evaluative, or judgmental and externally focused dimension. These are the mechanisms with which a terrorist group fans its members’ emotions of resentment toward the group’s enemies and encourages the members to damn their enemies as heretical. If changes can be introduced into either of these two dimensions, individuals may reconsider portions of the ideology.

Obstacles to execution of this strategy are obvious. First, getting a credible member to cooperate with a counter-ideology program is difficult due to the strength of the tightly knit terrorist group which, in turn, strengthens the appeal of the ideology. Second, by the time terrorists have reached the level of membership in the group, their available options have been drastically limited due to the group’s control of access to outside information. Thus, incentives must be applied that are valued more than subscription to the ideology in order to secure cooperation. Choices outside the existing scope of options must also be introduced to counter limits on available information.

The key to accomplishing both of these tasks lies in a rational actor approach. Determining an individual’s specific priorities may provide vulnerabilities for a counter-ideology program to exploit. To counter the limits of available information as noted by the concept of bounded rationality, the introduction of new options may reverse the
individual’s “apparently suboptimal choice” of membership. This thesis, therefore, uses a rational choice/game theoretical approach to identify ideological vulnerabilities in individuals and evaluate the Indonesian and Singaporean de-radicalization strategies. In all cases, countering an ideology is less about the content of the terrorist’s motivational story than overcoming the high preferential ranking of this story. Such a manipulation of preferences requires a detailed understanding of individual motivations and this is now where this study turns.
III. THE CASE OF AL-JEMAHAH AL-ISLAMIYAH: CONTEXT AND VARIABLES

Know your enemy and know yourself and you can fight a hundred battles without disaster.

Sun Tzu

A. INTRODUCTION

In a way, the spectacular and enormously destructive 2002 Bali bombing was the culmination of over 20 formative years of the Al-Jemaah Al-Islamiyah (JI) organization. With roots in the Darul Islam rebellion of the 1950s and after leaders Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir’s own radicalization in the 1970s and 80s, JI was reportedly founded in 1993, citing the heresy of the West and its influence on regional governments as the motive behind the group’s violent campaign to establish a pan-Southeast Asia Islamic state. The group took advantage of the fall of the Suharto government in 1998 and the newly opened political and operational space to begin operations in Indonesia in 2000, the most violent of which occurred in the period from 2002 to 2005. The bombing of churches, Hindu temples, hotels, and, of course, Bali nightclubs was the tactic of choice as the group aimed to remove Western/non-Muslim “corruption,” stop the Christian and Jewish “crusade,” and implement sharia.

That Indonesia and other regional governments still struggle to eradicate JI today must be a sign of the group’s resiliency, governmental weaknesses, or a combination of both. Despite the sweeping crackdown on the group’s membership that accounts for more than 400 arrests, the fact that there have been no major attacks since 2005, and the reform and co-opting of some of JI’s detained leadership, the group has adapted and remains a strategic concern both to the region and to the rest of the world. The spectacular attacks on Bali nightclubs in 2002 and 2005 as well as the bombing of the J.W. Marriott hotel in Jakarta in 2003 demonstrate JI’s deadly capacity, while the continued discoveries of weapons caches and operational plans demonstrate the group’s continued potential (Rondonuwu, 2008). The group’s original (and partially maintained),
Al-Qaeda-inspired ideology of seeking a regional Islamic state established under *sharia* (Abuza, 2003) and JI’s overt targeting of the perceived Jewish and American worldwide “crusade” mean JI has to remain a top priority for the governments of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore. The group is also a central concern for America and Australia in their respective international struggles against terrorism.

This chapter is divided into three sections: a brief examination of JI’s current status and ideological capacity; a history of the radicalization of JI’s founders which ultimately launched the group’s ideology; and a survey of JI membership that provides keys to understanding how the ideology is transmitted.

**B. JI’S CURRENT STATUS: A PERSISTENT IDEOLOGY**

The aftermath of the 2002 Bali bombing saw an immense regional crackdown on the organization which had existed up to that point with impunity. The Indonesian government, responding to domestic calls for action in the wake of Bali – and after much regional, US, and Australian pressure – began to ferret out JI operatives. While Singapore and Malaysia began to aggressively detain JI suspects and discover additional plots after the bombing, these countries knew about the potential of the then-newly discovered JI network well before the attack and had issued repeated warnings to Indonesia (“Huge death toll from Bali bombing,” 2002, October 13). It took a deadly incident such as Bali to arouse an Indonesian response.

There is little doubt that JI was a cohesive threat during this period, but its existence as a united front today is highly questionable. Despite sources ranging from scholars to government officials to media that lump all Indonesian, Singaporean, and Malaysian terror incidents and personnel under the banner of JI, much of the current terrorist activity may be ascribed to “ad hoc alliances” and “autonomous jihadi factions” that have their roots in JI. An example of these alliances is the breakaway Noordin Top network, a violent splinter cell that dissents with the larger JI organization because of the latter’s softened tactics. While the goals of these terrorist groups may, at least superficially, seem identical to JI’s, they actually represent the unique tactics of numerous factions and offshoots of the grander JI and Darul Islam projects. These
smaller groupings “resemble bundles of personal associations more than integral corporate bodies,” and the remaining JI mainstream “may be less of a danger … than at any other time since 2002” (Collier, 2006). This subtlety is important, as attributing the work of a breakaway cell to JI proper may suggest the wrong motives, although all groups are obviously striving for some kind of Islamic state. The JI notations in this study, while used as sort of shorthand for the various mainstream and splinter factions of the group, should not be taken as such a generalization of motives, but only as a generalization supporting the radicalization and de-radicalization processes.

Despite the regional successes in detaining JI members the group remains a concern for a number of reasons. The first is that it retains an organized element. While the old Mantiqi (regional) organization has been dismantled, the group still maintains a structure on Java that is led by a small, elite group and that incorporates cells outside of Java into the organization (Conboy, 2007). In contrast to the old top-down method of organization stipulated by the group’s PUPJI (Pedoman Umum Perjuangan al-Jama’ah al-Islamiyyah, or General Guide for the Struggle of Jemaah Islamiyah) document, JI now likely functions as a horizontally integrated organization with little central control and individual units now possessing a high degree of autonomy. Second, the group has learned from its defeats, shifting tactics to assassinations and using charities and humanitarianism to maintain relevancy (Abuza, 2007). Third, while many operatives have been captured, a significant number have not. As many as fifteen JI leaders remain at large, and all of these men have the ability to mount crippling attacks under the right circumstances (Abuza, 2007). Noordin Top, regarded as the organization’s top financier and the most wanted terrorist in Southeast Asia, has likely formed a new cell with designs on attacking soft targets. Dulmatin, an organizer that helped plan the 2002 Bali operation, also remains on the loose despite claims (now debunked) that he was killed in the southern Philippines earlier this year. The escape of purported head of the Singaporean branch if JI, Mas Selamat Kastari, from a Singapore jail in March has also given rise to fresh security fears and has led to a massive manhunt. The ability of operatives like these to elude capture is a testament to the continuing security challenges within the region.

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Fourth, and most important for the purposes of this study, is the fact that the group still has a significant ideological base from which to recruit. JI is allied with several Indonesian *pesantren* (Islamic boarding schools), long the primary sources of JI’s recruiting, which still openly teach an extremist brand of Islam to impressionable students. While these radical schools only constitute about one percent of all *pesantren* in Indonesia, institutions like Ba’asyir’s Al-Mukmin school have been confirmed as centers of extremist ideology. The question of radical schools’ curricula has become something of a public debate; a recent survey notes that over 90% of educators support the concept of democracy, but that over 80% of the same sample also supports the implementation of *sharia* (Hefner, 2007). Recent calls from a moderate council of Indonesian *ulama* (clergy specializing in Islamic law) for educational moderation are aimed directly at these radical schools. Specifically, the *ulama* state that “such terms as *jihad* (Islamic holy war), *dzimmi* (non-Muslims living in Islamic states) and *kafir* (infidel) need to be reinterpreted” in order to “stop violence committed in the name of religion” (Maulia, 2008).

These calls for moderation are, however, somewhat muted by the increasing fundamentalism of Indonesia’s political system which follows the trends of the country’s Muslim majority. While modern political Islam in Indonesia is characterized by political parties that are more “Islam-friendly” than outright radical, there does remain an organized, radical Islamist element that wants a national implementation to *sharia* (Baswedan, 2004). This begs the question: can a democratic government fighting religious extremism also cultivate religious fundamentalism for political purposes? Many sources have drawn attention to this dichotomy in Indonesia. Hefner’s (2007) work on societal attitudes on schooling is an example, noting that that the moderate Islamic “mainstream” in society understands the need for curricula of tolerance and democracy but that *sharia* still commands a strong preference. Another example is recent comparisons between the government’s treatment of JI and the small Ahmadiyah Islamic sect. Despite recent court findings that the group is illegal, JI is still not officially outlawed. Conversely, the government has essentially banned the peaceful Ahmadiyah group; this is seen as a capitulation to the strength of fundamentalist groups like the
Islamic Defender Front and Ba’asyir’s own MMI that consider Ahmadiyah to be heretical. The Wahid Institute, the eponymous think tank founded by the former Indonesian president, believes that the current president’s political survival is tied to fundamental Islamists, hence his administration’s recent agreement to consider the ban. Other, more moderate members of the ulama have urged the government to protect all its people, but when compared to the government’s stance on JI – the administration is content to “wait for the noise to die down and … leave it at that” on the issue of JI’s legality – it’s clear that little effective political pressure will be brought to bear on the schools that transmit JI’s ideology (Chew, 2008).

C. ELEMENTS OF JI’S IDEOLOGY

While it is clear that JI remains a dangerous organization, this thesis needs to ask more pointed questions about the group’s ideological construction in order to understand how to compromise the motivation of violent acts. While the contextual enablers are important to consider, they cannot alone constitute a counter-ideology response. That some elements in Indonesia’s society and politics are creating an increasingly hospitable environment for groups like JI is, at its strongest, a supporting condition; JI, after all, was born as a counter-state organization in a much more secular era. Even if society was to become secular again, groups like JI could still exist.

As noted in Chapter II, efforts to counter an ideology must instead reflect an understanding of the current or potential terrorist’s valuations. To do so is to consider the conditions and decisions that gave rise to the ideology as well as the characteristics of individuals that permit its maintenance and transmission. This section is thusly focused on JI’s formative history and the traits and interpersonal dynamics of the leadership in order to define variables for further analysis.

1. The Founders’ Radicalization

Political Islam is not a new phenomenon in Indonesia. Since the radical transformations brought on by Independence from the Netherlands in 1949, the country has endured various groups demanding either an implementation of sharia or the full
employment of an Islamic state. One such group that advocates the latter, Darul Islam (DI – literally “House of Islam”), is rooted in militarily opposition to the Dutch during the fight for independence.

After independence, DI also fought against eventual-president Sukarno’s secular government in a 13-year, failed attempt to establish limited provincial independence under an Islamic government. Defeated by Sukarno and overshadowed by the continuing secularism of Suharto, the movement lay dormant until the 1970s. DI was loosely reformed as an underground organization harboring the broader Islamic Caliphate movement beginning in the 1980s; this reformation, however, was not of the group’s own accord (Abuza, 2003, p. 141). DI’s reappearance was, instead, a direct reaction to the Suharto regime’s strategy of eliminating Islamist competition ahead of contested elections in 1977 and 1982 (Ressa, 2003, pp. 47-48). In the mid 1970s, Indonesian intelligence secretly contacted Islamic radicals and urged them to reestablish the movement in alliance with the government in order to counter the perceived threat of communism; this is especially important, as the military’s political legitimacy during this period rested in countering communism through broad societal coalitions (Aspinall & Berger, 2001). After the mobilization, the government then, in the latter part of the decade, fictitiously assigned all of the militants into an invented group named Komando Jihad, accused them of plotting to overthrow the state, and arrested 185 “members” of the treasonous organization. The government’s actions were to have broad consequences, causing the DI that reemerged in the 1980s to adopt a radical counter-state ideology in pursuit of an independent Caliphate.

Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, two clerics who were arrested in 1978 as part of the Komando Jihad roundup, were both members of the reformed DI movement and considered themselves the ideological heirs to the original movement of the late 1940s (Abuza, 2003, p. 126). Like the fictional Komando Jihad, the Indonesian government claimed that the two had recruited members for a shadow organization named Al-Jemaah Al-Islamiyah, or Islamic Community in a plot to overthrow the government and that Sungkar served as the governor of the Islamic state-in-waiting. While the charges may have been invented, Sungkar and Ba’asyir, newly radicalized after
their treatment, went on to actually recruit members for just such an organization when they were released upon appeal in 1982 (Barton, 2004, p. 49). They used Islamic study groups and the Salafi pesantren, or Islamic boarding schools, they founded in Java as bases from which to recruit members to form small cells committed to Islamic revolution.

The tipping point in the radicalization of the two men appears to have occurred in 1984 during riots in the Tandjung Priok section of Jakarta. In what was likely yet another manipulation of Muslim groups, the government used agents to fan the flames of the burgeoning radical movement to cause a riot in front of a mosque after a period of hard line sermons and widespread conditions of unrest (Vickers, 2005, p. 178). As the riot occurred, the army appeared quickly and opened fire on the crowd, killing dozens and possibly even hundreds of the rioters. This served to further radicalize the Islamic movements and caused Ba’asyir to consider the act as a “declaration of war” by the government (Abuza, 2003, p. 126). Evidence that this period had a profound effect on the development of Ba’asyir and Sungkar’s counter-state ideology comes directly from their 1998 article in the Islam Youth Movement’s magazine Nida ul-Islam; they claim that the requirement for groups to adopt the state’s Pancasila ideology (espousing five principles, with secular nationalism above all), the ban on Muslim political parties, and the violent response to the Tandjung Priok riots all proved the heresy of the Indonesian government (International Crisis Group, 2002, August 8). After fearing re-arrest in 1985 and fleeing to Malaysia, the two would continue building their radical network in their self-imposed exile. They were to return only in 1998 at the start of the Asian financial crisis when the political scene in Indonesia burst open with the resignation of Suharto.

Suharto’s resignation and the subsequent public demand for democratic reforms opened a political window of opportunity for Islamists. The same governmental restructuring that increased the freedom of political Islam also permitted the existence of an organized, extreme Islamic element. Sungkar and Ba’asyir were able to return to Java in 1998 in the newly open political climate. Sungkar died soon thereafter, but Ba’asyir was able to brashly organize the already-mentioned congress of Islamists, the MMI. The goal of this council was taken directly from Ba’asyir and Sungkar’s evolved ideology during their exile in Malaysia and the contacts made with Al-Qaeda; namely, this was the
establishment of a regional Islamic Caliphate under *sharia*. Most every Islamist group in Indonesia attended this summit, and Ba’asyir was elected the council’s *Amir*, or leader. The organization’s top officers were mostly Ba’asyir affiliates cultivated from the network he had established surrounding his *pesantren* in the town of Ngruki (Barton, 2004, p. 52, and International Crisis Group, 2002, August 8). JI’s extremism was then spread to the group’s targeted recruits with few impediments, with significantly improved freedom of recruitment, movement, and preaching lasting from 1998 until the regional crackdowns after the Bali bombing.

2. **The JI Leadership: Individuals in the Network**

Focus now turns from the discussion of JI’s ideology to the characteristics of the JI network as it exists today. JI, like all terrorist networks, is a combination of interdependent dynamics at the level of the membership. Examining the characteristics of terrorists and the individual’s assumption of the group’s identity can yield clues about how to curb future terrorist actions and interdict the radicalization process. In the JI example, the leadership is the most important group of personnel to be studied as events like the 2002 and 2005 Bali bombings that killed hundreds show that all of the planning, organization, and financing is concentrated in the leadership, with only a few relative outsiders needed to actually carry out the attacks as the suicide bombers (Koschade, 2006, and Conboy, 2006).

The specific question along this line of thinking then becomes: what are the characteristics of the JI leadership network and what dynamics are at play in JI leadership recruiting? This section answers this question in two parts. First, the individual traits of JI leaders are examined along with the social ties of the JI family network, demonstrating that while JI advertises itself as a pan-Southeast Asia entity it is really led from a small, localized group with very specific properties. These shared traits form the basis for necessarily tight bonds which reflect Piotr Sztompka’s (1999) three dimensions of trust. Second, a survey of John French and Bertram Raven’s (1959) “bases of social power” is used to identify variables that contribute to JI’s ideology of social change. These are shown to coalesce in a powerful group identity, the characteristics of which are best
expressed by Donald Taylor and Winnifred Louis’s (2004) “theory of the self,” a psychological theory that measures JI’s particular attraction as a social entity. Religious schools and study groups are shown to be important institutions which, through their significant influence, both maintain the group consciousness and drive recruiting efforts.

Thus, the shared social characteristics of the leadership and the strength of the group’s identity create a significant opportunity which is exploited by JI’s extremist ideology. These social dynamics form the links that connect the person to other nodes in the social network. Note again that this study is not concerned with structure of the network as would be required for an analysis of the structure of the group (i.e., social network analysis), but instead concentrates on the qualities of the social links that construct the network. These links are, at their core, entirely dependent on the social influence that creates bonds of trust that the members hold in each other and the group’s allies. These concepts are applied at various spots throughout the rest of this thesis.

a. Trust as the Network’s Cornerstone

At the core of JI’s web of influences and group identity is the ability of the members of the group to trust each other; without trust there can be no tightly-bound group that maintains security, provides for the strengthening of the ideology, or serves as the basis for the exercise of social power that provides for the group’s operations. Sztompka (1999) describes trust, along with the concepts of hope and confidence, as a necessary social reaction to the “actions of others” which are inherently “unpredictable” and “uncontrollable” (pp. 21-25). His definition of trust – one that is especially poignant given a group like JI’s need for absolute secrecy in order to avoid compromise – is “a bet about the future contingent actions of others” (p. 25). Trust, therefore, includes a certain amount of risk, and this further drives terrorist groups to nurture the tight bonds and total loyalty of their membership.

Sztompka specifies three dimensions of trust. The first, trust as a relationship, views trust from a rational choice perspective in characterizing interactions between people as maximizing utilities and minimizing risks of all involved parties (p. 60). What results from a relationship, then, are “complex relationships involving trust” in
which extensions of trust beget “mutually amplifying bond(s) of trust” as the “incentive to be trustworthy” emerges (pp. 61-62). In the case of JI, this dimension most notable in one of its sub-networks – hereafter referred to as feeder groups – that enable the trust and influence exhibited in the larger JI organization. These feeder groups, trusted units that promote some of JI’s social needs at an elemental, serve as key enablers for the terrorist recruitment process. They introduce the basic tenets of extremist ideology – in JI’s case, the appeal of *jihad* and the need to defend Islam from the Christian and Jewish “crusaders” – and allow recruiters to gauge the reactions of potential recruits from the safety of distance. Once individuals have expressed an interest in the ideological subject matter and appear to be trustworthy, they can be individually cultivated to determine compatibility with the ideology and, more importantly, dedication to the ultimate level of radical norms (Singapore “White paper,” 2003).

One feeder network in which this type of trust is evident is one comprised of family ties. Kinship ties dominate the interactions and recruiting of most of the group’s leaders that have joined since the first wave of militants that was recruited directly from JI’s religious schools (more about schools follows in the next section). For example, Amrozi and Mukhlas, two of the three leaders of the 2002 Bali bombings that have been arrested and sentenced to death, are brothers; their brother, Ali Imron, was also arrested for his role in the same plot but now aids the government in its de-radicalization efforts. Additionally, Mukhlas is the brother-in-law of Nasir Abas, the former commander of JI’s Sulawesi, South Philippines, and Sabah region of operations, and Muhammad Rais, involved in the 2002 Marriott bombing, is brother-in-law to radical breakaway Noordin Top. Even offspring are drawn into the clan, as JI-founder Abu Bakar Ba’asyir’s son Abdul Rohim is a high-level operative and is extensively involved in the group’s schooling process (International Crisis Group, 2007, May 3).

In addition to blood relations, marriage becomes a prime concern during JI indoctrination, further strengthening familial connections within the group. Spouses can compromise the security of the organization, and a leading criterion for acceptance into the group is likely “the reliability of the wife” as the example of one member who was not accepted due to questions about his wife shows (International Crisis Group, as
reported in Wai & Charles, 2004). Marriages can also expand the scope of the network, as marriages between Indonesians & Malaysians play an especially prominent role in JI’s regional influence (Barton, 2004, and Wai & Charles, 2004). One example is operations chief Hambali (arrested in 2003) who is married to a Sabahan Chinese woman who was likely the treasurer of Malaysian and Thai operations, making her a “full-fledged member” of JI; her sister is also married to a JI operative, and all four members of this family sub-group have links to the Sungai Manggis school in Malaysia. In total, more than 100 marriages between JI members have been documented (Wai & Charles, 2004). Thus, the family network works for both potential members/allies and the JI network as a secure recruiting institution to build trust from the dimension of trust as a relationship.

While it is important to consider the nature of JI’s feeder networks, it is also important to note the common individual traits that the group’s leaders share. While there is undoubtedly some overlap here with concepts that will be presented in the next section, most of the following falls can be represented best by Sztompka’s (1999) second dimension of trust: trust as a personality trait. In this dimension, individuals’ experiences and traits predispose people to trust others, forming the “trusting impulse;” this may refer to “a particular category of people” or “may embrace all people” (p. 65). Specifically in the case of JI, the qualities of “basic trust” that the group’s leaders exhibit are targeted toward a particular category and not extended generally (p. 65). These shared psychological traits in the JI leadership then serve as enablers of the “basic” notion of trust for those within the small group and also aids in dehumanizing others by purging their “human traits,” (p. 65), hence strengthening the rejection of the out-group’s norms which ultimately constructs the group identity (Taylor & Louis, 2004, p. 182).

One particularly resonant trait shared by most of the JI leadership is the need for absolutism that fundamentalist Islam provides. Individuals in community-based societies who are psychologically concrete/objective – that is, who are “solution-oriented” and who perceive the world in “black and white” – are particularly drawn to fundamentalism as a solution to the uncertainty of the changing world (Copland, 2005). Marc Sageman (2008) also comments on this absolutist trend, noting that a high proportion of his sample are engineers by trade and that those with technical backgrounds
“possess a specific frame of mind” that drives them to “construct their arguments from the foundations” via logical “building blocks.” When referencing Islam, then, this psychological trait predisposes one to identify with the Salafist brand of fundamentalism, which seeks to “return to the purity of the first community … of the Prophet” (p. 59). The Singapore “White paper” (2003) on the JI arrests goes on to note:

... many JI leaders ... wanted a “no fuss” path to heaven. They wanted to be convinced in JI that they had found “true Islam” and free themselves from endless searching ... they believed they could not go wrong, as the JI leaders quoted from holy texts.

The paper connects this yearning to a common psychological profile consisting of “high compliance, low assertiveness, low ... questioning of religious values, and high levels of guilt and loneliness.” Many JI terrorists fit exhibit these characteristics; Azahari bin Husin, Dulmatin, Hashim bin Abas, and Agus Dwikarna, all JI bomb makers, are (or were) all engineers or technicians, and Ibrahim Maidin, the Singaporean JI recruiter, is a good example of the malleable religious student: quiet, curious, and seeking definitive and “simple answers to naïve questions” (Ressa, 2004, p. 72). Many of JI’s Indonesian members share also share the “low questioning of religious values” exhibited by Maidin. Hambali is noted to have been “very religious, but also very quiet, aloof and reserved” (p. 72). Imam Samudra is similarly a “quiet intellect” and both he and Amrozi, a “simple” individual, are both absolutely devoted to role models who direct their thinking (pesantren teachers for Samudra and brother Mukhlas for Amrozi) (Copland, 2005). That the “vast majority” of Southeast Asian terrorists come from religious upbringings only strengthens the argument that most JI members are not likely to challenge religious values presented by a legitimate authority (Sageman, 2008, p. 51). Fundamentalism’s – in this case extremism’s – definitive answers to theological questions is key, therefore, to satisfying the needs of the concrete/objective personality’s need for “clear, objective, practical, and absolute” direction (Johnson, as reported in Ramakrishna, 2004).

While these characteristics are important to understanding the types of individuals in JI’s leadership, taken alone they provide an incomplete understanding of
the glue that binds the group together. To wit, Sztompka’s (1999) dimension of trust as a personality trait also notes that shared experiences draw people together, forming a crucial second part to understanding trust within the group. As an almost-subset of this dimension of trust, the idea that trust is more likely in “close-knit, small intimate communities” explains the likelihood that trust is not generally given carte blanche to larger, more anonymous crowds (p. 65, 93). Specifically, the visibility of peers and the “high density and intimacy of relationships” within the group contribute to developing and maintaining high levels of trust. These features act as enforcement apparatuses within the group, threatening defectors with retaliation due to the resultant transparency of the social structure (pp. 93-94). Thus, in some cases, personal enablers of trust such as “informal networks of kinship of friendship” can “engender strong bonds of trust” that “are superimposed above formal organizational structures” (p. 95).

Two of these informal social bonds that enable the most basic trust in JI can be noted. First, one trait that most of the early JI organizers have in common is the participation in the mujahidin in Afghanistan between 1985 and 1995. JI co-founder Abdullah Sungkar probably arranged for hundreds of then-Darul Islam members to travel to the country to wage jihad in the mid-1980s, and Mukhlas and Imam Samudra, two of the three organizers of the 2002 Bali bombing, spent two to three years each in Afghanistan fighting against the Soviets. Their experiences “endowed them with a religiously legitimated ethnocentric bigotry” that elevated their stereotyping and hatred of non-believers and Americans (Ramakrishna, 2004). Notably, events like the 1987 Battle of Jaji in which the mujahidin were able to repel a much larger Soviet force further emboldened the fighters against numerically superior enemies. Such experiences proved “formative and radicalizing,” and the later JI efforts to supply fighters to the Sulawesi and Maluku conflicts against those islands’ Christians likely had the same effect on younger generations (Barton, 2004, pp. 54-55).

Second, one trait, in keeping with JI’s origins, is that most of the group’s leadership comes from the Indonesian island of Java. While JI was originally founded with the goal of establishing a pan-Southeast Asia state, it is notable that almost all of the group’s operational leaders come from one locale. To be sure, the organization has ties
with other regional extremist organizations but, aside from the purported regional inclusiveness of Ba’asyir’s MMI and its paramilitary associate groups, the operations JI have been able to execute have been exclusively led by those from Java. In the Singapore case, for example, members (at least all of the approximately 70 governmental detainees) are Singaporean or Malaysian by nationality and are of various ethnicities, but this cell’s planned operations (thwarted by arrests) were not tied to or coordinated with JI proper. Hambali (from Java) seems to have been the key to these foreign alliances as he made contacts with the Malaysian, Singaporean, Bangladeshi, and Filipino groups; these alliances have been limited with prejudice in some cases, involving only training or a similarity of purpose, not operations.

Interestingly, ethnic background seems to be of little importance as some leaders are of mixed ethnicity. Ba’asyir possesses a Yemeni background and bomb maker/organizer Dulmatin and former JI head Sungkar are also of mixed Arab descent. Organizer Imam Samudra is Sundanese, an ethnic minority based in west Java, while two former JI *Amirs* (JI spiritual/operational leaders) Toriquddin and Abu Dujana are ethnic Javanese, cementing the notion that ethnicity is less important to the group than Javanese origin and radical credentials. Clearly, “Java has been central to shaping JI’s identity” (Fealy, 2007, p.71). This identity reflects the historical context of fundamental Islam on Java, both through the pesantren base and the preceding DI ideology.

### b. Influence and Collective Identity

Trust serves us well in defining how groups maintain or reinforce their tight social bonds but it does little to explain the mechanisms used to attract membership to a common goal in the first place. Due to the fact that terrorist groups’ violent actions fall outside the bounds of societal norms, there must be unique characteristics which entice the groups’ constituents to partake in these deadly acts. Perhaps the most significant way that terrorist groups attract and maintain their individual members is through the offering of an exclusive identity that is embodied in the collective. Special consideration must be given to this phenomenon – and its resultant ideologies – as it accounts for the suspension of the individual’s natural abhorrence of indiscriminate
killing (Moghaddam, 2005) and the limited public attraction of terrorism’s radical goals (Crenshaw, 1998). Only through a particularly strong attraction to a cause can individuals be persuaded to perpetrate acts of terror.

A group identity that is linked to an ideology is, by definition, rooted in the desire for social change. Such change, in accord with the tenets of the rational actor model, become attractive to individuals when the value placed on the change agent is increased through social influence. Of French and Raven’s (1959) five bases of social power (reward power, coercive power, legitimate power, referent power, and expert power), two bases especially lay the foundation for the model of influence with which to view JI. The first, legitimate power, is described as “internal values in [the person to be influenced] … which dictate that [someone else] has a legitimate right to influence” and that there is “an obligation to accept this influence.” This authority, requiring the acceptance of influence, revolves around “some sort of code or standard,” or shared set of norms, that is subscribed to by both parties (p. 159).

Influence stemming from authority, then, relies on similarity between individuals to foster social solidarity which inclines some to “follow the lead of others” in reference to the starting set of norms (Pfeffer, 1992, pp. 208-209). Nowhere is this more evident than in the most important of JI’s feeder groups, the one that contributes the most in terms of influence and solidarity: the network of religious schools and study groups from which the bulk of the JI leadership comes. Up to 30 pesantren (Islamic secondary boarding schools) in Indonesia and Malaysia are either allied with or have been established by JI members for purposes of teaching the JI ideology and screening potential recruits (International Crisis Group, 2007, November 19). Two schools of this group are by far the most important when considering numbers of recruits: the Al-Mukmin (or Pondok Ngruki) school in Central Java which was founded by JI leader Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, and the Luqmanul Hakiem (or Sungai Manggis) school in Johor, Malaysia which was founded by Ngruki alumnus Mukhlas. The shared norms of Islam, as the root of the legitimate base of social power, are manipulated in these schools to become more narrowly focused and exclusionary. Like all Indonesian pesantren, which together account for 13% of Indonesia’s total school attendance, the JI-allied schools
mainly appeal to rural farming or laborer families that already subscribe to a more conservative brand of Islam. Both of JI’s main pesantren are known for their discipline and connections to other Pakistani and Middle East schools where the defense of Islam from the corrupting influence of the West is taught. In the curriculum the Koran is taught textually, not interpretively, and students are isolated from the “warped values” presented in the media (Longboan, 2008).

In a similar fashion, religious study groups formed a smaller but important part of the network of schools. These were especially important in the early days of JI proselytizing, as Ba’asyir and Sungkar together used small study groups to create a small army-in-waiting. Before their self-imposed exile in Malaysia began in 1984, Ba’asyir and Sungkar used their prominence as clergy in central Java to recruit locals for a future Islamic uprising against the secular state. In a process that was to be imitated later in the radical pesantren, some rural men who attended the two’s usroh, or Islamic study groups, were drawn into the fold after expressing interest in Islamic revolution and the subsequent careful screening. These members were directed to establish small cells of about a dozen individuals in their villages to establish sharia and ignore “heathen … criminal laws enforced by a non-Muslim government” (Ressa, 2004, p. 49). This recruitment model – the careful recruiting of students expressing interest in the defense of Islam to an exclusive group motivated solely by “the laws of Allah” – included “education, recitation of he Koran, and worship” in a “war to oppose non-believers” (p. 50). Thus, the shared norms of Islam draw students to the pesantren, universities, and study groups where beliefs were tailored to meet the views of the school or group authorities.

Universities also played a supporting role in the school feeder network, with evidence of this dating to the days of Ba’asyir and Sungkar’s teachings on Java in the early 1980s. As happened elsewhere in the world, the 1979 Iranian revolution, coupled domestically with “the repression of political debate under Suharto,” gave rise to a resurgence of Islam in society (p. 49). Universities in Yogyakarta (close to Pondok Ngruki) became the centers of this new movement, with students and faculty at the State Islamic Institute accounting for most of the usroh network’s 100 or so members on Java.
at the time. (International Crisis Group, 2002, August 8). Ba’asyir and Sungkar’s efforts in Ngruki were an outgrowth of this larger social mobilization, with Ba’asyir especially serving as a popular symbol of resistance to the autocratic regime (Ressa, 2004, p. 45). (Abu Jibril, also one of JI’s early leaders, was a preacher at the time at the Sudirman Mosque in Yogyakarta that led the area’s Islamic resurgence.)

Note that this discussion of legitimate social power closely mimics certain aspects of the previous examination of trust as a relationship. Just as the family network serves as secure institution for recruiting potential JI members, the school/study group feeder network also functions as an institution in which to gauge trust and safely instill the group’s ideology. Both networks minimize JI’s risk by using their established networks to conduct “information acquisition and integration” while minimizing JI’s exposure to uncertainty (Sztompka, 1999, p. 61).

What is clear at this point is that JI’s employment of the legitimate base of social power has relied upon the perceived authority of the religious school or study group leader to mold the reinterpretation of the existing set of norms. It is notable that the recruitment process which starts in the schools and study groups relies in the end upon professed loyalty to JI’s cause; this is always secured by the member taking a bai’ah, or oath, to the leadership which serves as a “powerful compliance generating mechanism” (Singapore “White paper,” 2003). This tactic is attuned to the general Southeast Asian cultural tendency toward discipleship, a trait unique to Southeast Asian jihadi (Sageman, 2004, p. 113).

This should not, however, be unexpected. As a homegrown movement, JI mimics the traditional hierarchical structure of the pesantren by demanding the same unqualified loyalty to the group leader as is given to the leader of the school. The pesantren institution has existed in its current form since early Dutch colonial times, with the school leaders serving as community ‘headmen’ to liaise with the colonizing Europeans, reflecting their general strategy of co-opting local elites for the exercise of colonial power. In this way, schools have always served as a rallying point for “native authority” versus outsiders (colonizers, secular nationalists, etc.); the early usroh goal of an Islamic state and the later JI fight against Western influence can be seen as fitting this
cultural framework. With “absolute authority” over their students that continues past the students’ school tenures, pesantren chiefs like Ba’asyir undoubtedly command the same respect in other the organizations they head (Hefner, 2000, pp. 34-35).

Social authority in this context is closely tied to Sztompka’s (1999) third dimension of trust, trust as a cultural rule, or “the property of social wholes” instead of individual traits (p. 66). This dimension encapsulates the situational context that traditional (non-contextual) rational choice theory typically ignores. Such context is sometimes rooted in the expectations that society holds for its members, but more often this dimension is shown in expectations of those in specified roles. The central role of the JI pesantren in recruiting, for instance, exhibits the characteristics of this dimension. Additionally, that JI leaders leverage the unique Southeast Asian characteristic of the school’s headmaster as an exalted individual to influence potential recruits is not an accident; obedience to the school leader is expected, while the select few of JI’s vanguard occupy roles that “include an expectation, or even a demand, to distrust” the out-group (non-believers and Westerners in JI’s case) (p. 67). The dramatic example of three Singaporean JI detainees who testified against Ba’asyir is an example of this. Despite their damning testimony during the trial, they began to cry when they later saw him, claiming that they still loved him and didn’t want to betray him, but that they needed to tell the truth (Sageman, 2004, pp. 113-114). Thus, the school network provides the closest-knit of groups from which to recruit and demand obedience, and virtually all known JI members, whether leadership or foot soldiers, are connected to the “Ngruki network” either directly or indirectly (International Crisis Group, 2002, August 8).

While the power of JI’s authority figures is important to guiding the group, the second of French and Raven’s (1959) bases of power to be considered, referent power, is associated with group identity and with the desire for “oneness” with others (p. 161). This is a powerful force that often binds together groups that exhibit behavior that deviates from societal norms and goes beyond a superficial following of the group’s agenda. The power of these identities that are rooted in referent power is more specifically expressed by Taylor & Louis’s (2004) “theory of the self.” This proposition, that exclusive and secretive groups provide answers to an individual’s questions of
identity (who) and esteem (personal worth), suggests that “the attributes that comprise an individual’s personal identity are relative” to the perceptions of the societal “standard” (pp. 171-172). When groups offer an identity that radically differs from the norm, they position themselves as suppliers of the individual’s identity and esteem. There is a decision process involved in joining any extremist group, but this theory posits that this decision is made due to the individual needing what the group can provide instead of the group assuming traits of the collected individuals (pp. 172-173).

Because a terrorist group’s collective identity (which includes the concept of esteem, or self worth) is defined in opposition to society, members “have an ultra-clearly defined and nonnegotiable” self-definition. This only serves to strengthen the ties within the “in-group” while further entrenching a common Manichean view in which the “out-group” is demonized (pp. 180-182). The theory of the self, as a deeper understanding of the referent base of social power, then, holds that the attributes of extremist groups are important determinants of individual actions.

In the case if JI, the power of the group identity is seen in the recruits produced from the school feeder groups. Vetted students from the aforementioned web of schools, study groups, and universities exhibit certain traits of a collective identity that mirror the French and Raven/Taylor and Louis theoretical dimensions. These are a shared history of political detention, absolute dedication to JI’s goal of establishing an Islamic state through the efforts of a vanguard as begun in the DI rebellion of the 1950s, and unwavering loyalty to the schools and their founders (International Crisis Group, 2002, August 8).

One example of this attraction of the JI in-group is the recruiting effort in Singapore uncovered by the government in the crackdown after the 2002 Bali bombing. After police arrested the Singaporean cell’s main recruiter Ibrahim Maidin, a mild-mannered condominium manager in his 50s who is a self-taught radical, interrogation revealed that the secret recruitment of JI operatives follows a two-step approach. First, friends, relatives, or colleagues recommend the potential recruit to religious study classes geared toward general audiences. Maidin would insert brief references to jihad and the “plight of suffering Muslims worldwide” into the lectures to gauge interest. Such a
strategy in fomenting outrage follows the maxim that a skilful and tactical manipulation of “expressed emotions can be effective” in influencing behavior (Pfeffer, 1992, p. 221). Second, students expressing further interest by remaining after class to ask questions are gradually exposed to more incendiary teachings, and those deemed suitable are invited to join the movement after about 18 months of indoctrination. The new members, in adopting the new collective identity, would “feel a strong sense of exclusivity and self-esteem.” Furthermore, the group’s secrecy helps “create a sense of sharing and empowerment vis-à-vis outsiders” (Singapore “White paper,” 2003), thus exhibiting the maintenance of the in-group’s Manichaeism (Taylor & Louis, 2004, p. 182).

D. SUMMARY AND INTERIM CONCLUSION

Several key notions from this study, falling into two broad categories, can be noted at this point. The first category, the general nature of the state’s struggle with terrorist ideologies, has shown some important vulnerabilities and limitations. As established in Chapter II, the most effective path in attempting to compromise a terrorist ideology is one that is centered on changing the individual’s valuations. Weakening a terrorist’s resolve in Rejai’s (1995) affective (internal/emotional) and evaluative (external/judgmental) dimensions of an ideology is best accomplished through the work of those closest to the individual in experiences in values in order to maximize credibility. Chapter II goes on to note the limits of state enforcement capacity in controlling the spread of these ideologies, requiring regional governments to augment their efforts with programs other counter-ideology programs that aim to limit the appeal of these ideologies.

The second broad category, the specific characteristics and values of the JI leadership, has also yielded some important considerations. JI’s path to violent opposition was laid by founders Ba’asyir and Sungkar’s own radicalization after events of the 1970s through the 1990s. After the group’s formation in 1993 and operational commencement in 1998, influence exerted by the leadership through what French and Raven (1959) call legitimate and referent power attracted additional members to the leadership, corresponding with the strong JI group identity explained by Taylor and
Louis’s (2004) theory of the self. Sztompka’s (1999) dimension of trust as a cultural rule also predisposed those associated with the Ngruki network to follow the dictum of school and religious leaders who recruited for the secret and exclusive vanguard organization. The individuals who continue to form JI’s leadership can then be seen to have several common linkages through associated school and family feeder groups as well as shared experiences and personal characteristics. These commonalities are best categorized by Sztompka’s remaining dimensions of trust: trust as a relationship and trust as a personality trait.

A comprehensive theoretical approach to countering JI’s ideology must consider all of these notions in order to mitigate the individual’s lack of access to perfect information as stipulated by the concept of bounded rationality outlined in Chapter II. Some combination of the main points noted here must be employed to provide a framework for continued study. Figure 4 combines the broader categories of ideological and trust dimensions into a matrix which is to be considered in the remaining analyses of this thesis.

The reform efforts in Singapore and the co-opting efforts in Indonesia, detailed further in Chapters IV and V, are examined in their response to the variables and their corresponding position in the conceptual matrix above. For instance, suppose that a programmatic response seeks to leverage the discipleship trait in the network. This trait should, based on theory, be focused on the affective (or emotional) ideological dimension as discipleship constitutes part of the individual’s internal attraction to the ideology, and the legitimate power/trust as a cultural rule category as discipleship uses the legitimacy and expectations of social roles to secure compliance. Discipleship then would be placed at the intersection of the affective dimension and the legitimate power/trust as a cultural rule point in the matrix. The actual programmatic response could then be judged on its consideration of the appropriate intersection’s elements.
It is important to note that many of the items of evidence in the rows of trust will not be duplicated across the two columns of ideological dimensions; this signifies that the counter-ideology program must offer different approaches between the two dimensions where the evidence differs. For example, oaths of loyalty primarily affect the processes of recruitment and maintenance of the ideology via the individual’s emotions and have little to do with the evaluative, or external, dimension. Of course, this matrix is merely a model used to organize the relevant pieces of the evidence and does not yet represent any kind of analysis of the government’s or detained terrorist’s strategies. The next two chapters undertake this analysis by assigning preferences for all actors and analyzing strategies versus their optimal employment.
IV. THE RELIGIOUS REHABILITATION GROUP IN SINGAPORE

Now that you have been given the title of the Emir of the faithful in Afghanistan, does this mean that you have now become Caliph of all Muslims? ... Is it compulsory upon Muslims in non-Muslim countries to migrate to Afghanistan? ... what would happen to the mosques, Islamic institutions and other Islamic affairs in their countries?


A. INTRODUCTION

After the 2002 Bali suicide bombing claimed over 200 lives, Singapore and Indonesia, along with other regional governments, began to pursue JI members, targeting them for arrest. As part of the aggressive counter-terrorism response that began during this period, more than 400 JI operatives in the region were detained in the years following the bombing. While these law enforcement efforts in the form of raids and arrests radically reduced JI’s ability to operate, they have not, as previously shown, addressed the root causes of the group’s extremism. It is, additionally, imperative to counter the group’s ideology, the center of JI’s violent motivation, in order to prevent future JI radicalization. As such, regional governments have launched their own unique counter-ideology programs in attempts to mitigate the radical JI ideology.

The Indonesian and Singaporean counter-ideology programs, the prime concerns of this thesis, differ greatly in purpose and strategy. This section examines the Singaporean approach; as Jolene Jerard, a Research Manager at the International Center for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, and Ustaz Mohamed Salleh, a Research Analyst at the same center and an associate of the Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG), note, the Singaporean strategy is a continuous process, consisting of three related elements that target the community at large and the small group of terrorist detainees and their families (personal interview, September 23, 2008). The overarching goals of the
program include reducing the levels of radicalization of detainees and their families, enhancing the security of the country, and to “immunize Muslims in general from extremist ideology” (Hassan, 2007, p. 153).

While undoubtedly an important part of Singapore’s counter-ideology initiatives, the “immunizing” of the community from radicalism is outside the scope of this thesis. Such efforts represent the engagement of individuals and groups who are not yet radicalized (counter-radicalization) and, while perhaps successful, are at least in the Singaporean case completely isolated from the detainee rehabilitation/de-radicalization program. As such, this thesis focuses specifically on the country’s de-radicalization efforts as they are centered on the individual.

Religious rehabilitation in Singapore is carried out in a captive environment for the detainees and on a voluntary basis for their families. Since no JI members are a party to the program (like they are in Indonesia), a unique set of inducements must be offered to achieve even a modicum of rehabilitation since those doing the enticing are outsiders. Specifically, those who propose rehabilitation are Muslim scholars. The rehabilitation program, therefore, represents a direct confrontation between the radical interpretations of Islam harbored by JI members and the peaceful interpretations of the scholars.

This chapter explores Singapore’s de-radicalization program in terms of what strategies are used by the rehabilitators and the detainees’ and families’ receptiveness to these overtures. Consistent with the theoretical model guiding this study, the considerations of each party are examined as valuations in a game played against the other party and in reference to the context of the situation. This is all done in an effort to answer the following question: how effective is a program that directly confronts an extreme ideology by attempting to show the individual that his or her views are wrong?

B. PROGRAM OVERVIEW

Singapore takes a highly structured if time-intensive approach to countering JI’s ideology. This program, which is encouraged but not sponsored or funded by the government, relies on three elements to de-radicalize detained JI operatives and head off radical proliferation in the community. The RRG, a group of approximately 30 volunteer
asatizah (group of ustaz, or scholars/teachers of Islam) which also includes four female ustazah, administers the first two elements: the counseling of JI detainees and counseling and supporting their families with the hope of moderating their extreme views. These two elements attempt to directly change the ideology of radicalized individuals. The third element of the program is a community engagement program, where members from both the RRG and Inter Racial Religious Community Circles (IRRCC) hold conferences in public forums and give lectures at venues like schools about the correct, peaceful interpretation of Islamic scripture and the dangers of extremism. Pamphlets and guidebooks with titles such as *Don’t be extreme in your religion* (Bin Ali & Hassan, 2008) and *Questions & answers on jihad* (Bin Ali & Hassan, 2007) are also distributed within segments of the Singaporean Muslim community deemed to be especially at risk of radicalization. This community engagement project, while important in the overall Singaporean counter-ideology strategy, will not be examined here as it is beyond the scope of this thesis’ focus on individual-centered efforts. Instead, this study takes up the issues associated with the first two elements as administered by the RRG.

The RRG was founded after the government’s initial roundup of 33 JI operatives in Singapore that began in late 2002. Two ustaz who assessed the detainees in conjunction with the government’s Internal Security Department (ISD), Mohamed bin Ali, a member of the Islamic Religious Council of Singapore (MUIS), and Mohamed Hasbi bin Hassan, the president of the Singapore Islamic Scholars and Religious Teachers Association (PERDAUS), noted that the detainees possessed a dangerous misunderstanding of some basic Islamic concepts. In order to counter what the two scholars deemed a threat to the community as embodied in the JI ideology, they established the RRG with the concurrence of the government as an attempt to correct these misunderstandings through counseling. Volunteers from the Singaporean asatizah (community of religious scholars/teachers) were solicited to administer the counseling with the goal of correcting “their misinterpretations of Islam” (Montlake, 2007). Eventually, counseling of family members (using the female ustazah to counsel the wives of the detainees) was also offered to break down the religious misunderstanding and ideological support in the detainees’ households. This voluntary family counseling was
also tied to tangible support in the form of skills training for the wives and school fees and spending money for the children provided by the Interagency After Care Committee, a grouping of Muslim organization and mosques.

RRG Counselors have conducted more than 800 counseling sessions – each detainee is seen once a week for two hours, with one dedicated ustaz per detainee or family – since the group’s founding in early 2003. The group notes that detainees have a distorted view of Islam that plays upon their inability to cope with a pluralistic and secular society. They use the manipulated version of religion supplied by radical teachers as an outlet for social frustrations. Many detainees, when given the choice to engage with the counselors from the asatizah, ask specific questions about the morality of using violence in the name of religion (“A glimpse of RRG: reality and experience,” 2006).

By securing the support of the community to reform militants, starting with discussions with the asatizah and gradually involving reintroduction into mainstream society, the RRG claims some success in curbing extremism. To date, approximately 44 terrorist detainees (the total includes a small number of MILF members) have been graduated from their Detention Order (DO) (imprisoned) status and released into the community on Restriction Order (RO) status. RO status subjects the former detainees to close monitoring and regulates their actions, and those released on RO status serve an average of only 3 years in jail. A few have even reformed to the extent that they have the RO status lifted.

Of course, judging the successes of such a program is bound to be subjective as it is not entirely able to be quantified. Solely considering the numbers of released terrorists does not guarantee that the program is, in fact de-radicalizing individuals, although they must also convince representatives from the Ministry of Home Affairs and the ISD of their reform before release. Greg Fealy, a researcher at the Australian National University, notes that while rehabilitation efforts are worth trying, experience with other programs shows that only a small number of the detainees are likely to fully reform. Any numbers of success higher than just a few are possibly due to the unique position of Singapore to “monitor and control radical activities” (as reported in Hussain, 2007b, p. 184). Those close to the program and involved in its administration acknowledge that a
sort of “black swan” effect is present; the lack of violence in recent years may lead one to believe that the program is working, but until an established and verified long-term trend is observed there can always be doubt (J. Jerard & M. Salleh, personal interview, September 23, 2008). Indeed, at least one released prisoner, Mohamed Selani, has been rearrested and placed in DO status for supporting and funding the MILF.

C. INCENTIVES AND RECEPTION

It is important here to restate the theoretical guidance established earlier in this thesis, namely that counter ideological work needs to be conducted with as much consideration as possible to the valuations of the individual. Broad strategies or messaging campaigns are unlikely to yield effective results for those already indoctrinated into a group that insulates its members from outside viewpoints. A topic for another study might be the measurement of success of the RRG and IRRCC’s community engagement program in the context that it is administered by those already credible to the receptive audience, one that has not been radicalized. Again, though, this is beyond the scope of this study.

The RRG’s initiatives avoid these broad strategies. By tailoring the counseling sessions to each individual and adjusting teachings over a longer period of time – all while noting that conventional Western “philosophy and ideals … would not be able to prescribe the best refutation to their theological and juristic arguments” – this program strives to move as closely as possible to the level of the individual (Hassan, 2007, p. 150-153). The following analysis accounts for the specific elements of the RRG’s approach, concentrating on their unique appeals to the detainees’ values and the resultant effects in changing the affective and evaluative dimensions of the radical ideology.

1. One-On-One Engagement and Influence of the Asatizah

A notable characteristic of the Singapore de-radicalization strategy is that virtually all of the counseling is conducted in one-on-one meetings. According to a
member of the RRG’s secretariat, Ustaz Mohamed Bin Ali, these are almost always conducted as one-on-one counseling sessions as this has proven to be the most effective method to establish a dialogue (2008c).

Just establishing such a credible dialogue is one of the major challenges of the program. Radical Sunni fundamentalism, as viewed as an offshoot of the greater modern Islamist movement, is characterized by the modern dismissal of the importance of the _ulama_ (asatizah is another word for _ulama_) as an authoritative body; this group’s influence is limited even when performing its traditional role of interpreting Quranic scripture or the collected body of Islamic jurisprudence as embodied in the _ijma’a_ (the consensus of the Prophet’s companions and successive scholars), the _sunna_ (the sayings and the actions of the Prophet), or through _qiyas_ (analogical reasoning). As Mohammed Ayoob (2008) notes, the _ulama_ are of notably low importance to the modern Islamists, perceived to be supporters of the corrupt, secular regimes under the control of the West (pp. 21-29). (Note that Shi’i Islam does not share this characteristic, generally treating its scholars as authoritative figures.) Ayoob (2008) further states:

> the Sunni Islamist formations are largely distinct from and often hostile toward the traditional _ulama_. Several of their leading figures have in the past condemned the _ulama_ for practicing and preaching an ossified form of Islam incapable of responding to contemporary challenges. (p. 29)

Ayoob further notes that the interpretive role traditionally played by the _ulama_ is now more likely to be found in lay Islamists who tend to focus more on literal readings of the Quran (pp. 83-85). The emergence of small radical Islamist cells in Southeast Asia corresponds to the current Islamism trend, as Ustaz Mohamad Hasbi bin Hassan notes that violent fundamentalism, as internalized by the JI detainees, has only surfaced in the last 15 to 20 years (as reported in Hussain, 2007, p 176).

This observation emerged from the initial responses of the detainees to the counseling _ustaz_. Many detainees were hostile to the _asatizah_’s overtures, accusing them of being spies for the government (J. Jerard & M. Salleh, personal interview, September 23, 2008). Themselves with no formal training, many detainees accused the scholars of being hypocrites and questioned their “interpretation of religious texts, as certain as ever
that terror attacks … were justified by their faith” (Hussain, 2007b, pp. 183-186). Additionally, the detainees’ suspicion was reinforced by the Muslim community’s initial perception that their arrests were part of a “conspiracy against Islam” (Hasbi bin Hassan, as reported in Hussain, 2007a, p. 176).

Given this starting point, one can begin to model the interactions between the parties with game theory. It is useful here to restate the entering arguments for this methodology. These are the general assumptions that apply to all games: higher ordinal rankings denote higher preferences as cardinal values (i.e., a “4” ranking has four times the value of a “1” ranking) which allows the comparing of multiple strategies through value-based analyses when the actual assignment of utilities isn’t otherwise possible; an individual’s preferences appear rational to that person even if they are “apparently suboptimal” to others, thus representing bounded rationality; and preferences of one person/group don’t directly represent those of another, but they may be qualitatively compared for illustrative purposes. Additionally, the following specific assumptions are stated for series of games in this section: simply keeping the detainee incarcerated is an effective means of mitigating future violent action on his part; the terrorist remains absolutely dedicated to the cause; and rehabilitating the prisoner has benefits beyond his mere detention. The game can then be presented (Figure 5).

\[
\begin{array}{c|cc}
\text{Ustaz} & \text{C. Receptive} & \text{D. Not Receptive} \\
\hline
\text{A. Attempt Reform} & 4,1 & 3,3 \\
\text{B. Don’t Attempt Reform} & 2,2 & 1,4 \\
\end{array}
\]

Figure 5. RRG and Detainee Initial Game

Note that this game differs from the hypothetical game in Chapter II in that the detainee’s preferences to not be reformed are in complete opposition to the ustaz. This makes the players’ choices at matrix points AC and BD a total loss/total gain for each
player. Since there is no tangible benefit in being receptive to reform for the detainee (like there might be in a co-opting program), the detainee falls back on preserving the ideology; since the ustaz is not an authoritative figure, the detainee sees little value in even participating in the process and is indeed suspicious of it. Of course, the ustaz sees inherent value in correcting the misinterpretations of Islam for the safety of the community. Given these valuations, there is a likely outcome of AD and an apparently futile dominant strategy of A for the ustaz while the detainee always avoids rehabilitation.

Of course, there have been cases of rehabilitation in the program, so the valuations of the detainee must be somehow able to change. Eventually, some of the detainees do engage in dialogue that changes their attitudes. From the earlier work in this thesis, it can be surmised that these changes can only occur when a certain level of trust is established. Indeed, this is one reason why the Singapore example is of interest: the previously un-trusted ustaz eventually gains the trust of a certain number of detainees.

One way in which this trust is established is through a sheer volume of one-on-one contact. While there is no time limit placed on the counseling program or targeted goals regarding when rehabilitation is supposed to occur, the first six sessions are generally allocated toward rapport-building. These sessions are aimed simply at starting a dialogue with the detainee. Actually establishing a dialogue is, however, generally seen to be a small obstacle, as most detainees do end up in discussions with the asatizah (J. Jerard & M. Salleh, personal interview, September 23, 2008).

After this initial trust in dialogue is established, it falls on the ustaz to gain a measure of credibility with the detainees (and subsequently their families, a subject dealt with shortly). As already noted, the detainees do not initially submit to the authority of the asatizah, taking the Islamist position that this group justifies support for corrupt, secular regimes. This position, however, is against the prevailing belief in the Muslim community that views the asatizah are important pillars of society (J. Jerard and M. Salleh, personal interview, September 23, 2008). As Yaacob Ibrahim (2007), Singapore’s Minister-in-charge of Muslim Affairs, notes:
The [group of] Muslim religious teachers, or *asatizah*, holds a respected place in the Muslim community. … This respect is something the teacher earns through continuously learning and being able to address the concerns of the students of today. (p. 24)

The JI detainees’ initial hostility toward the teachers, therefore, represents a notable difference between their position and that of the Muslim community. This is noteworthy for two reasons, the first of which is that, ironically, individual detainees purport to value the welfare of the Muslim community highly, ranking this issue below only religion and their own personal economic well-being (Singapore “White paper,” 2003). Second, it reflects the insulated nature of the JI in-group. The exclusivity and secrecy of the tightly knit group allows the development of an individual’s personal identity and esteem that can be opposed to the prevailing societal norms (Taylor & Louis, 2004, pp. 171-173). By conducting repeated one-on-one sessions with the detainee, therefore, the counseling *ustaz* can remove the in-group motivations and reconnect the detainee with the community and hence the credibility of the *asatizah*.

At this stage, the de-radicalization process begins to deal with issues of context, so a presentation of a nested game is in order. The **specific assumptions** of this game are that the *ustaz* always prefers to rehabilitate the detainee, the detainee starts from the position of in-group isolation from the broader Muslim community, and that the acceptance of *ustaz* credibility and the surrender of the primacy of the in-group is required for the detainee to be receptive to reform. Note in Figure 6 that the two players’ rankings, with the 1 series (A1, B1, etc.) representing the *ustaz* and the 2 series representing the detainee, are subject to the decisions of the detainee in each sub-game. Also note that in this representation, each branching point of the extensive game form represents a different element of context, not the decisions of respective players. If the *ustaz* is not credible in the eyes of the detainee, there is no option for the surrender of the primacy of the in-group, and if the in-group primacy is maintained, there can be no option for reform.

Four outcomes then become evident when considering just the contextual elements of the perception of the *ustaz*’s credibility and the continued pull of the
The ranking of the *ustaz*’s preferences are fairly straightforward; with an entering preference of securing the detainee’s rehabilitation, the outcomes can be ordered B1>C1>A1>D1. The valuations of the detainee, however, reflect the detainee’s willingness to revalue these elements with respect to his entering position (see Figure 5). This position would lead to a detainee rank-ordering of D2>A2>C2>B2, representing a total conflict, zero-sum game with the *ustaz*. When the detainee views the *ustaz* as credible but is unwilling to surrender the group identity, the order becomes A2>D2>C2>B2, involving just a re-ordering of the top two choices D2 and A2 (yet representing decisions regarding two elements). If the detainee views the *ustaz* as credible and is willing to surrender the group identity, but is still unwilling to reform for some additional reason, the order is variable, with C1 always topping the choices but surrendering the group identity and treating the *ustaz* as credible again becoming more valuable than the option to reform.

![Figure 6. Nested Games Depicting Decision Points in Detainee Reform](image-url)
Thus, in this depiction, de-radicalization depends on the credibility of the counselor and the malleability of the group identity, both primarily secured both through one-on-one interaction and a reconnection with the Muslim community’s values. The reform decision for those who are especially hardened, though, may consider additional elements not included at this point in the discussion. Even though a dialogue may be initiated, there are those who “remain obstinate and continue to say that their understanding of Islam is correct” and “question the teachers’ interpretation of religious texts” (Hasbi bin Hassan, as reported in Hussain, 2007b. p. 183).

2. Helping Detainees’ Families

After the first round of JI arrests were made in late 2001, leaders in Singapore’s Muslim community began to note that the families of those who had been detained were having difficulties in coping with life without the head of the household. In response to the needs of the families, these leaders began to offer financial help to the families which later became a coordinated effort under the administration of the Inter-Agency After Care Committee (IAACC), an association of Muslim community groups and mosques. In time, the Singaporean government assumed the status of supporting (not administering) the program, providing the money used to benefit the families.

There are two goals associated with the IAACC’s work. The first is, of course, to support members of the Muslim community who have fallen on hard times. For example, of the 31 families of the initial wave of JI detainees, 21 of them have been identified as requiring financial help. The most pressing need is money to pay school fees and money is also given to families to buy basic supplies. Additionally, the wives often require help around the house with items like taxes and paying the bills, tasks that were exclusively performed by the husbands prior to their arrest (Nirmala, 2007). Basic job skill training is also available for the wives, as is special help when children have trouble at school. In this sense, as John Harrison, a Research Manager at the International Center for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, points out, IAACC counselors can act like a surrogate father for the families in need (personal interview, September 22, 2008).
The second part of the family car program is optional counseling administered by the RRG. Like the group’s engagement program with the detainees, counseling which emphasizes the correct interpretation of Islam is offered to the families on a voluntary basis. The goal is to ensure that the family members can integrate into mainstream Muslim society, that radical views aren’t propagated within the family, and that the husband isn’t rejected and perceived as having abandoned his family (J. Jerard & M. Salleh, personal interview, September 23, 2008). While not all of the families opt for the counseling, approximately 13 wives have emerged from the counseling with the goal of returning “their husbands back to a proper understanding of Islam” while banding together in a support group for themselves (Hussain, 2007b, p. 190).

While undoubtedly beneficial to the detainees’ families, the care and counseling for the detainees’ families seems to have had an additional effect on the detainees’ decisions during their own de-radicalization counseling. Detainees, in addition to valuing religious concerns, economic security, and the welfare of the broader Muslim community, appear to value their own families’ welfare above all (Jenkins, as reported in Nirmala, 2007). RRG counselors and family members are the only people outside of the Whitley Road Detention Center where the radical detainees are held that have access to the detainees. Many detainees who had resisted the RRG counseling rehabilitation began to change their minds upon receiving word that their families were being cared for by the RRG and the IAACC. As multiple accounts have shown, the family outreach program sometimes generates expressions of thanks and compels some detainees to feel indebted to the counselors. One detainee is quoted to have said “I have no excuse not to reciprocate by contributing to society.” Another is reported to have “appreciated the religious counseling” while regarding his counselor “as a fatherly figure,” fostering a sense of indebtedness (Wong, 2008).

Thus, the (perhaps unintended) incentive of family care may have a semi-independent role in getting detainees to buy into rehabilitation. While not tied directly to the RRG’s attempts to influence detainees that the ustaz is credible, the in-group identity should be surrendered, and that the reform message is internalized, the effect of providing for their family members may intervene at any stage of the process to cause the detainee
to reassess decisions. This relationship is depicted in Figure 7, showing the possible emplacement of the family care incentive as it could influence decisions at each intersection as induced from the above accounting.

Perhaps the most dramatic iteration of this collection of possible games would occur, as represented in specific examples above, if the detainee was to consider a possible family incentive after considering the ustaz credible and committing to surrender his group identity. Unlike the other conditions in the game, receptiveness to this new incentive would not appear to be a requirement for rehabilitation like the credibility of the ustaz or the surrender of the in-group identity would. Instead, it would generate a new offshoot in which acceptance of the sufficient incentive would serve to ensure reform, while rejection of the incentive could still allow a yes or no reform decision. In this case the final C and D series valuations might represent factors that are not considered in this model, with possible examples being the need for personal monetary payments or an existing grudge against the ustaz or government. There would not be an exclusive reliance on the factors of ustaz credibility and maintenance of the in-group identity.

![Figure 7. Possible Influences of Family Care Incentive](image-url)
After extensive interaction with the detainee and the resultant evaluations, it may be desirable to see what possible effect that the family care incentive might have on a detainees’ rehabilitation, or probability $r$ as depicted in Figure 8. Of course, this could be easy if the detainee already shows indicates a strong willingness to reform before the incentive apply, say with a high value of C2 driving $l-r$ to something like .9 (making the $r$ probability of family care incentive .1, or 10%). What, though, of the scenario when C2 is less easy to forecast or is unknown? In this case, the detainee’s top values would be B2, C2, and D2, presumably followed by A2 and E2. If, in this series, we add the specific assumptions that the detainee is inclined to consider the ustaz as credible and is willing to surrender the group identity but is still not willing to reform, but that the family incentive with reform would be more preferable than reform without this incentive. The resultant valuations would be D2>B2>C2>A2>E2, or in ordinal notation D2=5, B2=4, C2=3, A2=2, E2=1. Solving for an equilibrium value of $r$ requires “backward induction” using the payoff values and following the tree backward from the $r$ and $1-r$ branch (Gates & Humes, 1997, pp. 116-120). The equation for this dynamic is a function of the preceding decision intersection with probability $r$:

$$E_f (\text{no family care incentive}) = r(C2) + (1-r)(D2)$$

To start, if we want to find the equilibrium value of $r$ at which there is indifference to opting to follow the family care incentive or choosing not to reform:

$$E_f = r(3) + (1-r)(5)$$

Setting $E_f$ equal to the value B2=4, $r = \frac{1}{2}$. In this case, if there is an even chance of the detainee selecting choice C2 or D2 (probability 50%), then there is an indifference of selection at the “Family Care Sufficient Incentive” point, meaning the detainee will choose the highest payoff D2 (not receptive to reform). By extension, if $r > .5$, then the family care incentive should matter less as the desirable outcome C1 is likely for the ustaz. However, if $r < .5$ then there is a greater likelihood of either the detainee not selecting rehabilitation or of the detainee accepting the family care incentive. For illustration purposes, let $r = .3$ and replace $E_f$ with a new “relative” value of B2:

$$B2 = .3(3) + .7(5) = 4.4$$
Note that this “relative” value of B2 is higher in value than the option’s original value of 4, meaning that the B2 option holds more attraction but is still below the highest payoff of D2 (which is 5).

What this means is that if there is indication that the detainee will not reform (i.e., intends to select D2) despite cooperating through the credibility and group identity phases, the strengthening of the family care incentive could be considered to offset the increasing likelihood of the detainee not submitting to rehabilitation. This could be accomplished by increasing the benefits to the family or advertising the incentive more openly. The hope would, of course, be that, if in fact the detainee’s number one concern is the family (Jenkins, as reported in Nirmala, 2007), that the preferences might be reordered with rehabilitation-via-incentive assuming a higher valuation than not being receptive to reform.

Figure 8. Effect of Incentive on Receptivity to Reform
D. SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS

The RRG’s de-radicalization and family care program’s effectiveness rests in the ability of the ustaz to gain measures of trust and credibility with the detainee. Without this necessary condition, there can be none of the follow-on processes that aim to curb the extremist ideology. The implementation of these follow-on measures is no guarantee of success, however, although the program has seen many detainees successfully released on RO. When considering the number of released detainees alone – 73 were detained in years after late 2001 and approximately 44 of these have been released – the program should be seen as successful.

The RRG’s de-radicalization efforts address the individual’s adherence to the ideology head-on. The original method of one-on-one consultation between members of the asatizah and detainees is ultimately meant to convince them to reform based on separating them from ties to the JI in-group. Using a dedicated ustaz to engage the detainee, repeated interactions are aimed at eventually breaking down the in-group’s distrust of mainstream Islamic interpretation, virtually isolating the detainee from the possibly reinforcing resistance of his peers.

A more recent addition to the process – perhaps even with unintended effects – is the addition of caring for the detainees’ families which serves as an incentive for reform. Trust may be established in the asatizah when detainees find out their families are cared for. These measures are, of course, undertaken by the IAACC out of a sense of Islamic community, but they nonetheless constitute a powerful incentive for reform. That this incentive may produce results when applied at any stage of the engagement process is a testament to its importance.

What, though, are the underlying elements of this success? This chapter has, to this point, focused on the processes of the rehabilitation efforts as they address the individual’s concerns in the de-radicalization program. The actual concerns themselves have been considered only in a broad sense and treated as a result of the processes. Attention in this section turns to the specifics of the program in order to better understand how the processes address the specific requirements of the individuals. First, the
processes are compared to the individual’s concerns and the ideological dimensions uncovered in Chapter III. Then, and equally as important, this section examines the items that are not addressed.

1. **Programmatic Elements of Trust, Credibility, and Counter-Ideology**

The RRG views its efforts as a program in which the goal is to change the ideas stemming from the JI detainees’ misinterpretations of Islamic tenets. The major misconceptions addressed by the RRG are: *jihad* is a requirement to wage holy war on infidels, the world is divided rigidly into the realm of the believers (*dar al Islam*) and that of disbelief (*dar al kufr*) in which “aversion to disbelievers” is compulsory, death by suicide (via suicide bombings) in the name of martyrdom is allowed, and an oath like the JI *bai’ah* to a leader is inviolate (Hussain, 2007, p. 180). These concepts represent the both the evaluative and affective dimensions of JI’s ideology, characterizing the group’s judgments on the enemy out-group (“aversion to disbelievers,” compulsory *jihad*) and the emotional appeal for the individual (appeal of martyrdom, absolute belief in the sanctity of the *bai’ah*).

While the program is characterized as addressing the detainees’ ideas directly, what is clear is that a host of efforts directed instead at the needs and considerations of the detainees themselves is crucial to starting the ideological debate. As seen in the examination of the *asatizah’s* initial approach to the detainees, the rehabilitation process first requires the building of trust and credibility in the *ustaz*. Without these, as depicted in the entering game (Figure 5), there is no change in the status quo which could compel a change in the level of radicalization. The establishment of trust and then credibility in the counselor overcomes the ideological distrust of the *ulama*, then allowing the follow-on games regarding the compromise of the detainee’s in-group primacy and ultimately the receptivity to rehabilitation. Additionally, the family care program, described as “a safety net that would ensure a generation that blamed the authorities for their fathers’ arrests did not emerge” (Abdul Halim Kader, as reported in Hussain, 2007b, p. 190), becomes an incentive for the detainee to cooperate with the rehabilitation overtures.
At this point the specifics of the RRG’s program can be compared to the matrix denoting the intersections of the trust and influence characteristics and the affective and evaluative dimensions as presented in Chapter IV. A filled-in version of this matrix based on the examination in this chapter is found in Figure 9. The rehabilitation program deals thoroughly with the Trust in Relationships area, breaking down the relationship bonds established in Maidin’s religion study group and discounting the inviolate nature of the JI oath by establishing trust and credibility in the ustaz. After this trust and credibility is established in the counselor, the ideology’s judgment dimension is dealt with (the “receptive to reform” decision in Figure 6). Similarly, the RRG’s efforts to build trust and credibility address the Legitimate Power row in the Affective Dimension intersection, breaking down the legitimacy of the JI leadership’s ideological hold on the membership.

The RRG’s program also addresses two items in the Referent Power row, with the first being the in-group identity. This is accomplished in two ways; the first is through the trust and credibility efforts of the asatizah, as any gains realized by the counselors effectively weakens the attraction of the JI in-group in a kind of zero-sum contest. While there is a possibility that an individual can possess elements of many identities or even have different “nested” identities, when the primary identity is established “in contrast to others” any surrender of this primary identity makes the individual open to elements of other identities. As is shown in the RRG’s successful cases when the ustaz establishes a rapport with the detainee, the “absence of a clear contrast group hampers” the maintenance of the strong group identity (Kriesberg, 2007, pp. 55-61). By extension, when the group identity begins to lessen its grip on the detainee, the judgments associated with the evaluative dimension of the group’s ideology become less absolute and open to influence. Additionally, after the building of trust and credibility in the ustaz is able to compromise the group identity, these efforts give the counselor the ability to reintroduce the detainee to the norms of the Muslim mainstream. Once these are understood, the contrast of the JI ideology to the moderate norms has the potential to change the detainees’ conception that armed defense of a besieged Muslim community is required.
2. **Absent Elements**

From an analytical standpoint, what is just as important as what the RRG’s de-radicalization program addresses is what it does not address. It should be apparent from consideration of Figure 9 that there are elements that the RRG program does not address in its efforts. The remainder of this chapter examines the program’s limitations with respect to these absent elements.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trust in Relationships</th>
<th>Affective Dimension</th>
<th>Evaluative Dimension</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Family feeder network</td>
<td>-Study group feeder network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Study group feeder network</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Absolute loyalty/oath taking</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust as a Personality Trait/Personal Enablers of Trust</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimate Power/Trust as a Cultural Rule</td>
<td>-Absolute loyalty/oath taking</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Referent Power/Theory of the Self</td>
<td>-In-group identity</td>
<td>-In-group vs. out-group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Sense of belonging in Muslim community</td>
<td>-Perceived attacks on Muslim Community</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 9. Trust and Influence vs. Ideological Dimensions in the RRG Program

First, because the RRG was born from the *asatizah’s* sense of duty in volunteering to counsel the detainees because of their misconceptions of Islam (Hussain, 2007a, pp. 175-176), the program is fairly narrow in scope. The detainees are engaged only in ways that lead to the series of decision points as depicted in the nested games earlier in this
chapter. This means that the specific nature of the program, focusing as it does on moving detainees’ beliefs back into the boundaries of the Muslim mainstream, tends not to address many of the elements that were identified in Chapter III. For example, notice in Figure 9 that no personality traits/personal enablers of trust are considered by the program. Elements in this area that intersect with the affective dimension of the ideology would include many of the psychological traits identified in Singapore’s 2003 “White paper,” including the need for a “no fuss” path to heaven, a concrete/objective personality, high measures of guilt and loneliness, and highly compliant personalities. Addressing these elements, which contribute to the emotional and personal attraction of the ideology (especially in the Singapore case), could potentially directly affect the individual’s buy-in of the ideology. Instead, the use of reinterpretation of Islam as the primary issue may address these items indirectly, such as leveraging the ustaz’s eventual credibility to guide a compliant personality. Many of these same elements may also be seen in this row’s intersection with the ideology’s evaluative dimension; in addition to constituting an emotional attraction to the ideology, items such as a concrete/objective or a highly compliant personality make individual’s willing to carry out actions in judgment of the out-group. Simply isolating detainees from the close-knit reinforcement of the in-group without attacking the rationale of the underlying ideas may be enough to mitigate these violent judgments in some cases. Again, the RRG’s program may address these in an indirect fashion, but primarily addresses the issue of religion.

One additional area that is not addressed is the absolute loyalty/oath taking element as it is applied to the evaluative dimension. This element is a factor in both the Trust in Relationships and Legitimate Power areas as the loyalty to the cell leader or the JI Amir, in the vein of discipleship, creates an unquestioned adherence to the judgments levied by the group’s ideology. Again, because the primary concern of addressing the ideas held in the ideology narrows the scope of the interventions, the possibility of discrediting JI leaders is not directly undertaken.

Finally, there is one process related to the absolute loyalty element that is not present in the RRG’s program: the influence of other detainees’ actions on individual decisions to reform. A central maxim of this program is that detainees are not allowed to
communicate with each other (or anyone outside of their families, the *ustaz* counselor, or security service personnel). If we add a **specific assumption** that detainees of similar status are allowed to communicate with each other as their decision sequences progress and that one of the detainees values the reform option highly, a new dynamic is added to the scenario’s context. The reinforcing nature of the in-group’s “attraction” has the potential to leverage tendencies for maintenance of the group identity by securing conformity (French & Raven, 1959, p. 163).

This can be shown in game theory in a multiple-player contest where a possible coalition between two detainees of similar status changes payoffs. Of course, if both detainees are fully opposed to cooperating with the counselors then, if allowed to communicate, they will simply form a coalition with each other to strengthen their opposition. If, however, a credible member of the in-group (Detainee 1) decides to prefer receptivity to reform then the dynamics change. The following game (Figure 10) shows the new player, Detainee 2, who is assumed to be skeptical about reform; his preferences are shown by the third numeral (note that even though the game is presented in two matrices it still represents one contest).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Detainee 2 option E. Interested but not Convinced</th>
<th>Detainee 1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Attempt Reform</td>
<td>C. Receptive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4,4,3</td>
<td>3,2,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,3,2</td>
<td>1,1,1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Detainee 2 option F. Not Receptive</th>
<th>Detainee 1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Attempt Reform</td>
<td>C. Receptive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4,4,1</td>
<td>3,2,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,3,2</td>
<td>1,1,4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 10. Three-Person Coalition Game
Detainee 2’s option E. Interested but not Convinced presents a scenario where he may be slightly open to rehabilitation, especially given Detainee 1’s choices, but still values retaining the ideology above all. Detainee 2 basically has two choices given the entering assumptions: play alone or form a coalition with Detainee 1. Of interest is what Detainee 2 could expect in an overall payoff in this game if he decides to form a coalition with Detainee 1 to maintain the group identity. Finding this payoff value entails finding Detainee 2’s security level, or the worst payoff that he could get when going it alone while Detainee 1 and the ıztaz cooperate. His security level in this example is 2. Given the assumption that the counselor and Detainee 1 play option AC, Detainee 2’s option E gives him the highest possible payoff (over option ACF) and beats his security level, making his reform more likely.

Execution of this strategy would require letting detainees communicate among themselves. For this reason alone, such a strategy is, of course, not likely in the RRG’s case. The sensitivity of the RRG program’s goals in establishing credibility in the ıztaz along with potential skepticism in the Muslim community limits the engagement strategy to a one-on-one affair that is not open to other detainees’ participation. While the possibility of using peer detainees or those who have already reformed to help in the RRG’s work is evident to the ızatizah, the central belief remains that reformed detainees’ top requirement is to “readjust and reintegrate” into society “without being in the spotlight” (Y. Ibrahim, as reported in Hussain, 2007b, p. 188).
V. THE INDONESIAN NATIONAL POLICE’S “SOFT POWER” PROGRAM

There are only two forces existing:
1. The forces of Allah 2. The forces of taghout [Satan/false idol].

From an open letter written by convicted Bali bomber, Imam Samudra

A. INTRODUCTION

The aftermath of the 2002 Bali bombing proved to be a watershed event for the start of Indonesia’s counter-terror efforts. After the specifics of the Bali plot were uncovered by police work after the blast, arrests were made and intelligence was gained that led to even more arrests. Eventually, hundreds of JI members and sympathizers were arrested and the police began to assemble a picture of JI’s motives and the group’s characteristics.

The picture that emerged from the intelligence was one of an extremely close-knit group with a rigid hierarchy. JI was not a local phenomenon, however, as the group was discovered to maintain a strong network throughout Southeast Asia which centered about the group’s radical pesantren in both Indonesia and Malaysia (International Crisis Group, 2002, August 8). According to police Inspector General (retired) Ansyad Mbai, Indonesia’s Head Counter-Terrorism Coordinator, the group’s leadership, starting with Sungkar and Ba’asyir and continuing with members like Bali organizers, Mukhlas, Amrozi, Imam Samudra, and Ali Imron, were found to be products of the dormant DI movement. JI was a breakaway organization from DI but had assumed that group’s long-held goal of establishing an Islamic state under sharia with the additional goal of establishing a pan-Asian Islamic state. In response to the threat to the state, the Indonesian government repeatedly used heavy-handed and “draconian” tactics against DI in the 1950s through the 1980s which included violent repression and executions. This served to deeply radicalize the movement’s membership against the secular government. The JI that followed, then, was a product of this intensive radicalization and viewed...
anybody who exercised authority on behalf of the state to be *taghout*, or apostates/the forces of Satan (personal interview, September 25, 2008).

With the waves of arrests in the aftermath of the 2002 Bali bombing (many under an emergency political detention law emplaced by then-President Megawati) uncovering the radical nature and the reach of the group, police intelligence began to understand that using arrests and traditional physical methods of protection and deterrence would not be enough to address the JI problem. These methods of applying “hard power” could not alone stop the production of new recruits with violent intent; in fact, hard power methods would often led to greater radicalization in the small JI community. Additionally, the police simply lacked the resources to find and arrest all of the JI membership. With porous borders and weak identification and immigration systems, there was simply no way to use traditional methods to stop the operations and movement of geographically-savvy terrorists (A. Mbai, personal interview, September 25, 2008). What was also needed was a way to address the spread of the group’s radical ideas.

Such a method was found in what Indonesia calls the “soft power” approach. This program uses converted JI terrorists who have renounced the radical ideology to influence others to do the same. The ultimate goal, secured through co-opting as many detainees as possible, is to convince those members who have not yet been caught or those at risk of radicalization that violence is not the answer. With several notable successes already attributed to the program – and even though there is a risk of failure if a cooperative prisoner is released and continues where he left off – the police see this de-radicalization program as a requirement to achieve a permanent cessation of violence by striking at the heart of JI’s ideology (Mbai, 2007).

This chapter analyzes Indonesia’s soft power program, studying the strategies employed by the police to get influential detainees to cooperate. These strategies are heavily dependent on incentives that are provided to the detainees, so these will be examined in detail. This chapter ultimately seeks an answer to the question of what mix of trust and incentives is enough to achieve lasting effects in a de-radicalization program.
B. PROGRAM OVERVIEW

The soft power program is constructed around the defections of ranking members of the group which are in turn used to induce those of lower rank to cooperate. It is important to note that the program does not use moderate ulama to influence detainees, as “jihadis were not going to listen to ‘moderates’ outside their own circle” (International Crisis Group, 2007, November 19). As Police Superintendent Tito Karnavian explains, an examination of JI’s social dynamics and culture reveals that the group considers all outsiders heretics. The ulama, therefore, are seen as supporting the taghout government and are not to be trusted (personal interview, September 22, 2008). While this is obviously at odds with the successes that the Singapore program has had in getting detainees to trust the asatizah, this issue will not be addressed here; it will instead be examined in the next chapter.

This program, dubbed “creeping de-radicalization” due to the use of higher-level members to convince their subordinates to cooperate, relies on an understanding of how JI operates in order to exploit its characteristics (“Indonesia says ‘soft approach’ yields dividends in Southeast Asia’s war on terror,” 2007, October 12). Over the course of many years’ worth of detainee interactions, several group characteristics have emerged that have contributed to this required knowledge (International Crisis Group, 2007, November 19). First, JI operates with a rigid hierarchy where leaders in the group have considerable power over their subordinates (JI’s original hierarchical structure was documented in the group’s PUPJI manual). Second, the group possesses a distinct culture and set of norms. These norms include a respect for seniority, a respect for those perceived to have an in-depth knowledge of Islam (just reciting the Quran has been sufficient in some instances), and deference to those with previous military experience, with service in the mujahidin in Afghanistan ranking over experience in Indonesia or The Philippines. Third, members of the group will almost exclusively trust only those of the in-group, hence the police’s decision not to use moderate ulama in the de-radicalization process. Finally, individuals in the group are not necessarily motivated by religious or spiritual issues. Despite the intensive indoctrination process described earlier in this
thesis, individuals who join JI may value benefits such as the appeal to a sense of adventure or even employment as burglars for the group’s financial support over the religious cause (T. Karnavian, personal interview, September 22, 2008).

After understanding the general characteristics of the group, the first step in the process is to initiate a dialogue with a higher-ranking target detainee to gain specific knowledge of the detainee’s needs and values. A small cadre of ranking police officers is charged with this task, with each officer possessing knowledge of Islamic and Javanese culture (recall that most of Indonesia’s JI members are from Java); one or two officers from this small group are assigned to each target detainee to establish a continuity of contact. The police’s first contact with the detainee is the most important as it sets the conditions for the efforts at building trust and the resultant follow-on dialogue (T. Karnavian, personal interview, September 22, 2008). Establishing trust between the officer and the detainee becomes the crucial first step which enables the follow-on methods of the soft power approach to co-opt detainees (analyzed in the next section).

Securing the cooperation of high-ranking JI members can yield notable gains. The two most obvious cases of this are the successes that have followed the cooperation of two ranking detainees, Nasir Abas and Ali Imron. Nasir Abas, a veteran of the mujahidin in Afghanistan during the late 1980s, is the former commander of JI’s Mantiqi Three which covered the Southern Philippines, Sabah, and Sulawesi. He cooperates with the de-radicalization program after being arrested in 2003 and spending 10 months in prison on an immigration offense. His influence lies in his rank (a Mantiqi commander ranks very high in the organization – the third tier of command) and his past interactions with most JI members when he ran JI’s training camp on the island of Mindanao. Ali Imron, also an Afghanistan veteran, is known to have played a large role in the 2002 Bali bombing and is tied to head Bali organizers Amrozi and Mukhlas through the family feeder network (they are his brothers). He was also arrested in 2003 and has been given a life sentence for his role in executing the 2002 Bali bombing. Both men, for different reasons and with different methods that will be explored later in this
cooperate with the police in trying to correct what they see as the misinterpretations of Islamic concepts within the JI movement by trying to convince other detainees to see their points of view.

Both Abas and Imron have written books about their views and experiences and are publicly touted by the police as the two best examples of the program’s potential (T. Karnavian, personal interview, September 22, 2008). Indonesia widely publicizes the successes that Abas and Imron have had in their efforts to engage jailed JI radicals in a transparent strategy that seems to be aimed at accomplishing two things. First, the government undoubtedly wants to show that, as a modern democracy, it maintains the capacity to deal with threats in a non-repressive fashion. Second, by publicizing the co-opting and reformation of detainees, the credibility of the ideology of remaining, at-large extremists is challenged.

To be sure, Indonesia’s program is not always successful; the three organizers of the 2002 Bali bombing who currently await execution, Amrozi, Mukhlas, and Imam Samudra, have all rejected approaches from a cooperating peer. Abu Rusdan, a former JI Amir who cooperated with the police and provided valuable intelligence about the network’s operations, was released on police recommendation but has since been working to rebuild the JI network (A. Mbai, personal interview, September 25, 2008). Detainees who cooperate, however, usually express regret over the targeting of civilians as a tactic, thus reflecting a shift in the application of the ideology’s evaluative dimension. Additionally, the public efforts of those who cooperate reflect an emotive, or affective, swing away from JI’s ideology. An interview with Abas reflects this when he notes “slaying men without allowed reason is a big sin, and the prophet Muhammad never killed civilians … in the peaceful areas like in Indonesia, they slay women and children” [sic] (Patung, 2006). Indonesia’s “creeping de-radicalization” strategy may, therefore, be a “trial and error” approach (International Crisis Group, 2007, November 19), but it has yielded useful intelligence, seen the conversion of significant leaders in the network, and created a public awareness about the problem of JI’s radical ideology.
C. INCENTIVES AND RECEPTION

The police obviously desire that detainees totally surrender the radical ideology’s notions that that killing civilians is acceptable and that the establishment of an Islamic state is required. Such full conversions are not necessarily required for the soft power program to be effective, however, as those who only give up the most radical parts of the ideology can be of great benefit to the program. Ali Imron is the prime example of this. He has not surrendered the basic tenets of the JI ideology, namely that the ultimate goal should be the establishment of a Caliphate and the punishment of the West for atrocities committed against fellow Muslims in places like Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Balkans. He has, however, repented his role in the killing of innocent civilians in Bali, noting that this strategy is wrong because conditions were not right for an “offensive jihad” and that the true enemy, Western military forces, were not the target of the violent action (“Imprisoned Indonesian Terrorist Imron Renounces, Regrets Role in Bali Bombings,” 2008, March 17). Imron has nonetheless been successful in convincing others that the killing of civilians is wrong; this makes his participation in the police’s program valuable.

Since any level of cooperation is potentially beneficial, the police have a large incentive to co-opt influential members in even small amounts of participation in the program. This section examines the strategies that the Indonesian police use to entice influential detainees to cooperate in the soft power program and employ these members to further convince their JI subordinates to cooperate. Of note is that dialogue is not the only way to secure measures of trust in the police handlers; it can also be won with tangible incentives administered by the police. A full analysis of these methods shows how leveraging elements of trust and influence is having effects on the dimensions of the JI ideology.

1. Police Engagement and Overcoming Perceptions of Taghout

Just getting detainees to trust the police handler is the hardest part of the program. Kirsten Schulze, a senior lecturer at the London School of Economics who has written widely on security issues in Indonesia, notes that if the police overcome this initial distrust and the belief that anyone associated with the state is automatically taghout,
“then other deeply held jihadist tenets would also be questioned” (as reported in Waterman, 2008, July 22). Once a detainee surrenders even a little bit then further progress is more forthcoming.

The initial game in which a potentially influential detainee interacts with the government for the first time can be proposed (Figure 11). The specific assumptions in this game include: the detainee desires to be released from prison (or gain incentives, depending on sentencing) and to stay true to the group’s worldview; the police’s release of the terrorist involves a risk of return to radical action; and the prisoner will likely be effective in de-radicalizing others if co-opted. It should be noted that the police do not have absolute power to release detainees they deem sincere in their cooperation. Releases are done at the expiration of sentences administered by the due process within the legal system, but shortening of sentences may be influenced by police recommendations (A. Mbai, personal interview, September 25, 2008).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>A. Co-opt and employ</th>
<th>B. Keep in prison</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C. Cooperate</td>
<td>4,2</td>
<td>1,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Don’t cooperate</td>
<td>3,1</td>
<td>2,3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 11. Police and Detainee Initial Game

Note that this game’s ordinal rankings match those of the hypothetical game proposed in Chapter II but are different from those in the initial game proposed in the Singaporean case in Chapter IV. The detainee has a dominant strategy of D due to the higher valuations as expected by his devotion to the ideology. The police, on the other hand, do not have a pure strategy and play either strategy A or B depending on the detainee’s choice. This leaves a likely outcome of BD, meaning that the likely choice for the police will be to keep the detainee in prison without attempting to co-opt him and the detainee will likely not cooperate.
As examples like that of Nasir Abas demonstrate, however, there can be changes to these initial detainee valuations that result in cooperation. Some of these changes can be accounted for by the different levels of radicalization that each detainee has undergone. Abas, for instance, joined JI as a young man in part because of the attraction of the ideology but also because of the opportunities for adventure he saw in fighting in places like Afghanistan. Police describe him as more shallowly radicalized; that he already had reservations about the targeting of civilians and he immediately cooperated with police at the time of his arrest sheds light on this categorization. This stands in contrast to more hardcore radicals like Mukhlas and Amrozi who were essentially born into radicalization. The brothers’ family was active in the DI movement so they were exposed to the radical ideas of using Islam as a point of opposition to a corrupt government from a very young age. Ali Imron, the third brother, may seem like an exception given his cooperation with police, but when considering that he has only given up a small bit of the JI methodology (attacking civilians and the illegitimacy of waging offensive *jihad*) it is clear that he, too, maintains most of his radical views. The three brothers, then, can be said to be much more deeply radicalized than Abas and are therefore less likely to give up their radical views (T. Karnavian, personal interview, September 22, 2008).

That Imron and others like him do not give up most of their radical views but are still of use to the police points to an important aspect of Indonesia’s program. Fully de-radicalizing the detainees is less important than getting detainees to cooperate with the police for the program to be effective, signaling that the goal of “disengagement” from violent acts is an apt description of the police’s efforts. At the level of the individual, this can be further divided into “physical” or “psychological” disengagement, describing whether a detainee chooses to surrender the ideology (wholly or in part) or simply abandon violent tactics (Horgan, 2008). The differences in Ali Imron and Nasir Abas’ cooperation efforts reflect this characterization, with Imron representing a more physical disengagement while Abas has disengaged both physically and psychologically. Note, though, that even Imron has surrendered a crucial part of the ideology, so the de-radicalization characterization is also valid.
Thus, likelihood of cooperation is far more personal than the simplified game in Figure 11 suggests. The police have, as a consequence, broken down their approaches to detainees into three categories of results that guide their efforts: the detainee accepts family assistance or does not, the detainee admits to crimes or does not, and the detainee is willing to assist the police or not (Setyarso, 2007, November 14). Leaving the first category for analysis in the next sections, the second and third categories reflect practical statements of the physical or psychological (or combined) disengagement phenomena. The detainee, therefore, actually faces three choices in the initial game: cooperate and surrender most of the ideology (physical and psychological – or total – disengagement), cooperate without surrendering most of the ideology (physical disengagement and limited de-radicalization), or don’t cooperate. Figure 12 shows how these games might be represented given different levels of radicalization using Abas and Imron as examples.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Abas</th>
<th></th>
<th>Imron</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D. Total</td>
<td>E. Physical</td>
<td>F. Don’t cooperate</td>
<td>D. Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Co-opt and employ</td>
<td>6,6</td>
<td>5,5</td>
<td>1,4</td>
<td>6,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Keep in prison</td>
<td>4,3</td>
<td>3,2</td>
<td>2,1</td>
<td>4,2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 12. Separate Games of Varying Disengagement Preferences

Two strategic observations can be made. First, the intersection AF, which can indicate a detainee’s intent to deceive police by appearing to cooperate in order to secure release or privileges, ranks highly for both detainees but is not a preferred strategy.
Second, Abas’ game has a saddlepoint at AD reflecting his intent to cooperate and he has a dominant strategy D with a dominated strategy (he will never choose) F. Imron’s game, however, has no dominant strategies but strategy D is dominated. There are also two saddlepoints in this game, one at AE which represents his intent to physically disengage and one at BF which represents total opposition to the police’s efforts. As long as Imron believes that the police is sincere in its efforts he chooses strategy E, but if there is an indication that there will be no good-faith police response he chooses not to cooperate.

Imron’s strategic conundrum illustrates the requirement for the police to overcome the detainee’s perception that anyone from the government is taghout. Building detainee trust in the police handler is, therefore, a crucial first step and enables follow-on participation. Police handlers use two main approaches to establish this trust, the first of which is assigning dedicated handlers to each detainee. Through repeated interactions, handlers can convince detainees that their problems are understood. Most importantly, in order to convince detainees of their trustworthiness, all police handlers are devout Muslims and use this to show that they belong to the same umma (Muslim community) (Abuza, as reported in O’Brien, 2007, October 22). Some of the handlers are said to, in fact, hold only slightly less radical views than the prisoners themselves (“Reforming jihadists: preachers to the converted,” 2007, December 13). By praying and eating together, a level of trust and an intense relationship often develops which then leads to detailed knowledge of an individual’s background and needs (T. Karnavian, personal interview, September 22, 2008).

2. **Tangible Incentives and Family Care**

The second method that police use to establish and maintain trust is by administering incentives. Indonesian prisons are unpleasant places that are costly (prisoners must pay for their food) and house significant amounts of corruption and violence (International Crisis Group, 2007, November 19). Police use this fact to their advantage by housing those detainees that cooperate in nicer environments like the
holdings at the National Police headquarters in Jakarta. Amenities such as cell phones, laptops, traditional Muslim dress, ping pong tables, and treadmills are also provided.

Incentives can extend beyond the prison walls, too. One well-publicized perk of cooperation is seen in the recent gathering of prisoners at a police-sponsored retreat held at a police general’s villa. Selected prisoners were treated to escapes from confinement with a cookout and social gathering, all under minimum security; of note, no detainees tried to escape. Ali Imron has also been spotted with a police general at a Starbucks coffee house in an upscale Jakarta mall despite his life sentence for his role in Bali. Needless to say, there has been a significant amount of international outrage at these efforts, especially from the Australians who lost 88 citizens in the 2002 Bali blast. The police’s goal, however, is to prove that they are “brother Muslims” to secure the prisoners’ trust (“Indonesia says ‘soft approach’ yields dividends in Southeast Asia’s war on terror,” 2007, October 12).

While material incentives and preferential treatment may sway some detainees, the most powerful incentive is administering help to the families of detainees who are having difficulties while the husbands and fathers are in prison. Handlers can often determine a family’s status during the initial dialogue sessions with the detainee, but many of the more senior and, hence, more influential detainees may not know how their families are faring. This is due to deeply radicalized detainees’ emulation of the Hijira, or the migration of the Prophet Muhammad from Mecca to Medina in the first year of the Islamic calendar, 1 AH (622 AD), to avoid persecution. In the jihadi interpretation, this migration is the movement from the physical world to the jihad world, leaving all else behind including one’s house, family, and possessions. In the same way that the Prophet rebuilt the strength of his society during the migration, jihadis seek to build their strength by leaving the material world behind in order to respond to the threat to Islam (T. Karnavian, personal interview, September 22, 2008).

In these cases, helping families can help break down the resistance that deeply radicalized prisoners show toward police advances. One poignant example is that of Zarkasi, the former JI Amir who was arrested in 2007. Police had an especially difficult time getting any cooperation or information from him until they asked him about his
family. He responded that he didn’t know, as he had been dedicated to the jihad for 10 years in the path of the Hijira. When the police told him that his four children dropped out of school he hesitated and became more pliable when police asked him if his sacrifice, ostensibly for the good of the Muslim community, was justified given the plight of his children. Police then provided funds for his children’s school fees and Zarkasi was notified of the action by his family. He thanked the police and opened up to their dialogue, supplying valuable intelligence on the state of the network in the process (A. Mbai, personal interview, September 25, 2008).

Helping families to secure detainee cooperation has become the centerpiece of the Indonesian police’s efforts to build trust. This incentive can take the form of payments of school fees, providing small stipends, arranging for needed medical treatment, or even arranging for prisoners’ marriages. Often these incentives keep a family afloat in the face of tremendous hardships brought on the lack of income and the family’s stigma in the community at being connected with terrorism. For instance, wives of prisoners who were arrested in the raid in Palembang earlier this year have reported to a police assistance team that neighbors “sneered and ridiculed” their situation and that their debts were mounting (“Indonesia: report on families of detained JJ Palembang members,” 2008, July 11). When prisoners learn that the police have helped their families – this is never advertised by the police but is instead reported by the families themselves to the detainees – they often feel a sense of indebtedness that is the ultimate catalyst for establishing a relationship built on trust (T. Karnavian, personal interview, September 22, 2008).

The two police methods of securing trust, using dedicated handlers to establish a rapport and dialogue and administering incentives, create a framework that only requires the detainee to respond to one method to establish trust. A representation of this framework can be seen in Figure 13. While the first efforts to establish trust are seen in the attempt to establish rapport with the police handler, administering either tangible or family care incentives are not necessarily sequential with any of the rest of the strategy. Establishing trust may require only one type of incentive or the full range of incentives. Once trust is established via one method, it can be assumed that further efforts function more as maintainers or deepeners of trust.
Figure 13. Nested Games of Police Efforts to Establish Trust

Valuations of both the police and the detainee in this framework are variable and depend on circumstance. Generally speaking, trust that requires more incentives to establish equates to a deeper level of radicalization; Zarkasi’s example shows this. As such, a deeply radicalized detainee who is ultimately open to trusting the police handler would possibly rank trusting highly only with the full range of incentives, reflected in the ordering C2/F2>D2/G2>the rest. This should raise an important caution for police handlers. While the earliest possible establishment of trust may at first seem to be the most desirable outcome (represented by the ordering A1>B1/E1>C1/F1>the rest), the most desirable detainees may be those with higher levels of radicalization. Note that of the examples given in this chapter of the most influential detainees that have cooperated to some extent with the police program, Abu Rusdan, Zarkasi, and Ali Imron have all been deeply radicalized while only Nasir Abas can be said to be less radicalized. Therefore, if police wanted to get the most radical detainees to cooperate in the program,
consideration must be given to deliberately administering incentives to gauge the level of radicalization. In practical terms, this means that if dialogue or intelligence indicates that there may be a strong detainee preference for one incentive – children that require school fees, for instance – then it may be beneficial to administer this incentive last to generate indebtedness. While the level of radicalization is not itself a determinant of influence, managing the level of the prisoner’s feelings of indebtedness to the police may ultimately create a more cooperative agent of influence (T. Karnavian, personal interview, September 22, 2008). The police’s desired outcome ranking may then be more on the order of C1/F1>B1/E1>A1>the rest.

Analyzing the likelihood that the most valuable incentive will sway the prisoner can be again seen by using the method of backward induction. With specific assumptions including the family care incentive is likely to be the highest value to a certain detainee, tangible incentives and rapport are not enough alone to secure trust, and without the family care incentive there is more value in holding on to the ideology, we can propose that a deeply radicalized prisoner will rank the outcomes in the order C2>E2>D2>G2>the rest. The corresponding ordinal rankings would be C2=7, E2=6, D2=5, G2=4. Given the high values of C2 and D2, it is clear that the “payoffs associated with this game make this uncertainty irrelevant to the determination of equilibria” (Gates & Humes, 1997, p. 118); the detainee values C2 and D2 much too highly for the consideration of option B2. Only when the detainee values the incentives more closely can effectiveness be judged. This has implications for the intelligence function, as it can determine whether one incentive is far more valued than others. In cases where the values are more similar – say when a prisoner does not have immediate family and has more pressing tangible needs – police could manipulate the administration of incentives based on the need to generate indebtedness.

3. Influencing De-radicalization

To this point the program’s efforts have been aimed at developing a cadre of influential JI members to use in de-radicalizing other, lower ranking members. Since only a small compromise in adherence to the radical ideology is required, there is not any
formalized, comprehensive method to erase the group identity or the ideology itself in the individual. Because of this, the nested games depicted in Figure 13 serve as a complete representation of the first part of the program; note that efforts at religious reform and surrender of the group identity are absent. A similar game tree is then employed for each JI member engaged by the influencers, with police efforts supplanted by those of the new influential agents. The final outcome then is more about establishing solidarity of trust between the junior and senior members with just a small amount of ideology change in the individual than about comprehensive reform.

Potential agents for the de-radicalization program are selected for their ability to influence fellow JI detainees and members. While no formal criteria exists for agent selection, factors include the detainee’s position in the JI hierarchy to exploit the cultural deference to seniority, those who are perceived to possess in-depth knowledge of Islam, and those with mujahidin experience in Afghanistan as these men are revered by the younger generations of jihadis (International Crisis Group, 2007, November 19, and T. Karnavian, personal interview, September 22, 2008). These men, if they agree to cooperate, then become the primary agents of engagement with lower-ranking JI detainees. This necessarily means that some senior JI members may not be approached as they don’t meet some of these criteria; in general, JI leaders from the Ambon island conflict are largely ignored due to their perceived lack of influence compared the more pressing struggles with bombings and violence in places like Poso on Sulawesi island (International Crisis Group, 2007, November 19).

When these influencers have established a trusting relationship with their police handlers their own de-radicalization begins. This is a loosely structured process and it may even run concurrent with trust-building efforts. As the example of Zarkasi shows, a detainee’s commitment to the Muslim community through JI can be challenged by showing his own failures to take care of his family. Other initiatives follow this appeal to the sense of Muslim community. Detainees, usually eager to leave their confinement for a day outside of detention, are sometimes taken to interact with those who are struggling in Indonesian society. Visits to orphanages or with garbage collectors who represent the lowest rung of the socio-economic ladder are intended to demonstrate that most of the
Muslim society’s social problems can be found much closer to home and do not require armed jihad, but instead require community action. Programs started by the police to build housing for the impoverished garbage collectors see handlers and detainees working side by side in efforts to better the community and also serving to strengthen the bond of trust between them. In many cases, exposure to the challenges facing Muslim society is enough to change the thinking of otherwise hesitant detainees (T. Karnavian, personal interview, September 22, 2008).

After detainees have de-radicalized to whatever extent they will be, the acceptance of incentives carries an expectation that the detainees will support to the de-radicalization program. This support can include participation in public affairs efforts designed to spread the word that influential radicals have recanted; the already mentioned, publicized gathering at the police general’s villa is an example of this. Reformed prisoners also appear on television in public repentance for their terrorist actions and Nasir Abas and Ali Imron have also written books denouncing JI’s violent ideals, including countering Imam Samudra’s own book that espouses his radical ideas.

The most important use of cooperating detainees, however, is in their capacity to influence subordinate JI members and detainees. With a group culture that reveres those senior in the hierarchy, JI leaders have significant influence over younger and lower-ranking members; this is a result of the leaders identifying many of the traits discussed in Chapter III. Influencers include senior members of the religious school feeder network such as Mukhlas and high-ranking JI organizer and recruiter Abu Dujana who both taught at JI’s Malaysian pesantren in the 1990s, giving them significant stature. Others, including Abas, Imron, and Zarkasi were senior organizers or trainers in the organization and possess status due to the group’s reverence for those at the top of the hierarchy.

Just as the influencers hold referent power for different reasons, their de-radicalization messages also differ based on their own levels of radicalization and the effects of the discrete sequence of the police’s trust initiatives. Again, the two prime examples of this are the approaches of Abas and Imron, with the others’ messages falling somewhere between them. Abas relies on two arguments to de-radicalize detainees. The first is theological, as he notes that the Quran forbids wars of aggression against non-
combatants and that bombings do not constitute an acceptable act of defensive *jihad*. His second argument is that violence against Westerners, even if believed to be a defensive *jihad*, is too broadly interpreted as not all Westerners are anti-Muslim, as indeed not all Americans support the war in Iraq (“Reforming jihadists: preachers to the converted,” 2007, December 13). Abas has also noted that the original JI goal of establishing an Islamic state is no longer required, as the current government allows for the consideration of Islamic issues. Imron’s argument, on the other hand, still holds the establishment of an Islamic state as a primary goal, but (again, showing his depth of radicalization) holds that the killing of fellow Muslims or innocent civilians is not the way to achieve this goal. Instead, Imron sees the correct application of *jihad* as such:

> it is compulsory for Muslims wherever they are to fight and wage war against whomever wages war against Islam and Muslims … the bombings should have been undertaken in the United States and its allied countries to attack the US Government and the governments of its allies and their interests. US troops and the troops of their allies should have been attacked in places where there were Muslims -- in their own countries or wherever. (A. Imron, as reported in “Imprisoned Indonesian Terrorist Imron Renounces, Regrets Role in Bali Bombings,” 2008, March 17)

Clearly, these different arguments will have different influential effects on the detainees each man tries to de-radicalize.

A sequence of games depicting the interaction between an influencer and two detainees who have not been de-radicalized yet can be proposed. Clearly, if the targeted detainee has been deeply radicalized and views the influencer as not credible/a *taghout* agent of the government, then his highest values lie in not cooperating with the approach. If, however, the views of the influencer more closely align with those of at least one of the target detainees – say, a slightly de-radicalized Imron is more appealing then a fully cooperating Abas – then the decisions to cooperate are not so clear. Since influencers also have some authority to administer incentives personally on behalf of the police, incentives keep their important place in the sequence. Figure 14 depicts this framework.
The assumption behind Indonesia’s program is that the influence of the former high-ranking JI official constitutes the weightiest “incentive” in convincing subordinate detainees to cooperate. Therefore the hope is that the A2 choice is the highest valuation purely for de-radicalization in the sequence, followed by de-radicalization with the administration of the more traditional incentives (B2, C2, E2, F2). This is the same as stating that the tangible and family care incentives are not weighted the same as the influence of the ex-JI leader when deciding to cooperate. Matching an influencer’s ideological bent to the detainee’s is certain to help elevate the ranking of outcome A2.
This represents a shift in strategy from the first part of the program as depicted in Figure 13; no longer are incentives used as crucial methods to secure cooperation of a targeted detainee. In this case, the influencer would still, however, want to withhold incentives until the end of the process to maximize his influence. The primacy of the influencer’s role does not mean, however, that incentives serve no purpose. Instead, they can act to deepen the rapport with the influencer (and, by association, the police) and heighten cooperation as depicted by the standalone sub-game in Figure 14. Note that this sub-game applies after all options where de-radicalization occurs.

The heavy dotted line between outcome A1/A2 and the first administering of incentives represents the incomplete information set between these branches of the tree. Complete information in games and sub-games requires that each player know “who the other players are, all strategies available to these players, and the other players’ payoffs with certainty” (Gates & Humes, 1997, p. 45). This means that the target detainee does not know whether or not incentives will be administered and that the influencer does not know whether incentives will be required or even if they will be enough to de-radicalize the target detainee. With this assumption and the additional specific assumptions that family care is the most valued incentive and that the detainee is likely to de-radicalize given the available incentives, ordinal rankings can be assigned given the assertions from the previous paragraph: A2=7, C2=6, E2=5, F2=4, B2=3, D2=2, G2=1. Finding \( r \) in the B2/C2/D2 sub-game through backward induction can be represented as follows:

\[
E_t (\text{tangible incentive first}) = r(C2) + 1 - r(D2)
\]

\[
E_t = r(6) + (1 - r)(2)
\]

Setting \( E_t = B2 = 3 \), \( r = .25 \)

From the perspectives of the influencer and the police, this means that, despite the high ranking of C2, if the probability of its selection \( r = .25 \) (for whatever reason) then the detainee is indifferent to cooperating with one incentive or requiring the progression to the second incentive sub-game. If \( r < .25 \) then the detainee will choose B2 while if \( r > .25 \) then the detainee will progress to the second sub-game between choices C2 and D2.
In this same valuation scenario, the incentive sub-game with outcomes E2, F2, and G2 is dominated by the high rank of E2 and the low values of F2 and G2, making calculation of probability a valueless point.

The implications of this lie, again, heavily with the intelligence function. Determination of the likelihood of acceptance of a certain incentive – another way of putting this is unearthing the context behind a detainee’s view of certain options – can guide strategy. For instance, if the ranking of the family incentive is high but is unlikely to be selected for a contextual reason (say, in accordance with the importance of the family feeder network, that any help accepted would make the detainee an apostate to the JI-integrated family members), there may be a high indifference between cooperating with a lesser-valued incentive or not cooperating at all. While all possible permutations of these strategic interactions cannot be presented here, approaches must be tailored to each detainee to account for the desired impact of influence and other incentives. Only by avoiding the tendency to generalize about the needs of detainees can individual solutions be found for the problem of countering the JI ideology (T. Karnavian, personal interview, September 22, 2008).

D. SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS

The Indonesian police’s de-radicalization program is essentially, if informally, organized into two phases of operations. First, high-ranking JI detainees who are likely to cooperate with the police are identified and then approached for de-radicalization. This approach takes the form of efforts to establish trust in the dedicated police handler, as one of the foundations of JI’s ideology is that all government associates are *taghout*. Once this trust is established (note that this trust already constitutes an ideological shift), whether through rapport with the handler or incentives such as tangible perks or assistance to families, further efforts are taken to modify the ideology through exposure to the challenges of the actual Muslim community. Family care, widely seen as the program’s centerpiece, is notable in its success in converting recalcitrant leaders.

Second, the influential JI leaders who cooperate with the police are then used to influence their subordinate JI members. The item exerting the heaviest influence in this
phase is the reverence held for the ex-JI leaders’ authority; this alone is often enough to convince subordinates to moderate their views. As shown through the strategic analysis, the differences in influencers’ ideological moderation may also have different effects on the resultant moderation of the target detainees due to different individual levels of radicalization. In this second phase of the de-radicalization program, incentives may still be used to co-opt detainees but are more intended to cement trust and cooperation after the detainee has successfully de-radicalized.

Throughout the examination in this chapter, Indonesia’s program has been shown to address many of the trust, influence, and ideological traits that were exposed in Chapter III. This section now turns to a specific accounting of these traits, identifying those that have been thoroughly addressed and gaps in the program.

1. **Programmatic Elements of Trust, Credibility, and Counter-Ideology**

   Establishing trust with influential detainees is the first and most important step in the de-radicalization program. The intended effects of establishing a cooperative relationship with the high-ranking JI prisoners reflect two of the trust and influence elements that were presented in Chapter III. A listing of these elements in Chapter III’s matrix format can be found in Figure 15.

   The first and most obvious effect-driven element from the trust efforts is the family care incentive. If there is any hope of an influential detainee de-radicalizing, helping the detainee’s family has proven to be a necessary step to “break” the detainee and secure cooperation (Abuza, 2008). In addition to the obvious incentive that family care provides to the detainee and the resultant indebtedness that may tip the scale in favor of cooperation, families themselves may be de-radicalized by the kindness of those they previously considered *taghout*. This interrupts the cycle of radicalization that has been maintained in and advanced by the family feeder network; this is supported by the example of Zarkasi’s family accepting police help (along with many other families of JI members of similar rank) and the police family outreach efforts (A. Mbai, personal interview, September 25, 2008, and “Indonesia: report on families of detained JI Palembang members,” 2008, July 11). Reversing the *taghout* verdict on the police
handlers, therefore, amounts to a shift in the affective and evaluative dimensions of the ideology, as affecting the family network and re-defining the accepted Muslim community can lead to changes both in in-group definitions and judgments that the in-group formerly leveled.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Affective Dimension</th>
<th>Evaluative Dimension</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Trust in Relationships</strong></td>
<td>-School feeder network</td>
<td>-School feeder network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Family feeder network</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Trust as a Personality Trait</strong></td>
<td>-Low religious questioning</td>
<td>-Low religious questioning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Concrete/objective</td>
<td>-Concrete/objective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-High compliance/low assertive</td>
<td>-High compliance/low assertive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Java-based</td>
<td>-Java-based</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>**Legitimate Power/</td>
<td>-Discipleship/absolute loyalty</td>
<td>-Radicalization of founders (breakdown of trust in gov’t)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust as a Cultural Rule</td>
<td>-School feeder network</td>
<td>-Discipleship/Absolute loyalty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-School feeder network</td>
<td>-School feeder network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>**Referent Power/</td>
<td>-Sense of belonging in Muslim community</td>
<td>-In-group vs. out-group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theory of the Self</td>
<td></td>
<td>-Perceived attacks on Muslim Community</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 15. Trust and Influence vs. Ideological Dimensions in Indonesia

Secondly, aside from direct monetary help or other tangible incentives like better prison conditions, access to cell phones and laptops, etc., influencers are guided toward a new perception of the needs of the Muslim community. As detainee visits with garbage collectors and orphanages demonstrate, reversing the Hijira process of abandoning worldly concerns for violent jihad can be accomplished by redefining jihad as a struggle to better the community (T. Karnavian, personal interview, September 22, 2008). Any progress in this arena constitutes de-radicalization, even if the result is not a full surrender of the ideology.
Once the targeted, influential detainees have both established trust with the police and de-radicalized they can influence subordinate JI members owing to a combination of elements. This phase involves a combined effort to influence the affective and evaluative dimensions by using the inherent influence and trust of the senior leaders to elicit a change in individual’s judgments. The first and most important element is the absolute loyalty to the group’s senior leaders exhibited by the lower ranking members. Discipleship has played an important role in JI recruiting, with recruits looking to their recruiters as role models and figures of authority. This sense of discipleship has proven strong enough to convince members to undertake actions they would not have agreed with otherwise – Ali Imron participated in the Bali bombing not because he agreed with the methods but because “he trusted the men who were organizing them, including his brothers Mukhlas and Amrozi” – hence the police’s use of this influence in de-radicalization. This loyalty comes in from two sources of influence: military experience and religious credentials. Experience in Afghanistan and, to a lesser extent, other international jihad fronts is highly revered by the younger generation, as is a perceived mastery of Islam; note that both Nasir Abas and Ali Imron are Afghanistan veterans and Imron was regarded as a learned Islamic preacher who “could hold his own on points of Islamic law with JI’s best scholars” (International Crisis Group, 2007, November 19).

Of course, many of the influencers come from the original JI pesantren school network. If JI’s “ideological indoctrination story is anchored on the teacher-student relationship” in these pesantren as Justin Magourik (2008) convincingly suggests, then the network’s strict hierarchy, tendencies toward discipleship, and the history of the pesantren chief as a respected community leader must indicate that teachers hold a significant amount of influence. Muhammad Rais and Ali Imron are past religious teachers in these schools, while virtually all of the old guard (influencers) who cooperate with police either attended or have ties to JI-backed pesantren in Indonesia and Malaysia. As these schools serve as the “nerve center” for spread of JI’s ideology, anyone steeped in their teachings holds a position of authority in the organization (Magourik, 2008).

It is important to note that, in the Indonesian program, the subordinates approached by influencers and the police are not asked to give up their ties to JI in-group.
This is a crucial point because as the program relies on JI members’ relationships to achieve its ends. As the International Crisis Group (2007, November 19) notes:

JI and others like it are not just terrorist organizations, focused on jihad, but social groups of friends who meet, eat, play volleyball, pick up their children from school and do business together. Renouncing membership in JI would be as unthinkable as renouncing Indonesian citizenship.

Instead, the intent is to redirect the organization from voices inside the group, hence the free association allowed between jailed terrorists who cooperate and those on the outside. If influential members moderate, so too might the rank and file.

Finally, many elements of trust via personality traits are evident in the influencers’ approaches to subordinates. As previously mentioned, a perceived command of Islamic teachings is highly influential, and many of the high-level cooperatives are perceived as having such knowledge (Imron, Zarkasi, Rusdan, Rais, etc.). As virtually all of the influencers are from Java (with the exception of Abas who is Malaysian), their approaches are likely to appeal to the values of communalism held by detainees (Copland, 2005). Also, since many JI members can be classified as “concrete/objective” personalities (Copland, 2005, and Singapore “White paper,” 2003), the de-radicalization strategies applied must necessarily overcome this type’s tendency to categorize the world into right vs. wrong dualities. If influencers can associate with the taghout police, rigid beliefs must change if the subordinate is to maintain the relationship with his senior.

2. Absent Elements

The most obvious element that is missing from the Indonesian police’s de-radicalization program is one designed to be excluded. Note that while the “low religious questioning” element is included in Figure 15, its definition (see the above paragraphs) is limited to the influence exerted by influential senior members on junior ones. Recall from the examination in Chapter III that many JI leaders are attracted to the group’s ideology because they seek religiously based, definitive answers to simple, if naïve, questions. The police’s program is most notable in that it doesn’t challenge the religious motivations for the detainees’ violent ideologies. Indeed, the police encourage
identification with Islam, even tolerating radical interpretations (International Crisis Group, 2007, November 19). Programmatically, this is viewed as necessary as any attempts to remove the fundamental group identity – and, hence, the individual’s sense of self and personal esteem (Taylor & Louis, 2004, pp. 171-172) – would be at direct odds with the first step of proving that police handlers are not *taghout* (T. Karnavian, personal interview, September 22, 2008). Thus, one of the pillars of JI’s ideology is allowed to remain in place in order to realize the more immediate goal of simply stopping the violence with creeping de-radicalization (A. Mbai, personal interview, September 25, 2008). This is also the reason that the *bai’ah* oath is not challenged.

Except in an indirect way, the roots of the ideology are therefore allowed to persist. Senior police officials acknowledge as much, citing the difficulty (perhaps impossibility) of rooting out extremism when “the leadership of today’s radical groups is comprised of children, grand children, or relatives of those who were killed or executed in the past” (Mbai, 2007).

This speaks again to the levels of radicalization, the deepest of which cannot be realistically countered given the limited budget and lack of interagency coordination (International Crisis Group, 2007, November 19). There is little coordination between the police, other security services, the Ministry of Religion, and even the prison system (T. Karnavian, personal interview, September 22, 2008). The police, trying to interrupt JI’s militant ideology with little dedicated funding and even less interagency coordination, will therefore accept any level of de-radicalization in cooperating detainees as long as it contributes to the reduction of violence.
VI. COMBINED SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS, IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION

*The most hateful human misfortune is for a wise man to have no influence.*

*Herodotus*

A. INTRODUCTION

Southeast Asia has just opened a new chapter in its struggle with Islamic terrorism. As this thesis concludes, the Bali bombers Amrozi, Mukhlas, and Imam Samudra have just been executed by a firing squad near their prison in Java. The executions come after years of delays in carrying out the sentences due to legal appeals and, as has been proposed, competing political agendas within the Indonesian government. Hundreds of mostly rural and conservative Islamists are demonstrating against the state’s action, branding the three men as “martyrs” and denouncing Westerners as “infidels.” These protesters, though, are a tiny minority in the country in which Al-Jemaah Al-Islamiyah (JI) arose, as the vast majority of the population – 85% Muslim – is moderate and supports the executions ("Bali bomb burials stoke tensions," 2008, November 9).

This event serves as to remind the reader both of the terrible violence that JI is still capable of waging and the lack of recent attacks by the group in Southeast Asia. Despite no major terrorist attack since 2005, raids that unearth major weapons caches and plans like the one earlier this year in Palembang demonstrate that cells continue to operate and scheme against the “heretical” state. While more than 400 arrests have been made in the region, the JI radical ideology apparently still lives on.

The Singapore and Indonesian de-radicalization programs are large parts of multifaceted approaches to eliminating JI violence in their respective countries. In addition to robust action by the security services, these programs address prisoners’ violent motivations through discrete processes that have shown success in reducing the virulence of the JI ideology among the group’s most dedicated practitioners. Established by
different agencies and needs and executed in different ways, the de-radicalization programs realize similar ends through notably different ways and means. This chapter summarizes these differences and lists the implications of this study on future de-radicalization and counter-ideology efforts.

B. THE PROGRAMS COMPARED: SIMILAR GOALS, DIFFERENT EXECUTION

Both the Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG) and the Indonesian National Police’s programs counter the JI ideology by de-radicalizing individuals, not just buying them off or waging a broad “war of ideas” with extremists. These individual-focused efforts aim to avoid the ineffectiveness associated with the lack of credibility of outsiders’ messaging or public affairs activities (Bin Ali, 2008), over-generalization about specific Islamic concepts and the little attention usually paid “to root grievances and building trust in government” (Hassan, 2006), and ignoring the strength of these grievances that have, over time, led to deeply radicalized individuals (Mbai, 2007). Each country’s de-radicalization program, begun in the wake of the 2002 Bali bombings, always sees early resistance from detainees who view their dedicated counselors or handlers as apostates. The programs have, however, witnessed successes after reversing this perception by using dedicated efforts to build trust.

This is where the similarities end. The origins of each program testify to their differing intents and, as such, are reflected in the programmatic differences. The RRG’s program, founded by a group of religious scholars who were concerned about the misinterpretation of Islamic tenets and its effect on Muslim society, is primarily concerned with re-socializing misguided prisoners into the Muslim society through religious counseling. The Indonesia National Police’s “soft power” program, by contrast, is aimed at establishing a link between JI detainees and the “heretical” government they fight against to realize the immediate goal of reducing violence. These different approaches embody different de-radicalization processes and address the elements of JI’s ideology in different ways. They are outlined below.
1. Processes

The most obvious area in which the programs differ is in the procedures each uses to effect de-radicalization. In Singapore’s case, the RRG program is rooted in the asatizah’s concerns about the radicals’ misinterpretation of Islam and is therefore structured to address this problem exclusively. The first step in the process is building trust in the detainee’s dedicated counselor, as the JI ideology is constructed in large part around the perception that the asatizah are heretical apologists for secular corruption. After this trust is established, the individual ustaz counselor, through repeated one-on-one interactions that isolate the detainee from the influence of the JI in-group, works to convince the detainee that his radical interpretation of Islamic tenets is misguided. In essence, once the detainee surrenders the in-group identity by trusting the ustaz and internalizing the counseling, the prisoner reaches a point where he can decide whether or not to reform and rejoin the Islamic mainstream. This process is depicted in Figure 6.

A relatively recent addition to this process is the application of actions to help detainees’ families. Originally conceived as efforts from a concerned Muslim community designed to help detainee’s families who were struggling with their fathers and husbands incarcerated, this help has also come to represent an incentive for a hesitant detainee to participate in the reform process. As many detainees value the welfare of their families above all else, the asatizah’s family care often results in trust in the counselor through a sense of indebtedness for the kindness (Wong, 2008). While this incentive can have beneficial and even independent effects at any stage of the RRG’s program, the case where family care convinces an otherwise reluctant prisoner to be receptive to reform (i.e., at the end of the counseling decision process) most dramatically illustrates the incentive’s effect. This is shown in Figure 8.

The Indonesian program represents a different application of the de-radicalization approach. Indonesia’s primary goal is to stop the immediate violence and gain intelligence on JI cell activities, not necessarily to completely reform detainees’ interpretations of Islam (A. Mbai, personal interview, September 25, 2008). Trust is also a crucial first step in this program, but here it is the trust of an influential detainee in a
police handler that allows follow-on effects. Trust can be established through three basic methods: rapport with the police handler, administration of a family care incentive, or administration of tangible incentives (money, health care, better living conditions, etc.). While the obvious goal would seem to be to establish trust early on through rapport with the police handler, analysis shows that a sense of indebtedness that leads to trust is generated when a particularly valuable incentive is administered later in the process. This sequence is depicted in Figure 13.

Cooperation here can be defined by the smallest change in an individual’s beliefs that allows for a reduction of violence. The next step of the police’s program leverages this trust and the resulting de-radicalization of the influencers against impressionable JI subordinates. By using influential superiors to approach those more junior in the organization with messages imploring reform, the police intend the subordinates’ trust in the senior member to serve as the primary action for de-radicalization. Family care or tangible incentives can also be applied to further convince detainees to cooperate, but as Figure 14 depicts, these incentives may better affect the continuity of the relationship rather than the initial decision to cooperate.

Some major differences between the two programs can be discerned. First, while the RRG focuses on the central role of the asatizah in correcting religious misinterpretation among JI detainees, the Indonesian police’s program relies upon police handlers for de-radicalization. This of course represents the different tack of each program with respect to the perceived need to fully de-radicalize detainees, but it also speaks to the perceptions of the scholars and police themselves. Whereas in Singapore the problem is framed as one of religious misinterpretation, in Indonesia JI’s grievances hearken back to the period of the Darul Islam movement which serves to frame the problem as one of distrust of government. This framing distinction is important as it essentially defines who bears responsibility for correcting the problem. While the asatizah is seen by detainees as heretical in both programs – see the initial games in Chapters IV and V – this group of scholars is excluded from the Indonesian program under the assumption that prisoners will not trust these outsiders even though the police are considered outsiders, too. Overcoming the JI perception that governmental forces are
is the essential programmatic concern in Indonesia (T. Karnavian, personal interview, September 22, 2008). The decisions to use ustaz counselors or police handlers seems, therefore, to be more a decision based on which group needs to be legitimized in JI members’ eyes than an independent administration of a comprehensive program.

Second, incentives play different roles in the two programs. In Singapore, the family care incentive is really a by-product of a Muslim community initiative to help out those in need and is not formally a part of the rehabilitation program. Family care does, nonetheless, serve an important role in creating feelings of indebtedness in the detainee which begets reform. Incentives are a more explicit part of the program in Indonesia; family care and other tangible incentives are strategically applied both in the co-opting of influential JI detainees and the de-radicalization of their subordinates. Application of incentives in Indonesia has, in certain cases, been the ultimate and decisive factor in securing cooperation of senior detainees. Note that the scripting of the application of incentives is evident in Figures 7 and 13; family care may alter a detainee’s stance at any time of the process in the RRG program while incentives are deliberately applied in the Indonesian case.

Third, using influential detainees who have been de-radicalized (regardless of extent) to influence others only occurs in the Indonesian program. In order to isolate detainees from the influence of the in-group that has historically reinforced the ideology, the RRG treats counseling and care after release as a private affair between only the counselor, the detainee, and his family. Of course the Indonesian program relies upon the use of converted, influential detainees as resource multipliers due to the limited number of police and to leverage the power of the in-group and the hierarchy’s influence on targeted detainees. More on the specific surrender or preservation of the in-group identity follows in the next section.

Finally, because of the differences in the programs’ structures – primarily in the application of incentives – predicting a detainee’s likely reform or cooperation rests upon different considerations. Despite the characterization of these programs as “trial and error” by nature (International Crisis Group, 2007, November 19), the process studies in Chapters IV and V noted discrete process sequences that, at their respective decision
points, are open to forecasting. When the decisions preceding the final de-radicalization decision are different, however, this forecasting process also differs. In the Indonesian case, judging a subordinate detainee’s likelihood of de-radicalization (termination of the nested game tree) requires knowledge of not just the detainee’s preferences but also of an outcome’s probability of selection. If for instance, as in the example given after Figure 14, a detainee values the family care incentive highly but for reasons embedded in context he is unlikely to select it, he becomes indifferent to accepting either type of incentive. This of course has an impact on police strategy. In the Singapore case, there are less available options to secure reform, and the whole of the context’s possibilities is contained in the decision point “Receptive to Reform” in Figure 8. A premium must be placed on securing information about the likelihood of reform, therefore, as acceptance of the family care incentive to secure reform – this choice already a somewhat unintended incentive – depends entirely upon the \( r \) probability. This is to say that there are no other incentives that can be offered, and indeed it may not matter as long as the state is willing and able to simply keep recalcitrant detainees locked up. The fact that Singapore’s infrastructure permits this indefinite detention may be seen as a key point guiding Singapore’s limitation strategy (Fealy, as reported in Hussain, 2007b, p. 184).

2. Elements of Trust and Influence

Each program’s de-radicalization processes affect the affective and evaluative dimensions of the JI ideology. These two ideological components, part of Rejai’s (1995) full categorization of political ideologies into five discrete “dimensions,” constitute the ideology’s emotional/externally focused and the judgmental/externally focused aspects, respectively (pp. 4-10). Only by addressing these two dimensions can an individual’s internalization of the ideology be affected, and both programs address these two dimensions in unique ways.

Chapter III presents a detailed accounting of the elements of trust and influence in the JI network that transmit and maintain the affective and evaluative dimensions. These elements serve as the closest thing to a definition of the JI culture, characterizing the group’s norms, processes, and values. A matrix framework is presented that depicts the
intersection of the two ideological dimensions with the network’s four categories of trust and influence: trust in relationships, trust as a personality trait, legitimate power/trust as a cultural rule, and referent power/“theory of the self” (Taylor & Louis, 2004, pp. 171-172). This matrix allows for a heuristic analysis of each program’s addressed elements.

Such an analysis of the RRG program’s targeted elements represented by the matrix in Figure 9, shows that there are entire categories of trust and influence elements that are not addressed. While heavy emphasis is placed on forging relationships between the detainees and the ustaz and breaking down the in-group identity, no elements from the trust as a personality trait/personal enablers of trust row are addressed. These include such characteristics as the need for a “no fuss” path to heaven, a concrete/objective personality, high measures of guilt and loneliness, and highly compliant personalities (Singapore “White paper,” 2003). Such traits are central to a detainee’s “buy-in” of the radical ideas proposed by leaders such as cell leader Ibrahim Maidin who capitalized on members’ religious needs despite his status as a religious layman. Rehabilitation is through a deliberate process of religious reeducation and does not seek to use personal vulnerabilities to influence this de-radicalization. Additionally, the JI characteristic of absolute loyalty, while addressed with respect to the affective dimension, is not addressed in the evaluative dimension.

That these elements are absent speaks to the RRG’s goal of moving detainees completely away from their in-group identity and the decision not to use reformed prisoners to influence others. Isolation of detainees is a pervasive theme, whether in the one-on-one engagements with the asatizah counselors or after release on Restriction Order when detainees are forbidden to make contact with their former, radical peers. The end result, therefore, given successful de-radicalization in a highly controlled environment, is the destruction of the existing social network.

The Indonesian program, in contrast, seeks to keep the social group intact, having influential detainees de-radicalize subordinates through in-group norm of absolute loyalty (Figure 15). Almost all of the trust and influence elements in the network are used; subordinate’s compliance and tendencies toward discipleship is used to breed trust in the influencer’s message of change, influencers are drawn from the revered network of
pesantren teachers, and the personal enablers of trust are mobilized to this effect. Additionally, influential detainees are at least partially de-radicalized when police handlers expose them to the real struggles of jihad in the Muslim community. De-radicalization can occur on different levels as demonstrated by Nasir Abas and Ali Imron, the program’s most successful influencers, who bring very different messages to the subordinates they approach.

What the Indonesian program purposely avoids is taking on the grievances that drove the radicalization of the founders. While detainees possess different levels of radicalization, ranging from the main ideologues to barely-indoctrinated thieves, the main influencers are likely to have years and even generational depth to their radicalization (A. Mbai, personal interview, September 25, 2008). This is due to grievances that have been simmering since as early as the late 1940s when the Darul Islam movement fought to establish sharia in the newly independent Indonesia. Attacking these beliefs would likely alienate many of those top-level JI leaders who might otherwise cooperate. Ali Imron, a deeply radical individual, is one such leader who is permitted to espouse his only slightly toned-down ideology in order to guarantee his cooperation.

Figure 16 depicts the elements addressed by both the Singapore and Indonesia programs as summarized above and, most importantly, shows what elements have not been addressed. Note that the Indonesia program addresses the elements of trust as a personality trait/personal enablers of trust while the Singapore program does not. This is due to the nature of the Indonesian program’s reliance on appeals to influence while the RRG relies primarily upon religious reeducation. The same reasons hold for the legitimate power/trust as a cultural rule elements as they are, by definition, based on measures of influence (the Singapore program does address the fallacy of the JI oath). The RRG program does, however, deal with in-group identity as it affects the affective dimension of the ideology, striving to get detainees to surrender ties with the group, ties which are, conversely, encouraged by the Indonesian program.
Figure 16. Comprehensive Matrix of Elements in Both Programs

Two elements are not addressed by either program. First, there is no exploitation of the fact that JI members are often profiled as high in guilt and loneliness. As documented in Singapore’s “White paper” (2003), this characteristic, along with others, predisposes these individuals to indoctrination and suggests a need for a sense of belonging. Countering this element may require the introduction of a credible, alternate in-group to supplant JI membership. While the Indonesian police may indirectly attempt this as they convince detainees that the police are part of the same broader Muslim community, neither program addresses the element directly.

Second, neither program takes issue with the exalted status of the pesantren headmaster. This element comes from the power the headmaster has traditionally held in the community, especially in Indonesia during resistance to colonial rule. As schools
have served as hubs of “native authority” versus outsiders, headmasters have wielded “absolute authority” over their students and have significant influence in the community (Hefner, 2000, pp. 34-35). JI pesantren chiefs like Mukhlas, Abdullah Sungkar, and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir have commanded unwavering loyalty from their students which largely goes unchallenged. Indeed the Indonesian program, while not specifically sanctioning this loyalty, intentionally avoids breaking it down as it has served as the root of the close-knit in-group which the police use for their influence efforts. That there are reportedly still up to 30 JI-allied schools throughout Indonesia, however, should raise warnings that radical indoctrination still occurs (International Crisis Group, 2007, November 19). While no JI pesantren were located in Singapore (the Sungai Manggis school in neighboring Malaysia was shut down by security services), the RRG takes an indirect approach toward this element. By claiming that the oath of loyalty to the study group leader Ibrahim Maidin is not binding and that the radical ideas are not representative of true Islam, the RRG attempts to break down the in-group’s religious justification. In both programs, however, there is no systematic effort to discredit the ideas of JI founders Sungkar (who died in 1998) and Ba’asyir. The programs either try to maintain the in-group or attempt to discredit the teachings of the founders’ disciples. Ba’asyir is still publicly active and wields a significant amount of influence among the more radical Islamists, making this omission a worrying one.

C. IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION

Context is everything in counter-ideology work. As is required by the rational actor model, detailed knowledge of the terrorist group’s grievances and history, along with an understanding of the individual’s motivations, are necessary for de-radicalization programs. Starting with knowledge of how detainees will react to incentives or repeated overtures by a counselor or handler – or even not knowing these elements – should dictate a program’s strategies. The Singaporean and Indonesian programs, based on this knowledge and due to their respective framing of the problem of the JI ideology, have developed procedures that provide the following important lessons for future counter-ideology work.
• Establishing trust. This is the gateway to any de-radicalization. Whether establishing detainee trust in a police handler or an ustaz counselor, there is no progress until some degree of trust is established with the detainee. The reason that both programs use repeated one-on-one engagements is so that relationships can be built and, at least as importantly, maintained throughout the process. There are numerous instances of prisoners in both programs coming to see their counselor/handler as a role model or trusted confidant, showing the potential of such efforts (Hussain, 2007b, pp. 182-185, and T. Karnavian, personal interview, September 22, 2008). Both programs limit who establishes trust, with the Indonesian police especially adamant that moderate ustaz have no role in these efforts and the RRG believing equally as strongly that the problem is one to be solved from within the bounds of the Islamic community. The lesson to be learned from the case studies is that there are multiple, effective paths to the establishment of trust. Additionally, while the case studies are limited to de-radicalization efforts, the same premise may also likely apply to counter-radicalization initiatives, as the messenger must have some sense of buy-in from the audience for the message to be received.

• The role of incentives. Incentives, whether the demonstrated power of administering help to the detainees’ families in both programs or the provision of more tangible items like comfortable jail cells, laptops, and cell phones in Indonesia, can both help enable trust and keep detainees cooperating. Giving care to detainees’ families, many of which have been neglected due to the men’s Hijira migration to the world of jihad and which also experience hardships when the husbands are imprisoned, seems to generate a special sense of indebtedness which builds trust (J. Jerard & M. Salleh, personal interview, September 22, 2008, and T. Karnavian, personal interview, September 22, 2008). Beyond trust, though, physical incentives can also deepen cooperation with the authority. Attention must be paid to the strategic application of incentives, as even though they generate unintended effects (like indebtedness in Singapore), they are powerful tools. Additionally, introducing incentives allows for an element of prediction assuming one knows the individual’s decision-making context. Figure 17 recaps the hypothetical structure of an incentive embedded in the de-radicalization process. Depending on the valuations of the outcomes, decisions may be
easy to predict if a detainee’s valuation outweighs the others by a large margin, or may rely upon the specific context embedded within the decision which can be represented in \( r \) and \( 1-r \) probabilities when valuations are much closer in value (given other choices in the decision tree). The use of backward induction, in which the equilibrium value of \( A_2 \) can be set equal to \( r(B_2) + 1-r(C_2) \), can be used to determine these values; careful consideration must be given to the entering assumption that ordered preferences are equal to valued “payoffs,” as values in reality may not follow the assumed cardinal scaling. Much more detailed knowledge of specific detainee motivations would be required in these cases where manipulation of incentives may drive the decision to reform.

![Diagram](image)

**Figure 17.** Generic Nested Incentive Game

- The role of influence. The Singapore and Indonesia programs are alike in that they use influence to de-radicalize prisoners. The programs differ, however, in how they use it. Three observations regarding influence can be made. First, the RRG counselors themselves serve as the influencers after they win the battle for trust, while in Indonesia influential detainees do the influencing on subordinates after being co-opted by the police. The Indonesian approach leverages the existing value of JI leaders’ status in the hierarchy to affect outcomes, thus serving as an additional but value-adding step in the de-radicalization process. Indonesia’s use of influence is not highly structured, however; only certain detainees are targeted for influence and publicizing influencers’
views in the non-imprisoned JI community is not formalized. These issues result in the program being at least partially “trial and error in nature” (International Crisis Group, 2007, November 19). These differences in the strategies of influence in both programs owe their structures to the initial framing of the problem which then establishes the limitations of each process. Second, except possibly between high-ranking influencers in Indonesia, there is also no leveraging of influence between peers. As the conclusion to Chapter IV shows, mixing the desire to maintain the in-group and at least one detainee who is open to reform may generate coalitions in which the best available option for peers is to also reform. Third, there is a likely bridge here between de-radicalization and counter-radicalization. There is no direct use of reformed detainees to influence those at risk of radicalization in either country, with this task instead relegated to the asatizah. There are certainly some lessons to be learned here from criminology, as using former convicts to directly counsel groups prone to criminal violence is a technique that has been used for years. Despite being outside the scope of this study, this is likely the biggest issue for future counter-ideology programs in which de-radicalization and counter-radicalization are treated as separate entities.

There are, of course, limitations to the recommendations that can be drawn from these results. First, there is a security concern in using detainees to influence others or even members of the community. Although Indonesia has had marked success in using high-status detainees like Nasir Abas and Ali Imron to influence both subordinate detainees and the public at large, releasing detainees for such work without a rigorous vetting process invites defections. As an example, Indonesia relies only on police recommendations to implement sentence reductions at the judicial level and has seen at least one high-status detainee return to radical action (A. Mbai, personal interview, September 25, 2008). Perhaps for this reason more than any other, Singapore does not use rehabilitated detainees for this purpose, requiring inter-agency scrutiny before even releasing detainees into isolation from previous contacts; even Singapore, though, has seen at least one former prisoner regress to radicalism.

Second, using large amounts of incentives to secure cooperation may serve to weaken the amount of de-radicalization that is achieved. No clearer contrast can be
drawn between the two case study programs than the differences in intentional use of incentives. Since Indonesia uses incentives as part of its strategy to win trust and secure cooperation, the generally limited de-radicalization of its influencers may decrease violence but also leaves the basic set of grievances intact. The hope in this case is that a preponderance of even slightly moderated viewpoints will influence the community as a whole over time, but of course there is no way to measure this at a set point in time.

Third, these programs are constructed based on the particular regional, national, and intra-group characteristics of JI’s organization. Efforts to deal with other terrorist cells may find success with some of the basic tenets outlined here but ultimately other de-radicalization, counter-ideology, and “disengagement” efforts “will also be context-specific and necessarily nuanced both in terms of how the programmes are constructed, implemented, and promoted in different countries, and for different reasons” (Horgan, 2008). In societies where radical communities are smaller and more covert than Indonesia or Singapore, for instance, using rehabilitated, influential detainees to cross the divide into counter-radicalization through public affairs campaigns, etc. may not have much impact on radicalization.

Finally, the question of detainee recidivism is a murky one. As *jihadist* recidivism is in essence a “manpower concern,” in-group forces that act on released detainees, if allowed to come in contact with them, may be strong enough to compel them to rejoin the group. Additionally, since the very nature of global *jihad* groups are to spread “disinformation,” even carefully considered decisions to release prisoners carry risks (Pluchinsky, 2008). Distinguishing between the use of hardcore, released prisoners and those who are less radicalized may skew recidivism numbers to low percentages; as an analogy, the U.S. witness protection program – admittedly not a de-radicalization program but instead a pure disengagement effort – maintains about a 17% recidivism rate which is enough to give pause in the face of the risks terrorism entails (Ballen, 2008).

These concerns, while valid, are not context-specific and are somewhat overshadowed by the results the Singaporean and Indonesian programs have generated. Recall from Chapter II the following effectiveness criteria: measures of the status (“quality”) of those who reform (i.e., value to the organization and influential effect on
others), numbers of total defections from the terrorist group, the comprehensiveness of
the programs relative to their processes and targeted ideological elements, and the level
of JI-instigated violence since the programs have been implemented. First, the programs
are backed up by numbers: 44 of more than 70 total terrorist detainees have been
released under Singapore’s Restriction Order status after the multi-agency vetting
process, and of the 200-odd detainees approached by the Indonesian police since the
program’s inception, about 100 have cooperated. Second, while the status of detainees is
unimportant in the isolation of Singapore’s program, between 20 and 30 of those who
have cooperated in Indonesia represent high-ranking influencers. Successes of co-opting
notables like Imron, Abas, and Zarkasi must be tempered with the failures embodied by
the defection of Abu Rusdan, the former JI Amir, and in who don’t participate like Fahim
and Son Hadi, JI leaders who are allied with breakaway extremist Noordin Top. This
suggests that truly hardcore, influential prisoners are perhaps still unmoved by police or
peer overtures to de-radicalize (International Crisis Group, 2007, November 19). This,
combined with the fact that JI pesantren still spread the group’s violent ideology in parts
of Indonesia, is sobering. Third, new arrests have slowed to a trickle in Singapore despite
increased security awareness and there has been no major JI attack in either country since
2005. Additionally, there is a slowly increasing chorus of JI detainees who cooperate
with the police in Indonesia.

While it is hard to establish full causality here, these security gains must at least
partially represent both the increasing marginalization and the ineffectiveness of JI’s
ideology. The programs have been generally effective in their unique and respective
efforts. They have been constructed to utilize available resources as befits each country’s
identification of the problem, significant amounts of detainees have been de-radicalized,
and violence has fallen drastically while extremism has seen marked declines in
Singapore and measured reductions in Indonesia.

This is not to suggest that there are not shortcomings; analysis has shown that
there are many. First, using only one group to establish trust due to the framing of the
counter-ideology problem limits other effective paths to establishing trust. While the
RRG believes that the solution lies in religious reeducation and the Indonesian police
believe that moderate ustaz cannot effectively de-radicalize hardened JI members, the successes of each program show that there are multiple ways to set the initial trust condition. Ignoring them equates to lost opportunities. Second, not appealing to the full range of detainees’ personality vulnerabilities also sacrifices opportunities to secure cooperation. The RRG program’s sole focus on reeducation and the Indonesian police’s lack of attention to the guilt/loneliness element ignore the full power of psychological needs in changing behaviors. Remedying this may require the introduction of credible alternatives to the security of the in-group. Third, influence is either an untapped or unregulated commodity. Detainees in Singapore are not allowed to communicate with each other, negating any use of influence. Indonesian police manage the influence of subordinates but merely encourage the publicizing of reformed detainee’s thoughts. The use of peer influence with regard to the strength of the in-group is not addressed in either program. Finally, incentives are a powerful tool in generating and maintaining trust when strategically applied to that which the detainee values most. Each program over- or under-utilizes incentives to different respective extents; in Singapore the family care incentive is an unintended byproduct of external actions while Indonesia relies heavily upon incentives to the occasional detriment to the program’s goals. There is clearly a need to reach a controlled and moderated middle ground in each program.

The strengths and weaknesses of the RRG and Indonesian police’s programs should serve as guidance for other de-radicalization efforts. Designing a highly effective program would involve an interagency and closely controlled effort that addresses as many trust, influence, and ideological elements as is possible in the context. Such a program would include trust-building with the detainee as well as using him in follow-on actions to influence others where effective. To achieve the best construct of such programs, however, further study is needed of a range of topics. Better understanding of peer coalitions in de-radicalization settings is needed to gauge the influence that is present when detainees of equal status communicate during the rehabilitation process. Knowing more about detainees’ psychological needs, the incentives that can be offered to meet these needs, and the right mix and amount to administer would improve effectiveness. Finally, more study is needed regarding the relationship between de-
radicalization and counter-radicalization, as there is a largely untapped potential in using rehabilitated detainees to influence broader populations. Successes evident in the RRG and Indonesian police’s programs could only be amplified with a better understanding of these dynamics.
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